ML080420566

Review Team Findings with Respect to Inattentive Security Officers at Peach Bottom

ML080420566
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	02/06/2008
From:	Collins S Region 1 Administrator
To:	Mallett B NRC/EDO
Mallett, Bruce S.
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ML080420580	List: ML080420474 ML080420566
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Download: ML080420566 (27)

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Review Team Findings with Respect to Inattentive

Peach BottomFebruary 11, 2008

Peach Bottom Review Team FindingsBASIS AND SCOPEIn December 2007, the U.S. NRC's Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs tasked an independent team to review and evaluate activities associated with inattentive security o~cers identied at the Peach Bottom Nuclear Station in September 2007. e team was overseen by the Region I Deputy Regional Administrator, and included input from sta in the O~ce of Enforcement and the other three regional o~ces.is report reects the recommendations of the review team, some of which the NRC has already begun to address. e recommendations in this report represent the rst of three phases of activities NRC plans to take regarding this initiative, which are:

• Consider and take actions on certain review team ndings in this report

• Establish a Senior Executive Review Panel to determine the best method for implementing these recommendations

• Refer the report to the agency's Lessons Learned Oversight Board for its consideration as a formal lessons learned item.e Inspector General is also planning a review of this issue, and its ndings will be incorporated into overall agency actions.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Peach Bottom Review Team FindingsFebruary 6, 2008MEMORANDUM TO:

Bruce S. Mallett Deputy Executive Director of Reactor and Preparedness ProgramsFROM: Marc L. Dapas /RA/ Deputy Regional Administrator Region ITHRU: Samuel J. Collins /RA/ Regional Administrator Region I

SUBJECT:

PEACH BOTTOM REVIEW TEAM FINDINGSe attached report documents the results of the Peach Bottom lessons-learned review conducted by the NRC sta to evaluate allegation and inspection program activities associated with the condition of inattentive security o~cers identied at the Peach Bottom Station in September 2007. As noted in the Executive Summary of the attached report, this lessons-learned initiative involved an assessment of whether the allegation process, as currently dened, was appropriately followed; whether additional process exibilities could have been exercised; if inspection procedures for the security function pro

-vide su~cient guidance for identifying conditions of inattentiveness among the security force; and if changes to the allegation and inspection program, policies, or processes should be further considered.

A summary of the overall conclusions by the review team relative to these specic focus areas is provided in the Executive Summary to the attached report.e team's observations and ndings were discussed with the other regional o~ces as well as the Of

-ce of Enforcement. As noted in the attached lessons-learned report, each of the regional o~ces have implemented selected allegation process enhancements within the current exibilities of the allegation program. is has been a result of the collaborative information sharing that has occurred across the regional o~ces as this lessons-learned initiative proceeded. e report also includes proposed next steps for consideration by agency management in dispositioning the review team's recommendations. Please contact me if you have any questions regarding this lessons-learned initiative.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1Peach Bottom Review Team FindingsREVIEW TEAM FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO INATTENTIVE SECURITY OFFICERS AT PEACH BOTTOMI. Executive SummaryIn March 2007, the NRC received an allegation from a former security manager for Wackenhut (the company contracted by Exelon to provide security services at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station) expressing concerns with aspects of the security program at the Peach Bottom Station. e concerns were that security o~cers have been sleeping on duty due to fatigue from working excessive overtime; security o~cers are fearful of retaliation if they raise concerns; and Exelon managers are aware of in

-stances of inattentiveness, but have not taken proper actions to address it.Consistent with agency policy, the NRC informed Exelon (the licensee for the Peach Bottom Station) of these concerns because the licensee has primary responsibility for ensuring safe and secure operation of its facilities and can promptly address issues through ready access to site personnel and documenta

-tion. e NRC also requested the licensee to investigate the allegation concerns, take appropriate ac

-tions based on the results of the licensee's investigation, and provide the NRC with a written response for the NRC's review. In its response to the NRC, Exelon concluded that it was not able to substanti

-ate the concerns. e NRC reviewed the licensee's response and at the time considered it adequate to resolve the concerns.In September 2007, the NRC was presented with video evidence by a WCBS-TV reporter that showed a number of security o~cers at the Peach Bottom Station in an inattentive state in the ready room.

1 None of the inattentive o~cers were manning specic security posts at the time; however, they were required to be at

-tentive in order to respond if needed. After receiving this information, the NRC conducted a range of inspection and investigative activities to determine the extent of this condition and ensure that Exelon and its security contractor, Wackenhut, had taken prompt and eective corrective actions to address this unacceptable performance.Given that the NRC did not identify this unacceptable licensee/contractor performance issue earlier via its allegation process or inspection program, a review team conducted a comprehensive lessons-learned review to determine if the allegation process, as currently dened, was appropriately followed; whether additional process exibilities could have been exercised; if inspection procedures for the security func

-In September 2007, the NRC was presented with video evidence at the Peach Bottom Station in an inattentive state in the ready room.1 security posts at the time; however, they were required to be attentive in order to respond if needed. After receiving this information, the NRC conducted a range of inspection and investigative activities to determine the extent of this condi

-tion and ensure that Exelon and its security contractor, Wack

-enhut, had taken prompt and effective corrective actions to address this unacceptable performance.

1e ready room is a place where security o~cers not on patrol, or manning an observation post, are allowed to read, study, eat, or relax, but must remain ready to respond if called upon.

2U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission tion provide su~cient guidance for identifying conditions of inattentive

-ness among the security force; and if changes to the allegation and inspec

-tion program, policies, or processes should be further considered.is lessons-learned initiative in

-volved a review of the NRC allega

-tion process, specic instructions for implementing the allegation process, a review of security inspection proce

-dures, and discussions with selected sta in NRC Region I, the other three NRC regional o~ces, and the O~ce of Enforcement (the NRC program o~ce with oversight responsibility for implementation of the agency's allegation program). e eort was led by a senior technical employee with 23 years of NRC experience, who was assisted by a recently hired engineer with extensive experience in the Navy's nuclear program. Neither individual was involved in any aspect of the receipt and processing of the subject allegations or the security inspection program. In addition, a senior agency manager with 26 years experience in the eld of nuclear power, including 19 years with the NRC, provided oversight of this lessons-learned initiative.is report contains detailed information regarding how the NRC addressed the allegation concerns provided to the NRC in March, including the reasons why the NRC forwarded these concerns to Exelon for its evaluation, and the basis for the NRC's conclusion that the subject allegation could not be substantiated. e report also describes the NRC's response to the WCBS-TV reporter's communica

-tion that he possessed video clips of inattentive security o~cers.In summary, the lessons-learned re

-view team concluded that the NRC followed its allegation process in re

-sponse to two of the three concerns communicated to the NRC in March 2007, specically that: (1) security o~cers at the Peach Bottom Station have been sleeping on duty while in the bullet resistant enclosures, and in other (unspecied) areas, due to fa

-tigue from working excessive overtime and from not being able to adjust to 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shift schedules; and, (2) secu

-rity o~cers are fearful of retaliation if they raise concerns. With respect to the third concern that licensee man

-agement was aware of instances of in

-attentiveness, but did not take proper actions to address them, the review team concluded that the sta should have conducted a more thorough review of the licensee's response in determining if the licensee's evaluation was adequate to resolve the concern. In addition, the review team identied some allegation process exibilities which could have been exercised that may have This lessons-learned initiative involved a review of the -plementing the allegation process, a review of security inspection procedures, and discussions with selected staff in NRC Region I, the other three NRC regional of

-of the agency's allegation program).In summary, the lessons-learned review team conclud

-ed that the NRC followed its allegation process in re

-sponse to two of the three concerns communicated to -ing on duty while in the bullet resistant enclosures, and -ing excessive overtime and from not being able to ad

-are fearful of retaliation if they raise concerns. With respect to the third concern that licensee management was aware of instances of inattentiveness, but did not take proper actions to address them, the review team concluded that the staff should have conducted a more thorough review of the licensee's response in determin

-ing if the licensee's evaluation was adequate to resolve the concern.

