ML25092A172

NAC International, Inc., RAI Responses, Supplement 2 for Safety Analysis Report, Revision 25B

ML25092A172
Person / Time
Site:	07109403
Issue date:	04/02/2025
From:	Kanadevia Group, NAC International
To:	Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Shared Package
ML25092A169	List: ML25092A170 ML25092A172
References
ED20250050, EPID L-2023-NEW-0007
Download: ML25092A172 (1)

Text

Atlanta Corporate Headquarters: 2 Sun Court, Suite 220, Peachtree Corners, Georgia 30092 USA Phone 770-447-1144, www.nacintl.com March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Volunteer Package SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT RAI Responses, Supplement 2 NON-PROPRIETARY VERSION Revision 25B to ED20250050 Page 1 of 1 Proposed CoC Changes Volunteer Package SAR, Revision 25B Docket No. 71-9403 March 2025

NRC FORM 618 (8-2000) 10 CFR 71 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGES

1.

a. CERTIFICATE NUMBER

b. REVISION NUMBER

c. DOCKET NUMBER

d. PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER PAGE PAGE 9403 0

71-9403 USA/9403/B(U)F-96 1

OF 4

2.. PREAMBLE

a. This certificate is issued to certify that the package (packaging and contents) described in Item 5 below meets the applicable safety standards set forth in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71, Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material.

b. This certificate does not relieve the consignor from compliance with any requirement of the regulations of the U.S. Department of Transportation or other applicable regulatory agencies, including the government of any country through or into which the package will be transported.

3.

THIS CERTIFICATE IS ISSUED ON THE BASIS OF A SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT OF THE PACKAGE DESIGN OR APPLICATION a.

ISSUED TO (Name and Address)

b. TITLE AND IDENTIFICATION OF REPORT OR APPLICATION NAC International, Inc.

2 Sun Court, Suite 220 Peachtree Corners, GA 30092 NAC International Application dated December XX, 2024.

4. CONDITIONS This certificate is conditional upon fulfilling the requirements of 10 CFR Part 71, as applicable, and the conditions specified below.

5.

(a)

Packaging (1)

Model No.: VOLUNTEER (2)

Description The Volunteer packaging is comprised of a cask assembly, equipped with identical upper and lower impact limiters, and internal support structures for specific contents. The packaging, which includes three (3) different length configurations (i.e., long, standard, and short), is designed to transport various radioactive contents as listed in 5.(b)(1). All package configurations have an 86.0-inch outside diameter (OD), excluding impact limiter lift lugs and support angles. The length of the long, standard, and short packages, with impact limiters attached, are 266.5 inch, 254.5 inch, and 206.5 inch, respectively. The cask assembly is 43.0 inch at the top and bottom ends where the impact limiters are attached, and 43.5 inch in the region between the upper and lower impact limiters (excluding the upper and lower trunnions). The overall length of the long, standard, and short cask assemblies are 198.5 inch, 186.5 inch, and 138.5 inch, respectively. The cask cavity dimensions of the long, standard, and short cask configurations are 26.5 inch by 180.5 inch, 26.5 inch by 168.5 inch, and 26.5 inch by 120.5 inch, respectively.

The cask body radial construction consists of a 1.25-inch-thick stainless steel inner shell, surrounded by a 4.54-inch-thick (minimum) lead gamma shield and a 2.25-inch-thick stainless steel outer shell. The outside of the cask body weldment, between the end regions that are covered by the impact limiters, is covered by a 1/8-inch thick stainless steel thermal shield that is offset from the outer shell by a 1/8-inch thick spacers and wire wrap to create an insulating air gap. The top and bottom ends of the cask assembly both include a total

NRC FORM 618 (8-2000) 10 CFR 71 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGES

1.

a. CERTIFICATE NUMBER

b. REVISION NUMBER

c. DOCKET NUMBER

d. PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER PAGE PAGE 9403 0

71-9403 USA/9403/B(U)F-96 2

OF 4

5.(a)(2)

Description (Continued) thickness of 9.0 inches of stainless steel. The inner shell is welded to a stainless steel flange at the top end and a stainless steel inner bottom plate (forging) at the bottom end. The outer shell is welded to the stainless steel flange at the top end and a stainless steel outer bottom forging at the bottom end. The inner bottom plate fits within a machined 3.0-inch deep pocket on the inside of the outer bottom forging to provide 9.0 inches of stainless steel shielding on the bottom end. The cask lid is 9.0-inch-thick stainless steel stepped design, secured to the cask body weldment by twenty-four (24) 11/2-inch diameter bolts. The cask assembly also includes a vent port in the cask lid and a drain port in the flange, both sealed with identical port covers that are secured to the cask assembly by three (3) 7/8-inch diameter bolts. Elastomeric cask containment seals are used on the cask lid and port cover plates for all cask configurations except for TPBAR contents, which use metal containment seals. Elastomeric test O-ring seals are provided outside the containment seals for leak testing.

The packaging is equipped with identical cylindrical cup-shaped upper and lower impact limiters that fit over the respective ends of the cask assembly. Each impact limiter secured to the cask assembly by eight (8) 1-inch threaded retaining rods, washer plates, and hex nuts.

The impact limiters are constructed from Type 304 stainless steel shells that completely encase the internal balsa wood cores and protect them from the external environment. Each impact limiter assembly is 86.0 inch by 49.0-inch long, with a 43.4 inch by 15.0 inch deep pocket that fits over the end of the cask assembly.

The maximum weight of the contents and internal support structures is 11,500 lbs for all cask configurations. The maximum gross weight of the package for the long, standard, and short configurations is approximately 84.4 kip, 80.5 kip, and 64.8 kip, respectively.

(3)

Drawings The packaging is constructed and assembled in accordance with the following NAC International Drawing Nos.:

70000.38-L100 1P Packaging Assembly, Volunteer 70000.38-L110 1P Cask Assembly, Volunteer 70000.38-L115 2P Port Cover Assembly, Volunteer 70000.38-L116 1P Port Cover Assembly, Metal Seal, Volunteer 70000.38-L120 2P Cask Body Weldment, Volunteer 70000.38-L130 3P Cask Lid Assembly, Volunteer 70000.38-L131 2P Cask Lid Assembly, Metal Seal, Volunteer 70000.38-L141 0P Impact Limiter, Volunteer 70000.38-L150 0P Shield Liner Assembly, Volunteer 70000.38-L160 0P TPBAR Basket Assembly, Volunteer 70000.38-L165 0P TPBAR Spacer, Volunteer 70000.38-L166 0P TPBAR Bearing Plate, Volunteer 70000.38-L167 0P Basket Extension Assembly, TPBAR, Volunteer

NRC FORM 618 (8-2000) 10 CFR 71 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGES

1.

a. CERTIFICATE NUMBER

b. REVISION NUMBER

c. DOCKET NUMBER

d. PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER PAGE PAGE 9403 0

71-9403 USA/9403/B(U)F-96 3

OF 4

(b) Contents (1)

Type and Form of Material (i)

Irradiated Hardware: Radioactive material in the form of neutron activated metals or metal oxides in solid form, and/or contaminated non-fuel bearing reactor accelerator components, intact, segmented, and/or sized reduced, and contained inside a shield liner assembly; or (ii)

Vitrified HLW: Radioactive waste material confined within a solidified borosilicate glass matrix and contained inside a sealed stainless steel HLW canister with a welded closure; or (iii)

TPBARs: Production TPBARs in consolidation canisters.

(2)

Maximum quantity of material per package (i)

Irradiated Hardware a) Maximum Co 60 activity of 30,000 Ci.

b) Maximum heat load of 470 thermal watts per package.

(ii) Vitrified HLW a) Maximum combined total activities of all gamma and neutron-emitting isotopes not exceeding 474 Ci/kg and 2.15 Ci/kg, respectively. Maximum combined total activity density of Ba-137m and Cs-137 not to exceed 350 Ci/kg.

b) Maximum linear heat generation rate of 25.2 watts per inch of canister length, and maximum total heat load not to exceed 4.79 kW for a 15-foot long HLW canister and 2.75 kW for a 10-foot long HLW canister.

(iii)

TPBARs a) Up to 4 consolidation canisters, each with no more than 300 TPBARs, not to exceed 1,200 TPBARs total per shipment and no more than two (2) pre-failed TPBAR per shipment.

b) Average tritium content shall not exceed 1.5g per TPBAR.

c) Minimum cool time of 60 days.

d) Maximum decay heat of 2.75 thermal watts per TPBAR and 3.30 kW per package.

NRC FORM 618 (8-2000) 10 CFR 71 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGES

1.

a. CERTIFICATE NUMBER

b. REVISION NUMBER

c. DOCKET NUMBER

d. PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER PAGE PAGE 9403 0

71-9403 USA/9403/B(U)F-96 4

OF 4

(iv) Special Requirements for Plutonium

a. Plutonium contents in quantities greater than 0.74 TBq (20 Ci) must be in solid form.

(v) Fissile content shall meet 10 CFR 71.15 fissile exempt limits (c) Criticality Safety Index (CSI): Not Applicable.

6.

In addition to the requirements of 10 CFR 71 Subpart G:

(a)

The package must be loaded and prepared for shipment in accordance with the Package Operations in Section 8 of the application.

(b)

The package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program in Section 9 of the application.

7.

The package must be transported under exclusive-use controls.

8.

Transport by air is not authorized.

9.

The package must be marked with Package Identification Number USA/9403/B(M)-96 for shipments of TPBAR contents.

10.

The package authorized by this certificate is hereby approved for use under the general license provisions of 10 CFR 71.17.

11.

Expiration date: XXX, XXXX.

REFERENCES NAC International, Inc., Application - Volunteer Safety Analysis Report - Revision No. 0, dated May XX, 2024.

FOR THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

, Chief Storage and Transportation Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Date: XXXXXX, 20XX to ED20250050 Page 1 of 3 List of SAR Changes Volunteer Package SAR, Revision 25B Docket No. 71-9403 March 2025 to ED20250050 Page 2 of 3 List of Changes, Volunteer Package SAR, Revision 25B Chapter 1 Page 1.1-1, modified text where indicated.

Page 1.2-4, modified text where indicated.

Page 1.2-7, modified text where indicated.

Page 1.2-10 thru 1.2-11, modified text where indicated.

Page 1.2-18, modified text where indicated.

Page 1.2-24, modified text where indicated.

Chapter 2 Page 2.1-1, modified text where indicated.

Pages 2.1-4 and 2.1-5, modified text where indicated.

Page 2.6-2, modified text where indicated.

Page 2.6-25, modified text where indicated.

Page 2.6-41, modified text where indicated.

Page 2.7-50, modified text where indicated.

Chapter 3 Page 3-1, modified text where indicated.

Page 3.1-1, modified text where indicated.

Page 3.1-2, modified text where indicated (1st two are editorial).

Pages 3.1-3 thru 3.1-7, modified text where indicated.

Page 3.3-1, modified text where indicated.

Pages 3.3-7 thru 3.3-9, modified text where indicated.

Page 3.3-14, modified text where indicated.

Pages 3.4-4 and 3.4-5, modified text where indicated.

Chapter 4 Page 4.1-1, modified text where indicated.

Page 4.1-2, text flow change.

Page 4.2-1, modified text where indicated.

Page 4.3-1, modified text where indicated.

Chapter 5 Pages 5-i thru 5-iv, modified text where indicated.

Page 5.1-1, modified text where indicated.

Page 5.2-1, modified text where indicated.

Page 5.3-2, modified text where indicated.

to ED20250050 Page 3 of 3

Pages 5.6-41, modified text where indicated.

Pages 5.6-43 thru 5.6-52, modified text where indicated.

Chapter 6 - no changes Chapter 7

Page 7-6, modified text where indicated.

Page 7-7, text flow changes.

Page 7-30, modified text where indicated.

Chapter 8 Page 8-2, modified text where indicated.

Page 8.1-1, modified text where indicated.

Page 8.1-5, modified text where indicated.

Page 8.1-6, text flow change.

Page 8.1-7, modified text where indicated.

Pages 8.1-8 thru 8.1-10, text flow changes.

Page 8.3-1, modified text where indicated.

Chapter 9

Pages 9.2-1, modified text where indicated.

to ED20250050 Page 1 of 1 SAR Changed Pages Volunteer Package SAR, Revision 25B Docket No. 71-9403 March 2025

Atlanta Corporate Headquarters: 2 Sun Court, Suite 220, Peachtree Corners, Georgia 30092 USA Phone 770-447-1144, www.nacintl.com March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Volunteer Package SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT NON-PROPRIETARY VERSION Revision 25B

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 1.1-1 1.1 Introduction The Volunteer transportation package provides a safe means of transporting a wide range of non-fissile or fissile-exempt radioactive materials contents, as described in Section 1.2.2. The Volunteer packaging has long, standard, and short configurations, designated as Configurations 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Each configuration accommodates various contents as designated by the configuration IDs summarized in Table 1-1 and shown on Drawing No. 70000.38-L100 in Appendix 1.6.2. Package configurations 1A (long), 2A (standard), and 3A (short) are all for irradiated hardware contents described in Section 1.2.2.1. Configurations 1B (long) and 3B (short) are for vitrified Level Waste (HLW) in canisters described in Section 1.2.2.2.

Configuration 2B (standard) is for TPBAR contents described in Section 1.2.2.3. Furthermore, Configuration 2B has two options designated Configurations 2B-1 and 2B-2, that use different configurations for the internal support structures, as shown on Drawing No. 70000.38-L100 in Appendix 1.6.2.

