ONS-2018-011, Ufsar/Selected Licensee Commitment Changes
| ML18033A610 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 01/25/2018 |
| From: | Burchfield J Duke Energy Carolinas |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| ONS-2018-011 | |
| Download: ML18033A610 (45) | |
Text
- .I ef,DUKE
~'ENERGY ONS-2018-011 January 25, 2018 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station 10 CFR 50.71(e)
Docket Numbers 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 Renewed License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 UFSAR/Selected Licensee Commitment Changes J. Ed Burchfield, Jr.
Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Duke Energy ON01VP 17800 Rochester Hwy Seneca, SC 29672 o: 864.873.3478
- f. 864.873.4208 Ed.Burchfield@duke-energy.com Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.71(e), please find attached the latest revisions to the Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) Manual. The SLC Manual constitutes Chapter 16 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
Any questions regarding this information should be directed to Chris Wasik, Regulatory Affairs Manager, at (864) 873-5789.
I certify that I am a duly authorized officer of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, and that the information contained herein accurately represents changes made to Chapter 16 of the UFSAR since the previous submittal. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on January 25, 2018.
Sincerely, J. Ed Burchfield, Jr.
Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Attachments www.duke-energy.com
ONS-2018-011 January 25, 2018 Page 2 cc: Ms. Catherine Haney Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 Ms. Audrey Klett, Project Manager (ONS)
(by electronic mail only)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 0-08B1A Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Mr. Eddy L. Crowe Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station
ONS-2018-011 January 25, 2018 Attachments Revised Oconee Nuclear Station SLC Manual Pages SLC List of Effective Pages (LOEPs), Rev. 023 LOEP SLC Table of Contents, Rev. 006 TOC SLC 16.9.3 Keowee CO2 Systems
- DELETED*
16.9.3 SLC 16.9.6 Fire Detection Instrumentation, Rev. 005 16.9.6 SLC 16.9.9 Additional Protected Service Water (PSW)
System Commitments, Rev. 002 16.9.9 SLC 16.9.9a PSW Battery Cell Parameters *DELETED*
16.9.9.a SLC 16.9.22 PSW System Unavailability
- DELETED*
16.9.22 SLC 16.9.23 Alternate Chilled Water (AWC) and Alternate Reactor Building Cooling (RBC) Systems, Rev. 001 16.9.23 SLC 16.9.25 Spent Fuel Pool Area Isolation, Rev. 001 16.9.25 1 - 4 1 - 7 1 - 1 1 - 11 1 - 5 NIA 1 - 1 1 - 7 1 - 5
Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 01 /08/18 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Number Implementation Date 16.0 005 08/16/17 16.1 000 10/15/07 16.2 000 08/25/14 16.3 001 06/29/15 16.4 PENDING 16.5.1 000 11/26/12 16.5.2 000 11/15/12 16.5.3 000 02/21/07 16.5.4 000 11/15/12 16.5.5 Deleted 5/16/09 16.5.6 Deleted 02/10/14 16.5.7 000 12/13/06 16.5.8 000 01/31/07 16.5.8a Deleted 5/19/05 16.5.9 000 11/15/12 16.5.10 000 10/08/03 16.5.11 000 01/31/00 16.5.12 000 03/27/99 16.5.13 000 03/27/99 16.6.1 000 07/23/12 16.6.2 000 01/31/07 16.6.3 000 11/15/12 16.6.4 000 11/15/12 16.6.5 000 12/14/00 16.6.6 000 11/15/12 16.6.7 000 03/27/99 16.6.8 000 03/27/99 16.6.9 000 11/15/12 16.6.10 000 11/15/12 16.6.11 000 11/15/12 16.6.12 000 11/15/12 16.6.13 000 03/31/08 16.6.14 000 04/21/14 16.6.15 000 11/15/12 16.7.1 000 11/15/12 Oconee Nuclear Station LOEP 1 Revision 023
.Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 01/08/18 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Number Implementation Date 16.7.2 000 11/15/12 16.7.3 000 11/15/12 16.7.4 000 07/14/05 16.7.5 000 11/15/12 16.7.6 000 04/08/14 16.7.7 000 11/15/12 16.7.8 000 03/27/99 16.7.9 000 10/23/03 16.7.10 000 11/15/12 16.7.11 000 11/15/12 16.7.12 000 06/30/04 16.7.13 000 12/05/12 16.7.14 000 11/15/12 16.7.15 000 04/08/14 16.7.16 000 10/14/15 16.7.17 000 07/14/16 16.8.1 000 08/09/01 16.8.2 000 02/10/05 16.8.3 001 01/26/16 16.8.4 000 02/10/05 16.8.5 000 05/21/15 16.8.6 000 01/04/07 16.8.7 000 01/31/00 16.8.8 000 01/31/00 16.8.9 000 06/21/05 16.9.1 001 08/16/16 16.9.2 002 08/16/16 16.9.3 Deleted O 1 /08/18 16.9.4 001 08/16/16 16.9.5 002 08/16/16 16.9.6 005 12/19/17 16.9.7 001 08/16/16 16.9.8 000 02/15/06 16.9.8a 000 02/07/05 16.9.9 002 08/16/17 Oconee Nuclear Station LOEP2 Revision 023
Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised O 1 /08/18 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Number Implementation Date 16.9.10 000 01/12/04 16.9.11 001 06/29/15 16.9.11a 001 06/06/17 16.9.12 001 09/21/15 16.9.13 000 01/31/07 16.9.14 000 10/28/04 16.9.15 000 03/27/99 16.9.16 000 10/15/14 16.9.17 000 05/23/01 16.9.18 000 07/15/14 16.9.19 000 03/31/05 16.9.20 001 12/14/16 16.9.21 000 07/09/09 16.9.22 Deleted 08/16/17 16.9.23 001 08/16/17 16.9.24 003 11/18/16 16.9.25 001 08/16/17 16.10.1 000 11/15/12 16.10.2 000 12/02/03 16.10.3 000 03/27/99 16.10.4 000 11/15/12 16.10.5 Deleted 08/24/04 16.10.6 000 03/27/99 16.10.7 001 09/21/15 16.10.8 000 11/27/06 16.10.9 000 11/25/09 16.11.1 000 03/15/11 16.11.2 000 01/31/00 16.11.3 000 11/20/08 16.11.4 000 06/30/14 16.11.5 000 10/30/02 16.11.6 000 11/08/13 16.11.7 000 01/31/00 16.11.8 000 12/21/09 16.11.9 000 03/22/10 Oconee Nuclear Station LOEP3 Revision 023
Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised d 1 /08/18 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Number Implementation Date 16.11.10 000 05/14/14 16.11.11 000 03/27/99 16.11.12 000 04/10/03 16.11.13 000 03/27/99 16.11.14 000 03/27/99 16.12.1 000 03/27/99 16.12.2 000 05/03/07 16.12.3 000 05/01/03 16.12.4 000 03/27/99 16.12.5 000 03/27/99 16.12.6 000 11/08/07 16.13.1 001 12/22/15 16.13.2 000 12/15/04 16.13.3 000 12/15/04 16.13.4 000 03/27/99 16.13.5 Deleted 11/30/99 16.13.6 000 03/27/99 16.13.7 000 12/15/04 16.13.8 000 03/27/99 16.13.9 000 03/27/99 16.13.10 000 03/27/99 16.13.11 000 03/27/99 16.14.1 000 11/15/12 16.14.2 000 07/23/12 16.14.3 000 03/27/99 16.14.4 Deleted 03/15/11 16.14.4.a 000 03/15/11 16.15.1 000 04/12/06 16.15.2 000 11/15/12 16.15.3 000 11/15/12 Note: With the introduction of Fusion in June 2015, all controlled documents require a three-digit revision number. Thus, the revision numbers were set to "000" in the summer of 2015. As such, the revision dates for Revision 000 are based on the implementation dates for revisions in effect prior to this change.
