ONS-2014-066, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Manual Volume C, Revision 2014-014
| ML14143A185 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 05/22/2014 |
| From: | Batson S Duke Energy Carolinas |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| ONS-2014-066, FOIA/PA-2016-0071 | |
| Download: ML14143A185 (45) | |
Text
DUKE Scof, L.
Baton
- ENERGY, Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Duke Energy ON01VP I 7800 Rochester Hwy Seneca, SC 29672 ONS-2014-066 o: 864.873.3274
- f. 864.873.4208 Scott.Batson@duke-energy.corn May 22, 2014 10 CFR 50.54(q)
Attn: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2746
Subject:
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, and -287 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Manual Volume C, Revision 2014-014 Please find attached for your use and review copies of the revision to the Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures along with the associated revision instructions and 10 CFR 50.54(q) evaluation.
This revision is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) and does not reduce the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan or the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. If there are any questions or concerns pertaining to this revision please call Pat Street, Emergency Planning Manager, at 864-873-3124.
By copy of this letter, two copies of this revision are being provided to the NRC, Region II, Atlanta, Georgia.
Sincerely, Scott L. Batson Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Attachments:
Revision Instructions EPIP Volume C - Revision 2014-014 10 CFR 50.54(q) Evaluation(s) www.duke-energy.com
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission May 22, 2014 xc:
w/2 copies of attachments Mr. Victor McCree, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 w/copy of attachments Mr. James R. Hall, Project Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North Mailstop O-8B1 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 (send via E-mail) w/o attachments Mr. Eddy Crowe NRC Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station ELL EC2ZF
April 28, 2014 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
SUBJECT:
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Volume C Revision 2014-013 Please make the following changes to the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, Volume C:
REMOVE INSERT Cover Sheet Rev. 2014-013 Table of Contents Pages 1, 2, & 3 RP/O/AII000/001 Rev 000 Cover Sheet Rev. 2014-014 Table of Contents Pages 1, 2, & 3 RP/O/AI1000/001 Rev 001 Pat Street ONS Emergency Planning Manager
DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES VOLUME C APPROVED:
ý YAA i. J-~tzz~=
Terry I1atterson Director Nuclear Org Effectiveness Date Approved VOLUME C REVISION 2014-014 May 2014
VOLUME C TABLE OF CONTENTS SHIO/BI2005/001 SHIO/B12005/002 H PO/B/I 1009/018 H PO/B/I 1009/020 H PO/B/I1009/022 H PO/B/I1009/023 H PO/B/I 1009/026 RP/OIA/1000/001 RP/OIA/1 000/002 RP/0/IB/1 000/003 A RP/O/A/1 000/009 RP/O/A/1 000/010 RP/O/A/1000/015 A RP/OA/I1 000/015 B RP/O/B/1000/016 RP/O/A/1000/017 RP/0/B/1 000/018 RP/O/A/1000/019 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Projections Protocol for the Field Monitoring Coordinator During Emergency Conditions Off-Site Dose Projections Estimating Food Chain Doses Under Post-Accident Conditions On-Shift Off-Site Dose Projections Radiation Protection Emergency Response Environmental Monitoring For Emergency Conditions Emergency Classification Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure Rev.
Rev.
Rev.
Rev.
Rev.
Rev.
Rev.
Rev.
Rev.
006 005 023 005 013 000 000 001 002 ERDS Operation Rev.
011 Procedure For Site Assembly Procedure For Emergency Evacuation/Relocation Of Site Personnel Offsite Communications From The Control Room Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center MERT Activation Procedure For Medical, Confined Space, and High Angle Rescue Emergencies Spill Response Core Damage Assessment Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure Rev.
Rev.
Rev.
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002 001 001 000 Rev.
018 Rev.
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001 005 003 I
Revision 2014-014 May 2014
RP/0/B/1 000/022 RP/O/A/1 000/024 RP/0/B/1 000/027 RP/OIA/1 000/028 RPIO/BI1 000/029 RP/0/B/1 000/031 RPIOINA1 000/035 RP/OIA/l 000/036 SR/0/B/2000/001 SR/O/B/2000/002 SRIO/N2000/003 SR/O/A/2000/004 Business Management SSG Functional Area Directive 102 SCD - 110 Engineering Manual 5.1 Human Resources Procedure VOLUME C TABLE OF CONTENTS Procedure For Major Site Damage Assessment And Repair Protective Action Recommendations Re-Entry Recovery Procedure Nuclear Communications Emergency Response Plan Fire Brigade Response Joint Information Center Emergency Response Plan Severe Weather Preparations Equipment Important to Emergency Response Standard Procedure For Corporate Communications Response To The Emergency Operations Facility Standard Procedure for EOF Services Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility Notification to States and Counties from the Emergency Operations Facility for Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee Business Management Emergency Plan SSG Emergency Response Plan - ONS Specific Supply Chain Directive 110 - SCO Emergency Response Plan Engineering Emergency Response Plan ONS Human Resources Emergency Plan Rev.
014 Rev.
001 Rev.
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003 000 017 006 009 001 012 006 000 000 Rev.
012 Rev.
008 Rev.
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032 10/13/2004 2
Revision 2014-014 May 2014
Radiation Protection Section Manual 11.3 Safety Assurance Directive 6.1 Safety Assurance Directive 6.2 Training Division DTS-007 VOLUME C TABLE OF CONTENTS Off-Site Dose Assessment And Data Evaluation Emergency Response Organization Emergency Contingency Plan Oconee Training Division Training Standard Rev.
001 Rev.
007 Rev.
006 Rev.
018 3
Revision 2014-014 May 2014
Duke Energy Procedure No.
Oconee Nuclear Station RP/O/A/1000/001 Emergency Classification Revision No.
001 Electronic Reference No.
Reference Use OP009A63 PERFORMANCE
]
PDF Format Compare with Control Copy every 14 calendar days while work is being performed.
Compared with Control Copy*
Date Compared with Control Copy*
Date Compared with Control Copy*
Date Date(s) Performed Work Order/Task Number (WO#)
COMPLETION
]
o Yes 0l NA Checklists and/or blanks initialed, signed, dated, or filled in NA, as appropriate?
[] Yes E] NA Required enclosures attached?
[I Yes 0l NA Charts, graphs, data sheets, etc. attached, dated, identified, and marked?
o Yes 0l NA Calibrated Test Equipment, if used, checked out/in and referenced to this procedure?
"l Yes 0l NA Procedure requirements met?
Verified By*
Date Procedure Completion Approved*
Date
- Printed Name and Signature Remarks (attach additional pages, if necessary)
IMPORTANT: Do NOT mark on barcodes.
Printed Date: *03/06/2014*
Enclosure No.: *FULL*
I 111111 11111 1111111 II 11111 1111111 II 11111 11111II I11111 IIII IM1111III11111111111 i
RevisionNo.: *001*
Procedure No.: *RP/O/A/1000/001*
11111 11111 1111 IIIIIIIIIIII I I 11 I 111111 1111 1111 I llI 11111 IIIIII 1111II 1I1Il11111II111
Form 703-1. Procedure Process Record (PPR)
(R08-10)
Duke Energy (I)DNo. RP/0/A/1000/001 PROCEDURE PROCESS RECORD Revision No. 001 PREPARATION (2)
Station OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION (3)
Procedure Title Emergency Classification (4)
Prepared By* John Kaminski (Signature)
Date 03/04/2014 (5)
Requires NSD 228 Applicability Determination?
0 Yes (New procedure or revision with major ch gges) - Atta SD 228 documentation.
E] No (Revision with minor changes)
(6)
Reviewed By*
- 4. NwJi ll (QR)(/
Date Cross-Disciplinary Review By*
(QR)(KI)
NAW Date t
Reactivity Mgmt Review By*
.(QR)
NAbWDate It ay"/ V Mgmt Involvement Review By*
(Ops. Supt.) NA~f-ate (7)
Additional Reviews Reviewed By*
Date Reviewed By*
Date (8)
Approved By*
Date II PERFORMANCE (Compare with control copy everyP e dar days hile wo k is being performed.)
