IR 05000336/2006010: Difference between revisions

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| issue date = 07/27/2006
| issue date = 07/27/2006
| title = IR 05000336-06-010, 05000423-06-010: 05/08/2006 - 06/16/2006: Millstone Power Station Units 2 and 3: Component Design Bases Inspection
| title = IR 05000336-06-010, 05000423-06-010: 05/08/2006 - 06/16/2006: Millstone Power Station Units 2 and 3: Component Design Bases Inspection
| author name = Doerflein L T
| author name = Doerflein L
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRS/EB2
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRS/EB2
| addressee name = Christian D A
| addressee name = Christian D
| addressee affiliation = Dominion Resources, Inc
| addressee affiliation = Dominion Resources, Inc
| docket = 05000336, 05000423
| docket = 05000336, 05000423
Line 18: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:
{{#Wiki_filter:July 27, 2006Mr. David A. Christian, Sr. Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Dominion Resources 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711SUBJECT:MILLSTONE POWER STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000336/2006010 AND 05000423/2006010
[[Issue date::July 27, 2006]]
 
Mr. David A. Christian, Sr. Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Dominion Resources 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711
 
SUBJECT: MILLSTONE POWER STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000336/2006010 AND 05000423/2006010


==Dear Mr. Christian:==
==Dear Mr. Christian:==
Line 36: Line 31:
2In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) com ponent ofNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
2In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) com ponent ofNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).


Sincerely,/RA/
Sincerely,
/RA/
Lawrence T. DoerfleinEngineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor SafetyDocket Nos.50-336; 50-423License Nos.DPR-65, NPF-49
Lawrence T. DoerfleinEngineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor SafetyDocket Nos.50-336; 50-423License Nos.DPR-65, NPF-49


===Enclosure:===
===Enclosure:===
Inspection Report 05000336/2006010 and 05000423/2006010
Inspection Report 05000336/2006010 and 05000423/2006010w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
 
===w/Attachment:===
Supplemental Informationcc w/encl:J. A. Price, Site Vice President, Millstone StationC. L. Funderburk, Director, Nuclear Licensing and Operations Support D. W. Dodson, Supervisor, Station Licensing L. M. Cuoco, Senior Counsel C. Brinkman, Manager, Washington Nuclear Operations J. Roy, Director of Operations, Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company First Selectmen, Town of Waterford R. Rubinstein, Waterford Library B. Sheehan, Co-Chair, NEAC E. Woollacott, Co-Chair, NEAC E. Wilds, Director, State of Connecticut SLO Designee J. Buckingham, Department of Public Utility ControlG. Proios, Suffolk County Planning Dept.


R. Shadis, New England Coalition Staff G. Winslow, Citizens Regulatory Commission (CRC)S. Comley, We The People D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN)
REGION IDocket Nos.50-336, 50-423License Nos.DPR-65, NPF-49 Report Nos.05000336/2006010 and 05000423/2006010 Licensee:Dominion Nuclear Connecticut Inc, Facility:Millstone Power Station, Units 2 & 3Location:Waterford, CT 06385 Onsite Dates:May 8-12, 2006 May 22-26, 2006June 5-9, 2006June 12-16, 2006Inspectors:L. Scholl, Senior Reactor Inspector, Team LeaderG. Meyer, Senior Reactor Inspector D. Johnson, Reactor Inspector T. Setzer, Project Engineer T. Sicola, Reactor Inspector R. Cooney, NRC Electrical Contractor D. Prevatte, NRC Mechanical ContractorS. Manzona, NRC Co-Op Student (trainee) Approved By:Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Enclosure
R. Bassilakis, CAN J. M. Block, Attorney, CAN P. Eddy, Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York P. Smith, President, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority J. Spath, SLO Designee, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority 3Distribution w/encl
: S. Collins, RA M. Dapas, DRA B. Sosa, RI OEDO D. Roberts, NRR V. Nerses, NRR E. Miller, NRR S. Schneider, SRI - MillstoneS. Kennedy, RI - MillstoneJ. Benjamin, RI - Millstone E. Bartels, OA - Millstone P. Krohn, BC, DRP S. Barber, SPE, DRP Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
ROPreports@nrc.gov A. Blough, DRS M. Gamberoni, DRS L. Doerflein, DRS L. Scholl, DRS DRS fileSUNSI Review Complete: LTD  (Reviewer's Initials
)DOCUMENT NAME: E:\Filenet\ML062090049.wpdAfter declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be released to the Public.To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box:
" C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure " E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure " N" = No copyOFFICER1/DRSR1/DRSR1/DRSR1/DRS NAMELLScholl/LLSWLSchmidt/WLSLTDoerflein/LTDPGKrohn/BSN forDATE07/21/0607/25/0607/27/0607/24/06OFFICENAMEDATEOFFICIAL RECORD COPY EnclosureU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IDocket Nos.50-336, 50-423License Nos.DPR-65, NPF-49 Report Nos.05000336/2006010 and 05000423/2006010 Licensee:Dominion Nuclear Connecticut Inc, Facility:Millstone Power Station, Units 2 & 3Location:Waterford, CT 06385 Onsite Dates:May 8-12, 2006 May 22-26, 2006June 5-9, 2006June 12-16, 2006Inspectors:L. Scholl, Senior Reactor Inspector, Team LeaderG. Meyer, Senior Reactor Inspector D. Johnson, Reactor Inspector T. Setzer, Project Engineer T. Sicola, Reactor Inspector R. Cooney, NRC Electrical Contractor D. Prevatte, NRC Mechanical ContractorS. Manzona, NRC Co-Op Student (trainee) Approved By:Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Enclosure


=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
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Opened050336/2006010-1URINRC to review consideration of EDG frequency affects on designbases calculations.050336/2006010-2URI NRC to review licensee evaluation of removal of check valve CS-26 internals.Opened and  
Opened050336/2006010-1URINRC to review consideration of EDG frequency affects on designbases calculations.050336/2006010-2URI NRC to review licensee evaluation of removal of check valve CS-26 internals.Opened and  
===Closed===
===Closed===
: None
None


