RS-23-080, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-264-A, Revision 0, 3.3.9 and 3.3.10 - Delete Flux Monitors Specific Overlap Requirement SRs
| ML23242A107 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden, Nine Mile Point, Clinton, Quad Cities, LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 08/30/2023 |
| From: | Gullott D Constellation Energy Generation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk |
| References | |
| RS-23-080 | |
| Download: ML23242A107 (1) | |
Text
4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 630 657 2000 Office
10 CFR 50.90 RS-23-080 August 30, 2023 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 NRC Docket Nos. 50-461 Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25 NRC Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249 LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 NRC Docket No. 50-410 Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 NRC Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265
Subject:
Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-264-A, Revision 0, "3.3.9 and 3.3.10 - Delete Flux Monitors Specific Overlap Requirement SRs"
References:
- 1.
TSTF-264-A, Revision 0, "3.3.9 and 3.3.10 - Delete Flux Monitors Specific Overlap Requirement SRs," dated April 28, 1998 (ADAMS Accession No. ML040620165)
- 2.
Letter from William Beckner (U.S. NRC) to James Davis (NEI), dated July 26, 1999 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19067A141)
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit," Constellation Energy Generation, LLC (CEG) requests an amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License No. 50-461 for the Clinton Power Station (CPS), Unit 1; Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS), Units 2 and 3;
August 30, 2023 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 for LaSalle County Station (LSCS), Units 1 and 2; No. 50-410 for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (NMP2); and Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (QCNPS), Units 1 and 2 respectively. Specifically, CEG requests adoption of TSTF-264-A, Revision 0, "3.3.9 and 3.3.10 - Delete Flux Monitors Specific Overlap Requirement SRs," (Reference 1), an approved change to the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) (Reference 2), into each listed site's TS.
Although the Traveler title indicates 3.3.9 and 3.3.10 because it was prepared against the NUREG-1430 STS, it is also applicable to NUREG-1433 and NUREG-1444 based STS which have different numbering for the same Surveillance Requirements (SRs). The proposed change revises Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.1.1, "RPS Instrumentation," by deleting SRs 3.3.1.1.6 (numbered 3.3.1.1.5 at NMP2) and 3.3.1.1.7 (numbered 3.3.1.1.6 at NMP2), which verify the overlap between the source range monitor (SRM) and the intermediate range monitor (IRM),
and between the IRM and the average power range monitor (APRM).
provides a description and assessment of the proposed change. Attachment 2 provides the existing TS pages marked-up to show the proposed TS change. Attachment 3 provides the corresponding marked-up TS Bases pages and is provided for information only.
The proposed change has been reviewed by each listed site's Plant Operations Review Committee, respectively, in accordance with the requirements of the CEG Quality Assurance Program.
CEG requests approval of the proposed license amendment by August 30, 2024. Once approved, the amendment shall be implemented within 60 days.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, "Notice for public comment; State consultation,"
paragraph (b), a copy of this application, with attachments, is being provided to the designated State Officials.
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal. Should you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact Ms. Rebecca L. Steinman at (799) 231-6162.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. This statement was executed on the 30th day of August 2023.
Respectfully, David Gullott Director, Licensing & Regulatory Affairs Constellation Energy Generation, LLC Gullott, David M.
Digitally signed by Gullott, David M.
Date: 2023.08.30 08:45:39 -05'00'
August 30, 2023 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 Attachments:
- 1. Evaluation of Proposed Changes
- 2. Mark-up of Technical Specifications Pages
- 3. Mark-up of Technical Specifications Bases Pages - For Information Only cc:
NRC Regional Administrator, Region I NRC Regional Administrator, Region III NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Clinton Power Station NRC Project Manager, Clinton Power Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Dresden Nuclear Power Station NRC Project Manager, Dresden Nuclear Power Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector, LaSalle County Station NRC Project Manager, Lasalle County Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station NRC Project Manager, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station NRC Project Manager, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Illinois Emergency Management Agency - Division of Nuclear Safety A. L. Peterson, NYSERDA B. Frymire, NYSPSC
ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes
Subject:
Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-264-A, Revision 0, "3.3.9 and 3.3.10 - Delete Flux Monitors Specific Overlap Requirement SRs" 1.0
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION 2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION 2.1 Applicability 2.2 Variations 2.3 Detailed Description of Change
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements / Criteria 4.2 Precedents 4.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration 4.4 Conclusion
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
6.0 REFERENCES
ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes
Page 2 1.0
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit," Constellation Energy Generation, LLC (CEG) requests an amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License No. 50-461 for the Clinton Power Station (CPS), Unit 1; Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS), Units 2 and 3; Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 for LaSalle County Station (LSCS), Units 1 and 2; No. 50-410 for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (NMP2); and Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (QCNPS), Units 1 and 2 respectively. Specifically, CEG requests adoption of TSTF-264-A, Revision 0, "3.3.9 and 3.3.10 - Delete Flux Monitors Specific Overlap Requirement SRs," (Reference 6.1), an approved change to the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) (See Reference 6.2), into each site's TS.
Although the Traveler title indicates 3.3.9 and 3.3.10 because it was prepared against the NUREG-1430 STS, it is also applicable to NUREG-1433 and NUREG-1444 based STS which has different numbering for the same Surveillance Requirements (SRs). The proposed change revises Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.1.1, "RPS Instrumentation," by deleting SRs 3.3.1.1.6 (numbered 3.3.1.1.5 at NMP2) and 3.3.1.1.7 (numbered 3.3.1.1.6 at NMP2), which verify the overlap between the source range monitor (SRM) and the intermediate range monitor (IRM),
and between the IRM and the average power range monitor (APRM).
2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION 2.1 Applicability The NRC documented their approval of TSTF-264-A, Revision 0 in Reference 6.2, but as an older Traveler the approval letter does not include a model Safety Evaluation. CEG has reviewed TSTF-264-A, Revision 0 and has determined that the proposed change and associated justification justify incorporation of this amendment in each site's TS.
2.2 Variations TSTF-264-A deletes NUREG-1433/NUREG-1434 SR 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7 and all subsequent surveillances are renumbered, with corresponding cross-references to the renumbered surveillances being revised. Renumbering the remaining SRs in the plant-specific TS would result in a significant number of revisions to procedures, preventative maintenance tracking, and training materials. As a result, CEG is choosing to retain the SR numbers and show them as "deleted" instead of renumbering the remaining SRs as a variation from the TS changes described in TSTF-264-A. This variation is administrative in nature and has no impact of the applicability of the Traveler to any of the sites included in this request.
The intent of the Traveler is to relocate the existing Bases discussion of SR 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7 (numbered 3.3.1.1.5 and 3.3.1.1.6 at NMP2) overlap verification requirements to the Bases for SR 3.3.1.1.1. Differences in the existing plant-specific Bases wording results in small variations from the Traveler SR 3.3.1.1.1 insert wording. As one example, the Traveler version of the Bases insert for BWR/4 and BWR/6 plants discusses a one decade overlap; however, all sites included in this request, except CPS, currently have a 1/2 decade overlap
ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes
Page 3 requirement in their current SRs 3.3.1.1.6 and 3.3.1.1.7 Bases. Therefore, the proposed Bases insert for DRE, LCS, NMP2, and QDC reflects the existing 1/2 decade overlap requirement as a variation from the Traveler insert wording. All variations of the proposed SR 3.3.1.1.1 Bases insert wording compared to the Traveler wording are intended to simply retain and move the existing overlap criteria wording into the SR 3.3.1.1.1 Bases. As a result, these variations have no impact on the applicability of the Traveler to the sites included in this request.
