ML23003A786

U2 - Proposed Written Examination and Operating Test Outlines (Folder 2)

ML23003A786
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	09/30/2022
From:	Jeffrey Riley Dominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut
To:	Brian Fuller NRC/RGN-I/DORS/OB
References
EPID L-2022-OLL-0007
Download: ML23003A786 (1)

Text

75-day transmittal copy - updated from 150-day - June 23, 2022 Form 3.2-1 Administrative Topics Outline Facility:

Millstone Unit 2 Date of Examination: 09/12/2022 Examination Level:

RO SRO Operating Test Number: ES22L1 Administrative Topic (Step 1)

Activity and Associated K/A (Step 2)

Type Code (Step 3)

Conduct of Operations (A1R)

K/A 2.1.23 Ability to perform general and/or normal operating procedures during any plant condition. (RO 4.3)

Perform a batch makeup calculation to raise VCT level.

R,M Conduct of Operations (A2R)

K/A 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management. (RO 4.3)

Determine Shutdown Margin.

R,M Equipment Control (A3R)

K/A 2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

(RO 4.2)

Evaluate an RCP Seal Failure.

R,M Radiation Control (Spare)

K/A 2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principals and procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas or alignment of filters.

(RO 3.2)

Determine access requirements to a locked high-radiation area.

R,N Emergency Plan (A4R)

K/A 2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of emergency operating procedures critical safety functions or critical shutdown safety functions. (RO 4.0)

Use RATS to Determine and Prioritize the Safety Functions.

R,D

75-day transmittal copy - updated from 150-day - June 23, 2022 Instructions for completing Form 3.2-1, Administrative Topics Outline

1. For each license level, determine the number of administrative job performance measures (JPMs) and topic areas as follows:

Topic Number of JPMs RO*

SRO and RO Retakes Conduct of Operations 1 (or 2) 2 Equipment Control 1 (or 0) 1 Radiation Control 1 (or 0) 1 Emergency Plan 1 (or 0) 1 Total 4

5

2. Enter the associated knowledge and abilities (K/A) statement and summarize the administrative activities for each JPM.

3. For each JPM, specify the type codes for location and source as follows:

Location:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom Source and Source Criteria:

(P)revious two NRC exams (no more than one JPM that is randomly selected from last two NRC exams) (0)

(D)irect from bank (no more than three for ROs, no more than four for SROs and RO retakes) (1)

(N)ew or Significantly (M)odified from bank (no fewer than one) (3), Spare (1)

75-day transmittal copy - updated from 150-day - June 23, 2022 A1R Perform a batch makeup calculation to raise VCT level (Modify Bank 291, NRC 2016)

The examinee will perform a calculation for a Batch Make Up to raise the Volume Control Tank (VCT) from 70% to 85%. The examine will specifically provide; 1) the total gallons to raise level, 2) gallons of Boric Acid from the Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST), and 3) gallons of Primary Makeup Water (PMW).

The bank JPM is modified by changing the amount the level will be raised and the BAST concentration.

All answers of the modified JPM are different from the bank JPM.

A2R Determine Shutdown Margin (Modify Bank A1.2R, NRC 2017)

The examinee will determine the required Shutdown Margin (SDM) for the stated conditions and require SDM is met. The bank JPM is modified by changing the Core Average Burnup, the current RCS Boron concentration, and removing one Control Element Assembly (CEA) being fully withdrawn. This changes the required Shutdown Boron concentration as well as other aspects of the JPM.

A3R Evaluate an RCP Seal Failure (Modify Bank 276, NRC 2016)

The examinee will evaluate the conditions of a RCP with seal degradation. Report which stage(s) are failed or degraded and specify procedural actions based on the RCP seal stage conditions. The JPM is modified based on a different procedure for RCP Malfunctions (new procedure is AOP 2586. RCP Malfunctions and procedure in the bank JPM 276 is OP 2301C, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation). The JPM will be performed as an Admin JPM in the simulator (could also be performed in the classroom with computer printout), with the examinee using Alarm Response Procedures (ARPs), AOP 2586, and the Plant Process Computer (PPC) to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system. Then once an assessment of the conditions in determined specified the required procedurally required action.

A4R Use RATS to Determine and Prioritize the Safety Functions (Bank A4RO, NRC 2005)

The examinee will correctly identify and prioritize the Safety Function Success Paths. Given a list of post shutdown plant parameters the examinee with use the Resource Assessment Tress (RATs) and Safety Function Status Checklist (SFSC) to prioritize the Safety Function Success Paths and specify the first emergency operating procedure to be entered based on the assessment. This will require some modification based the procedure revisions since the last time it was used.

SpareA4R Determine access requirements to a locked high-radiation area (New)

The examinee when provided a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) and a Survey Map will determine the entry requirements to enter a high-radiation area.

75-day transmittal copy - updated from 150-day - June 23, 2022 Form 3.2-1 Administrative Topics Outline Facility:

Millstone Unit 2 Date of Examination: 09/12/2022 Examination Level:

RO SRO Operating Test Number: ES22LI1 Administrative Topic (Step 1)

Activity and Associated K/A (Step 2)

Type Code (Step 3)

Conduct of Operations (A1S)

K/A 2.1.5 Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement or overtime limitations.

(SRO 3.9)

Ensure Compliance with Fatigue Rule.

R,N Conduct of Operations (A2S)

K/A 2.1.42 Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement procedures. (SRO 3.4)

Assess the impact of a damaged door on plant activities and suspend fuel movement.

R,D Equipment Control (A3S)

K/A 2.2.36 Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operation. (SRO 4.2)

Review and accept a Pressurizer Heater Capacity Test.

R,N Radiation Control (A4S)

K/A 2.3.6 Ability to approve liquid or gaseous release permits. (SRO 3.8)

Review and approve a Radioactive Gaseous Waste Discharge.

R,N Emergency Plan (A5S)

K/A 2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications.

(SRO 4.6)

EAL Classification.

R,D Conduct of Operations (Spare)

K/A 2.1.23 Ability to perform general and/or normal operating procedures during any plant condition. (SRO 4.4)

Perform a Shutdown Safety Assess review for the predicted condition of the RCS in Reduced Inventory.

R,D

75-day transmittal copy - updated from 150-day - June 23, 2022 Instructions for completing Form 3.2-1, Administrative Topics Outline

1. For each license level, determine the number of administrative job performance measures (JPMs) and topic areas as follows:

Topic Number of JPMs RO*

SRO and RO Retakes Conduct of Operations 1 (or 2) 2 Equipment Control 1 (or 0) 1 Radiation Control 1 (or 0) 1 Emergency Plan 1 (or 0) 1 Total 4

5

2. Enter the associated knowledge and abilities (K/A) statement and summarize the administrative activities for each JPM.

3. For each JPM, specify the type codes for location and source as follows:

Location:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom Source and Source Criteria:

(P)revious two NRC exams (no more than one JPM that is randomly selected from last two NRC exams)

(D)irect from bank (no more than three for ROs, no more than four for SROs and RO retakes)

(N)ew or Significantly (M)odified from bank (no fewer than one)

75-day transmittal copy - updated from 150-day - June 23, 2022 A1S Ensure Compliance with Fatigue Rule - (New)

Examinee will determine which Reactor Operator(s) is/are available to work and meet the Fatigue Rule requirements. The examinee will be provided the schedule of (4) Operators and the Fatigue Rule procedure. They will then determine which if any operators are available to work the next dayshift.

A2S AEAS Broken Boundary Door - (Bank JPM-297, 218)

Examinee will assess the impact of a damaged door on plant activities. Using the provided OP 2356, Doors procedure they will determine that the door is a Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation Boundary (AEAS) and Technical Requirement Manual (TRM) Fire door. Based on the information determine from OP 2356, the initial conditions, and provided procedure OPS-FH-216, SFP Fuel Handling Operations, the examinee will suspend fuel movement. In addition, the examinee will establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the fire rated assembly.

A3S Review and accept a Pressurizer Heater Capacity Test - (New)

Examinee will review a completed Pressurizer Heater Capacity Test surveillance for acceptance. Upon review the examinee will determine that an error has been made and that the surveillance acceptance criteria for Proportional Heater power is not met. The examinee will not accept the surveillance. The examinee will assess the failed surveillance and enter the Pressurizer Technical Specification, 3.4.4.b. This is a condition the plant has experienced as a result of Pressurizer Heater failures.

A4S Review and approve a Radioactive Gaseous Waste Discharge - (New)

Examine will review a gaseous waste discharge permit and surveillance form and identify that the discharge cant be authorized as currently prepared. The examinee will be provided with all the required paperwork to authorize the discharge. They will identify that the Alert and/or Alarm radiation monitor setpoints are not correct and that a required verification has not been performed. Based on these two incorrect conditions the examinee will determine the discharge cant be authorized.

A5S EAL Classification - (Bank JPM-161)

Examinee will be given at set of plant conditions. Given this information and the Emergency Action Level (EAL) matrix the examinee will correctly classify the event within 15 minutes. Once the Classification is made the examinee will then be given updated plant information. They will use this information to make a second correct classification within the next15 minutes. This is a bank JPM. Millstone replaced their EAL tables in late 2020 and these are completely new tables.

(Spare) Shutdown Safety Assessment Review for Reduced Inventory Conditions - (Bank JPM-295)

Examinee will be provided with the current plant conditions and a predicted Shutdown Safety Assessment (SSA) for entering RCS Reduced Inventory. The examinee will review the SSA and determine that there are two errors in the assessment.

75-day transmittal copy - May24, 2022 Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Facility:

Millstone Unit 2 Date of Examination:

09/12/2022 Operating Test Number:

ES22L1 Examination Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code Safety Function Control Room Systems

a. S1 Emergency Boration - Alternate Path (K/A 004 A2.14, RO IR 4.0)

A,D,L,S 1

b. S2 LPSI Pump Failure to Trip Post SRAS - Alternate Path (K/A 006 A3.02, RO IR 4.2)

A,D,EN,L,S 2

c. S3 Forcing Pressurizer Spray - Alternate Path (K/A 010 A2.02, RO IR 4.5)

A,M,S 3

d. S4 Pumping the Containment Sump - Alternate Path (K/A 103 A3.01, RO IR 4.2)

A,D,S 5

e. S5 Respond to an Open Phase Condition (OPC) -

Alternate Path (K/A 062 A2.16, RO IR 3.7)

A,L,N,S 6

f. S6 Power Range Safety Channel and Delta T Power Channel Calibration (K/A 012 A4.02, RO IR 3.8)

D,S 7

g. S7 Respond to the Loss of a 2nd Circulating Water Pump - Alternate Path (K/A 075 A2.02, RO IR 3.9)

A,D,S 8

h. S8 Verify Control Room Air Conditioning System in Recirculation In Response to Radiation on RM 9799A/B (K/A 050 A4.01, RO IR 3.8)

M,S 9

In-Plant Systems

i. P1 Shift CAR RBCCW Valve to Local Manual (K/A 022 A4.04, RO IR 3.5)

D,E,L,R 5

j. P2 Shift AFW Pump Suction to Firewater (K/A 061 K1.07, RO IR 4.2)

D,E,L 4

k. P3 Transferring Computer UPS 480 VAC Main Power Supply (K/A 062 A1.03, RO IR 3.5)

D 6

75-day transmittal copy - May24, 2022

1. Determine the number of control room system and in-plant system job performance measures (JPMs) to develop using the following table:

License Level Control Room In-Plant Total Reactor Operator (RO) 8 3

11 Senior Reactor Operator-Instant (SRO-I) 7 3

10 Senior Reactor Operator-Upgrade (SRO-U) 2 or 3 3 or 2 5

2. Select safety functions and systems for each JPM as follows:

Refer to Section 1.9 of the applicable knowledge and abilities (K/A) catalog for the plant systems organized by safety function. For pressurized-water reactor operating tests, the primary and secondary systems listed under Safety Function 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core, in Section 1.9 of the applicable K/A catalog, may be treated as separate safety functions (i.e., two systems, one primary and one secondary, may be selected from Safety Function 4). From the safety function groupings identified in the K/A catalog, select the appropriate number of plant systems by safety functions to be evaluated based on the applicants license level (see the table in step 1).

For RO/SRO-I applicants: Each of the control room system JPMs and, separately, each of the in-plant system JPMs must evaluate a different safety function, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function in each location. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature.

For SRO-U applicants: Evaluate SRO-U applicants on five different safety functions.

One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function.

3. Select a task for each JPM that supports, either directly or indirectly and in a meaningful way, the successful fulfillment of the associated safety function. Select the task from the applicable K/A catalog (K/As for plant systems or emergency and abnormal plant evolutions) or the facility licensees site-specific task list. If this task has an associated K/A, the K/A should have an importance rating of at least 2.5 in the RO column. K/As that have importance ratings of less than 2.5 may be used if justified based on plant priorities; inform the NRC chief examiner if selecting K/As with an importance rating less than 2.5.

The selected tasks must be different from the events and evolutions conducted during the simulator operating test and tasks tested on the written examination. A task that is similar to a simulator scenario event may be acceptable if the actions required to complete the task are significantly different from those required in response to the scenario event.

Apply the following specific task selection criteria:

75-day transmittal copy - May24, 2022 S1 Emergency Boration - Alternate Path (Bank JPM-257)

Examinee observes the Reactor has tripped and commences Standard Post Trip Actions in accordance with EOP 2525. The examinee will observe and report (2) CEAs have not inserted and perform steps to Emergency Borate in accordance with EOP 2541, Appendix 3. The alternate path occurs after all action steps are completed and a check that Charging flow is greater than 40 gpm is being performed. The examinee will observe Charging flow is less than 40 gpm and take Contingency Actions (alternate path) to start an additional Charging pump to achieve greater than 40 gpm Charging flow.

At least one of the tasks shall be related to a shutdown or low-power condition.

Four to six of the tasks for RO and SRO-I applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures. Two to three of the tasks for SRO-U applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures.

At least one alternate path JPM must be new or modified from the bank.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall evaluate the applicants ability to implement actions required during an emergency or abnormal condition.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall require the applicant to enter the radiologically controlled area. This provides an excellent opportunity for the applicant to discuss or demonstrate radiation control administrative subjects.

If it is not possible to develop or locate a suitable task for a selected system, return to step 2 and select a different system.

4. For each JPM, specify the codes for type, source, and location:

Code License Level Criteria RO SRO-I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 4-6 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9

8 4

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1

1 1

(EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 1 1

1 (L)ow power/shutdown 1

1 1

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 2 2

1 (P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 3 3

2 (R)adiologically controlled area 1

1 1

(S)imulator

75-day transmittal copy - May24, 2022 S2 Respond to LPSI Pump Failure to Trip on SRAS Actuation - Alternate Path (Bank JPM-230)

Examinee will perform actions in the LOCA EOP associated with a Sump Recirculation Actuation Signal (SRAS). The examinee takes actions to realign the Charging pumps from the Boric Acid Storage Tanks (BAST) to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). Then when SRAS is observed to actuate, the examinee verifies the proper SRAS actuation has occurred.