===Closed===
===Closed===
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==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
Calculations/Engineering Analyses98-ENG-02621-M2, Determination of the Instrument Air Requirement for Certain Safety RelatedValves, Rev. 392-120,
Calculations/Engineering Analyses98-ENG-02621-M2, Determination of the Instrument Air Requirement for Certain Safety RelatedValves, Rev. 392-120,
: MP2-SWS Design Basis Alignments - Summer & Winter, Rev. 2
: MP2-SWS Design Basis Alignments - Summer & Winter, Rev. 2
: 96-018, Conversion of MP2 Service Water System
: DOS-Based Thermal Hydraulic Model toPROTO-FLOW, Rev. 003104-C-001, Evaluation of Condensation-Induced Waterhammer in RBCCW System, 05/22/03
: HI-971847,
: GL 96-06 RBCCW System Fluid Transient Analysis, 01/16/98
: HI-981906, Pressure Response in RBCCW System Following Late Pump Startup, 03/31/98HI-981951, Potential for Flashing in Millstone Unit 2 RBCCW System During Post Accident Operation, 01/13/99HI-982020, RBCCW System Fluid Analysis for Delayed Pump Start, 12/28/98
: 01-ENG-01884M3, MP3 Service Water Cubicle Internal Flooding Evaluation, Rev. 0
: PA-79-126-1027E2, Millstone Unit 2 EDG Loading, Rev. 2PA-91-019-0556E3, RSST, NSST & SBO Power Cables In Duct Banks, Rev. 1
: PA-90-050-077E3, SBO EDG Power Cable Sizing, Rev. 0
: 2-030-1311E2, Emergency Bus UV Setpoint Analysis, Rev. 1
: NL-026, Electrical Load on NSST & RSST, Rev. 3
: NL-040, UV Protective Relay System Relay Settings for Unit 3, Rev. 1
: NL-042, Degraded Voltage Protective System Relay Settings, Rev. 3
: MP2-ENG-ETAP 04014E2, Electrical Distribution System Analysis, Rev. 0
: MP3-ENG-ETAP 04125E3, Electrical Distribution System Analysis, Rev. 0
: 90-050-0410E3, Voltage Profile and Short Circuit Analysis for SBO EDG, Rev. 0
: SWEC 178E, 5 KV & 8 KV Power Cable Temperature Under Fault Conditions, Rev. 2
: PA-90-050-0308E3, SBO EDG Loading, Rev. 3
: 98-ENG-02132E2, MP2 Appendix R Load Calculation, Rev. 1
: A-3AttachmentSBO Bat-1208E3, SBO Battery Sizing, Rev. 0M3-EV-99-0114, Technical Evaluation for Unit 3 Control Building HVAC Heat Removal
: S-01759-S3, Emergency Switchgear Room Loss of Ventilation Analysis for Maintenance Rule,Rev. 089-078-873ES, Millstone Unit 2 Target Thrust/Torque Calculation for 2-CS-16.1A, 2-CS-16.1B, Rev. 2
: 89-078-890ES, Millstone Unit 2 MOV System and Functional Design Basis Review, Rev. 4PA-89-078 -272E2, MP2 MOV Voltage Drop Calculation, Rev. 0
: 89-078-01687M2, Millstone Unit 2 Required Stem Thrust Calculation for MOV 2-CS-16.1A and 2-CS-16.1B Using EPRI PPM Methodology, Rev. 0
: 89-078-1192M2, Millstone Unit 2 Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding Evaluation of GateValves, Rev. 098PL-02611-D-2, Valve 2-CS-16.1A/B Pressure Locking Modification and Air Space Sizing, Rev. 0
: 97-ENG-01840E2, MP2 Thermal Overload Relays for MOVs on Safety Related MCCs, Rev. 1
: 94102-C-03, Weak Link Seismic Assessment MOV 2-CS-16.1A/B, Rev. 5
: 97-169, MP2 RBCCW Design Basis Flow Distribution, Rev. 3
: 219-NP(B)-269-FB, Main Steam System Turbine Trip Stop Valve Closure (MSV 1,2,3,4), Rev. 089-094-02902M2, Millstone Unit 2 MOV Diagnostic Test Matrix, Rev. 396-ENG-1409M2, East DC Switchgear Room Loss of Cooling System F-54A, Rev. 2
: 96-ENG-1410M2, West DC Switchgear Room Loss of Cooling System F-54B, Rev. 1
: 97-ENG-01774-E2, Battery Sizing Calculation, Rev. 2
: K43-EV-99-0114, Actual MP3 Control Building HVAC Heat Removal Requirements
: NL-033, Millstone 3 Emergency Generator Loading and Starting KVA CalculationDesign DocumentsM3-99039, 4.16 KV Cross Tie
: MP2-MP3, Rev.
: CDM2-00-0283-04, 4.16 & 6.9 KV Circuit Breaker Closing Circuit Modification
: DM3-00-0657, SBO UPS Battery Replacement
: DCR M2-97037, Valves 2-CS-16.1 A & B Pressure Locking Modifications, Rev. 1DCN
: DM3-S-1047-94, MSIV (3MSS*CTV 27A, B, C, & D) Control Block Manifold ReplacementDCN
: DM3-01-0096-01, MSIV 3MSS*CTV27B and 3MSS*CTV27D Gasket Replacement, 05/09/01DCN
: DM3-00-1121-98, Train "B" MSIV Solenoid Replacement, 12/13/98DCN
: DM3-00-1119-98, MSIV Solenoid Valve Replacement, 12/11/98DCN
: DM2-01-0230-02, RBCCW Pumps Cartridge Seals, 07/29/04DCN
: DM2-00-1032-97, RBCCW Minimum Flow Recirculation Line - Orifice Replacement, 09/22/97Drawings25212-26904, Sht. 1, Chemical & Volume Control25212-26905, Sht. 1, Charging Pump Sealing and Lubrication
: 203-26005, Sht. 3, Condensate Storage and Aux. Feed
: 203-26002, Sht. 1, Main Steam From Generators
: 203-26015, Sht. 2, High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps
: A-4Attachment25212-26930, Sht. 2, Feedwater System25212-26923, Sht. 1, Main Steam and Reheat
: 212-26913, Sht. 2, High Pressure Safety Injection
: 991745, Sht. 1, Ingersoll-Dresser Pump Company HMTA Pump
: 500-849739, Pacific Pumps Division
: RL-IJ Charging Pump Drawing, Rev. 7
: 203-20150, Sht. 698, Containment Spray Test Hdr. To RWST HCD©), Rev. 825203-20071, Area 9, Piping Plan El. 14'-6", Sht. No. 2, 01/20/76
: D-72-253, Refueling Water Storage Tank For Bechtel Corporation, Rev. 10
: D-72-267, Details - Refueling Water Storage Tank For Bechtel Corporation, Rev. 8
: 203-26008, Sht. 2, Service Water, Rev. 84
: 203-26009, Sht. 7, Instrument Air System, Rev.14
: 203-26022, Sht. 1, RBCCW System, Rev. 44
: 203-26022, Sht. 2, RBCCW System, Rev. 25
: 203-26022, Sht. 3, RBCCW System, Rev. 14
: 203-26022, Sht. 4, RBCCW System, Rev. 23
: 203-26022, Sht. 5, RBCCW System, Rev. 25
: 203-26022, Sht. 6, RBCCW System, Rev. 15
: 212-27126, Sht. 1, Machinery Locations, Circulating & Service Water Pumphouse, Rev. 12
: 212-27128, Sht. 3, Machinery Locations, Circulating & Service Water Pumphouse, Rev. 10
: 212-24277, Sht. CW007A, Penetration Floor Mapwest , Intake Structure El. 14'-6", ServiceWater Pump Cubicle - West Room, Rev. 125212-24277, Sht. CW007B, Fire Stops & Seals Drawing, Intake Structure, Rev. 2
: 212-24277, Sht. CW007C , Fire Stops & Seals Drawing, Rev. 2
: 212-24277, Sht. CW007D, Fire Stops & Seals Drawing, Rev. 1
: 212-24277, Sht. CW008A, Penetration Floor Mapwest , Intake Structure El. 14'-6"Service Water Pump Cubicle - East Room, Rev. 125212-24277, Sht. CW008B, Fire Stops & Seals Drawing, Intake Structure, Rev. 1
: 212-24277, Sht. CW008C, Fire Stops & Seals Drawing, Rev. 1
: 212-24277, Sht. CW008D, Fire Stops & Seals Drawing, Rev. 1
: 212-24036, Fire Stops & Seals Map Locations, Rev. 3
: 212-29680, Sht. 7, Penetration Seals for Conduits, Sleeves, Cast, or Core Bored OpeningsUp To 5" Dia., Rev. 925212-29680, Sht. 8, Radiation, Air, Water and/or Fire Seal for Electrical Blockout Openings,Rev. 725212-29680, Sht. 9, Hydrostatic (Water) Seal for Electrical Ducts, Sleeves, or Conduits, Rev. 7
: 212-29680, Sht. 10, High Density S
ilicone Elastomer Fire, Air, and/or Radiation Seal forElectrical Blockout Openings, Rev. 725212-59079, Sht. 12, Water Screen Control Panel Schematic Diagram-Diff. Control 3SWT-PNLTSA, B, C, D, E, & F, Rev. V25212-59079, Sht. 15, Six-Model 45A Water Screens Arrg't of Control Panels, Rev. G
: 212-32001, Sht. 58D, RSST Breaker Control Circuit, Rev. 26
: 203-32002, Sht. 1, Unit 2 Main Feeder Breaker Control Circuit 22S3-24C-2 (302), Rev. 9
: 203-32002, Sht. 11, 4.16 kV Tie Feeder Breaker 24C-IT-2 (A304), Rev. 8
: 203-30001, Unit 2 Main Single Line Diagram, Rev. 23
: 203-30009, Unit 2 Main Single Line Meter and Relaying Diagram Bus 24E, Rev. 9
: 212-30001, Unit 3 Main Single Line and Phasing Diagram, Rev. 22
: 212-30018, Sht. 1, Bus 34C One Line Diagram 3ENS*SWG-A (-O), Rev. 34
: 212-30019, Sht. 2, Bus 34C One Line Diagram 3ENS*SWG-A (-O), Rev. 14
: A-5Attachment12179-EE-1Z, Bus 34A&B &AAC Diesel Generator One Line Diagram, Rev. 1212179-ESK-5BB, Elementary Diagram 4.16 KV NSST Circuit Breaker, Rev. 21
: 2179-ESK-5BD, Elementary Diagram 4.16 KV RSST Circuit Breaker, Rev. 26
: 2179-ESK-5BF, Elementary Diagram 4.16 Kv Bus Tie Circuit Breaker, Rev. 21
: 2179-EM-158A, SBO EDG Lube Oil, Rev. 9
: 2179-EM-158B, SBO EDG Diesel Cooling, Rev. 6
: 2179-EM-158C, SBO EDG Fuel Oil, Rev. 9
: 2179-EM- 158D, SBO EDG Air Starting, Rev. 9
: 2179-EM- 158E, SBO EDG Air Intake and Exhaust, Rev. 4
: 203-MP2-SFR, Figure 2.5-1, Safety Injection System, Rev. 6
: 212-29177, Sh. 101, Main Steam Isolation Valves Manifold Gaskets, 02/21/95
: 212-MP3-SFR, Figure 2.4-1, Main Steam System, Rev. 5
: 212-28723, Sht. 1-24, Logic Diagram - Emergency Load Sequencer Timing
: 203-28150, Sht. 1, 2A, 2B, 5A, 5B, Engineered Safety Logic
: 203-28115, Logic Diagram - CTMT Sump Recirc. Valves
: 203-30024, Single Line Diagram - 125VDC Emerg. & 120VAC Vital Sys
: 203-30107, Sht. 1 & 2, 125V CD Load Center Circuit Breaker Settings
: 203-30022, (DV10) 125 VDC & 120 VAC Distribution Panel Schedule, Sht. 10C, 10LA, 10P,11J, 11JA, 12C, 12Q, 12QA, 12T, 13M25203-35038, Sht. 56, Auxiliary Bldg.
: EL.14'-6" Lighting Panel Schedule Panel DO1125203-35038, Sht. 60, Auxiliary Bldg.
: EL.14'-6" Lighting Panel Schedule Panel DO2125203-35011, Lighting, Grounding & Comm. Plan, Aux. Bldg & Contain EL. (-) 45' -6"25203-35012, Lighting, Grounding & Comm. Plan, Aux. Bldg & Contain EL. (-) 55' -6" 25203-35013, Lighting, Grounding & Comm. Plan, Aux. Bldg & Contain EL. (-) 5' -0" 25203-35014, Lighting, Grounding & Comm. Plan, Aux. Bldg 14'-6" Cable Vault 25'-6"
: 203-35019, Lighting, Grounding & Comm, Aux. Bldg at EL. 36' -6"
: 203-28500, Sht. 53A&B,
: PT-102A Pressurizer Loop Diagram
: 203-28500, Sht. 54A&B,
: PT-102B Pressurizer Loop Diagram
: 203-28500, Sht. 56A&B,
: PT-102C Pressurizer Loop Diagram
: 203-28500, Sht. 57A&B,
: PT-102D Pressurizer Loop Diagram
: 203-29193, Sht. 1, Reactor Protective System Functional Diagram
: 203-29193, Sht. 6, Reactor Protective System Calibration & Indication Panel Schematic
: 203-29193, Sht. 8, Nuclear Instrumentation Reactor Protective System Cabinet Assy. FrontPanel Layout25203-29193, Sht. 11, Trip Unit Assembly Perspective
: 203-39069, Sht. 12-15, 21, 22, 24B, Reactor Protective System Schematic
: 203-39076, Reactor Protective System Bistable Trip Unit Schematic
: 203-39047, Sht.1-4,9-15, Safety Features Actuation System
: 212-32001, Sht. 1, Alternate A.C. Diesel Generator Breaker Control
: 203-32002, 4.16KV Main Feeder Breaker 34B-24E-2 Licensing DocumentsMPS-2 UFSAR Section 6.2, Refueling Water Storage Stank and Containment Sump, Rev. 22-3MPS-3 UFSAR Section 10.3, Main Steam System, Rev. 18-4
: MPS-2 UFSAR Section 9.4, Reactor Building Close Cooling Water System, Rev. 22-4