(9)
Compared with Control Copy*_
Date Compared with Control Copy*
Date Compared with Control Copy*
Date (10)
Date(s) Performed Work Order Number (WO#)
COMPLETION (11)
Procedure Completion Verification:
0] Unit 0 0 Unit 1 0 Unit 2 0 Unit 3 Procedure performed on what unit?
o Yes D NA Check lists and/or blanks initialed, signed, dated, or filled in NA, as appropriate?
o Yes D NA Required enclosures attached?
o Yes 0 NA Charts, graphs, data sheets, etc. attached, dated, identified, and marked?
o Yes 0 NA Calibrated Test Equipment, if used, checked out/in and referenced to this procedure?
o Yes 0 NA Procedure requirements met?
Verified By*
Date (12)
Procedure Completion Approved Date (13)
Remarks (Attach additional pages, if necessary)
- Printed Name and Signature
RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 2 of 6 Emergency Classification NOTE:
This procedure is an implementing procedure to the Oconee Nuclear Site Emergency plan and must be forwarded to Emergency Planning within seven (7) working days of approval.
- 1. Symptoms 1.1 This procedure describes the immediate actions to be taken to recognize and classify an emergency condition.
1.2 This procedure identifies the four emergency classifications and their corresponding Emergency Action Levels (EALs).
1.3 This procedure provides reporting requirements for non-emergency abnormal events.
1.4 The following guidance is to be used by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director in assessing emergency conditions:
1.4.1 Definitions and Acronyms are italicized throughout procedure for easy recognition. The definitions are in Enclosure 4.10 (Definitions/Acronyms).
1.4.2 The Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director shall review all applicable initiating events to ensure proper classification.
1.4.3 The BASIS Document (Volume A, Section D of the Emergency Plan) is available for review if any questions arise over proper classification.
1.4.4 IF An event occurs on more than one unit concurrently, THEN The event with the higher classification will be classified on the Emergency Notification Form.
A. Information relating to the problem(s) on the other unit(s) will be captured on the Emergency Notification Form as shown in RP/0/A/1000/015A, (Offsite Communications From The Control Room),
RP/0/A/1000/015B, (Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center) or SR/0/B/2000/004, (Notification to States and Counties from the Emergency Operations Facility).
1.4.5 IF An event occurs, AND A lower or higher plant operating mode is reached before the classification can be made, THEN The classification shall be based on the mode that existed at the time the event occurred.
2
RP/O/A/ 1000/001 Page 3 of 6 1.4.6 The Fission Product Barrier Matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) or higher.
A. An event that is recognized at Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) or lower shall not be classified using the Fission Product Barrier Matrix.
- 1. Reference should be made to the additional enclosures that provide Emergency Action Levels for specific events (e.g., Severe Weather, Fire, Security).
1.5 IF A transient event should occur, THEN Review the following guidance:
1.5.1 IF An Emergency Action Level (EAL) identifies a specific duration AND The Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director assessment concludes that the specified duration is exceeded or will be exceeded, (i.e.;
condition cannot be reasonably corrected before the duration elapses),
THEN Classify the event.
1.5.2 IF A plant condition exceeding EAL criteria is corrected before the specified duration time is exceeded, THEN The event is NOT classified by that EAL.
A. Review lower severity EALs for possible applicability in these cases.
NOTE:
Reporting under 10CFR50.72 may be required for the following step. Such a condition could occur, for example, if a follow up evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the condition was more severe than earlier believed.
1.5.3 IF A plant condition exceeding EAL criteria is not recognized at the time of occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g.; as a result of routine log or record review)
AND The condition no longer exists, THEN An emergency shall NOT be declared.
9 Refer to NSD 202 for reportability 3
RP/O/A/1000/001 Page 4 of 6 1.5.4 IF An emergency classification was warranted, but the plant condition has been corrected prior to declaration and notification THEN The Emergency Coordinator must consider the potential that the initiating condition (e.g.; Failure of Reactor Protection System) may have caused plant damage that warrants augmenting the on shift personnel through activation of the Emergency Response Organization.
A. IF An Unusual Event condition exists, THEN Make the classification as required.
- 1.
The event may be terminated in the same notification or as a separate termination notification.
B. IF An Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency condition exists, THEN Make the classification as required, AND Activate the Emergency Response Organization.
1.6 Emergency conditions shall be classified as soon as the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director assessment determines that the Emergency Action Levels for the Initiating Condition have been exceeded.
4
RP/O/A/1000/001 Page 5 of 6
- 2. Immediate Actions 2.1 Assessment, classification and declaration of any applicable emergency condition should be completed within 15 minutes after the availability of indications or information to cognizant facility staff that an EAL threshold has been exceeded.
2.2 Determine the operating mode that existed at the time the event occurred prior to any protection system or operator action initiated in response to the event.
2.3 IF The unit is at Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) or higher AND The condition/event affects fission product barriers, THEN GO TO Enclosure 4.1, (Fission Product Barrier Matrix).
2.3.1 Review the criteria listed in Enclosure 4.1, (Fission Product Barrier Matrix) and make the determination if the event should be classified).
2.4 Review the listing of enclosures to determine if the event is applicable to one of the categories shown.
2.4.1 IF One or more categories are applicable to the event, THEN Refer to the associated enclosures.
2.4.2 Review the EALs and determine if the event should be classified.
A. IF An EAL is applicable to the event, THEN Classify the event as required.
2.5 IF The condition requires an emergency classification, THEN Initiate the following:
- for Control Room - RP/0/B/1000/002, (Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure)
" for TSC - RP/O/A/1000/019, (Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure)
" for EOF - SR/O/A/2000/003, (Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility) 2.6 Continue to review the emergency conditions to assure the current classification continues to be applicable.
5
RP/O/A/I1 000/001 Page 6 of 6
- 3. Subsequent Actions 3.1 Continue to review the emergency conditions to assure the current classification continues to be applicable.
- 4.
Enclosures Enclosures 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 Fission Product Barrier Matrix System Malfunctions Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluents Loss Of Shutdown Functions Loss of Power Fires/Explosions And Security Actions Natural Disasters, Hazards, And Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Radiation Monitor Readings For Emergency Classification Unexpected/Unplanned Increase In Area Monitor Readings Definitions Operating Modes Defined In Improved Technical Specifications Instructions For Using Enclosure 4.1 References Page Number 7
8 10 12 14 15 17 20 21 22 27 28 30 6
.1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 1 of 1 SEE NOTE BELOW DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION USING THE TABLE BELOW:
ADD POINTS TO CLASSIFY.
RCS BARRIERS (BD 5-7)
FU FUEL CLAD BARRIERS (BD 8-9)
CONTAINMENT BARRIERS (BD 10-13)
Potential Loss (4 Points)
Loss (5 Points)
Potential Loss (4 Points)
Loss (5 Points)
Potential Loss (1 Point)
Loss (3 Points)
RCS Leakrate > 160 gpm RCS Leak rate that results in a loss Average of the 5 highest Average of the 5 highest CETC CETC > 12000 F _> 15 minutes Rapid unexplained containment of subcooling.
_ 12000 F OR pressure decrease after increase
>Ž7000 F CETC _> 700' F > 15 minutes with a OR valid RVLS reading 0" containment pressure or sump level not consistent with LOCA SGTR > 160 gpm Valid RVLS reading of 0" Coolant activity > 300 jiCi/ml DEI RB pressure _ 59 psig Failure of secondary side of SG OR results in a direct opening to the RB pressure > 10 psig and no environment with SG Tube Leak _
NOTE: RVLS is NOT RBCU or RBS 10 gpm in the SAME SG valid if one or more RCPs are running QR if Entry into the PTS (Pressurized I RIA 57 or 58 reading _> 1.0 R/hr LPI pump(s) are Hours RIA 57 OR RIA 58 Hours RIA 57 OR RIA 58 SG Tube Leak > 10 gpm exists in Thermal Shock) Operation running AND taking Since SD R/hr R/hr Since SD R/hr R/hr one SG.
