ML25051A257
| ML25051A257 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 04/01/2025 |
| From: | Kimberly Green Plant Licensing Branch II |
| To: | Erb D Tennessee Valley Authority |
| Green K | |
| References | |
| EPID L-2024-LLA-0041 | |
| Download: ML25051A257 (1) | |
Text
April 1, 2025 Mr. Delson C. Erb Vice President, OPS Support Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street, LP 4A-C Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
SUBJECT:
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. 174 AND 79 FOR REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.11 REGARDING TWO INOPERABLE TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR TEMPERATURE CONTROL SYSTEM (EPID L-2024-LLA-0041)
Dear Mr. Erb:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) has issued enclosed Amendment No. 174 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 and Amendment No. 79 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (Watts Bar), Units 1 and 2, respectively.
These amendments are in response to your application dated April 4, 2024, as supplemented by letter dated January 16, 2025.
The amendments revise Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specification 3.7.11, Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS), by modifying the conditions and required actions for two inoperable CREATCS trains.
A copy of our related safety evaluation is also enclosed. A notice of issuance will be included in the Commissions monthly Federal Register notice.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Kimberly J. Green, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391
Enclosures:
- 1. Amendment No. 174 to NPF-90
- 2. Amendment No. 79 to NPF-96
- 3. Safety Evaluation cc: Listserv
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-390 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 174 License No. NPF-90
- 1.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, the licensee) dated April 4, 2024, as supplemented by letter dated January 16, 2025, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2)
Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 174 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, and shall be implemented within 60 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION David Wrona, Chief Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Operating License and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: April 1, 2025 DAVID WRONA Digitally signed by DAVID WRONA Date: 2025.04.01 09:46:47 -04'00'
ATTACHMENT TO AMENDMENT NO. 174 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-90 DOCKET NO. 50-390 Replace page 3 of Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 with the attached revised page 3. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains a marginal line indicating the area of change.
Replace the following page of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached page.
The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the area of change.
Remove Pages Insert Pages 3.7-26 3.7-26
Facility License No. NPF-90 Amendment No. 174 (4)
TVA, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required, any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis, instrument calibration, or other activity associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (5)
TVA, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.
C.
This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect, and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below.
(1)
Maximum Power Level TVA is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3459 megawatts thermal.
(2)
Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 174 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
(3)
Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) (Section 18.2 of SER Supplements 5 and 15)
Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, TVA shall accomplish the necessary activities, provide acceptable responses, and implement all proposed corrective actions related to having the Watts Bar Unit 1 SPDS operational.
(4)
Vehicle Bomb Control Program (Section 13.6.9 of SSER 20)
During the period of the exemption granted in paragraph 2.D.(3) of this license, in implementing the power ascension phase of the approved initial test program, TVA shall not exceed 50% power until the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7) and (8) are fully implemented. TVA shall submit a letter under oath or affirmation when the requirements of 73.55(c)(7) and (8) have been fully implemented.
CREATCS 3.7.11 Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.7-26 Amendment 35, 132, 145, 162, 174 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.
Two CREATCS trains inoperable.
D.1 Initiate action to implement mitigating actions.
AND D.2 Verify control room temperature 90°F.
AND D.3 Restore one CREATCS train to OPERABLE status.
Immediately Immediately and once per hour thereafter 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> E.
Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition D not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.
E.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND E.2 Be in MODE 5 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 36 hours F.
Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition D not met in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
F.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.11.1 Verify each CREATCS train has the capability to remove the assumed heat load.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-391 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 79 License No. NPF-96
- 1.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, the licensee) dated April 4, 2024, as supplemented by letter dated January 16, 2025, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2)
Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 79 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, and shall be implemented within 60 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION David Wrona, Chief Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Operating License and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: April 1, 2025 DAVID WRONA Digitally signed by DAVID WRONA Date: 2025.04.01 09:47:23 -04'00'
ATTACHMENT TO AMENDMENT NO. 79 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-96 DOCKET NO. 50-391 Replace page 3 of Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 with the attached revised page 3. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains a marginal line indicating the area of change.
Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.
Remove Pages Insert Pages 3.7-24 3.7-24 3.7-25 3.7-25 3.7-25a Unit 2 Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 Amendment No. 79 C.
The license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act, and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect, and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below.
(1)
Maximum Power Level TVA is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3459 megawatts thermal.
(2)
Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 79 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
(3)
TVA shall implement permanent modifications to prevent overtopping of the embankments of the Fort Loudon Dam due to the Probable Maximum Flood by June 30, 2018.
(4)
FULL SPECTRUM LOCA Methodology shall be implemented when the WBN Unit 2 steam generators are replaced with steam generators equivalent to the existing steam generators at WBN Unit 1.