3Peach Bottom Review Team Findingsresulted in additional information as part of the NRC's eorts to validate the concerns expressed in the March allegation. However, it is not apparent that obtaining more information from the licensee with regard to its response to the allega

-tion concern, or exercising these process exibilities would have resulted in a dif

-ferent overall conclusion regarding the validity of the March 2007 allegation, or have resulted in the NRC identifying the unacceptable security o~cer behaviors before the events of September, 2007. e review team also concluded that the NRC took signicant and timely regulatory actions to address evidence of inattentive security o~cers provided to the NRC in September 2007.With respect to the NRC's program for inspecting security at nuclear power plants, the review team noted that none of the inspection procedures provide specic direction or guidance with respect to identifying potential security o~cer inat

-tentiveness; however, the procedures do re

-quire inspectors to monitor security o~cer performance in all plant areas, both dur

-ing day and night shifts, and to conduct interviews with security force personnel at their duty stations. ese procedures also require reviews of the behavioral observa

-tion and tness for duty programs, as well as security force work hours, all of which are regulatory measures designed to ensure security o~cer attentiveness. e review team noted that no inattentiveness issues were identied dur

-ing an NRC inspection of the licensee's performance in the security area that was conducted in April/May 2007. However, the scope of this inspection was not modied based on the information provided to the NRC in the March allegation. Due to the unique layout of security facilities, such as bullet resistant enclosures and ready rooms, it may be necessary to employ means other than typical NRC inspection techniques, to detect security o~cer inattentiveness.e review team developed several recom

-mendations with respect to the allegation program procedures, practices, and policies to be considered by the agency to maximize the information reasonably available to the NRC in its review of allegations. e team also developed recommendations specic to the inspection program to enhance the NRC's ability to identify conditions of in

-attentiveness via its inspection process/practices. ese recommendations, as well as the associated observations resulting from the lessons-learned review, are identied in Attachment 1.A graphical depiction of the allegation process is provided as Attachment 2 in this report to supple

-ment the various references to allegation process steps that were exercised.The review team also concluded that the NRC took the NRC in September 2007.The review team noted that no inattentiveness of the licensee's performance in the security area that was conducted in April/May 2007. However, based on the information provided to the NRC in the March allegation.The review team developed several recommenda

-tions with respect to the allegation program proce

-dures, practices, and policies to be considered by the agency to maximize the information reasonably available to the NRC in its review of allegations. The the inspection program to enhance the NRC's abil

-ity to identify conditions of inattentiveness via its inspection process/practices.

4U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionII. Purpose and Scopeis lessons-learned review was initiated after the NRC determined, in follow-up to allegations re

-ceived in September 2007, that several security o~cers had been inattentive at the Peach Bottom Station. e review was conducted to determine areas for agency improvement since the condition of inattentive security o~cers was not identied by the NRC as a result of an allegation received in March 2007, nor during NRC inspections at the Peach Bottom Station. Details of these allegations and NRC Region I's response to the allegations are described in this report. Specic NRC inspection activities and associated results are also described in this report. is lessons-learned review included an in-depth evaluation of several allegation les, agency proce

-dures governing the handling of allegations, and procedures pertaining to the NRC baseline security inspection program, as well as discussions with NRC Region I sta who processed the allegations and conducted security inspections at the Peach Bottom Station.

2 e lessons-learned review also involved an evaluation of information provided by the other three NRC regional o~ces regarding their respec

-tive processes for handling allegations, and an assessment of the results of sampling reviews conducted by the other regional o~ces specic to the disposition of allegations in the security area. In addition, the lessons-learned report includes the results of an independent review by the NRC Agency Allegation Advisor of the sta's handling of the March allegation. is independent assessment was conducted at the request of NRC Region I to assist in determining any lessons to be learned from an allegation process implementation perspective.

III. NRC Region I's Handling of the March 2 007 Allegation (2 007-00 40) Regarding Inattentive Security O~cersIn late March 2007, the NRC resident inspectors assigned to the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station received a letter from a former security manager for Wackenhut (the company contracted by Exelon to provide security services at the Peach Bottom Station) expressing concerns regarding the security program. e letter, along with a completed allegation receipt form, was promptly forwarded to the NRC Region I O~ce. e alleger, hereafter referred to as the concerned individual (CI), indicated that he was providing the NRC with the information in his letter on behalf of selected security o~cers working at the Peach Bottom Station. e information in the subject letter pertains to three distinct concerns:* security o~cers at the Peach Bottom Station have been sleeping on duty while in the bullet resistant enclosures (BREs), and in other (unspecied) areas, due to fatigue from working excessive overtime and from not being able to adjust to 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shift schedules;

• security o~cers are fearful of retaliation if they raise concerns; and,

• Exelon management is aware that security o~cers are sleeping on duty, but is not taking proper actions to address it.

2 e procedures reviewed were: NRC Management Directive 8.8, "Management of Allegations"; Regional Instruction (RI) 1210.1, Rev. 13, "Handling of Allegations"; and RI 1230.1, Rev. 4, "Handling of Complaints of Improper Actions by NRC Sta". In addition, three (3) allegation les related to Peach Bottom were reviewed.

5Peach Bottom Review Team FindingsAlthough the letter from the CI did not contain any specic objection to the NRC forwarding the concerns to the licensee, the CI requested that the NRC: (1) provide complete anonymity regarding the letter; (2) not inform the licensee or the security contractor of the letter's existence; (3) not tell the licensee or the security contractor that any security employee had voiced concerns captured in the let

-ter; and (4) not contact the CI in any manner. Consistent with NRC practice to avoid alienating CIs, which could make them reluctant to bring forward other concerns to the NRC in the future, NRC Region I honored the CI's requests. Specically, while the NRC paraphrased the CI's concerns and provided them to Exelon, the NRC did not reveal the CI's name, the licensee was not informed of the existence of the letter, the licensee was not informed of the source of the allegation, and the CI was not contacted by the NRC.

3In response to the CI's concerns, NRC Region I conducted an adhoc Allegation Review Board (ARB) on March 29, 2007, as well as a routine ARB on April 11, 2007, to determine appropriate follow-up actions to address the subject allegation.

4 Based on the ARB discussions, NRC Region I decided to forward all three of the CI's concerns to the licensee for appropriate follow-up and evaluation, and then review the licensee's written response to determine if the licensee adequately evaluated the concerns. Before making that decision, sta in the Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) conducted a historical review of existing allegation records/les involving security-related issues at the Peach Bot

-tom Station.

5 is included Allegation File 2005-0180 which pertained to a 2005 allegation involving security o~cers allegedly sleeping in BREs, an allegation that was investigated by the NRC O~ce of Investigations (OI) and was not substantiated.

6NRC Region I determined that there was no immediate safety signicance to the assertions in the CI's letter based on the results of the DRP sta review of previously identied security-related issues at the Peach Bottom Station. e ARB participants also questioned the validity of the rst concern with respect to the BREs given their physical conguration (an observation tower elevated 40+ feet above ground level and occupied by a single security o~cer), which indicated that the circumstance of secu

-rity o~cers having "witnessed security o~cers in BRE towers sleeping" was improbable, and given the lack of specic details such as dates/times of particular instances of inattentiveness and security o~cers involved. From a process standpoint, it is agency policy for an ARB to consider providing technical allegations to a licensee for evaluation since the licensee has primary responsibility for ensuring safe 3 e CI specically stated in his March 2007 letter that, "I do not want the NRC or its agent to contact me in any man

-ner. -we feel that you [the NRC] have been provided su~cient information and suggestions necessary to look into this matter." In addition, NRC Region I was aware that the CI's attorney wrote the Region I Senior Allegation Coordinator on April 5, 2006, requesting that all future communications with the CI (about a prior allegation or any other matter) be addressed only to the attorney's o~ce. is request further inuenced NRC Region I in its decision not to contact the CI directly about allegation 2007-0040.

4 Generally, ARBs are held in the Region I o~ce on a set day and time each week. Ad-hoc ARBs are conducted whenever regional sta determine that one or more concerns contained in a particular allegation warrant a more prompt discussion, such as when a concern could be an immediate safety issue. Generally, ARBs for reactor issues consist of managers from two technical divisions, the Regional Counsel, a representative of the NRC O~ce of Investigations, the Enforcement/Allegations Team Leader, the Senior Allegation Coordinator, and other technical and administrative sta as needed. e ARB makes decisions regarding the appropriate handling of allegations. In 2007, approximately 350 ARBs were convened by NRC Region I on a weekly and adhoc basis to review matters involving allegations at reactor and nuclear material licensees.

