IR 05000277/2007004

IR 05000277-07-004 and 05000278-07-004, on 07/01/07 - 09/30/07, Peach Bottom Integrated Inspection Report

ML073180112
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	11/13/2007
From:	Krohn P G Reactor Projects Region 1 Branch 4
To:	Crane C M Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
KROHN, PG
References
IR-07-004
Download: ML073180112 (42)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I475 ALLENDALE ROADKING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415 November 13, 2007Mr. Christopher M. CranePresident and CNO Exelon Nuclear Exelon Generation Company, LLC 200 Exelon Way Kennett Square, PA 19348

SUBJECT: PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATEDINSPECTION REPORT 05000277/2007004 AND 05000278/2007004

Dear Mr. Crane:

On September 30, 2007, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed aninspection at your Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Units 2 and 3. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 19, 2007, with Mr. J. Grimes and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules ofPractice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the PubliclyAvailable Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the PublicElectronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/Paul G. Krohn, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.:50-277, 50-278License Nos.:DPR-44, DPR-56

Enclosures:

Inspection Report 05000277/2007004 and 05000278/2007004

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information C. M. Crane2cc w/encl:Chief Operating Officer, Exelon Generation Company, LLC Site Vice President, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Plant Manager, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Regulatory Assurance Manager - Peach Bottom Manager, Financial Control & Co-Owner Affairs Vice President, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Senior Vice President, Mid-Atlantic Senior Vice President - Operations Support Director, Licensing and Regulatory Affairs J. Bradley Fewell, Assistant General Counsel, Exelon Nuclear Manager Licensing, PBAPS Director, Training Correspondence Control Desk Director, Bureau of Radiation Protection, Department of Environmental Protection R. McLean, Power Plant and Environmental Review Division (MD)

G. Aburn, Maryland Department of Environment T. Snyder, Maryland Department of Environment Public Service Commission of Maryland, Engineering Division Board of Supervisors, Peach Bottom Township B. Ruth, Council Administrator of Harford County Council Mr. & Mrs. Dennis Hiebert, Peach Bottom Alliance TMI - Alert (TMIA)

J. Johnsrud, National Energy Committee, Sierra Club Mr. & Mrs. Kip Adams E. Epstein, TMI Alert R. Fletcher, Department of Environment, Radiological Health Program J. Powers, Director, PA Office of Homeland Security R. French, Dir, PA Emergency Management Agency C. M. Crane2Mr. Christopher M. CranePresident and CNO Exelon Nuclear Exelon Generation Company, LLC 200 Exelon Way

Kennett Square, PA 19348

SUBJECT: PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000277/2007004AND 05000278/2007004

Dear Mr. Crane:

On September 30, 2007, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Peach BottomAtomic Power Station (PBAPS) Units 2 and 3. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which werediscussed on October 19, 2007, with Mr. J. Grimes and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's r ulesand regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities,and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. In accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Roomor from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessiblefrom the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/r eading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,Paul G. Krohn, Chief /RA/Reactor Projects Branch 4Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.:50-277, 50-278 License Nos.:DPR-44, DPR-56

Enclosures:

Inspection Report 05000277/2007004 and 05000278/2007004

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information Distribution w/encl:(via E-mail)S. Collins, RAP. Krohn, DRPM. Dapas, DRAR. Fuhrmeister, DRP D. Lew, DRPF. Bower, DRP, Sr Resident Inspector J. Clifford, DRPM. Brown, DRP, Resident Inspector G. West, RI OEDO S. Schmitt, Resident OA

H. Chernoff, NRRRoPreports@nrc.gov (All IRs)J. Lubinski, NRRRegion I Docket Room (with concurrences)

J. Hughey, PM NRR P. Bamford, Backup NRRSUNSI Review Complete: ____PGK_____ (Reviewer's Initials)DOCUMENT NAME: C:\FileNet\ML073180112.wpd ML073180112After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be released to the Public

.To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box:

" C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure " E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure " N" = No copyOFFICERI/DRP ERl/DRP NAMEMBrown/PKG forPKrohn/PGKDATE11/ 13 /0711/13 /07OFFICIAL RECORD COPY U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IDocket Nos.:50-277, 50-278 License Nos.:DPR-44, DPR-56 Report No.:05000277/2007004 and 05000278/2007004 Licensee:Exelon Generation Company, LLC Facility:Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3 Location:Delta, Pennsylvania Dates:July 1, 2007 through September 30, 2007 Inspectors:F. Bower, Senior Resident InspectorM. Brown, Resident Inspector T. Burns, Reactor Inspector R. Fuhrmeister, Senior Project Engineer E. Gray, Senior Reactor Inspector F. Jaxheimer, Senior Resident Inspector, Susquehanna M. Modes, Senior Reactor Inspector R. Nimitz, Senior Health Physicist G. Ottenberg, Reactor InspectorApproved by:Paul G. Krohn, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects iii

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000277/2007-004, 05000278/2007-004; 07/01/2007 - 09/30/2007; Peach Bottom AtomicPower Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3; Integrated Inspection.The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, a Susquehanna seniorresident inspector, a senior project engineer, and announced inspections by a senior health physicist and four regional specialist inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006. A.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

None.

B.Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant StatusUnit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) until September 5, 2007, when power was reduced to 55 percent for planned power suppression testing. On September 11, 2007, the unit returned to full power where it remained until the end of the inspection period, except for brief periods to support planned testing and rod pattern adjustments. Unit 3 began the inspection period at 100 percent RTP until July 25, 2007, when the unit began aplanned coastdown toward a refueling outage. On July 28, 2007, an unplanned power reduction to 89 percent was made due to a rapid rise in 3 'A' recirculation pump second stage seal temperature and, while the unit was at reduced power, the fifth stage feedwater heaters were removed from service. The unit returned to full power on July 28, 2007. On August 12, 2007, power was reduced to 93 percent for planned removal of the fourth stage feedwater heaters. The unit returned to full power on August 13, 2007. On August 30, 2007, power was reduced from 92 percent to 82 percent due to another rapid rise in the 3 'A' recirculation pump second stage seal temperature. Power was returned to maximum power for end-of-cycle coastdown on August 31, 2007.

On September 1, 2007, power was reduced from 92 percent to 86 percent due to control rod 34-07 scramming from full out to full in during performance of ST-O-60F-100-3, "Functional Test of Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channel

'A' Scram Test Switches." ON-121, "Drifting Control Rod" procedure was entered and all required actions were performed. After repairs were made, power was returned to maximum power for end-of-cycle coastdown on September 2, 2007, and the plant continued to coastdown until the unit was taken offline for a refueling outage on September 23, 2007, where it remained until the end of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R04Equipment Alignment (71111.04Q - 3 Partial Walkdown Samples).1Partial Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of three systems to verify the operability ofredundant or diverse trains and components when safety-related equipment was inoperable. The inspectors performed walkdowns to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, walked down system components, and verified that selected breakers, valves, and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation. The inspectors also verified that PBAPS had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the Corrective Action Program (CAP). The three systems reviewed were:

2Enclosure*3 'A' High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) System with 3 'B' HPSW Out-of Service;*2 'A' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System with 2 'B' RHR System

• Out-of-Service; and

• 3 'B' RHR System with 3 'A' RHR System Out-of-Service and Reactor Vessel not Flooded Up.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..2Complete Walkdown (71111.04S - 1 Sample)

a. Inspection Scope

During the week of September 24, 2007, the inspectors conducted one completewalkdown of the E-2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) system to verify the functional capability of the system. The inspectors used the licensee procedures and other documents listed below to verify proper system alignment:* Drawing E-1, Single Line Diagram Station;*Drawing M-377, Diesel Generator (DG) Auxiliary Systems;

• Procedure SO 52A.1.A-2, COL E-2 DG Normal Standby;

• Procedure SO 52A.1.A, DG Lineup for Automatic Start; and

• Procedure SO 52A.1.B, DG Operations.The inspectors also verified the EDG electrical power requirements, operatorworkarounds, labeling, hangers and support installation, and associated support systems status. Diesel support systems (air systems, fuel oil systems, etc.) were walked down to ensure proper operation. The walkdowns also included evaluation of system piping and supports against the following considerations:* Piping and Pipe Supports did not Show Evidence of Water Hammer;* Oil Reservoir Levels Appeared Normal

• Snubbers did not Appear to be Leaking Hydraulic Fluid;