(5)
By December 31, 2019, the licensee shall report to the NRC that the actions to resolve the issues identified in Bulletin 2012-01, Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System, have been implemented.
(6)
The licensee shall maintain in effect the provisions of the physical security plan, security personnel training and qualification plan, and safeguards contingency plan, and all amendments made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 50.54(p).
(7)
TVA shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p).
The TVA approved CSP was discussed in NUREG-0847, Supplement 28, as amended by changes approved in License Amendment No. 7.
(8)
TVA shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Fire Protection Report for the facility, as described in NUREG-0847, Supplement 29, subject to the following provision:
CREATCS 3.7.11 Watts Bar-Unit 2 3.7-24 Amendment 51, 69, 79 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.11 Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS)
LCO 3.7.11 Two CREATCS trains shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CREATCS train inoperable.
A.1 Restore CREATCS train to OPERABLE status.
30 days
- B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.
B.1 Be in MODE 3.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> AND B.2 Be in MODE 5.
36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
C.1 Place OPERABLE CREATCS train in operation.
Immediately OR C.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
Immediately (continued)
An allowance is permitted for one CREATCS train to be inoperable for up to 60 days. This TS provision is only authorized for one entry per train during modification activities planned for the upgrade of the main control room chillers beginning no earlier than July 1, 2023, and ending no later than December 31, 2024, provided compensatory measures are implemented as described in TVA letter CNL-20-012, dated May 19, 2020.
CREATCS 3.7.11 Watts Bar-Unit 2 3.7-25 Amendment 36, 51, 69, 79 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Two CREATCS trains inoperable.
D.1 Initiate action to implement mitigating actions.
Immediately AND D.2 Verify control room temperature 90°F.
Immediately and once per hour thereafter AND D.3 Restore one CREATCS train to OPERABLE status 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> E. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition D not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.
E.1 Be in MODE 3.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> AND E.2 Be in MODE 5.
36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> F. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition D not met in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
F.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies Immediately
CREATCS 3.7.11 Watts Bar-Unit 2 3.7-25a Amendment 36, 51, 69, 79 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.11.1 Verify each CREATCS train has the capability to remove the assumed heat load.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 174 AND 79 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-90 AND NPF-96 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-390 AND 50-391
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By application dated April 4, 2024 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML24095A159), as supplemented by letter dated January 16, 2025 (ML25016A068), the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, the licensee), submitted a license amendment request (LAR) for changes to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 and Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (Watts Bar or WBN), Units 1 and 2, respectively. The requested changes would revise each units Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.11, Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS), to modify the TS Actions for two inoperable control room emergency air temperature control system (CREATCS) trains. The proposed change would allow up to 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> to restore one CREATCS train to operable status provided mitigating actions are taken to ensure the control room temperature does not exceed 90 degrees Fahrenheit (°F). The proposed changes also change TS actions for when Condition D or the associated completion time (CT) to restore one train to operable status cannot be met in Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4 (proposed Condition E), and in Modes 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies (proposed Condition F). The proposed changes would also delete a one-time footnote associated with the CT for existing Required Action E.1.
The supplement dated January 16, 2025, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staffs original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register on August 6, 2024 (89 FR 63993).
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
2.1
System Description
The CREATCS is a safety-related system that provides temperature control for the Main Control Room (MCR) during power operations and following isolation of the MCR.
The CREATCS consists of two independent and redundant trains that provide cooling of recirculated MCR air. Each train consists of an air-handling unit (AHU), water chiller, chilled water pump, and associated piping, ductwork, instrumentation, and controls to provide for MCR temperature control. Each CREATCS train is a subsystem that provides air temperature control for the MCR. The purpose of the CREATCS is to maintain the control room temperature for 30 days of continuous occupancy.
The licensee indicated in an LAR dated February 24, 2010 (ML100570414), that a one-time change to TS 3.7.11 was needed so that it could replace the CREATCS chillers. The licensee stated that [d]ue to equipment reliability issues, obsolescence of spare parts, and future refrigerant availability, TVA has initiated a project to replace the Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS) chillers and the Shutdown Board Room (SDBR) chillers. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) staff issued Amendment No. 85 to Watts Bar, Unit 1, for a one-time change to the CT for TS 3.7.11, Required Action A.1 (ML110190280). However, due to unforeseen events, the MCR chillers were not replaced at that time.
TVA again planned to make modifications to the MCR chillers to improve their efficiency and submitted an LAR dated May 19, 2020 (ML20140A342), as supplemented by letter dated December 16, 2020 (ML20351A424). In the LAR, TVA estimated that it would take 55.7 days to complete the replacement for Train A and 38.4 days to replace Train B. TVA also requested a 4-day (i.e., 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />) delayed entry into TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3 during the modification of an affected train of CREATCS (current Required Action E.1). TVA explained that if the operable train should be declared inoperable, two trains of CREATCS would be inoperable and require immediate entry into LCO 3.0.3 as well as a shutdown of both units because the units share a common MCR.