Because Volunteer is not a fissile package, the CSI is not applicable. Finally, as discussed in Chapter 3, the Maximum Normal Operating Pressure (MNOP) of the package for irradiated hardware and vitrified HLW contents is less than 100 psig, and therefore it is designated Type B(U)-96 for these contents in accordance with 10 CFR 71.4 [1-3]. However, the MNOP for TPBAR contents is greater than 100 psig, and therefore it is designated Type B(M)-96 for TPBAR contents in accordance with 10 CFR 71.4 [1-3].

The primary mode of transportation for the Volunteer package is by road, although rail or sea transport modes are also allowed. The Volunteer package, shown in Figure 1-1, consists of a cask assembly that is equipped with upper and lower impact limiters, and containing a payload, with associated internal support structures and dunnage/shoring, as required. The package is required to be transported under exclusive-use controls. Furthermore, it is transported in a horizontal orientation, secured to a shipping skid by the cask trunnions, and covered by a personnel barrier or in an enclosure, as shown in Figure 1-2. The personnel barrier consists of a metallic frame covered with a porous metallic skin (e.g., expanded or perforated sheet metal) that allows air movement across the skin but prevents personnel from contacting the cask outer surface), whereas the enclosure cover consists of a metallic frame covered by a solid sheet metal skin that protects the package from direct exposure to weather, road grime, and diesel particulate.

All contents except for TPBAR CCs must be configured for transport with a personnel barrier.

TPBAR contents may be configured for transport either in an enclosure or personnel barrier.

More detailed descriptions of the packaging, contents, and operational features are provided in Section 1.2.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 1.2-4 the retaining rods are routed. In addition, the inside ends of each access tube includes a 5-inch x 4-inch deep stainless steel lined shear relief pocket at the cask interface.

Gamma shielding is provided by the shield liner assembly for irradiated hardware contents. The shield liner assembly, shown in Figure 1-6 and in Drawing No. 70000.38-L150 in Appendix 1.6.2, is fabricated entirely from stainless steel. It includes a 1.5-inch thick cylindrical shell and a 1.25-inch thick lid and bottom end plate. The bottom plate and lid each includes four (4) 2.5-inch screened drainage holes, each fitted with a wire mesh screen backed by a 0.47-inch thick perforated (i.e., by eighteen [18] 0.21-inch thru holes) stainless steel screen plate. Additional gamma shielding is provided by the grapple ring and lift lugs on the lid, as well as the components that extend radially beyond the outer surface of the cylindrical shell (i.e., the upper flange, bottom plate, and band).

Gamma shielding is provided by the TPBAR basket assembly for TPBAR CC contents. The TPBAR basket assembly, shown in Figure 1-8 and in Drawing No. 70000.38-L160 in Appendix 1.6.2, is fabricated entirely from stainless steel. The basket assembly is an open-ended support structure that is constructed from four (4) machined side shields (1.94-inch thick) that are connected by upper and lower flanges and steel bands, and an internal cruciform formed by two 5/16-inch thick plates. No gamma shielding is provided by the top and bottom ends of the basket assembly, however, the top end of the TPBAR contents is covered either by a 1.38-inch thick stainless steel bearing plate (Configuration 2B-1) or by TPBAR spacers (Configuration 2B-2).

The TPBAR spacers, which are placed over the top end of each TPBAR CC, include a 1.38 inch thick top and a 1/2-inch thick base that provide gamma shielding on the top end.

A detailed description of the shielding features that are credited in the shielding evaluation of the Volunteer package is provided in Chapter 5.

1.2.1.4 Criticality Control Features No special criticality control features (e.g., neutron absorbers) are necessary for the specified radioactive contents.

1.2.1.5 Structural Features The structural features of the packaging are summarized in this section. A more detailed discussion of the packaging structural features is provided in Chapter 2.

Lifting and Tiedown Devices NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 1.2-7 and disassembly operations. The impact limiter lift lugs are not package lifting devices, and therefore are rendered inoperable for lifting the package during transport in accordance with 10 CFR 71.45(a). This is achieved by blocking the holes of the lift lugs with bolts or other suitable means to prevent attachment of the rigging used for lifting.

Internal Supports or Positioning Features The Volunteer packaging includes internal support features for irradiated hardware contents and TPBAR CCs. Irradiated hardware contents must be packaged in a shield liner assembly and TPBAR CCs must be packaged in a TPBAR basket assembly. These shield liner assembly and TPBAR basket components are described below and shown in Figure 1-6 and Figure 1-7, respectively.

The shield liner assembly, shown in Figure 1-6 and in Drawing No. 70000.38-L150 in Appendix 1.6.2, is a stainless steel cylindrical shell assembly in which irradiated hardware contents are packaged for transport. The shield liner assembly includes three (3) different lengths that are sized to fit within the cask cavity for transport in the long cask (configuration 2A), standard cask (configuration 2A), and short cask (configuration 3A). All three shield liner assembly configurations are identical with respect to the cross-section dimensions, shell support features, and top and bottom end details; they vary only by the overall length. As shown in Figure 1-6, the shield liner assembly consists of an open-top cylindrical body weldment with a bolted lid.

The shield liner body weldment is made from a cylindrical shell, bottom plate, bolt flange, and intermediate band. The cylindrical shell can be made from 11/2-inch thick plate that is rolled into a shell with CJP seam weld(s) or it can be made from a 24-inch schedule 100 pipe. The cylindrical shell is connected to the bottom plate and top flange by 1-inch partial penetration groove welds with 1/4-inch cover fillet welds. A 5-inch wide x 1.13-inch thick steel band is attached to the outer surface of the cylindrical shell near its mid-length. The band is designed to provide structural support of the shield insert shell under transverse loads resulting from the NCT and HAC free drops.

The shield liner bolt flange, which is machined from a 3-inch thick plate, includes six (6) threaded holes for the lid bolts and three (3) threaded holes for alignment pins. The bottom plate, which is also machined from a 3-inch thick plate, includes a 21-inch x 1.75-inch deep inside pocket that effectively extends the shield liner cavity length and forms a shoulder to which the cylindrical shell is welded. As shown in Figure 1-6, the bottom plate also includes four (4) drainage holes that are covered by wire mesh screen that is protected from damage by 1/2-inch thick perforated plates. Both the bolt flange and bottom plate both include a semi-circle notch to fit around the cask drain tube. The intermediate band (discussed above) also includes an opening through which the drain tube fits. Guide keys (plates) are welded to between the bolt flange,

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 1.2-10 During transport, the vent and drain ports are plugged by identical bolted port covers made from Type 304 stainless steel with low carbon content equivalent to Type 304L stainless steel. The vent and drain port covers are each secured to the cask by three (3) 7/8-9 UNC SHCS made from the respective ports for protection from shear loading due to free drop and puncture tests.

1.2.1.6 Heat Transfer Features There are no special devices utilized on the Volunteer package for the transfer or dissipation of heat. The package is passively cooled. A more detailed discussion of the package thermal characteristics is provided in Chapter 3.

1.2.1.7 Packaging Markings The packaging marking is included on a nameplate that is permanently affixed to the exposed exterior surface of the cask body, as shown on Drawing No. 70000.38-L100 in Appendix 1.6.2.

At a minimum, the nameplate includes the package model number, approval number, serial number, gross weight, trefoil symbol, and package type.

1.2.2 Radioactive Contents The acceptable radioactive contents of the package include irradiated hardware in shield liner assemblies, vitrified HLW in canisters, and TPBAR CCs. The general requirements for all radioactive contents include:

1. The Volunteer package is designed for Type B quantity of radioactive material that may exceed 3000A2.

2. All packaging configurations are designed for a maximum payload weight of 11,500 pounds, including the weight of the contents, internal support structures, and any shoring and/or dunnage.

3. All contents are non-fissile or fissile exempt (i.e., meeting at least one of the requirements of 10 CFR 71.15(a) through (f)).

NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 1.2-11 The contents are described in the following sections, including the type and form of materials, maximum quantity per package, and loading and shipping restrictions.

1.2.2.1 Irradiated Hardware Contents 1A, 2A, and 3A are irradiated and/or contaminated non-fuel bearing (or fissile exempt quantities) metal and/or solid metal oxide, such as intact or segmented BWR control rod assemblies (CRAs) or control rod blades (CRBs), segmented reactor components, and solid metal GTCC waste. Contents 1A, 2A, and 3A are packaged in the long, standard, and short-length shield liner assemblies and shipped in the long, standard, and short-length cask assemblies, respectively. Shield liners with irradiated hardware contents may be dry-or wet-loaded into the cask and shipped with air as the cask fill gas. Wet loaded contents shall be vacuum dried prior to backfilling.

These contents shall meet the following requirements and restrictions:

Type and Form of Material:

1. Radioactive material in the form of neutron activated metals or metal oxides in solid form and/or contaminated non-fuel bearing reactor accelerator components.

2. Components may be intact, segmented, and/or size reduced (e.g., compacted) to fit within the cavity of the shield liner assembly.

Maximum Quantity per Package:

1. Maximum total Co-60 activity of 30,000 Ci.

2. Maximum total heat load of 470 thermal watts.

Loading and Shipping Restrictions:

1. Contents shall be packaged in a shield liner assembly. Except for close fitting contents, shoring must be placed between the shield liner and activated components to prevent reconfiguration of the contents under HAC.

2. Contents loaded in water shall be drained of all free water within the cavity of the shield liner and cask, to the extent practicable.

3. The package shall be covered by a personnel barrier when configured for transport.

1.2.2.2 Vitrified HLW Canisters Contents 1B and 3B are HLW that is vitrified in borosilicate glass and contained inside a sealed stainless steel HLW canister with a welded closure. The glass matrix may also contain non-

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 1.2-18 containment O-ring seals, replace the metallic containment O-ring seals with approved spares prior to reinstallation.

Remove the cask lid bolts. Using approved rigging, lift the cask lid and move it to the designated area for inspection and preparation activities. Visually inspect the exposed sealing surfaces and O-ring seals for damage, and repair or replace damaged components in accordance with maintenance procedures if necessary. If using the cask configuration with metallic containment O-ring seals, replace the metallic containment O-ring seals with approved spares prior to reinstallation.

Visually inspect the cask cavity for damage and/or foreign materials, remove any shipping dunnage, and verify that the cask cavity/internal support structures are configured properly for the intended contents.

If wet loading, fill the cask cavity with clean water, lift the cask by the lifting trunnions, carefully lower it to the designated cask loading area in the pool, and disengage/remove the lifting yoke. If dry loading, move the cask to the designated area for dry loading operations, install the necessary ancillary equipment (e.g., shield gate) on the cask, and configure the equipment for loading operations.

Loading of Contents If wet loading, fill the cask cavity with clean, pool-compatible water, lift the cask by the lifting trunnions and carefully lower it to the designated cask loading area in the pool, disengage/remove the lifting yoke and cask lid, lift the content(s) and carefully lower them into the cask cavity. Lower the cask lid onto the cask body, then engage the lift yoke to the cask lifting trunnions and lift the cask to remove it from the pool.

If dry loading, lift the content to be loaded into the cask cavity, move it over the cask cavity, and lower the content into the cask cavity, then lift the cask lid and place it on the cask.

Lubricate, install, and tighten the cask lid bolts to the specified torque values.

To drain water from the cask cavity (for wet loading), connect a gas supply to the vent port and drain system to the drain port. Pressurize the cavity with approved gas and operate the drain system to force all water out the drain line. Disconnect the gas supply and drain system from the vent and drain ports. Vacuum dry the cask cavity, and backfill with approved gas.

Install the drain and vent port covers and tighten the port cover bolts to the specified torque values.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 1.2-24 Table 1-1 Package Configuration and Content Designations Cask Length Package Designation Irradiated Hardware Vitrified HLW TPBAR CCs Long 1A 2A Standard 1B 2B-1 or 2B-2 Short 1C 2C Table 1-2 Characteristics of Typical Production TPBAR NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 2.1-1 2.1 Description of Structural Design 2.1.1 Discussion The Volunteer packaging has long, standard, and short configurations, designated as Configurations 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Each configuration accommodates various contents as designated by the configuration IDs shown on Drawing No. 70000.38-L100 in Appendix 1.6.2.

Package configurations 1A (long), 2A (standard), and 3A (short) are all for irradiated hardware contents described in Section 1.2.2.1. Configurations 1B (long) and 3B (short) are for vitrified Level Waste (HLW) in canisters described in Section 1.2.2.2. Configuration 2B (standard) is for TPBAR contents described in Section 1.2.2.3. Furthermore, Configuration 2B has two options designated Configurations 2B-1 and 2B-2, that use different configurations for the internal support structures, as shown on Drawing No. 70000.38-L100 in Appendix 1.6.2.

All packaging configurations have the same cross-section dimensions and end details and vary only in length. The overall lengths of the long packaging configurations 1A and 1B, standard packaging configurations 2A and 2B, and short packaging configurations 3A and 3B are 266.5 inches, 254.5 inches, and 206.5 inches, respectively. The cask cavity lengths of the long packaging configurations 1A and 1B, standard packaging configurations 2A and 2B, and short packaging configurations 3A and 3B are 180.5 inches, 168.5 inches, and 120.5 inches, respectively.