• Hangers were Functional; and

• Component Foundations were not Degraded.A review of outstanding maintenance work orders (WOs) was performed to verify that thedeficiencies did not significantly affect the EDG system function. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the incident report database to verify that EDG equipment alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3Enclosure 1R05Fire Protection (71111.05Q - 9 Samples)Fire Protection - Tours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PBAPS's Fire Protection Plan, Technical Requirements Manual(TRM), and the respective pre-fire action plan procedures to determine the required fire protection design features, fire area boundaries, and combustible loading requirements for the areas examined during this inspection. The fire risk analysis was reviewed to gain risk insights regarding the areas selected for inspection. The inspectors performed walkdowns of nine areas to assess the material condition of active and passive fire protection systems and features. The inspection was also performed to verify the adequacy of the control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, the condition of manual firefighting equipment, fire barriers, and the status of any related compensatory measures. The following nine fire areas were reviewed for impaired fire protection features:*Unit 2 and Unit 3 Cable Spreading Room and Computer Room (Fire Zones 78Hand 129);*Unit 2 Core Spray Instrument Room, Reactor Building, 116' Elevation (Fire Zone5F);*Unit 3 Core Spray Instrument Room, Reactor Building, 116' Elevation (Fire Zone13F);*Unit 3 Lubricating Oil Tank Room, Turbine Building, 116' Elevation (Fire Zone 89);

• Unit 3 Turbine Lubricating Oil Reservoir & Battery Room, Turbine Building, 135'Elevation (Fire Zone 93);*Unit 3 'B' RHR Pump and Heat Exchanger (HX) Room, Reactor Building, 91'6" NS116' Elevation (Fire Zone 10);*Unit 2, Reactor Building, 135' Elevation (Fire Zone 5H)

• Unit 2, Turbine Lubricating Oil Reservoir & Battery Room (Fire Zone 90); and

• Unit 3, 135 Drywell Area (Fire Zone 32).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06 -

1 External Sample)External Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the design, material condition and procedures for coping with thedesign basis maximum probable flood. The inspectors reviewed the abnormal operating procedure for mitigating the design basis flood. The inspectors reviewed publicly 4Enclosureavailable information relating to dams upstream and downstream of the station to confirmpotential water levels which could be achieved in the event of failures or extreme weather.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q - 1 Sample) Resident Inspector Quarterly Review

a. Inspection Scope

On August 27, 2007, the inspectors observed operators in PBAPS's simulator duringlicensed operator requalification training to verify that operator performance was adequate and that evaluators were identifying and documenting crew performance issues. The inspectors verified that performance issues were discussed in the crew's post-scenario critiques. The inspectors also observed the operators' implementation of operating procedures. The inspectors discussed the training, simulator scenarios, and critiques with the operators, shift supervision, and the training instructors. The evaluated scenario observed for this one sample involved the events listed below: *An Anticipated Transient Without Scram; and*Loss of Shutdown Cooling.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q - 3 Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed three samples of PBAPS's evaluation of degraded conditionsinvolving safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) for maintenance effectiveness during this inspection period. The inspectors reviewed PBAPS's implementation of the Maintenance Rule (MR), and verified that the conditions associated with the referenced condition reports (CRs) were evaluated against applicable MR functional failure criteria as found in the licensee's scoping documents and procedures.

The inspectors also discussed these issues with system engineers and MR coordinators to verify that they were tracked against performance criteria and that the systems were classified in accordance with MR implementation guidance. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The following conditions were reviewed:* Issue Report (IR) 622567, Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure for AO-2-23-042 Failure to Open;*IR 654785, Rapid Rise in 3 'A' Recirculation Pump Second Stage SealTemperature; and*E-1 Diesel Running Alarm and Reset During Full Load Run, CR 656655.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 5 Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated PBAPS's implementation of their maintenance risk program withrespect to the effectiveness of risk assessments performed for maintenance activities that were conducted on SSCs and verified that the licensee managed the risk in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.65(a)(4) and procedure WC-AA-101, "On-line Work Control Process." The inspectors evaluated whether PBAPS had taken the necessary steps to plan and control emergent work activities; and to manage overall plant risk. The activities selected were based on plant maintenance schedules and systems that contributed to risk. The inspectors completed five evaluations of maintenance activities on the following:*WO C0221701, Replace E-1 EDG Angle Gear Drive;*WO C0221104-16, Perform Online Noble Chemistry Injection;

• IR 653733, Missed Technical Specification (TS) - Inservice Testing (IST) Surveillance on two PBAPS Safety/Relief Valves;*IR 654019, Missed TS - IST Surveillance on PBAPS Relief Valve; and

• IR 659815, 4 'A' Feedwater Heater High Level Alarm.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15 - 5 Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five issues to assess the technical adequacy of the evaluations,the use and control of compensatory measures, and compliance with the licensing and design bases. Associated adverse condition monitoring plans, engineering technical evaluations, and operational and technical decision making documents were also reviewed. The inspectors verified these processes were performed in accordance with the applicable procedures. The inspectors used TS, TRM, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and associated Design Basis Documents (DBDs) as referencesduring these reviews. The issues reviewed included:*'B' Emergency Cooling Tower Fan (AR A0041691);*Heavy Loads Review for RIS 2005-25 (IR 647808);

• Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics (LEFM) System Impact Due to Letter fromManufacturer (IR 642941);*E-1 EDG Ventilation Logic System Functional Test (ST-l-40F-251-2), (IR 658387);

and*2 'B' Core Spray Room Flooding (IR 670207).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

(71111.17 - 2 Samples).1Design Change to MO-2-014-26A

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed procedures CC-AA-102, "Design Input and ConfigurationChange Impact," and CC-AA-103, "Configuration Change Control," and reviewed PBAPS's activities to perform a design change for a motor-operated valve. The engineering change request (ECR PB 07-00031) was developed to increase the available torque for four motor operators by changing gear sets. The ECR package was developed to be applied to the motor operators on the core spray system loop 'A' and loop 'B' full flow test valves on Units 2 and 3. The Unit 2 loop 'A' valve (MO-2-014-26A) was the focus of this inspection. The review was conducted to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the motor-operated valve had not been degraded through this modification. The review of selected post-modification testing results were also conducted to verify that operability was established, to verify that unintended system interactions did not occur, and to verify that the test acceptance criteria were met.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Online Addition of NobleChem to Unit 3

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed procedures CC-AA-102, "Design Input and ConfigurationChange Impact," and CC-AA-103, "Configuration Change Control," and reviewed PBAPS's activities to perform a design change for performing an application of Online NobleChemŽ. ECR PB 07-00118 was developed to inject noble metals into the reactor coolant via the feedwater system to mitigate intergranular stress corrosion cracking. The review was conducted to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of safety-related systems and components were not degraded through this modification. The associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening evaluation was also reviewed to verify its technical adequacy.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 6 Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed selected portions of post-maintenance testing (PMT) activitiesand reviewed completed test records. The inspectors observed whether the tests were 7Enclosureperformed in accordance with the approved procedures and assessed the adequacy ofthe test methodology based on the scope of maintenance work performed. In addition, the inspectors assessed the test acceptance criteria to evaluate whether the test demonstrated that the tested components satisfied the applicable design and licensing bases and the TS requirements. The inspectors reviewed the recorded test data to verify that the acceptance criteria were satisfied. The inspectors reviewed six PMTs performed in conjunction with the following maintenance activities:*WO C0220918, Replace RO-3800D/RO-3789D/RO-3801D;*WO C0221375, Repair Leak on 2 'D' Core Spray Pump Cyclone Separator;

• WO C0217450, Replacement of DPIS-3-02-116C;

• Troubleshoot Rework Testing (TRT)07-041, Raise Power Following 3 'A' Recirc Pump Seal Contact Event on August 30, 2007;*WO C0222695, AO-3-10-046A, Correct Check Valve Seat Leakage; and

• WO R0880609, Remove and Replace E134-W-A.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20 - 1 Sample)

.1 Unit 3 Refueling Outage (RFO) 16a. Inspection ScopeThe Unit 3 RFO (P3R16) was conducted from September 23, 2007 through the end of theinspection period. Prior to the start of P3R16 on September 23, 2007, the inspectors reviewed the Outage Risk Assessment Management (ORAM) Plan against procedures OU-PB-104, "Shutdown Safety Management Program;" OU-PB-104-1001, "Shutdown Risk Management for Outages;" and OU-AA-103, "Shutdown Safety Management Program." The ORAM plan was reviewed to confirm that the PBAPS had appropriately considered risk, industry experience, and previous site specific problems in developingand implementing a plan that maintained shutdown safety defense-in-depth.During the RFO, the inspectors observed portions of the shutdown process andperformed the activities listed below to verify PBAPS controls over the outage activities:

• Unit Shutdown - observed operators removing the generator from the grid, reactor scram, and operator response to the scram including stabilizing the plant in Mode 3;* Containment - conducted an initial drywell walkdown to check for unidentifiedleakage or other discrepant conditions;* Clearance Activities - verified clearances on the 'A' loop of RHR;

• Electrical Equipment - conducted complete system equipment alignment of the E2 EDG with the 'A' RHR loop out-of-service;*Decay Heat Removal - conducted partial system equipment alignment walkdownof 'B' loop of RHR shutdown cooling, verifying proper alignment of decay heat removal systems while the 'A' RHR loop was out-of-service;* Inventory Control - verified procedures were being followed for the control rod drivedecoupling/replacement; 8Enclosure* Reactivity Control - verified that control rod blade removal was being performed inaccordance with PBAPS procedures and the TSs;* Refueling Activities - verified that the PBAPS was using adequate controls toensure the location of the fuel assemblies was properly tracked; and* PBAPS Identification and Resolution of Problems - verified that the PBAPS wasproperly documenting outage issues in their CAP.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 6 Samples) [1 IST Sample; 1 Reactor Coolant System(RCS) Leakage Sample; 1 Isolation Valve Sample; 3 Routine Samples]

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed and observed portions of selected surveillance tests (STs), andcompared test data with established acceptance criteria to verify the systems demonstrated the capability of performing the intended safety functions. The inspectors also verified that the systems and components maintained operational readiness, met applicable TS requirements, and were capable of performing the design basis functions.