Both DNPS and QCNPS were not licensed to the 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC). Both the DNPS and QCNPS UFSAR contain a Section 3.1 "Conformance with NRC Design Criteria," that provides an assessment against the 70 draft GDC published in 1967 and concludes that the plant specific requirements are sufficiently similar to the Appendix A GDC. Therefore, this difference does not alter the conclusion TSTF-264-A is applicable to DNPS or QCNPS.
2.3 Detailed Description of Change SR 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7 are being deleted from the CPS, DNPS, LSCS and QCNPS TS.
These SRs are numbered 3.3.1.1.5 and 3.3.1.1.6 at NMP2 and are similarly proposed for deletion. These SRs require verification of overlap of Source Range Monitor (SRM) and Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) channels and verification of overlap of IRM and Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) channels. However, the surveillance function will still be performed by the associated CHANNEL CHECK (SR 3.3.1.1.1). A statement will be added to the TS Bases to clarify that the overlap verification is to be performed as part of the CHANNEL CHECK, SR 3.3.1.1.1.
contains a marked-up version of the TS showing the proposed change.
Supporting changes to the TS Bases will be made in accordance with the TS Bases Control Program. Attachment 3 provides the marked-up TS Bases pages. The TS Bases mark-up pages are being submitted for information only.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
The Neutron Monitoring System is a system of incore neutron detectors and out-of-core electronic equipment. The system provides indication of neutron flux, which can be correlated to thermal power level for the entire range of flux conditions that may exist in the core. The source range monitors (SRM) and the intermediate range monitors (IRM) provide flux level indications during reactor startup and low power operation. The local power range monitors (LPRM) and average power range monitors (APRM) allow assessment of local and overall flux conditions during power range operation. The traversing incore probe (TIP) subsystem provides a means to calibrate the LPRM System.
As stated in TSTF 264-A, SR 3.3.1.1.6 (3.3.1.1.5 at NMP2) and SR 3.3.1.1.7 (3.3.1.1.6 at NMP2) are unnecessary in that they duplicate requirements of the CHANNEL CHECK required by SR 3.3.1.1.1. The CHANNEL CHECK provides the overlap requirement since a lack of expected overlap would constitute failure of the channel to meet the established "agreement criterion." However, the "agreement criterion" can be established to provide this requirement with the appropriate flexibility to determine the inoperable components and initiate appropriate
ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes
Page 4 actions. Therefore, the proposed change still affords adequate assurance of safety when judged against current regulatory standards.
4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements / Criteria Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, paragraph 36(c)(3), "Surveillance Requirements," states: Surveillance requirements are requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation will be met.
The proposed change continues to test neutron monitors to ensure that the necessary functionality is maintained. Other than numbering or formatting differences, the proposed Surveillance Requirements are consistent with the standard TS.
4.2 Precedents The NRC documented their approved TSTF-264-A, Revision 0, on July 26, 1999 (Reference 6.2) and is reflected in NUREG-1433, "Standard Technical Specifications General Electric BWR/4 Plants" and NUREG-1434, " Standard Technical Specifications General Electric BWR/6 Plants." This change is also consistent with source range, intermediate range, and power range neutron flux instrumentation requirements in the Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering standard TS, neither of which include specific SRs verifying overlap requirements.
The two most recent precedent for adoption of this Traveler include:
Reference 6.3 for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear approved on September 29, 2016.
Reference 6.4 for James A. FitzPatrick approved on May 27, 2022.
4.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration Overview CEG requests adoption of TSTF-264-A, Revision 0, "3.3.9 and 3.3.10 - Delete Flux Monitors Specific Overlap Requirement SRs," an approved change to the Standard Technical Specifications (STS), into the CPS, DNPS, LSCS, NMP2, and QCNPS TS. Although the Traveler title indicates 3.3.9 and 3.3.10 because it was prepared against the NUREG-1430 STS, it is also applicable to NUREG-1433 and NUREG-1444 based STS which has different numbering for the same Surveillance Requirements (SRs). The proposed change revises Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.1.1, "RPS Instrumentation," by deleting Surveillance Requirements (SRs) 3.3.1.1.6 (numbered 3.3.1.1.5 at NMP2) and 3.3.1.1.7 (numbered 3.3.1.1.6 at NMP2), which verify the overlap between the source range monitor (SRM) and the intermediate range monitor (IRM), and between the IRM and the average power range monitor (APRM).
ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes
Page 5 CEG has evaluated the proposed change against the criteria of 10 CFR 50.92(c) to determine if the proposed changes result in any significant hazards. The following is the evaluation of each of the 10 CFR 50.92(c) criteria:
- 1.
Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response
No Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7, numbered 3.3.1.1.5 and 3.3.1.1.6, respectively at NMP2, are being deleted. These SRs require verification of overlap of Source Range Monitor (SRM) and Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) channels and verification of overlap of IRM and Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) channels. However, these requirements are unnecessary in that they duplicate requirements of the CHANNEL CHECK required by SR 3.3.1.1.1.
The proposed change does not affect any plant equipment, test methods, or plant operation, and are not initiators of any analyzed accident sequence. The SRM, IRM, and APRM will continue to perform their function as designed. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS will ensure that all analyzed accidents will continue to be mitigated as previously analyzed.
Therefore, it is concluded that this change does not significantly increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated.
- 2.
Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response
No The proposed changes to delete SR 3.3.1.1.6 (3.3.1.1.5 at NMP2) and SR 3.3.1.1.7 (3.3.1.1.6 at NMP2) do not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed), do not change the design function of any equipment, and do not change the methods of normal plant operation. The proposed change does not create any new credible failure mechanisms, malfunctions, or accident initiators not previously considered in the design and licensing basis.
Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
- 3.
Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response
No The proposed change to delete SR 3.3.1.1.6 (3.3.1.1.5 at NMP2) and SR 3.3.1.1.7 (3.3.1.1.6 at NMP2) have no effect on any safety analysis assumptions or methods of performing safety analyses. The changes do not adversely affect system operability or design requirements.
ATTACHMENT 1 Evaluation of Proposed Changes
Page 6 The equipment continues to be tested via the associated CHANNEL CHECK (SR 3.3.1.1.1) in a manner and at a frequency necessary to provide confidence that the equipment can perform its intended safety function.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
4.4 Conclusion Based on the considerations discussed above: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.
6.0 REFERENCES
6.1 TSTF-264-A, Revision 0, " 3.3.9 and 3.3.10 - Delete Flux Monitors Specific Overlap Requirement SRs"," dated April 28, 1998 (ADAMS Accession No. ML040620165) 6.2 Letter from William Beckner (U.S. NRC), to James Davis (NEI), dated July 26, 1999 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19067A141) 6.3 Letter from Michael D. Orenak (U.S. NRC) to Charles R. Pierce (Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments Regarding Multiple Technical Specification Changes (CAC Nos. MF5026 and MF5027)," dated September 29, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16231A041) 6.4 Letter from Justin C. Poole (U.S. NRC) to David P. Rhoades (Constellation Energy Generation, LLC), "James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant - Issuance of Amendment No. 350 Re: Adoption of TSTF-264, Revision 0 (EPID L-2021-LLA-0088), dated May 27, 2022 (ADAMS Accession No. ML22126A196)
ATTACHMENT 2a CLINTON POWER STATION UNIT 1 Docket No. 50-461 Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 MARK-UP OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES
RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 CLINTON 3.3-4 Amendment No. 192 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.5 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.6 Verify the source range monitor (SRM) and intermediate range monitor (IRM) channels overlap.