The alternate path occurs when one Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pump does not turn off, as required. The examinee then takes action to attempt to stop the pump with its handswitch, then when that is not successful, carries out Contingency Actions to reposition LPSI injection valves.

S3 Forcing Pressurizer Spray - Alternate Path (Modified JPM-223)

Examinee will Force Pressurizer Sprays. While performing this evolution a Pressurizer Spray valve will fail partially open. The examinee will perform Immediate Operator Actions to observe Pressurizer pressure safety channels and attempt to manually close the spray valve. When the Pressurizer Spray valve does not close the examinee will take Alternate Path (Contingency Action) to place the Pressurizer Spray valve(s) Normal/Close switch to close. This will close the Spray Valve. The Normal/Close switch is a new modification to the plant, completed during the last refuel outage, and the Immediate Operator Actions procedure was changed to reflect this modification.

S4 Pumping the Containment Sump - Alternate Path (Bank JPM-211)

Examinee pumps the Containment sump until the receipt of the CTMT NORM SUMP DIS PRESS HI annunciator is received. The examinee will observe the annunciator alarm and refer to the Alarm Response Procedure (ARP). The ARP directs that the Containment Sump pump be stopped and the examinee stops the pump. When the pump is stopped one of the discharge isolation valves does not close and the examinee identifies this and attempts to close the valve.

S5 Respond to an Open Phase Condition (OPC) - Alternate Path (New)

This is a new JPM for a recent modification to the plant which includes changes to the Standard Post Trip Actions procedure. The examinee will respond to a plant trip and identify an OPC exists and take action to divorce from the electrical source with the OPC and align to a good electrical source.

S6 Power Range Safety Channel and Delta T Power Channel Calibration (Bank JPM-173)

Examinee will performance a portion of a Reactor Protection System (RPS) calibration using procedure SP 2601D, Power Range Safety Channel and Delta T Power Channel Calibration.

The examinee will determine that the +10 Volt power Supply voltage is not in the acceptable range and bypass the channel.

S7 Respond to the Loss of a 2nd Circulating Water Pump - Alternate Path (Bank JPM S8)

Examinee will be directed to perform actions in response to a loss of a Circulating Water pump.

They will perform actions to cross-tie Circulating System Waterboxes. Once the Waterboxes have been cross-tied the examinee will identify a second Circulating Pump trip in the same Condenser, and either recommend tripping the plant or trip the plant.

75-day transmittal copy - May24, 2022 S8 Verify Control Room Air Conditioning System in Recirculation in Response to Radiation on RM 9799A/B - (Modified JPM-232)

The examinee will verify the CRACS system has shifted from the recirculation mode after radiation is detected in the Control Room, on radiation monitors RM 9799A/B. A failure on the operating facility will require the examinee to start equipment on one facility and stop equipment on the other facility, to place one complete facility in the recirculation mode, to protect Control Room personnel.

P1 Shift CAR RBCCW Valve to Local Manual - (Bank JPM-245)

Examinee will simulate placing a Containment Air Recirculation (CAR) fan valve in manual and opening it. The task involves isolating air, aligning the manual operator shaft to the valve stem, engaging the lever arm in the manual shaft, and opening the valve. The valve is in the RCA.

P2 Shift AFW Pump Suction to Firewater - (Bank JPM-040A/B)

Examinee will simulate aligning Fire Water to an Auxiliary Feedwater pump. This requires the examinee to open valves from the Firewater System and close a valve from the Condensate Storage Tank. The valves are located in the Turbine Building.

P3 Transferring Computer UPS 480 VAC Main Power Supply - (Bank JPM-116)

Examinee will transfer the Plant Process Computer UPS main power supply from one Vital Facility to the other. This requires checking the main 480 VAC breaker closed, checking UPS switches, operating computer power safety switches, and checking the UPS Inverter operating properly by verifying Inverter indications. The bulk of this JPM is performed in the DC switchgear rooms with a breaker check in the Control Room Air Conditioning equipment room.

75-day transmittal copy - May 24, 2022 Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Facility:

Millstone Unit 2 Date of Examination:

09/12/2022 Operating Test Number:

ES22L1 Examination Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code Safety Function Control Room Systems

a. S1 Emergency Boration - Alternate Path (K/A 004 A2.14, RO IR 4.0)

A,D,L,S 1

b. S2 LPSI Pump Failure to Trip Post SRAS - Alternate Path (K/A 006 A3.02, RO IR 4.2)

A,D,EN,L,S 2

c. S3 Forcing Pressurizer Spray - Alternate Path (K/A 010 A2.02, RO IR 4.5)

A,M,S 3

d.

e. S5 Respond to an Open Phase Condition (OPC) -

Alternate Path (K/A 062 A2.16, RO IR 3.7)

A,L,N,S 6

f. S6 Power Range Safety Channel and Delta T Power Channel Calibration (K/A 012 A4.02, RO IR 3.8)

D,S 7

g. S7 Respond to the Loss of a 2nd Circulating Water Pump - Alternate Path (K/A 075 A2.02, RO IR 3.9)

A,D,S 8

h. S8 Verify Control Room Air Conditioning System in Recirculation In Response to Radiation on RM 9799A/B (K/A 050 A4.01, RO IR 3.8)

M,S 9

In-Plant Systems

i. P1 Shift CAR RBCCW Valve to Local Manual (K/A 022 A4.04, RO IR 3.5)

D,E,L,R 5

j. P2 Shift AFW Pump Suction to Firewater (K/A 061 K1.07, RO IR 4.2)

D,E,L 4

k. P3 Transferring Computer UPS 480 VAC Main Power Supply (K/A 062 A1.03, RO IR 3.5)

D 6

75 -day transmittal copy - May 24, 2022

1. Determine the number of control room system and in-plant system job performance measures (JPMs) to develop using the following table:

License Level Control Room In-Plant Total Reactor Operator (RO) 8 3

11 Senior Reactor Operator-Instant (SRO-I) 7 3

10 Senior Reactor Operator-Upgrade (SRO-U) 2 or 3 3 or 2 5

2. Select safety functions and systems for each JPM as follows:

Refer to Section 1.9 of the applicable knowledge and abilities (K/A) catalog for the plant systems organized by safety function. For pressurized-water reactor operating tests, the primary and secondary systems listed under Safety Function 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core, in Section 1.9 of the applicable K/A catalog, may be treated as separate safety functions (i.e., two systems, one primary and one secondary, may be selected from Safety Function 4). From the safety function groupings identified in the K/A catalog, select the appropriate number of plant systems by safety functions to be evaluated based on the applicants license level (see the table in step 1).

For RO/SRO-I applicants: Each of the control room system JPMs and, separately, each of the in-plant system JPMs must evaluate a different safety function, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function in each location. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature.

For SRO-U applicants: Evaluate SRO-U applicants on five different safety functions.

One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function.

3. Select a task for each JPM that supports, either directly or indirectly and in a meaningful way, the successful fulfillment of the associated safety function. Select the task from the applicable K/A catalog (K/As for plant systems or emergency and abnormal plant evolutions) or the facility licensees site-specific task list. If this task has an associated K/A, the K/A should have an importance rating of at least 2.5 in the RO column. K/As that have importance ratings of less than 2.5 may be used if justified based on plant priorities; inform the NRC chief examiner if selecting K/As with an importance rating less than 2.5.

The selected tasks must be different from the events and evolutions conducted during the simulator operating test and tasks tested on the written examination. A task that is similar to a simulator scenario event may be acceptable if the actions required to complete the task are significantly different from those required in response to the scenario event.

Apply the following specific task selection criteria:

75 -day transmittal copy - May 24, 2022 S1 Emergency Boration - Alternate Path (Bank JPM-257)

Examinee observes the Reactor has tripped and commences Standard Post Trip Actions in accordance with EOP 2525. The examinee will observe and report (2) CEAs have not inserted and perform steps to Emergency Borate in accordance with EOP 2541, Appendix 3. The alternate path occurs after all action steps are completed and a check that Charging flow is greater than 40 gpm is being performed. The examinee will observe Charging flow is less than 40 gpm and take Contingency Actions (alternate path) to start an additional Charging pump to achieve greater than 40 gpm Charging flow.

At least one of the tasks shall be related to a shutdown or low-power condition.

Four to six of the tasks for RO and SRO-I applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures. Two to three of the tasks for SRO-U applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures.

At least one alternate path JPM must be new or modified from the bank.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall evaluate the applicants ability to implement actions required during an emergency or abnormal condition.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall require the applicant to enter the radiologically controlled area. This provides an excellent opportunity for the applicant to discuss or demonstrate radiation control administrative subjects.

If it is not possible to develop or locate a suitable task for a selected system, return to step 2 and select a different system.

4. For each JPM, specify the codes for type, source, and location:

Code License Level Criteria RO SRO-I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 4-6 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9

8 4

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1

1 1

(EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 1 1

1 (L)ow power/shutdown 1

1 1

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 2 2

1 (P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 3 3

2 (R)adiologically controlled area 1

1 1

(S)imulator

75 -day transmittal copy - May 24, 2022 S2 Respond to LPSI Pump Failure to Trip on SRAS Actuation - Alternate Path (Bank JPM-230)

Examinee will perform actions in the LOCA EOP associated with a Sump Recirculation Actuation Signal (SRAS). The examinee takes actions to realign the Charging pumps from the Boric Acid Storage Tanks (BAST) to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). Then when SRAS is observed to actuate, the examinee verifies the proper SRAS actuation has occurred.

The alternate path occurs when one Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pump does not turn off, as required. The examinee then takes action to attempt to stop the pump with its handswitch, then when that is not successful, carries out Contingency Actions to reposition LPSI injection valves.

S3 Forcing Pressurizer Spray - Alternate Path (Modified JPM-223)

Examinee will Force Pressurizer Sprays. While performing this evolution a Pressurizer Spray valve will fail partially open. The examinee will perform Immediate Operator Actions to observe Pressurizer pressure safety channels and attempt to manually close the spray valve. When the Pressurizer Spray valve does not close the examinee will take Alternate Path (Contingency Action) to place the Pressurizer Spray valve(s) Normal/Close switch to close. This will close the Spray Valve. The Normal/Close switch is a new modification to the plant, completed during the last refuel outage, and the Immediate Operator Actions procedure was changed to reflect this modification.

S5 Respond to an Open Phase Condition (OPC) - Alternate Path (New)

This is a new JPM for a recent modification to the plant which includes changes to the Standard Post Trip Actions procedure. The examinee will respond to a plant trip and identify an OPC exists and take action to divorce from the electrical source with the OPC and align to a good electrical source.

S6 Power Range Safety Channel and Delta T Power Channel Calibration (Bank JPM-173)

Examinee will performance a portion of a Reactor Protection System (RPS) calibration using procedure SP 2601D, Power Range Safety Channel and Delta T Power Channel Calibration.

The examinee will determine that the +10 Volt power Supply voltage is not in the acceptable range and bypass the channel.

S7 Respond to the Loss of a 2nd Circulating Water Pump - Alternate Path (Bank JPM S8)

Examinee will be directed to perform actions in response to a loss of a Circulating Water pump.

They will perform actions to cross-tie Circulating System Waterboxes. Once the Waterboxes have been cross-tied the examinee will identify a second Circulating Pump trip in the same Condenser, and either recommend tripping the plant or trip the plant.

75 -day transmittal copy - May 24, 2022 S8 Verify Control Room Air Conditioning System in Recirculation in Response to Radiation on RM 9799A/B - (Modified JPM-232)

The examinee will verify the CRACS system has shifted from the recirculation mode after radiation is detected in the Control Room, on radiation monitors RM 9799A/B. A failure on the operating facility will require the examinee to start equipment on one facility and stop equipment on the other facility, to place one complete facility in the recirculation mode, to protect Control Room personnel.

P1 Shift CAR RBCCW Valve to Local Manual - (Bank JPM-245)

Examinee will simulate placing a Containment Air Recirculation (CAR) fan valve in manual and opening it. The task involves isolating air, aligning the manual operator shaft to the valve stem, engaging the lever arm in the manual shaft, and opening the valve. The valve is in the RCA.

P2 Shift AFW Pump Suction to Firewater - (Bank JPM-040A/B)

Examinee will simulate aligning Fire Water to an Auxiliary Feedwater pump. This requires the examinee to open valves from the Firewater System and close a valve from the Condensate Storage Tank. The valves are located in the Turbine Building.

P3 Transferring Computer UPS 480 VAC Main Power Supply - (Bank JPM-116)

Examinee will transfer the Plant Process Computer UPS main power supply from one Vital Facility to the other. This requires checking the main 480 VAC breaker closed, checking UPS switches, operating computer power safety switches, and checking the UPS Inverter operating properly by verifying Inverter indications. The bulk of this JPM is performed in the DC switchgear rooms with a breaker check in the Control Room Air Conditioning equipment room.

75 -day transmittal copy - May 24, 2022 Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Facility:

Millstone Unit 2 Date of Examination:

09/12/2022 Operating Test Number:

ES22L1 Examination Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code Safety Function Control Room Systems

b. S2 LPSI Pump Failure to Trip Post SRAS - Alternate Path (K/A 006 A3.02, RO IR 4.2)

A,D,EN,L,S 2

e. S5 Respond to an Open Phase Condition (OPC) -

Alternate Path (K/A 062 A2.16, RO IR 3.7)

A,L,N,S 6

h. S8 Verify Control Room Air Conditioning System in Recirculation In Response to Radiation on RM 9799A/B (K/A 050 A4.01, RO IR 3.8)

M,S 9

In-Plant Systems

i. P1 Shift CAR RBCCW Valve to Local Manual (K/A 022 A4.04, RO IR 3.5)

D,E,L,R 5

j. P2 Shift AFW Pump Suction to Firewater (K/A 061 K1.07, RO IR 4.2)

D,E,L 4

75 -day transmittal copy - May 24, 2022

1. Determine the number of control room system and in-plant system job performance measures (JPMs) to develop using the following table:

License Level Control Room In-Plant Total Reactor Operator (RO) 8 3

11 Senior Reactor Operator-Instant (SRO-I) 7 3

10 Senior Reactor Operator-Upgrade (SRO-U) 2 or 3 3 or 2 5

2. Select safety functions and systems for each JPM as follows:

Refer to Section 1.9 of the applicable knowledge and abilities (K/A) catalog for the plant systems organized by safety function. For pressurized-water reactor operating tests, the primary and secondary systems listed under Safety Function 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core, in Section 1.9 of the applicable K/A catalog, may be treated as separate safety functions (i.e., two systems, one primary and one secondary, may be selected from Safety Function 4). From the safety function groupings identified in the K/A catalog, select the appropriate number of plant systems by safety functions to be evaluated based on the applicants license level (see the table in step 1).

For RO/SRO-I applicants: Each of the control room system JPMs and, separately, each of the in-plant system JPMs must evaluate a different safety function, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function in each location. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature.

For SRO-U applicants: Evaluate SRO-U applicants on five different safety functions.

One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function.