: TS 3/4.7.1.5, Main Steam Line Isolation Valves and Bases, 02/24/05TS 3/4.7.3, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System and Bases, 01/02/03
: A-6AttachmentTS 3/4.7.4, Service Water System and Bases, 02/13/03TS 3/4.7.11, Ultimate Heat Sink and Bases, 02/24/05LER 97-015-01, Performance Deficiency of Containment Air Recirculation Coolers During Design Basis Accidents (Response to Generic Letter 96-06), 06/10/99Ltr. B16104 to NRC, MP2 Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity DuringDesign Basis Accidents, 01/28/97Ltr. B16105 to NRC, MP3 Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity DuringDesign Basis Accidents, 01/28/97System Health Rating SheetsUnit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater - System 2322 - 1Q05Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater - System 2322 - 2Q05Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater - System 2322 - 3Q05Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater - System 2322 - 4Q05Unit 3 Auxiliary Feedwater - System 3322 - 1Q05Unit 3 Auxiliary Feedwater - System 3322 - 2Q05Unit 3 Auxiliary Feedwater - System 3322 - 3Q05Unit 3 Auxiliary Feedwater - System 3322 - 4Q05Unit 3 High Head Safety Injection - System 3308, 3330E - 1Q05
: Unit 3 High Head Safety Injection - System 3308, 3330E - 2Q05
: Unit 3 High Head Safety Injection - System 3308, 3330E - 3Q05
: Unit 3 High Head Safety Injection - System 3308, 3330E - 4Q05
: Unit 2 High Head Safety Injection - System 2308 - 1Q05
: Unit 2 High Head Safety Injection - System 2308 - 2Q05
: Unit 2 High Head Safety Injection - System 2308 - 3Q05
: Unit 2 High Head Safety Injection - System 2308 - 4Q05Miscellaneous DocumentsMemo
: TS2-97-530, M.F. Marino to R.C. Bonner, "Centrifugal Pump Minimum FlowRequirements," dated 12/15/97Memo
: MP3-TS-95-151, N.D. Hulme to M. Kupinski, "Recent Failures of Charging/SafetyInjection Pump Shafts," dated 03/09/95Memo
: SE-93-633, P.S. Higgins to File , "Millstone Unit No. 2 Pump Manufacturer'sRecommended Recirculation Flow Rates," dated 06/23/93Purchase Order 02126848
: Purchase Order 02138704
: Event Review Team Report, Millstone Unit 2 TDAFWP Failure, dated April 5, 2006Unit 2 List of Operator Work Rounds, Burdens and Distractions, 2004-2006
: Unit 3 List of Operator Work Rounds, Burdens and Distractions, 2004-2006
: Technical Requirements Manual (TRM)
: System Functional Requirements Manual (SFRM)
: NSE Report, Containment Fan Cooler Operations During a Design Basis Accident
: ACR M2-9600147, Potential Performance Deficiency of Containment Fan Cooler During DesignBasis Accident, 07/12/96NUCENG-06-39,
: Memorandum, S. A. Tomichik to Clint Gladding, Unit 2 and Site MarginManagement Issues, Rev. 2, 03/03/06
: A-7AttachmentAR
: 96029670, To File from F. W. Teeple, Potential Common-mode Post-Accident Failure ofContainment Coolers, 10/15/97AR
: 96026804, To File from J. M. Venable, Containment Fan Cooler Operations During a DesignBasis Accident, 09/23/96Reply to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Concerning Information Regarding the GenericLetter 96-05 Program at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 (TAC No. M97068), 05/24/99Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Conformance to Generic Letter 96-05 RevisedCommitments for MOV Periodic Verification Program, 02/11/99Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Schedule Change to Generic Letter 96-05 ProgramCommitment to Support Modified Risk Ranking Approach for Motor-Operated Valves,
: 2/21/2000Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Response to Request for Additional Information(TAC No. M97069) Regarding the Generic Letter 96-05 Program, 05/28/99Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Response to Generic Letter 96-05 PeriodicVerification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves, 11/15/96Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3 Supplemental Response to Request forAdditional Information Regarding the Generic Letter 96-05 Program (TAC Nos. M97068
and M97069), 03/14/00Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Revised Schedule - Commitments in Response toGeneric Letter 96-05 Safety-Related Motor Operated Valve Program, 08/13/97Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Response to Generic Letter 96-05 Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves, 03/17/97Valve Summary Report Millstone Unit 2, 2-MS-65A, 06/15/06Valve Summary Report Millstone Unit 2, 2-CS-16.1A, 05/31/06Valve Summary Report Millstone Unit 2, 2-CS-16.1B, 05/31/06Millstone Unit 2 Pump and Valve Inservice Testing Basis Document, Rev. 3, 05/08/03Operability Determination
: OD-MP3-041-01, 03/28/01CRED
: CR-04-03846, Rev. 1, 04/21/04
: CRED
: CR-04-03973, 04/24/04
: System Health Report, Unit 2 RBCCW System, Fourth Quarter 2005
: Memo,
: MP2-DE-98-0044, 02/06/98
: Technical Evaluation, M2-EV-98-0042, Evaluation of CAR Cooler Upper Flow Limit Millstone Unit2, Rev. 0, 02/12/98Technical Evaluation, M2-EV-00-0034, Analysis of RBCCW Thermal Relief Valve Lifting fromRBCCW Pump Restarts, Rev. 00, 05/26/00MPS2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model Notebook, Part III, Volume
: HR.4, Rev. 1,Supplemental Information for Human Failure Event AnalysisMPS3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model Notebook, Part III, Volume
: HR.2, Rev. 1 - HumanReliability Analysis, Post-initiator Human Failure Event Analysis
: EOP 2532, Loss of Coolant Accident Technical Guide, Rev. 24
: JPM-085, Job Performance Measure, Local Manual Operation of the Turbine Driven AuxiliaryFeedwater Pump, Rev. 9-1JPM-104, Job Performance Measure, Start the SBO Diesel, Rev. 2-3
: S2-EV-98-0314, Safety Evaluation for Fan 158 HELB Interlock Modification, Rev. 0
: A-8AttachmentM2-EV-03-0046, Technical Evaluation for Vital Switchgear Compensatory MeasuresOperability, Rev. 1MEPL Determination
: MP2-CD-3960, Temperature Switch
: TS-2019, 02/19/99
: Work Order M2-99-02529, Install and Test New Temperature Switch
: TS-2019, 03/15/99
: IEEE Std 485-1997, IEEE Recommended Practice for Sizing Lead-Acid Batteries for StationaryApplicationsNE-95-SB-359, Closeout of NRC
: IN 94-24Operating ProceduresAOP 3569, Severe Weather Conditions, Rev. 015-02OP 3335B, Reactor Plant Aerated Drains, Rev. 012-02
: OP-2347O, Backfeed Unit 2, Rev. 014-02
: OP-2315D, Vital Electrical Swgr Room Cooling, Rev. 012-04
: OP 2326A52, "B" RBCCW Heat Exchanger Maintenance Facility, 1 and 2, Rev. 000-00OP 2330A12, "A" RBCCW Pump Maintenance, Rev. 000-03
: EOP 2525, Standard Post Trip Actions, Rev. 20
: EOP 2530, Station Blackout, Rev. 9
: EOP 2532, Loss of Coolant Accident, Rev. 24
: EOP 2537, Loss of All Feedwater, Rev. 18
: EOP 2540, Functional Recovery, Rev. 21
: EOP 2540D, Functional Recovery of Heat Removal, Rev. 19
: EOP 2541, App. 1, Diagnostic Flowchart, Rev. 0
: EOP 2541, App. 6, TDAFW Pump Normal Startup. Rev. 0
: EOP 2541, App. 7, TDAFW Pump Abnormal Startup, Rev. 0
: EOP 2541, App. 14, Supplemental Cooling on Loss of Ventilation, Rev. 0EOP 2541, App. 23, Restoring Electrical Power, Rev. 0
: EOP 35 E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev. 22
: EOP 35
: ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, Rev. 20-1
: EOP 35
: ECA-0.3, Loss of All AC Power - Recovery with SBO Diesel, Rev. 9
: EOP 35 ECA 1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, Rev. 14
: EOP 35 ECA 1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, Rev. 15 (draft)
: EOP 35
: ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Rev. 21-1
: EOP 35
: FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Rev. 17
: EOP 35
: GA-25, Aligning SBO Diesel to Bus 34A or 34B, Rev. 1
: EOP 3501, Loss of All AC Power (Modes 5, 6, and Zero), Rev. 14-1
: EOP Basis Document for EOP E-0, Rev. 22
: EOP Basis Document for EOP ECA 0.0, Rev. 20-1
: EOP Basis Document for EOP ECA 0.3, Rev. 10
: EOP Basis Document for EOP ECA 1.1, Rev. 14
: EOP Basis Document for EOP
: ES-0.1, Rev. 21-1
: EOP Basis Document for EOP
: FR-H.1, Rev. 17
: OP 2260, Unit 2 EOP User's Guide, Rev. 9
: OP 2315D, Vital Electrical Switchgear Room Cooling Systems, Rev. 12-4
: OP 3346D, Station Blackout Diesel, Rev. 10-2
: A-9AttachmentProceduresMP 2703A11, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedpump Overhaul, Rev. 3 & 4NU-MP-1, Magnetic Particle Procedure Dry Particle Yoke Method, Rev. 13
: MP 3746XA, Charging Pump Maintenance, Rev. 005-05
: MP 2702G11, Fisher 480 Series Actuators with Lock-In-Last Position Device Maintenance, Rev.004-01MP-2719I,
: Air Start System, Rev. 3
: EN 21242, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System Facility 2 Flow Balance Verification,Rev. 001EN 21241, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System Facility 1 Flow Balance Verification,Rev. 001-01MP-08-LUB-SAP01, Lubrication Administration Guidance, Rev. 000-01
: MP 2702F8, Moisture Separator/Reheater Safety Valve Test, Rev. 6
: MP 2702F9, Crosby Style JMBU Auxiliary Relief Valve Overhaul, Rev. 2Tests - Surveillance, Modification, FunctionalSP 2604BO, HPSI Pump Inservice Testing, >1750 psia Facility 2, Rev. 000-01SP 2610BS, TDAFP Tests, Shutdown, Rev. 000-03
: SP 2610BO, TDAFP Tests, Operating, Rev. 000-02
: SP 3604A.2, Charging Pump B Operational Readiness Test, Rev. 013-08
: SP 3604A.5, Chemical and Volume Control System Valve Operability Test, Rev. 013-02SP 3622.1, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 3FWA*P1A Operational Readiness Test, Rev. 017-07SP 2604AR, HPSI High Flow IST Facility 1, Rev. 000-01SP 2604AR-001, 'A' HPSI High Flow IST MODE 6, Rev. 000-00, Performed 4/22/05
: SP 2604BR-002, 'B' HPSI High Flow IST MODE 6, Rev. 000-01, Performed 4/22/05
: SP 2604BR-002, 'C' HPSI High Flow IST MODE 6, Rev. 000-00, Performed 4/22/05SP 2604AO-001, 'A' HPSI Pump and Check Valve IST, Rev. 000-00, Performed 3/24/06
: SP 2604AO-002, 'B' HPSI Pump and Check Valve IST Facility 1, Rev. 000-00, Performed
: 3/23/06SP 2604BO-001, 'C' HPSI Pump and Check Valve IST, Rev. 000-00, Performed 3/10/06SP 2610B-001, TDAFP Operability Test and
: SV-4188 Stroke and Timing IST, Rev. 12,Performed 2/09/00SP 2610B-001, TDAFP Operability Test and
: SV-4188 Stroke and Timing IST, Rev. 12,Performed 5/29/00SP 2610B-001, TDAFP Operability Test and 2-MS-464 (SV-4188) Stroke and Timing IST, Rev. 13, Performed 10/17/01, 10/16/02, 12/10/
: 03, and 11/9/04SP 2610BO-001, 2-MS-464 (SV-4188) Stroke and Timing IST, Rev. 0, Performed 5/15/05 and
: 1/4/06SP 2610B-005, TDAFP High Flow Test (Mode 3), Rev. 0, Performed 5/29/00 and 11/25/03