Prior to withdrawing SRMs from the fully inserted position SR 3.3.1.1.7
NOTE-------------------
Only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1.
Verify the IRM and APRM channels overlap.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.8 Calibrate the local power range monitors.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.9 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.10 Calibrate the analog trip module.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) delete Deleted Deleted
RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 CLINTON 3.3-7 Amendment No. 149 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 3)
Reactor Protection System Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS PER FUNCTION CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION D.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE
- a. Neutron Flux-High 2
4 H
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 122/125 divisions of full scale 5(a) 4 I
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 122/125 divisions of full scale
- b. Inop 2
4 H
SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.15 NA 5(a) 4 I
SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.15 NA
- 2. Average Power Range Monitors
- a. Neutron Flux-High, Setdown 2
4 H
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.15 20% RTP
- b. Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High 1
4 G
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.3 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.17 0.55 W +
62% RTP and 113%
RTP(b)
- c. Fixed Neutron Flux - High 1
4 G
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.17 120% RTP
- d. Inop 1,2 4
H SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.15 NA (continued)
(a) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.
(b) Allowable Value is < 0.55 (W-8) + 42.5% RTP when reset for single loop operation per LCO 3.4.1, "Recirculation Loops Operating."
delete
ATTACHMENT 2b DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNITS 2 AND 3 Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249 Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25 MARK-UP OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES
RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Dresden 2 and 3 3.3.1.1-5 Amendment No. 237/230 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.4
NOTE-------------------
Not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after entering MODE 2.
Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.5 Perform a functional test of each RPS automatic scram contactor.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.6 Verify the source range monitor (SRM) and intermediate range monitor (IRM) channels overlap.
Prior to fully withdrawing SRMs SR 3.3.1.1.7
NOTE-------------------
Only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1.
Verify the IRM and APRM channels overlap.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.8 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)
Deleted.
Deleted.
delete
RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Dresden 2 and 3 3.3.1.1-9 Amendment No. 237/230 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 3)
Reactor Protection System Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION D.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE 1.
Intermediate Range Monitors a.
Neutron FluxHigh 2
3 G
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.17 SR 3.3.1.1.18 121/125 divisions of full scale 5(a) 3 H
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.17 SR 3.3.1.1.18 121/125 divisions of full scale b.
Inop 2
5(a) 3 3
G H
SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.18 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.18 NA NA 2.
Average Power Range Monitors a.
Neutron FluxHigh, Setdown 2
2 G
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.18 17.1% RTP b.
Flow Biased Neutron FluxHigh 1
2 F
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.3 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.17 SR 3.3.1.1.18 SR 3.3.1.1.19 0.56 W 67.4% RTP and 122% RTP(b)
(continued)
(a)
With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.
(b) 0.56 W + 63.2% and 118.5% RTP when reset for single loop operation per LCO 3.4.1, "Recirculation Loops Operating."
ATTACHMENT 2c LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 MARK-UP OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES
RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 LaSalle 1 and 2 3.3.1.1-5 Amendment No. 251/237 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.4
NOTE-------------------
Not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after entering MODE 2.
Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.5 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.6 Verify the source range monitor (SRM) and intermediate range monitor (IRM) channels overlap.
Prior to fully withdrawing SRMs SR 3.3.1.1.7
NOTE-------------------
Only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1.
Verify the IRM and APRM channels overlap.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.8 Calibrate the local power range monitors.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)
(Deleted)
(Deleted)
RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 LaSalle 1 and 2 3.3.1.1-9 Amendment No. 251/237 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 3)
Reactor Protection System Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION D.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE
- 1.
- a. Neutron FluxHigh 2
3 G
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 123/125 divisions of full scale 5(a) 3 H
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.15 123/125 divisions of full scale
- b. Inop 2
3 G
SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.15 NA 5(a) 3 H
SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.15 NA
- 2.
Average Power Range Monitors
- a. Neutron FluxHigh, Setdown 2
2 G
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.15 20% RTP
- b. Flow Biased Simulated Thermal PowerUpscale 1
2 F
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.3 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.11(b) (c)
SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.15 0.61 W +
68.2% RTP and 115.5%
RTP(d)
- c. Fixed Neutron Flux-High 1
2 F
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.11 SR 3.3.1.1.15 SR 3.3.1.1.17 120% RTP (continued)
(a)
With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.
(b)
If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(c)
The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the nominal trip setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The NTSP and the methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in the Technical Requirements Manual.
(d)
Allowable Value is 0.54 W + 55.9% RTP and 112.3% RTP when reset for single loop operation per LCO 3.4.1, "Recirculation Loops Operating."
ATTACHMENT 2d NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 2 Docket No. 50-410 Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 MARK-UP OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES
RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 NMP2 3.3.1.1-7 Amendment 91, 92, 151, 152, 186 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.5 Verify the source range monitor (SRM) and intermediate range monitor (IRM) channels overlap.
Prior to fully Withdrawing SRMs SR 3.3.1.1.6
NOTE ------------------------------
Only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1.
Verify the IRM and APRM channels overlap.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.7 Calibrate the local power range monitors.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.8 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.9 Calibrate the trip units.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.10
NOTES -----------------------------
- 1.
For Function 2.a, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after entering MODE 2.
- 2.
For Function 2.e, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST only requires toggling the appropriate outputs of the APRM.
Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)
Deleted Deleted
RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 NMP2 3.3.1.1-10 Amendment 91, 92, 123, 140, 151, 186 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 3)
Reactor Protection System Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION D.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE
- a.
Neutron Flux Upscale 2
3 H
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.14 122/125 divisions of full scale 5(a) 3 I
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.14 122/125 divisions of full scale
- b.
Inop 2
3 H
SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.14 NA 5(a) 3 I
SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.14 NA
- 2. Average Power Range Monitors
- a.
Neutron Flux - Upscale, Setdown 2
3 per logic channel H
SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 20% RTP
- b.
Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - Upscale 1
3 per logic channel G
SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.3 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13(c)(d) 0.61W +
63.4% RTP and 115.5%
RTP(b)(e)
- c.
Fixed Neutron Flux - Upscale 1
3 per logic channel G
SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.3 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.13 120% RTP
- d.
Inop 1,2 3 per logic channel H
SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.10 NA (continued)
(a)
With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.
(b)
Allowable Value is.50(W - 5%) + 53.5% RTP when reset for single loop operation per LCO 3.4.1, "Recirculation Loops Operating."
(c)
If the As-Found channel setpoint is outside its predefined As-Found tolerances, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(d)
The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value within the As-Left tolerance around the nominal trip setpoint at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the nominal trip setpoint are acceptable provided that the As-Found and As-Left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the surveillance procedures to confirm channel performance. The nominal trip setpoint and the methodologies used to determine the As-Found and the As-Left tolerances are specified in the Bases associated with the specified function.
(e)
With OPRM Upscale (function 2.e) inoperable, reset the APRM-STP High scram setpoint to the values defined by the COLR to Implement the automated BSP Scram Region in accordance with Action F.2 of this Specification.
ATTACHMENT 2e QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265 Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 MARK-UP OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES
RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Quad Cities 1 and 2 3.3.1.1-4 Amendment No. 248/243 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.4
NOTE-------------------
Not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after entering MODE 2.
Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.5 Perform a functional test of each RPS automatic scram contactor.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.6 Verify the source range monitor (SRM) and intermediate range monitor (IRM) channels overlap.
Prior to fully withdrawing SRMs SR 3.3.1.1.7
NOTE-------------------
Only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1.