3. Select a task for each JPM that supports, either directly or indirectly and in a meaningful way, the successful fulfillment of the associated safety function. Select the task from the applicable K/A catalog (K/As for plant systems or emergency and abnormal plant evolutions) or the facility licensees site-specific task list. If this task has an associated K/A, the K/A should have an importance rating of at least 2.5 in the RO column. K/As that have importance ratings of less than 2.5 may be used if justified based on plant priorities; inform the NRC chief examiner if selecting K/As with an importance rating less than 2.5.

The selected tasks must be different from the events and evolutions conducted during the simulator operating test and tasks tested on the written examination. A task that is similar to a simulator scenario event may be acceptable if the actions required to complete the task are significantly different from those required in response to the scenario event.

Apply the following specific task selection criteria:

75 -day transmittal copy - May 24, 2022 At least one of the tasks shall be related to a shutdown or low-power condition.

Four to six of the tasks for RO and SRO-I applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures. Two to three of the tasks for SRO-U applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures.

At least one alternate path JPM must be new or modified from the bank.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall evaluate the applicants ability to implement actions required during an emergency or abnormal condition.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall require the applicant to enter the radiologically controlled area. This provides an excellent opportunity for the applicant to discuss or demonstrate radiation control administrative subjects.

If it is not possible to develop or locate a suitable task for a selected system, return to step 2 and select a different system.

4. For each JPM, specify the codes for type, source, and location:

Code License Level Criteria RO SRO-I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 4-6 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9

8 4

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1

1 1

(EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 1 1

1 (L)ow power/shutdown 1

1 1

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 2 2

1 (P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 3 3

2 (R)adiologically controlled area 1

1 1

(S)imulator

75 -day transmittal copy - May 24, 2022 S2 Respond to LPSI Pump Failure to Trip on SRAS Actuation - Alternate Path (Bank JPM-230)

Examinee will perform actions in the LOCA EOP associated with a Sump Recirculation Actuation Signal (SRAS). The examinee takes actions to realign the Charging pumps from the Boric Acid Storage Tanks (BAST) to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). Then when SRAS is observed to actuate, the examinee verifies the proper SRAS actuation has occurred.

The alternate path occurs when one Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pump does not turn off, as required. The examinee then takes action to attempt to stop the pump with its handswitch, then when that is not successful, carries out Contingency Actions to reposition LPSI injection valves.

S5 Respond to an Open Phase Condition (OPC) - Alternate Path (New)

This is a new JPM for a recent modification to the plant which includes changes to the Standard Post Trip Actions procedure. The examinee will respond to a plant trip and identify an OPC exists and take action to divorce from the electrical source with the OPC and align to a good electrical source.

75 -day transmittal copy - May 24, 2022 S8 Verify Control Room Air Conditioning System in Recirculation in Response to Radiation on RM 9799A/B - (Modified JPM-232)

The examinee will verify the CRACS system has shifted from the recirculation mode after radiation is detected in the Control Room, on radiation monitors RM 9799A/B. A failure on the operating facility will require the examinee to start equipment on one facility and stop equipment on the other facility, to place one complete facility in the recirculation mode, to protect Control Room personnel.

P1 Shift CAR RBCCW Valve to Local Manual - (Bank JPM-245)

Examinee will simulate placing a Containment Air Recirculation (CAR) fan valve in manual and opening it. The task involves isolating air, aligning the manual operator shaft to the valve stem, engaging the lever arm in the manual shaft, and opening the valve. The valve is in the RCA.

P2 Shift AFW Pump Suction to Firewater - (Bank JPM-040A/B)

Examinee will simulate aligning Fire Water to an Auxiliary Feedwater pump. This requires the examinee to open valves from the Firewater System and close a valve from the Condensate Storage Tank. The valves are located in the Turbine Building.

SIMULATOR SCENARIO #1

Page 2 of 24 Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Event No.

Malf. No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

RH15B N - ATC/US TS - US Stroke B CTMT Spray MOV. Valve fails to stroke fully closed.

2 05A1A3S1 C06-B16 C - BOP/US Containment Penetration Cooling fan trips.

3 RC04 C - ATC/US TS - US RCS Leak 4

N/A R - All Rapid Downpower 5

RC03A M - All SB-LOCA (TRIP CRITERIA) 6 TC10H C - BOP/US MC - BOP Main Turbine fail to trip Manually trip turbine 7

RC06B C - ATC/US MC - ATC 2-RC-404, #2 PORV, fails open

• (N)Normal, (R)Reactivity, (I)Instrument, (C)Component, (M)Major, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control Facility:

Millstone Unit 2 Scenario #: 1 Scenario Source:

New Op. Test #: ES22LI1 Examiners:

Applicants/

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

100% power, steady state operations, A Train protected.

Turnover:

No equipment out of service. Perform SP 2606D, 2-CS-4.1B Valve Tests, Facility 2.

Critical Tasks:

(see page 5)

1. Manually shutdown the Turbine on the reactor trip prior to proceeding to Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries Safety Function

2. Commence a plant cool down within 60 minutes of the onset of a LOCA.

3. Secure Reactor Coolant pumps within 10 minutes of losing NPSH

Page 3 of 24 Scenario Summary:

The crew will take the shift with the unit at 100% power, steady state, no equipment OOS (IC-21).

Event 1: The ATC performs SP 2606D, 2-CS-4.1B Valve Tests, Facility 2. The valve does not stroke completely. The US enters TSAS 3.6.3.1 (CTMT Isolation Valves) and 3.6.2.1a (CTMT Spray Train).

Event 2: F-37A, A Containment Penetration Fan, trips. ARP 2590E-078, CTMT PENT CLG FAN OVERLOAD/TRIP, directs the US to OP 2314C, Containment Penetration Cooling. F-37B is started.

Event 3: The plant experiences a RCS leak. The crew enters AOP 2568, Reactor Coolant System Leak. The leak rate is determined to be greater than TS allowable. The US enters TS 3.4.6.2. The leak is determined to be not isolable.

Event 4: The crew enters AOP 2575, Rapid Downpower, and commences a down power to take the plant off-line.

Event 5: The RCS leak worsens to greater than the capacity of the Charging system. The plant is tripped, the 60-minute time to commence a cooldown is started. A LOCA is diagnosed and EOP 2532, Loss of Coolant Accident, is entered.

Event 6: On the trip, the Main Turbine does not trip. The BOP takes actions to emergency trip the turbine.

Event 7: On the trip, the #2 PORV, 2-RC-404, fails open. The ATC takes action to close the PORV.

The scenario will end at the examiners discretion.

Quantitative Attribute Target per Scenario Actual Events after EOP entry 1-2 2

Abnormal events 2-4 5

Major transients 1-2 1

EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions 1-2 1

Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions 1 per scenario set 0

Preidentified CTs 2 or more 3

Page 4 of 24 INPUT

SUMMARY

Either INPUT or VERIFY the following functions:

ID Number Description Delay Time Ramp Time Event Trigger Severity or Value Final Value Relative Order MALFUNCTIONS TC10H TURB TRIP FAIL(RX TRIP)

RH15 MECHICAL BINDING OF CS4.1B IN THE MID-POSITION 17 1

C06-B16 CTMT PENT CLG FAN OVERLOAD/TRIP (PIN to desktop) 2 ON ON 2

RC04 RX HEAD VENT LEAK 4

15 15 4

RC03A RCS COLD LEG LOOP 1A BRK 6

10 10 5

RC06B PORV (RC-404) FAIL 30 100 100 6

REMOTE FUNCTIONS OVERRIDES 05A1A3S1 CTMT PNTRTION FAN 2

STOP STOP 2

EVENT FILES ES22LI1 Simulator Scenario Event File (needed for trigger 17)

Page 5 of 24 Critical Task Elements Critical Task Statement Manually shutdown the turbine.

Initiating Cue EOP 2525, Standard Post Trip Actions, step 2. Reactivity Control - Turbine Trip Performance Feedback Main Turbine Control valves and Stop valves go closed, turbine speed starts lowering and switchyard breakers 15G-9T-8T & 9T open.

Success Path The Main Turbine is tripped by pushing the Emergency Trip push buttons on C-07.

Measurable Performance Standard The operator is observed to simultaneously push both Main Turbine MASTER TRIP/EMERGENCY TRIP push buttons prior to the US addressing the Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries safety function.

Critical Task Statement Secure all RCPs within 10 minutes of losing NPSH Initiating Cue RCS Pressure drops below the operating limit of the Reactor Coolant Pumps Performance Feedback The RCPs are secured, causing Hot leg temperatures to increase as natural circulation heat removal is established. Steam dumps/ADVs throttle open to maintain TAVE/S/G pressure.

Success Path Opening the RCP breakers.

Measurable Performance Standard The operator secures ALL reactor Coolant pumps within 10 minutes of the pumps not meeting their NPSH requirements as seen on MON1 or determined by EOP 2541, Appendix 2, Fig. 2, RCP NPSH curve.

Critical Task Statement Perform a plant cooldown.

Initiating Cue EOP 2532, Loss of Coolant Accident, step 19. Perform Controlled Cooldown Performance Feedback A cooldown of RCS temperatures, within Technical Specification limits (< 100 F/hour), should be observed. Note that the temperature change limits are for a continuous 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period.

Success Path The plant cooldown is performed by operating either the Atmospheric Dump Valves or the Condenser Steam Dump valves.

Measurable Performance Standard The operator is observed to commence a plant cooldown no later than one hour after an un-isolable LOCA occurs.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page 6 of 24 Event

Description:

Perform 2606D-004, 2-CS-4.1B Stroke IST, Facility 2 Symptoms/Cues: Valve does not stroke closed (dual indication)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC OPEN CS-4.1B, CS HDR B ISOL (C-01)

Booth Operator: AFTER CS-4.1B is open, Insert Trigger #17 RH15, MECHICAL BINDING OF CS4.1B IN THE MID-POSITION ATC CLOSE CS-4.1B, CS HDR B ISOL (C-01)

Notify US that CS-4.1B did not stroke closed Procedure directs operator to Go To Attachment 1, Actions for IST Data Outside Acceptable Limits Examiner note: Examinee may choose either ACTION a, b, or c.

US LCO 3.6.3.1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE. (1)(2)

Applicability: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION: With one or more of the isolation valve(s) inoperable, either:

a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or

b. Isolate the affected penetration(s) within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of a deactivated automatic valve(s) secured in the isolation position(s), or

c. Isolate the affected penetration(s) within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of a closed manual valve(s) or blind flange(s); or

d. Isolate the affected penetration that has only one containment isolation valve and a closed system within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> by use of at least one closed and deactivated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange: or

e. Be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

(1) Containment Isolation Valves may be opened on intermittent basis under administrative controls (2) The provisions of this specification in MODES 1, 2 and 3, are not applicable for main steam isolation valves. However, provisions of Specification 3.7.1.5 are applicable for main steam isolation valves.

US LCO 3.6.2.1.a CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS Two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains, with each cooling train consisting of two containment air recirculation and cooling units, shall be OPERABLE.

Applicability: MODES 1, 2 and 3*.

ACTION:

Inoperable equipment Required ACTION

a. One containment spray train a.1 Restore the inoperable containment spray train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1750 psia within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

• The Containment Spray System is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 3 if pressurizer pressure is < 1750 psia.

When the event has been addressed to the lead examiners satisfaction, proceed to the next event

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 7 of 24 Event

Description:

F-37A, A CTMT Penetration Cooling fan trips.

Symptoms/Cues: The following alarm is received coincident with F-37s green light lit and red light extinguished:

CTMT PENT CLG FAN OVERLOAD/TRIP (B-16, C-06/7)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, Insert Trigger #2 C06-B16, CTMT PENT CLG FAN OVERLOAD/TRIP 05A1A3S1, CTMT PNTRTION FAN (OFF)

PIN malfunction C06-B16, CTMT PENT CLG FAN OVERLOAD/TRIP to desktop.

WHEN F-37A handswitch is placed in OFF, REMOVE malfunction C06-B16, CTMT PENT CLG FAN OVERLOAD/TRIP US References the following ARP:

ARP 2590E-078, CTMT PENT CLG FAN OVERLOAD/TRIP T (CB-19, C-06/7 Directs BOP to OP 2314E, Containment Penetration Cooling System, to start standby fan.

BOP Places F-37B, CTMT PENT COOL SPLY FAN, to START Verifies HV-60, DIS DMPR, opens When the event has been addressed to the lead examiners satisfaction, proceed to the next event

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 8 of 24 Event

Description:

15 gpm RCS Leak Symptoms/Cues: Lowering Pressurizer level, lowering Letdown flow, rising CTMT level, and alarms:

Pressure increase on PI-8117, CTMT PRES-LR (CTMT narrow range pressure)

CTMT NORM SUMP LEVEL HI/LO (C-06/7, BA21)

Increase in CTMT particulate and gaseous RMs (8123A/B, 8262 A/B)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, Insert Trigger #4 RC04, RX HEAD VENT LEAK (15 gpm)

Examiner Note: Crew identifies RCS leak and enters AOP 2568, RCS Leak US CONTINUOUS ACTION PAGE (Plant trip criteria)

1. PRESSURIZER LEVEL LOWERING WITH SECOND CHARGING PUMP RUNNING IF in MODE 1 OR MODE 2, THEN TRIP Reactor AND GO TO EOP 2525, Standard Post Trip Actions ATC NOTE: Foldout page shall be monitored throughout this procedure.

1. Monitor Loss of RCS Inventory

a. CHECK Pressurizer Level - LOWERING

b. ADJUST LTDN FLOW CNTL, HIC-110, to stabilize Pressurizer level

c. CHECK Pressurizer level continuing to lower

d. START second Charging Pump

e. ADJUST LTDN FLOW CNTL, HIC-110, to stabilize Pressurizer level

f. CHECK Pressurizer level STABLE or RISING

g. INITIATE Forcing Pressurizer Sprays ATC US

2. Observe Reactor Power and RCS Temperature

a. CHECK Reactor Power - STABLE

b. CHECK RCS temperature - STABLE NOTE: Pumping the Containment Sump with an RCS leak should be avoided.

NOTE: ATTACHMENT B, Thumbrules, provides various tank fill rates.

NOTE: Stable Pressurizer level supports an accurate leak rate determination.

US ATC BOP

3. Determine RCS Leak Rate by any of the Following:

ACCOUNT for RCP Bleedoff flow AND CALCULATE the difference in Charging and Letdown flow REFER to ATTACHMENT B, Thumbrules, AND DETERMINE RCS leak rate OBTAIN SPDS Sump leak rate

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 9 of 24 Event

Description:

15 gpm RCS Leak Symptoms/Cues: Lowering Pressurizer level, lowering Letdown flow, rising CTMT level, and alarms:

Pressure increase on PI-8117, CTMT PRES-LR (CTMT narrow range pressure)

CTMT NORM SUMP LEVEL HI/LO (C-06/7, BA21)

Increase in CTMT particulate and gaseous RMs (8123A/B, 8262 A/B)

US

4. CHECK RCS Leakage Within The Following Limits Of T/S LCO 3.4.6.2, Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage:

NO Pressure Boundary Leakage LESS THAN or EQUAL TO 1 gpm Unidentified Leakage LESS THAN or EQUAL TO 10 gpm Identified Leakage LESS THAN or EQUAL TO 75 gpd Primary to Secondary Leakage through any one steam generator RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED PERFORM the following:

1. USE the following documents to determine reporting requirements, while continuing with this procedure:

MP-26-EPI-FAP06, Classification and PARs RAC 14, Non-Emergency Station Events

2. REFER to T/S LCO 3.4.6.2, Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage.

IF Containment Sump level indication is off scale, THEN REFER to T/S LCOs 3.4.6.1b, Leakage Detection Systems, and 3.3.3.8, Accident Monitoring AND PERFORM applicable actions.