5 Documentation in the le for allegation 2007-0040 lists the les reviewed by the DRP sta.

6 e NRC O~ce of Investigations conducts investigations for the NRC sta of licensees, their contractors or vendors, including all allegations of wrongdoing by individuals other than NRC employees and contractors. Substantiated criminal cases developed by OI are forwarded to the Department of Justice for potential prosecution.

6U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissionoperation of its facility and, in most cases, can promptly address issues through ready access to site personnel and documentation related to the issues that are the subject of the allegation.During the March 29 and April 11 ARBs, the third concern was discussed in the context of a potential wrongdoing issue related to management failure to address security o~cer inattentiveness. Statements in the CI's letter indicated that the licensee had taken some actions in the past to identify inattentive security o~cers, such as increased backshift inspections by licensee management, and licensee "em

-ployee concerns" sta interviewing personnel in the eld regarding security o~cers sleeping on-duty; however, in the view of the CI, these actions were not su~cient if the licensee "wants to really nd out if anyone is sleeping." e ARB noted that the CI's concern was that the licensee had not taken su~cient or proper actions to address the issue of inattentive security o~cers rather than a concern that the licensee took no action. For this reason, and because the third concern lacked any details or specicity to support a wrongdoing investigation, OI decided not to initiate such an investigation. e ARB concurred with this decision. If the CI had indicated that licensee management took no ac

-tion in response to concerns of inattentive security o~cers, or if the CI had provided su~cient details for OI to initiate an investigation on its own, this specic concern would not have been provided to the licensee for review/evaluation.Based on the ARB discussions and resulting direction, NRC Region I sent Exelon senior corporate management a letter on April 30, 2007, describing the three concerns and requesting that the licensee evaluate each concern and provide a written response to the NRC within 30 days. In its letter, NRC Region I indicated that the NRC would review the licensee's response to determine whether: (a) the individual in the licensee's organization assigned to conduct the investigation was independent of the organization aected by the concerns; (b) the evaluator was procient in the specic functional area; (c) the evaluation was of su~cient depth and scope; (d) appropriate root causes and generic implica

-tions were considered if the concerns were substantiated; and (e) the corrective actions, if necessary, were su~cient. On the same day that the allegation was provided to the licensee for investigation/evaluation, the NRC Region I Division of Reactor Safety (DRS) began a four-person, one week baseline security inspection at the Peach Bottom Station. However, there was no indication from review of the allegation le and discussions with regional personnel, that representatives at the March 29 and April 11 ARBs con

-sidered, during their deliberations, that there was a security baseline inspection planned for April 30 - May 4, 2007.

7 In hindsight, in conjunction with forwarding the allegation concerns to the licensee for its investigation, the baseline inspection could have been used to follow-up on the allegation, providing additional independence and potentially more information to the agency's review. Based on discussions with three of the four security inspectors who completed the baseline inspection (one inspector has since retired), two of the three inspectors were aware of the subject allegation because 7 e NRC baseline security inspection program consists of 11 separate inspection procedures conducted in specied time intervals at all NRC licensed reactor facilities. e program is comprised of three parts: inspection of security program ar

-eas, verication of performance indicators specic to the security function, and an assessment of the problem identication and resolution function in the area of security. None of the baseline security inspection procedures specically delineate inspections for security o~cer inattentiveness, but do require inspectors to monitor security o~cer performance in all plant areas, both during day and night shifts, and to conduct interviews with security force personnel at their duty stations. e procedures also require reviews of the behavioral observation and tness for duty programs, as well as security force work hours, all of which are regulatory measures designed to ensure security o~cer attentiveness.

7Peach Bottom Review Team Findingsone of those inspectors participated in the ARB on March 29, 2007. Notwithstanding the signicant challenge to identify inattentive security o~cers via inspection given a BRE's unique conguration, awareness of the allegation specics by all four inspectors might have provided an opportunity to visit additional security-related areas to look for any indication of inattentiveness.

8On May 30, 2007, NRC Region I received Exelon's response to the three concerns forwarded to the licensee in the NRC's April 30 letter. e licensee's review was conducted by two members of the Ex

-elon corporate organization who did not report to Peach Bottom Station management. In summary, Exelon indicated that it did not substantiate any of the three concerns forwarded by the NRC. e licensee's conclusion was based on the following:

• measures exist to reduce the potential for becoming inattentive and to monitor attentiveness, such as periodic communication checks with each security o~cer, a requirement that each of

-cer standup and walk around 2-3 minutes approximately every 15 minutes, and supervisor visits to each stationary post a minimum of twice per shift to further ensure attentiveness;

• the results of interviews with managers and security o~cers regarding observations of inat

-tentiveness which yielded no substantiating results 9;* reviews of corrective action program reports;

• a review of security o~cer work hour averages over the preceding three months, which showed work hours consistently lower than NRC limits; and,* Wackenhut and Exelon employee concerns program reports which did not indicate an inabil

-ity of security o~cers to adjust to the current shift schedule.

10 8 All inspectors are trained on the importance of looking for problems during their inspections, not just in planned areas of review, but any area that they may encounter, and inspectors have often found problems in areas that were not part of their planned review. For example, NRC Region I resident inspectors, during routine tours at Indian Point and Beaver Valley in 2007, identied inattentive security o~cers. Although the resident inspectors at Peach Bottom were aware of the March 2007 allegation since they had received the allegation letter in the mail, sensitizing the regional security inspectors to this allegation might have allowed for an additional opportunity to detect security o~cer inattentiveness. However, as clearly noted by the CI in his March letter, security employees were supposedly aware of measures taken by the NRC and Exelon to identify inattentiveness in the past, including back shift inspections by the NRC, suggesting that such additional inspec

-tions would have been ineective in identifying inattentive security o~cers. In fact, the alleger recommended ve covert tactics (e.g., installing hidden cameras in the BREs, observing the BREs using high power optics from concealed locations on the hillside behind Peach Bottom, or having NRC sta go undercover and join the Wackenhut security force at Peach Bottom) that the NRC could use to detect inattentive security o~cers in the BREs, measures which the NRC does not currently employ and which could place inspectors in harm's way (e.g. undertaking surreptitious actions that could startle armed security o~cers).

9 e NRC subsequently learned that all of the inattentive o~cers shown in a video provided to the NRC months later, were part of the same shift, and that none of the members of that shift were interviewed by Exelon because that shift was o duty at the time the interviews were conducted (refer to Section IV for a discussion of the NRC's receipt of the subject video).

10 Most reactor licensees and large independent contractors have internal Employee Concerns Programs (ECPs) which allow employees to condentially report problems outside their line organization. Such programs are voluntary and not required by the NRC.

8U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissione licensee's written response was reviewed by a DRS security specialist inspector in NRC Region I who determined that he needed to contact a licensee security manager regarding one of the actions described by the licensee, namely periodic communication checks with the security o~cers. e in

-formation specic to this action, provided by the licensee in its response letter, was unclear and was important because such checks can help detect inattentive security o~cers in remote locations. e DRS reviewer contacted the licensee's security sta at the Peach Bottom Station on June 11, 2007, and learned that the communication checks were random, and also learned that the licensee performed "command calls" that require all security o~cers to physically stand for at least two minutes. ere

-fore, based on the licensee's May 30, 2007 written response, as well as the supplemental information verbally provided to NRC Region I, the DRS representative concluded that the licensee's response to the concerns was thorough and complete, and so informed DRP, which had project responsibility for bringing the allegation le to closure. Consistent with past practice in both the NRC Region I O~ce and the other regional o~ces, this closure decision was not discussed at an ARB prior to generating a closure memorandum to le.

11As a result, a closure memorandum to le was prepared by a DRP Senior Project Engineer based on the input from the DRS security specialist inspector who reviewed the licensee's response, and the allega

-tion le was administratively closed via that memorandum on August 22, 2007, after being concurred in by a DRP Senior Project Engineer (concurring as the acting Branch Chief), the responsible DRS Branch Chief, and the Senior Allegation Coordinator.