Verify the IRM and APRM channels overlap.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.1.1.8 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)
DELETED DELETED delete
RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Quad Cities 1 and 2 3.3.1.1-8 Amendment No. 248/243 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 3)
Reactor Protection System Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION D.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE 1.
Intermediate Range Monitors a.
Neutron FluxHigh 2
3 G
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.16 SR 3.3.1.1.17 121/125 divisions of full scale 5(a) 3 H
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.16 SR 3.3.1.1.17 121/125 divisions of full scale b.
Inop 2
5(a) 3 3
G H
SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.17 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.17 NA NA 2.
Average Power Range Monitors a.
Neutron FluxHigh, Setdown 2
2 G
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.4 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.17 17.1% RTP b.
Flow Biased Neutron FluxHigh 1
2 F
SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.3 SR 3.3.1.1.5 SR 3.3.1.1.9 SR 3.3.1.1.10 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.16 SR 3.3.1.1.17 SR 3.3.1.1.18 0.56 W
(continued)
(a)
With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.
(b) 0.56 W + 63.2% and 118.4% RTP when reset for single loop operation per LCO 3.4.1, "Recirculation Loops Operating."
ATTACHMENT 3a CLINTON POWER STATION UNIT 1 Docket No. 50-461 Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 MARK-UP OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES PAGES
- For Information Only -
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 CLINTON B 3.3-23 Revision No. 20-6 BASES SURVEILLANCE analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> testing allowance does REQUIREMENTS not significantly reduce the probability that the RPS will (continued) trip when necessary.
SR 3.3.1.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value.
Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift on one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.
SR 3.3.1.1.2 To ensure that the APRMs are accurately indicating the true core average power, the APRMs are adjusted to the reactor power calculated from a heat balance if the heat balance calculated reactor power exceeds the APRM channel output by more than 2% RTP.
This Surveillance does not preclude making APRM channel adjustments, if desired, when the heat balance calculated reactor power is less than the APRM channel output. To provide close agreement between the APRM indicated power and to preserve operating margin, the APRM channels are normally adjusted to within +/- 2% of the heat balance calculated reactor power. However, this agreement is not required for OPERABILITY when APRM output indicates a higher reactor power than the heat balance calculated reactor power.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
(continued) delete Insert A
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 CLINTON B 3.3-25 Revision No. 21-4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.4 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS As noted, SR 3.3.1.1.4 is not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 since testing of the MODE 2 required IRM and APRM Functions cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers, lifted leads, or movable links. This allows entry into MODE 2 if the Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. In this event, the SR must be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after entering MODE 2 from MODE 1.
Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.3.1.1.5 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended Function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are periodically verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7 These Surveillances are established to ensure that no gaps in neutron flux indication exist from subcritical to power operation for monitoring core reactivity status.
The overlap between SRMs and IRMs is required to be demonstrated to ensure that reactor power will not be increased into a region without adequate neutron flux indication. This is required prior to withdrawing SRMs from the fully inserted position since indication is being transitioned from the SRMs to the IRMs.
The overlap between IRMs and APRMs is of concern when reducing power into the IRM range. On power increases, the system design will prevent further increases (initiate a rod block) if adequate overlap is not maintained.
Overlap between IRMs and APRMs exists when sufficient IRMs and APRMs concurrently have onscale readings such that the (continued)
(Deleted)
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 CLINTON B 3.3-26 Revision No. 21-4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS transition between MODE 1 and MODE 2 can be made without either an APRM downscale rod block or an IRM upscale rod block. Overlap between SRMs and IRMs similarly exists when, prior to withdrawing the SRMs from the fully inserted position, IRMs are above the downscale value of 5 and increasing as neutron flux increases, prior to the SRMs indication reaching their upscale limit.
As noted, SR 3.3.1.1.7 is only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1. That is, after the overlap requirement has been met and indication has transitioned to the IRMs, maintaining overlap is not required (APRMs may be reading downscale once in MODE 2).
If overlap for a group of channels is not demonstrated (e.g., IRM/APRM overlap), the reason for the failure of the Surveillance should be determined and the appropriate channel(s) declared inoperable. Only those appropriate channel(s) that are required in the current MODE or condition should be declared inoperable.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.3.1.1.8 LPRM gain settings are determined from the local flux profiles measured by the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP)
System. This establishes the relative local flux profile for appropriate representative input to the APRM System.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.3.1.1.9 and SR 3.3.1.1.12 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are periodically verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
(continued) delete
SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 CLINTON B 3.3-31 Revision No. 0 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The SRMs provide the operator with information relative to the neutron level at very low flux levels in the core. As such, the SRM indication is used by the operator to monitor the approach to criticality and to determine when criticality is achieved. The SRMs are maintained fully inserted until the count rate is greater than a minimum allowed count rate (a control rod block is set at this condition). After SRM to intermediate range monitor (IRM) overlap is demonstrated (as required by SR 3.3.1.1.6), the SRMs are normally fully withdrawn from the core.
The SRM subsystem of the Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) consists of four channels. Each of the SRM channels can be bypassed, but only one at any given time, by the operation of a bypass switch. Each channel includes one detector that can be physically positioned in the core. Each detector assembly consists of a miniature fission chamber with associated cabling, signal conditioning equipment, and electronics associated with the various SRM functions. The signal conditioning equipment converts the current pulses from the fission chamber to analog DC currents that correspond to the count rate. Each channel also includes indication, alarm, and control rod blocks. However, this LCO specifies OPERABILITY requirements only for the monitoring and indication functions of the SRMs.
During refueling, shutdown, and low power operations, the primary indication of neutron flux levels is provided by the SRMs or special movable detectors connected to the normal SRM circuits. The SRMs provide monitoring of reactivity changes during fuel or control rod movement and give the control room operator early indication of unexpected subcritical multiplication that could be indicative of an approach to criticality.
APPLICABLE Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions SAFETY ANALYSES during refueling and low power operation are provided by LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks"; LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)"; LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection (continued) 1
SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 CLINTON B 3.3-34 Revision No. 1-1 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and B.1 (continued) capability. During this time, control rod withdrawal and power increase are not precluded by this Required Action.
Having the ability to monitor the core with at least one SRM, proceeding to IRM Range 3 or greater (with overlap required by SR 3.3.1.1.6) and thereby exiting the Applicability of this LCO, is acceptable for ensuring adequate core monitoring and allowing continued operation.
With three required SRMs inoperable, Required Action B.1 allows no positive changes in reactivity (control rod withdrawal must be immediately suspended) due to the inability to monitor the changes. Required Action A.1 still applies and allows 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to restore monitoring capability prior to requiring control rod insertion. This allowance is based on the limited risk of an event during this time, provided that no control rod withdrawals are allowed, and the desire to concentrate efforts on repair, rather than to immediately shut down, with no SRMs OPERABLE.
C.1 In MODE 2, if the required number of SRMs is not restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed Completion Time, the reactor shall be placed in MODE 3. With all control rods fully inserted, the core is in its least reactive state with the most margin to criticality. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
D.1 and D.2 With one or more required SRM channels inoperable in MODE 3 or 4, the neutron flux monitoring capability is degraded or nonexistent. The requirement to fully insert all insertable control rods ensures that the reactor will be at its minimum reactivity level while no neutron monitoring capability is available. Placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position prevents subsequent control rod withdrawal by maintaining a control rod block. The mode switch should be locked (i.e., the key removed) to preclude inadvertent operation of the mode switch. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is sufficient to accomplish the Required Action, and takes into account the low probability of an event requiring the SRM occurring during this time.