Oconee Nuclear Station LOEP4 Revision 023
TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE NO 16.0 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.5.1 16.5.2 16.5.3 16.5.4 16.5.5 16.5.6 16.5.7 16.5.8 16.5.8a 16.5.9 16.5.10 16.5.11 16.5.12 16.5.13 16.6 16.6.1 16.6.2 16.6.3 SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS INTRODUCTION APPLICABILITY DEFINITIONS COMMITMENTS RELATED TO REACTOR COMPONENTS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Reactor Coolant System Vents Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (L TOP) System Loss of Decay Heat Removal Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Boron Sampling
[DELETED]
[DELETED]
Chemistry Requirements Pressurizer
[DELETED]
Testing Following Opening of System (Core Barrel Bolt Inspections)
Loss of Reactor Coolant Subcriticality RCS Leakage Testing Following Opening of System High Pressure Injection and the Chemical Addition Systems COMMITMENTS RELATED TO ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (NON-ESF SYSTEMS)
Containment Leakage Tests Reactor Building Post-Tensioning System Containment Heat Removal Verification Frequency 16.0-1 16.1-1 16.1-1 16.2-1 16.3-1 Pending 16.5.1-1 16.5.1-1 16.5.2.1 16.5.3-1 16.5.4-1 16.5.5-1 16.5.6-1 16.5.7-1 16.5.8-1 16.5.8a-1 16.5.9.1 16.5.10-1 16.5.11-1 16.5.12-1 16.5.13-1 16.6.1-1 16.6.1-1 16.6.2-1 16.6.3-1 Rev.006
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
SECTION TITLE NO 16.6.4 Low Pressure Injection System Leakage 16.6.5 Core Flood Tank Discharge Valve Breakers 16.6.6 Core Flooding System Test 16.6. 7 BWST Outlet Valve Control 16.6.8 LPI System Valve Test Restrictions 16.6.9 Containment Purge Valve Testing 16.6.10 Trisodium Phosphate (TSP) 16.6.11 Containment Debris Sources 16.6.12 Additional High Pressure Injection (HPI) Requirements 16.6.13 Additional Requirements to Support Low Pressure Injection (LPI)
Operability 16.6.14 Control of HPI and LPI/RBS Pump Room Temperatures 16.6.15 High Pressure Injection (HPI) and Liquid Waste Disposal (LWD)
Leakage 16.7 INSTRUMENTATION 16.7.1 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation 16.7.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram 16.7.3 Emergency Feedwater System 16.7.4 Hydrogen Analyzers 16.7.5 Steam Generator Overfill Protection 16.7.6 Diverse Actuation Systems 16.7.7 Position Indicator Channels 16.7.8 lncore Instrumentation 16.7.9 RCP Monitor
- 16. 7.10 Core Flood Tank Instrumentation
- 16. 7.11 Display Instrumentation 16.0-2 16.6.4-1 16.6.5-1 16.6.6-1 16.6.7-1 16.6.8-1 16.6.9-1 16.6.10-1 16.6.11-1 16.6.12-1 16.6.13-1 16.6.14-1 16.6.15-1 16.7.1-1 16.7.1-1 16.7.2-1 16.7.3-1 16.7.4-1 16.7.5-1 16.7.6-1 16.7.7-1 16.7.8-1 16.7.9-1 16.7.10-1 16.7.11-1 Rev. 006
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
SECTION TITLE PAGE NO 16.7.12 SSF Diesel Generator (DG) Air Start System Pressure 16.7.12-1 Instrumentation 16.7.13 SSF Instrumentation 16.7.13-1 16.7.14 Rod Withdrawal Alarm Limit 16.7.14-1 16.7.15 Engineered Safeguards Protective System (ESPS) Voter Trouble Alarm 16.7.15-1 16.7.16 Spent Fuel Pool - Wide Range Level Instrumentation 16.7.16-1 16.7.17 Reactor Protective System Instrumentation Setpoints 16.7.17-1 16.8 ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS 16.8.1-1 16.8.1 Control of Room Temperatures for Station Blackout 16.8.1-1 16.8.2 Additional Requirements to Support Keowee Hydro Unit (KHU) 16.8.2-1 OPERABILITY 16.8.3 Power Battery Parameters 16.8.3-1 16.8.4 Keowee Operational Restrictions 16.8.4-1 16.8.5
[DELETED]
16.8.5-1 16.8.6 Lee/Central Alternate Power System 16.8.6-1 16.8.7 Auctioneering Diodes 16.8.7-1 16.8.8 External Grid Trouble Protection 16.8.8-1 16.8.9 Keowee Governor Speed Out Of Tolerance (OOT) Alarm 16.8.9-1 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.1-1 16.9.1 Fire Suppression Water System 16.9.1-1 16.9.2 Sprinkler and Spray Systems 16.9.2-1 16.9.3
[DELETED]
16.9.3-1 16.9.4 Fire Hose Stations 16.9.4-1 16.9.5 Fire Barriers 16.9.5-1 16.9.6 Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6-1 16.9.7 Keowee Lake Level 16.9.7-1 16.0-3 Rev. 006 I
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
SECTION TITLE PAGE NO 16.9.8 Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS) Booster Fans 16.9.8-1 16.9.8a HPSW System Requirements to Support Loss of LPSW 16.9.8a-1 16.9.9 Additional Protected Service Water (PSW) System Commitments 16.9.9-1 16.9.10 Component Cooling and HPI Seal Injection to Reactor 16.9.10-1 Coolant Pumps 16.9.11 Turbine Building Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11-1 16.9.11a Auxiliary Building Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11a-1 16.9.12 Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) And 16.9.12-1 Siphon Seal Water (SSW) System Operability Requirements 16.9.13 Spent Fuel Cooling System 16.9.13-1 16.9.14 SSF Diesel Generator (DG) Inspection Requirements 16.9.14-1 16.9.15 Radioactive Material Sources 16.9.15-1 16.9.16 Reactor Building Polar Crane and Auxiliary Hoist 16.9.16-1 (RCS System Open) 16.9.17 Reactor Building Polar Crane (RCS at elevated 16.9.17-1 temperature and pressure) 16.9.18 Snubbers 16.9.18-1 16.9.19 Gravity Induced Reverse Flow to Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) 16.9.19-1 Through a Unit 2 Condensate Cooler 16.9.20 Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors 16.9.20-1 16.9.21 Standby Shutdown Facility External Flood Protection 16.9.21-1 16.9.22
[DELETED]
16.9.22-1 16.9.23 Alternate Chilled Water (AWC) and Alternate Reactor Building Cooling 16.9.23-1 (RSC) Systems 16.9.24 FLEX - Equipment and Connections 16.9.24-1 16.9.25 Spent Fuel Pool Area Isolation 16.9.25-1 16.0-4 Rev. 006 I
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
SECTION TITLE PAGE NO 16.10 COMMITMENTS RELATED TO STEAM & POWER CONVERSION 16.10.1-1 SYSTEMS 16.10.1 Local Start of Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump 16.10.1-1 16.10.2 Steam Generator Secondary Side Pressure and 16.10.2-1 Temperature (PIT) Limits 16.10.3 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump and Valve Testing 16.10.3-1 16.10.4 Low Presssure Service Water System Testing 16.10.4-1 16.10.5
[DELETED]
16.10.5-1 16.10.6 Emergency Feedwater Controls 16.10.6-1 16.10.7 Alternate Source of Emergency Feedwater (EFW) 16.10.7-1 16.10.8 Upper Surge Tank (UST) Riser Branch Line Automatic Isolation Valves 16.10.8-1 16.10.9 Air Operated Valves (AOVs) Required to Support Standby Shutdown 16.10.9-1 Facility (SSF) During Station Blackout (SBO) 16.11 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS CONTROL 16.11.1-1 16.11.1 Radioactive Liquid effluents 16.11.1-1 16.11.2 Radioactive Gaseous Effluents 16.11.2-1 16.11.3 Radioactive Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 16.11.3-1 16.11.4 Operational Safety Review 16.11.4-1 16.11.5 Solid Radioactive Waste 16.11.5-1 16.11.6 Radiological Environmental Monitoring 16.11.6-1 16.11.7 Dose calculations 16.11.7-1 16.11.8 Reports 16.11.8-1 16.11.9 Radioactive effluent release report 16.11.9-1 16.11.10 Radiological Environmental Operating Reports 16.11.10-1 16.11.11 Iodine Radiation Monitoring Filters 16.11.11-1 16.0-5 Rev. 006 I
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
SECTION TITLE PAGE NO 16.11.12 Radioactive Material in Outside Temporary 16.11.12-1 Tanks Exceeding Limit 16.11.13 Radioactive Material in Waste Gas Holdup 16.11.13-1 Tank Exceeding Limit 16.11.14 Explosive Gas Mixture 16.11.14-1 16.12 REFUELING OPERATIONS 16.12.1-1 16.12.1 Decay Time for Movement of Irradiated Fuel 16.12.1-1 16.12.2 Area Radiation Monitoring for Fuel Loading and Refueling 16.12.2-1 16.12.3 Communication Between Control Room and Refueling Personnel 16.12.3-1 16.12.4 Handling of Irradiated Fuel Assemblies 16.12.4-1 16.12.5 Loads Suspended over Spent Fuel in Spent Fuel Pool 16.12.5-1 16.12.6 Fuel Damage During Fuel Handling Operations in Containment 16.12.6-1 16.13 CONDUCT OF OPERATION 16.13.1-1 16.13.1 Minimum Station Staffing Requirements 16.13.1-1 16.13.2
[DELETED]
16.13.2-1 16.13.3
[DELETED]
16.13.3-1 16.13.4 Reactivity Anomaly 16.13.4-1 16.13.5 Deleted 16.13.5-1 16.13.6 Retraining and Replacement of Station Personnel 16.13.6-1 16.13.7 Procedures for Control of Ph in Recirculated 16.13.7-1 Coolant after Loss-of-coolant Accident & Long-term Emergency Core Cooling Systems 16.13.8 Respiratory Protective Program 16.13.8-1 16.13.9 Startup Report 16.13.9-1 16.13.10 Core Operating Limits Reports 16.13.10-1 16.13.11 Procedure for Station Survey Following an Earthquake 16.13.11-1 16.0-6 Rev. 006 I
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
SECTION TITLE PAGE NO 16.14 CONTROL RODS AND POWER DISTRIBUTION 16.14.1-1 16.14.1 APSR Movement 16.14.1-1 16.14.2 Control Rod Program Verification 16.14.2-1 16.14.3 Power Mapping 16.14.3-1 16.14.4
[DELETED]
16.14.4-1 16.14.4.a Engineering Work Station 16.14.4.a-1 16.15 VENTILATION FILTER TESTING PROGRAM 16.15.1-1 16.15.1
[DELETED]
16.15.1-1 16.15.2 Control Room Pressurization and Filtering System 16.15.2-1 16.15.3 Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation System 16.15.3-1 16.0-7 Rev. 006 I
16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.3 [DELETED]
16.9.3-1
[DELETED]
16.9.3 Rev. 001 I
Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.6 Fire Detection Instrumentation COMMITMENT APPLICABILITY:
The provided Fire Detection Instrumentation for each equipment/location shall be FUNCTIONAL as listed in Table 16.9.6-1.