NOTE: PTS is entered under 2 RIA 57 reading 1.6 R/hr suction from the LPI AND either of the following:
2 RIA 58 reading > 1.0 R/hr drop line.
0 - <0.5
>300
> 150 0 - < 0.5
> 1800
Ž860 the other SG has secondary side failure that results in a direct A cooldown below 400'F @
opening to the environment AND
> 100lF/hr. has occurred.
3RIA 57 or 58 reading _ 1.0 R/hr 0.5 - < 2.0
> 80
> 40 0.5 -<2.0
>400
_ 195 is being fed from the affected unit.
HPI has operated in the 2.0-8.0
> 32
> 16 2.0-8.0
> 280
> 130 injection mode while NO RCPs were operating.
HPI Forced Cooling RCS pressure spike > 2750 psig Hydrogen concentration > 9%
Containment isolation is incomplete and a release path to the environment exists Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgment Director judgment Director judgment judgment Director judgment Director judgment UNUSUAL EVENT (1-3 Total Points)
ALERT (4-6 Total Points)
SITE AREA EMERGENCY (7-10 Total Points)
GENERAL EMERGENCY (11-13 Total Points)
OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3,4 4.1.U. I Any potential loss of Containment
- 4. I.A. I Any potential loss or loss of the RCS 4.1.S.1 Loss of any two barriers 4.1.G. 1 Loss of any two barriers and potential loss of the third barrer 4.1.U.2 Any loss of containment
- 4. I.A.2 Any potential loss or loss of the Fuel 4.1.S.2 Loss of one barrier and potential loss of either Clad RCS or Fuel Clad Barriers 4.1.G.2 Loss of all three barriers 4.1.S.3 Potential loss of both the RCS and Fuel Clad Barriers NOTE:
9 An event with multiple events could occur which would result in the conclusion that exceeding the loss or potential loss threshold is IMNINNENT (i.e., within 1-3 hours). In this IMMINENT LOSS situation, use judgment and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.
Referencing this matrix frequently will aid in determining a fission barrier failure or other upgrade criteria.
7
.2 System Malfunctions RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 1 of 2 ALER SITE AREA EMERGENCY' UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT GENERAL EMERGENCY I.
RCS LEAKAGE (BD 15)
OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 A.
Unidentified leakage _> 10 gpm B.
Pressure boundary leakage > 10 gpm C.
Identified leakage > 25 gpm Includes SG tube leakage
- 2.
UNPLANNED LOSS OF MOST OR ALL SAFETY SYSTEM ANNUNCIATION/
INDICATION IN CONTROL ROOM FOR > 15 MINUTES (BD 16)
OPERATING MODE:
1, 2,3,4 A.
Unplanned loss of > 50% of the following annunciators on one unit for > 15 minutes:
Units 1 & 3 i SAI, 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 14,15, 16,& 18 3 SAI, 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 14, 15, 16, & 18 Unit 2 2 SAI, 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 14, 15, & 16 UNPLANNED LOSS OF MOST OR ALL SAFETY SYSTEM ANNUNCIATION/
INDICATION IN CONTROL ROOM (BD 20)
OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 A.
Unplanned loss of > 50% of the following annunciators on one unit for > 15 minutes:
Units I & 3 I SAI, 2, 3,4, 5,6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16,& 18 3 SAI, 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 14, 15, 16, & 18 Unit 2 2 SAI, 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,14,15, & 16 AND Loss of annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift complement) to safely operate the unit AND Significant plant transient in progress OR Loss of the OAC and ALL PAM indications (END)
- 1.
INABILITY TO MONITOR A SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT IN PROGRESS (BD 22)
OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 A.
Unplanned loss of > 50% of the following annunciators on one unit for > 15 minutes:
Units 1 & 3 1 SAI, 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 14, 15, 16, & 18 3 SAI, 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 14,15, 16,& 18 Unit 2 2 SAl, 2, 3,4, 5,6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, & 16 AND A significant transient is in progress AND Loss of the OAC and ALL PAM indications AND Inability to directly nionitor any one of the following functions:
AND Loss of annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift complement) to safely operate the unit (CONTINUED)
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Subcriticality Core Cooling Heat Sink RCS Integrity Containment Integrity RCS Inventory (END) 8
.2 RP/0/A/1000/001 System Malfunctions Page 2 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT I
ALERT 1
SITE AREA EMERGENCY 1
GENERAL EMERGENCY
- I
_ii
- 3.
INABILITY TO REACH REQUIRED SHUTDOWN WITHIN LIMITS (BD 17)
OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 A.
Required operating mode not reached within TS LCO action statement time
- 4.
UNPLANNED LOSS OF ALL ONSITE OR OFFSITE COMMUNICATIONS (BD 18)
OPERATING MODE: All A. Loss of all onsite communications capability (Plant phone system, PA system, Pager system, Onsite Radio system) affecting ability to perform Routine operations B.
Loss of all onsite communications capability (Selective Signaling, NRC ETS lines, Offsite Radio System, AT&T line) affecting ability to communicate with offsite authorities.
- 5.
FUEL CLAD DEGRADATION (BD 19)
OPERATING MODE: All:
A.
DEI - >5lgCi/ml (END) 9
.3 Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 1 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT J
SITE AREA EMREC GENERAL ]EMERGENCjY ANY UNPLANNED RELEASE OF GASEOUS OR LIQUID RADIOACTIVITY TO THE ENVIRONMENT THAT EXCEEDS TWO TIMES THE SLC LIMITS FOR 60 MINUTES OR LONGER (BD 25)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Valid indication on radiation monitor RIA 33 of > 4.06E+06 cpm for > 60 minutes (See Note 1)
B.
Valid indication on radiation monitor RIA-45 of > 9.35E+05 cpm or RP sample reading of >
6.62E-2uCi/ml Xe 133 eq for > 60 minutes (See Note 1)
C.
Liquid effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11.1 for > 60 minutes as determined by Chemistry Procedure D.
Gaseous effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.I1.2 for > 60 minutes as determined by RP Procedure
- 1. ANY UNPLANNED RELEASE OF GASEOUS OR LIQUID RADIOACTIVITY TO THE ENVIRONMENT THAT EXCEEDS 200 TIMES RADIOLOGICAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR 15 MINUTES OR LONGER (BD 30)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Valid indication of RIA-46 of > 2.09 E+ 04 cpm or RP sample reading of> 6.62 uCi/ml Xe 133 eq for> 15 minutes. (See Note 1)
B RIA 33 HIGH Alarm AND Liquid effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11.1 for > 15 minutes as determined by Chemistry Procedure C.
Gaseous effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11.2 for >15 minutes as determined by RP Procedure (CONTINUED)
- 1.
BOUNDARY DOSE RESULTING FROM ACTUAIIMMINENT RELEASE OF GASEOUS ACTIVITY (BD 35)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Valid reading on RIA 46 of > 2.09E+05 cpm or RIA 56 reading of> 17.5 R/hr or RP sample reading of 6.62E+0I uCi/ml Xe 133 eq for >
15 minutes (See Note 2)
B.
Valid reading on RIA 57 or 58 as shown on.8 (See Note 2)
C.
Dose calculations result in a dose projection at the site boundary of:
> 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem CDE adult thyroid D.
Field survey results indicate site boundary dose rates exceeding >100 mRad/hr expected to continue for more than one hour OR Analyses of field survey samples indicate adult thyroid dose commitment of > 500 mRem CDE (3.84 E"7 ltCi/ml) for one hour of inhalation NOTE 2: If actual Dose Assessment cannot be completed within 15 minutes, then the valid radiation monitor reading should be used for emergency classification.
- 1.
BOUNDARY DOSE RESULTING FROM ACTUALI IMMINENT RELEASE OF GASEOUS ACTIVITY (BD 39)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Valid reading on RIA 46 of> 2.09E+06 cpm or RIA 56 reading of> 175 R/hr or RP sample reading of 6.62E+02uCi/ml Xe 133 eq for> 15 minutes (See Note 3)
B.
Valid reading on RIA 57 or 58 as shown on.8 (See Note 3)
C.
Dose calculations result in a dose projection at the site boundary of:
> 5000 mRem CDE adult thyroid D.