: SP 2610BS-003, TDAFP High Flow Test (Mode 3), Rev. 000-01, Performed 5/17/05 and
: 04/07/06SP 2610B-004, TDAFP and Recirculation Check Valve IST, Rev. 000-06, Performed 5/29/02
: SP 2610B-004, TDAFP and Recirculation Check Valve IST, Rev. 000-07, Performed 8/22/02, 11/13/02, 1/08/03, 2/05/
: 03, 3/31/03, and 6/26/03SP 2610B-004, TDAFP and Recirculation Check Valve IST, Rev. 000-08, Performed 09/18/03, 11/24/03, 3/03/04, 5/26/
: 04, 8/18/04, and 11/09/04
: A-10AttachmentSP 2610BO-002, TDAFP and Recirculation Check Valve IST, Rev. 000-00, Performed 2/02/05, 5/16/05, 7/20/05, 10/12/
: 05, 1/09/06, 3/29/06, 4/07/06, and 4/26/06SP 3604A.2-001, 3CHS*P3B Operational Readiness Test (Two Charging Pumps Aligned forService), Rev. 015-03, Performed
: 11/17/04, 2/09/05, 7/26/05, and 11/15/05SP3604A.5-005, CVCS Check Valve Full Stroke Surveillance in Mode 6 or 0, Rev. 007-01,Performed 10/06/05SP 3622.1-002, Auxiliary Feed Pump 'A' Cold Shutdown Flow Test, Rev. 004-04, Performed
: 10/03/05SP 3622.1-001, Auxiliary Feed Pump 3FWA*P1A Operational Readiness Test, Rev. 013-03,Performed 12/12/05, 4/
: 19/05, 6/24/05 and 3/06/06SP 2606I, High Flow Inservice Testing of "A" CS Pump and Check Valves, Rev. 000-01,including completed Surveillance Forms from 05/06/02 through 05/24/05SP 2606J, High Flow Inservice Testing of "B" CS Pump and Check Valves, Rev. 000-01
: SP 2606A, Containment Spray Pump Operability and Inservice Testing Facility 1, Rev. 013-02SP 2604X, Instrument Air Accumulator Check Valve Test, Rev. 002-05, including test datasheets for tests performed on 4/9/05 and 10/22/03SP 2612C, Service Water Flow Path Verification and Valve Tests, Facility 1, Rev. 009-02,including data sheets for tests performed from 06/22/02 through 02/28/06SP 2612D, Service Water Flow Path Verification and Valve Tests, Facility 2, Rev. 010-01SP 2612B, "C" Service Water Pump Tests, Rev. 010-01, including data sheets from 6/14/02through 3/16/06SP 3626.4, Service Water Pump 3SWP*P1A Operational Readiness Test, Rev. 12-07
: SFP 17, Fire Penetration Seal and Barrier Inspections, Rev. 002-00, including data sheets forinspection performed on 11/7/01 and 1/8/03SP-2661, A EDG Overspeed Trip Test, Rev. 000-12
: SP-2613I,
: A EDG Loss of Load Test, Rev. 002-03
: SP-26130, A EDG Hot Restart, Rev. 000-00
: IC-3471 A01, SBO UPS Battery Test, Rev. 002
: IC-2429B, Safety Related Instrument Calibration-Shutdown
: SPROC ENG00-S-01, Millstone Unit 2-3 Cross Tie Test, Rev. 00SP 2605T, IST Leak Testing of 2-CS-16.1A/B, Rev. 000-01
: SP 2604G, Containment Sump, RWST Header Isolation and PP Min Flow Valves Stroke andTiming IST, Facility 1, Rev. 016-00SP 2604H, Containment Sump, RWST Header Isolation and PP Min Flow Valves Stroke andTiming IST, Facility 2, Rev. 016-00SP 21157, HPSI System and ECCS Suction Leakage Test, Rev. 006-01
: SP 3443E10, Train A ESFAS Time Response, Rev. 005-02
: SP 3443E20, Train B ESFAS Time Response, Rev. 004-05
: SP 3616A.1, Main Steam System Valve Operability Tests, Rev. 012-12SP 21156, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System Leakage Test, Rev. 003-01
: SP 2611A, "A" RBCCW Pump Tests, Rev. 010-01
: C
: SP 760, Battery Discharge Test, Rev. 001
: C
: SP 760-001, Battery
: DB1-201A Discharge Inspection, Rev. 001
: C
: SP 760-002, Battery
: DB2-201B Discharge Inspection, Rev. 001
: C
: SP 760-003, Battery
: DB3-201B Discharge Inspection, Rev. 001
: C
: SP 750-001, Unit 2 Tech Spec Battery Weekly Inspection, Rev. 001
: C
: SP 750-005, Unit 2-Non-Tech Spec Battery Weekly Inspection, Rev. 000
: C
: SP 750-003, Unit 3 Tech Spec Battery Weekly Inspection, Rev. 001
: A-11AttachmentC
: SP 750-006, Unit 3-Non-Tech Spec Battery Weekly Inspection, Rev. 001C
: SP 750-004, Unit 3 Battery Quarterly Inspection, Rev. 001
: C
: SP 750, Battery Weekly and Quarterly Surveillance, Rev. 001-07 C
: SP 750-002, Unit 2 Battery Quarterly Inspection, Rev. 001
: C
: SP 750-003, Unit 3 Tech Spec Battery Weekly Inspection, Rev. 001
: C
: SP 760-004, Battery DB4A Discharge Inspection, Rev. 001
: C
: SP 760-005, Battery 301A-1 Discharge Inspection, Rev. 001
: C
: SP 760-006, Battery 301A-2 Discharge Inspection, Rev. 001
: C
: SP 760-008, Battery 301B-2 Discharge Inspection, Rev. 001
: C
: SP 760-007, Battery 301B-1 Discharge Inspection, Rev. 001
: C
: SP 760-009, Battery 301C-1 Discharge Inspection, Rev. 001
: C
: SP 760-010, Battery 301D-1 Discharge Inspection, Rev. 001
: MP 3786AB, SBO Battery Inspectors and Equalize Procedure, Rev. 002-02
: SP 2402PC, Channel "C" SPEC 200 Safety Parameters Functional Test, Rev. 001-20
: SP 2402PB, Channel "B" SPEC 200 Safety Parameters Functional Test, Rev. 002-12
: SP 2402PD, Channel "D" SPEC 200 Safety Parameters Functional Test, Rev. 001-21
: SP 2402PA, Channel "A" SPEC 200 Safety Parameters Functional Test, Rev. 001-19
: SP 2403AB, Channel "B" ESAS ATI Functional Test, Rev. 002-05
: SP 2403AC, Channel "C" ESAS ATI Functional Test, Rev.002-05
: SP 2403AA, Channel "A" ESAS ATI Functional Test, Rev. 002-05
: SP 2403AD, Channel "D" ESAS ATI Functional Test, Rev. 002-05
: SP 2401J, Thermal Margin/Low Pressure Calculator Test (Test Computer Method), Rev. 013-05
: SP 2402BT, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter Calibration, Rev. 000
: SP 2402BR, Pressurizer Pressure Rack Calibration, Rev. 000
: SP 3646A.2-001, Emergency Diesel Generator B Operability Tests, Rev. 016-02
: SP 3646A.1-001, Emergency Diesel Generator A Operability Tests, Rev. 016-02SP 3448E11, Actuation Logic Test of EGLS Autotest System - Train A, Rev. 003-04
: SP 3448E31, Diesel Sequencer Actuation Logic Test, Rev. 006-02Vendor Manuals25203-365-010, Installation, Operation and Maintenance of Motor and Turbine Driven AuxiliaryFeedwater Pumps, Rev. 0225203-578-0011, Installation, Operation , Maintenance of Gate, Globe and Self-Actuated CheckValves (Valve 2-CS-26), Rev. 3Fisher Valves Vendor Manual - Series 480-12, -15, -16 Actuators, 03/73
: 203-343-001, Service Water Pump Installation, Operation, and Maintenance Manual, Rev. 2
: 203-013-001A, Diesel Generator Service Water Duplex Strainers, Rev. B
: 203-266-001, Fisher Type 9100 Butterfly Control Valve Body Instruction Manual, 02/72
: 203-266-001, Fisher Type 486D, 486U, and 486L Actuators Instruction Manual, 01/70
: 212-0790001A, Traveling Water Screens Vendor Manual, Rev. L
: 212-063-001, Installation, Operation, and Maintenance of Service Water Dual BackwashStrainers, Rev. 125212-414-001A, Screen Wash Pumps Vendor Manual, Rev. C
: 203-127-001, C&D Technologies, Inc, Vendor Technical Manual
: 2AttachmentWork OrdersM2-99-12710M2-98-11346
: M2-00-18176
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: M20006938
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: A-13AttachmentCorrective Action DocumentsM-06-00724
: M-06-03071 
: DM2-00-0304
: DM2-01-0304
: DM2-02-0304
: DM2-00-1684-98
: DM2-00-1690-98
: DM2-00-0149-99
: DM2-01-0149-99
: DM2-00-0864-99
: DM2-01-0864-99
: DM2-02-0864-99
: DM2-00-0898-99
: DM2-00-0972-99
: DM2-01-0972-99
: DM2-00-0348-00
: DM2-00-0362-00
: DM2-00-0168-01
: DM2-00-0399-05
: DM3-00-0116-03
: DM3-00-0227-05
: DM3-00-0045-06
: DM3-00-0059-06
: DM3-00-0232-01
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: M2-00-1163
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: M2-00-3424
: M2-00-1892
: MP2-070-04
: MP3-004-06
: MP3-002-06
: MP3-003-06
: CR-04-1065
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: CR-04-08225
: CR-04-08217
: CR-04-06949
: CR-04-06948
: CR-04-06935
: CR-04-06886
: CR-04-04854
: CR-04-04748
: CR-04-04098
: CR-04-03973
: CR-04-03846
: CR-04-01774
: CR-04-01667
: CR-04-01195
: CR-03-12351
: CR-03-10874CR-03-10784CR-03-08477
: CR-03-08173
: CR-03-04952
: CR-03-04485
: CR-03-02776
: CR-03-02711
: CR-03-02128
: CR-03-00015
: CR-02-12232
: CR-02-10597
: CR-02-10355
: CR-02-10112
: CR-02-10038
: CR-02-08961
: CR-02-08597
: CR-02-08515
: CR-02-08512
: CR-02-08509
: CR-02-08039
: CR-02-07097
: CR-02-06881
: CR-02-06839
: CR-02-06438
: CR-02-06352
: CR-06-05339
: CR-06-05453
: CR-06-05454
: CR-06-05562
: CR-06-05565
: CR-06-05592
: CR-02-04846
: CR-06-04938
: CR-03-03827
: CR-04-01312
: CR-04-03758
: CR-04-10525
: CR-05-09292
: CR-05-09454
: CR-04-00384
: CR-04-01038
: CR-06-04938
: CR-05-13357
: CR-05-14096
: CR-03-02317
: CR-03-02343
: CR-06-00700
: A-15Attachment
==LIST OF ACRONYMS==
USEDACAlternating CurrentAFWAuxiliary FeedwaterASMEAmerican Society of Mechanical Engineers
CCWComponent Cooling Water
CDBI[NRC] Component Design Bases InspectionCDFCore Damage Frequency
CFRCode of Federal Regulations
CREDCondition Report Engineering Disposition Form
CVCSChemistry and Volume Control System
CRCondition Report
CSContainment Spray
DCDirect Current
DCNDesign Change Notice
DCRDesign Change Request
ECCSEmergency Core Cooling System
EDGEmergency Diesel Generator
EOPEmergency Operating Procedures
FSARFinal Safety Analysis Report
GL[NRC] Generic LetterHPSIHigh Pressure Safety Injection
HzHertz
gpmGallons per Minute
HRAHuman Reliability Analysis
IMC[NRC] Inspection Manual ChapterIN[NRC] Information Notice
IP[NRC] Inspection ProcedureISTIn-service Testing
JPMJob Performance Measure
kVKilo Volts
LNPLoss of Normal Power
LOCALoss of Coolant Accident
LOOPLoss of Off-site Power
MDAFPMotor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater PumpMOVMotor Operated Valve
MSIVMain Steam Isolation Valve
NCV[NRC] Non-cited Violation
NEINuclear Energy Institute
NPSHNet Positive Suction Head
NRCNuclear Regulatory Commission
NSSTNormal Station Service Transformer
OEOperating Experience
P&IDPiping and Instrument Diagram
PI&RProblem Identification and Resolution
PORVPower Operated Relief Valve
PRAProbabilistic Risk AnalysisPTPressure Transmitter
A-16AttachmentRAWRisk Achievement WorthRBCCWReactor Building Closed Cooling Water
RCPReactor Coolant Pump
RG[NRC] Regulatory GuideRHRResidual Heat Removal
RRWRisk Reduction Worth
RSSTReserve Station Service Transformer
RWSTRefueling Water Storage Tank
SBOStation Blackout
SDPSignificance Determination Process
SGSteam Generator
SISafety Injection
SPSurveillance Procedure
SPARStandardized Plant Analysis Risk
SRASenior Reactor Analyst
SSCSystem, Structure, or Component
SWService Water
TBTechnical Bulletin
TBCCWTurbine Building Closed Cooling Water
TDAFPTurbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater PumpTSTechnical Specification
WOWork Order
UFSARUndated Final Safety Analysis Report
UPSUninterruptible Power Supply
URIUnresolved Item
VacVolts Alternating Current
VCTVolume Control Tank
VdcVolts Direct Current
}}
}}