NOTE---------------------------------------------------
Fire Detection Instrumentation located within containment is not required to be FUNCTIONAL during the performance of Type A Containment Leakage Rate Tests.
At all times.
16.9.6-1 Rev.005 I
ACTIONS Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6
NOTE:----------------------------------------------------------
FUNCTIONALITY of fire detection instrumentation for adequate equipment/location coverage may also be determined by the Site Fire Protection E:ngineer or designee, based on performance based assessment risk.
CONDITION A.
All fire detection instruments in all fire zones nonfunctional due to fire detection system failure.
RE:QUIRE:D ACTION A.1
NOTE:-------------
An hourly firewatch is not required for inaccessible equipment/locations such as the Reactor Building at power operation. Periodic inspections using a TV camera (if available) are permitted, or, the inaccessible equipment condition may be monitored by remote indications which would provide early warning of a fire.
COMPLE:TION TIME:
NOTE:-----------
The provisions of SLC 16.2. 7 do not apply.
!::stablish hourly fire watch once within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> patrol in all affected fire zones.
AND hourly +25% thereafter 16.9.6-2 Rev.005 I
ACTIONS ( continued)
B.
CONDITION One or more Fire Detection lnstrument(s) in any fire zone nonfunctional.
REQUIRED ACTION Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 COMPLETION TIME B.1
NOTE-------------
An hourly firewatch is not required for inaccessible equipment/locations such as the Reactor Building at power operation. Periodic inspections using a TV camera (if available) are permitted, or, the inaccessible equipment condition may be monitored by remote indications which would provide early warning of a fire.
NOTE-----------
The provisions of SLC 16.2. 7 do not apply.
Establish hourly fire watch once within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> patrol for the affected fire detection instruments or AND zones.
B.2 Complete an evaluation as permitted by RIS 2005-07 and implement alternative compensatory measures as required.
16.9.6-3 hourly +25% thereafter Prior to terminating Required Action B.1 Rev. 005 I
Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 16.9.6.1 SR 16.9.6.2.
SR 16.9.6.3 SR 16.9.6.4 SR 16.9.6.5 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of Oconee Fire Detection Instruments using Fire Detection Instrumentation Control Board Panel Test Switch.
31 days Visually inspect Oconee Fire Detection 184 days Instruments accessible during power operation.
Test each Oconee fire detector for sensitivity.
12 months Visually inspect Oconee Fire Detection 24 months Instruments not accessible during power operation.
Test each Oconee fire detector not accessible 24 months during power operation for sensitivity.
16.9.6-4 Rev. 005 I
TABLE 16.9.6-1 Fire Detection Instrumentation OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION Fire Fire Area Zone Location Description AB Auxiliary Building El. 758-Col.
AB 48 S-T/45-47 Unit 3 LPI & RB Spray Pumps El. 758-Col.
AB 49 S-T/42-44 Unit 3 LPI & RB Spray Pumps El. 758-Col.
AB 50 R-S/42-44 Unit 3 HPI Pump Area El. 758-Col.
Unit 3 HPI Pump. Spent Resin Xfr Pump Waste AB 50A R-S/45-47 Tank, Waste & CT Om Pumps El. 758-Col.
Unit 2 LPI Pumps & Valve Room (Inside Room AB 52 S-T/29-31
- 63)
El. 758-Col.
AB 53 S-T/26-29 Units 1 & 2 LPI & RB Spray Pumps El. 758-Col.
Unit 1 LPI Pumps & Valve Room (Inside Room AB 54 S-T/24-26
- 61)
El. 758-Col.
Unit 1 RB Sump & Cinp Om Pump, HPI Pump, AB 55 R-S/24-26 Spent resin Xfer Pump El. 758-Col.
AB 55A R-S/26-27 Unit 1 & 2 HPI Pump Area El. 758-Col.
Unit 2 Spent Resin Xfer Pump, HPI Pump, RB AB 56 R-S/28-30 Sump & Comp Brn Pump, Wt Unit 3 BA Mix, Spt Res Storage, RC Bid HUT, AB
,58 Rms. 100, 261 CBAST, Misc WHUT AB 60 Rm. 159 Unit 3 LPI Room Hatch Area AB 61 Rm. 158 Unit 3 HPI Room Hatch Area AB 62 Rm. 157 Unit 3 Operators Panel/Chem Sample Hood AB 64 Rm. 128 Unit 2 Emerg Aux Service Water Pump Unit 2 MWHT, Misc Wst Exp, CBAST, RC Bid AB 65 Rms. 100, 124 Xfer Pmp, RC Bid HT AB 67 Rm. 119 Unit 2 LPI Room Hatch Area AB 68 Rm. 118 Unit 2 HPI Pump Hatch Area AB 69 Rm. 117 Unit 2 Operators Panel/Chem Sample Hood AB 70 Rm. 119 Unit 1 LPI Room Hatch Area AB 72 Rm. 118 Unit 1 HPI Pump Hatch Area Unit 1 RC HU Tnks, CBAST, RC Bid Xfr Pmp, AB 76 Rm. 100 Wst Oma, Fltr Room SRST AB 77 Rms. 200, 264 Unit 3 Storage, Chemistry Storage AB 79 Rm. 252 Unit 3 RB Component Coolers Rms. 200, 220, Unit 2 l&E Hot shop, Misc Evap Fd Tk, Chem AB 81 224 Storage, Laund, RC EFT AB 83 Rm. 216 Unit 1 & 2 RB Component Coolers AB 85 Rms. 200, 204 Unit 1 Chemistry Storage, High Level Storage 16.9.6-5 Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 Detectors Details Provided LPI/HPI areas 2
LPI/HPI areas 2
LPI/HPI areas 1
LPI/HPI areas 1
LPI/HPI areas 2
LPI/HPI areas 2
LPI/HPI areas 2
LPI/HPI areas 1
LPI/HPI areas 1
1st floor hallway 7
LPI hatch 3
all 3
Waste Control 1
ASW SWGR area/
PSW pump area 2
1st floor hallway 9
LPI hatch 3
HPI hatch 2
Waste Control 1
LPI hatch 1
HPI hatch 3
1st floor hallway 6
all 14 Component Coolers 1
2nd floor hallway 15 Component Coolers 1
2nd floor hallway 10 Rev. 005 I
Fire Fire Area Zone Location AB AB 86 Rms. 356, 368 Rms. 354, AB 89 354A Rms, 312, 328, AB 90 333,334 AB 92 Rm. 311 AB 94 Rms. 300, 304 AB 95 Rm. 310 AB 99 Rm. 452 AB 100 Rms. 455, 458 Rms. 450, 4508, Cable AB 101 Shaft AB 103 Rm. 407 AB 104 Rm. 408 AB 105 Rm. 404 AB 106 Rm. 403 AB 108 Rm. 402 AB 109 Rm.400 Rms. 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512,513,515, AB 110 516,516A Rms. 552, 553, AB 112 554,556,557 AB 114 Rm. 669 AB 115 Rm. 666 Rms. 650, 651, AB 116 653,657 AB 118 Rm. 618 AB 119 Rm. 603 AB 121 Rm. 600 TABLE 16.9.6-1 Fire Detection Instrumentation Description Auxiliary Building (cont'd)