The principal structural members, important to the safe operation of the packaging, for each packaging configuration consists of the following major components: (1) cask assembly, comprised of the cask body weldment, cask lid and bolts, and port covers (drain and vent) and bolts, (2) impact limiters, which are attached to the top and bottom ends of the cask, and (3) inner support structures for certain contents. The structural designs of these components are described in the following sections.

2.1.1.1 Cask Assembly The primary structural components of the cask assembly include the cask body weldment, cask lid, vent port cover, drain port cover, and all associated lid bolts, as shown on Drawing No.

70000.38-L110 in Appendix 1.6.2.

The cask body weldment, shown in Figure 1-3 and on Drawing No. 70000.38-L120 in Appendix 1.6.2, is essentially the same for all configurations, with identical cross section geometry and top and bottom end details, but differing in length. The cask body weldment is comprised of an inner weldment (i.e., inner bottom plate, inner shell, and flange) that is surrounded by a lead

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 2.1-4 limiters are designed to crush in the NCT free drop, HAC free drop, and HAC puncture drop tests to absorb energy and limit the acceleration loads imparted to the cask assembly, internal support structures, and contents.

2.1.1.3 Internal Support Structures The packaging includes internal support structures for irradiated hardware contents and TPBAR CCs. Irradiated hardware contents must be packaged in a shield liner assembly and TPBAR CCs must be packaged in a TPBAR basket assembly. These shield liner assemblies and TPBAR basket components are described below and shown in Figure 1-6 and Figure 1-7, respectively.

NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 2.1-5 For vitrified HLW, the sealed stainless steel HLW canister with a welded closure holds the vitrified HLW during transport and is loaded directly into the cask cavity without any internal support structures.

2.1.1.3.1 Shield Liner Assembly The shield liner assembly is a stainless steel cylindrical shell assembly in which irradiated hardware contents are packaged for transport. The shield liner is a secondary container that facilitates the loading and unloading of irradiated hardware contents into and out of the cask assembly and minimizes contamination of the cask cavity.

The shield liner assembly includes three (3) different lengths that are sized to fit within the cask cavity for transport in the long cask (configuration 2A), standard cask (configuration 2A), and short cask (configuration 3A). All three shield liner assembly configurations are identical with respect to the cross-section dimensions, shell support features, and top and bottom end details; they vary only by the overall length. A detailed description of the shield liner assembly is provided in Section 1.2.1.5 (Internal Supports and Positioning Features), with the geometry and materials of fabrication being defined on Drawing No. 70000.38-L150 in Appendix 1.6.2.

The shield liner assembly is not a pressure boundary, nor is it relied upon for criticality control.

It is a structural support that is designed and fabricated in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC),Section III, Division 1, Subsection NF [2.7].

2.1.1.3.2 TPBAR Basket Assembly The TPBAR basket assembly, which is only used in conjunction with configuration 2B for the standard length cask, consists of an open-ended internal support structure for TPBAR CC contents. The TPBAR basket assembly can be configured in two different ways (i.e.,

configurations 2B-1 and 2B-2) with additional internal support structures. Configuration 2B-1 includes a 1.38-inch thick TPBAR bearing plate that is bolted to the inside surface of the cask lid. The TPBAR bearing plate serves as a spacer at the top end of the cavity and it spreads the loading from the top end of the CC bails on the inside of the cask lid for top end and corner drop loading conditions. Configuration 2B-2 includes an aluminum extension plate that is bolted to the top end of the TPBAR basket and TPBAR spacers that are placed on top and around the bail handle of the TPBAR CC. The aluminum extension plate serves as a spacer at the top end of the cavity and the TPBAR spacers include a 1.38-inch thick top plate that spreads the loading from the top end of the CC bails on the inside of the cask lid for top end and corner drop loading conditions. A detailed description of the TPBAR basket assembly and associated internal support structure components is provided in Section 1.2.1.5, with the geometry and materials of

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 2.6-2 shown in Figure 2.6-1 that is used for the cask assembly stress analysis conservatively has maximum temperatures of 300°F at the top and bottom ends of the cask cavity and 325°F on the inside surface of the inner shell and larger temperature differentials through the cask bottom end (15°F), top end (15°F), and side wall (18°F). As discussed in Section 2.6.1.4, the results of the NCT heat cask assembly stress analysis show that the maximum stresses in all components of the cask assembly due to the design temperature distribution bound those from the generic (i.e.,

bounding heat flux) and TPBAR temperature distributions calculated in Chapter 3.

As discussed in Section 3.1.4, the maximum internal pressures for the NCT heat and cold conditions are 460 psig and 403 psig, respectively. Upper-bound design internal pressure loads of 575 psig and 490 psig are conservatively used for the stress analysis of the cask assembly for hot and cold conditions, respectively.

2.6.1.2 Differential Thermal Expansion Differential thermal expansion of the packaging components is evaluated considering possible interference resulting from a reduction in gap sizes. The effects of differential thermal expansion of the cask assembly materials are accounted for in the NCT heat finite element analysis.

Differential thermal expansion between the cask internal support structures and the cask cavity is evaluated as follows:

Shield Liner Differential thermal expansion between the shield liner assembly and the cask cavity is evaluated to demonstrate that the shield liner assembly expands freely within the cask cavity under the worst case NCT and HAC conditions. As discussed in Chapter 3, the NCT heat results for irradiated hardware in shield liners are bounded by those for vitrified HLW. The results of the thermal evaluation for vitrified HLW in Table 3.3-3 show that the maximum temperatures of the canister and cask inner shell for the NCT heat are 397°F and 241°F, respectively. An upper bound shield liner temperature of 400°F and a lower bound temperature for the cask body of 70°F are conservatively used for the evaluation of differential thermal expansion between the shield liner assembly and cask cavity.

The nominal axial and radial gaps between the shield liner assembly and the cask cavity are 0.75 inch and 0.25 inch, respectively, for all three cask configurations (i.e., 1A, 2A, and 3A).

The thermal expansion of the long shield liner assembly (Configuration 1A), which is 26.25 inch by 179.75 inch long, is bounding for the standard and short shield liner configurations. The axial and radial thermal expansion of the long shield liner assembly at 400°F, based on a coefficient of thermal expansion for 304 stainless steel of 9.5x10-6 in/in/°F, are 0.56 inch and 0.26 inch, respectively. Conservatively assuming zero thermal expansion of the cask cavity (i.e.,

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 2.6-25 the cold and hot NCT end drop conditions are evaluated with minimum (zero) and maximum (design) internal pressure loading.

A 30,380-pound bolt preload, corresponding to the nominal bolt torque of 600 ft-lb, is applied to the finite element model as an initial condition for each lid bolt in combination with temperature loads. For the cold condition (i.e., -20°F ambient temperature, zero decay heat, and zero insolation), a uniform temperature of -20°F is applied to the entire cask assembly model, whereas for the hot condition (i.e., 100°F ambient temperature, maximum decay heat, and maximum insolation) the design temperature distribution used for the NCT heat evaluation (Figure 2.6-1) is applied to the model. For the cold condition with maximum decay heat, the design temperature distribution used for the NCT cold evaluation (Figure 2.6-2) is applied to the model. Internal pressure loading (0 psig minimum, 575 psig maximum for hot conditions, or 490 psig maximum for cold conditions) is applied to all modeled cask cavity surfaces. The load combinations evaluated for the NCT end drop are summarized as follows:

The 22g NCT end drop acceleration load is applied to the model to account for the inertial load of the modeled cask components. The load from the maximum weight of the cask contents and internal support structures (i.e., 11,500 pounds) is applied as a pressure load on the impacted end of the cask cavity. For the bottom end drop, the content pressure load is applied as a uniformly distributed pressure load over the entire bottom end of the cask cavity. However, for the top end drop the content pressure load is conservatively applied over a small area at the center of the cask lid (approximately equivalent to the area of a 7.23-inch diameter circle, typical of the loading that would occur with vitrified HLW in a standard canister or irradiated hardware in a shield liner assembly), to provide a bounding loading condition for the different packaging contents and internal support structures. The pressure loads on the cavity surface from the contents are superimposed with the internal pressure loads. The load from the weight of the impact limiter (i.e., upper-bound weight of 3,500 pounds conservatively used) opposite the end of impact is applied as a uniform pressure load on the end of the cask assembly. The applied NCT end drop loading is reacted by a uniform pressure load applied to the impacted end of the cask assembly. Symmetry boundary conditions are applied to the 1/4-symmetry model and a single node on the cask centerline is restrained in the axial direction for numerical stability.

The maximum stress intensities in the cask assembly for the NCT end drop are compared to the Level A limits for elastic system analysis, as discussed in Section 2.1.2.2. For hot conditions, the allowable stress intensities are based conservatively based on upper-bound design temperatures of 350°F for the inner shell, 325°F for the outer shell, and 300°F for the remainder of the cask assembly. For cold conditions with zero decay heat, the allowable stress intensities are based on a design temperature of -20°F for all cask assembly components. For cold conditions with maximum decay heat, the allowable stress intensities are conservatively based on upper-bound

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 2.6-41 NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 2.7-50 2.7.4 Thermal In accordance with 10 CFR 71.73(c)(4), the package is designed to withstand a 30-minute fire with the flame temperature of 1,475°F (800°C). This section presents the structural evaluation of the package for the HAC thermal loading. Section 2.7.4.1 provides a summary of the maximum pressures and temperatures resulting from the HAC thermal test. Differential thermal expansion between the packaging components during the HAC thermal test is discussed in Section 2.7.4.2.

The stresses in the packaging components due to the HAC thermal test are evaluated in Section 2.7.4.3. Finally, a comparison of the maximum stress intensities in the packaging from the HAC thermal test to the applicable allowable stress design criteria is provided in Section 2.7.4.4.

The results of the structural evaluation of the HAC thermal test demonstrate that maximum stresses in the packaging satisfy the applicable allowable stress design criteria, that no permanent deformation of the packaging occurs, and that the integrity of the containment seal is maintained.

2.7.4.1 Summary of Pressures and Temperatures NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 3-1 3

THERMAL EVALUATION This section summarizes the thermal evaluation of the Volunteer package for the range of authorized contents, including irradiated hardware in shield liners, vitrified high level waste (HLW) in sealed canisters, and tritium producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) in consolidation canisters. The results of the thermal evaluation demonstrate that the packaging remains within the applicable thermal limits for the Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) heat condition of 10 CFR 71.71(c)(1) [3.3] and the Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC) thermal test of 10 CFR 71.73(c)(4) [3.3]. The results of the thermal evaluation are considered in the packaging structural, containment, and shielding safety analyses.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 3.1-1 3.1 Description of Thermal Design The Volunteer packaging, shown in Figure 1-1, consists of a cask assembly with identical impact limiters on its top and bottom ends. In addition, internal support structures are used inside the cask cavity with some of the contents. The cask assembly consists of a body weldment and bolted cask lid. The cask body has a steel-lead-steel sidewall construction with integral upper (lifting) trunnions and lower (rotation) trunnions attached to the outer shell, and a thermal shield outside the outer shell to insulate the package from the effects of the HAC thermal test (i.e., fire).

More detailed descriptions of the packaging components are provided in Section 3.1.1.

3.1.1 Design Features All details and relevant dimensions of the packaging components are provided in the Drawings in Appendix 1.6.2.

The cask assemblys containment vessel provides leaktight containment of the radioactive contents, as well as the associated shielding, structural, and thermal properties necessary to protect the contents and satisfy the applicable regulatory and design criteria. The cask body weldment is comprised of an inner shell, inner bottom plate, bolt flange, outer shell, bottom forging, with each constructed from mild austenitic stainless steel. Chemical copper lead is poured into the annular cavity between the inner and outer shells. A thermal shield shell is provided at the exterior of the cask body (outside the casks outer shell, with spacer wire between the thermal shield and the outer shell) to minimize heat input to the cask assembly during the HAC thermal test. The cask body weldment includes a drain port in the top flange connected to an optional drain tube assembly that is used to drain the water from the cask cavity following wet-loading and wet-unloading operations, and to flood the cask cavity with water in preparation for wet-unloading operations, as described in Chapter 9. The drain tube assembly is not included in the cask configurations for vitrified HLW contents.

The cask lid is connected to the cask body by high-strength stainless steel socket head cap screws (SHCSs). The cask lid includes two (2) face seals; an inner seal for containment and an outer seal to facilitate leakage rate testing. The cask lid includes a vent port that is used to pressurize the cask cavity to facilitate draining water from the cask cavity for wet-loading and wet-unloading operations, to vent the cask cavity gases during cask reflood operations prior to wet-unloading, and to vacuum dry and fill the cask cavity with an approved gas prior to shipment. A bolted port cover, made from mild austenitic stainless steel, is used to seal the vent port during shipping. The vent port also includes two face seals: an inner containment seal and an outer test seal. The cask lid and port cover include different configurations to accommodate the different

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 3.1-2 3.1.2 Content Decay Heat and Shipping Configurations The Volunteer packaging is used to transport a wide range of radioactive materials under exclusive use controls primarily by overweight permitted truck shipments, but it may also be transported by rail or sea. The initial intended content include:

1. Vitrified high-level waste (HLW) (in a borosilicate glass monolith) inside a sealed

canister,

2. Irradiated hardware, such as reactor internals, non-fuel components, and other Greater Than Class C (GTCC) waste packaged in a shield liner, and

3. Tritium-Producing Burnable Absorber Rods (TPBARs) in consolidation canisters (CCs).

Volunteer packaging is provided in three different length configurations, all having the same cross-section dimensions, bottom and top end dimensions, trunnion dimensions, and impact limiter dimensions, but varying only in length as follows:

1. Long Configurations (1A and 1B) have an overall length of 266.5 inches and a cavity length of 180.5 inches. Configuration 1A is for irradiated hardware in a long shield liner assembly and Configuration 1B is for vitrified HLW in a 15-foot long canister.