Field survey results indicate site boundary dose rates exceeding >1000 mRad/hr expected to continue for more than one hour OR Analyses of field survey samples indicate adult thyroid dose commitment of -> 5000 mRem CDE for one hour of inhalation NOTE 1: If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EAL AND the required assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be completed within this period, declaration must be made on the valid Radiation Monitor reading.
NOTE 3: If actual Dose Assessment cannot be completed within 15 minutes, then the valid radiation monitor reading should be used for emergency classification.
(CONTINUED)
(CONTINUED)
(END) 10
.3 Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 2 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT I
SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY GENERA E.M"RGENCY'
_I_
2 UNEXPECTED INCREASE IN PLANT RADIATION OR AIRBORNE CONCENTRATION (BD 27)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
LT 5 reading 14" and decreasing with makeup not keeping up with leakage WITH fuel in the core B.
Valid indication of uncontrolled water decrease in the SFP or fuel transfer canal with all fuel assemblies remaining covered by water AND Unplanned Valid RIA 3, 6 or Portable Area Monitor readings increase.
C.
I R/hr radiation reading at one foot away from a damaged storage cask located at the ISFSI D.
Valid area monitor readings exceeds limits stated in Enclosure 4.9.
NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.4., (Loss of Shutdown Functions).
High radiation levels will also be seen with this condition.
- 2.
RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR INCREASES IN RADIATION LEVELS THAT IMPEDES OPERATION OF SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN SAFE OPERATION OR TO ESTABLISH OR MAINTAIN COLD SHUTDOWN (BD 32)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Valid radiation reading > 15 mRad/hr in CR, CAS, or Radwaste CR B.
Unplanned/unexpected valid area monitor readings exceed limits stated in Enclosure 4.9
- 2.
LOSS OF WATER LEVEL IN THE REACTOR VESSEL THAT HAS OR WILL UNCOVER FUEL IN THE REACTOR VESSEL (BD 38)
OPERATING MODE: 5,6 A.
Loss of all decay heat removal as indicated by the inability to maintain RCS temperature below 2000 F AND LT 5 indicates 0 inches after initiation of RCS makeup NOTE: These readings may also be indicative of Fission Product Barrier concerns which makes a review of the Fission Product Barrier Matrix necessary.
B.
Loss of all decay heat removal as indicated by the inability to maintain RCS temperature below 200' F 3.
MAJOR DAMAGE TO IRRADIATED FUEL OR LOSS OF WATER LEVEL THAT HAS OR WILL RESULT IN THE UNCOVERING OF IRRADIATED FUEL OUTSIDE THE REACTOR VESSEL (BD 33)
AND Either train ultrasonic level indication less than 0 inches and decreasing after initiation of RCS makeup NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.4., (Loss of Shutdown Functions). High radiation levels will also be seen with this condition.
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Valid RIA 3*, 6, 41, OR 49* HIGH Alarm (END)
- - Applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only B.
HIGH Alarm for portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge C.
Report of visual observation of irradiated fuel uncovered D.
Operators determine water level drop in either the SFP or fuel transfer canal will exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.4., (Loss of Shutdown Functions).
High radiation levels will also be seen with this condition.
(END))
(END)
.1. ____________________________
J. _________________________
II
.4 Loss of Shutdown Functions RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 1 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT%
ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY
. I GENERAL EMERGENCY
- ,!:FAILURE:,
OF RI'S* TOv COM LET OR:::::*
- i<
(CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)
- 1.
FAILURE OF RPS TO COMPLETE OR INITIATE A Rx SCRAM (BD 44)
OPERATING MODE 1, 2,3 A.
Valid reactor trip signal received or required WITHOUT automatic scram AND DSS has inserted Control Rods OR Manual trip from the Control Room is successful and reactor power is less than 5% and decreasing
- 2.
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PLANT IN MODE 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN) (BD 46) 1.
OPERATING MODE: 1, 2 A.
Valid reactor trip signal received or required WITHOUT automatic scram AND DSS has NOT inserted Control Rods FAILURE OF RPS TO COMPLETE OR INITIATE A Rx SCRAM (BD 50)
- 1.
FAILURE OF RPS TO COMPLETE OPERATING MODE: 1, 2 A.
Valid Rx trip signal received or required WITHOUT automatic scram AND NOT 5%
AND AND Manual trip from the Control Room was successful in reducing reactor power to <
and decreasing Average of the 5 highest CETCs Ž12000 F OPERATING MODE:
5,6 A.
Loss of LPI and/or LPSW AND Manual trip from the Control Room was NOT successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing
- 2.
COMPLETE LOSS OF FUNCTION NEEDED TO ACHIEVE OR MAINTAIN MODE 4 (HOT SHUTDOWN) (BD 51)
OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 A.
Average of the 5 highest CETCs Ž12000 F shown on ICCM B.
Unable to maintain reactor subcritical C.
EOP directs feeding SG from SSF ASWP or station ASWP (CONTINUED)
ICCM (END) on Inability to maintain RCS temperature below 2000 F as indicated by either of the following:
RCS temperature at the LPI Pump Suction OR Average of the 5 highest CETCs as indicated by ICCM display OR Visual observation (CONTINUED) 12
.4 Loss of Shutdown Functions RP/O/A/1000/001 Page 2 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY
- 1.
UNEXPECTED INCREASE IN PLANT RADIATION OR AIRBORNE CONCENTRATION (BD 42)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
LT 5 reading 14" and decreasing with makeup not keeping up with leakage WITH fuel in the core B.
Valid indication of uncontrolled water decrease in the SFP or fuel transfer canal with all fuel assemblies remaining covered by water AND Unplanned Valid RIA 3, 6 or Portable Area Monitor readings increase.
C.
I R/hr radiation reading at one foot away from a damaged storage cask located at the ISFSI D.
Valid area monitor readings exceeds limits stated in Enclosure 4.9.
- 3.
MAJOR DAMAGE TO IRRADIATED FUEL OR LOSS OF WATER LEVEL THAT HAS OR WILL RESULT IN THE UNCOVERING OF IRRADIATED FUEL OUTSIDE THE REACTOR VESSEL (BD 48)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Valid RIA 3*, 6, 41, OR 49* HIGH Alarm
- Applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only B.
HIGH Alarm for portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge C
Report of visual observation of irradiated fuel uncovered D.
Operators determine water level drop in either the SFP or fuel transfer canal will exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.3, (Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent). High radiation levels will also be seen with this condition.
- 3.
LOSS OF WATER LEVEL IN THE REACTOR VESSEL THAT HAS OR WILL UNCOVER FUEL IN THE REACTOR VESSEL (BD 52)
OPERATING MODE: 5,6 A.
Loss of all decay heat removal as indicated by the inability to maintain RCS temperature below 2000 F AND LT-5 indicates 0 inches after initiation of RCS Makeup B.
Loss of all decay heat removal as indicated by the inability to maintain RCS temperature below 2000 F AND Either train ultrasonic level indication less than 0 inches and decreasing after initiation of RCS makeup NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.3, (Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent). High radiation levels will also be seen with this condition.
NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.3., (Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent). High radiation levels will also be seen with this condition.
(END)
(END)
(END) 13
.5 Loss of Power RP/O/AI1000/001 Page 1 of 1 141 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY
- 1.
LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES FOR GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES (BD 55) 1.
LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE AC POWER AND LOSS OF ALL ONSITE AC POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES (BD 57) 1.
LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE AC POWER AND LOSS OF ALL ONSITE AC POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES (BD 59) 1.
PROLONGED LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE POWER AND ONSITE AC POWER (BD 62)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Unit auxiliaries are being supplied from Keowee or CT5 AND Inability to energize either MFB from an offsite source (either switchyard) within 15 minutes.
- 2.
UNPLANNED LOSS OF REQUIRED DC POWER FOR GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES (BD 56)
OPERATING MODE: 5,6 A.
Unplanned loss of vital DC power to required DC busses as indicated by bus voltage less than 110 VDC AND Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss (END)
OPERATING MODE: 5,6 Defueled A.