Revision as of 14:24, 13 July 2019

IR 05000336-06-010, 05000423-06-010: 05/08/2006 - 06/16/2006: Millstone Power Station Units 2 and 3: Component Design Bases Inspection
ML062090049
Person / Time
Site: Millstone  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 07/27/2006
From: Doerflein L
Engineering Region 1 Branch 2
To: Christian D
Dominion Resources
References
IR-06-010
Download: ML062090049 (47)
v • d • e


Text

July 27, 2006Mr. David A. Christian, Sr. Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Dominion Resources 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711SUBJECT:MILLSTONE POWER STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000336/2006010 AND 05000423/2006010

Dear Mr. Christian:

On June 16, 2006, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection atthe Millstone Power Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection findings,which were discussed on June 16, 2006, with Mr. A. Jordan and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

In conducting the inspection, the team examined the adequacy of selected components andoperator actions to mitigate postulated transients, initiating events, and design basis accidents.

The inspection also reviewed Dominion's response to selected operating experience issues.

The inspection involved field walkdowns, examination of selected procedures, calculations and records, and interviews with station personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. However, alicensee identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is listed in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent withSection VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy because of the very low safety significance of the violation and because it is entered into your corrective action program. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspectors at the Millstone PowerStation.

2In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) com ponent ofNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Lawrence T. DoerfleinEngineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor SafetyDocket Nos.50-336; 50-423License Nos.DPR-65, NPF-49

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000336/2006010 and 05000423/2006010w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION IDocket Nos.50-336, 50-423License Nos.DPR-65, NPF-49 Report Nos.05000336/2006010 and 05000423/2006010 Licensee:Dominion Nuclear Connecticut Inc, Facility:Millstone Power Station, Units 2 & 3Location:Waterford, CT 06385 Onsite Dates:May 8-12, 2006 May 22-26, 2006June 5-9, 2006June 12-16, 2006Inspectors:L. Scholl, Senior Reactor Inspector, Team LeaderG. Meyer, Senior Reactor Inspector D. Johnson, Reactor Inspector T. Setzer, Project Engineer T. Sicola, Reactor Inspector R. Cooney, NRC Electrical Contractor D. Prevatte, NRC Mechanical ContractorS. Manzona, NRC Co-Op Student (trainee) Approved By:Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000336/2006010, 05000423/2006010; 05/08/2006 - 06/16/2006; Millstone Power StationUnits 2 and 3; Component Design Bases Inspection.This inspection was conducted by a team of five NRC inspectors and two NRC contractors. One Green licensee-identified finding, which was a non-cited violation (NCV), is included in this report. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red)using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP).

Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after

NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation ofcommercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process,"Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B.Licensee-Identified Violations

A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee has beenreviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This violation and corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

1.REACTOR SAFETYCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R21Component Design Bases Inspection (IP 71111.21).1Inspection Sample Selection ProcessThe team selected risk significant components and operator actions for review usinginformation contained in the Millstone Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and the U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR)model. Additionally, the Millstone Significance Determination Process (SDP) Phase 2Notebook, Revision 2, was referenced in the selection of potential components for review. In general, this included components and operator actions that had a risk achievement worth (RAW) factor greater than 2.0 or a Risk Reduction Worth (RRW)factor greater than 1.005. The components selected were located within both safetyrelated and non-safety related systems, and included a variety of components such asswitchgear, inverters, strainers, pumps, generators, transformers and valves. The components selected involved 15 Unit 2 and 3 plant systems and are discussed insection 1R21.2.An initial list of 100 components was created for each unit based on risk considerations. A margin assessment was then performed to narrow this down to 22 components for a detailed design review. The samples were evenly split between units 2 and 3. This design margin assessment considered original design issues, margin reductions due to modifications, or margin reductions identified as a result of material condition/equipment reliability issues. These included items such as failed performance test results,significant corrective action history, repeated maintenance, maintenance rule (a)(1)status, operability reviews for degraded conditions, NRC resident inspector input ofequipment problems, system health reports and industry operating experience. Consideration was also given to the uniqueness and complexity of the design and the available defense-in-depth margins. During the detailed design reviews, the team verified the design bases were correctly implemented for the selected components. An overall summary of the reviews performed and the specific inspection findings identified are included in the following sections of the report..2 Results of Detailed Reviews.2.1 Detailed Component Design Reviews.2.1.1Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2AFW-P4 (Unit 2)

a. Inspection Scope

The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFP) provides feedwater to the steamgenerators following the loss of main feedwater system and is the only auxiliary 2Enclosurefeedwater pump that is available during the loss of all alternating current (AC) power. The team conducted a walkdown of the pump and reviewed design documents, calculations, in-service testing (IST) criteria and results, vendor manuals, maintenance history, design changes and condition reports. The team interview ed system engineers,IST engineers, predictive maintenance engineers and operations personnel to gain an understanding of recent maintenance issues and the overall reliability of the pump. Theteam performed a detailed review of a March 29, 2006 event during which the pump failed when the outboard bearing overheated during a post-maintenance test. The teamalso reviewed the associated root cause evaluation (M-06-03071) and interviewed staff members involved in its development.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2.1.2 Containment Sump Outlet Header Isolation Motor Operated Valves (MOVs) 2-CS-16.1A/B (Unit 2)

a. Inspection Scope

The team evaluated MOVs 2-CS-16.1A and 2-CS-16.1B for adequacy of design andtheir ability to perform as required during transient and accident conditions. The teaminterviewed operators and the valve system engineer to gain an understanding of theoverall reliability of the valves. The team also performed a review of design changes,condition reports, calculations and test results associated with the valves.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2.1.3Service Water Pump 2SW-P5C (Unit 2)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected service water (SW) pump 2SW-P5C as a representative sample ofthe Unit 2 service water pumps. The team performed walkdowns of the service water and circulating water pumphouse areas, including the intake traveling screens that service both the circulating water and service water systems. The team also reviewedassociated design documents, calculations, in-service testing procedures and results, vendor manuals, maintenance histories, and condition reports; and interviewed the system engineers and design engineers for these systems.

b. Findings

The team identified an issue regarding the operation of the service water pumps at afrequency below 60 Hz, which could occur when the pumps would be powered from the emergency diesel generators (EDGs).