By letter dated May 5, 2021 (ML21078A484), the NRC staff issued Amendment Nos. 145 and 51 to the Facility Operating Licenses for Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2, respectively, to add a one-time footnote to the CT for Required Action A.1 to allow each CREATCS train to be inoperable for up to 60 days while replacing each respective trains chiller. The amendments also added a one-time footnote to the CT for Required Action E.1 to allow up to a 4-day delayed entry into TS LCO 3.0.3 if both trains of CREATCS become inoperable provided the MCR is monitored, and the temperature does not exceed 90 °F. This delay only applied if both trains of CREATCS became inoperable during Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4. These amendments were limited to the time that the CREATCS modifications would be performedbetween May 1, 2022, and May 1, 2023.
By letter dated June 7, 2023 (ML23122A232), the NRC staff issued Amendment Nos. 162 and 69 to the Facility Operating Licenses for Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2, respectively, to revise the dates in the footnotes for Required Actions A.1 and E.1 to be between July 1, 2023, and December 31, 2024.
2.2 Requested Changes As described in section 3.3 of the enclosure to the LAR, the licensee requested changes to each units TS 3.7.11. The requested changes would replace existing Conditions D and E with new Conditions D, E, and F. The requested changes would allow two trains of CREATCS to be inoperable for up to 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> provided that initiation of action to implement mitigating actions is taken immediately and the control room temperature is verified to be at or below 90 °F immediately and once per hour thereafter (new Condition D). Should the Required Action and associated CT of Condition D not be met in Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4, the licensee must be in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> (new Condition E). If the Required Action and associated CT of Condition D is not met in Modes 5 or 6, or during the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, the licensee must immediately suspend movement of the irradiated fuel assemblies (new Condition F). The licensee also proposed the deletion of the one-time footnote associated with the CT for existing Required Action E.1.
2.3 Regulations and Guidance Under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.90, Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit, whenever a holder of a license wishes to amend the license, including TSs in the license, an application for amendment must be filed, fully describing the changes desired. Under 10 CFR 50.92(a), determinations on whether to grant an applied-for license amendment are to be guided by the considerations that govern the issuance of initial licenses to the extent applicable and appropriate. Both the common standards for licenses in 10 CFR 50.40(a), and those specifically for issuance of operating licenses in 10 CFR 50.57(a)(3), provide that there must be reasonable assurance that the activities at issue will not endanger the health and safety of the public, and that the applicant will comply with the Commissions regulations.
The Commissions regulatory requirements related to the content of TSs are set forth in 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, which require, in pertinent part, that the TSs include:
(1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) LCOs; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls.
Section 50.36(a)(1) states, that Each applicant for a license authorizing operation of a...
utilization facility shall include in his application proposed technical specifications with the requirements of this section. A summary statement of the bases or reasons for such specifications... shall also be included in the application, but shall not become part of the technical specifications.
As stated in 10 CFR 50.36(b), each license authorizing operation of a production or utilization facility will include technical specifications. The TSs will be derived from the analyses and evaluation included in the safety analysis report, and amendments thereto.
Under 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2), the technical specifications will include LCOs, which are the lowest functional capability or performance level of equipment required for safe operation of the facility.
When LCOs are not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the TSs until the LCOs can be met.
Under 50.34(a)(3), Appendix A, General Design Criteria [GDC] for Nuclear Power Plants, to 10 CFR Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, establishes the minimum requirements for the principal design criteria for water-cooled nuclear power plants similar in design and location to plants for which construction permits have been issued by the Commission. The principal design criteria establish the necessary design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements for structures, systems, and components important to safety. The NRC staff considered the following GDC as part of its review:
GDC 19, Control room, states, in part:
A control room shall be provided from which actions can be taken to operate the nuclear power unit safely under normal conditions and to maintain it in a safe condition under accident conditions, including loss-of-coolant accidents...
Equipment at appropriate locations outside the control room shall be provided (1) with a design capability for prompt hot shutdown of the reactor, including necessary instrumentation and controls to maintain the unit in a safe condition during hot shutdown, and (2) with a potential capability for subsequent cold shutdown of the reactor through the use of suitable procedures.