The six STs reviewed and observed included:*ST-O-052-154-2, E-4 DG Simulated Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling System Signal Auto Start with Offsite Power Available;*ST-O-014-301-3, Core Spray Loop 'A' Pump, Valve, Flow and Cooler Functionaland In-Service Test [IST Sample];*ST-O-052-211-2, E-1 Diesel Generator (DG) Slow Start Full Load;

• ST-O-052-214-2, E-4 DG Slow Start Full Load;

• ST/Local Leak-Rate Test (LLRT) 30.10.07, LLRT - 'A' - RHR Pump DischargeValve (Isolation Valve Sample); and*ST-O-020-560-2, Reactor Coolant Leakage Test.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23 - 1 Sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed one temporary configuration change package (TCCP) to verifythat implementation of the modification did not affect systems important to safety. The review was also conducted to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk significant SSCs had not been degraded through these modifications. The inspectors reviewed the TCCP against the UFSAR and TSs to ensure the modifications did not affect system operability or availability. The inspectors compared the TCCP implementation to the guidance provided in procedures CC-AA-112, "Temporary Configuration Changes," and CC-MA-112-1001, "TCCP." *TCCP 07-00325, Jumper Installed on 'B' Phase of the Main Generator Output 9EnclosureDisconnect Switch (3G3).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness1EP6Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 1 Sample)Simulated Training Evolution

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine emergency drill conducted by Exelon onJuly 10, 2007. The inspectors observed activities in the control room simulator and Technical Support Center to evaluate classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors also attended the drill critique conducted by Exelon to compare inspector observations to those of the Exelon drill evaluators.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.2.RADIATION SAFETYCornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety2OS1Access Controls (71121.01 - 2 Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector selectively reviewed activities and associated documentation in the below listed areas. The evaluation of Exelon's performance in these areas was against criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, applicable TSs, and applicable Exelon procedures. Inspection Planning - Performance IndicatorsThe inspectors reviewed performance indicators (PIs) for the Occupational ExposureCornerstone. The inspectors also discussed and reviewed current performance, relative to the indicators, with cognizant Exelon personnel.Plant Walkdowns, Radiation Work Permit (RWP) Reviews, and Jobs-in-Progress ReviewsThe inspectors walked down selected radiological controlled areas and reviewedhousekeeping, material conditions, posting, barricading, and access controls to radiological areas. The inspectors made selective independent ambient radiation level measurements to verify conditions.

10EnclosureThe inspectors reviewed and discussed internal dose assessments for 2006 and 2007, since the previous inspection, to identify any apparent actual occupational internal doses greater than 50 millirem committed effective dose equivalent. The review also included the adequacy of evaluation of selected dose assessments, as appropriate, and included selected review of the program for evaluation of potential intakes associated with hard-to-detect radionuclides (e.g., transuranics). The inspectors selectively reviewed in-plant source term evaluations including average energy determinations.The inspectors reviewed and discussed the high radiation area controls program withradiation protection supervisors and technicians to identify changes that could potentially reduce program effectiveness and the level of worker protection. Problem Identification and ResolutionThe inspectors selectively reviewed self-assessments and audits since the previousinspection to determine if identified problems were entered into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors evaluated the database for repetitive deficiencies or significant individual deficiencies to determine if self-assessment activities were identifying and addressing the deficiencies. The review also included evaluation of data to determine if any problems involved PI events with dose rates greater that 25 R/hr at 30 centimeters, greater than 500 R/hr at 1 meter or unintended exposures greater than 100 millirem total effective dose equivalent, 5 rem shallow dose equivalent (SDE), or 1.5 rem lens dose equivalent.The inspectors reviewed problem reports since the last inspection which involved potentialradiation worker or radiation protection personnel errors to determine if there was an observable pattern traceable to a similar cause. The review included an evaluation of corrective actions, as appropriate. (See Section 4OA2.6)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified. 2OS2ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02 - 5 Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted the following activities to determine if Exelon was properlyimplementing operational, engineering, and administrative controls to maintain personnel exposure as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). Implementation of these controls was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, applicable industry standards, and applicable station procedures. Inspection PlanningThe inspectors reviewed station collective dose history, current exposure trends, andongoing and planned activities to assess current performance and exposure challenges.

The inspectors determined the plant's current 3-year rolling average collective exposure and determined the site specific trends in collective exposures (using NUREG-0713 and plant historical data).

11EnclosureThe inspectors reviewed planning and preparation for the Unit 3 maintenance outage. The inspectors evaluated interfaces between various station departments from an ALARA planning perspective. The inspectors evaluated the status of radiation protection shielding requests. The inspectors reviewed ALARA plans for work activities likely to result in the highest personnel collective exposures and reviewed the planning and preparation for those work activities to determine if ALARA requirements were integrated into work procedure and radiation work permit documents. The work activities selectively reviewed were: reactor coolant re-circulation pump work, torus inspection (diving activities), under vessel work/control rod drive change-out, in-service inspection, scaffolding activities, refueling activities, and various valve work activities. The inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 2006 Refueling Outage Report. The inspectors reviewed and discussed various Station ALARA Committee meeting minutes (2007) and reviewed the Peach Bottom Station 2007-2012 Exposure Reduction Plan.Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems The inspectors reviewed the assumptions and basis for current annual collective exposureestimates. The inspectors reviewed the exposure tracking system to evaluate the level of detail, and exposure report timeliness. Source-Term Reduction and ControlThe inspectors selectively reviewed and discussed Exelon's understanding of the plantsource-term, including knowledge of input mechanisms to reduce the source term; and the source-term control strategy in place. The inspectors reviewed and discussed work planning contingencies for changes in source term or radiation dose rates. The inspectors discussed the licensee's program for identification and control of areas of localized dose rates ("hot spots"). The inspectors reviewed station dose rates used for trending. Problem Identification and ResolutionsThe inspectors selectively reviewed applicable self-assessments and audits related to theALARA program. (See Section 4OA2.6)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified. 2OS3Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03 - 3 Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected activities, and associated documentation, in the belowlisted areas. The evaluation of Exelon's performance in these areas was against criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, applicable TSs, and applicable station procedures.Calibration, Operability, Alarm Setpoint 12EnclosureThe inspectors selectively reviewed calibration of the following instrumentation used forradiological assessment and used for ongoing work activities: *Area Radiation Monitor Channels (Criticality Monitors), Reactor Building RefuelFloor Monitors/Fuel Pool (Unit 3 Refueling Floor Areas);*Alpha Counter (SAC-4), 78486, 79099;

• Radiation Survey Meter (Telepole) - 75622, 79146;

• Portable Area Monitor (AM-2) - 76530, 333690;

• Contamination Monitors (RM-14) - 74050; and

• Local Air Monitor (AMS-4) - 334638. The inspectors selectively reviewed operability checks; calibration, including use ofappropriate sources; and alarm setpoints, as applicable. The inspectors selectively reviewed applicable self-assessments and audits related to theradiation monitoring instrumentation and protective equipment program. (See Section 4OA2.6)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety2PS1Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems(71122.01 - 1 Sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selectively reviewed the calibration of flow rate instrumentation for thestation plant vents and main stack. The review was against criteria contained in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.2PS3Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) (71122.03 - 11 Samples).1Review of the Implementation of Exelon's REMP

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the implementation of Exelon's REMP. The review was againstapplicable criteria specified in TSs, station procedures, the REMP program requirements outlined in the ODCM, and applicable NRC Guidance.