3EnclosureAt a given flow rate for a centrifugal pump, its developed head is proportional to its speed squared, which, for an AC induction motor drive, is directly proportional to its drive motor's power supply frequency. Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.a.3 specifies anallowable EDG frequency of 60 hertz, +/-1.2 hertz (+/- 2%). Therefore, when operated from the EDGs at the minimum TS allowed frequency, the pump developed head could be as much as 4% below that when powered from the grid at 60 Hz, as they are during surveillance tests. Additionally, the team noted that the Millstone Unit 2 EDG governorsare designed to control EDG speed (and therefore frequency) to within +/- 0.25% of the speed setpoint. The team questioned if this potential pump performance degradation should beaccounted for when establishing pump test acceptance criteria. This adjustment had not been made in the service water pumps' design basis calculations,92-120, "MP2 SWS Design Basis Alignments - Summer & Winter", Rev. 02 and 98-ENG-02697M2, "MP2 Service Water Pumps Acceptance Curve", Rev. 01, or surveillance test procedure, SP 2612B, "C Service Water Pump Tests", Rev. 010-01. However, the team verified that the actual service water pump performance was acceptable, by comparing the latest performance data for the worst performing pump, 2-SW-P5C, against the current acceptance criteria curve from calculation 98-ENG-02697M2, that the team adjustedupward by 4%. Additionally, the team also found that calculation 92-120, from which the acceptancecriteria curve in calculation 98-ENG-02696M2 was derived, included a 10% factor for "Model Uncertainties", which appeared to be a generic factor intended to be sufficiently large to encompass all uncertainties, including for test instrumentation. The team observed that if the actual instrumentation used for these tests had lower combineduncertainties than this generic factor, there could be sufficient margin in this factor to account for the frequency droop factor without changing current acceptance criteria. The extent to which EDG operating frequency should be accounted for in designcalculations is unresolved pending further NRC review (URI 05000336/2006010-01)..2.1.4Service Water Air Operated Valves 2-SW-3.2A/B (Unit 2)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected service water air-operated valves 2-SW-3.2A/B as a representativesample of the various air-operated components in the facility that perform safety-relatedfunctions. These specific valves perform the safety function of isolating the service water supply to the turbine building closed cooling water (TBCCW)system heatexchangers for any event that involves safety injection (SI) actuation or the loss of normal power (LNP). This action is necessary to assure that all safety-related components served by service water have adequate flow to satisfy their design basis requirements. The team performed walkdown inspections of these valves, reviewed associated design documents, calculations, in-service testing criteria and results, vendor manuals, maintenance histories, and condition reports; and interview ed the systemengineers and design engineers.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2.1.5Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) Pump 2RB-P11A (Unit 2)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected the A RBCCW pump as a representative sample of the three Unit 2RBCCW pumps. The team reviewed the system design basis flow and net positivesuction head (NPSH) calculations associated with the pump operation under various transient and accident conditions. The team also reviewed recent pump test results, condition reports, maintenance history, and conducted a walkdown of the pump with the RBCCW system engineer. In addition, the team interviewed the RBCCW systemengineer.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2.1.6Containment Spray (CS) System Check Valve 2CS-26 (Unit 2)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected the containment spray pump minimum flow check valve 2-CS-26 asrepresentative of components whose failure posed very high risk for core damage. The failure of this valve to open had the 5 th highest risk achievement worth of all PRA events. This valve is in the single common minimum flow return line to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) for the both divisions of the containment spray pumps, as well as for both divisions of the low pressure and high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps.

Its safety function is to open to provide a flowpath back to the RWST when any of these pumps operate in a minimum flow mode, and thereby to prevent pump degradation or failure as a result of low or no flow.

The team performed reviews of associated documents, including design drawings, vendor documents, calculations, a technical evaluation, condition reports, surveillance test procedures and results, and maintenancehistory documentation, and interviewed the system engineer and design engineer forthis system.

b. Findings

The risk associated with the failure of this valve and a related procedure concern wasidentified by the licensee in 2004 and documented in condition report CR-04-06286.

The CR recommended investigating the possibility of removing the valve's internals,thereby eliminating the risk, since no functional requirement, other than to open on demand, could be identified for this valve. The team noted that CR-04-06286 wassubsequently closed without documenting a bases for not removing the internals. In 5Enclosureresponse to the teams questions, the licensee issued two new CRs. CR-06-05264 was initiated to address the improper closure of the original 2004 CR, and CR-06-05010 was initiated to again recommend evaluation of removing the valve's internals. Notwithstanding, the licensee's position was that single failure of this valve was notrequired to be considered during the period where minimum flow capability might berequired based on a statement in failure modes and effects analysis for the safety injection system. Specifically, FSAR Section 6.3.4.1 states that, "Failure of internals,including check and stop valves, is a passive failure. Passive failures are considered in the recirculation phase only, no earlier than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after an accident." Also, the licensee stated that the containment spray system did not need to be single failure proofbecause the containment fan coolers provide a redundant containment heat removalmethod. The licensee also pointed out that an open flowpath through this valve wasdemonstrated during the performance of quarterly pump surveillance tests required bytechnical specifications (TS), and that the valve was disassembled and inspected every 18 months in accordance with the inservice test (IST) program.Because of the relatively high risk associated with the failure of this valve, this issue isunresolved pending additional NRC review, including an assessment of the licensee'sevaluation of permanent removal of the valve internals (URI 05000336/2006010-02)..2.1.7Electrical Bus 24E (Unit 2)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected Bus 24E as a representative sample of the Unit 2, 4.16 kV electricalbuses. This is a swing bus that can be supplied from either emergency bus 24A or 24B and provides power to the alternate SW, RBCCW, and HPSI pumps. This bus also is also used to provide power to Unit 2 from the station blackout (SBO) diesel generator. The team reviewed calculation MP2-ENG-ETAP-04014E2, which performed load flowand voltage studies, short circuit analysis and motor starting studies. The team also reviewed calculation 92-030-1311E2, Emergency Bus Undervoltage Setpoint Analysis, which calculates minimum allowable voltages to assure that the voltage exceeds the reset value of the degraded voltage relay. The team reviewed the operating procedure for the switchgear cooling system and walked down heat exchanger X-182, whichprovides cooling to the bus 24E switchgear room, to verify that any leaks in the cooling system would not impact the operation of the switchgear. The team also verified thatmeasures could be taken to return service water to the cooler in the event of an inadvertent isolati on caused by a moisture detector in the leak detection system.The team also reviewed relay coordination curves for the various bus tie and feedercircuit breakers to ensure that proper coordination exists between bus 24E and all ties to the bus.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.2.1.8Reserve Station Service Transformer (RSST) (Unit 2)

a. Inspection Scope

The Unit 2 RSST is a three winding transformer with a high voltage winding at 345 kVand low voltage windings rated at 6.9 kV and 4.16 kV. The 4.16 kV winding supplies the emergency buses and the 6.9 kV winding supplies balance of plant large loads.The team reviewed MP2-ENG-ETAP-04014, Attachment AH, that provides a summaryof the loads on the transformer. The team reviewed the protective relaying for the transformer, including the differential relaying and over current relaying on the 345 kV winding, and phase and ground over current on the secondary sides. The team also reviewed preventive maintenance work orders including those associated with oil sampling analysis. Condition reports associated with the RSST were also reviewed to ensure the issues had been appropriately addressed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.2.1.9125 Vdc Bus 201B and Battery DB2-201B (Unit 2)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected the Unit 2 125 volt direct current (Vdc) Bus 201B and "B" Battery asa representative sample of the Unit 2 DC system. The team conducted a walkdown ofthe battery and switchgear rooms, and a review of calculations and changes, testing criteria and results, vendor manuals, maintenance history, work packages and condition reports. The team interviewed system engineers, design engineers and operationspersonnel to assess the licensee's evaluation and corrective actions for recent margin and performance issues and to assess the overall reliability of the DC system.

b. Findings

A licensee identified violation associated with the battery is documented in Section4OA7 of this report.

.2.1.1 0 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 15G-12U (Unit 2)

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed calculation PA-79-126-1027-E2, MP2 Emergency Diesel Generator(EDG) Loading Calculation, to determine the maximum load on the Unit 2 EDGs. The team assessed the adequacy of the designs for the EDG output breaker and support 7Enclosuresystems by reviewing the logic and the schematic diagrams for the output breaker(A312) as well as piping and instrumentation drawings (P&IDs) for various support systems including fuel oil, lubrication oil, starting air, jacket water cooling. The teamalso reviewed SPROC ENG00-S-01, Millstone 4.16 kV Cross Tie Test, and verified theelapsed time to perform the test was within the design assumptions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2.1.11 Pressurizer Pressure Transmitters PT-102A/B/C/D (Unit 2)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected the pressurizer pressure transmitters PT-102A/B/C & D as arepresentative sample of Unit 2 instrumentation systems with inputs to the reactorprotection system. The team conducted a walkdown of the instrumentation switchgear,control room panels and indications, and reviewed circuit and functional logic diagrams, testing criteria and results, work packages and condition reports. The team interviewed system engineers, design engineers and operations personnel to gain an understandingof performance issues and the overall reliability of pressurizer pressure transmitters.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.2.1.12 Service Water Strainers 3SWP*STR1A/B/C/D (Unit 3)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected service water strainers 3SWP*STR1A/B/C/D for review. Thesesafety-related components are located immediately downstream of the service water pumps and provide filtration of particulate from the service water flow streams prior to their distribution to various safety-related and non-safety-related heat exchangers. The strainers were selected, in part, to allow an assessment of the licensee's resolution of a history of significant design, maintenance, and manufacturing quality control issues.

The team performed walkdowns of the strainers, reviewed test procedures, design documents, maintenance work orders, condition reports, and vendor documents, and conducted interviews wit h the system engineer. The team also reviewed corrective actions taken and planned to improve the reliability ofthe intake structure cathodic protection system, which is designed to prevent corrosionin the intake structure components and structures, including the safety-related service water system components.