According to section 3.1.1, Introduction, of the Watts Bar Dual-Unit Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), the plant was designed to meet the intent of the Proposed General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Construction Permits, published in July 1967. The Watts Bar construction permits were issued in January 1973. The Watts Bar UFSAR describes the criteria it addresses. As described in the Watts Bar UFSAR, TVA addresses how it meets the current version of GDC 19. As discussed in UFSAR section 3.1.2, WBNP [Watts Bar Nuclear Plant] Conformance with GDCs (ML23346A225), the MCR is provided with unit control panels for each of the two units, and the unit control panels contain those instruments and controls necessary for operation of the unit, functions such as the reactor and its auxiliary system, turbine generator, and the steam and power conversion systems. The MCR is designed and equipped to minimize the effects of possible events such as fire, high radiation levels, and excessive temperature which might preclude occupancy. The MCR is continuously occupied by qualified operating personnel under all operating and accident conditions except in the case of events such as fire or smoke which could necessitate its evacuation. In the unlikely event that control room occupancy becomes impossible, provisions have been made to bring the reactor units to, and maintain them in, a hot shutdown condition, from a location external to the main control room. By use of appropriate procedures and available equipment, the unit can also be brought to cold shutdown conditions.
The NRC staffs guidance for the review of TSs is in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR [Light-Water Reactor]
Edition (SRP), Chapter 16.0, Technical Specifications, Revision 3, dated March 2010 (ML100351425). As described therein, as part of the regulatory standardization effort, the NRC staff has prepared Standard Technical Specifications (STS) for each of the LWR nuclear designs. The Watts Bar units are Westinghouse four-loop design reactors and the TSs were approved based on the STS in NUREG-1431, Revision 0. Accordingly, the NRC staffs review includes consideration of whether the proposed changes are consistent with NUREG-14311, as modified by NRC approved-travelers.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
The NRC staff evaluated the licensees application to determine whether the proposed changes are consistent with the regulations, guidance, and plant-specific design and licensing basis information discussed in section 2.3 of this safety evaluation. The NRC staff also took into consideration the differences between the STS and the Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2, TSs, such as 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants, NUREG-1431, Volume 1, Specifications, and Volume 2, Bases, Revision 5, September 2021 (ML21259A155 and ML21259A159, respectively).
a single control room for a single unit in STS and a common control room for a dual-unit site such as Watts Bar.
The NRC staff reviewed the acceptability of the proposed changes to the TSs by evaluating whether, among other things, the changes, including associated mitigating actions, provide reasonable assurance of public health and safety. The NRC staff also verified that the proposed changes to the TSs assure that the temperature limits of MCR equipment are maintained, that control room habitability is maintained, and that the LCO will continue to be met.
3.1
NRC Staff Evaluation
3.1.1 Evaluation of Proposed New Condition D Proposed new Condition D contains Required Actions and CTs when two CREATCS trains are inoperable. New Required Action D.1 would require initiation of action to implement mitigating actions immediately. New Required Action D.2 would require verification that control room temperature is 90 °F immediately and once per hour thereafter. New Required Action D.3 would require restoring one CREATCS train to operable status within 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />.
3.1.1.1 Required Action D.1 and Completion Time The licensee proposed Required Action D.1 and associated CT to immediately initiate action to implement mitigating actions. The proposed mitigating actions listed in the TS Bases include:
A non-safety related chiller system with a diesel generator to provide power to the non-safety related system will be operated.
TVA will employ a graded approach to defense-in-depth and protected equipment strategies based on the operating status of the affected unit. The risk of the activity will be assessed and managed, including the use of physical barriers as needed.
TVA procedures will preclude work on or near protected equipment and limit access to the area to emergency situations and non-intrusive monitoring of running equipment per operator rounds.
Other mitigating actions such as opening cabinet doors, use of fans to circulate air within the MCR habitability zone, use of ice vests, may be employed.
The TS Bases are a licensee-controlled document, and changes to the Bases are controlled by Watts Bar TS section 5.6, Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program and may require NRC approval pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.
The NRC staff finds that immediately implementing mitigating actions is reasonable to maintain the control room temperature at or below the 90 °F control requirement proposed in Required Action D.2 during the proposed 96-hour period for Required Action D.3, which are evaluated in the sections below. Therefore, the staff finds that proposed Required Action D.1 and associated Completion Time are acceptable. Although specific mitigating measures are only discussed in the TS Bases, the NRC staff is not basing its finding on the specific measures Watts Bar will implement. Rather, the NRC staff is basing its finding on the fact that Watts Bar will implement mitigating measures such that the temperature and time criterion are met. This is acceptable because if the temperature or time criterion are not met, the TSs include relevant actions for the licensee to take. Therefore, simply knowing that these criteria will be met is sufficient to provide the NRC staff with the requisite assurance. In particular, this SE makes no conclusions regarding the use and adequacy of the non-safety related chiller system as a mitigating action.
3.1.1.2 Required Action D.2 and Completion Time The licensee proposed Required Action D.2 and CT to perform an immediate and hourly verification that control room temperature is 90 °F.