US LCO 3.4.6.2 RCS LEAKAGE Reactor Coolant System Operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

a. No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE,

b. 1 GPM UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE,

c. 75 GPD primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one S/G, and

d. 10 GPM IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a. With any RCS operational LEAKAGE not within limits for reasons other than PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE, reduce LEAKAGE to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

b. With ACTION and associated completion time of ACTION a. not met, or PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE exists, or primary to secondary LEAKAGE not within limits, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 10 of 24 Event

Description:

15 gpm RCS Leak Symptoms/Cues: Lowering Pressurizer level, lowering Letdown flow, rising CTMT level, and alarms:

Pressure increase on PI-8117, CTMT PRES-LR (CTMT narrow range pressure)

CTMT NORM SUMP LEVEL HI/LO (C-06/7, BA21)

Increase in CTMT particulate and gaseous RMs (8123A/B, 8262 A/B)

US LCO 3.3.3.8 ACCIDENT MONITORING:

The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-11 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. ACTIONS per Table 3.3-11.

Table 3.3-11, ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Instrument Total #

Channels Minimum Channels OPERABLE ACTION

8. Containment Water Level (Narrow Range) 1 1

7##

1. 1. Refer to ACTION statement in Technical Specification 3.4.6.1.

ACTION 7; Restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. (See the ACTION statement in Technical Specification 3.4.6.1.).

US LCO 3.4.6.1 LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEM:

The following Reactor Coolant System leakage detection systems shall be OPERABLE:

a. One of two containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitoring channels, and

b. The containment sump level monitoring system.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

b. With the containment sump level monitoring system inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided:

1. A Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance is performed at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> during steady state operation. Otherwise, be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

ATC MAINTAIN VCT Level 72 to 86%

US

6. Evaluate Activities That Could Impact RCS Integrity

a. CHECK activities that could affect primary plant leakage - NONE IN PROGRESS Valve alignment Periodic Testing Maintenance

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 11 of 24 Event

Description:

15 gpm RCS Leak Symptoms/Cues: Lowering Pressurizer level, lowering Letdown flow, rising CTMT level, and alarms:

Pressure increase on PI-8117, CTMT PRES-LR (CTMT narrow range pressure)

CTMT NORM SUMP LEVEL HI/LO (C-06/7, BA21)

Increase in CTMT particulate and gaseous RMs (8123A/B, 8262 A/B)

US

7. Identify AND Locate RCS Leak Using Table 1 DETERMINE priority of steps 8 through 16 for leak identification and isolation NOTE: Based on priorities determined in step 7, steps 8 through 16 may be performed in any order.

At US discretion, only steps applicable to the observed leak in progress need to be performed.

NOTE: ATTACHMENT E, Potential RCS Leak Isolations, provides a listing of valves that may be used to isolate leakage from the RCS

a. PERFORM steps 8 through 16 in any order and as required to identify and isolate RCS leak

b. PROCEED TO step 17.

US

9. Evaluate Containment For RCS Leakage

a. CHECK all of the following conditions - MET:

Containment Sump level rate of rise - NORMAL (C-07)

Containment Radiation Monitor readings - NORMAL (RC-14/PPC)

Containment Temperature and Pressure - NORMAL (C-01/PPC)

US

9. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

a. PERFORM the following:

1. ENSURE RCS Sample valves - CLOSED (C-01X/PPC/C-72):

2-RC-001, RC Hot Leg Isol 2-RC-002, PZR Surge Sample Isol 2-RC-003, PZR Stm Sample Isol 2-RC-45, RC Combined Sample Isol Valve

2. NOTIFY OMOC of the potential need for Containment entry for leak identification.

3. REQUEST Work Week Coordinator PREPARE for Containment Entry using C OP 200.14, Containment Entry.

4. USE ATTACHMENT E, Potential RCS Leak Isolations, to address leakage into Containment.

a. IF leakage into Containment is indicated WITHOUT a resulting loss of RCS inventory, THEN CONSIDER other system leakage.

5. PROCEED TO step 10.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 12 of 24 Event

Description:

15 gpm RCS Leak Symptoms/Cues: Lowering Pressurizer level, lowering Letdown flow, rising CTMT level, and alarms:

Pressure increase on PI-8117, CTMT PRES-LR (CTMT narrow range pressure)

CTMT NORM SUMP LEVEL HI/LO (C-06/7, BA21)

Increase in CTMT particulate and gaseous RMs (8123A/B, 8262 A/B)

Examiner note: There is no need to proceed through the other RCS Leak identification steps. The US should proceed to step 17.

US

17. Evaluate RCS Leakage

a. CHECK RCS leakage has been reduced to within Tech Spec 3.4.6.2 limits

17. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

a. PERFORM one of the following to place the plant in MODE 5 within the time constraints of TS 3.4.6.2:

GO TO AOP 2575, Rapid Downpower.

OR GO TO OP 2207, Plant Cooldown.

CREW Transitions to AOP 2575, Rapid Downpower

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 13 of 24 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower Symptoms/Cues: Directed from AOP 2568, RCS Leak, step 17 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: AOP 2575, Rapid Downpower, is entered.

US

1. Perform notifications ATC

2. Initiate forcing sprays Places all B/U heaters to ON Adjusts PRES CNTL-Y, PIC 100Y thumbwheel to achieve 50% output ATC BOP

3. Insert Group 7 CEAs 10 steps (8 - 12 steps in procedure)

Lower Turbine Load (LOAD SPEED CONTROL switch), maintain TCOLD +/- 2°F of program.

US

4. Determine Reactivity Plan Availability Borate from RWST using 2 Charging Pumps BOP

5. Reduce turbine load AND Maintain TCOLD within 2 °F of program

1) Set up Turbine controls (Attachment G)

Select Load Setpt and enter desired value 14%.

Select Rate Setpt and enter desired value 30%/hour

2) Reduce turbine load when effects of boron are seen (After step 7 is complete).

When ready to commence load reduction, then select Load Resume.

IF Turbine Load Ramp Rate needs adjustment, perform any of the following:

o SELECT Rate Setpt AND ENTER new value.

o SELECT one of the following: 5%, 10%, or 20% per hour o SELECT Raise or Lower (0.25% / hour change).

ATC

6. Raise Charging Flow - No actions taken, both charging pumps running from Event #4 ATC

7. Borate from the RWST

a. CHECK Boration from RWST - SELECTED

b. CHECK VCT MAKEUP BYPASS, CH-196 - CLOSED

c. CHECK RWST TO CHG SUCT, CH-504 - OPEN

d. OPEN RWST ISOL, CH-192

e. CLOSE VCT OUT ISOL, CH-501

8. N/A - Borate from the BAST ATC

9. Maintain VCT parameters Level 70 - 90%

Pressure < 30 psig

10. N/A - Temporary Suspension of Boration CREW

11. Maintain parameters as specified in Attachment A AFTER the BOP has seen the effects of the boration and commenced turbine load reduction AND the event has been addressed to the lead examiners satisfaction, proceed to the next event.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 14 of 24 Event

Description:

LOCA, Reactor trip, EOP 2525, Standard Post Trip Actions Symptoms/Cues: RCS Leakage exceeds the capacity of the Charging Pumps, pressurizer level lowers, Letdown lowers to limiter (28gpm), CTMT pressure increasing.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: WHEN directed by Lead Examiner, INSERT Trigger #6 RCO3A, RCS Cold Leg Loop 1A Break (10)

ATC Reactivity Control - Reactor Trip

1. Ensure Reactor Trip by ALL of the following:

ALL CEAs fully inserted Reactor power is dropping SUR is negative Examiner Note: Mark START TIME of LOCA :.

Critical Task: Manually shutdown the Turbine on the reactor trip prior to proceeding to Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries Safety Function BOP Reactivity Control -Turbine Trip

2. Ensure Turbine trip by ALL of the following:

a. CHECK main turbine is tripped by ALL the following conditions:

ALL main stop valves OR ALL control valves are closed RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED a.1 Perform the following:

1) TRIP Turbine

2) If turbine can NOT be tripped, THEN CLOSE MSIVs Generator Megawatts indicate zero Turbine speed lowering

b. IF 15G-2X1-4, motor operated disconnect is closed, THEN CHECK BOTH Main Generator output breakers 15G-8T-2 and 15G-9T-2 are open BOP Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries

3. Ensure Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries is met by ALL of the following conditions:

a. CHECK Open Phase Condition annunciator RSST OPEN PHASE (C-06/7, C-48) -

NOT LIT.

b. CHECK vital and non-vital loads - ENERGIZED.

c. CHECK that both facilities of Service Water are operating.

d. CHECK that both facilities of RBCCW are operating with Service Water cooling.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 15 of 24 Event

Description:

LOCA, Reactor trip, EOP 2525, Standard Post Trip Actions Symptoms/Cues: RCS Leakage exceeds the capacity of the Charging Pumps, pressurizer level lowers, Letdown lowers to limiter (28gpm), CTMT pressure increasing.

ATC RCS Inventory Control

4. Ensure RCS Inventory Control met by ALL of the following conditions:

a. Pressurizer level is between 20 to 80%, trending to 35 to 70%.

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED a.1 START the 3rd charging pump AND SECURE Letdown

b. CHECK RCS subcooling > 30 °F ATC RCS Pressure Control

5. ENSURE RCS Pressure Control met by BOTH the following:

CHECK pressurizer pressure is 1900 to 2350 psia, trending to 2225 to 2300 psia.

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 5.1 OPERATE the Pressurizer Pressure Control System. Manually OPERATE pressurizer heaters and spray valves.

5.2 If any spray valve will not close, then stop RCPs as necessary 5.3 If any PORV is open AND pressurizer pressure is less than 2250 psia, THEN close the associated PORV Block valve.

5.4 IF pressurizer pressure is less than 1714, THEN ensure ALL the following:

SIAS actuated (C01)

CIAS actuated (C01)

EBFAS actuated (C01) 5.5 IF pressurizer pressure is less than 1714 psia AND SIAS actuated, THEN ENSURE ONE RCP in each loop is stopped.

5.6 TCOA: IF Pressurizer pressure lowers to less than the minimum of Fig. 2 RCP NPSH Curve THEN STOP ALL RCPs ATC Core Heat Removal

6. Ensure Core Heat Removal met by ALL of the following conditions:

a. CHECK at least 1 RCP is operating, AND loop T < 10 °F RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED a.1 IF RCPs are not operating, OR loop T is greater than 10°F, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) PLACE TIC-4165, steam dump TAVG controller, in manual and closed.

2) PLACE BOTH pressurizer spray valve controllers in manual and CLOSE the valves.

HIC-100E HIC-100F

b. RCS subcooling 30 °F

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 16 of 24 Event

Description:

LOCA, Reactor trip, EOP 2525, Standard Post Trip Actions Symptoms/Cues: RCS Leakage exceeds the capacity of the Charging Pumps, pressurizer level lowers, Letdown lowers to limiter (28gpm), CTMT pressure increasing.

BOP RCS Heat Removal

7. Ensure RCS Heat Removal met by ALL of the following conditions:

a. At least one S/G has BOTH of the following conditions met:

Level 10% to 80%.

Main feedwater or TCOA: TWO auxiliary feedwater pumps operating to restore level between 40% to 70%.

b. RCS TCOLD is being maintained between 530 °F to 535 °F

c. BOTH S/G pressures are 880 to 920 psia.

ATC Containment Isolation - met

8. Ensure Containment Isolation met by ALL of the following conditions:

a. CTMT pressure < 1.0 psig RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED - No actions a.1 IF containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.42 psig, THEN ENSURE ALL of the following:

SIAS actuated. (C01)

CIAS actuated. (C01)

EBFAS actuated. (C01)

MSI actuated. (C01)

b. CHECK No primary plant rad monitors have an unexplained rise or are in alarm RM-7891 has unexplained rise

c. CHECK No steam plant rad monitors have an unexpected rise or are in alarm RM-5099 is in alarm ATC Containment Temperature and Pressure Control - met

a. CTMT temperature < 120 °F RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED a.1 ENSURE ALL available normal cooling and ventilation systems are OPERATING:

CAR fans operating on the facility with an operating train of RBCCW CTMT Aux Circ fans

b. CTMT pressure < 1.0 psig RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED b.1 IF containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.42 psig, THEN ENSURE ALL of the following:

SIAS, CIAS, EBFAS, MSI actuated. (C01) (already done in Containment Isolation, above)

1) Place ALL available containment aux circ fans I low speed

2) START ALL available containment post incident recirc fans

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 17 of 24 Event

Description:

LOCA, Reactor trip, EOP 2525, Standard Post Trip Actions Symptoms/Cues: RCS Leakage exceeds the capacity of the Charging Pumps, pressurizer level lowers, Letdown lowers to limiter (28gpm), CTMT pressure increasing.

b.2 IF containment pressure is greater than or equal to 9.48 psig, THEN ENSURE ALL of the following:

CSAS actuated (C01)

ALL operating containment spray pumps are delivering at least 1300 gpm each ATC/BOP Perform Appendix 4, Reactor Trip Subsequent Actions US Diagnose the event

a. Diagnostic Flowchart directs operator to EOP 2532, Loss of Coolant Accident

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page 18 of 24 Event

Description:

EOP 2532, Loss of Coolant Accident Symptoms/Cues: Directed by performance of Diagnostic Flowchart Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US WARNING

1. ALL Personnel are required to use ice vests for all tasks associated with a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and performed in Unit 2 Aux. Building and or Enclosure Building.

2. Ice vests can be found in Unit One Control Room area.

NOTE: Harsh Containment values are designated with brackets [ ]. These values should be used anytime CIAS has actuated on high containment pressure greater than 4.42 psig.

US BOP Confirm Diagnosis

• 1. Monitor the Safety Function Status Checks AND CHECK Safety Function Status Check Acceptance Criteria are satisfied.

• 2. CHECK steam generators sample available:

a. CHECK B train RBCCW header in operation.

b. ENSURE RB-210, SAMPLE/DEGAS EFF CLR ISOL, is open.

c. OPEN BOTH the steam generator sample valves:

MS-191A MS-191B

d. DIRECT Chemistry to Sample BOTH steam generators for activity AND boron

e. WHEN the samples have been taken, THEN CLOSE BOTH steam generator sample valves:

MS-191A MS-191B US Classify the Event

• 3. REFER TO MP-26-EPI-FAP06, Classification and PARs, AND PERFORM the following:

a. CLASSIFY the event

b. Using EOP 2541, Appendix 46, Sampling for EAL Determination, DIRECT Chemistry to sample for EAL determination.