(continued) 1 verified
Insert A The agreement criteria includes an expectation of overlap when transitioning between neutron flux instrumentation. The overlap between SRMs and IRMs must be demonstrated prior to withdrawing SRMs from the fully inserted position since indication is being transitioned from the SRMs to the IRMs. This will ensure that reactor power will not be increased into a neutron flux region without adequate indication. The overlap between IRMs and APRMs is of concern when reducing power into the IRM range (entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1). On power increases, the system design will prevent further increases (by initiating a rod block) if adequate overlap is not maintained. Overlap between IRMs and APRMs exists when sufficient IRMs and APRMs concurrently have onscale readings such that the transition between MODE 1 and MODE 2 can be made without either APRM downscale rod block, or IRM upscale rod block. Overlap between SRMs and IRMs similarly exists when, prior to withdrawing the SRMs from the fully inserted position, IRMs are above the downscale value of 5 and increasing as neutron flux increases prior to the SRMs indication reaching their upscale limit.
If overlap for a group of channels is not demonstrated (e.g., IRM/APRM overlap), the reason for the failure of the Surveillance should be determined and the appropriate channel(s) declared inoperable. Only those appropriate channels that are required in the current MODE or condition should be declared inoperable.
ATTACHMENT 3b DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNITS 2 AND 3 Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249 Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25 MARK-UP OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES PAGES
- For Information Only -
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.3.1.1-27 Revision 79 BASES SURVEILLANCE time required to perform channel Surveillance. That REQUIREMENTS analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> testing allowance does (continued) not significantly reduce the probability that the RPS will trip when necessary.
SR 3.3.1.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value.
Significant deviations between instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.
SR 3.3.1.1.2 To ensure that the APRMs are accurately indicating the true core average power, the APRMs are adjusted to the reactor power calculated from a heat balance if the heat balance calculated reactor power exceeds the APRM channel output by more than 2% RTP.
This Surveillance does not preclude making APRM channel adjustments, if desired, when the heat balance calculated reactor power is less than the APRM channel output. To (continued) delete Insert C
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.3.1.1-30 Revision 55 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.5 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS an alternative to using an automatic scram function trip.
This is accomplished by placing the RPS channel test switch in the test position, which will input a trip signal into the associated RPS logic channel. The RPS channel test switches are not specifically credited in the accident analysis. The Manual Scram Functions are not configured the same as the generic model used in Reference 13. However, Reference 13 concluded that the Surveillance Frequency extensions for RPS Functions were not affected by the difference in configuration since each automatic RPS logic channel has a test switch which is functionally the same as the manual scram switches in the generic model. As such, a functional test of each RPS automatic scram contactor using either its associated test switch or by test of any of the associated automatic RPS Functions is required to be performed. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7 These Surveillances are established to ensure that no gaps in neutron flux indication exist from subcritical to power operation for monitoring core reactivity status.
The overlap between SRMs and IRMs is required to be demonstrated to ensure that reactor power will not be increased into a neutron flux region without adequate indication. This is required prior to fully withdrawing SRMs since indication is being transitioned from the SRMs to the IRMs.
The overlap between IRMs and APRMs is of concern when reducing power into the IRM range. On power increases, the system design will prevent further increases (by initiating a rod block) if adequate overlap is not maintained. The IRM/APRM and SRM/IRM overlaps are acceptable if a 1/2 decade overlap exists.
(continued) delete Deleted.
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.3.1.1-31 Revision 55 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS As noted, SR 3.3.1.1.7 is only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1. That is, after the overlap requirement has been met and indication has transitioned to the IRMs, maintaining overlap is not required (APRMs may be reading downscale once in MODE 2).
If overlap for a group of channels is not demonstrated (e.g., IRM/APRM overlap), the reason for the failure of the Surveillance should be determined and the appropriate channel(s) declared inoperable. Only those appropriate channels that are required in the current MODE or condition should be declared inoperable.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.3.1.1.9 LPRM gain settings are determined from the local flux profiles measured by the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP)
System. This establishes the relative local flux profile for appropriate representative input to the APRM System.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.3.1.1.13, SR 3.3.1.1.15, and SR 3.3.1.1.17 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.
Note 1 to SR 3.3.1.1.15 and SR 3.3.1.1.17 states that neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they are passive devices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal.
For the APRMs, changes in neutron detector sensitivity are (continued) delete
SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.3.1.2-1 Revision 0 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The SRMs provide the operator with information relative to the neutron flux level at very low flux levels in the core.
As such, the SRM indication is used by the operator to monitor the approach to criticality and determine when criticality is achieved. The SRMs are not fully withdrawn until the count rate is greater than a minimum allowed count rate (a control rod block is set at this condition). After SRM to intermediate range monitor (IRM) overlap is demonstrated (as required by SR 3.3.1.1.6), the SRMs are normally fully withdrawn from the core.
The SRM subsystem of the Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) consists of four channels. Each of the SRM channels can be bypassed, but only one at any given time, by the operation of a bypass switch. Each channel includes one detector that can be physically positioned in the core. Each detector assembly consists of a miniature fission chamber with associated cabling, signal conditioning equipment, and electronics associated with the various SRM functions. The signal conditioning equipment converts the current pulses from the fission chamber to analog DC currents that correspond to the count rate. Each channel also includes indication, alarm, and control rod blocks. However, this LCO specifies OPERABILITY requirements only for the monitoring and indication functions of the SRMs.
During refueling, shutdown, and low power operations, the primary indication of neutron flux levels is provided by the SRMs or special movable detectors connected to the normal SRM circuits. The SRMs provide monitoring of reactivity changes during fuel or control rod movement and give the control room operator early indication of unexpected subcritical multiplication that could be indicative of an approach to criticality.
APPLICABLE Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions SAFETY ANALYSES during refueling and low power operation is provided by LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks"; LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)"; LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection (continued) 1
SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 Dresden 2 and 3 B 3.3.1.2-4 Revision 0 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and B.1 (continued)
Provided at least one SRM remains OPERABLE, Required Action A.1 allows 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to restore the required SRMs to OPERABLE status. This time is reasonable because there is adequate capability remaining to monitor the core, there is limited risk of an event during this time, and there is sufficient time to take corrective actions to restore the required SRMs to OPERABLE status or to establish alternate IRM monitoring capability. During this time, control rod withdrawal and power increase is not precluded by this Required Action. Having the ability to monitor the core with at least one SRM, proceeding to IRM Range 3 or greater (with overlap required by SR 3.3.1.1.6), and thereby exiting the Applicability of this LCO, is acceptable for ensuring adequate core monitoring and allowing continued operation.
With three required SRMs inoperable, Required Action B.1 allows no positive changes in reactivity (control rod withdrawal must be immediately suspended) due to inability to monitor the changes. Required Action A.1 still applies and allows 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to restore monitoring capability prior to requiring control rod insertion. This allowance is based on the limited risk of an event during this time, provided that no control rod withdrawals are allowed, and the desire to concentrate efforts on repair, rather than to immediately shut down, with no SRMs OPERABLE.