Watts Bar UFSAR section 9.4.1.3 states, All MCR equipment operates normally at an ambient temperature of 75°F. Abnormal excursions of short duration (12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or less) to 104°F maximum and 60°F minimum may occur without adverse effects on the equipment (ML23346A225). The NRC staff notes that this 75 °F is the ambient temperature of the MCR; it is not an equipment qualification limit. The upper end for the normal temperature range for MCR equipment is 80 °F.
In the LAR, the licensee stated that the temperature limit of 90 °F provides adequate margin between the normal MCR operating temperature of 75 °F and the equipment operability limit of 104 °F to ensure that the equipment operability limit is not exceeded. The NRC staff requested a justification for the proposed temperature limit and an explanation for how the proposed temperature limit ensures equipment operability (ML24327A057).
In its January 16, 2025, response (ML25016A068), the licensee provided a discussion on the method used to monitor and document issues resulting in temperature excursions beyond the MCR normal range (i.e., above 80 °F) and abnormal (i.e., 104 °F) temperature limits and duration, as defined in Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2, Technical Requirements Manual (TRM)
Technical Requirement 3.7.5, Area Temperature Monitoring. The licensee stated that in addition to the proposed 90 °F temperature limit (Required Action D.2), TRM 3.7.5, Required Action A.1 requires that whenever the temperature in one or more areas has exceeded the normal temperature limits (including the MCR) for greater than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, it has to document the exceedance in accordance with the Corrective Action Program (CAP) and include an analysis to demonstrate the operability of the affected equipment. The report must contain the cumulative time and the amount by which the temperature has exceeded the limits. When the temperature has exceeded the abnormal limit (i.e., 104 °F), TRM 3.7.5 Action B.1.1 requires that action be taken to either restore the temperature below the normal limit within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, and Action B.1.2 requires that if the temperature is not restored, then the affected equipment is declared inoperable within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, and completion of action TRM 3.7.5 Action B.2 to document the condition in the TVA CAP and an analysis of operability be performed for the affected equipment based on time and magnitude of the exceedance.
Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed Required Action D.2 and CT will ensure that the MCR temperature is maintained within the 90 °F limit ensuring equipment operability and habitability for MCR personnel. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the Required Action D.2 and CT are acceptable.
3.1.1.3 Required Action D.3 and Completion Time The licensee proposed Required Action D.3 and CT to restore one CREATCS train to OPERABLE status within 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />. In the May 19, 2020, LAR, the licensee had proposed the 96-hour delayed entry into LCO 3.0.3 (during Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, but not during Modes 5 and 6, or during fuel movement) to allow post-maintenance testing following the replacement of the MCR chillers. In the 2020 LAR, the licensee stated that 4 days (i.e., 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />) is a reasonable timeframe to perform maintenance to restore an inoperable CREATCS train to an operable status based on a review of their Maintenance Rule (i.e., 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants) unplanned unavailability data for the CREATCS chillers from March 2015 to March 2020. The licensee concluded that 4 days is expected to be sufficient time to restore at least one CREATCS train to operable status while minimizing the length of time in which the CREATCS is inoperable and potentially avoiding unnecessary impact to plant operations.
The licensee reiterated in the current LAR that the proposed 96-hour CT to restore one train of CREATCS to operable status is reasonable based on past operating experience for restoring a CREATCS train to service. The licensee provided more recent examples of outage times in the current LAR, including:
On January 5, 2022, Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2, entered the 30-day completion time for TS 3.7.11, Condition A, due to a component outage for the B MCR chiller. The B MCR chiller was restored to operable status on January 9, 2022, at 1159 for a total outage time of 103 hours0.00119 days <br />0.0286 hours <br />1.703042e-4 weeks <br />3.91915e-5 months <br />.
On February 5, 2023, Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2, entered TS 3.7.11, Condition A due to a failure of the A MCR chiller. The A MCR chiller was restored to operable status on February 7, 2023, at 1000 for a total outage time of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
On February 4, 2024, Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2, entered TS 3.7.11, Condition A due to a failure of the A MCR chiller. The A MCR chiller was restored to operable status on February 9, 2024, for a total outage time of approximately 122 hours0.00141 days <br />0.0339 hours <br />2.017196e-4 weeks <br />4.6421e-5 months <br />.
For the current LAR, in response to request for additional information (RAI) SCPB-1, the licensee stated, Monitoring, trending, and reporting data was used as a basis to qualify the requested 96-hour completion time for the WBN CREATCS function (ML25016A068). The licensee calculated unavailable hours averaged for 30 events with durations greater than a single shift, considering that the single shift events mostly consisted of reset and restarts with a short period of monitoring and determined 90.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> was average from discovery of event to declaration of operability. The licensee also referenced two recent entries into LCO 3.0.3 due to two inoperable trains of CREATCS.