12A graphic summary of the NRC's allegation process is provided as Attachment 2. IV. NRC Region I's Handling of the September 2 007 Allegations (2 007-0 118 and 2 007-0 121) Regarding Inattentive Security O~cersOn September 10, 2007, 19 days after the March allegation (2007-0040) was closed, the NRC Region I Public Aairs O~cer received an allegation (tracked as Allegation File 2007-0118) from a WCBS-TV reporter indicating that he possessed a video which showed inattentive security o~cers at the Peach Bottom Station. An adhoc ARB was promptly convened on September 10, and because the reporter did not provide any specics, one of the decisions of the ARB was to contact the reporter that same day for additional information. NRC Region I sta contacted the reporter, but he did not provide any additional details. A second adhoc ARB was convened on September 10, and given that the reporter indicated he had video evidence of multiple inattentive security o~cers, the ARB determined that this matter posed a potential immediate security concern. As such, the ARB directed NRC Region I sta to contact Exelon as soon as possible and inform the licensee of the allegation. e licensee was con

-tacted later that day. As a result of the ARB discussions, the resident inspectors assigned to the Peach Bottom Station began increased monitoring of security o~cer activities, which included conducting 11NRC Region I does not typically convene an ARB to discuss/review a licensee's response to an allegation. is is done on a case-by-case basis when substantive questions arise regarding the adequacy of the licensee's response, and hence there is the need for supplemental information from the licensee. e other three NRC regional o~ces were contacted as part of this review, and like the Region I O~ce, none of the other regional o~ces routinely convene an ARB to discuss/review a licensee's allegation response. However, one regional o~ce does have a Division Director or Deputy Director (a Senior Executive Service member) review/sign all allegation closure memorandums to le or closure letters to the alleger.

12 As noted earlier, the CI indicated he did not desire any NRC contact; hence, a closure memorandum to le was generated vice a letter to the CI documenting the results of the NRC's evaluation of the allegation.

9Peach Bottom Review Team Findingso-hours inspection checks of security o~cers for inattentiveness. No instances of inattentive security o~cers were identied. During a subsequent telephone conversation on September 12, 2007, the reporter informed NRC Re

-gion I that the video in his possession was approximately 10 minutes in length and showed inattentive guards in the ready room. An adhoc ARB was convened on September 12, and NRC Region I decided to forward this information to Exelon in support of its ongoing investigation. Given the information provided by the reporter, NRC Region I was concerned that multiple security o~cers would have had to collaborate to conceal their inattentiveness. On September 18, 2007, a telephone conference was conducted between Exelon and the NRC in order for the licensee to provide a status of its investigation into the allegation of inattentive security o~cers. During the conference call, the licensee informed the NRC sta that during its interviews with various security o~cers, several o~cers had identied a particular security o~cer that they each believed had taken video clips of other security o~cers in the spring of 2007. When this particular individual was interviewed by the licensee and confronted with this information, the security o~cer indicated that he was terminating the interview and stated that he would not answer any questions without the NRC present. Based on this information, NRC Region I sta promptly convened an ad

-hoc ARB at the conclusion of the conference call with the licensee. Per direction from the ARB, NRC Region I sta contacted the subject security o~cer to obtain more information. Coincidentally, the security o~cer had contacted NRC Region I to provide a number of concerns, principally that he had observed inattentive security o~cers on a number of occasions (tracked as Allegation File 2007-0121). On September 19, 2007, the reporter permitted NRC Region I sta to view the video, which consisted of two separate clips, showing several security o~cers, on more than one occasion, in a state of inat

-tentiveness in what appeared to be the "old" ready room at the Peach Bottom station.

13 After viewing the video clips, another adhoc ARB was convened to determine appropriate follow-up action. Subsequently, on September 20, 2007, in light of the allegation concerns provided by the security of

-cer on September 18, and NRC Region I viewing the video clips on September 19, an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) was chartered to review the overall matter of inattentive security o~cers at the Peach Bottom Station.

14Since September 20, 2007, the NRC has taken a number of actions to more fully understand condi

-tions at the Peach Bottom Station, increase regulatory oversight of security-related activities at that site, and advise other reactor licensees of the agency's expectations with respect to security o~cer attentive

-ness. Specically, NRC Region I:

• conducted an AIT from September 21 - 28, 2007, which determined that a total of 10 secu

-rity o~cers had been inattentive on at least one occasion; the inattentive security o~cers did have an adverse impact on elements of the defense-in-depth security strategy, but this situa

-tion did not signicantly degrade the overall security function at the Peach Bottom Station; and prompt compensatory and corrective actions were implemented by Exelon following notication of this matter on September 10, 2007; 13 In July 2007, Exelon moved the ready room to a new location with lighting and temperature control more conducive to maintaining attentiveness.

14 An Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) is an infrequent, reactive inspection conducted for the purpose of event assess

-ment and follow-up. In this case, special agents of the NRC O~ce of Investigations participated in the AIT for the pur

-poses of assisting the inspectors in conducting interviews.

1 0U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• sent a letter to Exelon senior management on October 4, 2007, requesting that the licensee submit in writing those actions taken or planned to assure that security o~cers remain at

-tentive at all times while on duty, that o~cers are willing and able to recognize instances of inattentiveness and promptly take all appropriate actions, and that supervisors and person

-nel take the necessary actions to encourage o~cers and all plant sta to bring forward any concerns;

• issued a Conrmatory Action Letter (CAL) on October 19, 2007, conrming various licens

-ee corrective actions going forward 15;* conducted weekly conference calls with Exelon to discuss the transition to a proprietary secu

-rity force and CAL activities 16;* conducted an AIT follow-up inspection on November 5-9, 2007, resulting in the identica

-tion of one potentially greater-than-green nding regarding inattentive security o~cers and an ineective behavioral observation program;

• held public meetings with Exelon in the vicinity of the Peach Bottom Station on October 9 and December 3, 2007; and,* exercised, via a Deviation Memorandum signed by the NRC's Executive Director for Op

-erations on December 13, 2007, existing exibility in the NRC's reactor oversight process (ROP) to further increase security oversight at the Peach Bottom Station in addition to those resources and inspections already scheduled for 2008. In addition, the NRC issued a Security Advisory to licensees nationwide on September 27, 2007, re-emphasizing NRC requirements regarding security o~cer attentiveness to duty, as well as issued NRC Bulletin 2007-01, "Security O~cer Attentiveness," on December 12, 2007, to all holders of reactor licenses for the purpose of obtaining information on licensee administrative and managerial controls to deter and address inattentiveness and complicity among licensee security personnel.Furthermore, with respect to the specic allegation that was received in March (2007-0040), although the associated allegation le had been closed in August 2007, NRC Region I conducted another ARB on September 26, 2007. is ARB was convened since the initial information gathered during the AIT indicated that some security o~cers had been inattentive in the March 2007 timeframe, which conicted with the conclusion in the licensee's response to the March allegation (2007-0040) that the allegation could not be substantiated. e matter of inattentive security o~cers at the Peach Bottom Station and related licensee deciencies in not identifying inattentiveness, are still under NRC review.

On October 2, 2007, NRC Region I requested that the NRC O~ce of Enforcement (OE) Agency Allegation Advisor (AAA) conduct an independent review of the sta's handling of Allegation File 15 A Conrmatory Action Letter (CAL) is a letter issued by the NRC to document or "conrm" actions that a licensee has committed to take in addressing a specic matter. Failure to comply with the terms of a CAL can result in the NRC issuing an Order to the licensee to require specic actions or impose various license conditions.

16 At the end of September 2007, Exelon decided to terminate its contract with Wackenhut and create a proprietary security force.

11Peach Bottom Review Team Findings2007-0040 to assist in determining any lessons to be learned from a regional allegation process imple

-mentation perspective.

17 is independent review was not conducted until November 2007 after the AAA coordinated with the NRC O~ce of the Inspector General (OIG) who had also initiated a review of this matter. In her report, which is provided as Attachment 3, the AAA concluded that with respect to two of the three concerns forwarded to the licensee for its review/evaluation, NRC Region I evaluated and responded to the concerns in accordance with the requirements and guidance in Man

-agement Directive 8.8, "Management of Allegations." However, with respect to the concern involving licensee management being aware of instances of inattentiveness, but not taking proper actions to address them, the AAA was unable to determine the basis for the sta's conclusion that the scope and depth of the licensee's evaluation was adequate to resolve the concern. V. Evaluation of the Adequacy of the NRC Inspection Program for Detecting Security O~cer Inattentivenesse NRC baseline security inspection program consists of 11 separate inspection procedures con

-ducted at specied time intervals at all NRC licensed reactor facilities. e program is comprised of three parts:

• the inspection of security program areas;

• verication of performance indicators specic to the security function; and,* an assessment of the problem identication and resolution function in the area of security.None of the baseline security inspection procedures provide specic direction or guidance with respect to identifying potential security o~cer inattentiveness; however, the procedures do require inspectors to monitor security o~cer performance in all plant areas, both during day and night shifts, and to conduct interviews with security force personnel at their duty stations. ese inspections also include a review of the quarterly security logs, which list, among other information, any instances of security o~cer inattentiveness identied by the licensee. ese procedures also require reviews of the behav

-ioral observation and tness for duty programs as well as security force work hours, all of which are regulatory measures designed to ensure security o~cer attentiveness.