13EnclosureInspection Planning and In-Office InspectionThe inspectors reviewed the 2005 and 2006 Annual Environmental Monitoring Reportsand licensee assessment results to verify that the REMP was implemented as required by TS and the ODCM. The inspectors reviewed the reports for changes to the ODCM with respect to environmental monitoring, commitments in terms of sampling locations, monitoring and measurement frequencies, land use census, inter-laboratory comparison program, and analysis of data. The inspectors also reviewed the UFSAR results for information regarding the environmental monitoring program and meteorological monitoring instrumentation.The inspectors reviewed licensee self-assessments, audits, licensee event reports, andinter-laboratory comparison program results. (See Section 40A2.6)Onsite InspectionThe inspectors observed 10 thermoluminescence dosimeter (TLD) monitoring stations todetermine whether they are located as described in the ODCM and to determine the equipment material condition. The inspectors observed collection of air particulate and iodine samples at five locations. The inspectors observed collection of a composite drinking water sample at one location. The inspectors observed ongoing surface water sampling at the station discharge. The inspectors verified that the environmental sampling was representative of the release pathways as specified in the ODCM and that sampling techniques were in accordance with applicable procedures. The inspectors selectively reviewed calibration testing records for the meteorologicaltower (tower 2) to verify that meteorological instruments were operable, calibrated, and maintained in accordance with guidance contained in the UFSAR, NRC Safety Guide 23, and licensee procedures. The inspectors reviewed events documented in the Annual Environmental MonitoringReport, as applicable, which involved a missed sample, inoperable sampler, lost TLD, or anomalous measurement for the cause and corrective actions. The inspectors conducted a review of the Exelon's assessment of positive sample results(i.e., licensed radioactive material detected above the lower limits of detection), as applicable. The inspectors reviewed, as applicable, the associated dose calculations and radioactive effluent release data that was the likely source of the released material. The inspectors reviewed any significant changes made by Exelon to the ODCM as theresult of changes to the land census (2005, 2006) or sampler station modifications since the last inspection. The inspectors reviewed technical justifications for any changed sampling locations. The inspectors evaluated the reviews, as applicable, required to ensure that the changes did not affect the ability to monitor the impacts of radioactive effluent releases on the environment.The inspectors reviewed the calibration and maintenance records for selected airsamplers, composite water samplers, and thermoluminescent dosimeters.The inspectors reviewed the results of Exelon's vendor laboratory to analyze the REMPsamples and reviewed the results of the vendor's quality control program, including the inter-laboratory comparison program, to verify the adequacy of the vendor's program.

14EnclosureThe inspectors reviewed audits and technical evaluations performed on the vendor'sprogram. The inspectors reviewed the results of the inter-laboratory comparison program to verify the adequacy of environmental sample analyses performed and the quality control evaluation of the inter-laboratory comparison program and the corrective actions for any deficiencies. Where applicable, the inspectors reviewed determination of any bias to the data and the overall effect on the REMP. The inspectors reviewed quality assurance audit results of the program to determine whether Exelon met applicable the TS/ODCM requirements. Unrestricted Release of Material from the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA)The inspectors selectively observed locations where Exelon monitors potentiallycontaminated material leaving the RCA, and inspected the methods used for control, survey, and release from these areas. The inspectors observed the performance of personnel surveying and releasing material for unrestricted use to verify that the work was performed in accordance with plant procedures.The inspectors verified that the radiation monitoring instrumentation was appropriate forthe radiation types present and was calibrated with appropriate radiation sources. The inspectors reviewed Exelon's criteria for the survey and release of potentially contaminated material and verified that there was guidance on how to respond to an alarm which indicated the presence of licensed radioactive material.The inspectors reviewed Exelon's equipment to ensure the radiation detection sensitivitieswere consistent with the NRC guidance for surface contamination and for volumetrically contaminated material. The inspectors discussed Exelon's capabilities to detect radionuclides that decay via electron capture. The inspectors reviewed procedures and records to verify that the radiation detection instrumentation was used at its typical sensitivity level based on appropriate counting parameters (i.e., counting times and background radiation levels). The inspectors verified that Exelon had not established a release limit by altering the instruments typical sensitivity through methods such as raising the energy discriminator level or locating the instrument in a high radiation background area. Identification and Resolution of ProblemsThe inspectors reviewed Exelon event reports, special reports, audits, and self-assessments, as applicable, related to the REMP, since the previous inspection to determine if identified problems are entered into the CAP for resolution commensurate with their importance to safety and risk. The inspectors also reviewed ARs to evaluate Exelon's threshold for identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems relating to occupational radiation safety. The review included a check of possible repetitive issuessuch as radiation worker or radiation protection technician errors. The following documents were reviewed:*Program Area Audit - NOSA-PEA-06-04(AR476157476157, May 3, 2006, Chemistry,Radwaste, Effluent and Environmental Program;*Check-in Assessment - (609506); and

• ARs: 648182, 646600, 143932, 359300, 481820, 525342, 542286, 578328,359297, 394589, 429224, 438574, 593040).

15EnclosureThis review was against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, TSs, and the stationprocedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Review of Meteorological Data

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selectively reviewed the meteorological data associated with the variousmeteorological towers at the station and discussed the data with cognizant licensee personnel. The inspectors also reviewed and discussed determination of ambient environmental radiation doses using thermoluminescent dosimetry. The review was against criteria contained in the ODCM.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.4.OTHER ACTIVITIES4OA1Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 - 10 Samples)Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of the PBAPS's submittals for the PIs listed below toverify the accuracy of the data reported. The PI definitions and the guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline,"

Revision 4, and Exelon procedure LS-AA-2200, "Mitigating System Performance Index Data Acquisition and Reporting," were used to verify that procedure and reporting requirements were met. The inspectors reviewed raw PI data collected since January 2007 and compared graphical representations from the most recent PI report to the raw data to verify the data was included in the report. The inspectors also examined a selected sample of operations logs, licensee event reports, CAP records and procedures to verify the PI data was appropriately captured for inclusion into the PI report and the individual PIs were correctly calculated. *High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), Unit 2 and Unit 3;*Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), Unit 2 and Unit 3;

• EDGs, Unit 2 and Unit 3;

• RHR System, Unit 2 and Unit 3; and

• Emergency Service Water System, Unit 2 and Unit 3.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

16Enclosure4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems (PI&R) (71152 - 4 Annual Samples).1Torus Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

Based on identification of prior problems with the Unit 2 torus during an NRC InserviceInspection Program inspection and resident inspector input, the inspectors selected condition reports IR 500730, 500728, 500747, 500533, 500534, 500617, 500732, and 500751 as a PI&R sample for a detailed follow-up review. The prior inspection had identified weaknesses in the torus program, such as the follow-up on repaired areas, sample size, sample distribution, pit tracking, repair re-examination, and root cause.

The inspectors assessed Exelon's PI&R program and specific response to the issues raised by the prior NRC inspection. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken in response to the NRC concerns to determine if appropriate cause analyses, extent of condition reviews, and prioritization was undertaken. The inspectors reviewed the timeliness of Exelon's corrective actions to determine whether Exelon was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue. This review was undertaken in order to understand if the ultimate corrective action of recoating the torus was being planned in a timely fashion.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors determined that Exelon'soverall response to the issue was timely. The inspectors noted that Exelon's evaluation and follow-up corrective actions, as documented, were, in some cases, not completely responsive to the identified concern. Program owners and responsible engineering staff at PBAPS, however, clearly understood the concern and had implemented or were planning programmatic adjustments to accommodate the concerns. "Issue Report 670222, "LTA [Less-Than-Adequate] Documentation to Previously Identified NRC Questions," was written by Peach Bottom to capture this issue and enter it into their corrective action program.".2Inspection of Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) Practices and Corrective Actions Taken toExclude Foreign Material from Entering Plant Systems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected four IRs initiated in 2R16 (2006) for detailed review (IRs 533285,533343, 534435 and 534509). The IRs were associated with the introduction of foreign materials into SSCs which could impact nuclear safety and risk. The IRs were reviewed to ensure that the full extent of the FME issues were identified, appropriate evaluations were performed, root and contributing causes were identified, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors reviewed a number of action requests (ARs) associated with the disposition of each IR to determine if the actions taken or planned would restore a condition adverse to quality to an acceptable condition or capability. The inspectors reviewed the FME program, refuel floor FME plans, FME training materials and lesson plans, and the CAP. The inspectors interviewed personnel responsible for implementation of the FME program. The inspectors also conducted a plant walkdown of accessible areas of Unit 2, including the refuel floor where 17Enclosurenew fuel was being receipt inspected and placed into the fuel pool. The inspectorsevaluated the refuel floor FME area, examined the personnel log, tool and parts log, and observed the maintenance and control of the physical boundary of the area which isdesignated as a FME Area 1 (highest level of control).