Unit 3 Hatch Area Chemistry Labs & Change Room Unit 3 Equipment Room Unit 2 Hallway, Change Room, Laundry Room, RP Lab, Chemistry Lab, Medical Room, Decon Room and Offices Unit 2 Equipment Room Unit 1 Hallway, Hatch Area, Change Room, Tool Storage, and Drumming Area Unit 1 Equipment Room Unit 3 East Penetration Room Unit 3 Control Battery Room Unit 3 Cable Room Unit 2 East Penetration Room Unit 2 Control Batterv Room Unit 2 Cable Room Unit 1 Cable Room Unit 1 East Penetration Room Unit 1 Control Battery Room Unit 1 & 2 Control Room Unit 3 Control Room Unit 3 Purge Inlet Equipment Room Unit 3 Purae Exhaust Equipment Room Unit 3 AHU Room Unit 2 Purge Exhaust Equipment Room Unit 1 & 2 AHU Room Unit 1 Purge Exhaust Equipment Room 16.9.6-6 Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 Detectors Details Provided 3rd floor hallway 32 all; including cable shaft 20 3rd floor hallway 36 all; including cable shaft 13 all 28 all; including cable shaft 12 all 20 all 4
all; including cable shaft 29 all 25 all 5
all; including cable shaft 21 all; including cable shaft 21 all 22 all 5
all 38 all 29 all 5
all 10 all 6
all 10 all 8
all 11 Rev. 005 I
Fire Fire Area Zone Location BH Unit 1 & 2 BH12 45 Block House Unit 3 Block BH3 47 House CT-4 Block CT4 46 House PSW PSW PS101 PSW PS102 PSW PS103 PSW PS104 PSW PS105 RB EL. 796+6 and RB1 122 797+6 EL. 796+6 and RB2 123 797+6 EL. 796+6 and RB3 124 797+6 SSF SSF SSF SF104 TB Ele. 775 - Col.
TB 1
B-E/52-56 Ele. 775 - Col.
TB 2
E-F/54-55 Ele. 775 - Col.
TB 3
H-N/48-56 Ele. 775 - Col.
TB 4
E-F/54-55 Ele. 775 - Col.
TB 6
B-E/42-46 Ele. 775 - Col.
TB 7
E-F/43-44 Ele. 775 - Col.
TB 8
F-G/43-44 Ele. 775 - Col.
TB 9
J-M/43-44 TABLE 16.9.6-1 Fire Detection Instrumentation Description Blockhouse Unit 1 & 2 Block House Unit 3 Block House CT-4 Block House PSWBuilding Cable Vault PSW Main Floor (transformer space)
Batterv Room 2 Batterv Room 1 Mezzanine Area Reactor Building Unit 1 Reactor Building - Basement thru 4th Floor Unit 2 Reactor Building - Basement thru 4th Floor Unit 3 Reactor Building - Basement thru 4th Floor Standby Shutdown Facility Standby Shutdown Facility Turbine Building Unit 3 Lube Oil Purifier Area Unit 3 EHC Area Unit 3 Heater Drain Pumps 301 & 302 Unit 3 Turbine Driven EFDW Pump Area Unit 3 Main Feedwater Pump Area Unit 3 Motor Driven EDFW Pump Area Unit 3 Hotwell Pump & TB Sump Area 1 Unit 3 Powdex/LPSW Pump Area 16.9.6-7 Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 Detectors Details Provided all 6
all 3
Ionization smoke detection 2
photoelectric smoke detectors only 2
photoelectric smoke detectors only 6
photoelectric smoke detectors only 2
photoelectric smoke detectors only 2
photoelectric smoke detectors only 4
all (both ionization and heat) 22 all (both ionization and heat) 22 all (both ionization and heat) 22 all (Honeywell panel detection) 74 all 2
all 3
all (both ionization and beam) 15 all 2
all 4
all 1
all 1
all 2
Rev.005
Fire Fire Area Zone Location TB Ele. 775 - Col.
TB 10 B-C/38-39 Ele. 775 - Col.
TB 11 E-F/40-41 Ele. 775 - Col.
TB 12 H-N/34-42 Ele. 775 - Col.
TB 13 B-D/32-38 Ele. 775 - Col.
TB 15 B-E/27-32 Ele. 775 - Col.
TB 17 F-J/28-29 Ele. 775 - Col.
TB 18 L-M/30-31 Ele. 775 -
TB 19 Col.E-F/21-27 Ele. 775 - Col.
TB 21 F-J/27-28 Ele. 775 - Col.
TB 22 L-M/22-23 Ele. 775 - Col.
TB 24 B-F/13-21 Ele. 775 - Col TB 25 F-M/13-20 Ele. 796 - Col.
TB 27 E-G/53-55 Ele. 796 - Col.
TB 28 L-M/52-53 Ele. 796 - Col.
TB 29 J-M/43-46 Ele. 796 - Col.
TB 31 D-G/39-41 Ele. 796 +6 -
TB 32 Col. G-N/32-42 Ele. 796 +6-TB 33 Col. B-N/28-32 Ele. 796 +6-TB 33A Col.B-N/28-30 Ele. 796+6-Col. B-N/23-28 (not including TB 34 FZ 34A)
Ele. 796 +6-TB 34A Col. L-M/25-26 Ele. 796 - Col.
TB 35 G-N/14-23 Ele. 796 - Col.
TB 36 F-G/14-15 Ele. 796 +6-TB 37 Col.N-R/86-87 Ele. 822 - Col.
TB 38 D-G/45-54 TABLE 16.9.6-1 Fire Detection Instrumentation Description Turbine Building (cont'd)
Unit 2 Lube Oil Purifier Area Unit 2 EHC Area Unit 2 Heater Drain Pumps 2D1, 2D2, 2E1, &
2E2 Unit 2 Turbine Driven EFDW Pump Area Unit 2 Main Feedwater Pump Area, MCC 2XC Unit 2 HW Pump, LPSW Pump - B Area Unit 2 Powex, Backup IA Compressors Unit 1 Main Feedwater Pump Area, MCC 1XC Switchgear Unit 1 HW Pump, LPSW Pump - A Area Unit 1 Powdex Area Unit 1 TDEFDW Pump, EHC, Oil Purifier, Auxiliary Boiler Heater Drain Pumps 1E1 & 1E2 Unit 3 MT Oil Tank, MS & Control Valves Unit 3 Heater Bav Area, MSRH A1 & A2 Unit 3 4160 Volt Switchqear Unit 2 MT Oil Tank, MS & Control Valves Unit 2 Heater Bay Area, MSRH A1 & A2, 3XS6, 3X10, MCC 2XGB, SSF Transfer cables Unit 2 6900/4160 Volt Switchgear, SSF Transfer cables Unit 2 Power Battery Room Unit 1 6900/4160 Volt Switchgear, SSF Transfer cables Unit 1 Power Batteries Unit 1 Heater Bay Area, MSRH A1 & A2, MCC 1XGB Switchgear Unit 1 MT Oil Tank, MS & Control Valves Unit 2 SSF Transfer Cables Unit 3 Main Turbine, Turbine Fir, Offices 16.9.6-8 Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 Detectors Details Provided Ionization 2
all 3
All (both ionization and beam) 15 all 4
all 6
all 3
all 1
all 5
all 3
all 1
all 4
all (both ionization and beam) 15 all 6
all 3
all 37 all 4
all 14 all 31 all 1
all 30 all 2
all 4
all 3
all 4
all 7
Rev. 005 I
Fire Fire Area Zone Location TB Ele. 822 - Col.
TB 39 J-N/43~56 Ele. 822 - Col.
TB 39A L-M/45-47 Ele. 822 - Col.
TB 40 D-G/28-40 Ele. 822 - Col TB 41 J-N/27-42 Ele. 822 - Col.
TB 42 E-G/15-27 Ele. 796 - Col.