The regulation in 10 CFR 50.36 does not specify what actions are required or how quickly they must be completed; however, the TSs generally allow continued operation for a limited time in a condition where the single failure criterion is not met, or defense-in-depth is reduced, and generally requires an orderly shutdown or exiting the mode of applicability when a loss of safety function exists.
In LAR section 5.2, the licensee referenced two precedents where the NRC has approved increases in CTs for Required Actions associated with dual-train inoperability of various systems. The NRC staff considered these precedents. Although these two licensing actions only allowed for a 24-hour competition time, the NRC staff determined that they are still relevant because they allowed for a delayed entry into LCO 3.0.3 before shutting the reactor down.
Additionally, the licensee compared the proposed 96-hour CT to the completion times approved in the STS for other reactor designs (i.e., boiling-water reactors). Although the referenced STS are not directly applicable to Watts Bar, the NRC staff concluded the justification for approval in the STS also applies to the Watts Bar proposed change because the control room cooling function is largely independent of the reactor designs.2 The NRC staffs evaluations of the STS for other designs considered that the proposed CTs were finite, typically within 7-days duration.
For this LAR, the licensee has proposed to initiate mitigating actions immediately when two trains of CREATCS are inoperable, and the proposed CT of Required Action D.3 is consistent with CTs for Required Actions previously approved by the NRC under similar conditions.
The NRC determined that the 96-hour CT of the proposed new Required Action D.3 is reasonable based on the determination that the mitigating actions of Required Action D.1 and the 90 °F temperature limit of required action D.2 will ensure that equipment operability and MCR habitability while limiting the probability that MCR temperatures would adversely affect the equipment or occupants ability to control the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a design basis accident during the proposed 96-hour CT. The proposed 96-hour CT will also provide a reasonable time to restore at least one CREATCS train to operable. The NRC staff finds that the proposed 96-hour CT is consistent with precedent (e.g.,
STS for BWR/6) and the licensees experience that has shown a 96-hour CT provides a reasonable time to restore operability of at least one CREATCS train.
Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed Required Action D.3 and CT are acceptable.
3.1.2 Evaluation of Proposed New Condition E Proposed new Condition E contains the timeframes for plant shutdown (i.e., Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />) if proposed Condition D is not met in Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4.
These proposed completion times are more restrictive than the current shutdown requirements in TS LCO 3.0.3 when an LCO is not met (i.e., Mode 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />).
The NRC staff considered whether the licensee would be able to safely complete the proposed Required Actions within the proposed Completion Times for Condition E if the temperature exceeds 90 °F in proposed Required Action D.2.
In response to RAI SCPB-RAI-1 (ML20351A424), the licensee discussed and justified the measures, mitigating actions, and procedures that would be implemented to ensure a safe shutdown of both Watts Bar units following the loss of both trains of CREATCS when the MCR temperature exceeds 90 °F.3 This included a provision for the unlikely scenario in which operators determine that the units cannot be effectively controlled from the MCR. The licensee stated that in such cases, the units can be safely maintained and shut down, if necessary, from the Auxiliary Control Room (ACR) in accordance with the plants abnormal operating instructions. The licensee concluded that, with the actions and design features in place, both 2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric BWR/4 Plants, NUREG-1433, Volume 1, Specifications, and Volume 2, Bases, Revision 5.0, September 2021 (ML21272A357 and ML21272A358, respectively); U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric BWR/6 Plants, NUREG-1434, Volume 1, Specifications, and Volume 2, Bases, Revision 5.0, September 2021 (ML21271A582 and ML21271A596, respectively); and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Standard Technical Specifications, Combustion Engineering Plants, NUREG-1432, Volume 1, Specifications, and Volume 2, Bases, Revision 5.0, September 2021 (ML21258A421 and ML21258A424, respectively) 3 Although this response mentioned the mitigating measures, the NRC staff did not rely on the specific mitigating measures, which are only described in the Bases, in its review of the proposed changes. The NRC staff also is not approving the TS Bases changes, which describe the specific mitigating measures.
units can safely be brought to Mode 5 if all cooling is lost in the MCR and the temperature exceeds 90 °F while in TS 3.7.11.
The NRC staff finds that, based on its engineering judgment, the actions and measures that the licensee can take to shut down the reactors and proceed to Modes 3 and 5 are reasonable should the MCR temperature exceed the proposed 90 °F limit in Required Action D.2. As indicated in section 3.1.1.2 above, if 104 °F is exceeded and the affected equipment is ultimately declared inoperable, the condition is documented in the TVA CAP and an analysis of operability is performed.
Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed Required Action and Completion Time for proposed Condition E are acceptable.