18An inspection conducted by DRS security inspectors from April 30 - May 4, 2007, consisted of reviewing records, observing activities, and interviewing the security o~cer workforce in the areas 17 During this lessons-learned review, NRC Region I also engaged the other three regional o~ces to discuss their respective actions in determining if any allegation process implementation gaps exist given the events at Peach Bottom. NRC Region II is conducting a historical review of security-related allegation concerns; Region III conducted a review on a site-by-site basis in order to determine if similarities exist between its licensees and the situation at Peach Bottom; and, Region IV conducted a review of allegations received over the last two years aimed at identifying any programmatic issues in the al

-legation process, and to identify any security or inattentive sta ndings that merited additional scrutiny. e results and recommendations of those reviews are provided as Attachment 4 to this report.

18 e procedures examined were: Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2201, "Security and Safeguards Inspection Program for Commercial Power Reactors"; Inspection Procedures (IP) 71130.01 - Access Authorization, .02 - Access Control, .03 - Contingency Response, .04 - Equipment Performance, .05 - Protective Strategy Evaluation, .07 - Security Training, .08 - Fitness For Duty Program, .09 - Owner Controlled Area Controls, .10 - Information Technology Security, .11 - Materials Control and Accountability, and .12 - Physical Protection of Shipments of Irradiated Fuel.

12U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissionof access control; security equipment performance, testing, and maintenance; security training; and owner-controlled area controls. e inspectors toured a number of security-related areas at the site, including three BREs, as part of this baseline inspection. No inspection ndings related to security o~cer inattentiveness were identied during these inspections. Based on discussions with three of the four security inspectors who completed this baseline inspection (one inspector has since retired), two of the three inspectors were aware that NRC Region I had received the March allegation, but only because one of the two inspectors participated in the ARB on March 29, 2007. As mentioned earlier, the scope of this inspection was not modied based on the March allegations. e NRC resident inspectors also conduct a variety of inspections at each licensed site. e resident inspectors are stationed at their assigned site full-time, and conduct inspections on occasions during weekends and backshifts. e resident inspectors observe and inspect licensee activities in all func

-tional areas, including security. Under Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 71152, "Identication and Resolution of Problems," resident inspectors are instructed to review licensee corrective action system reports, including a sampling of reports related to the security program. e inspectors also note the performance of security o~cers in the course of entering and touring the site.

19 e NRC is currently in the process of evaluating whether the role of the resident inspectors in verifying attributes of security program performance should be expanded.

20However, as clearly denoted by the CI in his March letter, security o~cers were supposedly aware of measures taken by the NRC and the licensee to identify inattentiveness in the past, including back shift inspections by the NRC, suggesting that such additional NRC inspections would not have been eective in identifying inattentive security o~cers.

21 e resident sta at the Peach Bottom Station conrmed that they had not observed any indication of inattentive security o~cers in the March - Sep

-tember 2007 timeframe in the course of their inspection activities, which involved tours of a number of plant areas on several occasions.Observations and recommendations resulting from this lessons-learned review are provided as Attachment 1.

19 As indicated in footnote No. 7, all inspectors are trained on the importance of looking for problems during their inspec

-tions, not just in planned areas of review, but any area that they may encounter, and inspectors have often found problems in areas not part of their planned review. For example, Region I resident inspectors, during routine tours at Indian Point and Beaver Valley in 2007, identied inattentive security o~cers. Although the resident inspectors at Peach Bottom were aware of the March 2007 allegation since they had received the allegation letter in the mail, they were not directed via the ARB to focus additional eorts to identify inattentive security o~cers in the BREs or other areas.

20 An "Adhoc Working Group on Security Inspections by Resident Inspectors", led by the O~ce of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR), prepared a report identifying ways for resident inspectors to become more involved in security inspections at their sites. e options proposed remain under agency review.

21 As noted earlier, in his March 2007 letter, the CI recommended ve covert tactics (e.g., installing hidden cameras in the BREs, observing the BREs using high power optics from concealed locations on the hillside behind Peach Bottom, or having NRC sta go undercover and join the Wackenhut security force at Peach Bottom) that the NRC could use to detect inattentive security o~cers in the BREs, measures which the NRC does not currently employ and which could place inspectors in harm's way (e.g. undertaking surreptitious actions that could startle armed security o~cers.

13Peach Bottom Review Team Findings OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSA. Process for Forwarding Allegations to a Licensee, Evaluating Licensee Responses, and Docu

-menting the NRC Evaluation of the Licensee Response:

1. OBSERVATION - e third of the three concerns in Allegation File 2007-0040, as summarized from the alleger's (hereafter referred to as the concerned individual, or CI) letter, was that licensee management was aware of security o~cer inattentiveness, but was not taking proper action. NRC Management Directive 8.8, "Management of Allegations," which provides guidance on the handling of allegations, states that allegations made against a licensee's management or those parties who would normally receive and address the allegation, should not be referred to licensees. Wrongdoing issues normally result in an investigation by the NRC O~ce of Investigations (OI) when su~cient details are provided to reach OI's threshold for opening an investigation.

1 However, the alleged concern was a general statement without any specics to allow for OI to open an investigation. Since the Allegation Review Board (ARB) decided to honor the CI's request that he not be contacted in any manner, NRC Region I did not attempt to obtain any specics from the CI that may have formed the basis to initiate an OI investigation. Given the general nature of the statement, NRC Region I decided to provide this concern to Exelon for investigation along with the other two concerns.RECOMMENDATION - e NRC O~ce of Enforcement (OE) should evaluate the NRC prac

-tice of honoring concerned individual's (CI's) requests not to be contacted unless there is a clear and immediate nuclear safety issue, to determine if additional guidance is needed. e NRC views CIs as an important element in helping to ensure nuclear safety. erefore, it is important to maintain a good relationship with CIs and be sensitive to their requests. However, in hindsight, additional contact with the CI (via telephone or, if necessary, mail) would not have compromised the CI's identity and may have resulted in the NRC obtaining more specic information to sup

-port additional NRC action in this matter, such as the location of other areas besides the Bullet Resistant Enclosures where security o~cers were inattentive (i.e., the ready room), as well as other information provided to the CI by the security o~cers he stated that he represented.

2. OBSERVATION - One of the factors to consider in the ARB's decision to provide an allegation to the licensee is the licensee's past performance in dealing with allegations, including the likelihood that the licensee would thoroughly investigate, document, and resolve the allegation. Allegation File 2007-0040 indicates that the history of previously dispositioned security allegations was reviewed, but it does not document how that history was considered in the decision to forward the allegation concerns to the licensee.RECOMMENDATION - NRC Region I, the other regional o~ces, and OE should evaluate whether the ARB disposition form, drafted by the responsible division prior to an ARB, should be revised to provide an additional section that describes: (1) the history/trends of related allega

-1 OI's threshold for opening an investigation is "specic indication of wrongdoing beyond mere suspicion." Also, refer to Section III regarding the ARB discussion with respect to whether the CI claimed the licensee was "ignoring" inattentive security o~cers (clearly a wrongdoing matter), or not taking su~cient or proper action.

14U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissiontions at the facility (i.e., number of allegations at the facility in the last two years, substantiated OI cases, and whether a large percentage of concerns are focused in the area that is the subject of the allegation) as well as related inspection ndings; and, (2) how those inspection ndings and the allegation history were considered in the decision to forward the concern(s) to the licensee. Such information could be periodically retrieved from the NRC Allegation Management System (AMS) and Reactor Planning System (RPS) and provided to the responsible division.