C.1 In MODE 2 with the IRMs on Range 2 or below, if the required number of SRMs is not restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed Completion Time, the reactor shall be placed in MODE 3. With all control rods fully inserted, the core is in its least reactive state with the most margin to criticality. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
(continued) 1 verified
Insert C The agreement criteria includes an expectation of 1/2 decade of overlap when transitioning between neutron flux instrumentation. The overlap between SRMs and IRMs must be demonstrated prior to fully withdrawing SRMs since indication is being transitioned from the SRMs to the IRMs. This will ensure that reactor power will not be increased into a neutron flux region without adequate indication. The overlap between IRMs and APRMs is of concern when reducing power into the IRM range (entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1). On power increases, the system design will prevent further increases (by initiating a rod block) if adequate overlap is not maintained. Overlap between IRMs and APRMs exists when sufficient IRMs and APRMs concurrently have onscale readings such that the transition between MODE 1 and MODE 2 can be made without either APRM downscale rod block, or IRM upscale rod block. Overlap between SRMs and IRMs similarly exists when, prior to fully withdrawing the SRMs, IRMs respond to control rod movement before SRMs have reached the upscale rod block.
If overlap for a group of channels is not demonstrated (e.g., IRM/APRM overlap), the reason for the failure of the Surveillance should be determined and the appropriate channel(s) declared inoperable. Only those appropriate channels that are required in the current MODE or condition should be declared inoperable.
ATTACHMENT 3c LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 MARK-UP OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES PAGES
- For Information Only -
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.1.1-26 Revision 79 BASES SURVEILLANCE entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on REQUIREMENTS the RPS reliability analysis (Ref. 10) assumption of the (continued) average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RPS will trip when necessary.
SR 3.3.1.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value.
Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift on one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.
SR 3.3.1.1.2 To ensure that the APRMs are accurately indicating the true core average power, the APRMs are adjusted to the reactor power calculated from a heat balance if the heat balance calculated reactor power exceeds the APRM channel output by more than 2% RTP.
(continued) delete Insert B
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.1.1-29 Revision 79 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.5 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. In accordance with Reference 10, the scram contactors must be tested as part of the Manual Scram Function. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7 These Surveillances are established to ensure that no gaps in neutron flux indication exist from subcritical to power operation for monitoring core reactivity status.
The overlap between SRMs and IRMs is required to be demonstrated to ensure that reactor power will not be increased into a region without adequate neutron flux indication. This is required prior to fully withdrawing SRMs since indication is being transitioned from the SRMs to the IRMs.
The overlap between IRMs and APRMs is of concern when reducing power into the IRM range. On power increases, the system design will prevent further increases (initiate a rod block) if adequate overlap is not maintained. The IRM/APRM and SRM/IRM overlap are acceptable if a 1/2 decade overlap exists.
As noted, SR 3.3.1.1.7 is only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1. That is, after the overlap requirement has been met and indication has transitioned to the IRMs, maintaining overlap is not required (APRMs may be reading downscale once in MODE 2).
If overlap for a group of channels is not demonstrated (e.g., IRM/APRM overlap), the reason for the failure of the Surveillance should be determined and the appropriate (continued)
(Deleted)
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.1.1-30 Revision 51 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS channel(s) declared inoperable. Only those appropriate channel(s) that are required in the current MODE or condition should be declared inoperable.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.3.1.1.8 LPRM gain settings are determined from the local flux profiles measured by the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP)
System. This establishes the relative local flux profile for appropriate representative input to the APRM System.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. SR 3.3.1.1.8 also ensures the operability of the OPRM system (specification 3.3.1.3).
SR 3.3.1.1.9 and SR 3.3.1.1.12 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at lease once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
(continued) delete
SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.1.2-1 Revision 0 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The SRMs provide the operator with information relative to the neutron level at very low flux levels in the core. As such, the SRM indication is used by the operator to monitor the approach to criticality and to determine when criticality is achieved. The SRMs are not fully withdrawn until the count rate is greater than a minimum allowed count rate (a control rod block is set at this condition). After SRM to intermediate range monitor (IRM) overlap is demonstrated (as required by SR 3.3.1.1.6), the SRMs are normally fully withdrawn from the core.
The SRM subsystem of the Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) consists of four channels. Each of the SRM channels can be bypassed, but only one at any given time, by the operation of a bypass switch. Each channel includes one detector that can be physically positioned in the core. Each detector assembly consists of a miniature fission chamber with associated cabling, signal conditioning equipment, and electronics associated with the various SRM functions. The signal conditioning equipment converts the current pulses from the fission chamber to analog DC currents that correspond to the count rate. Each channel also includes indication, alarm, and control rod blocks. However, this LCO specifies OPERABILITY requirements only for the monitoring and indication functions of the SRMs.
During refueling, shutdown, and low power operations, the primary indication of neutron flux levels is provided by the SRMs or special movable detectors connected to the normal SRM circuits. The SRMs provide monitoring of reactivity changes during fuel or control rod movement and give the control room operator early indication of unexpected subcritical multiplication that could be indicative of an approach to criticality.
APPLICABLE Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions SAFETY ANALYSES during refueling and low power operation are provided by LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks"; LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)"; LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection (continued) 1
SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 LaSalle 1 and 2 B 3.3.1.2-4 Revision 0 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and B.1 (continued) adequate capability remaining to monitor the core, limited risk of an event during this time, and sufficient time to take corrective actions to restore the required SRMs to OPERABLE status or to establish alternate IRM monitoring capability. During this time, control rod withdrawal and power increase are not precluded by this Required Action.
Having the ability to monitor the core with at least one SRM, proceeding to IRM Range 3 or greater (with overlap required by SR 3.3.1.1.6) and thereby exiting the Applicability of this LCO, is acceptable for ensuring adequate core monitoring and allowing continued operation.
With three required SRMs inoperable, Required Action B.1 allows no positive changes in reactivity (control rod withdrawal must be immediately suspended) due to the inability to monitor the changes. Required Action A.1 still applies and allows 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to restore monitoring capability prior to requiring control rod insertion. This allowance is based on the limited risk of an event during this time, provided that no control rod withdrawals are allowed, and the desire to concentrate efforts on repair, rather than to immediately shut down, with no SRMs OPERABLE.
C.1 In MODE 2 with the IRMs on Range 2 or below, if the required number of SRMs is not restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed Completion Time, the reactor shall be placed in MODE 3. With all control rods fully inserted, the core is in its least reactive state with the most margin to criticality. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
D.1 and D.2 With one or more required SRM channels inoperable in MODE 3 or 4, the neutron flux monitoring capability is degraded or nonexistent. The requirement to fully insert all insertable control rods ensures that the reactor will be at its minimum reactivity level while no neutron monitoring capability is available. Placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown (continued) verified 1
Insert B The agreement criteria includes an expectation of 1/2 decade of overlap when transitioning between neutron flux instrumentation. The overlap between SRMs and IRMs must be demonstrated prior to withdrawing SRMs from the fully inserted position since indication is being transitioned from the SRMs to the IRMs. This will ensure that reactor power will not be increased into a neutron flux region without adequate indication. The overlap between IRMs and APRMs is of concern when reducing power into the IRM range (entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1). On power increases, the system design will prevent further increases (by initiating a rod block) if adequate overlap is not maintained. Overlap between IRMs and APRMs exists when sufficient IRMs and APRMs concurrently have onscale readings such that the transition between MODE 1 and MODE 2 can be made without either APRM downscale rod block, or IRM upscale rod block. Overlap between SRMs and IRMs similarly exists when, prior to withdrawing the SRMs from the fully inserted position, IRMs are above mid-scale on range 1 before SRMs have reached the upscale rod block.
If overlap for a group of channels is not demonstrated (e.g., IRM/APRM overlap), the reason for the failure of the Surveillance should be determined and the appropriate channel(s) declared inoperable. Only those appropriate channels that are required in the current MODE or condition should be declared inoperable.