TB 44 C-F/12-14 WP1 WP1 97 Rm. 348 WP1 107 Rm. 409 WP1 120 Rm. 620 WP2 WP2 91 Rm. 349 WP2 102 Rm. 410 WP2 117 Rm. 621 WP3 WP3 87 Rm. 376 WP3 98 Rm. 455 YARD YARD-U3RCP YARD EAST SWGR TABLE 16.9.6-1 Fire Detection Instrumentation Description Turbine Building (cont'd)
Unit 3 Auxiliarv Shutdown Panel Unit 3 Power Battery Room Unit 2 Main Turbine, Turbine Fir, Offices Unit 1 Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Unit 1 Main Turbine, Turbine Fir, Offices Unit 1 MCC 1XA & 1XA-A Unit 1 West Penetration Room Unit 1 Cask Decon Tank Room Unit 1 West Penetration Room Unit 1 Purge Inlet Equipment Room Unit 2 West Penetration Room Unit 2 Cask Decon Tank Room Unit 2 West Penetration Room Unit 2 Purge Inlet Equipment Room Unit 3 West Penetration Room Unit 3 Cask Decon Tank Room Unit 3 West Penetration Room Yard Yard Area - East 16.9.6-9 Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 Detectors Details Provided all 1
all 2
all 7
all 1
all 7
all 2
all 4
all 7
all 6
all 4
all 7
all 6
all 4
all 7
Rev.005 I
BASES Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 On June 16, 2004, the NRC revised its regulation Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Section 50.48 to include a new paragraph 50.48(c) that incorporates by reference National Fire Protection Association 805, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants 2001 Edition," hereafter referred to as NFPA 805. On December 29, 2010, the NRC issued Oconee's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) approving adoption of a performance-based (PB) fire protection program (FPP) as an alternative to the existing, deterministic fire protection regulations. Specifically, NFPA 805 allows the use of PB methods, such as fire modeling, and risk-informed (RI) methods, such as fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), to demonstrate compliance with the nuclear safety performance criteria. As a result of transitioning to the NFPA 805 Licensing Basis, certain Fire Protection Systems and Features are "required" to satisfy either the NFPA 805 Chapter 3 fundamental fire protection program safety goals or the NFPA 805 Chapter 4 performance based/risk informed safety goals. These "required" Fire Protection Systems and Features are placed into SLCs since they comprise the safety basis of the new fire protection program.
Allowed out of service times and action statements along with some surveillance requirements are consistent with the NFPA 805 licensing basis and safety goals. The documentation of these "required" fire protection systems and features is provided in the SER Attachments A and D.
The equipment contained in this SLC is considered part of the NFPA 805 Power Block. Power Block structures, systems, and components (SSCs) include all safety-related and balance-of-plant systems and components required for operation, including radioactive waste processing and storage, the 230 kV switchyard, and Keowee Dam and associated structures. Power Block SSCs are required for the safe and reliable operation of the plant. Calculation OSC-10650, Oconee NFPA 805 Power Block, defines the Power Block for Oconee. Not all fire detection within the Power Block is required by this SLC. Only the Power Block detection listed in Table 16.9.6-1 herein is within the scope of this SLC.
DPC-1435.00-00-0002, Technical Basis for Roving Continuous Fire Watches, justifies the allowances for continuous and hourly fire watches. This Selected Licensee Commitment is part of the Oconee Fire Protection Program and therefore subject to the provisions of Oconee Facility Operating License Conditions.
ACTIONS FUNCTIONALITY of the NRC committed Fire Detection Instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires in areas containing safety related and important to safety equipment at Oconee Facilities. Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program. The regulatory requirement is to have NFPA 805 required Fire Detection Instrumentation FUNCTIONAL at all times.
16.9.6-10 Rev. 005 I
Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6 A.1 and B.1 In the event that a portion of the Fire Detection Instrumentation is nonfunctional, the establishment of compensatory actions in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the nonfunctional instrumentation is restored to FUNCTIONALITY.
RA B.2 provides an option for times when fire watches may not be the most effective compensatory measure for degraded or inoperable fire protection features. To implement a different compensatory measure or combination of measures, perform a documented evaluation of the impact of the proposed alternate compensatory measure. The evaluation must demonstrate that the alternate compensatory measure would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. Additionally, the evaluation of the alternate compensatory measure should incorporate risk insights regarding the location, quantity, and type of combustible material in the fire area; the presence of ignition sources and their likelihood of occurrence; the automatic fire suppression and fire detection capability in the fire area; the manual fire suppression capability in the fire area; and the human error probability where applicable. Retain all such evaluations in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(a). Refer to RIS 2005-07 for additional information.
REFERENCES:
- 1. Oconee UFSAR, Chapter 9.5-1 and UFSAR, Chapter 18, Table 18-1 (Portions of this SLC are credited in the Fire Protection Program for License Renewal).
- 2. Oconee License Renewal Commitments, OSS-0274.00-00-0016.
- 3. Oconee Fire Protection Safety Evaluation dated December 29, 2010.
- 4. Oconee License Amendment Request dated April 14, 2010.
- 5. Oconee Fire Protection Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection Program, (currently contained in the Fire Protection DBD), as revised.
- 6. Oconee Plant Design Basis Specification for Fire Detection, as revised.
- 7. Drawing Series 0-0310-K, Fire Protection Plans.
- 8. Drawing Series 0-0310-L, Fire Protection Plans.
- 9. OSC-10650, Oconee NFPA 805 Power Block.
- 10. DPC-1435.00-00-0002, Technical Basis for Roving Continuous Fire Watches.
- 11. 0-0756-J, Location Diagram Fire Detection System (FD) Standby Shutdown Facility Detector Locations.
16.9.6-11 Rev. 005 I
Additional PSW System Commitments 16.9.9 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.9 Additional Protected Service Water (PSW) System Commitments COMMITMENT:
APPLICABILITY:
ACTIONS a)
Trapped Inventory (CCW) shall be FUNCTIONAL.
b)
Power for an independent backup source of electrical power to support required SSF System loads shall be available.
c)
Channel A of the Manual Keowee Emergency Start Function shall be FUNCTIONAL.
d)
Control Battery Room HVAC Power Transfer Switches shall be available.
MODES 1 and 2
NOTE-----------------------------------------------------------
The provisions of SLC 16.2.4 are not applicable.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
Commitment a or c not A.1 Declare PSW inoperable.
Immediately met.
AND A.2 Enter applicable TS Immediately condition.
B.. Commitment b or d not B.1 Log unavailability.
NA met.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.9.9.1 Perform Manual Keowee Emergency Start 12 months CHANNEL A FUNCTIONAL TEST.
SR 16.9.9.2 Perform functional test of required power 24 months transfer switches used for control battery room HVAC.
16.9.9-1 Rev. 002 I
BASES Additional PSW System Commitments 16.9.9 The PSW system is designed as a standby system for use under emergency conditions. The PSW system provides added "defense-in-depth" protection by serving as a backup to existing safety systems and as such, the system is not required to comply with single failure criteria.
The PSW system is provided as an alternate means to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for one, two, or three units following postulated scenarios that damage essential systems and components normally used for safe shutdown.
The PSW system is designed as an alternate means to mitigate the consequences of a fire, tornado, or a loss of Lake Keowee event by providing emergency cooling water to one or more of the three Oconee Units Steam Generators and High Pressure Injection (HPI) pump motor coolers.
The PSW pumping system utilizes the inventory of lake water contained in the Unit 2 Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) piping. The PSW primary and booster pumps are located in the Auxiliary Building (AB) at elevation 771' and take suction from the Unit 2 CCW piping and discharge into the steam generators of each unit via the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system headers. The raw water is vaporized in the steam generators (SGs), removing residual heat, and is dumped to atmosphere via the Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs) or Atmospheric Dump
- Valves (ADVs). For extended operation, the PSW portable pump with a flow path capable of taking suction from the intake canal and discharging into the Unit 2 CCW piping is designed to provide a backup supply of water to the PSW system in the event of loss of CCW and subsequent loss of CCW siphon flow. The PSW portable pump is stored onsite.
The PSW system is designed to support cool down of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and maintain safe shutdown conditions. The PSW system is designed to maintain SG water levels to promote natural circulation Decay Heat Removal (DHR) using the SGs for an extended period of time during which time other plant systems required to cool the RCS to MODE 5 conditions will be restored and brought into service. In addition, the PSW system, in combination with the HPI system, provides borated water for Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal cooling, RCS makeup, and reactivity management.
This SLC addresses commitments associated with the PSW System that are not explicitly addressed by Technical Specifications 3. 7.10 or 3. 7.1 Oa.