US Implement Placekeeping

• 4. PERFORM the following:

OPEN the placekeeper and ENTER the EOP entry time.

ENSURE Alarm Silence Switch is in NORMAL.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page 19 of 24 Event

Description:

EOP 2532, Loss of Coolant Accident Symptoms/Cues: Directed by performance of Diagnostic Flowchart ATC SIAS Actuation

• 5. IF pressurizer pressure is less than 1714 psia, PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. CHECK SIAS, CIAS and EBFAS have actuated. (C-01)

b. TCOA ENSURE at least ONE complete facility of CRAC is operating in the recirc mode: (C25A/B)

Facility 1 HV-203A, Fan F-21A exhaust damper is open.

Fan F-21A, supply fan is running.

HV-206A, Fan F-31A exhaust damper is open.

Fan F-31A, exhaust fan is running.

HV-212A, Fan F-32A exhaust damper is open.

Fan F-32A, filter fan is running.

HV-202, minimum fresh air damper is closed.

HV-207, cable vault exhaust damper is closed.

HV-208, exhaust air damper is closed.

ATC Optimize Safety Injection

• 6. PERFORM ALL of the following actions:

a. CHECK at least ONE train of SIAS, CIAS and EBFAS actuated. (C-01X)

b. ENSURE ALL available SI pumps are operating.

c. REFER To EOP 2541, Appendix 2, Figures, Fig. 3 AND CHECK that safety injection flow is adequate.

d. START ALL available charging pumps.

e. ENSURE vital switchgear cooling is operating for each operating ECCS train as follows:

A TRAIN Lower 4160V switchgear room Fan F-134, LOWER 4160VAC SWITCHGEAR COOLING FAN, is energized.

SW-178B, COOLER x-182 CONTROL VALVE, is open.

West 480V switchgear room Fan F-51, WEST 480V SWGR RM COOLING FAN, is running SW-178A, COOLERS X-181A, X-181 SW CONTROL VALVE, is open.

East DC switchgear room Fan F-54A, A DC SWGR RM COOLING FAN, is running P-122A, A Chilled Water pump, is running X-169A, A Vital chiller, is energized

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page 20 of 24 Event

Description:

EOP 2532, Loss of Coolant Accident Symptoms/Cues: Directed by performance of Diagnostic Flowchart B TRAIN Upper 4160V switchgear room Fan F-133, UPPER 4160V SWGR RM COOLING FAN, is energized SW-178C, COOLER X-183 SW CONTROL VALVE, is open East 480V switchgear room Fan F-52, EAST 480V SWGR RM COOLING FAN, is energized Fan F-142, EAST 480V SWGR RM EXHAUST FAN, is energized West DC switchgear room Fan F-54B, B DC SWGR RM COOLING FAN, is running P-122B, B Chilled Water pump, is running X-169B, B Vital chiller, is energized

f. CHECK F-112A OR F-112B, Battery Room Exhaust fan is running (ZE689A or ZE689B)

Critical Task: Secure all RCPs within 10 minutes of losing NPSH (IF PORV BLOCK VALVE CLOSURE DELAYED)

ATC RCP Trip Strategy

• 7. PERFORM The following actions:

a. CHECK BOTH of the following conditions exist:

pressurizer pressure is less than 1714 psia AND SIAS has actuated

b. ENSURE ONE RCP in each loop is stopped.

c. PLACE associated pressurizer spray valve controller in MAN AND CLOSE the applicable spray valve:

HIC-100E, spray valve controller, RC-100E HIC-100F, spray valve controller, RC-100F

d. REFER TO EOP 2541, Appendix 2, Figures, Fig. 2, RCP NPSH Curve, AND CHECK RCP NPSH is within limits.

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED (IF PORV BLOCK VALVE CLOSURE DELAYED) d.1 TCOA STOP ALL RCPs d.2 PLACE TIC-4165, steam dump TAVG controller, in M AND closed.

d.3 PLACE BOTH spray valve controllers in MAN AND CLOSE the valves:

HIC-100E, spray valve controller, RC-100E HIC-100F, spray valve controller, RC-100F

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page 21 of 24 Event

Description:

EOP 2532, Loss of Coolant Accident Symptoms/Cues: Directed by performance of Diagnostic Flowchart ATC RCP Operating Limits

• 8. PERFORM the following actions:

a. CHECK at least ONE RCP operating RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED (IF PORV BLOCK VALVE CLOSURE DELAYED) a.1 IF ALL RCPs are stopped, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) PLACE BOTH spray valve controllers in MAN AND CLOSE the valves:

HIC-100E, spray valve controller, RC-100E HIC-100F, spray valve controller, RC-100F

2) PLACE TIC-4165, steam dump TAVG controller, in M AND closed.

a.2 PROCEED TO step 9

b. REFER TO EOP 2541, Appendix 22, RCP Operating Parameters, AND CHECK RCP limits satisfied ATC Isolate the LOCA

• 9. ISOLATE potential LOCA locations as follows:

a. CHECK BOTH PORVs closed.

RC-402 RC-404

b. ENSURE BOTH of the following letdown isolation valves are closed:

CH-515 CH-516

c. CHECK ALL of the following RCS sample line isolation valves are closed:

Facility 1 RC-45, RC combined sample isolation valve Facility 2 RC- 001, RC hot leg isolation valve RC- 002, pressurizer surge sample isolation valve RC- 003, pressurizer steam sample isolation valve

d. CHECK NO leakage into the RBCCW system by BOTH of the following:

CHECK RM-6038, RBCCW Radiation Monitor is NOT ALARMING OR increasing CHECK RBCCW Surge Tank level not rising

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page 22 of 24 Event

Description:

EOP 2532, Loss of Coolant Accident Symptoms/Cues: Directed by performance of Diagnostic Flowchart ATC Check LOCA Inside of Containment

• 10. CHECK that the LOCA is occurring inside of containment by evaluating the following:

a. NONE of the following Radiation Monitors Outside Containment have an unexplained alarm OR indicate an unexplained rise in activity:

RM-7894, Charging Pump Area RM-7895, Primary Sample Sink RM-7896, - 25 ft 6 in Waste Process Area RM-7897, - 45 ft 6 in Waste Process Area RM-8169, Millstone Stack WR RM-8168, Unit 2 WR Stack BOP

b. CHECK that ALL of the following annunciators are not in alarm:

AUX BLDG SUMP LEVEL HI (C06, AA-21)

RBCCW RM SUMP LEVEL HI (C06, AB-21)

SI RM A SUMP LEVEL HI (C06, CA-21)

SI RM B SUMP LEVEL HI (C06, CB-21)

SI RM C SUMP LEVEL HI (C06, DA-21)

c. MONITOR Aerated Waste Tank levels for abnormal rise.

d. MONITOR Clean Waste receiver tank levels for NO abnormal rise ATC Place Hydrogen Analyzers in Service

• 11. USE EOP 2541, Appendix 19, Hydrogen Analyzer Operation. AND PLACE the hydrogen analyzers in service.

ATC Containment Isolation and Containment Cooling

• 12. PERFORM the following actions:

a. CHECK EITHER of the following conditions exist:

Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.42 psig Radiation monitors inside containment are greater than their alarm setpoints

b. ENSURE SIAS, CIAS, EBFAS and MSI have actuated. (C01)

c. CHECK that at least one train of SIAS, CIAS, EBFAS and MSI has properly actuated. (C01X)

d. ENSURE ALL available CAR fans are operating:

CAR fans operating in slow speed CAR emergency outlet valves open:

RB-28.3A RB-28.3B RB-28.3C RB-28.3D

e. START ALL available post-incident recirculation fans.

f. CHECK Bus24C or 24D is energized from offsite power RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED PROCEED TO step 13

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page 23 of 24 Event

Description:

EOP 2532, Loss of Coolant Accident Symptoms/Cues: Directed by performance of Diagnostic Flowchart ATC Containment Spray Actuation

• 13. PERFORM the following actions for Containment Spray actuation:

a. CHECK containment pressure is greater than or equal to 9.48 psig

b. ENSURE CSAS actuated. (C01)

c. ENSURE ALL available containment spray headers are providing flow greater than or equal to 1300 gpm.

ATC Containment Spray Termination

• 14. TERMINATE containment spray as follows:

a. CHECK at least ONE containment spray pump operating.

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED PROCEED TO step 15 BOP RBCCW Header Operating

• 15. PERFORM the following actions for EACH RBCCW header:

a. CHECK RBCCW AND associated SW pumps operating

b. CHECK ALL operating RCPs are supplied with RBCCW cooling flow.

BOP Close MSIVs on a Loss of Offsite Power

• 16. CHECK Main Condenser is available, as indicated by ALL the following:

At least ONE MSIV open Condenser vacuum better than 15 Hg-Abs (0 to 15)

At least ONE Condensate pump operating At least ONE Circ pump operating BOP Align Instrument Air

• 17. CHECK instrument air pressure greater than 90 psig AND stable US LOCA in Progress

• 18. CHECK LOCA is still in progress

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Page 24 of 24 Event

Description:

EOP 2532, Loss of Coolant Accident Symptoms/Cues: Directed by performance of Diagnostic Flowchart CREW NOTE

1. The operator is required to initiate a RCS cooldown following an un-isolable LOCA no later than one hour after the event occurs.

2. After one hour, the operator will establish and maintain an average cooldown rate of greater than 40F/hr. (e.g., at two hours following the LOCA, the RCS is greater than 40 F cooler than it was one hour following the LOCA) until the steam dump/bypass valves or ADVs are full open.

3. The starting point for the RCS cooldown should be the TCOLD or CET temperatures where RCS has stabilized. The PPC cooldown ( F/hr.) display will indicate accurately after 'RCS STABLE' is selected.

4. TCOLD should be used for monitoring RCS cooldown if in forced or natural circulation.

CETs should be used for all other cases.

US Perform Controlled Cooldown

• 19. CHECK Steam Dumps to Condenser available.

a. TCOA INITIATE a controlled cooldown using the steam dumps to establish shutdown cooling entry conditions.

b. USE EOP 2541, Appendix 8, Plant Cooldown, AND PERFORM supplemental cooldown actions.

CRITICAL TASK: LOCA-09, Perform a Plant Cooldown TIME of LOCA:____________

TIME plant cooldown started:__________ _________

When the event has been addressed to the lead examiners satisfaction, the scenario is complete.

SIMULATOR SCENARIO #2

Page 2 of 18 Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Event No.

Malf. No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

N/A N - ATC/US Swap Charging Pumps 2

SW01B C - BOP/US TS - US Trip of B Service Water pump 3

ED02 TS - US Loss of North Bus, 4

FW01 C - BOP/US Lowering Condenser vacuum 5

R - All Rapid Downpower 6

FW02 M - All Loss of Vacuum (TRIP CRITERIA) 7 EG08A C - BOP/US MC - BOP A EDG fails to start (SBO).

8 RP27B C - ATC/US MC - ATC Failure of ALL RPS trips AND Manual trip pushbuttons

• (N)Normal, (R)Reactivity, (I)Instrument, (C)Component, (M)Major, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control Facility:

Millstone Unit 2 Scenario #: 2 Scenario Source:

NRC Exam 2014-2 Op. Test #: ES22LI1 Examiners:

Applicants/

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

100% power, steady state operations Turnover:

B EDG RTO, B SW pump running, aligned to B SW header. Bus 24E is aligned to Bus 24D Critical Tasks:

1. Manually Shutdown the reactor prior to the US proceeding to the Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries Safety Function.

2. Start the TDAFW pump within 10 minutes of a loss of feedwater

Page 3 of 18 Scenario Summary:

The crew will take the shift with the unit at 100% power, steady state, with the B EDG OOS. The B SW Pump is running, supplying the B Service Water header.

Event 1: The ATC swaps Charging Pumps from P18C to P18A in Lead in accordance with OP 2304E, Charging Pumps; Section 4.2, Normal Charging Pump Operation.

Event 2: The B Service Water Pump trips. The crew enters AOP 2565, Loss of Service Water, and starts the C Service Water pump. The crew continues through the procedure. The US enters TS 3.7.4.1 for a Loss of a Service Water loop.

Event 3: The North bus de-energizes. There are no actions for the crew. The US enters TS 3.8.1.1.a for Loss of Off-Site lines.

Event 4: Condenser vacuum starts degrading, the crew enters AOP 2574, Loss of Condenser Vacuum.

Event 5: AOP 2574 directs the crew to AOP 2575, Rapid Downpower.

Event 6: Condenser Vacuum degrades to reactor trip criteria. The crew trips the plant.

Event 7: The Rx trip push buttons do not work, so the ATC opens the MG set feeder breakers to trip the reactor. The trip starts both the 10-minute Loss of Feedwater timer.

Event 8: On the trip, the A Diesel fails to start. The BOP starts the Diesel. After 10 seconds, the diesel output breaker trips open, at that point, the BOP trips the A EDG. The unit is now in a Station Blackout condition and the 60-minute SBO timer starts. The BOP starts the Terry Turbine. After completion of the Standard Post-Trip Actions, the crew diagnoses and enters EOP 2530, Station Blackout.

The scenario will end at the examiners discretion.

Quantitative Attribute Target per Scenario Actual Events after EOP entry 1-2 2

Abnormal events 2-4 5

Major transients 1-2 1

EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions 1-2 1

Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions 1 per scenario set 0

Preidentified CTs 2 or more 2

Page 4 of 18 INPUT

SUMMARY

Either INPUT or VERIFY the following functions:

ID Num Description Delay Time Ramp Time Event Trigger Severity or Value Final Value Relative Order MALFUNCTIONS EG11B DG 13U AUTO START FAIL 0

RP27B NO RPS AUTO TRIP 0

RP04A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP (PB-1) FAIL 0

RP04B MANUAL REACTOR TRIP (PB-2A) FAIL 0

RP04C MANUAL REACTOR TRIP (PB-3A) FAIL 0

RP04D MANUAL REACTOR TRIP (PB-4A) FAIL 0

SW01B SERVICE WATER PUMP B TRIP 2

1 ED02 LOSS OF RSST 3

2 FW01A LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM 4

5.6 5.6 3

FW01B RAPID LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM 5

0.25 0.25 4

EG08A DG 12U OUTPUT BRKR 15G-12U-2 FAIL 6

5 REMOTE FUNCTIONS EGR18 DIESEL GEN B (A401) RI/RO RO 0

OVERRIDES 06A1A5S34 D/G B MANUAL START/STOP (DIGITAL INPUT)

STOP 0

Page 5 of 18 Critical Task Elements Critical Task Statement Manually Shutdown the reactor.

Initiating Cue Indication that a reactor trip setpoint has been exceeded and the CEAs have not inserted.

Performance Feedback Pushing the manual trip pushbuttons do NOT open the Trip Circuit breakers. When the MG set input breakers are opened, the CEAs insert fully. Rod bottom lights will light, power will start lowering and the core will have a negative start up rate.