3.1.3 Evaluation of Proposed New Condition F Proposed new Condition F states that if Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition D not met in Mode 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, then the licensee is immediately required to Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. This condition assures that if at least one CREATCS train is not restored following the proposed period of dual-train inoperability controlled by Condition D.3 (i.e., 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />) then the risk of a fuel handling accident (FHA) would be mitigated by an orderly and immediate cessation of movement of irradiated fuel. Additionally, Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2 are Westinghouse plants and the proposed Condition F Required Action and associated CT for the Watts Bar TS are consistent with the equivalent STS 3.7.11 condition (i.e., Condition D) for Westinghouse plants as provided in NUREG-1431. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the proposed Required Action and Completion Time for proposed Condition F are acceptable.
3.1.4 Evaluation of the Deletion of Expired Temporary Footnote The licensee proposed to delete the temporary footnote associated with current Required Action E. The current footnote applies only between July 1, 2023, and December 24, 2024, and is therefore, expired. The licensee stated that a separate LAR will be required to revise the completion dates for the current footnote to Required Action A once a revised schedule for completion of the MCR chiller replacement project is established.
The NRC staff has determined that the deletion of this expired footnote is administrative in nature and, therefore, is acceptable.
3.1.5 Evaluation of TS Bases Change to Action A.1 In the LAR, the licensee initially proposed a change to TS Bases 3.7.11, Action A.1 (proposed wording addition in italics), that would allow the use of the non-safety related chiller while the operable safety-related train would be placed in standby; however, there was no corresponding proposed change for TS 3.7.11, Condition A. The Bases would have stated, in part:
The 30 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event requiring control room isolation, the consideration that the remaining train can provide the required protection, and that alternate safety or nonsafety related cooling means are available, including the option to provide normal cooling with a non-safety related chiller and the remaining train in standby.
Based on review of the licensees proposed change to TS Bases 3.7.11, Action A.1, the NRC staff requested that the licensee address several aspects regarding assurance that the non-safety related chiller would be operationally ready to perform an engineered safety feature (ESF) function. The NRC staff also questioned if the proposed change to the TS Bases had been made under the TS Bases Control Program.
In its response dated January 16, 2025, the licensee stated that it has removed the proposed change from the TS Bases. Because the licensee has removed the proposed statement from the TS Bases, the NRC staffs concern regarding the use of non-safety related chiller in place of the operable safety-related train of CREATCS has been resolved.
3.2 Evaluation of Control Room Habitability and GDC 19 The Main Control Room Habitability System is the set of equipment, components, supplies, and other features, including the building enclosure, provided to ensure that a suitable environment is maintained for personnel and equipment in the MCRHS area for safe, long-term occupancy during normal and emergency operations of the plant. It includes all rooms on plan Elevation 755 of the Control Building including the MCR, all rooms to which MCR personnel may require access during emergency operations, and other rooms which may require less frequent access such as the kitchen, toilet facilities, and technical support center.
As noted in section 2.1 above, the CREATCS functions to provide temperature control for the MCR during power operations and following isolation of the MCR. Isolation of the MCR is a safety function that is assumed in several of the licensees design basis accident analyses, as described in chapter 15 of the UFSAR (ML23346A225). For example, in UFSAR Table 15.5-14 where it lists key control room parameters that are used in several design basis accident analyses, the licensee states that isolation of the control room from the external environment occurs within 74 seconds of accident initiation. Thus, to ensure the licensees analytical assumptions, and the resultant dose consequences for the control room operators remain valid, the control room must be in a condition where it can be isolated in applicable Modes of operation and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. Unmitigated inoperability of both trains of CREATCS would preclude temperature control during MCR isolation, but would not directly affect the ability to isolate the control room.
As described in sections 3.1.1.2 and 3.1.2 above, inadequate MCR temperature control could result in MCR equipment failures and under certain environmental conditions could require abandoning the MCR for the ACR in accordance with abnormal operating instructions. In the LAR the licensee states that unavailability of the CREATCS will not directly impact plant safety, provided actions are in place to ensure operator habitability and equipment operational requirements are not exceeded. To preclude these potential adverse conditions, the Required Actions of Condition D include mitigating actions for maintaining the MCR temperature and hourly control room temperature verifications.
In the NRC staff evaluation sections above, the NRC staff found that the proposed Required Actions and CTs for proposed Condition D are acceptable. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that because the proposed changes to TS 3.7.11 will not directly impact the ability to isolate the MCR in the unlikely event that isolation is required with inoperable redundant trains, and the proposed mitigating actions will ensure that the MCR temperature is maintained such that the plant may be operated safely from the MCR, GDC 19 will continue to be met.
3.3 Evaluation of Human Factors The following subsections discuss the NRC staffs evaluation of the changes the licensee has proposed for personnel affected by the proposed amendments.