MFB I and 2 de-energized AND Failure to restore power to at least one MFB within 15 minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power
- 2.
AC POWER CAPABILITY TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES REDUCED TO A SINGLE SOURCE FOR GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES (BD 58)
OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 A.
AC power capability has been degraded to a single power source for > 15 minutes due to the loss of all but one of the following:
Unit Normal Transformer (backcharged)
Unit SU Transformer Another Unit SU Transformer (aligned)
CT4 CT5 (END)
OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 A.
MFB I and 2 de-energized AND Failure to restore power to at least one MFB within 15 minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power
- 2.
LOSS OF ALL VITAL DC POWER (BD 60)
OPERATING MODE:
1,_2,3,4 A.
Unplanned loss of vital DC power to required DC busses as indicated by bus voltage less than IIOVDC AND Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss (END)
OPERATING MODE:
1, 2, 3,4 A.
MFB I and 2 de-energized AND SSF fails to maintain Mode 3 (Hot Standby)
(I}
AND At least one of the following conditions exist:
Restoration of power to at least one MFB within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is NOT likely OR Indications of continuing degradation of core cooling based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring (END)
Loss of Power - Emergency Action Levels (EALs) apply to the ability of electrical energy to perform its intended function, reach its intended equipment. ex. - If both MFBs, are energized but all 4160V switchgear is not available, the electrical energy can not reach the motors intended. The result to the plant is the same as if both MFBs were de-energized.
14}
14
.6 Fire/Explosions and Security Actions RP/O/A/I 000/001 Page 1 of 2
- 12) (3)
UNUSUAL EVENT "
ALERT I
- SITE AREA EMERGENCY
- .,GENERAL EMERGENCY
- /.=.'. :,:....
- .*....i..,, * "::.:: **W.
- 1.
FIRES/EXPLOSIONS WITHIN THE PLANT (BD 65)
OPERATING MODE: All
- 1.
FIRE/EXPLOSION AFFECTING OPERABILITY OF PLANT SAFETY SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH/MAINTAIN SAFE SHUTDOWN (BD 70)
NOTE: Only one train of a system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.
(CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)
(CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)
NOTE: Within the plant means:
Turbine Building Auxiliary Building Reactor Building Keowee Hydro Transformer Yard B3T B4T Service Air Diesel Compressors Keowee Hydro & associated Transformers SSF A.
Fire/explosions AND Affected safety-related system parameter indications show degraded performance OR Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment required for safe shutdown (Continued)
A.
Fire within the plant not extinguished within 15 minutes of Control Room notification or verification of a Control Room alarm B.
Unanticipated explosion within the plant resulting in visible damnage to permanent structures/equipment includes steam line break and FDW line break (Continued)
£ _______________________________________
.5. _______________________________________
.1. _______________________________________
15
.6 Fire/Explosions and Security Actions RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 2 of 2 (2) (3)
UNUSUAL EVENT J
ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY I
GENERAL EMERGENCY
- 2.
CONFIRMED SECURITY CONDITION OR THREAT WHICH INDICATES A POTENTIAL DEGRADATION IN THE LEVEL OF SAFETY OF THE PLANT (BD 67)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Security condition that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the Security Shift Supervision.
B.
A credible site-specific security threat notification C.
A validated notification from NRC providing information of an aircraft threat
- 3.
OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR WARRANT DECLARATION OF A NOUE. (BD 69) 2 HOSTILE ACTION WITHIN THE OWNER CONTROLLED AREA OR AIRBORNE ATTACK THREAT. (BD 72)
A.
A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision.
B.
A validated notification from NRC of an AIRLINER attack threat within 30 minutes of the site.
- 3.
OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR WARRANT DECLARATION OF AN ALERT (BD 75)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION.
Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
(END)
I.
HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA (BD 76)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision.
- 2.
OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR WARRANT DECLARATION OF A SITE AREA EMERGENCY. (BD 78)
- 1.
A HOSTILE ACTION RESULTING IN LOSS OF PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE FACILITY (BD 79)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
A HOSTILE ACTION has occurred such that plant personnel are unable to operate equipment required to maintain safety functions B.
2.
A HOSTILE ACTION has caused failure of Spent Fuel Cooling Systems and IMMINENT fuel damage is likely for a freshly off-loaded reactor core in pool.
OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR WARRANT DECLARATION OF A GENERAL EMERGENCY. (BD 81)
OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All A.
Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; (I) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.
(END)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring off-site response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.
(END)
A.
Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility.
Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels off-site for more than the immediate site area.
(END) 16
.7 Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 1 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT
]
ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY
[
GENERAL EMERGENCY NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA AFFECTING THE PROTECTED AREA (BD 83)
- 1.
NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA AFFECTING THE PLANT VITAL AREA (BD 89)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Tremor felt and seismic trigger actuates (0.05g)
(CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)
(CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Tremor felt and valid alarm on the strong motion accelerograph B
Tornado striking within Protected Area Boundary C.
Vehicle crash into plant structures/systems within the Protected Area Boundary D.
Turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to turbine or generator seals (CONTINUED)
NOTE: Only one train of a safety-related system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy these conditions.
B.
Tornado, high winds, missiles resulting from turbine failure, vehicle crashes, or other catastrophic event.
AND Visible damage to permanent structures or equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit.
OR Affected safety system parameter indications show degraded performance.
(CONTINUED)
J ______________________________________
I ______________________________________
L _____________________________________
17
.7 Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 2 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 1*
- 2.
NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA AFFECTING KEOWEE HYDRO CONDITION B (BD 85)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Reservoir elevation > 805.0 feet with all spillway gates open and the lake elevation continues to rise B.
Seepage readings increase or decrease greatly or seepage water is carrying a significant amount of soil particles C
New area of seepage or wetness, with large amounts of seepage water observed on dam, dam toe, or the abutments D.
Slide or other movement of the dam or abutments which could develop into a failure E.
Developing failure involving the powerhouse or appurtenant structures and the operator believes the safety of the structure is questionable
- 3.
NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA AFFECTING JOCASSEE HYDRO CONDITION B (BD 86)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Condition B has been declared for the Jocassee Dam (CONTINUED)
- 2.
RELEASE OF TOXIC/FLAMMABLE GASES JEOPARDIZING SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN SAFE OPERATION OR ESTABLISH/
MAINTAIN MODE 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN) (BD 91)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Report/detection of toxic gases in concentrations that will be life-threatening to plant personnel B.
Report/detection of flammable gases in concentrations that will affect the safe operation of the plant:
Reactor Building Auxiliary Building Turbine Building Control Room
- 3.
TURBINE BUILDING FLOOD (BD 93)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Turbine Building flood requiring use of AP/I1,2,3/A/ 1700/1 0, (Turbine Building Flood)
- 4.
CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION HAS BEEN INITIATED (BD 94)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Evacuation of Control Room AND ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:
AND Plant control IS established from the Aux shutdown Panel or the SSF OR Plant control IS BEING established from the Aux Shutdown Panel or SSF (CONTINUED)
- 1.
CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION AND PLANT CONTROL CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED (BD 96)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Control Room evacuation has been initiated AND Control of the plant cannot be established from the Aux Shutdown Panel or the SSF within 15 minutes
- 2.
KEOWEE HYDRO DAM FAILURE (BD 97)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Imminent/actual dam failure exists involving any of the following:
Keowee Hydro Dam Little River Dam Dikes A, B, C, or D Intake Canal Dike Jocassee Dam - Condition A (CONTINUED)
(CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)
J __________________________
J __________________________
18
.7 Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 3 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALER 7T SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4
RELEASE OF TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GASES DEEMED DETRIMENTAL TO SAFE OPERATION OF THE PLANT (BD 87)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Report/detection of toxic or flammable gases that could enter within the site area boundary in amounts that can affect normal operation of the plant B.
Report by local, county, state officials for potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event
- 5.
OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH WARRANT DECLARATION OF AN UNUSUAL EVENT (BD 88)
OPERATING MODE:
- 5.
OTHER CONDITIONS WARRANT CLASSIFICATION OF AN ALERT (BD 95)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Emergency Coordinator judgment indicates that:
Plant safety may be degraded AND Increased monitoring of plant functions is warranted (END)
- 3.