Success Path Opening the MG set input breakers.

Measurable Performance Standard The operator opens the MG set input breakers prior to the US proceeding to the Maintenance of Vital auxiliaries Safety Function.

Critical Task Statement Start the turbine-driven Auxiliary Feed (TDAFW) Pump within 10 minutes of a Loss of Feedwater Initiating Cue EOP 2525, Standard Post Trip Actions, step 7. RCS Heat Removal, RNO step a.1 Performance Feedback Turbine-driven discharge pressure will increase with speed to a value greater than S/G pressure. At that point, there will be indication of feed flow to both steam generators.

Success Path With no Main Feed or Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feed pumps available, the TDAFW pump is started to ensure RCS Heat Removal Safety Function is met.

Measurable Performance Standard The operator will start the TDAFW pump by opening the steam inlet valve, then increase pump speed using the governor (SPD CNTL) until feed flow is established within 10 minutes of a Loss of Feedwater.

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 6 of 18 Event

Description:

Swap Charging Pumps to A in Lead Symptoms/Cues: OP 2304E, Charging Pumps, Section 4.2, Normal Charging Pump Operaiton Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed to pre-lubricate the C Charging pump packing, report the following for the C Charging pump plunger flush pump:

Pump has been running for greater than one minute with the following indications:

No abnormal noise or vibration Seal tank level > 1/2 full Pressure = 9 psig Seal flow indicated If queried, report the A Charging pump suction and discharge valves are open and oil level is good.

ATC Ensure A Charging pump is in Normal after Close (Red flag)

Position CHG PP BACK-UP CNTL switch to 2 & 3position Booth Operator: When queried for post-start checks on A Charging pump, report the following:

Pump has been running for greater than one minute with the following indications:

No abnormal noise or vibration Power end oil pressure = 35 psig and stable Power end oil temperature 115 F and stable Power end oil level = 3/4 full Seal tank level > 1/2 full Pressure = 9 psig Seal flow indicated When the event has been addressed to the lead examiners satisfaction, proceed to the next event.

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 7 of 18 Event

Description:

B Service Water Pump trip Symptoms/Cues: Alarm SW PUMP B OVERLOAD/TRIP (C-06/7, AB-4)

Loss of B Service Water Header flow, pump amperage = 0, pump red light not lit Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: WHEN directed by Lead Examiner, INSERT Trigger #2 SW01B, Service Water pump B Trip US Refers to ARP 2590E-026, SW PUMP B OVERLOAD/TRIP Enters AOP 2565, Loss of Service Water BOP Checks A Service Water ump aligned to Facility 1 Service Water Header Starts A Service Water pump US Goes to Section 5, AOP 2565, for trip of B SW pump while providing A header BOP Closes SW-97B Places B SW pump in Pull-To-Lock Monitors Header flow, Pump pressure, motor amperage Determine the cause of the pump malfunction Booth operator: When directed to investigate SW pump trip, report the following:

Breaker A502 has Overcurrent relay target dropped, no other issues B SW pump has no abnormal indications US LCO 3.7.4.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM Two Service Water Loops shall be OPERABLE APPLICABILITY: modes 1, 2, 3 AND 4 ACTION: With one service water loop inoperable, restore the inoperable loop to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

TRMAS 7.1.21 APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN REQUIREMENTS (14 day requirement)

BOP Refers to OP 2326A to complete alignment of A Service Water pump Booth Operator: When directed, Insert trigger #x and report SIAS/LNP ACTUATION SIGNAL HS 6484A in BLOCK HS6484A to BLOCK Booth Operator: When directed, report the following actions complete:

NaOCl suspended to B SW pump Post start checks complete A SW pump Packing leak-off from gland, Lube water flow through flush line flow gauge No abnormal noises or vibrations Proper discharge pressure and strainer P P gauge vented US Log exit from:

TS LCO 3.7.4.1 TRMAS 7.1.21 When the event has been addressed to the lead examiners satisfaction, proceed to the next event.

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 8 of 18 Event

Description:

North bus de-energizes Symptoms/Cues: RSST LOCKOUT CHANNEL 1(C-08, A3); RSST UNDERVOLTAGE (C-08, C3);

RSST TROUBLE (C-08, D3); RSST PRIMARY TRANSFER TRIP OPERATION (C-08, B4);

RSST BACKUP TRANSFER TRIP OPERATION (C-08, B5);NSST/RSST 4160 SUPPLY OUT OF SYNCH Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: WHEN directed by Lead Examiner, INSERT Trigger #3 ED02, LOSS OF RSST US References one of the following ARPs:

• ARP 2590F-009, RSST LOCKOUT CHANNEL 1

• ARP 2590F-011, RSST UNDERVOLTAGE

• ARP 2590F-012, RSST TROUBLE ARP 2590F-014, RSST PRIMARY TRANSFER TRIP OPERATION ARP 2590F-018, RSST BACKUP TRANSFER TRIP OPERATION ARP 2590F-020, NSST/RSST 4160 SUPPLY OUT OF SYNCH US LCO 3.8.1.1 A.C. SOURCES - OPERATING As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system, and

b. Two separate and independent diesel generators each with a separate fuel oil supply tank containing a minimum of 12,000 gallons of fuel.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and4.

ACTION:

Inoperable equipment Required ACTION

a. One offsite circuit a.1 Perform Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1 for remaining offsite circuit within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> prior to or after entering this condition, and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter AND a.2 Restore the offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (within 10 days* if Required ACTION a.3 is met) or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

AND a.3 With MPS3 in MODE 5, 6, or defueled, the MPS3 'A' RSST inoperable, and the MPS3 'A' NSST energized with breaker 15G-13T-2 (13T) and associated disconnect switches closed, restore either offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 10 days* if the following requirements are met:

- Within 30 days prior to entering the 10-day* AOT, the availability of the supplemental power source (MPS3 SBO diesel generator) shall be verified.

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 9 of 18 Event

Description:

North bus de-energizes Symptoms/Cues: RSST LOCKOUT CHANNEL 1(C-08, A3); RSST UNDERVOLTAGE (C-08, C3);

RSST TROUBLE (C-08, D3); RSST PRIMARY TRANSFER TRIP OPERATION (C-08, B4);

RSST BACKUP TRANSFER TRIP OPERATION (C-08, B5);NSST/RSST 4160 SUPPLY OUT OF SYNCH Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

- During the 10-day*AOT, the availability of the supplemental power source shall be checked once per shift. If the supplemental power source becomes unavailable at any time during the 10-day*AOT, restore to available status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

- The risk management actions contained in DENC letter 20-109, (also provided in TS Bases 3/4.8), shall remain in effect during the 10-day*AOT.

• To facilitate replacement of the MPS3 'A' RSST and associated equipment, use of a one-time 35-day allowed outage time is permitted provided the requirements of Required ACTION a.3 are met. The work shall be completed no later than the end of MPS3 Refueling Outage 22 (fall 2023).

US Directs SP 2619G-001, AC Electrical Sources Inoperability, TS 3.8.1.1 ACTION a - One offsite Circuit Inoperable, be performed.

Booth Operator: When queried for the status of Unit 3 electrical alignment (SP 2619G-001), report the following:

Unit 3 is on-line, 100% power NSST A Energized, No valid alarms 34A1-2 Closed NSSA-34A-2 Closed When the event has been addressed to the lead examiners satisfaction, proceed to the next event.

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 10 of 18 Event

Description:

Degrading vacuum Symptoms/Cues: COND VACUUM LO (C-06/7, A-37)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: WHEN directed by Lead Examiner, INSERT Trigger #4 FW01A, LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM US References ARP 2590E-185, COND VACUUM LO Enters AOP 2574, Loss of Condenser Vacuum US Review Reactor trip criteria:

Reactor power and turbine load < 30% and backpressure > 5 Hg Backpressure approaching 7.5 Hg AND reactor power > 15%

If at any time, efforts to restore vacuum are unsuccessful. Refer to AOP 2575, Rapid Downpower and LOWER power until pressure stabilizes.

NOTIFY ISO New England of imminent loss of unit.

Booth Operator: When directed, report the following (No actions required):

SJAE steam supply pressure = 225 psig Both sets of SJAEs are in service Local vacuum gages (Hoggers) = 28 Hg AR-11, AR-12A and AR-12B are OPEN Traveling screen P = 3 H2O Trash rack P = 1 H2O Proper operation of CN-302 A water seal exists in AR-17 Condenser expansion joint filled Condenser walk down with no indication of in-leakage No recent or on-going maintenance activities in the Turbine building BOP Verify the following:

F55A or F55B operating EB-55 and EB-56 OR EB-57 OPEN SJAE supply pressure 200-250 psig Both sets of SJAE in service BOP Start both Mechanical Vacuum pumps Check Mechanical Vacuum pump pressure > 27 Hg OPEN AR-11 OPEN AR-12A and AR-12B START F55A, Secure F55B, ENSURE EB-171 closed BOP ENSURE the following:

all available circulating water pumps are operating Available waterbox inlet and outlet valves are open

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 11 of 18 Event

Description:

Degrading vacuum Symptoms/Cues: COND VACUUM LO (C-06/7, A-37)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Normal Circ water pump amperage Traveling screen P < 12 H2O Trash rack P < 9 H2O Condenser T < 26 F BOP ENSURE the following:

Condenser Steam Dumps and bypass valves are closed proper operation of CN-302 Steam Seal pressure between 2 and 6 psig Condensate Surge tank level > 15% and not lowering Turbine Exhaust hood temperature < 175 F AR-17 is closed Water seal exists in AR-17 Condenser expansion joint filled US Transitions to AOP 2575, Rapid Downpower

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 12 of 18 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower Symptoms/Cues:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: AOP 2575, Rapid Downpower, is entered.

US Perform notifications ATC Initiate forcing sprays Places all B/U heaters to ON Adjusts PRES CNTL-Y, PIC 100Y thumbwheel to achieve 50% output ATC BOP Insert Group 7 CEAs 10 steps (8 - 12 steps in procedure)

Reduce Turbine Load (LOAD SPEED CONTROL switch), maintain TCOLD +/- 2°F of program.

US Determine Reactivity Plan Availability Borate from RWST using 2 Charging Pumps BOP Set up Turbine controls (Attachment G)

Select Load Setpt and enter desired value 14%.

Select Rate Setpt and enter desired value 30%/hour ATC Raise Charging Flow - No actions taken, both charging pumps running from Event #4 ATC Borate from the RWST

a. CHECK Boration from RWST - SELECTED

b. CHECK VCT MAKEUP BYPASS, CH-196 - CLOSED

c. CHECK RWST TO CHG SUCT, CH-504 - OPEN

d. OPEN RWST ISOL, CH-192

e. CLOSE VCT OUT ISOL, CH-501 BOP Reduce turbine load when effects of boron are seen.

When ready to commence load reduction, then select Load Resume.

IF Turbine Load Ramp Rate needs to be adjusted, perform any of the following:

o SELECT Rate Setpt AND ENTER new value.

o SELECT one of the following: 5%, 10%, or 20% per hour o SELECT Raise or Lower (0.25% / hour change).

Maintain TCOLD within 2 °F of program ATC Maintain VCT parameters Level 70 - 90%

Pressure < 30 psig CREW Maintain parameters as specified in Attachment A AFTER the BOP has seen the effects of the boration and commenced turbine load reduction AND the event has been addressed to the lead examiners satisfaction, proceed to the next event.

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 13 of 18 Event

Description:

Rapid Loss of Vacuum Symptoms/Cues: Lowering Condenser Vacuum. Reactor trip criteria met.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: WHEN directed by Lead Examiner, INSERT Trigger #5 FW01B, RAPID LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM Manually Shutdown the reactor prior to the US proceeding to the Maintenance of Vital auxiliaries Safety Function.

ATC Reactivity Control Reactor Trip

1. Ensure Reactor Trip All CEAs fully inserted Reactor power is dropping SUR is negative RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1.1 IF Reactor trip breakers are closed, THEN insert CEAs by any of the following methods:

1) PUSH the RX TRIP TCBS buttons

2) OPEN CEDM MG set feeder breakers

3) OPEN the reactor trip circuit breakers (Local)

BOP Reactivity Control Turbine Trip

2. Ensure Turbine trip Stop valves and Control valves are closed Generator Megawatts indicate zero Turbine speed lowering BOP Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries

3. Ensure Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries is met by ALL of the following conditions:

a. CHECK Open Phase Condition annunciator RSST OPEN PHASE (C-06/7, C-48) - NOT LIT

b. CHECK vital and non-vital loads - ENERGIZED RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED (All 6.9 kV and 4160 V buses de-energized) b.1 Bus 24C de-energized

1) Containment pressure is < 20 psig

2) ENSURE diesel generator has started

3) ENSURE vital to non-vital tie breaker is open

4) Ensure EDG output breaker synchronizing switch is ON

5) ENSURE EDG output breaker is closed Examiner Note: Power will be restored to bus 24C temporarily, then lost again when the breaker trips open (after the US finishes with Vital Auxiliaries). The crew will return to the step to energize the bus and end up tripping the diesel.

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 14 of 18 Event

Description:

Rapid Loss of Vacuum Symptoms/Cues: Lowering Condenser Vacuum. Reactor trip criteria met.

Booth Operator: WHEN the crew is completed Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries, INSERT Trigger #6 EG08A, DG 12U OUTPUT BRKR 15G-12U-2 FAIL

6) IF EDG output breaker cannot be closed, then TRIP the EDG BOP Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries

c. CHECK that both facilities of Service Water are operating RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED c.1 No actions to take BOP

d. CHECK that both facilities of RBCCW are operating with Service Water cooling.

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED d.1 If a SW pump is NOT running, place the associated RBCCW pump in Pull-To-Lock ATC RCS Inventory Control Pressurizer level < 20%

a. Pressurizer level is between 20 to 80%, trending to 35 to 70%.

ATC RCS Pressure Control

a. CHECK that pressurizer pressure is 1900 to 2350 psia, trending to 2225 to 2300 psia ATC Core Heat Removal

a. CHECK at least 1 RCP is operating, AND loop T < 10 °F RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED a.1 IF RCPs are not operating, OR loop T is greater than 10°F, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) PLACE TIC-4165, steam dump TAVG controller, in manual and closed.

2) PLACE BOTH pressurizer spray valve controllers in manual and CLOSE the valves.

HIC-100E HIC-100F

b. RCS subcooling > 30 °F Start the turbine-driven Auxiliary Feed (TDAFW) Pump within 10 minutes of a Loss of Feedwater.

BOP RCS Heat Removal

a. At least one S/G has BOTH of the following conditions met:

Level 10% to 80%.

Main feedwater or TCOA: TWO auxiliary feedwater pumps operating to restore level between 40% to 70%.

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED a.1 RESTORE level to between 40% and 70% in at least ONE SG using ANY of the following:

TDAFW Pump. Refer to Appendix 6, TDAFW Pump Normal Startup.

b. RCS TCOLD is being maintained between 530 °F to 535 °F

c. BOTH S/G pressures are 880 to 920 psia.