8EnclosureThe team reviewed several aspects of the flooding protection of the service water pumphouse for the design basis flood. The assessment included walkdowns, interviews with the associated system engineers, and reviews of design, inspection, and operatingprocedures, condition reports, and calculations.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2.1.13 Traveling Screen 3SWT*SSC1A (Unit 3)

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed traveling water screen 3SWR-SSC1A as an example of equipmentthat, though classified as non-safety, had the potential in case of its failure to cause the cascading failure of critical safety-related equipment. The failure of the traveling screen to perform its design function, removing medium-sized mechanical contaminates from the circulating and service water flow stream from the ultimate heat sink, Long Island Sound, could have the potential to overwhelm the associated service water strainer,thereby preventing the associated service water system division from providing therequired cooling water flow to both its safety-related and its non-safety-related heat exchangers. Structural failure of a traveling screen would have the potential to not only negate its design function, but also impact the structural and therefore functional integrity of the associated service water pump. The team's review included walkdowns, review of vendor documents, design documents, condition reports, and maintenance work history documents and interviews with the system engineer. The review was also extended to the supporting non-safety-related screen wash and instrument air systems,whose functions were necessary for the proper operation of the traveling screens.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2.1.14 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 3FWA*P1A (Unit 3)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected the motor driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump P1A (MDAFP) as arepresentative sample of a Unit 3 AFW system component. The team conducted awalkdown of the pump, and reviewed permanent modifications, in-service testing criteria and results, vendor manuals, maintenance history, temporary design changes and condition reports. The team interview ed system engineers, IST engineers, predictivemaintenance engineers, and operations personnel to assess the licensee's resolution of recent maintenance issues and the overall reliability of the pump.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2.1.15 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) 3MSS*CTV27A (Unit 3)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected the A MSIV and its associated isolation logic as a representativesample of MSIVs installed in Unit 3. The team interviewed the valve system engineerand performed a review of design changes, engineering evaluations, condition reports, calculations, and test results associated with the valve.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2.1.16 Charging Pump 3CHS*P3B (Unit 3)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected charging pump P3B as a representative sample a Unit 3 chemicaland volume control system (CVCS) component. The team conducted a walkdown of thepump, and a review of work orders, calculations, in-service testing criteria and results, vendor manuals, maintenance history, design changes and condition reports. The team interviewed system engineers, IST engineers, predictive maintenance engineers andoperations personnel to gain an understanding of recent maintenance issues and the overall reliability of the pump. The team focused on the January 24, 2006, event whenthe P3B charging pump shaft sheared during a surveillance test run. The team alsoreviewed the root cause evaluation (M-06-00724) and interviewed personnel involved in its development.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2.1.17 Station Blackout (SBO) Diesel Generator 3BGS-BG-A (Unit 3)

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the capability of the SBO diesel generator to provide an alternate ACpower source to Unit 2 or Unit 3. The team reviewed calculation PA-090-050-00308E3, Station Blackout Diesel Generator Loading, to verify that the SBO generator's capacitywas sufficient to provide power to either unit during a station blackout event and to supply power for safe shutdown following a fire. The team also reviewed calculation 90-050-00097E3, SBO Diesel Generator Power Cable, to assure that the power to Unit 2 would not be limited by the cable which was installed by plant modification DCR M3-99039. The cable sizing review included assuring that the cable was adequate to 10Enclosurewithstand a short circuit condition without exceeding its temperature limit. The teamalso reviewed the SBO diesel support system designs, including the lube oil system,engine cooling system, fuel oil system, air start system, air intake and exhaust, and theenclosure air conditioning, ventilation and heating. The team also reviewed the adequacy of the on-site fuel oil storage capabilities.The team reviewed several condition reports associated with the SBO diesel to assessthe adequacy of the licensee's resolution of the issues. The team also reviewed actions taken by the licensee as a result of NRC Information Notice 97-21, Availability of AC Power Source Designed for Station Blackout Event.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2.1.18 Inverter 3VBA*INV-1 (Unit 3)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected the Unit 3 DC/AC inverters and battery chargers. The teamconducted a walkdown of the battery and switchgear rooms, and a review of calculations and changes, testing criteria and results, vendor manuals, maintenance history, work

packages and condition reports. The team interviewed system engineers, designengineers and operations personnel to gain an understanding of recent margin and performance issues and the overall reliability of inverters and battery charger systems.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2.1.19 Emergency Diesel Generator 3EGS*EG-A (Unit 3)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected the A EDG. The team conducted a walkdown of the EDG spacesand support systems, and conducted interviews with system engineers, designengineers and operations personnel. The team reviewed EDG loading calculations and changes, testing criteria and results, electrical diagrams, work packages and condition reports, as well as surveillance and maintenance history.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

11Enclosure.2.1.20 DC Panel/3BYS*PNL-301A-1 /Battery 3BYS*BAT-1 (Unit 3)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected the DC panel 301A/B and Batteries 301A-1/301B-1 as arepresentative sample of the Unit 3 DC electrical system. The team conducted awalkdown of the battery and switchgear rooms, and a review of calculations and changes, testing criteria and results, vendor manuals, maintenance history, work

packages and condition reports. The team interviewed system engineers, designengineers and operations personnel to gain an understanding of recent margin and performance issues and the overall reliability of DC electrical system.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2.1.21 Electrical Bus 34C (Unit 3)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected bus 34C as a representative sample of the Unit 3 AC powerdistribution system 4.16 kV buses. Bus 34C is normally supplied from the reservestation service transformer and can also be powered by EDG A when the normal source of power is unavailable. Bus 34C supplies 480 volt emergency buses 32U, 32V, 32W and 32X and several large pump motors.The team reviewed the electrical distribution analysis that was performed using ETAPPower Station software and documented in calculation MP3-ENG-ETAP-04125E3. The calculation analyzed various plant configurations such as RSST feed, and normal station service transformer (NSST) feed and loading conditions for both operating and shutdown modes. The review included the assumptions, inputs and results of the load flow and voltage profile study, short circuit analyses, motor starting analyses, and the SBO DG voltage profile. The team also reviewed engineering evaluations for conditions not meeting the acceptance criteria in the calculation. The team reviewed calculationNL-042 which established the degraded voltage protection scheme relay settings and verified that the steady state voltages in the system analyses remained above the valueof the minimum reset value for all buses. The team reviewed the relay coordination curves and settings for bus 34C supply and tiebreakers. Schematic diagrams for the breaker feeding the bus from the RSST and for the tie breaker to bus 34A were reviewed to verify the adequacy of the design.

The team also reviewed the circuit breaker maintenance program and implementing procedures as well as selected surveillance procedures, including those for the busundervoltage channel calibration. The team also verified the licensee had a program for monitoring circuit breaker performance to ensure the breaker operation is not adversely impacted by hardened lubricants.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2.1.22 Diesel Sequencer 3RPS*PNLESCAm (Unit 3)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected the Unit 3 emergency diesel generator sequencers. The teamconducted a walkdown of the EDG's and associated control panels. The team reviewed EDG loading calculations and changes, sequencer testing criteria and results, logic and electrical diagrams, work packages and condition reports. The team interviewed systemengineers, design engineers and operations personnel to review the design adequacy of

the sequencer system.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2.2Review of Low Margin Operator ActionsThe team assessed manual operator actions and selected a sample of six operatoractions for detailed review based upon risk significance, time urgency, and factors affecting the likelihood of human error. The operator actions were selected from a PRA ranking of operator action importance based on RAW and RRW values. The non-PRA considerations in the selection process included the following factors:*Margin between the time needed to complete the actions and the time availableprior to adverse reactor consequences*Complexity of the actions

  • Reliability and/or redundancy of components associated with the actions*Extent of actions to be performed outside of the control room
  • Procedural guidance
  • Training.2.2.1Align To Unit 3 Station Blackout (SBO) Diesel for AC Power (Unit 2

)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected the operator actions to align the Unit 2 electrical distributi on syst emto receive AC power from the Unit 3 SBO diesel for review. Unit 3 has an SBO diesel generator which can supply AC power under loss of all AC power conditions (i.e., station blackout), and Unit 2 has the capability to align to Unit 3 busses to receive AC powerfrom the Unit 3 SBO diesel generator. These operator actions would be performed under the emergency operating procedures (EOPs). The failure of these actions could result in continued loss of all AC power, and without subsequent recovery of offsite power, could result in core damage.

13EnclosureThe team reviewed EOPs which specify the control room operator actions to align theUnit 2 electrical busses, and observed a demonstration of these actions in the simulator under SBO conditions. The team interviewed licensed operators and trainers regarding the difficulty of associated actions, the training provided on these actions, and the knowledge level necessary for successful completion. Also, the team walked down the applicable electrical equipment in the field. The team evaluated the capability toperform these actions from outside the control room. The team reviewed human error analyses and evaluations related to the time available prior to adverse consequences.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2.2.2Provide Alternate Cooling to 125 Vdc Switchgear Rooms (Unit 2)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected the manual personnel actions to provide alternate cooling to the eastand/or west 125 Vdc switchgear rooms for review. These actions would be performed following loss of ventilation to these rooms, including loss-of-offsite power and station blackout, to prevent the malfunction of the DC breakers and controls located in these rooms. Malfunctions of the DC electrical equipment would adversely affect numerous other safety-related systems. The alternate cooling actions involve opening applicabledoors and installing temporary fans for loss of ventilation, and involve opening doors forloss of power conditions.The team evaluated procedural guidance for providing alternate cooling under loss ofAC power conditions (i.e., emergency operating procedures) and loss of ventilation conditions (i.e., operating procedures), and interviewed licensed operators and trainers regarding the difficulty of associated actions, the training provided on these actions, and the knowledge level necessary for successful completion. The personnel noted that the loss of ventilation aspects are periodically implemented as part of routine maintenance.

The team inspected the switchgear rooms and temporary ventilation fans stored in the vicinity, and walked through the procedures with an operator to evaluate factors potentially affecting successful completion. The team reviewed human error analyses and room heatup calculations to evaluate the time available prior to adverse consequences.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..2.2.3Manually Initiate Turbine-Driven AFW Pump (Unit 2)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected the manual operator actions to initiate the turbine-driven AFW pump,both manually in the control room or locally in the turbine AFW pump room, for review.