2. Standard Configurations (2A, 2B-1, and 2B-1) have an overall length of 254.5 inches and a cavity length of 168.5 inches. Configuration 2A is for irradiated hardware in a standard length shield liner assembly and Configurations 2B-1 and 2B-2 are for TPBARs in CCs.

NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 3.1-3

3. Short Configurations (3A and 3B) have an overall length of 206.5 inches and a cavity length of 120.5 inches. Configuration 3A is for irradiated hardware in a short shield liner assembly and Configuration 3B is for vitrified HLW in a 10-foot long canister.

The maximum heat loads for each content are summarized in Table 3.1-1.

3.1.3 Summary Tables of Temperatures The operating temperature limits are based on the performance requirements of the individual packaging components. These operating temperature limits of the package components that are significant to the shielding and containment design are outlined in Table 3.1-2, including the temperature requirements for maximum temperature on the package accessible surfaces that are specified in 10CFR71.43(g).

The thermal evaluation in this chapter considers three different model configurations as summarized in Table 3.1-3. The models are representative and bounding for all Volunteer transport configurations in terms of contents and cask length. Thermal analyses are performed for each of these configurations for NCT and HAC.

Normal Conditions of Transport Per the requirements of 10 CFR 71.71(c)(1), the Volunteer package is evaluated for NCT, as presented in Section 3.3. Specifically, steady-state thermal analyses are performed simulating exposure of the package to an ambient air temperature of 100°F with insolation as specified in 10 CFR 71.71(c)(1). The results of the analyses for the NCT are presented in Section 3.3.1. The temperatures of several key package components are summarized and compared with their allowable temperatures in Table 3.1-4 for models with Bounding Heat Flux, TPBAR contents, and Vitrified HLW contents, respectively.

As presented in Table 3.1-4, the maximum temperatures for the package components remain below their respective temperature limits for NCT. Therefore, when exposed to NCT, the structural, containment, and shielding performances of the package will not be adversely affected by the temperatures experienced under these conditions.

The Volunteer package must be shipped under exclusive use controls. In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 71.43(g) the maximum temperature on the accessible surface of the package in still air at 100°F and in the shade is limited to 185°F for an exclusive use shipment.

As discussed in Section 3.3.1, the maximum temperature of the accessible surface of the package, when exposed to an ambient temperature of 100°F in still air and shade, is 153°F,

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 3.1-4 below the 185°F temperature limit for an exclusive use shipment. Therefore, the temperature limit of 10 CFR 71.43(g) for exclusive use is satisfied for the respective contents.

Hypothetical Accident Conditions Per the requirements of 10 CFR 71.73(c)(4), the Volunteer package is evaluated for HAC, as presented in Section 3.4. The results of the analyses are presented in Section 3.4.3. The temperatures of several key package components are summarized and compared to their allowable temperatures in Table 3.1-5. The impact limiter shells/plates are only required to maintain confinement of the balsa wood; therefore, they are only required to remain below their respective melting temperatures during HAC.

As presented in Table 3.1-5, the package components remain below their allowable temperatures for HAC. Therefore, when exposed to HAC, the structural, containment, and shielding performance of the package will not be adversely affected by the temperatures experienced under these conditions.

3.1.4 Summary Table of Maximum Pressures The summary of maximum internal pressures in the cask cavity for NCT and HAC, calculated as described in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.4.3.2, respectively, is provided in Table 3.1-6. The maximum calculated internal pressure loads for TPBAR contents under NCT and HAC, based on 1.5g tritium per TPBAR, 2 pre-failed TPBARs per shipment, and 100% event-failure of the remaining TPBARs, are 460 psig and 494 psig, respectively, whereas the maximum calculated internal pressure loads for irradiated hardware and vitrified HLW contents under NCT and HAC are 6.8 psig and 8.7 psig, respectively. For NCT cold the maximum calculated internal pressure load, also based on 1.5g tritium per TPBAR, 2 pre-failed TPBARs per shipment, and 100%

event-failure of the remaining TPBARs, is 403 psig. Therefore, the maximum normal operating pressure (MNOP) for the package configurations with TPBAR contents is 460 psig and MNOP for the package configurations with irradiated hardware and vitrified HLW is 6.8 psig. Thus, the package designation for cask configurations 1A, 1B, 2A, 3A, and 3B is Type B(U) because their MNOP is less than 100 psig, whereas the package designation for configuration 2B-1 and 2B-2 is Type B(M) because the MNOP exceeds 100 psig. Note that the structural evaluation of the cask assembly in Chapter 2 uses bounding internal pressure loads of 490 psig and 575 psig for NCT cold and hot conditions, respectively. For the HAC thermal test, a bounding design pressure of 600 psig is conservatively used.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 3.1-5 Table 3.1-1 - Packaging Contents and Design Heat Loads Table 3.1-2 - Temperature Limits of Packaging Components NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 3.1-6 Table 3.1-3 - Thermal Model Configurations Table 3.1-4 - Summary of Maximum NCT Packaging Temperatures NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 3.1-7 Table 3.1-5 - Summary of Maximum HAC Packaging Temperatures Table 3.1-6 - Summary of Maximum Pressures NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 3.3-1 3.3 Thermal Evaluation for Normal Conditions of Transport This section describes the thermal evaluation of the Volunteer packages under NCT. The evaluation is conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 71 and Regulatory Guide 7.8 for the applicable NCT thermal loads. The results are compared with the allowable limits of temperature and pressure for the package components.

Analytical Approach The thermal performance of the package for the NCT condition of 10 CFR 71.71(c)(1) is assessed using finite element analysis (FEA) methods to perform steady-state heat transfer analyses. Specifically, the general-purpose finite element code ANSYS [3.6] is used to model and analyze the package for the NCT heat test of 10 CFR 71.71(c)(1) (i.e., 100°F ambient temperature in still air, insolation, and maximum decay heat) and NCT cold tests of 10 CFR 71.71(c)(2) (i.e., -40°F ambient temperature in shade, insolation, and maximum decay heat). In addition, the package is evaluated for the cold initial conditions specified in 10 CFR 71.71(b),

consisting or an ambient temperature of -20°F in still air and shade with maximum decay heat.

As discussed in Section 3.1.2, the Volunteer packaging is provided in three different length configurations for the transport of different contents such as vitrified HLW in sealed canisters, TPBARs in consolidation canisters, and irradiated hardware in shield liner assemblies. As summarized in Table 3.1-3, three different configurations (i.e., bounding heat flux, TPBAR contents, and vitrified HLW contents) are considered in the thermal evaluation in this chapter.

More detailed descriptions of the thermal models are provided as follows.

Bounding Heat Flux Model The three-dimensional (3D) 1/2-symmetry (180°) finite element models shown in Figures 3.3-1 through 3.3-4 are used to perform steady state thermal analyses of the transportation cask assembly with impact limiters. These analyses do not model any cask contents, rather, they model a uniform heat flux from the contents over the surface of the cask cavity. The purpose of the thermal analyses performed using these models is to evaluate the thermal performance of the long, standard, and short cask configurations for upper-bound content heat loads for a generic shipping configuration that includes a personnel barrier. The results from these analyses are used to develop the generic (i.e., bounding) temperature distributions that are used for the cask structural analysis, as discussed in Chapter 2. Content-specific thermal analyses are also performed as discussed in the following sub-headings of this section.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 3.3-7 Hc = 0.0008333x(T/L)1/4 (Btu/hr-in2-°F)

The cask design heat load of 3.3 kW is applied to the contents of the CC as heat generation rates using the power distribution curve as shown in Figure 3.3-11 [3.11].

Vitrified HLW Content Model The 3D 1/2-symmetry (180-degree) finite element model shown in Figures 3.3-12 through 3.3-14 is used to perform steady state NCT thermal analyses of the transportation package containing vitrified HLW content. The model includes the loaded cask assembly, the top and bottom impact limiters, and vitrified HLW canister contents. The cask assembly and impact limiters in the model are identical to those to long cask model for the Bounding Heat Flux models. A loaded canister containing glass is modeled inside the cask cavity surrounded by air. The vitrified HLW canister is conservatively modeled as a 24-inch x 15-foot long right-circular cylindrical shell with a 3/8-inch thick cylindrical shell and end plates, filled with vitrified waste (i.e., in a solid borosilicate glass matrix).

During transport, the cask is in horizontal position and the vitrified HLW canister rests on the lower side of the cask cavity. As such, a non-uniform air gap is modeled between the vitrified HLW canister and the cask inner shell, as shown in Figure 3.3-13. Air gaps are also modeled between the top and bottom ends of the of the vitrified HLW canister and the respective ends of the cask cavity. Conduction and radiation are considered in these gaps. An emissivity of 0.36 is used for the canister outer surfaces and the inner surfaces of the cask cavity. ANSYS Radiation matrix (MATRIX50) is used for the radiation between the outer surface of the canister and the inner surface of the cask inner shell.

A bounding cask heat load of 4.55 kW is applied to the canister content as heat generation rate based on a vitrified HLW content weight of 6,887 pounds and bounding glass density of 0.0961 lb/in3. Note that this heat load bounds the design heat load of 4.29 kW for the vitrified HLW as shown in Table 3.1-1.

Note that the thermal evaluation results using this model are bounding and applicable to the Volunteer cask configuration containing irradiated hardware content (i.e., a cylindrical stainless steel shield liner containing irradiated hardware). The shield liner used with the irradiated hardware contents and the vitrified HLW standard canister are similar in size, shape, and positioning within the cask cavity. The design heat load for the irradiated hardware content is 0.47 kW, which is significantly less than the heat load of 4.55 kW used in the model for vitrified HLW content. Therefore, maximum temperatures for the HLW content and the standard canister from this model are bounding for the irradiated hardware content and the shield liner respectably.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 3.3-8 Maximum temperatures for cask components and the impact limiters from this model are also bounding for those for the cask configuration with irradiated hardware content.

3.3.1 Heat and Cold Per the requirements of 10 CFR 71.71(c)(1), thermal evaluations are performed for the Volunteer packages for the NCT. As summarized in Table 3.1-3, three bounding model configurations are considered. The models are representative and bounding for all Volunteer transport configurations in terms of contents and cask length. Steady-state thermal analyses are performed simulating NCT conditions as specified in 10 CFR 71.71(c)(1). The results of the analyses are presented in this section. The temperatures of several key package components are summarized and compared with their allowable temperatures in Table 3.1-2.

Bounding Heat Flux Model For the bounding heat flux model configuration, steady state analyses are performed using the 3D 180-degree finite element models for the long, standard, and short casks for the NCT hot case (100°F ambient with solar insolation). A steady state analysis is also performed for the long cask for the NCT cold case (-40°F without solar insolation). The governing analysis results correspond to the evaluations for the long cask. The maximum temperatures for key package components for both the hot and cold cases are presented in Table 3.3-1. The package component temperatures are below their allowable temperatures for NCT. In addition, a steady state analysis is performed using the 2D 90-degree model to determine the temperature of the aluminum mesh personnel barrier for NCT. The analysis results show that the maximum temperature of the accessible surface of the package when exposed to an ambient temperature of 100°F in still air and shade is 153°F for the Volunteer package with aluminum mesh personnel barrier. The maximum surface temperature is below the limits of 185°F for exclusive use.

TPBAR Content Model For the TPBAR Content model configuration, steady state analyses are performed using the 3D 180-degree finite element models for both the NCT hot case (100°F ambient with solar insolation) and the cold case (-40°F ambient with no solar insolation). The maximum temperatures for TPBAR cladding and key package components for both the hot and cold cases are presented in Table 3.3-2. The maximum TPBAR cladding temperature is well below the allowable temperature limit of 650°F [3.10]. The package component temperatures are below their allowable temperatures for NCT. The maximum temperature of the aluminum enclosure surfaces is 163°F, which is less than the allowable temperature of 185°F for package accessible surfaces.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 3.3-9 TPBAR Content Vacuum Condition Model Note that an additional steady state analysis is performed for the vacuum drying condition for the TPBAR configuration. The same 3D 180-degree finite element model for TPBAR for the evaluation of normal condition of transport is used for the analysis considering the cask in vertical position with an ambient temperature of 100°F. The impact limiters, aluminum enclosure, surrounding air, and carbon steel deck of the shipping skid are removed from the model and contents are conservatively centered in the radial direction (i.e. no radial contact).

Since the vacuum drying operation is performed inside a building, no solar insolation is considered. The analysis results indicate that the maximum content temperature is below the allowable temperature for the normal condition of transport, confirming that no thermal limit is required for the vacuum drying operations as described in Chapter 8.

Vitrified HLW Content Model For the Vitrified content model configuration, steady state analyses are performed using the 3D 180-degree finite element models for both the NCT hot case (100°F ambient with solar insolation) and the cold case (-40°F ambient with no solar insolation). The maximum temperatures for the canister content (vitrified HLW or irradiated hardware) and key package components for both the hot and cold cases are presented in Table 3.3-3. The maximum temperature of the canister content is well below the allowable temperature limit of 752°F. The package component temperatures are below their allowable temperatures for NCT. The maximum temperature of the accessible package surface (aluminum mesh personnel barrier) is conservatively considered to be 153°F (which is less than the temperature limit of 185°F) based on the analysis results for the Bounding Heat Flux model configuration.