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified associated with the review of the selected IRsand action assignments. However, the inspectors noted that there had been a previous loss of foreign material integrity on the refuel floor during refuel outages in 2003 (Unit 3)and 2004 (Unit 2). In the previous outages, the loss of foreign material occurred from the same location (reactor cavity work platform) and was found in the reactor vessel. The foreign material was removed without identified damage to reactor structural internals, fuel, connecting systems, or other vital components during those outages. The inspectors noted that a safety-related component was replaced ('D' RHR pump impeller) due to identified damage caused by the loss of a calibration standard during the Unit 2 refuel outage 2R16 (2006). The inspectors discussed this incident and previous instances with PBAPS and concluded that the same vendor was involved in the performance of the in-vessel visual inspection. This contractor was responsible for the work location and the control of various cameras, calibration standards, lanyard material, and other devices used to secure tools and loose equipment in use on the platform. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action(s) specified to enhance safety andperformance of personnel responsible for implementation of the FME program to preclude similar occurrences of material loss in areas where systems and components are exposed and the risk of tool and material loss is high. The corrective actions appear to have been marginally successful, in that, there was loss of foreign material from the reactor cavity work platform during the last refueling outage (P3R16) and the overall number of FME events decreased. However, this is still a focus area for the plant because there was a significant event involving FME that caused damage to a turbine bearing and a slight extension to the refueling outage..3Corrective Actions for the RCIC System Drain Line Crack/Leak of October 2006 Near theTorus Shell

a. Inspection Scope

This inspection focused on the PI&R and corrective action aspects of the RCIC systemdrain line leak that occurred in October 2006, near location of the RCIC discharge location at the torus.The inspectors reviewed the applicable AR's that described the leak condition, causeanalysis, and provided for assignments for completion of corrective and preventive actions. The AR's reviewed included:*AR 541265, Leak in Pipe Downstream, MO-2-23-031;*AR 541936, ANII Review of Work Done Under Issue 541265; and

• AR 554818, Safety-Related Pipe not Classed per 10 CFR 50.55(a). To see the location of the initial leak, the as-repaired configuration, and to verify the extent-of-condition effectiveness, the inspectors conducted walkdowns in the Unit 2 torus room and of portions of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 HPCI and RCIC systems. The inspectors 18Enclosureinterviewed the responsible engineering and American Society of Mechanical Engineers(ASME) Code inspection personnel to verify the adequacy of corrective actions. The inspection scope included review of the process for AR tracking, assignment tracking and control of the adequacy of task completion, the classification of safety-related piping, pipe flow rate evaluation scope, and the basis for confirmation that Unit 3 was not affected by a similar problem.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified..4 PECO/Exelon Procedures and Backlogged Procedural Changes

a. Inspection Scope

In order to determine if the backlog of procedure change requests negatively impactedplant safety, the inspectors reviewed Peach Bottom's CAP documents associated with requested procedure updates and enhancements that were backlogged in the licensee's procedure change tracking databases. The inspectors also reviewed whether conflicts existed that could have a detrimental effect on procedure completion in cases where there was an active PECO procedure and an Exelon controlling document. In December 2006, an initiative (IR 569168) to evaluate the number and potential effects of conflicting PECO and Exelon documents was put in place by the licensee.A sample of procedure modifications and enhancements was reviewed by the inspectorsto determine the impact the change would have on the procedure, and whether the amount of time it took the licensee to evaluate and implement the change was appropriate based on its impact. The inspectors also interviewed station personnel and searched the corrective action program documents to determine if any procedural conflicts resulted in any negative impact on plant operation.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified. Interviews with station personnel and review ofIR's indicated that no significant procedural conflicts existed between active PECO procedures and Exelon procedures. Of the sample that the inspectors performed on the existing items in the backlog of procedural updates, the majority were enhancements to the procedure intended to improve human factors or correct editorial errors. No examples were identified where a suggested procedure change involved critical steps of the procedure. Interviews with station personnel and review of backlogged procedure revisions indicated that appropriate prioritization methods were used based on the expected effect of the revision and when the procedure would be performed next.During the time of the inspection, a backlog of 1,558 requested procedure revisionsexisted station-wide. Approximately 1,400 of these were in operations and maintenance.

In general, Peach Bottom has established a plan to address new procedure change requests and reduce the backlog. Based on interviews with Peach Bottom personnel responsible for making the procedure changes, the inspectors acknowledged that additional resources would be required to effect a large reduction in the number of backlogged procedure change requests that would not be commensurate with the significance of the procedural enhancements. However, the inspectors noted a minor example of a procedure change request being inappropriately cancelled, with resources 19Enclosurebeing a contributing factor in IR 663248.

.5 Routine Review of Items Entered Into the CAP

a. Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure (IP) 71152, "Identification and Resolution ofProblems," and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures, human performance issues or program issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed routine screening of issues entered into PBAPS's CAP. This review was accomplished by selectively reviewing copies of IRs and accessing PBAPS's computerized database.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.4OA3Event Followup (71153 - 1 Sample)

.1 Alert Declared Due to Carbon Dioxide Leak from a Portable Fire Extinguisher in the DieselGenerator Building

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected applicable plant records, correction action documentsand approved procedures while evaluating the performance of PBAPS personnel in response to a non-routine evolution. The inspectors assessed personnel performance to determine what occurred and how the operators responded, and to determine if plant personnel's response was in accordance with plant procedures and training. The review also included the inspectors' observations in the main control room and the technical support center during the event. The following non-routine evolution was observed and reviewed:At 3:25 p.m. on August 8, 2007, plant personnel notified the main control room that theseal on a CO2 extinguisher in the E-3 EDG room had failed and the CO2 was rapidly discharging into the room. The concentrations of carbon dioxide and oxygen were not known and the room was evacuated. At 3:36 p.m., using EP-AA-1007, "Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station," the shift manager declared an Alert based on emergency action level (EAL) HA7, "Release of Toxic of Flammable Gases." State and Local Agencies notifications were completed at 3:46 p.m.

The emergency response facilities were staffed and activiated by 4:24 p.m. The event was terminated at 4:53 p.m. in accordance with plant procedures after the E-3 EDG room was ventilated and verified to be safe for access. PBAPS personnel determined that the E-3 EDG was unaffected by the event and remained available if needed. The inspectors verified that this event was placed into the CAP (IR 658607). Theinspectors verified that this issue captured the results of a subsequent review that determined that the emergency declaration was not required since an atmosphere immediately dangerous to life and health could not have been created by this equipment failure. The inspectors reviewed the root cause report (RCR) for this event (IR 658607-09) which documented that the basis for EAL HA7 was confusing. The inspectors also verified that insufficient training on changes to the HA7 basis were documented as a contributing cause.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.4OA6Meetings, Including ExitExit Meeting SummaryOn October 19, 2007, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Grimes and other PBAPS staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified. ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Exelon Generation Company Personnel

M. Flynn, Maintenance CAPCO

D. Foss, Senior Regulatory Engineer

F. Giaco, Core Spray/ Primary Containment System Engineer

J. Grimes, Site Vice President

A. Lloyd, Operations Support AD Coordinator

M. Massaro, Plant Manager

N. Alexakos, Manager, Engineering-Programs

J. Armstrong, Regulatory Assurance Manager

C. Behrend, Engineering Director

C. Jordan, Chemistry Manager

D. Lewis, Operations Director

D. Oltmans, Chemist

G. Stathes, Maintenance Director

S. Sullivan, Operations Support Manager

R. Taylor, Radiation Protection

S. Taylor, Manager, Radiation Protection

W. Thorpe, Chemistry CAPCO

A. Wasong, Training Director

NRC Personnel

F. Bower, Senior Resident Inspector

M. Brown, Resident Inspector

T. Burns, Reactor Inspector

R. Fuhrmeister, Senior Project Engineer

E. Gray, Senior Reactor Inspector

F. Jaxheimer, Susquehanna SRI

M. Modes, Senior Reactor Inspector

R. Nimitz, Senior Health Physicist

G. Ottenberg, Reactor Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened None.Closed None.

Discussed

None.