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 15 of 18 Event

Description:

Rapid Loss of Vacuum Symptoms/Cues: Lowering Condenser Vacuum. Reactor trip criteria met.

ATC Containment Isolation - met

a. CTMT pressure < 1.0 psig

b. No primary plant rad monitors have an unexplained rise or are in alarm

c. No steam plant rad monitors have an unexpected rise or are in alarm ATC Containment Temperature and Pressure Control - met

a. CTMT temperature < 120 °F RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED a.1 ENSURE ALL available normal cooling and ventilation systems are OPERATING:

CAR fans operating on the facility with an operating train of RBCCW CTMT Aux Circ fans

b. CTMT pressure < 1.0 psig RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED b.1 IF containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.42 psig, THEN ENSURE ALL of the following:

SIAS actuated. (C01)

CIAS actuated. (C01)

EBFAS actuated. (C01)

MSI actuated. (C01)

ATC BOP Perform Appendix 4, Reactor Trip Subsequent Actions US Diagnose the event

a. Diagnostic Flowchart directs operator to EOP 2530, Station Blackout

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 16 of 18 Event

Description:

EOP 2530, Station Blackout Symptoms/Cues:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Confirm Diagnosis Monitor Safety Function Status Check (hand off to STA)

US Classify the event (hand off to SM)

Record EOP entry time Place Master Alarm Silence in NORMAL CHECK EOP 2525, Standard Post Trip Actions, performed US Check Vital 4160V expected to be restored within 30 minutes of event initiation.

TCOA: USE EOP 2541, Appendix 14, Supplemental Cooling on Loss of Ventilation, AND WITHIN 30 minutes of event initiation, ALIGN Supplemental cooling for ALL Vital Equipment (De-energizes PPC)

BOP

6. Check Main Condenser Available RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 6.1 PERFORM the Following:

Close BOTH MSIVs ENSURE MSIV Bypass valves are closed OPEN AR-17 BOP

7. Maintain Secondary Inventory CLOSE both low point drains MS-265B, MS-266B CLOSE B/D valves MS-220A, MS220B CLOSE Sample valves MS-191A, Ms-191B ATC

8. TCOA REDUCE RCS leakage within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of event initiation. As follows:

CLOSE both Letdown isolation valves CH-515 & CH-516 Place all de-energized charging pumps in Pull-To-Lock CLOSE RCP Bleed-off isolation RC-506 CHECH RCS Sample valves closed. RC-001, RC-002, RC-003, RC-045 BOP ENSURE RCS TCOLD is being maintained < 535 °F by operating ADVs ENSURE SG level is being restored by the TDAFW pump BOP ENSURE all feeder breakers on de-energized 4160V and 6.9kV are open. EOP 2541 Appendix 39, Opening Supply Breakers on De-energized Electrical Buses US When All feeder breakers are open, USE EOP 2541, Appendix 23, Restoring Electrical Power and Energize ONE vital electrical bus.

Refers To Appendix 23, Attachment 23-N, Energizing 4.16kV Bus 24E from Unit 3

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 17 of 18 Event

Description:

EOP 2530, Station Blackout Symptoms/Cues:

BOP Obtains permission from Unit 3 to energize Bus 24E from Unit 3 Bus 34A/B ENSURE 4.16kV Bus 24E SPLY VOLTS voltage is indicated Place SYNC SEL SW, 34B-24E-2 to ON and check INCOMING voltage indicated CLOSE A505, 24E/34B TIE BKR CHECK voltage on RUNNING voltmeter REFER to Attachment 23-U, 3MVA Electrical Limit on Bus 34A/B and ENSURE 3MVA is not exceeded as loads are restored to service BOP As directed by US, REALIGN and place the following pumps in service:

B RBCCW US restore power to Bus 24 C(D) iaw Appendix 23-D(G), Energizing 4.16kV Bus 24C(D) from 24E BOP Check no faults on Bus 24C(D)

Check Bus 24E energized from Bus 34A/B Ensure the following breakers open:

A312 (A401), EDG Output Breaker A302 (A411), RSST Supply Breaker A304 (A410), 24A(B)/24C(D) tie breaker A408 (A305), 24D(C)/24E tie breaker Ensure A305 (A408), 24C(D)/24E tie breaker is open Check A305 (A408), 24C(D)/24E tie breaker is racked up Notify Unit 3 SM that unit 2 bus 24C(D) is going to be energized for bus 34A/B BOP Place ALL four ESAS UV BUS A3(4) into INHIBIT position (Key#26)

Press Facility 1(2) UV RESET button (ESF Actuation Cabinet 5(6)

Ensure Facility 1(2) sequencer reset:

Sequence zero light not lit Sequence 1 through 4 lights lit Diesel breaker lit BOP Place the following in Pull-To-Lock:

A(C)RBCCW pump A(C)Service Water pump BOTH Auto AFW OVERIDE/MAN/START/RESET handswitches Place A(B) AFW pump in Normal After Trip If actuated, override the following to prevent restart:

A(C) HPSI pump A(B) LPSI pump A(B) Containment Spray pump A(B) AFW pump

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 18 of 18 Event

Description:

EOP 2530, Station Blackout Symptoms/Cues:

BOP CLOSE A305(A408) and observe Bus 24C(D) volts increase Examiner Note: Please ensure the operator returns the keys to the key locker. A common occurrence is for the operator to place the keys in their pocket which could jeopardize exam security if the keys leave the simulator.

BOP Reset all bus 24C(D) undervoltage sensor trips Place ALL four ESAS UV BUS A3(4) channel bypass switches into OPERATE position and REMOVE keys (Key #26)

BOP Ensure 3 MVA limits are not exceeded When the event has been addressed to the lead examiners satisfaction, the scenario is complete.

SIMULATOR SCENARIO #3

Page 2 of 20 Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Facility:

Millstone Unit 2 Scenario #: 3 Scenario Source:

Op. Test #: ES22LI1 Examiners:

Applicants/

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

100% power, steady state operations, A Train protected.

Turnover:

RM-8240, CTMT Hi Range RM-8241 Out of Service for repairs.

Critical Tasks:

(see page 5)

1. Cooldown the RCS to < 515 F prior to isolating the affected S/G

2. Secure all RCPs within 10 minutes of losing NPSH

3. Isolated the affected S/G within 60 minutes of the SGTR.

Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

N/A N - ATC/US Place F14B in STBY, start F14D in Fast Speed 2

RX21D C - BOP/US MC - BOP TS - US

1. 2 ADV fails open 3

RM01K TS -US RM-8241, CTMT High Range RM, failure 4

SG01B C - BOP/US TS - US

1. 2 S/G Tube leak 5

N/A RX - ALL Rapid Downpower 6

SG02B M - All

1. 2 Tube Rupture (TRIP CRITERIA) 7 RC04 N/A LOCA occurs on trip 8

SI05A ES033 C - ATC/US MC - ATC A HPSI pump degraded, C HPSI pump not running

• (N)Normal, (R)Reactivity, (I)Instrument, (C)Component, (M)Major, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control

Page 3 of 20 Scenario Summary:

The crew will take the shift with the unit at 100% power, steady state, no equipment OOS (IC-21).

Event 1: The ATC places F14B in STBY and starts F14D in FAST in accordance with OP 2313A, Containment Recirculation and Cooling System.

Event 2: #1 Atmospheric Dump Valve (ADV) fails open due to controller output failing high. The BOP takes Immediate Operator Actions to take manual control of the ADV and closes it.

Event 3: RM-8241, CTMT High Range Rad Monitor, fails. The US refers to TSAS 3.3.3.1.b and Table3.3-6 then determines the plant meets the minimum channels requirement with RM-8240 still OPERABLE Event 4: A 90 gallon per day tube leak occurs in the #2 S/G. The crew enters AOP 2569, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines the plant is required to taken off line. The US enters TSAS 3.4.6.2.c due to > 75 gpd leakage through any one S/G Event 5: The crew commences a downpower iaw AOP 2575, Rapid Downpower Event 6: A S/G tube rupture occurs. The crew trips the unit and enters EOP 2525, Standard Post Trip Actions. The 60-minute clock for isolating #2 S/G starts here.

Event7: A LOCA occurs at the time of the trip. Multiple events are diagnosed and the crew transitions to EOP 2540, Functional Recovery. Containment Isolation Safety Function is determined not to be met. The crew enters EOP 2540E, Functional Recovery of Containment Isolation. The plant is cooled down and the #2 S/G is isolated Event 8: The A HPSI pump is degraded and the C HPSI pump does not start on the SIAS signal. The ATC takes action to start the C HPSI pump.

The scenario will end at the examiners discretion.

Quantitative Attribute Target per Scenario Actual Events after EOP entry 1-2 1

Abnormal events 2-4 4

Major transients 1-2 1

EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions 1-2 1

Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions 1 per scenario set 1

Pre-identified CTs 2 or more 3

Page 4 of 20 INPUT

SUMMARY

Either INPUT or VERIFY the following functions:

ID Number Description Delay Time Ramp Time Event Trigger Severity or Value Final Value Relative Order MALFUNCTIONS ES03J SIAS SIGNAL FAIL TO ACTUATE AM-614 0

RX21D PIC 4224 setpoint to IA fail 2

0%

0%

1 RM01K CTMT ARM R8241 3

100%

100%

2 SG01B SG #2 TUBE LEAK(SMALL) 4 0.0750 0.0750 3

SG02B S/G #2 Tube Rupture 5

300 300 4

RC04 RX HEAD VENT LEAK 30 322 322 5

SI05A HPSI PP A DEGRADED PERFORMANCE 20 28 28 5

REMOTE FUNCTIONS MSR13 2-MS-202 DISCONNECT STATUS RI OVERRIDES EVENT FILES

Page 5 of 20 Critical Tasks Elements Critical Task Statement Cooldown the RCS prior to isolating the faulted Steam Generator.

Initiating Cue EOP 2541, Appendix 12, SGTR Response; step 1. Commence Cooldown to TH Less Than 515 F Performance Feedback A cooldown of RCS temperatures, within Technical Specification limits (< 100 F/hour), should be observed. Note that the temperature change limits are for a continuous 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period.

Success Path The plant cooldown is performed by operating either the Atmospheric Dump Valves or the Condenser Steam Dump valves.

Measurable Performance Standard The plant is cooled down to both loops THOT temperatures are less than 515 F prior to isolating the faulted Steam Generator.

Critical Task Statement Secure all RCPs within 10 minutes of losing NPSH Initiating Cue RCS Pressure drops below the operating limit of the Reactor Coolant Pumps Performance Feedback The RCPs are secured, causing Hot leg temperatures to increase as natural circulation heat removal is established. Steam dumps/ADVs throttle open to maintain TAVE/S/G pressure.

Success Path Opening the RCP breakers.

Measurable Performance Standard The operator is observed to commence a plant cooldown no later than one hour after an un-isolable LOCA occurs. A cooldown rate of greater than 40 F/hour shall be established and maintained.

Critical Task Statement Isolate the affected steam generator.

Initiating Cue EOP 2541, Appendix 12, SGTR Response; step 7. Isolate Most Affected S/G Performance Feedback The positioning of components is observable by lights, switches and other control indications. When isolated, the affected S/G pressure will stabilize since no more steam is being drawn off and the affected loops T will go to zero as the SG is no longer available as a heat sink.

Success Path The affected S/G is isolated by performing the component manipulations to establish the desired plant condition of the affected S/G being isolated from the outside environment.

Measurable Performance Standard The affected S/G is isolated within 60 minutes of the Tube Rupture.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 6 of 20 Event

Description:

OP 2313A, Containment Air Recirculation and Cooling System.

Swap CAR fans. B Standby; D Fast Speed Symptoms/Cues: None Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC PLACE B CAR to STOP and HOLD for 2 seconds.

WHEN 2 seconds elapse, RELEASE B CAR fan switch.

ATC ENSURE the following OPEN:

RB-28.2D, NORM OUTLET RB-28.3D, EMERG OUTLET RB-28.1D, CLR D INLET (Locked open)

CHECK B RBCCW header flow <8000 gpm PLACE D CAR fan to START HIGH and OBSERVE red FAST SPEED indicating light lit PRESS CAR FAN VIB RESET B&D button When the event has been addressed to the lead examiners satisfaction, proceed to the next event

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 7 of 20 Event

Description:

1. 1 Atmospheric Dump Valve (ADV) fails open Symptoms/Cues: PIC-4224 controller output fails to 100% and #2 ADV opens (red light lit)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task:

Booth Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, Insert Trigger #2 RX21D, PIC 4224 setpoint to IA fail (0%)

BOP Performs OP 2585, Immediate Operator Actions, for S/G ADV failing open (memory):

1. Check affected S/G pressure < ADV setpoint

a. SG pressure is less than setpoint

2. IF controller is failed,

a. PLACE affected ADV controller to manual and

b. ENSURE ADV is closed.

US LCO 3.2.6 DNB Margin The DNB margin shall be preserved by maintaining the cold leg temperature, pressurizer, reactor coolant flow rate, and AXIAL SHAPE INDEX within limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT APPLICABILITY: MODE ACTION: With any of the above parameters exceeding its specified limits, restore the parameter to within its above specified limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or reduce THERMAL POWER to < 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT:

2.7 DNB The DNB margin shall be preserved by maintaining the cold leg temperature, pressurizer, reactor coolant flow rate, and AXIAL SHAPE INDEX within the following limits:

Parameter Limits Cold Leg Temperature 549 F Pressurizer Pressure

> 2225 psia*

Reactor Coolant Flow Rate 360,000 gpm AXIAL SHAPE INDEX Figure 2.7-1

• Limit not applicable during either the THERMAL POWER ramp increase in excess of 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER per minute or a THERMAL POWER step increase of greater than 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

Examiner Note: The ADV only needs to be able to be operated in local manual to remain OPERABLE US LCO 3.7.1.7 ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVES Each atmospheric dump valve shall be OPERABLE.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.7.1.7 Verify the OPERABILITY of each atmospheric dump valve by local manual operation of each valve in the flowpath through on complete cycle of operation at the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

When the event has been addressed to the lead examiners satisfaction, proceed to the next event

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 8 of 20 Event

Description:

RM-8241, CTMT High Range Rad Monitor, fails.

Symptoms/Cues: RM-8241, CTMT HI RANGE RM, Hi Rad (red) and Alert (yellow) lights lit.

The following alarms are received:

• HYDROGEN PURGE ISOL VLVS HI RAD (C-01, C-30)

• POST INCIDENT RAD MONITOR HI/FAILURE (C-02, D-10)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, Insert Trigger #3 RM01K, CTMT ARM 8241 fail (100%)

US References the following ARPs:

ARP 2590A-119, HYDROGEN PURGE ISOL VLVS HI RAD (C-01, C-30)

ARP 2590B-040, POST INCIDENT RAD MONITOR HI/FAILURE Both ARPs direct the operator to Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 ATC VERIFY Hydrogen Purge Valves are closed US LCO 3.3.3.1 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION:

The radiation monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.363 shall be OPERABLE with their alarm/trip setpoints within the specified limits APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-6.