OTHER CONDITIONS WRRANT DECLARATION OF SITE AREA EMERGENCY (BD 98)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgment (END)
- 1.
OTHER CONDITIONS WARRANT DECLARATION OF GENERAL EMERGENCY (BD 99)
OPERATING MODE: All A.
Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgment indicates:
Actual/imminent substantial core degradation with potential for loss of containment OR Potential for uncontrolled radionuclide releases that would result in a dose projection at the site boundary greater than 1000 mRem TEDE or 5000 mRem CDE Adult Thyroid (END)
A.
Emergency Coordinator determines potential degradation of level of safety has occurred (END) 19
.8 Radiation Monitor Readings for Emergency Classification RP/O/A/1000/001 Page 1 of 1 All RIA values are considered GREATER THAN or EQUAL TO HOURS SINCE RIA 57 R/hr
].
RIA 58 R/hr*
REACTOR TRIPPED Site Area Emergency General Emergency Site Area Emergency General Emergency 0.0 - < 0.5 5.9E+003 5.9E+004 2.6E+003 2.6E+004 0.5 - < 1.0 2.6E+003 2.6E+004 1.1E+003 1.1E+004 1.0 - < 1.5 1.9E+003 1.9E+004 8.6E+002 8.6E+003 1.5 - < 2.0 1.9E+003 1.9E+004 8.5E+002 8.5E+003 2.0 - < 2.5 1.4E+003 1.4E+004 6.3E+002 6.3E+003 2.5 - < 3.0 1.2E+003 1.2E+004 5.7E+002 5.7E+003 3.0 - < 3.5 1.1E+003 1.1E+004 5.2E+002 5.2E+003 3.5 - < 4.0 1.OE+003 1.0E+004 4.8E+002 4.8E+003 4.0 - < 8.0 1.0E+003 1.OE+004 4.4E+002 4.4E+003
- RIA 58 is partially shielded 20
.9 Unexpected/Unplanned Increase In Area Monitor Readings RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 1 of 1 NOTE:
This Initiating Condition is not intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g.; incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.).
UNITS 1, 2, 3 MONITOR NUMBER UNUSUAL EVENT 1000x ALERT NORMAL LEVELS mRAD/HR mRAD/HR RIA 7, Hot Machine Shop Elevation 796 150
>_ 5000 RIA 8, Hot Chemistry Lab Elevation 796 4200
_ 5000 RIA 10, Primary Sample Hood Elevation 796 830
Ž5000 RIA 11, Change Room Elevation 796 210
Ž5000 RIA 12, Chem Mix Tank Elevation 783 800
_ 5000 RIA 13, Waste Disposal Sink Elevation 771 650
> 5000 RIA 15, HPI Room Elevation 758 NOTE*
> 5000 NOTE:
RIA 15 normal readings are approximately 9 mRad/hr on a daily basis. Applying 1000x normal readings would put this monitor greater than 5000 mRad/hr just for an Unusual Event. For this reason, an Unusual Event will NOT be declared for a reading less than 5000 mRad/hr.
21
.10 RP/O/A/1000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page 1 of 5
- 1. List of Definitions and Acronyms NOTE:
Definitions are italicized throughout procedure for easy recognition.
1.1 ALERT - Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
1.2 BOMB - Refers to an explosive device suspected of having sufficient force to damage plant systems or structures.
1.3 COGNIZANT FACILITY STAFF - any member of facility staff, who by virtue of training and experience, is qualified to assess the indications or reports for validity and to compare the same to the EALs in the licensee's emergency classification scheme. (Does not include staff whose positions require they report, rather than assess, abnormal conditions to the facility.)
1.4 CONDITION A - Failure is Imminent or Has Occurred - A failure at the dam has occurred or is about to occur and minutes to days may be allowed to respond dependent upon the proximity to the dam.
1.5 CONDITION B - Potentially Hazardous Situation is Developing - A situation where failure may develop, but preplanned actions taken during certain events (such as major floods, earthquakes, evidence of piping) may prevent or mitigate failure.
1.6 CIVIL DISTURBANCE - A group of persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
1.7 EXPLOSION - A rapid, violent, unconf'med combustion, or catastrophic failure of pressurized/energized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems, or components.
1.7 EXTORTION - An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
1.8 FIRE - Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke, such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment, do NOT constitute fires. Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
1.9 FRESHLY OFF-LOADED CORE - The complete removal and relocation of all fuel assemblies from the reactor core and placed in the spent fuel pool. (Typical of a "No Mode" operation during a refuel outage that allows safety system maintenance to occur and results in maximum decay heat load in the spent fuel pool system).
22
.10 RP/0/A/1000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page 2 of 5 1.10 GENERAL EMERGENCY - Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility.
Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate area.
1.11 HOSTAGE - A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure demands will be met by the station.
1.12 HOSTILE ACTION - An act toward an NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, takes HOSTAGES, and/or intimidates the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILES, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area.)
1.13 HOSTILE FORCE - One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.
1.14 IMMINENT - Mitigation actions have been ineffective, additional actions are not expected to be successful, and trended information indicates that the event or condition will occur. Where IMMINENT timeframes are specified, they shall apply.
1.15 INTRUSION - A person(s) present in a specified area without authorization. Discovery of a BOMB in a specified area is indication of INTRUSION into that area by a HOSTILE FORCE.
1.16 INABILITY TO DIRECTLY MONITOR - Operational Aid Computer data points are unavailable or gauges/panel indications are NOT readily available to the operator.
1.17 LOSS OF POWER - Emergency Action Levels (EALs) apply to the ability of electrical energy to perform its intended function, reach its intended equipment. Ex. - If both MFBs, are energized but all 4160v switchgear is not available, the electrical energy can not reach the motors intended. The result to the plant is the same as if both MFBs were de-energized.
1.18 PROJECTILE - An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.
1.19 PROTECTED AREA - Typically the site specific area which normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security PROTECTED AREA fence.
23
.10 RP/0/A/1000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page 3 of 5 1.20 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) LEAKAGE - RCS Operational Leakage as defined in the Technical Specification Basis B 3.4.13:
RCS leakage includes leakage from connected systems up to and including the second normally closed valve for systems which do not penetrate containment and the outermost isolation valve for systems which penetrate containment.
A. Identified LEAKAGE LEAKAGE to the containment from specifically known and located sources, but does not include pressure boundary LEAKAGE or controlled reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal leakoff (a normal function not considered LEAKAGE).
LEAKAGE, such as that from pump seals, gaskets, or valve packing (except RCP seal water injection or leakoff), that is captured and conducted to collection systems or a sump or collecting tank; LEAKAGE through a steam generator (SG) to the Secondary System (primary to secondary LEAKAGE): Primary to secondary LEAKAGE must be included in the total calculated for identified LEAKAGE.
B. Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE (except RCP seal water injection or leakoff) that is not identified LEAKAGE.
C. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE (except primary to secondary LEAKAGE) through a nonisolable fault in an RCS component body, pipe wall or vessel wall.
1.21 RUPTURED (As relates to Steam Generator) - Existence of Primary to Secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.
1.22 SABOTAGE - Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable. Equipment found tampered with or damaged due to malicious mischief may not meet the definition of SABOTAGE until this determination is made by security supervision.
1.23 SECURITY CONDITION - Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.
1.24 SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS AREA - Any area within the Protected area which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
24
.10 RP/O/A/1000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page 4 of 5 1.25 SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT (SLC) -Chapter 16 of the FSAR 1.26 SIGNIFICANT PLANT TRANSIENT - An unplanned event involving one or more of the following:
(1) Automatic turbine runback>25% thermal reactor power (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load (3) Reactor Trip (4) Safety Injection System Activation 1.27 SITE AREA EMERGENCY - Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public, or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious act; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevents effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are NOT expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the Site Boundary.