A-2Attachment

Section 1R04: Equipment AlignmentCOL 32.1.A-3, Revision 9,

HPSW SystemCOL 10.1.A-2A, Revision 18, RHR System Set Up for Automatic Operation

COL 10.1.A-3B, Revision 18, RHR System Set Up for Automatic Operation Loop 'B'

SO 10.2.B-3, Revision 15, RHR Shutdown Cooling Mode Shutdown

SO 52A.1.A-2 COL, Revision 12, E2 Diesel Generator Normal Standby

SO 52A.1.A, Revision 13, Diesel Generator Lineup for Automatic Start

SO 52A.1.B, Revision 39, Diesel Generator Operations Drawing E-1, Single Line Diagram Station Drawing M-377, Diesel Generator Auxiliary Systems

IR 645760, Exhaust Leak on Opposite Control Side of E-2 Diesel

IR 520690, D/G Local Speed was Downscale

IR 636425, 0BK016 Compressor Failed to Stop When Required

IR 591564, Numerous Lube Oil Leaks

Section 1R05: Fire ProtectionPF-5F, Revision 2, Prefire Strategy Plan Unit 2 Core Spray Instrument Room, Unit 2 Reactor Building, 116' ElevationPF-13F, Revision 2, Prefire Strategy Plan Unit 3 Core Spray Instrument Room, Unit 3 ReactorBuilding, 116' ElevationPF-89, Revision 2, Prefire Strategy Plan Unit 3 Lube Oil Tank Room, Unit 3 Turbine Building, 116'ElevationPF-78H, Revision 3, Prefire Strategy Plan Fire Zones 78H & 129 Cable Spreading Room &Computer Room Turbine Building, 150' ElevationPF-10, Revision 0, Prefire Strategy Plan 3 'B'

RHR pump and HX room Reactor Building, 91'6"and 116' ElevationPF-5H, Revision 2, Prefire Strategy Plan Unit 2 Reactor Building, 135' Elevation North

PF-90, Revision 2, Prefire Strategy Plan Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir & Battery Room

PF-32, Revision 0, Prefire Strategy Plan RB3 - 135 Drywell Area

Section 1R06: Flood Protection MeasuresSE-4 Bases, Revision 11, Flood - BasesSE-4 Procedure, Revision 21, Flood - ProcedureSection 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness622567, Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure for

AO-2-23-042 Failure to Open603918,

AO-2-23-042 Would Not Reopen During Performance of ST

A1607626,

AO-2-23-042 Would Not Reopen During the Performance of ST

A0394275,

AO-2-23-042: Operator PM/Replace Accessories

R0474324,

AO-2-23-043: Operator PM/ Replace Accessories

376462, AOV Improvement Item for BS&B Valves

21020, U2 HPCI Full Flow Test Valve

MO-2-23-021 Did Not Open

533180, Valve Travel Does Not Hit Backstop in Open Direction

ST-O-023-301-2, HPCI Pump, Valve, Flow and Unit Cooler Functional and In-Service Test

A-3AttachmentA1557558,

AO-2-23-042 30 DPM Packing LeakC0217287, Repack Valve, PB-2-23-P-V-AO-2-23-042

R1047738,

ST-O-094-400-2, Stroke Time Test of Valves for Post-Maintenance

ER-AA-410-1001, Revision 2, Air Operated Valve Design Basis Review and Setpoint Control

CC-AA-309-101, Revision 9, Engineering Technical Evaluations

533179, Valve Does Not Hit back stop in Open Direction

20592, EOC: Margin Improvement Opportunity for AO-2-23-043

MA-MA-716-010-1005, Revision 8, WO Planning Process

A1401592,

AO-2-13-032: OP PM/ Replace Accessories

29804, EOC: Install Longer Actuator Stems Next Opportunity

29806, EOC: Install Longer Actuator Stems Next Opportunity

29811, EOC: Install Longer Actuator Stems Next Opportunity

29816, EOC: Install Longer Actuator Stems Next Opportunity

IR 651056, 3 'B' Recirculation #2 Seal Pressure is Steadily Lowering

IR 651914, Secured Seal Bleed-Off System

IR 660110, Verify 3 'B' Recirculation Seal Purge Flow Indication

ST-O-052-201-2, E-1 DG Slow Start and Full Load Test.

ST-O-052-212-2, E-2 DG Slow Start and Full Load Test.

ST-O-052-154-2, E-4 DG ECCS Auto start test.

System 52, DGs - Scoping/Risk Significance Detailed Report System 52, DGs - MR Scope and Performance Monitoring Report (Scoping Questions)

IR 657327, Multiple Adjustments Required to Set EDG Speed Switches

IR 656655-09, Evaluate the Function of DGs to Become Ready to Load (Isochronous) from anActive Testing Condition/Run for MR Program Scope

UFSAR Section 8.5.5, Inspection & Testing

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work ControlAR A1622310,

E-1 EDG Speed Sensor

SPE-7257A Not Attached

IR 647557, E-1 EDG Speed Sensor

SPE-7257A Not Attached

AER-AA-600, Risk Management, Revision 5

ER-AA-600-1045, Risk Assessments of Missed or Deficient Surveillances, Revision 0

Regulatory Guide 1.182, Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities atNuclear Power Plants, May 2000IR

650334, Potential Impact to IST Relief Testing Intervals

AO 1E.2-3, Revision 13, Placing Feedwater Heaters In-service After a Heater Isolation

AO 1E.6-3, Revision 6, Unplanned or Maintenance Related Removal and Return to Service of theFifth, Fourth or Third Stage Feedwater HeatersRT-I-06-200-2, Revision 6, Feedwater Heater Level Controller Adjustment, Completed August 16, 2007R1070564, Unit 3 Feedwater Heater Level Controller Adjust

IR 00659815, 4 'A' Feedwater Heater High Level Alarm Drawing - M-305, Sheet 2, P&ID Vents & Drains Heaters 3, 4, & 5

Drawing - M-304, Sheet 2, P&ID Turbine & Extraction Steam Drawing - M-303, Sheet 4, P&ID Main Steam, Bypass & Crossaround

A-4Attachment

==Section 1R15: Operability EvaluationsIR

645596, During==

PM Inspection Maintenance Found 3-inch Crack in 'B' Emergency CoolingTower Fan BladeIR

640371,

RIS 2005-25, Supplement 1, NRC Heavy Loads Guidelines Clarification

NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-25, Supplement 1, Clarification of NRC Guidelines forControl Of Heavy LoadsNRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-25, Clarification of NRC Guidelines for Control Of Heavy LoadsECR

PB 07-00099-000, Update UFSAR per the Below Listed Passport Assignments

IR 642941, LEFM System Impact Due to Letter from Manufacturer

IR 632273, New LEFM Uncertainty Term

RT-O-098-01N-3, Revision 6, Daily Log Mode 1, 2 or 3

IR 649970, 3 'B' Feedwater Line, LEFM to Venturi Flow Ratio, Reading High

IR 627143, Water Leak through Ceiling Going into ARM 2-9 Junction Box

SO 6H.1.A-3, Revision 0, Feedwater Thermal Power Optimization System Startup

CIB 125, Revision 0, Cameron Customer Information Bulletin, Transducer Placement Uncertainty

IR 643464, LEFM to Venturi Ratios

IR 651530, Potential Leak on 'C' LEFM Indication Lines

PTRM 07-3-113, One or More LEFM System Flow Meters Inoperable (Potential)

IR 670207, Water Found in the 2 'B' Core Spray Room

IR 670313, Water Found in the 2 'C' Core Spray Room

RT-W-020-930-2, Survey for Floor Barriers in Reactor Building Drainage System

A1630240, Water Found in the 2 'B' Core Spray Room

Section 1R17: Permanent Plant ModificationsIR 576947,

MO-3-014-26A Not Able to Meet Minimum Thrust, Perform Extent of ConditionReview/Generic ImplicationsIR

637119, PMT Stroke of Core Spray

MO-2-014-26A Exceeded Stroke Time

IR 637918,

MO-2-014-26A Stroke Time After

ECR 07-00031 Close to Limit

IR 637907,

MO-2-014-26A PMT Performed Prior to PMT Procedures Distributed

A1619072, PMT Stroke of Core Spray

MO-2-014-26A Exceeded Stroke Time

A1043247,

MO-3-014-26A-OP:

Perform Motor Operator PM

A1618839,

ST-O-094-400-2 - Stroke Time Test of Valves for Post-Maintenance

R1069113, Stroke Time Test of Valves for Post-Maintenance

A1103178, Core Spray Loop 'A' Full Flow Test Valve Operation

ST-O-094-400-2, Stroke Time Test of Valves for Post-Maintenance Testing (Test Records)

IR 446521, Apply NMCA During P3R16

IR 598502, ECR for Online Noble Chemistry (OLNC) Durability/ECP Monitor

IR 630085, OLNC ECR Impact Reviews Overdue

IR 651480 Online Noble Metals Setpoint Changes Resulted in Inaccurate Scale Display