3.3.1 Operator Actions for TS 3.7.11 Condition D.1 As identified in the proposed TS Bases (Attachment 3 to the Enclosure to the LAR), operators will use mitigating actions such as employing a non-safety related chiller with a dedicated diesel generator, opening cabinet doors, and using fans to circulate air, and use of ice vests by operators, to maintain control room area temperature below 90 °F. Additionally, mitigating actions include TVA procedures that will preclude work on or near protected equipment and limit access to the area to emergency situations and non-intrusive monitoring of running equipment per operator rounds.
3.3.2 Operator Actions for TS 3.7.11 Condition D.2 In the May 5, 2021, amendments, the NRC staff approved the operator action to verify the control room temperature less than or equal to 90 °F, every hour, for up to 4 days in lieu of the immediate entry into LCO 3.0.3. For the current LAR, the proposed hourly temperature checks remain the same as for the May 2021 amendments, i.e., control room temperature is measured and displayed in the control room, allowing operators to be aware of the temperature trending relative to the 90 °F limit.
3.3.3 Operator Actions for TS 3.7.11 Condition D.3 The licensee stated the proposed 96-hour CT is considered adequate given the mitigating actions and low probability of an accident that would require the CREATCS, provides reasonable time to diagnose, repair, and test most problems with the CREATCS, while minimizing the period of time that control room occupants might have to respond to an event while utilizing the mitigating actions. In addition to the mitigating actions, the operators will request priority maintenance to restore the inoperable CREATCS train.
Furthermore, in the event it becomes necessary to abandon the MCR entirely, the operators can control the reactors from the ACR in accordance with the plant abnormal operating instructions.
The ACR is a physically independent location outside of the CB and meets the separation criteria of GDC 19 in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
3.3.4 Evaluation of Human Factors The NRC staff reviewed the operator actions described in the sections above and the human performance aspects associated with the proposed amendments and finds them to be acceptable because the operators will take actions to mitigate heat and monitor the temperature in the MCR. The NRC staff is neither relying on the TS Bases in its review of the proposed changes to the relevant TS, nor approving TS Bases changes. The NRC staff is mentioning the items in section 3.3.1 for information purposes only. Changes to the relevant procedures would be controlled by 10 CFR 50.59.
The NRC staff reviewed TVAs request to revise the Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2, TS actions for two inoperable CREATCS trains and finds it to be acceptable because the licensee has appropriately considered the human performance aspects to ensure that control room habitability can be maintained in accordance with GDC 19. Additionally, the licensee can remotely shut down the reactors when control room habitability cannot be maintained.
3.4 Technical Conclusion Based on its evaluation above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed addition of Condition D is acceptable because the Required Actions D.1, D.2, and D.3, and their respective CTs will ensure that the MCR temperature remains adequately below a limit that is specified for equipment operability (i.e., 104 °F), and that if the temperature goes above 90 °F or one train of CREATCS cannot be restored to OPERABLE within 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />, actions will be taken to shut down the reactors (Condition E) or to immediately suspend movement of fuel (Condition F). The proposed changes to the Required Actions D, E, and F will continue to meet 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2), because the licensee will shut down the reactors (proposed Conditions E and F) or will implement remedial actions until the LCO can be met (proposed Condition D).
The NRC staff also finds that MCR habitability can be maintained under the conditions permitted by Condition D. The staff also finds that the licensee has appropriately considered the human performance aspects to ensure that control room habitability can be maintained in accordance with GDC 19.
Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the proposed changes to TS 3.7.11, specifically, proposed Conditions D, E, and F, and their respective Required Actions and Completion Times are acceptable because TS 3.7.11, as revised, will continue to meet the requirements in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2), and the MCR habitability will be maintained in accordance with GDC 19.
4.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commissions regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment on January 14, 2025. The State official had no comments.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration published in the Federal Register on August 6, 2024 (89 FR 63993), and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors: N. Carte, NRR G. Curran, NRR D. Garmon, NRR D. Gibbs, NRR T. Scarbrough, NRR J. Wilson, NRR Date: April 1, 2025
ML25051A257 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL2-2/PM NRR/DORL/LPL2-2/LA NRR/DSS/SCPB/BC NRR/DEX/EMIB/BC NAME KGreen ABaxter MValentin SBailey DATE 2/20/2025 2/21/2025 3/18/2025 3/21/2025 OFFICE NRR/DEX/EICB/BC NRR/DRO/IOLB/BC NRR/DRA/ARCB/BC NRR/DSS/STSB/BC NAME FSacko JAnderson (ADAgostino for)
KHsueh SMehta (w/edits)
DATE 3/20/2025 3/21/2025 3/19/2025 3/21/2025 OFFICE OGC - NLO w/edits NRR/DORL/LPL2-2/BC NRR/DORL/LPL2-2/PM NAME NMertz DWrona KGreen DATE 03/28/2025 04/1/2025 04/1/2025