3.3.2 Maximum Normal Operating Pressure NCT pressures are summarized in Table 3.3-4 and calculated as follows.

3.3.2.1 Vitrified High Level Waste and Irradiated Hardware Payloads Vitrified HLW and irradiated hardware contents do not produce or release gas into the cask cavity. Because these payloads do not off-gas, the quantity of gas in the cask cavity remains constant and the ideal gas law can be simplified to a ratio of pressure to temperature (p2=p1(T2/T1)). The maximum internal pressure for these contents is calculated using the backfill pressure and temperature of the cask and the maximum average gas temperature in the cask.

The cask is backfilled with air at a pressure of 1 atm and temperature of 293K.The maximum average gas temperature from Section 3.3.1 is rounded up for pressure calculation. The evaluated temperature is 310°F (427.6K). The calculated maximum internal pressure for NCT is 6.8 psig (1.46 atm).

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 3.3-14 Table 3.3-3 - Maximum Component Temperatures for NCT - Vitrified HLW Content Table 3.3-4 - Maximum Pressures for NCT NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 3.4-4 The temperature profile from the steady state analysis for NCT hot condition is used as initial condition of the model for the fire transient analysis. The 30-minute fire is followed by a 36-hour cool down period.

Vitrified HLW Content Model As shown in Figure 3.4-3, a 3D 180-dgree finite element model is used to perform transient thermal analysis for the fire accident for the cask configuration with vitrified HLW or irradiated hardware content. The model of the loaded cask used for fire transient analysis is the same as the model for the analysis of NCT, except as follows:

1) When fire starts, the air gap between lead and outer shell is closed to allow more heat input from the fire;

2) Link elements representing the retaining rods for the impact limiters are added;

3) Link elements representing the conduction of space wires in cask radial direction are added to the layer between the outer shell and the thermal shield shell. These conduction links are disabled right after the 30-minute fire.

The model of impact limiters for fire analysis is based on the damaged geometry of the impact limiters after the HAC free drop, which precedes the HAC fire condition. The modeling of the impact limiters and boundary conditions for the vitrified HLW Content model for the fire analysis are identical to that for the Bounding Heat Flux model used for the fire accident analysis.

The temperature profile from the steady state analysis for NCT hot condition is used as initial condition of the model for the fire transient analysis. The 30-minute fire is followed by a 36-hour cool down period.

3.4.3 Maximum Temperatures and Pressure 3.4.3.1 Maximum HAC Temperatures Results The peak temperatures of the package components are summarized in Tables 3.4-1 through 3.4-3 for the bounding heat flux model, TPBAR content model and the vitrified HLW content model, along with the respective temperature limits. As shown in the tables, the package components remain below their allowable temperatures for the HAC, except for the lead (in Tables 3.4-1 and 3.4-2 only). Note that the duration of the lead peak temperature exceeding the allowable temperature of 622°F is short and it occurs in small, localized regions adjacent to the trunnions.

The maximum temperatures for TPBAR and the canister content for vitrified HLW or irradiated hardware are well below their temperature limits. Although not required to survive the HAC

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 3.4-5 fire; the peak temperatures of the impact limiter balsa wood cores are included in the summary tables.

3.4.3.2 Maximum HAC Pressure Results The cask internal pressures for the HAC thermal test are calculated using the methodology outlined in Section 3.3.2 and the HAC cask free volume of 803,000 cm3. For the irradiated hardware and vitrified waste payloads, the maximum internal pressure, conservatively calculated based on an upper-bound average gas temperature of 380°F (466.5K), is 8.7 psig (1.59 atm). For the TPBAR payload, the maximum internal pressures, conservatively calculated based on an upper-bound average gas temperature of 430°F (494.3K), are 24.0 psig (2.6 atm) for 0% rod failure and 494 psig (34.6 atm) for 100% rod failure.

3.4.4 Maximum Thermal Stresses The stress analysis of the cask assembly for the HAC thermal test is discussed in Section 2.7.4.3.

The results of the thermal stress analysis show that the maximum stress intensities in all components of the cask assembly are lower than the respective allowable stress intensities.

3.4.5 Accident Conditions for Fissile Material Packages for Air Transport The packaging is not presently authorized for air transport. Therefore, this section is not applicable.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 4.1-1 4.1 Description of the Containment System The packaging has a simple, robust containment system design. The containment boundary is defined by the following components: (1) cask body inner weldment (inner shell, inner bottom plate, flange, and all associated seam welds); (2) cask lid and its inner seal; (3) lid port cover and its inner seal, and (4) drain port cover and its inner seal. The full-penetration longitudinal and circumferential seam welds of the inner shell and the circumferential welds connecting the inner shell to the flange and inner bottom plate are part of the system containment boundary. Other than the lid closure and port cover closures, there are no penetrations to the containment boundary, and no valves or pressure relief devices of any kind. In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 71.51(c), the packaging does not rely on any filter or mechanical cooling system to meet containment requirements, nor does the containment system include any vents or valves that allow for continuous venting. A sketch of the containment system, including the containment system components and the pressure/containment boundary, is included in Figure 4.1-1. In the context of this application the terms pressure and containment boundary are synonymous as this boundary retains pressure and radionuclide content. In Figure 4.1-1, the pressure boundary of the cask containment system is shown with red lines and the cask assembly components that are not included in the containment system are shown with outlines only (no internal hatch pattern).

The cask body inner weldment consists of the cask inner shell, inner bottom plate, flange, and all associated seam welds. The inner shell is rolled from plate and formed into a cylinder by a full-penetration longitudinal and circumferential seam welds. The inner bottom plate, and bolt flange are connected to the inner shell by full-penetration circumferential welds. All containment vessel welds are examined using dye-penetrant testing (PT) and radiographic testing (RT) methods in accordance with the requirements of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)

Subsection NB [4-1] to verify they do not include any unacceptable indications of weld flaws.

The flange includes threaded bolt holes and thread inserts to accommodate the cask lid bolts.

The portion inboard of the bolt holes is the sealing surface for the cask lid containment seal.

The cask lid is a solid austenitic stainless steel (Type 304) plate or forging with a stepped-plug design that prevents shear loading of the lid bolts. The cask lid has machined bolt holes and scalloped pockets in which the lid bolt heads are recessed, two (2) concentric seal groove, a leak test port, and a vent port that is used for backfilling the cavity and contents prior to shipment.

Inerting and backfill is a payload-specific activity and is not required for all contents (e.g.,

contents such as activated hardware and vitrified HLW may be transported with air as the cavity gas). The cask lid is secured to the cask body weldment by twenty-four (24) high strength

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 4.1-2 stainless steel socket head cap screws (i.e., lid bolts). The lid bolts are considered part of the containment system but are not part of the containment boundary.

The vent and drain port covers, which fit flush into the machined pockets in the cask lid and flange, are also a solid austenitic stainless steel plates with machined bolt holes, two (2) concentric seal grooves, and a leak test port. Each port cover fits over a quick-connect fitting attached to the port, filling most of the void space to maximize shielding efficiency. No credit is taken for containment provided by the vent and drain port quick-connect fittings.

The containment vessel is designed, fabricated, examined, tested, and inspected in accordance with the applicable requirements of Subsection NB of the ASME Code [4-1] with certain exceptions discussed in Chapter 1. As discussed in Section 7.10.2, there are no known adverse chemical, galvanic, or other reactions between the packaging materials or between the contents and the packaging materials.

NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 4.2-1 4.2 Containment Under Normal Conditions of Transport 4.2.1 NCT Pressurization of the Containment Vessel As discussed in Section 3.1.4, the maximum normal operating pressure (MNOP) for TPBAR contents for NCT, based on 1.5g tritium per TPBAR, 2 pre-failed TPBARs per shipment, and 100% event-failure of the remaining TPBARs, is 460 psig, whereas the maximum calculated internal pressure loads for irradiated hardware and vitrified HLW contents for NCT is 6.8 psig.

Thus, the package designation for cask configurations 1A, 1B, 2A, 3A, and 3B is Type B(U) because their MNOP is less than 100 psig, whereas the package designation for configuration 2B-1 and 2B-2 is Type B(M) because the MNOP exceeds 100 psig. As discussed in Section 2.6, bounding internal pressure loads of 490 psig and 575 psig are conservatively used for the structural evaluation of NCT tests for cold and hot initial test conditions, respectively.

4.2.2 NCT Containment Criterion The package is designed to a leaktight containment criterion per ANSI N14.5-2014 [4-3].

Therefore, the containment criterion is 1x10-7 ref cm3/sec.

4.2.3 Compliance with NCT Containment Criterion Compliance with the NCT containment criterion is demonstrated by analysis. The structural evaluation in Section 2.6 shows there would be no loss or dispersal of radioactive contents, and that the containment boundary, seal region, and closure bolts do not undergo any inelastic deformation when subjected to the conditions of 10 CFR 71.71. The thermal evaluation in Section 3.3.1 shows the seals, bolts and containment system materials of construction do not exceed their temperature limits when subjected to the conditions of 10 CFR 71.71.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 4.3-1 4.3 Containment Under Hypothetical Accident Conditions 4.3.1 HAC Pressurization of the Containment Vessel As discussed in Section 3.1.4, the maximum internal pressure for TPBAR contents for HAC, based on 1.5g tritium per TPBAR, 2 pre-failed TPBARs per shipment, and 100% event-failure of the remaining TPBARs, is 494 psig, whereas the maximum calculated internal pressure loads for irradiated hardware and vitrified HLW contents for HAC is 8.7 psig. TPBAR with changes in pressure from NCT conditions limited to change in gas temperature (i.e., no additional gas is released from TPBARs.) As discussed in Section 2.7.4.3, the structural evaluation for the HAC thermal test (fire) is performed based on a bounding design internal pressure of 600 psig..

4.3.2 HAC Containment Criterion The packaging is designed to a leaktight containment criterion per ANSI N14.5 [4-3].

Therefore, the containment criterion is 1x10-7 ref cm3/sec.

4.3.3 Compliance with HAC Containment Criterion Compliance with the HAC containment criterion is demonstrated by analysis. The structural evaluation in Section 2.7 shows there would be no loss or dispersal of radioactive contents, and that the containment boundary, seal region, and closure bolts do not undergo any inelastic deformation when subjected to the HAC test conditions of 10 CFR 71.73. The thermal evaluation in Section 3.4.3 shows the seals, bolts and containment system materials of construction do not exceed their temperature limits when subjected to the HAC test conditions of 10 CFR 71.73.

Refer to Section 4.5.3 for an evaluation of TPBAR containment seal permeation under HAC.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 5-i Chapter 5 Shielding Evaluation Table of Contents 5

SHIELDING EVALUATION......................................................................................... 5-1 5.1 Description of Shielding Design................................................................................... 5.1-1 5.1.1 Shielding Design Features................................................................................ 5.1-1 5.1.2 Summary of Maximum Radiation Levels......................................................... 5.1-1 5.2 Source Specification..................................................................................................... 5.2-1 5.2.1 Gamma Source.................................................................................................. 5.2-1 5.2.2 Neutron Source................................................................................................. 5.2-1 5.3 Shielding Model............................................................................................................ 5.3-1 5.3.1 Configuration of Source and Shielding............................................................. 5.3-1 5.3.2 Material Properties............................................................................................ 5.3-2 5.4 Shielding Evaluation..................................................................................................... 5.4-1 5.4.1 Methods............................................................................................................. 5.4-1 5.4.2 Input and Output Data....................................................................................... 5.4-2 5.4.3 Flux-to-Dose Rate Conversion......................................................................... 5.4-2 5.4.4 External Radiation Levels................................................................................. 5.4-2 5.5 References..................................................................................................................... 5.5-1 5.6 Appendices................................................................................................................... 5.6-1 5.6.1 Shielding Analysis - TPBAR Payload............................................................. 5.6-1 5.6.2 Shielding Analysis - Vitrified Waste Payload................................................ 5.6-24 5.6.3 Shielding Analysis - Irradiated Hardware Payload........................................ 5.6-41