COMMITMENT Additional PSW system commitments include the following:
a) Trapped Inventory, which includes the following, shall be FUNCTIONAL:
The Unit 2 CCW Inlet pipe is full (not unwatered and not partially unwatered}.
CCW Cross-Connect valves shall be FUNCTIONAL to ensure inventory to satisfy the Unit(s) decay heat removal requirements to mitigate a Loss of Lake Keowee event.
b) Power for an independent backup source of electrical power to support required SSF System loads shall be available.
c) Channel A of the Manual Keowee Emergency Start Function shall be FUNCTIONAL.
d) Control Battery Room HVAC Power Transfer Switches shall be available.
16.9.9-2 Rev. 002 I
Trapped Inventory Additional PSW System Commitments 16.9.9 The PSW system is capable of using the water inventory trapped in the CCW piping for decay heat removal. An external source of makeup water is not immediately required due to the large quantities of water stored underground in the intake and discharge CCW piping. The combined stored volume of water in the CCW intake and discharge lines below elevation 791ft would provide sufficient cooling water for all three units for at least 30 days after trip of the three reactors (Ref. 1 ).
Access to the combined stored volume of water in the CCW Intake and discharge piping rely upon specific combinations of the applicable Units' CCW Intake and Discharge Unwatering and CCW Cross-Connect valves to provide water to the Unit 2 CCW Intake piping which provides suction to the PSW pumps. These valve combinations are defined as follows:
Unit 1 (applicable when Unit 1 is in MODES 1 and 2) 1 CCW-30, -31, -32, -40 and 2CCW-41 must be opened to transfer water from the Unit 1 CCW Inlet and Discharge piping to the Unit 2 CCW Inlet pipe.
Unit 2 (applicable when Unit 2 is in MODES 1 and 2)
Normally, 1 CCW-30, -40 and 2CCW-31, -32, -41 must be opened to transfer water from the Unit 2 CCW Discharge to the Unit 2 CCW Inlet pipe using the Unit 1 CCW Inlet pipe. When Unit 1 CCW Inlet pipe is unwatered, 2CCW-31, -32, -75, -78, -79, -86, -87 must be opened to transfer water from the Unit 2 CCW Discharge pipe to the Unit 2 CCW Inlet pipe.
Unit 3 (applicable when Unit 3 is in MODES 1 and 2)
There are two pathways available for transferring water from Unit 3 CCW Inlet and Discharge piping to Unit 2 CCW Inlet. Either or both pathways may be used, but only one is required. One pathway relies on opening 3CCW-30, -31, -32, -33 and 2CCW-30. Another pathway relies on opening 3CCW-30, -31, -32, -33, -42, -94 and 2CCW-41.
Provide Power for Independent Backup Source of Electrical Power to Support Required SSF System Loads Provide power from a PSW power supply to support essential SSF system loads (includes CT-7 Transformer, breaker B7T-2 (B7T 4160V Feeder), breaker B7T-4 (SSF Bus Alt Feed), and breaker OTS1-0 (SSF Alternate Power Supply Bkr). No other 4160V loads on B7T switchgear are required. If power path through CT-7 Transformer with breaker B7T-2 (B7T 4160V Feeder) is unavailable then B7T-01 (B6T-B7T Tie) can be racked in and closed to supply both PSW switchgears to meet this commitment. If SLC 16.9.19, "Gravity Induced Reversed Flow to Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) through a Unit 2 Condensate Cooler" is not met, power must be available to PSW switchgears from Fant Black line to meet this commitment.
Channel A of the Manual Keowee Emergency Start Function Channel A is required since its cable is not routed through the Turbine Building (TB) and is not affected by a TB fire (Ref. 3). A surveillance requirement was added to verify the functionality of the manual emergency start capability of the KHUs from the Unit 1 &2 and the Unit 3 Main Control Rooms (MCRs). The PSW system requires manual activation. Normal power is provided 16.9.9-3 Rev.002
Additional PSW System Commitments 16.9.9 from the Central Tie Switchyard via a 100 kV transmission line. An alternate power source is provided from the KHUs via a tornado protected underground path. The KHUs can be emergency started either automatically or manually. Capability is provided to manually initiate an emergency start from the Unit 1 &2 MCR and the Unit 3 MCR.
Control Battery Room HVAC Power Transfer Switches The PSW system can also provide backup power to the station Control Battery Room HVAC system. When backup power to the Control Battery Room HVAC system is required, manual transfer switches are aligned from the normal power source to the PSW power source.
APPLICABILITY These additional PSW commitments are required to be met in MODES 1 and 2. Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis was performed assuming full power initial conditions as described in the Bases above and in the Oconee Fire Protection Program Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment. The plant configuration examined in the Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis is representative of risk significant operating conditions and provides reasonable assurance that an event mitigated by PSW during these MODES will not prevent the plant from achieving and maintaining the fuel in a safe and stable condition.
ACTIONS The exception for SLC 16.2.4 provided in the NOTE of the Actions, permits entry into MODES 1 or 2 when PSW system commitments are not met. This is acceptable because the PSW system is not required to support normal operation of the station or to mitigate a design basis event.
A.1 and A.2 When COMMITMENT a or c is not met, the PSW System shall be declared inoperable and the applicable TS condition entered immediately.
When COMMITMENT b or dis not met, the respective required action is to log unavailability of the function.
16.9.9-4 Rev. 002 I
Additional PSW System Commitments 16.9.9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 16.9.9.1 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on the required Manual Keowee Emergency Start Channel A switches to ensure that Keowee will manually start from each Control Room to provide power to the PSW System. The Surveillance Frequency of 12 months is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk.
SR 16.9.9.2 This SR verifies that Control Battery Room HVAC normal and alternate power transfer switches (shown in table below) are FUNCTIONAL every 24 months for the required equipment.
Component 1 EL-SX-TRN001 (U1 Cntrl Batt Rm HVAC Norm/Alt Pwr Xfer Sw) 2EL-SX-TRN001 (U2 Cntrl Batt Rm HVAC Norm/Alt Pwr Xfer Sw) 3EL-SX-TRN001 (U3 Cntrl Batt Rm HVAC Norm/Alt Pwr Xfer Sw)
REFERENCES
- 1. Calculation OSC-11194, CCW Heatup During PSW and/or SSF-ASW Operation.
- 2. Amendment 386, 388, and 387, Issuance of Amendments Regarding Implementation of the Protected Service Water System, dated August 13, 2014.
- 3. AR 01842071, Manual Keowee Emergency Start Function.
16.9.9-5 Rev. 002 I
SLC Change 2016-04 deleted 16.9.9a, PSW Battery Cell Parameters. on August 16, 2017 Remove pages 16.9.9a - 1 through 16.9.9a - 9 from manual
-~~-
~
16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.22 [DELETED]
16.9.22-1
[DELETED]
16.9.22 Rev. 001
AWC and Alternate RBC Systems 16.9.23 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.23 Alternate Chilled Water (AWC) and Alternate Reactor Building Cooling (RBC)
Systems COMMITMENT:
The following cooling systems shall be FUNCTIONAL:
- AWC Supplied Control Complex Cooling System or comparable measures may be used to provide AWC Supplied Control Complex Cooling.
- AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling System or comparable measures may be used to provide AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling.
- Alternate RBC System.
APPLICABILITY:
When Protected Service Water (PSW) is required to be OPERABLE ACTIONS
NOTES---------------------------------------------------------
The provisions of SLC 16.2.4 are not applicable.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
AWC Supplied Control A.1 Declare PSW inoperable.
Immediately Complex Cooling is non-functional.
AND A.2 Enter applicable TS Immediately Condition(s).
- 8.
AWC Supplied 8.1 Log unavailability in Immediately Auxiliary Building Operations Log.
Cooling is non-functional.
AND 8.2 Initiate actions to restore the NA AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling System to a FUNCTIONAL status.
(continued) 16.9.23-1 Rev. 001 I
AWC and Alternate RBC Systems 16.9.23 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.
Alternate RBC system C.1 Log unavailability in Immediately is non-functional.
Operations Log.
C.2 Initiate actions to restore the NA Alternate RBC system to a FUNCTIONAL status.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.9.23.1 Operate each Chiller System.
92 days SR 16.9.23.2 Start each Cable Room AHU (1-52, 1-53, 2-52, 92 days and 2-53).
SR 16.9.23.3 Verify that 4160V Switchgear AWC1, 600V 24 months MCCs AWC2 and AWC3, and 208V MCCs AWC4 and AWC5 can be energized.