ATTACHMENT 3d NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 2 Docket No. 50-410 Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 MARK-UP OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES PAGES
- For Information Only -
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 NMP2 B 3.3.1.1-30 Revision 0, 1, 24 (A123), 37 (A140),
42 (151), 44 (A152), 58 (A175)
BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.1 and SR 3.3.1.1.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value.
Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift on one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.
SR 3.3.1.1.3 To ensure that the APRMs are accurately indicating the true core average power, the APRMs are adjusted to the reactor power calculated from a heat balance if the heat balance calculated reactor power exceeds the APRM channel output by more than 2%
RTP.
This Surveillance does not preclude making APRM channel adjustments if desired, when the heat balance calculated reactor power is less than the APRM channel output. To provide close agreement between the APRM indicated power and to preserve operating margin, the APRM channels are normally adjusted to within
+/- 2% of the heat balance calculated reactor power. However, this argument is not required for OPERABILITY when APRM output indicates a higher reactor power than the heat balance calculated power.
(continued)
Insert B delete
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 NMP2 B 3.3.1.1-31 Revision 0, 1, 37 (A140). 42 (A151),
44 (A152), 58 (A175)
BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.3 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
An allowance is provided that requires the SR to be performed only at 23% RTP because it is difficult to accurately maintain APRM indication of core THERMAL POWER consistent with a heat balance when < 23% RTP. At low power levels, a high degree of accuracy is unnecessary because of the large inherent margin to thermal limits (MCPR, APLHGR, and LHGR). At 23% RTP, the Surveillance is required to have been satisfactorily performed in accordance with SR 3.0.2.
A Note is provided which allows an increase in THERMAL POWER above 23% if the Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. In this event, the SR must be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after reaching or exceeding 23% RTP. Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.
SR 3.3.1.1.4 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.
As noted, for Functions 1.a and 1.b, SR 3.3.1.1.4 is not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 since testing of the MODE 2 required IRM Functions cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers, lifted leads, or movable links. This allows entry into MODE 2 if the 7 day Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. In this event, the SR must be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after entering MODE 2 from MODE 1. Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.3.1.1.5 and SR 3.3.1.1.6 These Surveillances are established to ensure that no gaps in neutron flux indication exist from subcritical to power (continued)
(Deleted) delete
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 NMP2 B 3.3.1.1-32 Revision 0, 1, 42 (A151), 44 (A152)
BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.5 and SR 3.3.1.1.6 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS operation for monitoring core reactivity status.
The overlap between SRMs and IRMs is required to be demonstrated to ensure that reactor power will not be increased into a region without adequate neutron flux indication. This is required prior to fully withdrawing SRMs since indication is being transitioned from the SRMs to the IRMs.
The overlap between IRMs and APRMs is of concern when reducing power into the IRM range. On power increases, the system design will prevent further increases (initiate a rod block) if adequate overlap is not maintained. Overlap between IRMs and APRMs exists when sufficient IRMs and APRMs concurrently have onscale readings such that the transition between MODE 1 and MODE 2 can be made without either APRM downscale rod block, or IRM upscale rod block. Overlap between SRMs and IRMs similarly exists when, prior to withdrawing the SRMs from the fully inserted position, IRMs are above mid-scale on range 1 before SRMs have reached the upscale rod block. The IRM/APRM and SRM/IRM overlaps are also acceptable if a 1/2 decade overlap exists.
As noted, SR 3.3.1.1.6 is only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1. That is, after the overlap requirement has been met and indication has transitioned to the IRMs, maintaining overlap is not required (APRMs may be reading downscale once in MODE 2).
If overlap for a group of channels is not demonstrated (e.g., IRM/APRM overlap), the reason for the failure of the Surveillance should be determined and the appropriate channel(s) declared inoperable. Only those appropriate channel(s) that are required in the current MODE or condition should be declared inoperable.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.3.1.1.7 LPRM gain settings are determined from the local flux profiles measured by the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP)
System. This establishes the relative local flux profile (continued)
SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 NMP2 B 3.3.1.2-1 Revision 0 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The SRMs provide the operator with information relative to the neutron level at very low flux levels in the core. As such, the SRM indication is used by the operator to monitor the approach to criticality and to determine when criticality is achieved. The SRMs are maintained fully inserted until the count rate is greater than a minimum allowed count rate (a control rod block is set at this condition). After SRM to intermediate range monitor (IRM) overlap is demonstrated (as required by SR 3.3.1.1.5) and the IRMs are on Range 3, the SRMs are normally fully withdrawn from the core.
The SRM subsystem of the Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) consists of four channels (Ref. 1). Each of the SRM channels can be bypassed, but only one at any given time, by the operation of a bypass switch. Each channel includes one detector that can be physically positioned in the core.
Each detector assembly consists of a miniature fission chamber with associated cabling, signal conditioning equipment, and electronics associated with the various SRM functions. The signal conditioning equipment converts the current pulses from the fission chamber to analog DC currents that correspond to the count rate. Each channel also includes indication, alarm, and control rod blocks.
However, this LCO specifies OPERABILITY requirements only for the monitoring and indication functions of the SRMs.
During refueling, shutdown, and low power operations, the primary indication of neutron flux levels is provided by the SRMs or special movable detectors connected to the normal SRM circuits. The SRMs provide monitoring of reactivity changes during fuel or control rod movement and give the control room operator early indication of unexpected subcritical multiplication that could be indicative of an approach to criticality.
APPLICABLE Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions SAFETY ANALYSES during refueling and low power operation are provided by LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks"; LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)"; LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection (continued) 1
SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 NMP2 B 3.3.1.2-4 Revision 0 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and B.1 (continued) capability. During this time, control rod withdrawal and power increase are not precluded by this Required Action.
Having the ability to monitor the core with at least one SRM, proceeding to IRM Range 3 or greater (with overlap required by SR 3.3.1.1.5) and thereby exiting the Applicability of this LCO, is acceptable for ensuring adequate core monitoring and allowing continued operation.
With three required SRMs inoperable, Required Action B.1 allows no positive changes in reactivity (control rod withdrawal must be immediately suspended) due to the inability to monitor the changes. Required Action A.1 still applies and allows 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to restore monitoring capability prior to requiring control rod insertion. This allowance is based on the limited risk of an event during this time, provided that no control rod withdrawals are allowed, and the desire to concentrate efforts on repair, rather than to immediately shut down, with no SRMs OPERABLE.
C.1 In MODE 2 with the IRMs on Range 2 or below, if the required number of SRMs is not restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed Completion Time, the reactor shall be placed in MODE 3. With all control rods fully inserted, the core is in its least reactive state with the most margin to criticality. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
D.1 and D.2 With one or more required SRM channels inoperable in MODE 3 or 4, the neutron flux monitoring capability is degraded or nonexistent. The requirement to fully insert all insertable control rods ensures that the reactor will be at its minimum reactivity level while no neutron monitoring capability is available. Placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position prevents subsequent control rod withdrawal by maintaining a control rod block. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is sufficient to accomplish the Required Action, and takes into account the low probability of an event requiring the SRM occurring during this time.