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 5-ii List of Figures Figure 5.3 MCNP Shielding Model - Package Geometry, Bottom Half........................... 5.3-6 Figure 5.3 MCNP Shielding Model - Package Geometry, Top Half................................. 5.3-7 Figure 5.3 MCNP Shielding Model - Package Geometry, Cask Midplane....................... 5.3-8 Figure 5.3 MCNP Shielding Model - Package Geometry, Through Impact Limiter Bolt Holes................................................................................................... 5.3-9 Figure 5.3 Key Dimensions and Materials....................................................................... 5.3-10 Figure 5.6.1 TPBAR Axial Power Profile........................................................................ 5.6-11 Figure 5.6.1 VISED Cask XY Slice with TPBAR Payload, Cask Midplane................... 5.6-12 Figure 5.6.1 VISED Cask XY Slice with TPBAR Payload, Through Consolidation Can Bottom Brace..................................................................................... 5.6-13 Figure 5.6.1 VISED Cask XY Slice with TPBAR Payload, Through TPBAR Bearing Plate Void.................................................................................................. 5.6-14 Figure 5.6.1 VISED Cask XZ Slice with TPBAR Payload, No Axial Shift.................... 5.6-15 Figure 5.6.1 VISED Cask XZ Slice with TPBAR Payload, Maximum Axial Shift........ 5.6-15 Figure 5.6.1 NCT Global RZT Mesh Plot: TPBAR, Upward Shift................................. 5.6-16 Figure 5.6.1 NCT Global RZT Mesh Plot through Cask Midplane: TPBAR, Upward Shift........................................................................................................... 5.6-17 Figure 5.6.1 NCT Global RZT Mesh Plot through Lower Trunnions: TPBAR, No Shift........................................................................................................... 5.6-18 Figure 5.6.1 NCT Global RZT Mesh Plot through Upper Trunnions: TPBAR, Upward Shift............................................................................................. 5.6-19 Figure 5.6.1 NCT Radial 2m from Vehicle Mesh Plot: TPBAR, Upward Shift............ 5.6-20 Figure 5.6.1 NCT Top Surface Mesh Plot: TPBAR, Upward Shift............................... 5.6-21 Figure 5.6.1 NCT Bottom Surface Mesh Plot: TPBAR, No Shift.................................. 5.6-22 Figure 5.6.1 HAC Global RZT Mesh Plot: TPBAR, Upward Shift............................... 5.6-23 Figure 5.6.2 VISED Cask XY Slice with Vitrified Waste Payload................................. 5.6-32 Figure 5.6.2 VISED Cask XZ Slice with Vitrified Waste Payload.................................. 5.6-32 Figure 5.6.2 NCT Global RZT Mesh Plot: Vitrified Waste, Gamma.............................. 5.6-33 Figure 5.6.2 NCT Global RZT Mesh Plot: Vitrified Waste, Neutron.............................. 5.6-34 Figure 5.6.2 NCT Radial 2m from Vehicle Mesh Plot: Vitrified Waste, Gamma........... 5.6-35 Figure 5.6.2 NCT Radial 2m from Vehicle Mesh Plot: Vitrified Waste, Neutron........... 5.6-36 Figure 5.6.2 NCT Top Surface Mesh Plot: Vitrified Waste, Gamma.............................. 5.6-37 Figure 5.6.2 NCT Bottom Surface Mesh Plot: Vitrified Waste, Gamma......................... 5.6-38 Figure 5.6.2 HAC Global RZT Mesh Plot: Vitrified Waste, Gamma.............................. 5.6-39 Figure 5.6.2 HAC Global RZT Mesh Plot - Vitrified Waste, Neutron.......................... 5.6-40 Figure 5.6.3 VISED Cask XY Slice with Irradiated Hardware Payload.......................... 5.6-45 Figure 5.6.3 VISED Cask XZ Slice with Irradiated Hardware Payload.......................... 5.6-45 Figure 5.6.3 NCT Global RZT Mesh Plot: Irradiated Hardware...................................... 5.6-46 Figure 5.6.3 NCT Global RZT Mesh Plot through Lower Trunnions:

Irradiated Hardware.................................................................................. 5.6-47 Figure 5.6.3 NCT Global RZT Mesh Plot through Upper Trunnions:

Irradiated Hardware.................................................................................. 5.6-48 Figure 5.6.3 NCT Radial 2m from Vehicle Mesh Plot: Irradiated Hardware.................. 5.6-49 Figure 5.6.3 NCT Top Surface Mesh Plot: Irradiated Hardware..................................... 5.6-50

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 5-iii Figure 5.6.3 NCT Bottom Surface Mesh Plot: Irradiated Hardware................................ 5.6-51 Figure 5.6.3 HAC Global RZT Mesh Plot: Irradiated Hardware..................................... 5.6-52

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 5-iv List of Tables Table 5.1 Package Shielding Design Features.................................................................... 5.1-2 Table 5.2 Gamma Source Energy Group Structure............................................................ 5.2-2 Table 5.2 Neutron Source Energy Group Structure........................................................... 5.2-3 Table 5.3 Primary MCNP Model Package Dimensions..................................................... 5.3-3 Table 5.3 MCNP Shielding Model - Tally Locations........................................................ 5.3-4 Table 5.3 MCNP Material Definitions............................................................................... 5.3-5 Table 5.4 ANSI/ANS-6.1.1 1977 Flux-to-Dose Conversion Factors................................. 5.4-3 Table 5.6.1 TPBAR 30-Day Radionuclide Activity Inventory......................................... 5.6-4 Table 5.6.1 TPBAR 60-Day Gamma Source Spectrum..................................................... 5.6-5 Table 5.6.1 TPBAR Axial Power Profile........................................................................... 5.6-6 Table 5.6.1 Fraction of Source in Each TPBAR Axial Zone............................................. 5.6-6 Table 5.6.1 TPBAR Homogenized Densities..................................................................... 5.6-6 Table 5.6.1 Primary MCNP Model Package Dimensions, TPBAR Payload..................... 5.6-7 Table 5.6.1 MCNP Material Definitions for TPBAR Payload........................................... 5.6-8 Table 5.6.1 TPBAR Results, No Axial Shift...................................................................... 5.6-9 Table 5.6.1 TPBAR Results, Axial Shift.......................................................................... 5.6-10 Table 5.6.2 Vitrified Waste Activity Inventory................................................................ 5.6-27 Table 5.6.2 Vitrified Waste Gamma Spectrum................................................................ 5.6-28 Table 5.6.2 Vitrified Waste Neutron Spectrum................................................................ 5.6-29 Table 5.6.2 Primary MCNP Model Package Dimensions, Vitrified Waste Payload....... 5.6-30 Table 5.6.2 MCNP Material Definitions for Vitrified Waste Payload............................. 5.6-30 Table 5.6.2 Vitrified Waste Results.................................................................................. 5.6-31 Table 5.6.3 Irradiated Hardware Gamma Spectrum......................................................... 5.6-43 Table 5.6.3 Primary MCNP Model Package Dimensions, Irradiated Hardware Payload..................................................................................... 5.6-43 Table 5.6.3 Irradiated Hardware Results.......................................................................... 5.6-44

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 5.1-1 5.1 Description of Shielding Design 5.1.1 Shielding Design Features The packaging design is comprised of the inner and outer shell, lead gamma shield, inner bottom plate and outer bottom forging, upper and lower trunnions, lid, and impact limiters. The assembly of these components is shown in Figure 1-1. The key design features of the packaging that are credited for radiation shielding are listed in Table 5.1-1. Payload-specific design features are described within the appendices.

5.1.2 Summary of Maximum Radiation Levels The package is required to be transported under exclusive-use controls with the cask covered by a personnel barrier or in an enclosure as shown in Figure 1-2. Accordingly, 10 CFR 71.47(b) specifies the following limits for NCT dose rates:

10 mSv/hr (1000 mrem/hr) at any point on the external surface of the package 2 mSv/hr (200 mrem/hr) at any point on the outer surface of the vehicle*

0.1 mSv/hr (10 mrem/hr at any point 2-meters from the outer lateral surface of the vehicle or any point 2 meters from the vertical planes projected by the outer edges of the vehicle (excluding the underside of the vehicle) 0.02 mSv/hr (2 mrem/hr) in any normally occupied space (e.g., tractor cab), except that this provision does not apply to private carriers, if exposed personnel under their control wear radiation dosimetry devices in conformance with 10 CFR 20.1502.

10 CFR 71.51(a)(2) limits the dose rate at 1-meter from the package surface to 10 mSv/hr (1000 mrem/hr) for HAC.

All dose rates are below limits, with at least 5% margin. The bounding dose rates, including the calculated package transport index (TI), are provided in Section 5.6.1.3 for Configurations 2B-1 and 2B-2 (TPBAR); Section 5.6.2.3 for Configurations 1B and 3B (Vitrified waste); and Section 5.6.3.3 for Configurations 1A, 2A, and 3A (Irradiated Hardware).

• The outer surface of the vehicle includes the top and underside of the vehicle; or in the case of a flat-bed style vehicle, at any point on the vertical planes projected from the outer edges of the vehicle, on the upper surface of the load or enclosure, if used, and on the lower external surface of the vehicle.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 5.2-1 5.2 Source Specification The ORIGEN module of the SCALE package [5-1] is used to convert activity inventories (in Ci or Ci/kg) to gamma and neutron source terms.

The bounding source terms are provided in Section 5.6.1.1 for Configurations 2B-1 and 2B-2 (TPBAR); Section 5.6.2.1 for Configurations 1B and 3B (Vitrified waste); and Section 5.6.3.1 for Configurations 1A, 2A, and 3A (Irradiated Hardware).

5.2.1 Gamma Source The gamma energy groups shown in Table 5.2-1 are based on a generic grouping structure developed for this package, accounting for gammas that are directly emitted and those from Bremsstrahlung. An energy group structure finer than the typical default 18-group gamma structure in ORIGEN-S is applied to provide improved accuracy for high energy gamma radiation produced by activated materials. High energy activation gamma rays are the dose driver in Volunteer payloads, in particular the cobalt-60 gamma rays.

5.2.2 Neutron Source The neutron energy groups shown in Table 5.2-2 are based on a generic grouping structure developed for this package, accounting for neutrons from spontaneous fission and,n reactions.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 5.3-2 5.3.1.2 MCNP Shielding Model - Source Geometry The payload-specific source modeling is provided in Section 5.6.1.2 for Configurations 2B-1 and 2B-2 (TPBAR); Section 5.6.2.2 for Configurations 1B and 3B (Vitrified waste); and Section 5.6.3.2 for Configurations 1A, 2A, and 3A (Irradiated Hardware).

5.3.1.3 MCNP Shielding Model - Tally Locations Dose rate results are based on F4 mesh tallies. Cylindrical mesh detectors use 4 cm divisions on the perpendicular and parallel planes to the surface of interest. Azimuthal divisions are used to capture angular variations at distances 2 meters and under from the cask. The tally description includes two global meshes (for plotting and weight window generation, respectively) and a second set of tallies to facilitate tabulation of results. A summary of these tallies is shown in Table 5.3-2. XYZ meshes are used to evaluate the planes at the surface of the vehicle and 2 meters from the vehicle. These tallies use an 8 cm spacing in the y and z direction. For NCT, the 1-meter axial detectors are based on the cask (package) with impact limiters. For HAC, the 1-meter axial detectors are based on the cask (package) without impact limiters. Other than the 1-meter detectors, the NCT axial detectors are spaced at 2 meter increments to determine the distances required to meet surface, 2 meter, and truck cab dose rate limits. The shipment configuration (location on trailer, distance to trailer edge, etc.) will incorporate the locations at which these limits are met.

5.3.2 Material Properties NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 5.6-41 5.6.3 Shielding Analysis - Irradiated Hardware Payload The irradiated hardware payload is specified as 30,000 Ci of Co-60 and will be shipped using a shield liner assembly. Both the short and long shield liner/cask lengths are modeled. The longest liner/cask produces the maximum dose rates for irradiated hardware.

5.6.3.1 Irradiated Hardware Source Specification The irradiated hardware gamma source term is determined based on 30,000 Ci of Co-60 using SCALE/ORIGEN. The resulting gamma spectrum is shown in Table 5.6.3-1. The irradiated hardware heat load is 462.5 W.

5.6.3.2 Irradiated Hardware Shielding Model A minimum source weight of 3810 lbs of hardware (steel) in the long shield liner yields a density of 1.681 g/cm3. The source is modeled as stainless steel 304.

The model of the shield liner with irradiated hardware is developed based on the parameters in Table 5.6.3-2; tolerances are applied as described in the table. VISED slices are shown in Figure 5.6.3-1 and Figure 5.6.3-2 for the short shield liner. The shield liner is shifted upward by 0.91 inches (2.3114 cm) when inserted into the cask cavity. The shield liner lid has 2.5 inches of top spacer/flange/lid lug that will assure spacing of the source/shield liner to the cask lid and therefore lead taper area.

The tally multiplier is taken directly from Table 5.6.3-1 (based on 30,000 Ci of Co-60).

5.6.3.3 Irradiated Hardware External Radiation Levels All figures in this section have dose rates in units of mSv/hr. Scales for the radial plots are based on the governing limit (e.g., 10 mSv/hr at the radial surface under NCT). Scales for the NCT axial plots are based on the surface maximum specific to each surface (top or bottom).

Maximum irradiated hardware dose rates are shown in Table 5.6.3-3. All dose rate limits are met, with the minimum radial margin computed for the NCT 2m from vehicle result.

The NCT global RZT mesh is plotted in Figure 5.6.3-3. This figure shows the axial peak at the top lead gap and slightly higher dose rates at the bottom surface of the cask relative to the top.

The NCT global RZT mesh through the trunnion elevations is plotted in Figure 5.6.3-4 and Figure 5.6.3-5.