2 3. OBSERVATION - e April 30, 2007, letter forwarding the allegation concerns to Exelon re

-quested that the licensee ensure that:

• the individual in the licensee's organization assigned to conduct the follow-up investigation was independent of the organization aected by the concerns;

• the evaluator was procient in the specic functional area;

• the evaluation was of su~cient depth and scope;

• appropriate root causes and generic implications were considered if the concerns were sub

-stantiated; and,* the corrective actions, if necessary, were su~cient. However, the NRC letter to the licensee did not request that the licensee describe in its response specically how each of these attributes was satised. e letter also did not request that if individu

-als were interviewed as part of the licensee's review, the licensee's response include a description of how the sample of employees interviewed was su~ciently large and varied to ensure the sample was a representative cross section of the organization or individuals involved. Finally, the letter did not ask the licensee to discuss why the interviews were su~ciently rigorous to likely identify any issues. In this case, the licensee interviewed nine security o~cers and ve Exelon managers, who the licensee considered likely to encounter security o~cers during routine supervisory observations. However, the NRC learned during the AIT that no members of the crew in which security o~cers were cap

-tured on video as inattentive were interviewed as part of the licensee's investigation into the March allegations due to scheduling issues. Also, as noted by the AAA in her independent review of this matter (refer to Attachment 3), it was not clear whether the interviews referred to by the licensee in its response were of su~cient rigor to identify whether all incidents of inattentiveness were reported.

RECOMMENDATION - NRC Region I has revised its standard letter to forward concerns to licensees to include the following statement: "Your response should describe how each of these attributes were satised, and if interviews of individuals were conducted as part of your review, include the basis for determining that the number and cross section of individuals interviewed, as well as the scope of the interviews, is appropriate to obtain the information necessary to fully evaluate the subject concern(s). e NRC will consider these factors in reviewing the adequacy of your evaluation of this concern(s)." is change should be evaluated by OE for incorporation into agency guidance.

2 NRC Region IV recommended from its allegation process review that "management expectations for Branch Chief responsibilities associated with tracking and trending allegations should be claried and captured in appropriate agency procedures. Additional tools and training should be made available as necessary."

15Peach Bottom Review Team Findings

4. OBSERVATION - NRC Region I provided limited information to Exelon regarding the range of measures security o~cers allegedly took to avoid being detected when they were inattentive, presum

-ably in an eort to protect the identity of the CI, as well as those individuals that the CI indicated had provided information to him. ese measures included: (1) reclining in a chair or lying on the oor of the Bullet Resistant Enclosures (BREs), out-of-sight while being protected from discovery by sitting or lying on the BRE hatch door; and, (2) taking 10 to 15 minute power naps, depending on radio trans

-missions, then waking momentarily for radio checks. Providing this information may have prompted the licensee to consider other approaches to validating the CI's concerns. RECOMMENDATION - NRC Region I, the other regional o~ces, and OE should evaluate whether su~cient descriptive information is provided to a licensee when available, particularly in matters involving inattentiveness (which are typically very di~cult to prove), to maximize the eectiveness of the licensee's investigation without revealing the identity of the CI.

5. OBSERVATION - e licensee's response to the third concern regarding licensee management being aware of instances of inattentiveness but not taking proper action, indicated that the licensee had identied instances of inattentiveness in the past and had taken appropriate action. However, the response provided to the NRC did not provide any specics regarding the referenced past incidents of inattentive behavior, or the actions taken by the licensee in response to these incidents.

3 NRC Region I does not routinely discuss licensee responses to allegations at an ARB. Management Directive 8.8, "Management of Allegations," does not require such ARBs. NRC Region I only exercises this process exibility when the responsible division determines there is a need for such an ARB based upon con

-cerns with the licensee's response that calls into question the overall adequacy of that response. Such ARBs have been conducted when licensee responses were initially considered to be inadequate based upon divisional review.

4 NRC Region I contacted the other three NRC regional o~ces and determined that they also do not routinely discuss licensee responses to allegations at an ARB. As a result, in most cases, the NRC as

-sessment of the adequacy of the licensee evaluation is based on the results of the review by the respon

-sible division and any review conducted by another division and/or the Senior Allegation Coordina

-tor.5 A follow-up ARB would provide all ARB participants, including the ARB Chairman, a formal opportunity to critique the licensee's response as well as the basis for closure, before actual closure of the le, in order to determine whether the licensee's response was su~ciently comprehensive. It would also identify what, if any, further NRC/licensee engagement and/or independent NRC follow-up ac

-tion is warranted.

3 e DRS security specialist inspector who reviewed the licensee's written response did not probe the licensee for that information given his knowledge, based on ve years experience inspecting and/or reviewing security-related issues in NRC Region I, that instances of security o~cer inattentiveness at Exelon facilities had occurred infrequently and had been properly addressed.

4 In 2007, NRC Region I licensees were formally requested to supplement their response on ve occasions when follow-up ARBs questioned their adequacy.

5 As indicated in footnote No.11 in Section III of this report, one regional o~ce does have a Division Director or Deputy Director review/sign all allegation closure memorandums to le or closure letters to the alleger, providing senior agency manager level review of the licensee's response.

16U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionRECOMMENDATION - NRC Region I, and from a more programmatic perspective, OE, should evaluate its allegation program, procedures, and practices to determine whether they should be changed to require a more structured review process, with additional senior manage

-ment review, of licensee responses to allegations provided by the NRC. Such a process might include a formalized checklist to verify the adequacy of a licensee response, coupled with either a review by an NRC senior manager, or a follow-up ARB. is would provide for an additional critique of the licensee's investigation results, as described in its written response to the NRC, to better determine whether the licensee's evaluation was su~ciently comprehensive and whether any additional NRC follow-up action is warranted.

B. Communications/Interactions with Concerned Individual(s):

1. OBSERVATION - Since the ARB decided to honor the CI's request that he not be contacted in any manner, the NRC did not attempt to obtain any specics from the CI to support additional NRC action, such as an OI investigation, nor did the NRC provide the CI with the results of its allegation follow-up.

RECOMMENDATION - NRC Region I, and from a more generic programmatic perspective, OE, should evaluate its allegation program, procedures, and practices to determine whether there needs to be more exibility in honoring requests from a CI that they not be contacted. As noted in Observation A.1, notwithstanding the CI's request not to be contacted, in hindsight, additional contact with the alleger (via telephone or mail) would not have compromised the CI's identity and may have resulted in the NRC obtaining more specic information to support additional NRC action in this matter. In addition, contact with the CI to provide the results of the allegation review, including the NRC conclusion that it was unable to substantiate the CI's concerns, may have resulted in additional information being provided by the CI.

2. OBSERVATION - e structure of NRC Region I closure memorandums to le and closure letters to CIs is such that each concern is described, followed by the results of the NRC's evaluation of the concern. is structure is used for those concerns forwarded to the licensee for review and evaluation, as well. e structure does not include a section describing the licensee evaluation of, and response to the concern, and a separate section addressing the adequacy of the licensee's response to the concerns. is approach would provide an additional tool to ensure a more thorough review of the licensee's evaluation. RECOMMENDATION - e NRC regional o~ces, in coordination with OE, should evaluate their respective procedures and practices to determine whether the closure memorandum and closure letter, for concerns forwarded to the licensee, should be structured to address the follow

-ing four categories of information: (1) Concern; (2) Licensee Evaluation of, and Response to the Concern; (3) Adequacy of the Licensee Response to the Concern; and, (4) NRC Assessment of the Concern.

6 6 At least one other regional o~ce currently structures their closure letters/memorandums in this manner. NRC Region IV also recommended from its allegation process review that "a heightened sensitivity should be encouraged and exercised by the individuals that are responsible for closing the concerns to fully document how each issue was resolved. Include oine discussions and verications to clearly document how the concerns were resolved."

1 7Peach Bottom Review Team Findings C. Inspection Process for Detecting Inattentiveness and Inspector Awareness of Allegations

1. OBSERVATION - In his March 2007 allegation (2007-0040), the CI recommended that the NRC undertake a range of "covert" measures to detect security o~cer inattentiveness, measures which the NRC has not implemented in the past and which would have a variety of legal and personal safety implications. ere is a high degree of di~culty in verifying certain licensee employee behaviors or activities, such as inattentiveness on back shifts in remote locations. Given the conguration of the BREs, as well as the layout of the old ready room at the Peach Bottom Station, observations by inspec

-tors using typical inspection techniques to detect inattentiveness in these security facilities would most likely have been unsuccessful.