IR 648134, GE OLNC Procedure Issues

IR 648567, OLNC Injection Skid Dilution Pump Leak

IR 647975, OLNC Sample Skid Tube Fitting Failure

IR 639559, Material for OLNC Not Available

IR 652251, Pump Failure - OLNC Injection Skid

IR 650517, No Guidance for Sampling U3 GE Noble Metal Sampling Skid

IR 648992, Main Steam Line Radiation Monitoring Alarm Setpoint Issues

IR 640785, Noble Metals ECP Manifold ECR Revision

IR 640575, Iron ECP Probe Degraded

A-5AttachmentIR

653373, Online NMCA Recommend NNOE to IndustryIR

663286, GE Warranty Not Met for Online Noble Metal Deposition

50.59 Screening No.

PB-2007-22-S, Online Addition of NobleChem to Unit 3

Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance TestingC0220918, Replace

RO-3800D/

RO-3789D/

RO-3801DST-O-032-301-3, HPSW Pump, Valve and Flow Functional and Inservice Test Completed July 31, 2007R1071399, HPSW PP, Valve and Flow Functional Test

C02212375, Repair Leak on 2 'D' Core Spray Pump Cyclone Separator

IR 660155, 2DS764 Had a One Drop Per Second Leak

ST-O-014-306-2, Revision 24, Core Spray Loop 'B' Pump, Valve, Flow and Cooler Functional andInservice TestMA-AA-716-008, Revision 2, FME Program

SO 14.7.B-2, Revision 3, Manual Operation of Core Spray System with Discharge to Torus

C0217450, Replacement of DPIS-3-02-116C

SI3A-2-MSL-C1FQ, Revision 5, Functional Test Main Steam Line High Flow Instruments of RPS'C' Card File, Completed August 20, 2007IR

662229,

DPIS-3-02-116C Has its Associated Trip Light Lit

LCO 7-3-162, Function 1C - Main Steam Line Flow - High INOP

PBAPS TSs 3.3.6.1 - Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

TRT Control Form 07-041, Raise Power Following 3 'A' Recirc Pump Seal Contact Event onAugust 30, 2007Adverse Condition Monitoring and Contingency Plan - 3 'B' Recirc Pump Seal Increasing SecondStage Pressure Issued March 20, 2006IR

666150, Unit 3 Power Reduction - Issue for Tracking

GP-5, Revision 65, Power Operations

SO 2A.1.D-3, Revision 8, Operation of the Recirc Pump Speed Control System

OP-AB-300-1003, Revision 3, Boiling Water Reactor Reactivity Maneuver Guidance

WO

C0222695,

AO-3-10-046A, Correct Check Valve Seat Leakage

ST-O-007-510-3, Revision 3, Primary Containment isolation System Valves Remote PositionIndication Verification ST/LLRT 30.10.07, Revision 8, Local Leak Rate Test 'A' - RHR Pump Discharge

R0880609, Remove and Replace E134-W-A

AO 56.1, Removing and Returning to Service a 480 VAC Emergency or Non-Emergency MotorControl Center BucketA1337929, Perform Circuit Breaker Inspection

M-C-700-232, Testing and Control of 600 Volt Class Molded Case Circuit Breakers and Setpoints

C0220342,

CHK-3-06-96B, Inspect/Rework as Required

C0220385,

CHK-3-06-96A, Inspect/Rework as Required

==Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage ActivitiesIR

00674468, Blocked==

A-C-134 Hatches on Unit 3 Reactor 135-ScaffoldOU-PB-104-1001, Revision 1, Shutdown Risk Management for Outages

OU-PB-104, Revision 0, Shutdown Safety Management Program

OU-AA-103, Revision 7, Shutdown Safety Management Program

GP-6, Revision 15, Refueling Operations

GP-26, Revision 19, Coordination of HCU, CRB, CRD, DBG, and PIP Work During a Refuel

A-6AttachmentOutageGP-3, Revision 108, Normal Plant Shutdown

GP-18, Revision 23, SCRAM Review Procedure

COL

GP-18, Revision 40, SCRAM Review Procedure Check List

ER-AA-600-1043, Revision 4, Shutdown Risk Management

3R16, Shutdown Safety Status

IR 680361, P3R16 Dose Estimate is 306 REM on Estimate of 228

IR 672478, Failure of A200 Motor Contactor

IR 672690, 3 'B' RHR Loop Shutdown Cooling Data - P3R16

IR 672693, 3 'A' RHR Loop Shutdown Cooling Data - P3R16

IR 672823, MOV Motor Inspection required for Magnesium Rotor Condition

IR 673119, Perform Acoustic monitoring on U3 Scram Inlet/Outlet valvesIR

673126, PORC Safety Concerns with Bottom Head Flush Evolution

IR 673155, Recirculation Pump Snubber Replacement strut Fails Form, Fit and Function

IR 677669,

AO-3-10-046A Body to Bonnet Bolts New Discovery

IR 669963, Installation of Vent Connections for 3 'B' Recirculation Pump not in P3R16

R1009978, RHR Loop A PCIV Leakage (Refuel)

R1008351, LLRT: MSIV 'C'

R1008596, ISI 'B' CS PCIV Leakage Test

Section 1R22: Surveillance TestingSO 52A.1.B,

DG OperationsST-0--52-214-2, Revision 21, E-4 DG Slow Start Full Load and IST Test

ST-0-052-154-2, Revision 8, E-4 DG Simulated Unit 2 ECCS Signal Auto Start with Offsite PowerAvailableSO 52A.1.B, Revision 39, DG Operations

ST-O-020-560-2, Reactor Coolant Leakage Test

R1077161, Reactor Coolant Leakage Test

TC# 07-083, Implement 343 Startup Loading Restrictions During 2SU Outages IAW Tech Eval576602-05ST/LLRT 30.10.07, Revision 8, LLRT 'A' - RHR Pump Discharge

WO R1009940, LLRT: 'A' RHR Pump DischargeSection 1R23: Temporary Plant ModificationsIR

664019, Increased Heating on the 'B' Phase Ball of Switch #3G3AR A1628158, Increased Heating on the 'B' Phase Ball of Switch #3G3

Quanta Services Barehand Work Procedure

TRT 07-43, Install Jumper to Bypass the 3G3 Disconnect Switch

WO

C0222340, Install Jumper on Switch #3G3, Disconnect Switch from North SubstationRing Bus to Unit 3 Generator

Section 2OS1: Access ControlsProceduresRP-AA-461, Revision 1, Radiological Controls for Contaminated Water Diving OperationsRP-AA-350, Revision 7, Personnel Contamination Monitoring, Decontamination and ReportingRP-AA-400, Revision 4,

ALARA Program

RP-AA-401, Revision 7, Operational ALARA Planning

RP-AA-551-1003, Revision 3, Cobalt Reduction Program Work Process

A-7AttachmentOU-AA-101, Revision11, Refuel Outage ManagementRP-AA-550-1001, Revision 2, Hot Spot and Radiation Source Component Tracking

RP-AA-4002, Revision 2, Radiation Protection Refuel Outage ReadinessSection 2PS1: Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and MonitoringSystemsRadiation Dose Assessment Report No. 21, dated April 25, 2006Radiation Dose Assessment Report No. 22, dated April 27, 2007

Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report No. 64, dated May 25, 2007

Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report No. 63, dated May 24, 2006

Radioactive Effluent Release Report No. 49, dated April 27, 2007

Meteorological Tower Calibration Records and Associated Procedures (most recent) Land Use Survey - 2005, 2006Calibration Procedures, Calibration Results, Operability Checks for Instrumentation Used forMaterial and Personnel Surveys

Procedure

RP-AA-503, Revision 1, Unconditional Release Survey Method

Procedure

RP-AA-300-1002, Revision 0, Electron Capture Isotope Control

Procedure

CY-AA-130-200, Revision 7, Quality ControlProcedure

CY-AA-170-1100, Revision 0, Quality Assurance for REMP Procedure

CY-AA-170-200, Revision 0 Radioactive Effluent Controls Program

Procedure

CY-AA-160-000, Revision 3, Chemistry Records

Procedure

CY-AA-170-100, Revision 1, REMP

Procedure

CY-AA-170-300, Revision 1, ODCM Administration

Procedure

CY-AA-170-1000, Revision 2, REMP and Meteorological Program ImplementationSample Collection Procedures - Water, Air Particulate, and Air Iodine

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator VerificationLS-AA-2200, Revision 1, Mitigating System Performance Index Data Acquisition & ReportingER-AA-2020, Revision 3, Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX) andMitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) Failure Determination EvaluationIR 633198,