16.9.23-2 Rev. 001 I
BASES AWC and Alternate RBC Systems 16.9.23 The AWC System and the Alternate RBC System provide an alternate means to recover from the potential loss of normal ventilation to ensure extended operation of the PSW system. For Auxiliary Building cooling, the AWC System uses portable chillers and permanently installed piping to selected air handling units to provide cooling to the Control Complex, the Penetration Rooms, and other areas of the Auxiliary Building. These areas AHUs are provided with an alternate power source from the PSW electrical distribution system. For Reactor Building Cooling, the Alternate RBC system uses a diesel driven pump to take suction from Lake Keowee and feed lake water through a connection to the Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) supply lines to the 'A' Reactor Building Cooling Unit (RBCU) on each unit. The 'A' RBCU fans are provided with an alternate power source from the PSW electrical distribution system.
There are two separate main chilled water headers - one which feeds Air Handling Units (AHUs) normally supplied by chilled water and one which feeds AHUs normally supplied by LPSW.
The AWC System and the Alternate RBC System equipment is powered by a 4160/600/208V distribution system. Power to the Auxiliary Building and Reactor Building is provided through a new electrical power distribution system referred to as the AWC Electrical Distribution System.
This distribution*system is powered from PSW power through PSW switchgear B6T, breaker 8.
The 4160V Switchgear, AWC1 provides power to the 2 chilled water systems through separate 4160/480V Transformers (AWC6 and AWC7). Transformer AWC6 supplies 480V power to the Chiller 1 System. Transformer AWC7 supplies 480V power to the Chiller 2 System.
The 4160V Switchgear AWC1 also provides power to 2 separate 600V Motor Control Centers (MCCs) (AWC2 and AWC3) through 2 separate 4160/600V Transformers (AWC2 and AWC3).
These 600V MCCs provide power to 2 separate 208V MCCs (AWC4 and AWC5) through 2 separate 600/208V Transformers (AWC4 and AWC5). The 600V and 208V MCCs provide power to selected AH Us, Exhaust Fans (EF), and RBCUs. The 600V MCC (AWC2) and 208V MCC (AWC 4) provides power to the Unit 1 and 2 loads. The 600V MCC (AWC3) and 208V MCC (AWC5) provides power to the Unit 3 loads.
The individual loads to the AHUs are fed from the new distribution system through manual transfer equipment that separates normal plant power from the new distribution system.
COMMITMENT The AWC and Alternate RBC Systems shall be FUNCTIONAL when PSW is required to be OPERABLE as follows:
AWC Supplied Control Complex Cooling or comparable measures may be used to provide AWC Supplied Control Complex Cooling, AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling or comparable measures may be used to provide AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling, and Alternate RBC.
16.9.23-3 Rev.001 I
AWC and Alternate RBC Systems 16.9.23 AWC Supplied Control Complex Cooling and AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling Systems The AWC System supplies chilled water to selected AH Us that supply air to the Control Complex (Control Room, Cable Room, and Equipment Room), the Penetration Rooms, and portions of the Auxiliary Building. These loads are divided into two Chiller systems. Chiller System 1 feeds the Control Complex and Penetration Rooms while Chiller System 2 feeds the remainder of the Auxiliary Building.
Chillers 1 and 2 are considered equivalent systems for heat removal capability and are powered from the same 4160V switchgear (AWC1 ). If Chiller 1 is non-functional, Chiller 2 may be aligned to supply Chiller System 1 loads provided the normal loads on Chiller System 2 are isolated.
Comparable measure(s) to meet the cooling functions may include, but are not limited to the following:
Providing a temporary cooler.
Engineering analysis to show NFPA 805 requirements can be met without cooling system.
Each Chiller System includes the following:
one 500 ton air cooled chiller, piping, valves, pumps, duplex strainer, power and associated skid mounted components, auxiliaries, and make-up system.
associated AH Us, boundary valves, supply and return valves, portable hoses (if applicable), power supply, AHU dampers, ventilation boundary dampers, duct work, fans, and power supply transfer switches.
Chiller System 1 Tables 16.9.23-1 and 16.9.23-2 provide the AWC Supplied Control Complex Cooling AHUs and Ventilation Boundary Control Dampers that are supplied from Chiller System 1.
TABLE 16.9.23-1 AHU I" d f Ch"II S
t 1
s supp 1e ram 1 er ysem AHU AHU LOCATION SERVICE AREA AHU 1-11 Unit 1/2, 6th Floor, El. 838+0, Col. 72-Q U-1/2 Control Room AHU 1-22 Unit 1, 3rd Floor, El. 796+6, Col. 71-Qa U-1 Equipment Room AHU 1-52 Unit 1, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 72-S U-1 Cable Room AHU 1-53 Unit 1, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 71-N U-1 Cable Room AHU 2-23 Unit 2, 3rd Floor, El. 796+6, Col. 75-Qa U-2 Equipment Room AHU 2-52 Unit 2, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 74-S U-2 Cable Room AHU 2-53 Unit 2, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 75-N U-2 Cable Room AHU 3-11 Unit 3, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 89-Qa U-3 Cable Room AHU 3-13 Unit 3, 6th Floor, El. 838+0, Col. 88-P U-3 Control Room AHU 3-15 Unit 3, 3rd Floor, El. 796+6, Col. 87-N U-3 Equipment Room 16.9.23-4 Rev. 001 I
1VS DACD13 1VS DACD14 2VS DACD13 2VS DACD14 1VS DACD02 1VS DACD03 3VS DACD09 3VS DACD12A AWC and Alternate RBC Systems 16.9.23 Table 16.9.23-2 C t IC on ro ompex en I a 10n oun arv Vt"lt" B
d D ampers Control Dam per Control Dam per Control Dam per Control Damper Control Damper Control Damper Control Damper Control Damper Table 16.9.23-3 is the AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling AHUs supplied from Chiller System 1.
TABLE 16.9.23-3 AHU I" d f Ch"II S
t 1
s supp 1e ram 1 er ;ysem AHU AHU LOCATION SERVICE AREA AHU 1-19 Unit 1, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 71-V U-1 West Pen. Room AHU 1-32*
Unit 1, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 65-Q U-1 East Pen. Room AHU 1-33*
Unit 1, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 66-Q U-1 East Pen. Room AHU 2-19 Unit 2, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 75-V U-2 West Pen. Room AHU 2-32*
Unit 2, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 79-Q U-2 East Pen. Room AHU 2-33*
Unit 2, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 80-Q U-2 East Pen. Room AHU 3-32*
Unit 3, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 94-Q U-3 East Pen. Room AHU 3-33*
Unit 3, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 95-Q U-3 East Pen. Room AHU 3-6 Unit 3, 4th Floor, El. 809+3, Col. 90-V U-3 West Pen. Room
- Either AHU-32 or 33 is required to provide functionality for each Unit.
Chiller System 2 Table 16.9.23-4 is the AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling AHUs supplied from Chiller System 2.
AHU AHU 1-10 AHU 1-15 AHU 2-16*
AHU 3-7 AHU 3-8 AHU 3-9 TABLE 16.9.23-4 AHUs supplied from Chiller 2 AHU LOCATION Unit 1/2, 6th Floor, El. 838+0, Col. 74-P Unit 1, 5th Floor, El. 822+0, Col. 66-N Unit 2, 5th Floor, El. 822+0, Col. 80-P Unit 3, 5th Floor, El. 822+0, Col. 94-P Unit 3, 5th Floor, El. 822+0, Col. 95-P Unit 3, 6th Floor, El. 838+0, Col. 88-Qa SERVICE AREA U-1/2 Aux. Bldg. 6th Fir.
U-1 A.B. Basement-5th Fir.
U-2 A.B. Basement-5th Fir.
U-3 A.B. Basement-5th Fir.
U-3 A.B. Basement-5th Fir.
U-3 Aux. Bldg. 6th Fir.
- System remains functional with AHU removed from service.
16.9.23-5 Rev. 001 I
AWC and Alternate RBC Systems 16.9.23 For AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling, exhaust fans along with associated dampers, nitrogen supplies, and power supplies are also required to support FUNCTIONALITY. Table 16.9.23-5 provides the Exhaust Fans that are required.
TABLE 16.9.23-5 Auxiliary Building Cooling Exhaust Fans EXHAUST FANS EF-15 EF-16 EF-17 EF-18 EF-19 EF-20 EF-21 F3-1*
F3-2*
F3-3*
F3-4**
F3-5**
F3-6**
- PSW events require all 3 exhaust fans to remain available.
- System remains functional with 1 of 3 exhaust fans removed from service.