1.28 SITE BOUNDARY - That area, including the Protected Area, in which DPC has the authority to control all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property (1 mile radius from the center of Unit 2).\\
1.29 TOXIC GAS - A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g.; Chlorine).
1.30 UNCONTROLLED - Event is not the result of planned actions by the plant staff.
1.31 UNPLANNED -
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
1.32 UNUSUAL EVENT - Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.
1.33 VALID - An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by: (1) an instrument channel check; or, (2) indications on related or redundant instrumentation; or, (3) by direct observation by plant personnel such that doubt related to the instrument's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit with this definition is the need for timely assessment.
25
.10 RP/O/A/1000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page 5 of 5 1.34 VIOLENT - Force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.
1.35 VISIBLE DAMAGE - Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture.
1.36 VITAL AREA - An area within the protected area where an individual is required to badge in to gain access to the area and that houses equipment important for nuclear safety. The failure or destruction of this equipment could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
26
.11 Operating Modes Defined In Improved Technical Specifications MODES RP/O/A/ 1000/001 Page 1 of 1 REACTIVITY
% RATED AVERAGE CONDITION THERMAL REACTOR COOLANT MODE TITLE POWER (a)
TEMPERATURE (Keff)
(OF) 1 Power Operation
>0.99
> 5 NA 2
Startup
>0.99
<5 NA 3
Hot Standby
<0.99 NA
>250 4
Hot Shutdown (b)
< 0.99 NA 250 > T > 200 5
Cold Shutdown (b)
< 0.99 NA
< 200 6
Refueling (c)
NA NA NA (a) Excluding decay heat.
(b) All reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned.
(c) One or more reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned 27
.12 RP/O/A/1000/001 Page 1 of 2 Instructions For Using Enclosure 4.1
- 1. Instructions For Using Enclosure 4.1 - Fission Product Barrier Matrix 1.1 If the unit was at Hot S/D or above, (Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4) and one or more fission product barriers have been affected, refer to Enclosure 4.1, (Fission Product Barrier Matrix) and review the criteria listed to determine if the event should be classified.
1.1.1 For each Fission Product Barrier, review the associated EALs to determine if there is a Loss or Potential Loss of that barrier.
NOTE:
An event with multiple events could occur which would result in the conclusion that exceeding the loss or potential loss thresholds is imminent (i.e. within 1-3 hours). In this situation, use judgement and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.
1.2 Three possible outcomes exist for each barrier. No challenge, potential loss, or loss.
Use the worst case for each barrier and the classification table at the bottom of the page to determine appropriate classification.
1.3 The numbers in parentheses out beside the label for each column can be used to assist in determining the classification. If no EAL is met for a given barrier, that barrier will have 0 points. The points for the columns are as follows:
Barrier Failure Points RCS Potential Loss 4
Loss 5
Fuel Clad Potential Loss 4
Loss 5
Containment Potential Loss 1
Loss 3
1.3.1 To determine the classification, add the highest point value for each barrier to determine a total for all barriers. Compare this total point value with the numbers in parentheses beside each classification to see which one applies.
1.3.2 Finally as a verification of your decision, look below the Emergency Classification you selected. The loss and/or potential loss EALs selected for each barrier should be described by one of the bullet statements.
28
EXAMPLE:.12 RP/O/A/1000/001 Instructions For Using Enclosure 4.1 Page 2 of 2 Failure to properly isolate a 'B' MS Line Rupture outside containment, results in extremely severe overcooling.
PTS entry conditions were satisfied.
Stresses on the 'B' S/G resulted in failure of multiple S/G tubes.
RCS leakage through the S/G exceeds available makeup capacity as indicated by loss of subcooling margin.
Barrier EAL Failure Points RCS SGTR > Makeup capacity of one HPI pump in Potential Loss 4
normal makeup mode with letdown isolated Entry into PTS operating range Potential Loss 4
RCS leak rate > available makeup capacity as Loss 5
indicated by a loss of subcooling Fuel Clad No EALs met and no justification for No 0
classification on judgment I
I_ Challenge Containment Failure of secondary side of SG results in a Loss 3
direct opening to the environment RCS 5 + Fuel 0 + Containment 3 = Total 8 A. Even though two Potential Loss EALs and one Loss EAL are met for the RCS barrier, credit is only taken for the worst case (highest point value) EAL, so the points from this barrier equal 5.
B.
No EAL is satisfied for the Fuel Clad Barrier so the points for this barrier equal 0.
C. One Loss EAL is met for the Containment Barrier so the points for this barrier equal 3.
D. When the total points are calculated the result is 8, therefore the classification would be a Site Area Emergency.
E. Look in the box below "Site Area Emergency". You have identified a loss of two barriers. This agrees with one of the bullet statements.
The classification is correct.
29
.13 RP/O/A/1000/001 References Page 1 of 1 1
References:
- 1.
PIP 0-05-02980
- 2.
PIP 0-05-4697
- 3.
PIP 0-06-0404
- 4.
PIP 0-06-03347
- 5.
PIP 0-09-00234
- 6.
PIP 0-10-1055
- 7.
PIP 0-10-01750
- 8.
PIP 0-11-02811
- 9.
PIP 0-12-1590
- 10.
PIP 0-10-7809
- 11.
PIP 0-12-9201
- 12.
PIP 0-12-9198
- 13.
PIP 0-12-11227
[Type text]
APPENDIX C. APPLICABILITY DETERMINATION (Rev. 10)
."Page 1 of 2 PART I - ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC SITE UNIT(S) 0 Oconee 0J McGuire 0 Catawba 0 Unit 1 0D Unit 2 0 Unit 3 Emergency Classification ACTIVITY TITLE/DOCUMENT/REVISION:
RP/0/A/1000/001, REV 001
'PART II-PROCESS REVIEW For each activity, address all of the questions below. If the answer is "YES" for any portion of the activity, apply the identified nrocesst~esi to that nor~tion :Of the activity. Note:+/- It is not unusual to have more than one nroeess annlv to a nIven activitv.=
Will implementation of the above activity require a change to the:
I Technical Specifications (TS) or Operating License?
- 2.
Quality Assurance Topical?
- 3.
Security Plans?
(See Appendix H)
- 4.
- 5.
Inservice Testing Program Plan?
- 6.
Inservice Inspection Program Plan?
- 7.
Fire Protection Program Plan?
7a -Utilize Appendix E to address Fire Protection Program Plan Impact.
- 8.
- 9.
Code of Federal Regulations?
- 10.
Programs and manuals listed in the Administrative Section of the TS?
0 11 NO NO NO 0
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES IJ YES El YES 0YES YES 0]
YES YES YES E0 YES 11 YES If YES, process as a license amendment per NSD 227.
If YES, seek assistance from Independent Nuclear Oversight.
If YES, process per the Nuclear Security Manual.
If YES, process per the Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual.
If YES, process per site IST Program for ASME code compliance and related facility changes.
If YES, process per Materials, Metallurgy and Piping Inservice Inspection FAM for ASME code compliance and related facility or procedure changes.
If YES, evaluate activity in accordance with NSD 320.
Check to confirm use of Appendix E Screening Questions.
If YES, process per NSD 214.
If YES, contact the Regulatory Affairs group.
If YES, contact the Regulatory Affairs group.
[Type text]
Page26f 2 PART Mlia -10 CFR 72.48 APPLICABILITY For each activity, address the question below. If the answer to question 11 is "YES," and questions'14 and 17 are answered "NO", then process the activity per NSD 211 - 10 CFR 72.48 does apply.
I1.
Does the activity involve SSCs, procedures or conduct tests or experiments that support/impact the loading or Z
ID transport of the canister/cask to the ISFSI, the ISFSI facility, spent fuel cask design?
NO YES PART Ilb - 10 CFR 50.59APPLICABILITY.
For each activity, address all of the questions below. If the answer to question 18 is "YES," then 10 CFR 50.59 does not apply. If the answer to questions 18 is "NO," then process the activity per NSD 209 - 10 CFR 5049 applies..
- 12.
Does the activity involve a procedure, governed by NSD 703 that has been excluded from the 10 CFR 50.59
[D El process per NSD 703 and the exclusion status remains valid?
NO YES
- 13.