RECOMMENDATION - Given that licensees may elect to implement additional surveillance methods for inattentiveness in response to Bulletin 2007-01, "Security O~cer Attentiveness," (e.g., closed circuit cameras in BREs and ready rooms), the NRC's program O~ce of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR) should consider evaluating the information provided by these surveillance methods in the future, when appropriate.

2. OBSERVATION - On the same day that the concerns provided to the NRC in March were for

-warded to Exelon for review, investigation, and response, NRC Region I initiated a baseline inspection of the security program at the Peach Bottom Station. However, security specialists on that inspection were only knowledgeable of this allegation because one of the specialists happened to participate in the rst ARB for this allegation. us, the security specialist inspectors did not specically focus on looking for indications of inattentiveness during their inspection.RECOMMENDATION - e NRC regional o~ces should evaluate their respective procedures and practices to determine whether region-based inspectors should be apprised of pertinent open allegations pertaining to the licensee of a facility they are scheduled to inspect. Currently, in the course of preparing for such inspections, region-based inspectors are only informed of al

-legations they were assigned to review by an ARB.

3. OBSERVATION - e resident inspectors assigned to the Peach Bottom Station were cognizant of the CI's concerns since the March letter was sent to them and they completed the Allegation Re

-ceipt Report, forwarding the concerns to the allegation sta in the NRC Region I o~ce. Although a resident inspector's primary role is to look for problems with equipment, procedures, or people, no specic direction was provided to the resident sta by the ARB to give greater scrutiny to security of

-cers being attentive during their routine inspector tours of the site.RECOMMENDATION - e NRC regional o~ces should evaluate their respective procedures and practices to determine whether resident inspectors are informed of all allegation concerns specic to their assigned site, and the actions resulting from an ARB, so they are sensitive to the concerns in the course of their routine inspections, maximizing the opportunity to validate those concerns.

18U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission D. Conclusions and Next Stepse lessons-learned review team concluded that the NRC followed its allegation process in response to two of the three concerns communicated to the NRC in March 2007. With respect to the third concern that licensee management was aware of instances of inattentiveness, but did not take proper actions to address them, the review team concluded that the sta should have conducted a more thor

-ough review of the licensee's response in determining if the licensee's evaluation was adequate to resolve the concern. In addition, the review team identied some allegation process exibilities which could have been exercised that may have resulted in additional information as part of the NRC's eorts to validate the concerns expressed in the March allegation. However, it is not apparent that obtaining more information from the licensee with regard to its response to the allegation concern, or exercising these process exibilities, would have resulted in a dierent overall conclusion regarding the validity of the March 2007 allegation, or have resulted in the NRC identifying the unacceptable security o~cer behaviors before the events of September 2007. With respect to the NRC's program for inspecting security at nuclear power plants, the review team noted that none of the inspection procedures provide specic direction or guidance with respect to identifying potential security o~cer inattentiveness; however, the procedures do require inspec

-tors to monitor security o~cer performance in all plant areas, both during day and night shifts, and to conduct interviews with security force personnel at their duty stations. ese procedures also require reviews of the behavioral observation and tness for duty programs, as well as securi

-ty force work hours, all of which are regulatory measures designed to ensure security o~cer atten

-tiveness. e review team noted that no inattentiveness issues were identied during an NRC in

-spection of the licensee's performance in the security area that was conducted in April/May 2007. However, the scope of this inspection was not modied based on the information provided to the NRC in the March allegation. Due to the unique layout of security facilities, such as bullet resistant enclosures and ready rooms, it may be necessary to employ means other than typical NRC inspection techniques, to detect security o~cer inattentiveness.Finally, the review team concluded that the NRC took signicant and timely regulatory actions to ad

-dress evidence of inattentive security o~cers provided to the NRC in September 2007.Regarding NRC follow-up actions deriving from the results of this lessons-learned review, the follow

-ing next steps are proposed:

1. e lessons-learned report be forwarded to the agency Lessons Learned Oversight Board (LLOB) for the board's evaluation of whether the report recommendations contained therein meet the criteria of Management Directive 6.8, "Lessons Learned Program", for designation as an agency lessons-learned item.

2. NRC Region I evaluate the recommendations set forth in this lessons-learned report, and make allegation program procedure and process changes as necessary. To date, NRC Region I has sensitized the sta on the need to carefully document the basis for forwarding allegation concerns to licensees; maximize opportunities to inspect concerns in conjunction with the baseline inspection program in order to ensure independent NRC review; and thoroughly evaluate licensee responses to concerns forwarded to the licensee for evaluation/review.

19Peach Bottom Review Team Findings

3. e NRC O~ce of Enforcement, as the program o~ce responsible for allegation policies, a. consider the recommendations in this lessons-learned report and the results of the inde

-pendent review conducted by the AAA (see Attachment 3), to determine if any changes to the allegation program and/or implementing guidance should be made;b. coordinate with NRC Region I and share the results of this lesson-learned report with all regional and headquarters o~ces involved in handling allegations; and, c. for any recommended changes, determine whether additional resources are needed to implement the changes and quantify these resource needs.

2 0U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission DocumentYes or No and proceed to step 2 Review allegation for potential immediate public health and safety concerns?

Discrimination Potential NRC wrongdoing?

Generic applications?

Does CI object to RFI from licensee?Concerned Individual (CI)

Receipt of potential allegation within 5 days of receiptYesYes No No No NoYesYes or No Notify other Regions/HQ Proceed to step 2Transfer concerns to HQ and END PROCESS CI - Concerned IndividualOAC - Office Allegation CoordinatorARB - Allegation Review Board RFI - Request for InformationRFAI - Request for Additional InformationSSW - Staff Suspected WrongdoingADR - Alternate Dispute Resolution Determine if HQ has the lead No No NoYesConduct ARB ASAP NoYesReconvene ARB at 6 month point and every 4 months thereafter Closure goals: for tech. issues -

80% 150 days; 90% 180 days; 100% 360 daysConduct ARB within 30 days of receipt Inform OI/ADR/OI/DOL info to be provided to CI Return to step 4 Enforcement process Inform OI/ADR/OI/DOL info to be provided to CI* Screen allegation and concerns* Involve appropriate tech. staff* Assign responsibilities and action dates SSW?Provide allegation receipt form to supervisor and OAC 1.2.4.5.6.7.8.9.3.Send acknowledgement letter to CI (if necessary)Re-panel ARB with new information (if necessary)

Send closure letter addressing concerns to CI Document resolution of allegation and final report Inspection; RFI from licensee; referral to another agency (ex. OSHA)

Are substantiated concerns violations?

Do results and/or response address concerns?Receipt of licensee response; inspection results; OI transcript or report; new information or concernsSend ARB minutes to all involved +

OI + RC Branch review to properly identify concerns and recommendations forARB - draft ARB panel form and potential violationsInsufficient information -

contact CIRFAI/more inspection or investigationAd hoc ARBYesYesYes Inform Regional mgmt for OIG notification If other concerns, proceed to step 2; if not, END PROCESS Send/contact status update to CI (if necessary)

Every 180 days or soonerALLEGATION PROCESS FLOWCHART 21Peach Bottom Review Team Findings January 28, 2008MEMORANDUM TO:

Samuel J. Collins, Regional Administrator Region I FROM: Lisamarie L. Jarriel, Agency Allegation Advisor /RA/

O~ce of EnforcementTHRU: Cynthia A. Carpenter, Director /RA/

O~ce of Enforcement

SUBJECT:

RESULTS OF ASSESSMENT OF ALLEGATION RI-2007-A-0040On November 7-8, 2007, I performed an independent assessment, at the Regional Administrator's re

-quest of Region I's implementation of the NRC's Allegation Program as it relates to allegation number RI-2007-A-0040, received March 27, 2007. e assessment, consisting of the review of the allega

-tion le and discussions with members of the Region I sta, was conducted against the requirements and guidance of Management Directive (MD)8.8, "Management of Allegations," including a review against referral and evaluation criteria. On November 8, 2007, I met with the Regional Administrator and members of his sta to present the preliminary results of the assessment. In general, I found the allegation was handled in accordance with allegation process guidance, with the exception of one issue related to the su~ciency of the sta's evaluation of one of the three concerns. is issue is discussed below.Request for Information to the Licensee Regarding Allegation Concerns e concerns raised by the alleger included:

1) Security o~cers regularly sleeping on duty in the bullet resistant enclosures (BREs) and other areas due to fatigue from excessive overtime;

2) Security o~cers fearful of retaliation for reporting concerns internally or to the NRC, and;

3) Security o~cers believing that the NRC and licensee already know they are sleeping but don't want to address the issue. In addition, the alleger commented that, "e o~cers have to wake the sleeping o~cers up and feel they are becoming part of a cover-up by not reporting these incidents." On April 30, 2007, re

-gional management sent the licensee a request for information regarding concern 1 and the aspects of concerns 2 and 3 related to licensee management.