Alternate Reactor Building Cooling System The alternate RBC System consists of one Alternate Reactor Building Cooling Pump (OLPSPU0005 or OLPSPU0006), portable water hose, portable flowmeters, RBCUs 1A, 2A, and 3A (including associated LPSW valves), and the AWC alternate power source. During a PSW event, the associated RBCU runs in low speed.
ACTIONS The exception for SLC 16.2.4 provided in the NOTE of the Actions, permits entry into MODES 1 or 2 with AWC and Alternate RBC systems not FUNCTIONAL. This is acceptable because these cooling systems are not required to support normal operation of the facility or to mitigate a design basis event.
A.1 and A.2 When the AWC Supplied Control Complex Cooling System is non-functional, Required Action A.1 specifies the PSW system to be declared inoperable and the applicable TS (Ref. 2) be entered immediately. Actions shall be taken to restore the AWC Supplied Control Complex Cooling System to a FUNCTIONAL status.
16.9.23-6 Rev. 001 I
B.1 and B.2 AWC and Alternate RBC Systems 16.9.23 When the AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling System is non-functional, unavailability shall be logged in the Operations log immediately and actions shall be initiated to restore the AWC Supplied Auxiliary Building Cooling system to a FUNCTIONAL status.
C.1 and C.2 When the Alternate RBC System is non-functional, unavailability shall be logged in the Operations log immediately and actions shall be initiated to restore the Alternate RBC system to a FUNCTIONAL status.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 16.9.23.1 Standby systems shall be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Testing each Chiller's Skid mounted components adequately checks this system. The Chiller Skids shall be operated and tested every 92 days. The 92 day Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk.
Note that if the Chiller Skid is placed in continuous operation, those periods can be credited in lieu of testing.
- SR 16.9.23.2 Standby systems shall be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Starting and running the fans of each Cable Room AHU adequately checks this system. The 92 day Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk.
SR 16.9.23.3 Verify that power paths from 4160V Switchgear AWC1 through 4160/600V Transformers AWC2 and AWC3 to MCCs AWC2 and AWC3 are energized, respectively. Verify that power paths from 600V MCCs AWC2 and AWC3 through 600/208V Transformers AWC4 and AWC5 to 208V MCCs AWC4 and AWC5 are energized, respectively. Verification of the energized power paths shall be performed every 24 months. The 24 month Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk.
REFERENCES
- 1. Amendment 386, 388, and 387, Issuance of Amendments Regarding Implementation of the Protected Service Water System, dated August 13, 2014.
- 2. Technical Specification 3. 7.10, Protected Service Water System.
16.9.23-7 Rev. 001 I
SFP Area Isolation 16.9.25 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.25 Spent Fuel Pool Area Isolation COMMITMENT:
APPLICABILITY:
ACTIONS Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Area shall be capable of being isolated per the following:
- a. 1,3VSDAID05
- b. 1,3VSDAID06
- b. Roll-up doors R-19 (Unit 1 and 2) and R-22(U3) are capable of being manually opened.
- c. Sand bags and tarps are staged locally and capable of providing drain isolation.
When Protected Service Water (PSW) is required to be OPERABLE
NOTES---------------------------------------------------------
The provisions of SLC 16.2.4 are not applicable.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
Commitment(s) a, b, or A.1 Perform a risk assessment Immediately c not met.
using the Electronic Risk Assessment Tool.
A.2 Initiate actions to restore SFP Area Isolation capability.
16.9.25-1 Immediately Rev. 001 I
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE SR 16.9.25.1 Inspect roll-up doors R-19 and R-22 to ensure they are free of obstructions and damage that would prevent them from being accessed and opened manually.
SR 16.9.25.2 Inspect sandbags and tarps to ensure they are free of damage, degradation and are staged near SFP drains such that they can be deployed in a timely manner.
SR 16.9.25.3 Manually open roll-up doors R-19 and R-22 to ensure doors are free of obstructions and damage that would prevent them from being accessed and opened.
SR 16.9.25.4 Perform a functional test for dampers 1,3VSDAID05 and 1,3VSDAID06.
16.9.25-2 SFP Area Isolation 16.9.25 FREQUENCY 61 days 61 days 12 months 12 months Rev.001 I
BASES SFP Area Isolation 16.9.25 The SFP Ventilation System is designed to maintain a suitable environment in the SFP area for the proper operation, maintenance and testing of equipment as well as for personnel access.
The system is designed to maintain the SFP area between 60°F and 113°F. The system has two potential operating modes. In the unfiltered or normal mode of operation, air is exhausted directly to the unit vent. In the filtered mode of operation, exhaust air is directed through the Reactor Building Purge Filter Train before being discharged to the unit vent. In both modes of operation the path of ventilating air in the SFP area is from areas of low activity toward areas of progressively higher activity for discharge to the unit vent. This system is not nuclear safety related. In the event of loss of power, the system is not operational.
The Alternate Chilled Water (AWC) System and the Alternate RBC System (Ref. 1) provide an alternate means to recover from the potential loss of normal ventilation to ensure extended operation of the Protected Service Water (PSW) system. For Auxiliary Building cooling, the AWC System uses portable chillers and permanently installed piping to selected air handling units (AHUs) to provide cooling to the Control Complex, the Penetration Rooms, and other areas of the Auxiliary Building. These areas AH Us are provided with an alternate power source from the PSW electrical distribution system. A select group of Auxiliary Building exhaust fans are also provided with an alternate power source from the PSW electrical distribution system to support cooling of the Auxiliary Building.
During a PSW event, cooling is lost to the SFP; thereby, inducing the SFP inventory to boil. As the SFP boils, a steam layer will form and could enter the Auxiliary Building through the ventilation system ducts and SFP drainage system. When conditions cool and steam condenses, the water can potentially pool and cause an adverse effect by draining to the Control Rooms and LPI pump rooms. In addition, the steam release to the Auxiliary Building can result in elevated temperatures in areas containing the AHUs and exhaust fans utilized by the AWC system. The elevated temperatures can exceed the design limits for the electrical equipment associated with the AWC system.
COMMITMENT SFP Area shall be capable of being isolated per the following:
1,3VSDAID05 1,3VSDAID06 The SFP Area Isolation circuitry includes the instrument air supply, spring loaded actuator, dampers, and temperature detector.
- b.
Roll-up doors R-19 (Unit 1 and 2) and R-22 (U3) are capable of being manually opened.
- c.
Sand bags and tarps are maintained and staged in SFP area near drains and capable of providing drain isolation.
16.9.25-3 Rev. 001 I
ACTIONS SFP Area Isolation 16.9.25 The exception for SLC 16.2.4 provided in the NOTE of the Actions, permits entry into MODES 1 or 2 with SFP Area not capable of being isolated. This is acceptable because these commitments are not required to support normal operation of the facility or to mitigate a design basis event.
A.1 and A.2 When the SFP Area Isolation commitments a, b, or c is not met, a risk assessment shall be performed immediately by Required Action A.1. Required Action A.1 is required in conjunction with A.2 to initiate actions to restore the SFP area isolation capability immediately.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 16.9.25.1 Standby systems shall be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Inspecting and verifying that roll-up doors R-19 (Unit 1 and 2) and R-22 (U3) are not obstructed, damaged or otherwise prohibited from being manually rolled up adequately checks this commitment. The 61 day Surveillance Frequency is adequate based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk.
SR 16.9.25.2 Standby systems shall be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Inspecting and verifying that the sand bags, tarps, and staging area are not degraded, damaged or obstructed to prevent SFP drains from being blocked adequately checks this commitment. The 61 day Surveillance Frequency is adequate based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk.
SR 16.9.25.3 Standby systems shall be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Manually opening roll-up doors R-19 and R-22 ensures doors, chain falls, etc. are free of obstructions and damage that would prevent them from being accessed and opened. The 12 month Surveillance Frequency is adequate based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk.
Analysis assumes the roll-up doors are at least 75% open after a PSW event and before initiation of SFP boiling. The 12 month Surveillance Frequency is adequate based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk.
SR 16.9.25.4 Standby systems shall be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Since the Damper Isolation circuitry pilot temperature detector cannot be tested, a test valve is provided to allow for simulation of opening the pilot temperature detector on a high temperature. The simulation will close the isolation dampers to provide an adequate check of the system. The Damper Isolation circuitry shall be operated and tested every 12 months. The 12 month 16.9.25-4 Rev. 001 I
SFP Area Isolation 16.9.25 Surveillance Frequency is adequate based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk.
REFERENCES
16.9.25-5 Rev. 001 I