Does the activity involve an administrative procedure governed by NSD 100 or AD-DC-ALL-0201 that does 0
El not contain information regarding the operation and control of Structures, Systems and Components?
NO YES
- 14.
Does the activity involve a type of Engineering Change that NSD 301 excludes from the 10 CFR 50.59 0
El and/or 10 CFR 72.48 Processes? Consult NSD 301 for assistance.
NO YES
- 15.
Does the activity involve (a) maintenance activities that restore SSCs to their as-designed condition E l1 (including activities that implement approved design changes) or (b) temporary alterations supporting NO YES maintenance that will be in effect during at-power operations for 90 days or less?
- 16.
Does the activity involve a UFSAR modification that NSD 220 excludes from the 10 CFR 50.59 Process?
Z El Consult NSD 220 for assistance.
NO YES
- 17.
Does the activity involve NRC and/or Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC approved changes to the licensing basis?
ED El NO YES
- 18.
Are ALL aspects of the activity bounded by one or more "YES" answers to questions I through 17, above?
El N
NO YES PART IV - UFSAR REVIEW ::,:'
- 19.
Does the activity require a modification, deletion, or addition to the UFSAR to satisfy the UFSAR content ED El requirements of 10 CFR 50.34 (b), 10 CFR 50.71 (e), or Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.70? Consult NSD 220 for NO YES Assistance.
IF YES, process per NSD 220.
(Print Name)
DOA&I-c)_
(Sign)4.
PAR SO DATE Applicability Determination Preparer
Form 703-2. Procedure Change Process Record (R08-10)
Duke Energy PROCEDURE CHANGE PROCESS RECORD (1)
ID No. RP/O/A/1000/001 Revision No. 001 Change No.
Permanent/Restricted to (2)
Station: OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION (3)
Procedure
Title:
Emergency Classification (4)
Section(s) of Procedure Affected:
(5)
Requires NSD 228 Applicability Determination?
Yes (Procedure change with major changes) - Attach NSD 228 documentation.
El No (Procedure change with minor changes)
(6)
Description of Change: (Attach additional pages, if necessary.)
- 1. Added Note to remind the Emergency Coordinator to refer to the fission product barrier matrix frequently.
(7)
Reason for Change:
Enhancements noted during drill (8)
Prepared By*
John Kaminski (Signature)
Date 03/04/2014 (9)
Reviewed By*
iý&OAt 0.)(KI)
Date A4 b Cross-Disciplinary Review By* _"
(QR)(KI) NA b'iC Date,If Reactivity Mgmt. Review By*
(QR)
NAA
-Date If Mgmt. Involvement Review By*
.(Ops. Supt.) NA V4e-Date (10) Additional Reviews Reviewed By*
Date Reviewed By*
-f7)-'
A.
L Date (11)
Approved By* ?ATIRJi%.
Date IWH7Z -
- Printed Name and Signature
3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual.10.7.2
§50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form Activity Description and
References:
Emergency Classification, RP/0/A/1000/001 rev 001 See attached sheet for all changes pertaining to this procedure.
I Activity Scope:
0 The activity is a change to the emergency plan El The activity is not a change to the emergency plan Change Type:
F-The change is editorial or typographical E The change is not editorial or typographical E7 1
Change Type:
El The change does conform to an activity that has prior approval
[
The change does not conform to an activity that has prior approval Planning Standard Impact Determination:
El §50.47(b)(1) - Assignment of Responsibility (Organization Control)
El §50.47(b)(2) - Onsite Emergency Organization Fl §50.47(b)(3) - Emergency Response Support and Resources 0 §50.47(b)(4) - Emergency Classification System*
El §50.47(b)(5) - Notification Methods and Procedures*
El §50.47(b)(6) - Emergency Communications El §50.47(b)(7) - Public Education and Information El §50.47(b)(8) - Emergency Facility and Equipment El §50.47(b)(9) - Accident Assessment*
El §50.47(b)(10) - Protective Response*
El §50.47(b)(1 1) - Radiological Exposure Control El §50.47(b)(12) - Medical and Public Health Support El §50.47(b)(1 3) - Recovery Planning and Post-accident Operations El §50.47(b)(14) - Drills and Exercises El §50.47(b)(1 5) - Emergency Responder Training El §50.47(b)(16) - Emergency Plan Maintenance
- Risk Significant Planning Standards El The proposed activity does not impact a Planning Standard Commitment Impact Determination:
El The activity does involve a site specific EP commitment Record the commitment or commitment reference:
H ý (OX, ýIi (e, 0The activity does not involve a site specific EP commitment Results:
El The activity can be implemented without performing a §50.54(q) effectiveness evaluation Z The activity cannot be implemented without performing a §50.54(q) effectiveness evaluation Preparer Name:
John Kaminski Prep S' na, re Date:
t _..-.. _._
Reviewer Name:
Revi r Sigi r r Date:
Don Crowl A./
Revision 12 T
3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual.10.7.3
§50.54(q) Effectiveness Evaluation Form Activity Description and
References:
Emergency Classification RP/0/A/1000/001 rev 001 Activity Type:
BLOCK 2 F-1 The activity is a change to the emergency plan
[
The activity affects implementation of the emergency plan, but is not a change to the emergency plan Impact and Licensing Basis Determination:
BLOCK 3 Licensing Basis:
10CFR50.47b (4) A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.
NUREG 0654II.D. 1. An emergency classification and emergency action level scheme as set forth in Appendix 1 must be established by the licensee. The specific instruments, parameters or equipment status shall be shown for establishing each emergency class, in the in-plant emergency procedures. The plan shall identify the parameter values and equipment status for each emergency class Compliance Evaluation and
Conclusion:
13LOCK 4
- 1. Evaluation:
The addition of a note to remind the Emergency Coordinators to frequently review/revisit the fission product barrier matrix is an enhancement and does not impact any classification, impact the timing and or timeliness of any classification. The proposed change serves to provide another reminder to the emergency coordinator of the need to be mindful of the fission product barriers. No changes were made to any EAL, any setpoint and or any other part of the Emergency Classification scheme. The EAL Scheme continues to comply with regulations and requirements and remains consistent/compliant with NUMARC/NESP 007.
==
Conclusion:==
The proposed activity E does / El does not continue to comply with the requirements.
Reduction in Effectiveness (RIE) Evaluation and
Conclusion:
B1LOCk I
- 1. Evaluation:
The addition of a note to remind the Emergency Coordinators to frequently review/revisit the fission product barrier matrix is an enhancement and does not impact any classification, impact the timing and or timeliness of any classification. The proposed change serves to provide another reminder to the emergency coordinator of the need to be mindful of the fission product barriers. As such the addition of the note may enhance correct and timely classification determinations by providing the reminder to verify fission product barrier integrity. Therefore there has been no reduction in the function or timing or timeliness of the E Plan as result of the proposed change.
==
Conclusion:==
The proposed activity LI does / [ does not constitute a RIE.
Effectiveness Evaluation Results
.BLOCK 6
[
The activity does continue to comply with the requirements of §50.47(b) and §50 Appendix E and the activity does not constitute a reduction in effectiveness. Therefore, the activity can be implemented without prior approval.
fl The activity does not continue to comply with the requirements of §50.47(b) and §50 Appendix E or the activity does constitute a reduction in effectiveness. Therefore, the activity cannot be implemented without prior approval.
Preparer Name:
Pr a
Date:
John Kaminski C XdqIf 3
Reviewer Name:
Rev Signa Date:e Don Crowl Z___
__.4______
Approver Name:
pree Date:
Pat Streetv Revision 12
Attachment to 50.54q Emergency Classification RP/0/A/1000/001 rev 001 Change Step number/
Current Wording Proposed Wording Reason for Change page number I.1 NA (New) Referencing this matrix frequently will Enhancement to assist the Note aid in determining a fission product barrier Emergency Coordinator in the failure or other upgrade criteria, identification of emergency classifications.
2 Enclosure NA (New) NOTE: These readings may also be Enhancement to assist the 4.3.2.B.a indicative of Fission Product Barrier concerns Emergency Coordinator in the which makes a review of the Fission Product identification of emergency Barrier Matrix necessary classifications.