IRs are not Consistently Getting MSPI Failure Determinations

IR 639563, MSPI Report Shows Unexpected E-1 EDG Unavailability Hours

IR 631822, Extending Rollout of the 2006 Revised PRA Update at PBAPS

PB's Archival Operations Logs January 1, 2007 to August 31, 2007

PBAPS Mitigating Systems Performance Index Basis Document

MSPI Derivation Report - Unit 2 HPCI - July 2007

MSPI Derivation Report - Unit 3 HPCI - March 2007

MSPI Derivation Report - Unit 2 HPCI - March 2007

MSPI Derivation Report - Unit 2 RCIC - March 2007

MSPI Derivation Report - Unit 3 RCIC - March 2007

MSPI Derivation Report - Unit 2 Emergency AC Power Systems - April 2007

MSPI Derivation Report - Unit 3 Emergency AC Power Systems - April 2007

MSPI Derivation Report - Unit 3 RHR - March 2007

MSPI Derivation Report - Unit 2 RHR - March 2007

MSPI Derivation Report - Unit 3 Cooling Water System - March 2007

MSPI Derivation Report - Unit 2 Cooling Water System - March 2007

Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution

Procedures

A-8AttachmentN-FME, Maintenance Training-FME WorkerMA-AA-716-008 R2, FME Program December 11, 2006 R4, Fuel Floor FME Plan PBAPS

LS-AA-125, Revision 11, CAP Procedure

LS-AA-127, Revision 7,

Passport Action Tracking Management Procedure

AD-AA-101-1002, Writer's Guide and Process Guide for Procedures and T&RM, Revision 11

AD-AA-101, Processing of Procedures and T&RMS, Revision 18

AO-56E.2-2, E124-R-C, E124-T-B, E124-D-A, E124-P-A and E124-O-A Motor Control Centers orE124 Emergency Load Center Deenergization and Reenergization, Revision 12HU-AA-104-101, Procedure Use and Adherence, Revision 0

IC-C-11-00010, Calibration of Pressure and Vacuum Switches, Revision 1

M-007-011, Target Rock 1" Model No. 73AA-001 Solenoid Valve Maintenance, Revision 1

NE-C-210, Establishing and Maintaining Component Classification, Revision 6

SO-10.1.B-3, Residual Heat Removal System Shutdown Cooling Mode Manual Start, Revision 31

ST-O-033-400-2, ESW Valve

CHK-2-33-514 Inservice Test, Revision 7

T-101, RPV Control, Revision 18

T-216-2, Control Rod Insertion by Manual Scram or Individual Scram Test Switches, Revision 7

T-357-2, Area 57 Fire Guide, Revision 1Issue ReportsIR

533285, Grinding not Controlled in the RCIC RoomIR

533343, PB not Meeting Expectations for the Control of FMEA 1 Zones

IR 534435, FME Performance Escalation (FME Issues During Torus Project)

IR 534509, Calibration Standard Unaccounted for During IVVI

IR 670229, Response to Previously Identified NRC Questions Inadequate

IR,

666004, NOS Identified No Porc Reviewed Procedure for Containment Access

2530 327656

438428

438441

449561

453559

478007

485289

498390

498519

508166 532267

2876

533284

539952

2841

546678

554357

554676

555889

556079 556081

556084

556522

560911

568035

568038

569168

571410

571433

571833 586750

589281

589618

609539

610409

21388

26111

631866

637376

649908 656960

658618

661162

661394

661496

663248Action RequestsAR

00533309, Torus FME Issues and Recovery Plan (Includes 27 Assigned Actions)AR

00534435, FME Performance Escalation Torus Project (Includes 4 Assigned Actions)

AR 00533309, Report Performance of Root Cause (2R16 FME Issues) Torus Project

AR 00534509, Lost Calibration Standard and Attached Rope (Includes 53 Assigned Actions)

AR A1584575, Grinding Not Controlled in the RCIC Room - 2R16AR

00533285, Grinding Not controlled in RCIC Room (Includes 8 Assigned Actions)AR

00533343, PB not Meeting Expectations for the Control of FMEA 1 Zones (Includes 2Assigned Actions)AR

541265, Leak in Pipe Downstream,

MO-2-23-031

A-9AttachmentAR

541936, ANII Review of Work Done Under Issue 541265AR

554818, Safety-Related Pipe not Classed Per 10 CFR 50.55a

AR 00658602* - Moisture on Torus Shell Below Valve MO-2-10-34B

AR 00658605* - Torus Room floor Wet and Slippery

AR 00658855* - Schedule Evaluation for Piping Inspection in Torus

A0793153 A0806704

A0811417

A0814241

A0817109

A0819370

A0819371 A0820363 A0835283

A0848186

A0865974

A0896276

A0959323

A0961983 A0970868 A0981206

A1035116

A1050371

A1078118

A1078294

A1084919 A1090971 A1093106

A1181734

A1198628

A1299331

A1310579

A1339378 A1378124 A1403305

A1423708

A1479229

A1492617

A1495766* Indicates this was generated as a result of this inspection.LS-AA-125, Revision 11, CAP ProcedureLS-AA-127, Revision 7,

Passport Action Tracking Management ProcedureEngineering ReportsFailure Analysis of the Peach Bottom Unit 2 HPCI/RCIC Flush Line, Project Number

PEA-23656,Dated October 26, 2006Drawings/IsometricsBechtel Dwg S-54, Revision 30, Job #6280; Containment Vessels Requirement SuppressionChamber - Units 2 & 3, Plan Sections and PenetrationsP&I Diagram, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, Sheet 1 # 6280-M-359, Revision 49

P&I Diagram, High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Sheet 1 # 6280-M-365, Revision 61Other DocumentsPeach Bottom Atomic Power Station Procedure Revision Report, August 21, 2007PECO - Station Common Document Listing Report, January 5, 2007

==Section 4OA3: Event FollowupIR

658607, Alert Declared for==

CO2 in E-3 EDG BayIR

660892, NER

PB-07-055 Yellow - Alert Due to CO2 Extinguisher Failure

IR 665576, Suspected IDHL Alert - Ops Shirt Critique Items

IR 665991, EP - RA1 & RU1 EAL Threshold Value Description Contradicted by Basis

IR 660094, Portable CO2 Fire Extinguisher Rupture Disk Failure

IR 658620, ERO Phones in MCR Distracting During Event

IR 658621, NRC Resident Phone in MCR in Undesirable LocationIR

658655, U2 ERDS Disconnected from NRC During August 8, 2007 AlertGP-15, Local Evacuation

EP-AA-1007, Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station,Revision 14PEA-62117, Failure Evaluation of an ANSUL Sentry 20 CD20-1 20 lb. Fire Extinguisher that

A-10AttachmentDischarged in the E3 Diesel Bay, Peach Bottom StationEvent Summary Report of Alert Declared at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station on 8/8/2007

Exelon Press Release, Peach Bottom Declares, Terminates Alert dated August 8, 2007

PNO-I-07-007, Alert Declared Due to Carbon Dioxide Leak from a Portable Fire Extinguisher inthe Diesel Generator Building, dated August 8, 2007 (DCS no. 05000277080807;

ML072200656)

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADAMSAgency-wide Documents Access and Management SystemALARAas low as is reasonably achievable

ARaction request

ASMEAmerican Society of Mechanical Engineers

CAPcorrective action program

CFRCode of Federal Regulations

CRcondition report

DBDsDesign Basis Documents

DGdiesel generator

DRPDivision of Reactor Projects

EALemergency action level

ECRengineering change request

EDGemergency diesel generator

FMEforeign material exclusion

FMEAforeign material exclusion area

HXheat exchanger

HPCIhigh pressure coolant injection

HPSWhigh pressure service water

IPInspection Procedure

IRissue report

ISTinservice testing

IVVIin-vessel visual inspection

LEFMlinear elastic fracture mechanics

LLRTlocal leak-rate test

MRMaintenance Rule

NDEnon-destructive examination

NEINuclear Energy Institute

NRCNuclear Regulatory Commission

ODCMOffsite Dose Calculation Manual

ORAMoutage risk assessment management

PARSPublicly Available Records

PBAPSPeach Bottom Atomic Power Station

PIperformance indicator

PI&Rproblem identification & resolution

PMTpost-maintenance testing

RCAradiologically controlled area

RCICreactor core isolation cooling

RCRroot cause report

REMPRadiological Environmental Monitoring Program

RFOrefueling outage

RHRresidual heat removal

RPSreactor protection system

RTPrated thermal power

A-11AttachmentRWPradiation work permitSSCsstructures, systems, and components

STssurveillance tests

TCCPtemporary configuration change package

TLDthermoluminescence dosimeter

TRMTechnical Requirements Manual

TRTTroubleshoot Rework Testing

TSTechnical Specification

UFSARUpdated Final Safety Analysis Report

WO work order