14EnclosureThese actions would be performed under the EOPs following reactor events in which thefeedwater system and motor-driven AFW pumps were insufficient to provide coolingwater to the steam generators (SGs). Failure to provide SG cooling water could lead to loss of core cooling. There is no automatic actuation of the turbine AFW pump. Thelocal actions would be performed under the EOPs if DC power was lost.The team reviewed EOPs which specify the control room and local operator actions toinitiate the turbine AFW pump. The team observed a demonstration of these actions in the simulator under post-trip conditions, and interviewed licensed operators and trainers regarding the difficulty of associated actions, the training provided on these actions, and the knowledge level necessary for successful completion. Also, the team walked down the applicable equipment in the field and walked through the procedural steps with a licensed operator. The equipment operators have been trained on the steps to be performed locally to start the pump, and the team reviewed the job performance measure (JPM) used to periodically evaluate the equipment operators' knowledge. The team evaluated the factors, including exhaust ventilation, which would affect the operators' ability to perform the actions in the turbine AFW pump room. The teamevaluated the capability to perform these actions from the remote shutdown panels. The team reviewed human error analyses and evaluations related to the time available prior to adverse consequences.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2.2.4Once-Through-Cooling of the Reactor (Unit 2)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected the operator actions to initiate once-through-cooling of the reactor forreview. These actions would be performed by the reactor operators under the EOPs when core cooling via the SGs is no longer effective, and involve initiating/confirming safety injection and opening the power operated relief valves (PORVs), i.e., a direct feed path and a direct bleed path.The team reviewed EOPs which specify the control room operator actions to initiateonce-through-cooling. The team interviewed licensed operators and trainers regarding the difficulty of associated actions, the training provided on these actions, and the knowledge level necessary for successful completion. The team observed a demonstration of these actions in the simulator under post-trip conditions. Also, the team evaluated the capability to perform these actions from the remote shutdownpanels. The team reviewed human error analyses and evaluations related to the time available prior to adverse consequences

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

15Enclosure.2.2.5 Establish Feed and Bleed Cooling of the Reactor (Unit 3)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected the operator actions to initiate feed and bleed cooling of the reactorfor review. These actions would be performed by the reactor operators under the EOPs when core cooling via the SGs is no longer effective, and involve initiating/confirming safety injection and opening the PORVs, i.e., a direct feed path and a direct bleed path.The team reviewed EOPs which specify the control room operator actions to initiate feedand bleed cooling and the associated basis documents. The team interviewed licensed operators and trainers regarding the difficulty of associated actions, the training provided on these actions, and the knowledge level necessary for successful completion. The team observed a demonstration of these actions in the simulator under post-trip conditions. Also, the team evaluated the capability to perform these actionsfrom the remote shutdown panels. The team reviewed human error analyses and evaluations related to the time available prior to adverse consequences.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2.2.6Start and Align the Station Blackout Diesel Generator (Unit 3

)

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected the operator actions to start and align the SBO diesel generator forreview. Unit 3 has an SBO diesel generator which can supply AC power during a station blackout.

These operator actions would be performed under the EOPs. The failure of these actions could result in continued loss of all AC power, and without subsequent recovery of offsite power, could result in core damage.The team reviewed EOPs which specify the control room licensed operator and localequipment operator actions to start the SBO diesel generator and align its output to vitalelectrical busses, and observed a demonstration of these actions in the simulator under SBO conditions. Also, the team walked through the applicable actions at the SBO diesel with t he system engineer, a licensed operator, and an equipment operator, andwalked through the procedural steps at the applicable breakers in the field with a licensed operator.

The team interviewed licensed operators and trainers regarding the difficulty of associated actions, the training provided on these actions, and the knowledge level necessary for successful completion. Further, equipment operators have been trained on the steps to be performed locally to start the SBO diesel generator, and the team reviewed the JPM used to periodically evaluate the equipmentoperators' knowledge. The team evaluated the capability to perform these actions fromoutside the control room. The team reviewed human error analyses and evaluations related to the time available prior to adverse consequences.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..3Review of Industry Operating Experience (OE) and Generic Issues

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed selected operating experience issues that had occurred at domesticand foreign nuclear facilities for applicability at Millstone Units 2 and 3. The teamperformed an independent applicability review and selected issues apparent applicable to Millstone for a detailed review to verify that the licensee had taken appropriateactions. The team performed a detailed review of the following OE issues..3.1NRC Information Notice (IN) 92-64, Nozzle Ring Settings on Low Pressure Water-ReliefValves (Unit 2)The team reviewed the licensee's assessment of the potential of improper maintenanceto adversely affect low pressure water relief valves. The team reviewed associated maintenance procedures and the failure history of valves that were susceptible to the problem. A sample of condition reports associated with relief valve issues were also reviewed to verify that the problems identified in the IN had not occurred..3.2NRC Bulletin 88-04, Pump Minimum Flow Cooling (Unit 2)The team reviewed the potential loss of safety-related pumps due to two conditions:dead-heading of a weaker pump through a common minimum flow line and inadequate minimum flow capacity for single pump operation. The areas reviewed included procedural changes and internal memos written to limit the safety-related pump operation on minimum flow to less than 30 minutes..3.3NRC Information Notice (IN) 96-45, Potential Common Mode Post-Accident Failure ofContainment Coolers (Unit 2 & 3)The team reviewed the potential for post-accident water hammer to cause failure of thecontainment coolers, including their piping and supports. This concern was also addressed in Generic Letter 96-06. The licensee evaluated both units for this concern and found that the potential for such failures existed in Unit 2, but that it did not exist inUnit 3, because the containment fan coolers were not used for post-accident containment pressure control in Unit 3. Licensee Event Report 97-015-00 addressed Unit 2 corrective actions, which included RBCCW (cooling source) system designmodifications and procedure revisions. The team reviewed licensee correspondence on the subject, a related Nuclear Safety Engineering Report, Condition Report M2-96-0146, RBCCW design drawings, and five related calculations, and discussed corrective actions with the responsible design engineer. Although the LERs were observed to have addressed the RBCCW piping and supports only and not addressed the water hammer effects on the cooler units themselves, the team's review of the calculations 17Enclosureverified that the containment coolers had been adequately analyzed and shown to becapable of withstanding the water hammer loads and stresses..3.4NRC Information Notice (IN) 94-76, Failure of Charging/Safety Injection Pump Shafts(Unit 3)The team reviewed the potential failures of centrifugal pumps used in charging andsafety injection pump applications. The team reviewed the Millstone Unit 3 pumpperformance history and discussed the issue with system and design engineers. Themethod and frequency of vibration monitoring were also reviewed, as well as the most recent vibration data for the charging pump..3.5NRC Generic Letter (GL) 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design Basis Capability ofSafety-Related Motor-Operated Valves (Unit 3)The team reviewed the testing of MOVs to address degradation that could result in (1)the increase in thrust or torque requirements to operate the valves and

(2) the decrease in the output capability of the motor actuator. The team reviewed the licensee'sresponse to the generic letter and technical evaluations related to the issue. The team also interviewed the MOV program owner..3.6NRC Information Notice (IN) 93-95, Storm-Related Loss of Offsite Power Events Due toSalt Buildup on Switchyard Insulators (Unit 3)The team reviewed the licensee's actions to address salt buildup on switchyardinsulators. The licensee has applied a coating (Sylgard) to switchyard insulators at Millstone. The team reviewed CR M3-97-3073 addressing coating degradations andCR-04-10718 addressing periodic replacement of the insulators..3.7NRC Information Notice (IN) 94-24, Inadequate Maintenance of Uninterruptible PowerSupplies and Inverters (Unit 3)The team reviewed the potential for inadequate maintenance of uninterruptible powersupplies (UPS) and inverters. The team reviewed the licensee's evaluation of the IN,corrective actions implemented as a result of the evaluation, and maintenance and tests performed on the UPS and inverters.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

18Enclosure4.OTHER ACTIVITIES4OA2Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R)

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a sample of problems that were identified by the licensee andentered into the corrective action program. The team reviewed these issues to verify an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to design or qualification issues. In addition, condition reports written on issues identified during the inspection were reviewed to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem into the corrective action system. The specific corrective action documents that were sampled and reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.4AO6Meetings, Including ExitExit Meeting SummaryOn June 16, 2006, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. A. Jordan, Director -Operations and Maintenance, and other members of the Dominion staff. The teamverified that no proprietary information is documented in the report.4AO7Licensee-Identified ViolationsThe following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by thelicensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI ofthe NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as an NCV.Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems Criteria V, "Instructions, Procedures and Drawings," of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.

Contrary to this requirement, plant personnel replaced 40 watt bulbs in the Unit 2 125 Vdc lighting system with 300 watt bulbs which was not consistent wit h system drawingspecifications. The higher wattage bulbs resulted in a significantly higher load on the safety-related batteries. Upon identification of the issue, the licensee confirmed the affected lighting was not credited for use during a fire safe shutdown event and then de-energized the circuits to prevent an adverse impact on the battery. A root cause evaluation was being performed to determine if any additional corrective actions were warranted. This issue was determined to be more than minor because it affected the configuration control attribute of the mitigating system cornerstone objective to ensure 19Enclosurethe availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Theinspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance because preliminary licensee evaluations determined that the additional load on the battery wouldnot have prevented t he system from supplying sufficient voltage to the most limiting load on the systems during accident conditions. The licensee has entered this issue into thecorrective action program (CR-06-05202).

ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

A. Chyra Probabilistic Risk AssessmentJ. ArmstrongFire Protection Engineer

D. AubeSupervisor - Electrical/I&C Systems and Standards

P. BandaruDesign Engineer

W. Bellows Inservice Testing Engineer

K. Cyr Electrical System Lead Engineer

K. DeslandesSupervisor - Electrical & I&C Engineering

G. FilippidesI&C Lead Engineer

G. GardenerDesign Engineer

T. KinneyMaintenance Supervisor

N. KuzelInspection Response Coordinator

P. L'HeureuxSupervisor - Mechanical Systems and Standards Group

M. LeggDesign Engineer

M. MarinoDesign Engineer

A. NicoteraPredictive Maintenance Engineer

N. Nowland Inspection Response Coordinator

G. OlsonShift Manager

R. Patel Design Engineer

D. Smith Engineering Manager

H. ThompsonSystem Engineer

R. VanstreenbergerMOV Program Engineer

K. Wallace Design Engineer

R. Wells Design Engineer

J. YoungShift Technical Advisor NRC Pers onnelW. Schmidt, Senior Reactor Analyst
S. Schneider, Senior Resident Inspector
S. Kennedy, Resident Inspector
J. Benjamin, Resident Inspector

A-2Attachment

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened050336/2006010-1URINRC to review consideration of EDG frequency affects on designbases calculations.050336/2006010-2URI NRC to review licensee evaluation of removal of check valve CS-26 internals.Opened and

Closed

None

Closed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Calculations/Engineering Analyses98-ENG-02621-M2, Determination of the Instrument Air Requirement for Certain Safety RelatedValves, Rev. 392-120,

MP2-SWS Design Basis Alignments - Summer & Winter, Rev. 2
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