22U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionMD 8.8 addresses such requests for information or evaluation. Evaluations are not requested if doing so, among other things, could compromise an investigation or inspection because of knowledge gained from the request, or an independent review could not be assured because the party to which the request is being made is alleged to have been directly involved in the issue. e guidance also says that if an allegation raises an overriding safety issue the NRC will request an evaluation by the licensee regardless of any factor mentioned above.Both concern 1 and 3 include vague assertions of wrongdoing. According to interviews with the Regional Field O~ce Director, the O~ce of Investigation (OI) will not initiate an investigation with

-out specic indications of wrongdoing, such as dates of the infractions and the names of individuals involved in the alleged wrongdoing. Typically, in the absence of such specics, additional informa

-tion is sought from the alleger or by inspection. MD 8.8 also indicates that in the absence of such information the concern can be closed without further evaluation. Given that concerns 1 and 3 did not include the necessary level of specicity, additional information was needed for an investigation of wrongdoing to proceed. e alleger in this case explicitly requested that the NRC not contact him with regard to his concerns. erefore, honoring the alleger's request, the sta did not ask him for further information to support his assertions of wrongdoing. Rather, the region requested information from the licensee, after rst removing inferences to wrongdoing. With regard to the alleger's rst concern, the region requested information from the licensee regarding the assertion that o~cers were routinely sleeping due to fatigue. e assertion that such incidents were being "covered up" was not included in the request for information. Similarly, the region requested information from the licensee concerning the third concern regarding the appropriateness of actions taken to address known incidents of inattentiveness. As with concern 1, the region did not share with the licensee the vague assertion that the licensee knowingly did nothing to address such incidents. My assessment found that the region's request for information to the licensee was in accordance with MD 8.8 in that, a) the concerns involved an overriding safety issue that needed prompt attention by the licensee, b) specic wrongdoing assertions were not shared with the licensee, c) no OI investigation was planned due to the vagueness of the wrongdoing assertions, therefore, compromise of such was not an issue, d) concern 1 focused on wrongdoing by the security o~cers who were contractors, not licensee personnel, and, although concern 3 concerned licensee personnel, the request for information was made to senior licensee management, far removed from direct oversight of the security organiza

-tion, and e) the area of concern was focused on the BREs and the logistics required to successfully evaluate and substantiate sleeping in these areas necessitated the licensee's involvement. Although not associated with assertions of wrongdoing, it should be noted that information was also requested about the licensee's safety conscious work environment (SCWE) to help evaluate concern 2 regarding security o~cers' fear of retaliation. e NRC regularly monitors the licensee's SCWE us

-ing insights from allegation trends, and inspections involving interviews, observations, and document reviews. In the absence of corroborating information indicating challenges to the work environment, it is appropriate to request information about such concerns from the licensee. Each request for in

-formation from the licensee includes direction to the licensee that the evaluator be independent of the organization involving the alleged concern. For each of the concerns, personnel independent of security contractor and licensee line management reportedly conducted the evaluation.

23Peach Bottom Review Team FindingsAssessment of the Licensee's Response and Sta Evaluation of ConcernManagement Directive 8.8,Section I.D.7 articulates expectations for the NRC sta review of the licensee's response to requests for information. is section states:"NRC should ensure that a licensee's response is adequate. If a thorough review by the licensee is not conducted, it may be necessary for NRC to inspect or investigate the licensee's conclusions and assertions. e scope and depth of the NRC's verication should be predicated on many factors, such as, but not limited to, the licensee's past performance, the safety signicance of the matter, and the level of licensee management possibly involved in the matter." With regard to the regional sta's review of the licensee's response to the concerns discussed above, documents reviewed in the allegation le and interviews with key reviewers indicated that the regional sta applied their knowledge of the licensee's past performance to appropriately inform their review and that follow up was conducted on at least one specic aspect of the licensee's response. e sta's evaluation and response to concerns 1 and 2 were in accordance with the requirements and guidance in MD 8.8. With respect to concern 3, however, I was unable to determine the basis for the sta's conclusion that the scope and depth of the licensee's evaluation was adequate to resolve the concern. In response to concern 3, the region's memo to le closing the allegation stated that the licensee's response to this concern was "reasonable with supported conclusions." e licensee stated that they conducted interviews of personnel likely to encounter inattentive security o~cers, should they ex

-ist, and further that all reported incidents of security o~cers sleeping on duty were taken seriously, aggressively investigated, and corrected. However, with regard to the latter statement, the licensee's documented response did not provide corroborating evidence to support its claim. It is not clear, based on my review of the allegation le and interviews with regional sta, that additional support

-ing information was provided or sought concerning the specic inattentive instances identied by the licensee, the nature of the investigations conducted, the corrective actions taken, or the eectiveness of those corrective actions. It also was not clear whether the interviews referred to by the licensee were of su~cient rigor to identify whether all incidents of inattentiveness were reported. erefore, I was not able to determine the basis for the conclusion that incidents of inattentiveness were reported and proper actions were taken by the licensee in response to those incidents. It should be noted that it is not clear whether obtaining additional information with regard to this specic concern would have impacted the sta's overall conclusions regarding this allegation.In summary, the assessment found that allegation RI-2007-A-0040 was handled in accordance with MD 8.8 related to requests for information, but I was unable to determine the basis for the sta's conclusion that the scope and depth of the licensee's evaluation was su~cient to resolve one of the concerns raised. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

24U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

SUMMARY

OF RESPONSES BY NRC REGIONS II, III, AND IV TO CONCERNS WITH THE HANDLING OF INATTENTIVE SECURITY OFFICER ALLEGATIONSRegion IV completed a review of allegations received over the last two years. is review aimed at identify

-ing programmatic issues in the alle-gation program, and to specically identify any security or inattentive ndings that potentially could have been handled more rigorously. During this review, allegations were selected that included security issues, inattentiveness concerns, and cases involving allegers that were not satised with the manner in which the agency handled the allegation. Region III has audited all security-related allegations received since 2004, including those dealing with inattentive security o~cers, to identify best practices and op

-portunities for improvement.Region III has asked resident inspectors to evaluate current con

-ditions at each reactor site using the following questions:1. Does the site have a ready room like that at Peach Bottom?2. If so, has the resident toured the area on backshifts?3. Has the licensee communicat

-ed with site security personnel regarding the importance of remaining attentive?Region II is in the process of reviewing their history of providing security al

-legations to licensees. is information will be used to evaluate any areas for enhancement to the alle

-gation process, and correc

-tive actions developed to disposition responsibilities for any necessary changes.Programmatic Reviews and AssessmentsRegion IV is currently evaluating the recommendations / enhance

-ments stemming from this review which include:

• encourage increased sensitivity in providing complete docu

-mentation of closure bases;

• clarify and document responsi

-bilities for tracking and trending allegations;

• ensure identied issues involv

-ing inattentive operators/o~cers have been addressed;

• provide a phone call in addition to a closure letter in an eort to provide greater satisfaction of CI's; and,* establish a working group to de

-termine and standardize agency 'best practices' for handling allegations.Region III has expanded the dia

-logue during ARBs dealing with allegations of inattentiveness:

• e ARB discusses in greater depth whether an allegation of inattentiveness should be sent to the licensee for evaluation or reviewed through inspec

-tion/investigation

• e ARB considers whether resident inspectors should be asked to perform immediate walk-downs of security posts where o~cers are allegedly inattentive.

• e ARB also considers whether the Region should im

-mediately notify the licensee of alleged inattentiveness to avoid any potential safety or security issues that might be caused by alleged inattentiveness.Awaiting completion of Region II audit of security related allegations.Recommendations/

Improvements/

Enhancements Region IV (Dallas-Fort Worth)Region III (Chicago)Region II (Atlanta)

NUREG-1904 February 2008