The NCT radial XYZ mesh at 2 meters from the vehicle is plotted in Figure 5.6.3-6. This figure illustrates that the axial location of the peak is at the top lead gap, consistent with Figure 5.6.3-3.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 5.6-43 Table 5.6.3 Irradiated Hardware Gamma Spectrum E Upper E Lower Source

[MeV]

[MeV]

[/sec]

3*

2.5 2.2200E+07 2.5 2

1.3320E+10 2

1.9 0.0000E+00 1.9 1.8 0.0000E+00 1.8 1.7 0.0000E+00 1.7 1.6 0.0000E+00 1.6 1.5 3.2239E+03 1.5 1.4 7.6762E+05 1.4 1.3 1.1098E+15 1.3 1.2 2.1150E+07 1.2 1.1 1.1083E+15 1.1 1

1.3102E+08 1

0.9 2.6995E+08 0.9 0.8 8.4883E+10 0.8 0.7 9.8360E+08 0.7 0.45 6.5649E+09 0.45 0.3 1.0549E+11 0.3 0.15 5.6028E+11 0.15 0.1 1.5687E+12 0.1 0.07 3.0976E+12 0.07 0.045 5.6515E+12 0.045 0.03 7.5070E+12 0.03 0.02 9.7573E+12 0.02 0.01 2.3618E+13 Total 2.2701E+15 Table 5.6.3 Primary MCNP Model Package Dimensions, Irradiated Hardware Payload Packaging Component Nominal Dimension, (in [cm])

Modeled Dimension, (in [cm])

Shield liner cavity height (short) 114.75 [291.465]

114.75 [291.465]

Shield liner cavity height (long) 174.75 [443.865]

174.75 [443.865]

Shield liner cavity OD 20.94 [53.1876]

21.38 [54.3052]

Shield liner OD 24 [60.96]

24 [60.96]

Shield liner top thickness 1.25 [3.175]

1.24 [3.1496]

Shield liner bottom thickness 1.25 [3.175]

1.23 [3.1242]

• There is no source above 3 MeV.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 5.6-44 Table 5.6.3 Irradiated Hardware Results Model Detector mrem/hr mSv/hr FSD NCT Rad Package Surface 1.67E+02 1.67E+00 2.2%

Rad Vehicle Surface 4.17E+01 4.17E-01 3.3%

Rad 1m from Package 2.79E+01 2.79E-01 2.4%

Rad 2m from Vehicle 8.96E+00 8.96E-02 7.2%

Top Surface 2.09E+01 2.09E-01 3.5%

Top 1m 5.70E+00 5.70E-02 6.4%

Top 2m 2.67E+00 2.67E-02 5.1%

Top 4m 9.02E-01 9.02E-03 2.3%

Bot Surface 2.18E+01 2.18E-01 3.0%

Bot 1m 6.08E+00 6.08E-02 6.5%

Bot 2m 2.62E+00 2.62E-02 4.9%

Bot 4m 8.97E-01 8.97E-03 1.0%

HAC Rad 1m 1.77E+02 1.77E+00 2.2%

Top 1m 1.12E+02 1.12E+00 3.3%

Bot 1m 7.81E+01 7.81E-01 3.4%

Notes:

1) Conservatively applied 200 mrem/hr limit on top/bottom impact limiter surface. By limiting to 200 mrem/hr, no offset between the impact limiter end and vehicle vertical surface needs to be defined.

2) At the top, 10 mrem/hr limit met at 1m and 2 mrem/hr limit met at 4m.

3) At the bottom, 10 mrem/hr limit met at 1m and 2 mrem/hr limit met at 4m.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 5.6-45 Figure 5.6.3 VISED Cask XY Slice with Irradiated Hardware Payload Figure 5.6.3 VISED Cask XZ Slice with Irradiated Hardware Payload NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 5.6-46 Figure 5.6.3 NCT Global RZT Mesh Plot: Irradiated Hardware NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 5.6-47 Figure 5.6.3 NCT Global RZT Mesh Plot through Lower Trunnions: Irradiated Hardware NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 5.6-48 Figure 5.6.3 NCT Global RZT Mesh Plot through Upper Trunnions: Irradiated Hardware NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 5.6-49 Figure 5.6.3 NCT Radial 2m from Vehicle Mesh Plot: Irradiated Hardware NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 5.6-50 Figure 5.6.3 NCT Top Surface Mesh Plot: Irradiated Hardware NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 5.6-51 Figure 5.6.3 NCT Bottom Surface Mesh Plot: Irradiated Hardware NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 5.6-52 Figure 5.6.3 HAC Global RZT Mesh Plot: Irradiated Hardware NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 7-6 7.7 Criticality Control Not applicable to the Volunteer package; the authorized contents are limited to non-fissile or fissile-exempt radioactive materials.

7.8 Corrosion Resistance All exposed internal and external surfaces of the Volunteer packaging are made of austenitic stainless steel, except for the TPBAR extension plate flange plate, which is made from aluminum. Therefore, the primary concern is not general corrosion, but rather types of localized corrosion, such as pitting and crevice corrosion or intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC). These corrosion mechanisms are possible in environments that contain chlorides (e.g., exposure to road salts during transport) or, in the case of the TPBAR cask configuration, environments with tritium at high pressure. To minimize the potential for material degradation issues such as IGSCC due to exposure to tritium at high pressure (e.g., from TPBAR contents),

Type 304 stainless steel with the low-carbon content of Type 304L stainless steel is used for the cask assembly components that are in contact with the cask cavity (i.e., cask inner bottom plate, inner shell, and flange, cask lid, vent and drain port covers, TPBAR basket assembly, and TPBAR spacers).

Furthermore, to mitigate the remote possibility of localized corrosion on the packaging surfaces of the package, Chapter 9, Section 9.2.3.4 requires all exposed surfaces of the cask assembly and impact limiters be visually inspected within the 12-month period prior to any shipment for damage or degradation, including pitting corrosion, which is a precursor of IGSCC.

The maximum temperatures of the cask components are well below the sensitization temperature of stainless steel (600°C to 850°C).

7.9 Protective Coatings Not applicable to the Volunteer package as there are no protective coatings specified.

7.10 Content Reactions 7.10.1 Flammable and Explosive Reactions Not applicable to the Volunteer package as the contents are limited to irradiated hardware in shield liner assemblies, vitrified high-level waste (HLW) in canisters, and TPBAR consolidation canisters (CCs). Irradiated hardware contents do not generate flammable or explosive gases because the cavity is vacuum dried prior to closure. The vitrified HLW is contained inside of a sealed stainless steel canister inside the cask cavity, and it is loaded, transported, and unloaded dry; therefore, the alpha emitters contained in the borosilicate glass matrix inside the sealed

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 7-7 canisters will not contact water during transport, and therefore, will not generate flammable gas.

As discussed in Section 4.5.2, tritium from TPBAR contents is limited to less than 5% of the gas in the cask cavity to ensure that there are no flammability concerns.

7.10.2 Content Chemical Reactions, Outgassing, and Corrosion The authorized contents are not subject to chemical reactions, outgassing, or corrosion due to the internal environment in the cask during the short duration of transport. The cask assembly is made entirely from stainless steel, except for the lead gamma shield that is fully encased and sealed in the annulus between the cask inner and outer shells. The packaging internal support structures (i.e., shield liner assemblies, TPBAR basket, TPBAR spacers, and TPBAR bearing plate) are made of stainless steel materials and the TPBAR extension plate flange plate is made from aluminum. There are no known adverse chemical, galvanic, or other reactions between these packaging materials or between the contents and the packaging materials.

7.11 Radiation Effects NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 7-30

[7-24] [DELETED]

[7-25] Parker Hannifin Corporation, Parker ORing Handbook, ORD 5700/USA, 2001.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 8-2 vary by the type of containment seals used; Configurations 2B-1 and 2B-2 use metallic containment seals, whereas all other configurations use elastomeric seals. In terms of the operating procedures, the main difference between the metallic and elastomeric seal configurations is the requirements for pre-shipment leakage rate testing. As discussed in Section 9.2.2.2, elastomeric seals are used for multiple shipments and tested prior to each shipment using the gas pressure drop or rise method to verify no detectable leakage to a sensitivity of 1x10-3 ref-cm3/s, whereas metallic seals must be replaced each shipment, and therefore they require maintenance helium leakage rate testing in accordance with the requirements of Section 9.2.2.1 to demonstrate leaktight containment.

As noted on Drawing No. 70000.38-L110 in Appendix 1.6.2, the cask assembly for configuration 2B includes metal containment seals in the cask lid and port covers, may be re-configured with a shield liner assembly rather than the TPBAR basket internal support components for shipment of irradiated hardware (i.e., configuration 2A), provided the required maintenance activities from Chapter 9 are performed and documented in the packaging maintenance log. In this case, the operating procedures for the cask lid and port covers with metal containment seals shall apply.

However, in no case may a cask lid or port cover with elastomeric seals be used for shipment of TPBAR contents because the tritium permeation rate through most elastomers is orders of magnitude higher than the regulatory limits, as discussed in Section 4.4.1.1 of Appendix E of NUREG-2216 [8-1].

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 8.1-1 8.1 Package Loading This section describes the operations for preparing the package for loading (Section 8.1.1),

loading the contents (Section 8.1.2), and preparing the package for transport (Section 8.1.3). It is the responsibility of the cask user to verify that the contents are authorized in accordance with the package CoC and that the package is loaded and closed in accordance with detailed written procedures that are based on the operating procedures described in this chapter, the requirements of the CoC, and any applicable site requirements.

The primary mode of transportation for the Volunteer package is by road, although rail or sea transport modes are also allowed. The package is required to be transported under exclusive-use controls. Furthermore, it is transported in a horizontal orientation, secured to a shipping skid by the cask trunnions, and covered by a personnel barrier or in an enclosure, as shown in Figure 1-2.

Loading operations are performed in a vertical orientation and may be performed in a dry or wet (e.g., pool) environment, as described in Sections 8.1.2.1 and 8.1.2.2, respectively. Dry-loading operations shall be performed in a precipitation-free environment, or measures shall be taken to prevent precipitation from entering the package cavities, such as performing loading operations under a protective cover. If standing water collects inside the cask cavity, absorbent materials or another suitable method, such as a vacuum system, shall be used to remove the free-standing water from the cask cavity, which may require the contents to be unloaded. Wet-loading operations require draining all standing water from the cask cavity prior to closure and leakage rate testing. Wet loading operations are performed using the cask configuration with drainage features. However, dry loading operations may be performed using cask configurations with or without the drainage features. When the cask configuration with the drainage tube is used for dry loading operations, a pre-shipment leakage rate test of the drain port seal is required even if the drain port cover is not removed during loading operations.

The only special equipment required for the loading and unloading operations of the package, other than standard sockets and wrenches for fasteners, equipment used to lift the packaging components, a radioactive contamination detector, and a radiation survey meter, are the pre-shipment backfilling and leakage rate testing apparatuses.

Appropriate controls shall be used for all loading and unloading operations to prevent the spread of radioactive contamination and protect personnel from exposure to excessive radiation.

8.1.1 Preparation for Loading

1. Verify the contents to be loaded comply with applicable requirements of the CoC.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 8.1-5 c.

Carefully remove the previously used metallic containment (inner) seals from the cask lid and vent and drain port covers and inspect the metal seal grooves for wear and/or damage (e.g., scratches, gouges, nicks, cracks, etc.) that may prevent the containment seals from functioning properly.

d. Install approved replacement metal seals in the cask lid, vent port cover, and drain port cover.

8.1.2 Loading of Authorized Contents This section describes the operations for loading the contents into the package and closing the package. Separate procedures are provided for wet-loading and dry-loading operations in Sections 8.1.2.1 and 8.1.2.2, respectively. The procedures for wet-and dry-loading are as follows:

8.1.2.1 Wet Loading

1. Fill the cask cavity with clean, pool-compatible water.

2. Attach the lifting yoke to a crane hook, lower the lifting yoke over the cask upper trunnions, and engage the cask upper trunnions with the lifting yoke arms.

3. Lift the cask assembly and carefully lower it into the designated cask loading area in the pool. While lowering the cask assembly into the fuel pool, spray the exterior surfaces of the cask assembly, lifting yoke, and slings with clean pool-compatible water.

4. Disengage the lifting yoke from the cask upper trunnions and remove the lifting yoke from the pool, spraying the surfaces of the slings and lifting yoke with clean pool-compatible water as they are being removed from the pool.

5. If contents have been pre-loaded into a secondary container (e.g., irradiated hardware in a shield liner), verify that the secondary container is properly closed (e.g., lid installed and lid bolts installed and tightened) and ready to load into the cask assembly.

6. Carefully lower the contents into the cask cavity as follows:

a.

If loading a pre-loaded shield liner into the cask cavity, align the channel in the edge of the shield liner assembly with the drain tube assembly in the cask cavity and slowly lower the shield liner to the bottom of the cask cavity.

b. If loading irradiated hardware into a shield liner in the cask cavity, carefully lower the piece(s) into the shield liner cavity until filled, but do not exceed the weight limit for irradiated hardware contents. Once full, install the shield liner lid weldment on the shield liner body and use a long-handled tool to tighten the shield liner lid bolts to 35 +/- 5 ft-lbs.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 8.1-6 Note: The bail of each CC must be aligned radially (i.e., one side of the bail in the corner nearest the basket centerline and the other side in the opposite corner of the basket cell).

c.

If loading TPBAR CCs into the cask cavity, lift each loaded CC and lower it into one of the four (4) openings in the TPBAR basket. If loading TPBAR CCs in package configuration 2B-2, install a TPBAR spacer on top of each CC bail. If loading TPBAR CCs in package configuration 2B-1, DO NOT install TPBAR spacers on the tops of the CC bails.

7. With the cask lid suspended from the crossbeams of the lifting yoke, carefully lower the lifting yoke and cask lid into the pool, while spraying the surfaces of the cask lid, lifting yoke, and slings with clean pool-compatible water. Position/align the cask lid directly over the top of the cask cavity and slowly lower it into place using the match marks on the cask lid and cask top flange as guides. Visually confirm that the cask lid is seated.