(continued) 1 verified
Insert B The agreement criteria includes an expectation of 1/2 decade of overlap when transitioning between neutron flux instrumentation. The overlap between SRMs and IRMs must be demonstrated prior to withdrawing SRMs from the fully inserted position since indication is being transitioned from the SRMs to the IRMs. This will ensure that reactor power will not be increased into a neutron flux region without adequate indication. The overlap between IRMs and APRMs is of concern when reducing power into the IRM range (entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1). On power increases, the system design will prevent further increases (by initiating a rod block) if adequate overlap is not maintained. Overlap between IRMs and APRMs exists when sufficient IRMs and APRMs concurrently have onscale readings such that the transition between MODE 1 and MODE 2 can be made without either APRM downscale rod block, or IRM upscale rod block. Overlap between SRMs and IRMs similarly exists when, prior to withdrawing the SRMs from the fully inserted position, IRMs are above mid-scale on range 1 before SRMs have reached the upscale rod block.
If overlap for a group of channels is not demonstrated (e.g., IRM/APRM overlap), the reason for the failure of the Surveillance should be determined and the appropriate channel(s) declared inoperable. Only those appropriate channels that are required in the current MODE or condition should be declared inoperable.
ATTACHMENT 3e QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265 Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 MARK-UP OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES PAGES
- For Information Only -
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.3.1.1-28 Revision 62 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.1 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS approximately the same value. Significant deviations between instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.
SR 3.3.1.1.2 To ensure that the APRMs are accurately indicating the true core average power, the APRMs are adjusted to the reactor power calculated from a heat balance if the heat balance calculated reactor power exceeds the APRM channel output by more than 2% RTP.
This Surveillance does not preclude making APRM channel adjustments, if desired, when the heat balance calculated reactor power is less than the APRM channel output. To provide close agreement between the APRM indicated power and to preserve operating margin, the APRM channels are normally adjusted to within +/- 2% of the heat balance calculated reactor power. However, this agreement is not required for OPERABILITY when ARPM output indicates higher reactor power than the heat balance calculated reactor power.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
(continued)
Insert C delete
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.3.1.1-31 Revision 43 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.5 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS extensions for RPS Functions were not affected by the difference in configuration since each automatic RPS logic channel has a test switch which is functionally the same as the manual scram switches in the generic model. As such, a functional test of each RPS automatic scram contactor using either its associated test switch or by test of any of the associated automatic RPS Functions is required to be performed. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7 These Surveillances are established to ensure that no gaps in neutron flux indication exist from subcritical to power operation for monitoring core reactivity status.
The overlap between SRMs and IRMs is required to be demonstrated to ensure that reactor power will not be increased into a neutron flux region without adequate indication. This is required prior to fully withdrawing SRMs since indication is being transitioned from the SRMs to the IRMs.
The overlap between IRMs and APRMs is of concern when reducing power into the IRM range. On power increases, the system design will prevent further increases (by initiating a rod block) if adequate overlap is not maintained. The IRM/APRM and SRM/IRM overlaps are acceptable if a 1/2 decade overlap exists.
As noted, SR 3.3.1.1.7 is only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1. That is, after the overlap requirement has been met and indication has transitioned to the IRMs, maintaining overlap is not required (APRMs may be reading downscale once in MODE 2).
If overlap for a group of channels is not demonstrated (e.g., IRM/APRM overlap), the reason for the failure of the Surveillance should be determined and the appropriate channel(s) declared inoperable. Only those appropriate channels that are required in the current MODE or condition should be declared inoperable.
(continued) delete Deleted
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.3.1.1-32 Revision 43 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.3.1.1.9 LPRM gain settings are determined from the local flux profiles measured by the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP)
System. This establishes the relative local flux profile for appropriate representative input to the APRM System.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.3.1.1.10 and SR 3.3.1.1.15 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
(continued) delete
SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.3.1.2-1 Revision 0 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The SRMs provide the operator with information relative to the neutron flux level at very low flux levels in the core.
As such, the SRM indication is used by the operator to monitor the approach to criticality and determine when criticality is achieved. The SRMs are not fully withdrawn until the count rate is greater than a minimum allowed count rate (a control rod block is set at this condition). After SRM to intermediate range monitor (IRM) overlap is demonstrated (as required by SR 3.3.1.1.6), the SRMs are normally fully withdrawn from the core.
The SRM subsystem of the Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) consists of four channels. Each of the SRM channels can be bypassed, but only one at any given time, by the operation of a bypass switch. Each channel includes one detector that can be physically positioned in the core. Each detector assembly consists of a miniature fission chamber with associated cabling, signal conditioning equipment, and electronics associated with the various SRM functions. The signal conditioning equipment converts the current pulses from the fission chamber to analog DC currents that correspond to the count rate. Each channel also includes indication, alarm, and control rod blocks. However, this LCO specifies OPERABILITY requirements only for the monitoring and indication functions of the SRMs.
During refueling, shutdown, and low power operations, the primary indication of neutron flux levels is provided by the SRMs or special movable detectors connected to the normal SRM circuits. The SRMs provide monitoring of reactivity changes during fuel or control rod movement and give the control room operator early indication of unexpected subcritical multiplication that could be indicative of an approach to criticality.
APPLICABLE Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions SAFETY ANALYSES during refueling and low power operation is provided by LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks"; LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)"; LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection (continued) 1
SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 Quad Cities 1 and 2 B 3.3.1.2-4 Revision 0 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and B.1 (continued)
Provided at least one SRM remains OPERABLE, Required Action A.1 allows 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to restore the required SRMs to OPERABLE status. This time is reasonable because there is adequate capability remaining to monitor the core, there is limited risk of an event during this time, and there is sufficient time to take corrective actions to restore the required SRMs to OPERABLE status or to establish alternate IRM monitoring capability. During this time, control rod withdrawal and power increase is not precluded by this Required Action. Having the ability to monitor the core with at least one SRM, proceeding to IRM Range 3 or greater (with overlap required by SR 3.3.1.1.6), and thereby exiting the Applicability of this LCO, is acceptable for ensuring adequate core monitoring and allowing continued operation.
With three required SRMs inoperable, Required Action B.1 allows no positive changes in reactivity (control rod withdrawal must be immediately suspended) due to inability to monitor the changes. Required Action A.1 still applies and allows 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to restore monitoring capability prior to requiring control rod insertion. This allowance is based on the limited risk of an event during this time, provided that no control rod withdrawals are allowed, and the desire to concentrate efforts on repair, rather than to immediately shut down, with no SRMs OPERABLE.
C.1 In MODE 2 with the IRMs on Range 2 or below, if the required number of SRMs is not restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed Completion Time, the reactor shall be placed in MODE 3. With all control rods fully inserted, the core is in its least reactive state with the most margin to criticality. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
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Insert C The agreement criteria includes an expectation of 1/2 decade of overlap when transitioning between neutron flux instrumentation. The overlap between SRMs and IRMs must be demonstrated prior to fully withdrawing SRMs since indication is being transitioned from the SRMs to the IRMs. This will ensure that reactor power will not be increased into a neutron flux region without adequate indication. The overlap between IRMs and APRMs is of concern when reducing power into the IRM range (entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1). On power increases, the system design will prevent further increases (by initiating a rod block) if adequate overlap is not maintained. Overlap between IRMs and APRMs exists when sufficient IRMs and APRMs concurrently have onscale readings such that the transition between MODE 1 and MODE 2 can be made without either APRM downscale rod block, or IRM upscale rod block. Overlap between SRMs and IRMs similarly exists when, prior to fully withdrawing the SRMs, IRMs respond to control rod movement before SRMs have reached the upscale rod block.
If overlap for a group of channels is not demonstrated (e.g., IRM/APRM overlap), the reason for the failure of the Surveillance should be determined and the appropriate channel(s) declared inoperable. Only those appropriate channels that are required in the current MODE or condition should be declared inoperable.