8. Lower the lifting yoke slightly to engage the lift arms with the cask upper trunnions. After visually verifying that the lifting yoke arms are properly positioned on the cask upper trunnions, lift the loaded cask assembly from the pool, spraying the surfaces of the slings, lifting yoke, and cask assembly with clean pool-compatible water as it breaks the pool surface.

9. Move the loaded cask to the designated work area, detach the rigging from the cask lid, disengage the lifting yoke from the cask upper trunnions, and remove the lifting yoke and lid rigging.

10. Lubricate, install, and tighten each of the twenty-four (24) cask lid bolts, in the sequence shown on the cask lid, to a torque of 600 +/- 30 ft-lbs.

11. Connect a gas supply to the vent port valve and drain line to the drain port valve, with the drain hose discharge directed to the plant drain system or other collection point for radiological wastewater.

12. Open the gas supply valve and pressurize the cask cavity (<30 psig) to help push the water out the drain tube.

13. When the water level reaches the bottom end of the drain tube and the blowdown pressure is released, close the gas supply valve temporarily to allow residual water to collect at the bottom of the cask cavity, then open the gas supply valve to remove as much residual water from the cask cavity as possible. Repeat this operation until no additional residual water can be removed by this method. Remove the drain and gas supply lines.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 8.1-7 Note:

Irradiated hardware contents that are wet-loaded do not require inerting of the cask cavity.

14. Attach a vacuum drying system (VDS) to the vent port and vacuum dry the cask cavity and contents as follows:

a.

Turn on the VDS vacuum pump and evacuate the cask cavity to a pressure below 10 torr (13 mbar) and continue vacuum pumping for at least 15 minutes more.

b. Isolate the vacuum pump and monitor the cask cavity vacuum pressure for a minimum of 10 minutes. If the pressure rise is greater than 5 torr (6.7 mbar), repeat vacuum drying operation.

c.

Backfill the cask cavity with helium for TPBAR contents, or air for irradiated hardware contents to a pressure of 0 to 1 psig (i.e., 14.7 to 15.7 psi absolute).

d. Disconnect the VDS from the cask.

15. Install the vent and drain port covers. Lubricate, install, and tighten each of the three (3) cask port cover bolts to a torque of 100 +/- 10 ft-lbs. If the port covers are already installed, verify that the port cover bolts are tightened to a torque of 100 +/- 10 ft-lbs.

8.1.2.2 Dry Loading This section describes the procedure for dry-loading the cask assembly and installing the packaging closures. Dry loading operations are either performed using engineered radiological controls, such as remotely operated equipment in a shielded enclosure (e.g., a hot cell) or specially designed equipment (e.g., a dry transfer system, or DTS), or using administrative controls, such as temporary shielding and distance to limit occupational exposure to ALARA.

For dry-loading operations, the user is required to verify adequate radiological controls are in place. The following procedure is not specific to any of the radiological control approaches discussed above.

1. If contents have been pre-loaded into a secondary container (e.g., irradiated hardware in a shield liner or vitrified HLW in a sealed canister), verify that the secondary container is properly closed (e.g., lid installed and lid bolts installed and tightened or vitrified HLW canister welded closed) and ready to load into the cask assembly.

2. Carefully lift and lower the contents into the cask cavity as follows:

a.

If loading a loaded shield liner into the cask cavity, align the channel in the edge of the shield liner assembly with the drain tube assembly in the cask cavity and slowly lower the shield liner to the bottom of the cask cavity.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 8.1-8

b. If loading a canister containing vitrified HLW into the cask cavity, lift the vitrified waste canister, position it over the cask cavity, and slowly lower it to the bottom of the cask cavity.

Note: The bail of each CC must be aligned radially (i.e., one side of the bail in the corner nearest the basket centerline and the other side in the opposite corner of the basket cell).

c.

If loading TPBAR CCs into the cask cavity, lift each loaded CC and lower it into one of the four (4) openings in the TPBAR basket. If loading TPBAR CCs in package configuration 2B-2, install a TPBAR spacer on top of each CC bail. If loading TPBAR CCs in package configuration 2B-1, DO NOT install TPBAR spacers on the tops of the CC bails.

3. Using suitable rigging and a crane, lift the cask lid over the cask cavity and align it to the cask using the alignment marks on the lid and cask flange, and slowly lower the cask lid until seated properly on the cask body weldment.

Note: After the cask lid is placed on the cask body weldment, the contents are in a fully shielded configuration and it is safe to resume hands-on closure operations.

4. Lubricate, install, and tighten each of the twenty-four (24) cask lid bolts to a torque of 600 +/-

30 ft-lbs.

5. If shipping TPBAR contents, attach a vacuum drying system (VDS) to the vent port and inert the cask cavity and contents as follows:

a.

Turn on the VDS vacuum pump and evacuate the cask cavity to a pressure below 10 torr (13 mbar) and continue vacuum pumping for at least 15 minutes more.

b. Isolate the vacuum pump and monitor the cask cavity vacuum pressure for a minimum of 10 minutes. If the pressure rise is greater than 5 torr (6.7 mbar),

repeat vacuum drying operation.

c.

Backfill the cask cavity with helium to a pressure of 0 to 1 psig (i.e., 14.7 to 15.7 psi absolute).

Disconnect the VDS from the cask.

Note: If Shipping TPBARs, assure He is present behind the port covers for the leakage rate test in Section 8.1.3 Step 2a.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 8.1-9

6. If the vent and drain port covers were removed, reinstall the vent and drain port covers.

Lubricate, install, and tighten each of the three (3) cask port cover bolts to a torque of 100 +/-

10 ft-lbs. If the vent and/or drain port covers were not removed for loading operations, verify that the port cover bolts are tightened to a torque of 100 +/- 10 ft-lbs.

8.1.3 Final Preparation for Transport

1. Perform a pre-shipment leakage rate test of the cask lid containment seal as follows:

a.

If using a cask lid with a metallic containment seal, perform maintenance leakage rate testing of the cask lid closure in accordance with the requirements of Section 9.2.2.1.

b. If using a cask lid with an elastomeric O-ring containment seal, perform pre-shipment leakage rate testing of the cask lid in accordance with the requirements of Section 9.2.2.2.

Note: Pre-shipment leakage rate testing for the vent and drain port covers is required before every shipment, even if the port covers were not removed during the loading process.

2. Perform a pre-shipment leakage rate test of the vent and drain port covers as follows:

a.

If using port covers with metallic containment seals, perform maintenance leakage rate testing of the port cover closures in accordance with the requirements of Section 9.2.2.1.

b. If using port covers with elastomeric O-ring containment seal, perform pre-shipment leakage rate testing of the port cover closures in accordance with the requirements of Section 9.2.2.2.

3. Install the plugs in the leak test ports of the cask lid and vent and drain port covers.

4. Prior to placing the loaded cask onto the shipping skid, perform a contamination survey in accordance with the requirements of 49 CFR 173.443(a)(1) to confirm that the non-fixed (removable) radioactive surface contamination on the accessible external surfaces of the cask assembly (particularly those surfaces that will be inaccessible once the cask assembly is placed on the shipping skid) does not exceed the limits specified in 49 CFR 173.443, Table 9.

If the non-fixed surface contamination exceeds the limits, then decontaminate the surfaces, as necessary.

5. Using a lifting yoke and crane, engage the lifting yoke arms to the cask assembly upper trunnions, lift the loaded cask assembly and move it to the shipping skid on the transport trailer.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 8.1-10 Note:

The casks lower trunnions are offset from the cask centerline by 1-inch.

Orient the cask with the lower trunnion offset toward the rear end of the shipping skid to make it preferentially rotate toward the front end of the shipping skid when downending.

6. Position the cask assembly lower trunnions in the lower pillow block supports of the shipping skid and carefully downend the cask assembly to the horizontal position on the shipping skid.

7. Verify the cask assembly trunnions are properly positioned in the skipping skid supports, then disengage the lifting yoke from the cask upper trunnions.

8. Install the cask tiedown securement brackets on the shipping skid to secure the cask assembly by its upper and lower trunnions.

9. Install the cask top impact limiter on the top end of the cask assembly as follows:

a.

Using the appropriate lifting slings and crane, lift and position the impact limiter on the end of the cask assembly.

b. With the impact limiter supported by the crane, insert each of eight (8) impact limiter retaining rods through the impact limiter access tubes and screw the end of the retaining rod into the corresponding threaded hole in the end of the cask assembly hand tight.

Alternatively, the eight (8) impact limiter retaining rods may be pre-installed on the end of the cask assembly hand tight prior to positioning the impact limiter on the end of the cask.

c.

Place an impact limiter washer over the end of each of the retaining rods, lubricate and install a hex hut on the end of each of the retaining rods, and tighten each hex nut to a torque of 35 +/- 5 ft-lbs.

d. Lubricate and install a jam nut on the end of each of the retaining rods, and tighten each hex nut to a torque of 75 +/- 5 ft-lbs.

e.

Detach the lifting slings from the impact limiter and disable the impact limiter lift lugs to prevent them from being inadvertently used to lift the package.

10. Prior to placing the impact limiter on the bottom end of the cask assembly, perform a contamination survey in accordance with the requirements of 49 CFR 173.443(a)(1) to confirm that the non-fixed (removable) radioactive surface contamination on the bottom end of the cask assembly does not exceed the limits specified in 49 CFR 173.443, Table 9. If the non-fixed surface contamination exceeds the limits, then decontaminate the surfaces, as necessary.

11. Repeat Step 9 to install the bottom impact limiter on the bottom end of the cask assembly.

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 8.3-1 8.3 Preparation of Empty Package for Transport This section describes the procedure for preparing a previously used and empty package for transport, including the inspections, tests, and special preparations needed to ensure that the packaging is verified to be empty, is properly closed, and that the radiation and contamination levels are within the applicable regulatory limits.

Packaging that is used for shipment of irradiated hardware contents (i.e., configurations 1A, 2A, and 3A) and vitrified HLW contents (i.e., configurations 1B and 3B) is generally clean and can be decontaminated and shipped as Empty Class 7 material packaging in accordance with the requirements of 49 CFR 173.428 [8-2]. However, packaging that is used for shipment of TPBARs (i.e., configuration 2B) will be contaminated with tritium after it is used to transport TPBARs and will likely no longer be able to meet the requirements for Empty Class 7 shipments. Instead, packaging that is used for shipment of TPBARs must be shipped under the provisions of 49 CFR 173.421 [8-2] for excepted packages for limited quantities of Class 7 (radioactive) materials.

In general, empty packaging previously used for transportation of TPBARs will be received at the TPBAR loading facility, which is equipped and prepared to deal with potential discharges of tritium from an empty package. However, maintenance operations performed on empty packaging, including reconfiguration of packaging configuration 2B-1 or 2B-2 (i.e., TPBAR contents) to packaging configuration 2A (i.e., irradiated hardware contents), previously used for transporting TPBARs should address the potential for release of tritium from the cask cavity that has off-gassed during the empty cask shipment to the environment and/or breathing air. The precautions that should be taken when performing maintenance operations on a packaging that has previously been used to transport TPBARs are addressed in Section 9.2.

The general procedure for preparing each empty package for transport is as follows:

1. With the cask lid removed, visually inspect the cask cavity to confirm that has been emptied of contents as far as practical. The cask cavity may contain internal support structures (e.g.,

TPBAR basket assembly) that will be used for the subsequent shipment.

2. If shipping as an Empty Class 7 material packaging, perform a contamination survey of the accessible interior surfaces (including any empty payload internals) of the packaging to be shipped in accordance with the requirements of 49 CFR 173.443(a)(1) to verify that the interior contamination limits of 49 CFR 173.428(d) are satisfied, otherwise proceed to Step 4.

If the non-fixed surface contamination exceeds the limits for an Empty Class 7 package shipment, decontaminate the interior surfaces, as necessary, until the internal contamination limits are met. If the internal contamination limits for an Empty Class 7 package shipment

Volunteer Package SAR March 2025 Docket No. 71-9403 Revision 25B NAC International 9.2-1 9.2 Maintenance Program The maintenance program includes periodic inspections, tests, and maintenance activities designed to ensure continued performance of the packaging. This section describes the periodic testing, inspection, and replacement schedules, as well as the criteria for replacement and repair of components and subsystems on an as-needed basis. The maintenance requirements are summarized in Table 9.2-1.

9.2.1 Structural and Pressure Tests The packaging does not require any routine structural or pressure tests. This includes the replacement of Lid Bolts, Port Cover Bolts and associated threaded inserts which are exempted from the pressure test per NB-6111 [9-3]. The replacement requirements for threaded fasteners or inserts are presented in Section 9.2.3.

9.2.2 Leakage Rate Tests The periodic, maintenance, and pre-shipment leakage rate testing requirements are discussed in the following sections and summarized in Table 9.2-1.

9.2.2.1 Periodic and Maintenance Leakage Rate Testing Periodic leakage rate testing is performed in accordance with Section 7.5 of ANSI N14.5-2014

[9-4] to confirm that the containment capabilities of the containment boundary have not deteriorated over an extended period of use. A periodic leakage rate test is required to be performed on every containment seal of the packaging within the 12-month period prior to every shipment, but need not be performed for packages that are out-of-service (e.g., placed into temporary storage). As discussed in Section 9.2.3.1, all packaging elastomeric O-Rings and NAC PROPRIETARY INFORMATION REMOVED