ACTION:

a. With a radiation monitoring channel alarm/trip setpoint exceeding the value shown in Table 3.3-3, adjust the setpoint to within the limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or declare the channel inoperable.

b. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the number of MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE in Table 3.3-6, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-6. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable Instrument MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE Applicable MODES Alarm/Trip Setpoint Action CTMT High Range 1

1,2,3,4 100 R/hr 17 ACTION 17 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE requirements, initiate the preplanned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameter(s), within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and:

1. Either restore the inoperable(s) channels to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the discovery or

2. Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 14 days following discovery outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status When the event has been addressed to the lead examiners satisfaction, proceed to the next event

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 9 of 20 Event

Description:

AOP 2569, Steam Generator Tube Leak Symptoms/Cues: The following alarm is received coincident with rising SJAE RM-5099 trends (PPC):

• N-16 ALERT (CB-19, C-06/7)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, Insert Trigger #4 SG01B, SG #2 TUBE LEAK (SMALL)

US References the following ARP:

ARP 2590E-94, N-16 ALERT (CB-19, C-06/7)

The ARP direct the operator to validate the alarm with RMs (5099, SJAE and 4262, B/D) and Chemistry samples.

If a SGTL is confirmed, Refer to AOP 2569, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

US Enters AOP 2569, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

US Determine trip Criteria met.

Trip criteria NOT met. US reviews trip criteria with crew.

ATC Monitor Loss of RCS Inventory Check Pressurizer level lowering Adjusts LTDN FLOW CNTL, HIC-110 to stabilize pressurizer level Determines RCS leak rate BOP Request Chemistry sample both S/Gs US Determine Notification AND Technical Specification Applicability US LCO 3.4.6.2 REACTOR COOLANT OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE:

Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage shall limited to:

a. No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE,

b. 1 GPM UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE,

c. 75 GPD primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any steam generator, and

d. 10 GPM IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE.

APPLICABILITY: modes 1, 2, 3, AND 4.

ACTION:

a. With any operational LEAKAGE not within limits for reasons other than PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE not within limits, reduce LEAKAGE to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

b. With ACTION and associated completion time of ACTION a. not met, or PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE exists, or primary to secondary LEAKAGE not within limits, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

US Notifies HP and OMOC of S/G Tube Leak

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 10 of 20 Event

Description:

AOP 2569, Steam Generator Tube Leak Symptoms/Cues: The following alarm is received coincident with rising SJAE RM-5099 trends (PPC):

• N-16 ALERT (CB-19, C-06/7)

BOP Monitor N-16 Radiation Monitors.

N-16 HIGH (CA-19, C-06/7)

N-16 ALERT (CB-19, C-06/7) is in alarm Check alarm valid based on:

R-5099, SJAE - rising R-4262, Blowdown RM RCS leak rate - UNEXPLAINED RISE (PPC)

Chemistry sample Using PPC N-16 Pri/Sec leakage screen Check for both of the following:

Primary to secondary leak rate > 75 gpm Primary to secondary leak rate rising by 15 gpd/ 30 min.

Perform BOTH the following:

Using AOP 2575, Rapid Downpower, reduce power to < 50 % in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Within the following 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, enter MODE 3, HOT STANDBY, while continuing with AOP 2569, step 9.

CREW Transitions to AOP 2575, Rapid Downpower

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.:ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5 Page 11 of 20 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower Symptoms/Cues: Directed from AOP 2569, Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: AOP 2575, Rapid Downpower, is entered.

US Perform notifications ATC Initiate forcing sprays Places all B/U heaters to ON Adjusts PRES CNTL-Y, PIC 100Y thumbwheel to achieve 50% output ATC BOP Insert Group 7 CEAs 10 steps (8 - 12 steps in procedure)

Reduce Turbine Load (LOAD SPEED CONTROL switch), maintain TCOLD +/- 2°F of program.

US Determine Reactivity Plan Availability Borate from RWST using 2 Charging Pumps BOP Set up Turbine controls (Attachment G)

Select Load Setpt and enter desired value 14%.

Select Rate Setpt and enter desired value 30%/hour ATC Raise Charging Flow - No actions taken, both charging pumps running from Event #4 ATC Borate from the RWST

a. CHECK Boration from RWST - SELECTED

b. CHECK VCT MAKEUP BYPASS, CH-196 - CLOSED

c. CHECK RWST TO CHG SUCT, CH-504 - OPEN

d. OPEN RWST ISOL, CH-192

e. CLOSE VCT OUT ISOL, CH-501 BOP Reduce turbine load when effects of boron are seen.

When ready to commence load reduction, then select Load Resume.

IF Turbine Load Ramp Rate needs to be adjusted, perform any of the following:

o SELECT Rate Setpt AND ENTER new value.

o SELECT one of the following: 5%, 10%, or 20% per hour o SELECT Raise or Lower (0.25% / hour change).

Maintain TCOLD within 2 °F of program ATC Maintain VCT parameters Level 70 - 90%

Pressure < 30 psig CREW Maintain parameters as specified in Attachment A AFTER the BOP has seen the effects of the boration and commenced turbine load reduction AND the event has been addressed to the lead examiners satisfaction, proceed to the next event.

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.:ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 12 of 20 Event

Description:

1. 2 S/G tube rupture. Plant trip.

Symptoms/Cues:

• MAIN STEAM LINE HI RAD/INST. FAIL (C-01, A-30) alarms

• Lowering RCS pressure and temperature Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, Insert Trigger #5 SG02B, SG #2 TUBE RUPTURE Examiner Note: The reactor trip due to SGTR starts the 60 minute clock for isolating the ruptured S/G ATC Reactivity Control Reactor Trip Ensure Reactor Trip BOP Reactivity Control Turbine Trip Ensure Turbine trip BOP Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries No Open Phase Condition All busses energized BOP Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries RBCCW and Service Water headers operating.

ATC RCS Inventory Control Pressurizer level < 20%

a. Pressurizer level is between 20 to 80%, trending to 35 to 70%.

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED a.1 Start the 3rd charging pump and secure Letdown

b. RCS subcooling > 30 °F Critical Task: Secure RCPs within 10 minutes of losing NPSH.

ATC RCS Pressure Control

a. CHECK that pressurizer pressure is 1900 to 2350 psia, trending to 2225 to 2300 psia.

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED OPERATE the Pressurizer Pressure Control System. Manually OPERATE pressurizer heaters and spray valves.

IF pressurizer pressure is less than 1714 psia AND SIAS actuated, THEN ENSURE ONE RCP in each loop is stopped.

TCOA: IF Pressurizer pressure lowers to less than the minimum of Fig. 2 RCP NPSH Curve THEN STOP ALL RCPs

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.:ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 13 of 20 Event

Description:

1. 2 S/G tube rupture. Plant trip.

Symptoms/Cues:

• MAIN STEAM LINE HI RAD/INST. FAIL (C-01, A-30) alarms

• Lowering RCS pressure and temperature ATC Core Heat Removal

a. CHECK at least 1 RCP is operating, AND loop T < 10 °F RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED b.1 IF RCPs are not operating, OR loop T is greater than 10°F, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) PLACE TIC-4165, steam dump TAVG controller, in manual and closed.

2) PLACE BOTH pressurizer spray valve controllers in manual and CLOSE the valves.

HIC-100E HIC-100F

b. RCS subcooling > 30 °F BOP RCS Heat Removal

a. At least one S/G has BOTH of the following conditions met:

Level 10% to 80%.

Main feedwater or TCOA: TWO auxiliary feedwater pumps operating to restore level between 40% to 70%.

b. RCS TCOLD is being maintained between 530 °F to 535 °F

c. BOTH S/G pressures are 880 to 920 psia.

Examiner Note: The C HPSI pump did not start on SIAS signal (A HPSI is degraded).

ATC Containment Isolation - met

a. CTMT pressure < 1.0 psig RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED - No actions a.1 IF containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.42 psig, THEN ENSURE ALL of the following:

SIAS actuated. (C01)

CIAS actuated. (C01)

EBFAS actuated. (C01)

MSI actuated. (C01)

b. No primary plant rad monitors have an unexplained rise or are in alarm RM-7891 has unexplained rise

c. No steam plant rad monitors have an unexpected rise or are in alarm RM-5099 is in alarm

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.:ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6 Page 14 of 20 Event

Description:

1. 2 S/G tube rupture. Plant trip.

Symptoms/Cues:

• MAIN STEAM LINE HI RAD/INST. FAIL (C-01, A-30) alarms

• Lowering RCS pressure and temperature ATC Containment Temperature and Pressure Control - met

a. CTMT temperature < 120 °F RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED a.1 ENSURE ALL available normal cooling and ventilation systems are OPERATING:

CAR fans operating on the facility with an operating train of RBCCW CTMT Aux Circ fans

b. CTMT pressure < 1.0 psig RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED b.1 IF containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.42 psig, THEN ENSURE ALL of the following:

SIAS actuated. (C01)

CIAS actuated. (C01)

EBFAS actuated. (C01)

MSI actuated. (C01)

ATC BOP Perform Appendix 4, Reactor Trip Subsequent Actions US Diagnose the event

a. Diagnostic Flowchart directs operator to EOP 2540, Functional Recovery, due to indications of two events (SGTR and LOCA).

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Page 15 of 20 Event

Description:

EOP 2540E, Functional Recovery of Containment Isolation Symptoms/Cues: Directed by Diagnostic Flowpath Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed by the crew to CLOSE MS-202 disconnect, REPORT the disconnect closed.

Examiner Note: the crew enters EOP 2540, Functional Recovery US

1.

Classify the event

2.

PERFORM ALL of the following OPEN the Safety Function Tracking Page and ENTER the EOP entry time.

ENSURE the master alarm silence switch is in NORMAL ATC

3.

IF pressurizer pressure is less than 1714 psia AND SIAS has initiated, PERFORM the following:

a. ENSURE ONE RCP in each loop is stopped.

b. PLACE associated pressurizer spray valve controller RC-100E or RC-100F in manual and CLOSE the valve

c. IF pressurizer pressure lowers to less than the minimum RCP NPSH limit, PERFORM the following:

1) STOP ALL RCPs

2) PLACE TIC-4165, steam dump TAVG controller, in manual and closed

3) PLACE pressurizer spray valve controllers RC-100E and RC-100F in manual and CLOSE the valve BOP

4.

Sample steam generators that are available for heat removal as follows:

a. CHECK B train RBCCW in service.

b. ENSURE RB-210, SAMPLE/DEGAS EFF CLR ISOL, is open

c. OPEN the steam generator sample valves:

MS-191A MS-191B

d. DIRECT Chemistry to perform ALL of the following:

Sample ANY steam generator that is available for heat removal Frisk the samples Report the frisk results Analyze the samples for boron and activity

e. WHEN Chemistry reports that samples have been taken, PERFORM the following:

CLOSE steam generator sample valves IF SIAS has actuated, AND no other sampling is in progress, CLOSERB-210, SAMPLE/DEGAS EFF CLR ISOL

5.

PLACE hydrogen analyzers in service, Refer To Appendix 19, Hydrogen Analyzer Operation

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Page 16 of 20 Event

Description:

EOP 2540E, Functional Recovery of Containment Isolation Symptoms/Cues: Directed by Diagnostic Flowpath Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US NOTE: If the Safety Function Status Checklist is not satisfied for the selected success path, the US may commence the operator actions for safety functions which are not met based on Safety Function hierarchy. The remaining Safety Functions should be prioritized as time permits

6.

Identify success paths to be used to satisfy each safety function using BOTH of the following:

Perform Resource Assessment Trees (RATS)

Safety Function Tracking Page

7.

Prioritize Safety Functions to be addressed first based on ALL the following:

a. Safety Functions which do not meet the Safety Function Status Checklist for the selected success path

b. Safety Functions for which the equipment to support the success path is not operating

c. Safety functions for which success path three has been selected

d. Safety functions for which success path two has been selected

e. Safety functions for which success path one has been selected Examiner Note: US performs RATs and determines CI-1 the correct path.

Resource Assessment Tree Evaluation Reactivity Control RC-1 MET DC Power DC-1 MET AC Power AC-1 MET Inventory Control IC-2 MET Pressure Control PC-2 MET Heat Removal HR-2 MET Containment Isolation CI-1 NOT MET CTMT Temperature and Pressure Control CTPC-1 US

8.

DIRECT STA to check that Safety Function Status Checklist Acceptance Criteria are satisfied for chosen success paths

9.

PERFORM operator actions for chosen success paths based on priority assigned.

Examiner Note: The crew transitions to EOP 2540E, Functional Recovery of Containment Isolation. CI-1

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Page 17 of 20 Event

Description:

EOP 2540E, Functional Recovery of Containment Isolation Symptoms/Cues: Directed by Diagnostic Flowpath ATC Check SIAS/CIAS Actuation

1.

IF ANY of the following conditions exist:

Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.42 psig Radiation monitors inside containment are greater than their alarm setpoint An unexplained rise in containment radiation level or activity ENSURE the following:

a. ENSURE SIAS, CIAS, EBFAS and MSI have actuated (C-01)

b. CHECK at least one train of SIAS, CIAS, EBFAS and MSI have actuated (C-01X).

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED b.1 IF ANY component is not in its required position, manually ALIGN the applicable component. ATC starts C HPSI pump

c. ENSURE ONE complete facility of CRACS operating in recirc mode: (C25)

Facility 1 HV-203A, Fan F-21A exhaust damper is open.

Fan F-21A, supply fan is running.

HV-206A, Fan F-31A exhaust damper is open.

Fan F-31A, exhaust fan is running.

HV-212A, Fan F-32A exhaust damper is open.

Fan F-32A, filter fan is running.

HV-202, minimum fresh air damper is closed.

HV-207, cable vault exhaust damper is closed.

HV-208, exhaust air damper is closed.

ENSURE vital switchgear cooling is operating for each operating ECCS train.

d. ENSURE vital switchgear cooling is operating for each operating ECCS train as follows:

Facility 1 Fan F-51 is running Fan F-134 is running SW-178A, service water supply, is open SW-178B, service water supply, is open Facility 2 Fan F-52 is running Fan F-142 is running Fan F-133 is running SW-178C, service water supply, is open

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Page 18 of 20 Event

Description:

EOP 2540E, Functional Recovery of Containment Isolation Symptoms/Cues: Directed by Diagnostic Flowpath US Identify and Isolate SGTR

2.

IF a SGTR is indicated by ANY of the following:

Steam generator activities Main steam piping radiation levels Steam generator level change when not feeding Steam generator blowdown activity Steam generator mismatch in level with essentially the same feed and steaming rate for both steam generators Feed flow mismatch between steam generators Steam flow versus feed flow mismatch in a steam generator prior to the trip Steam flow to feed flow mismatch in a SG prior to the trip IDENTIFY and ISOLATE the most affected S/G. Refer To Appendix 12, SGTR Response.

Examiner Note: The crew transitions to EOP 2541, Appendix 12, SGTR Response.

Critical Task: Cooldown the RCS to < 515 F prior to isolating the affected S/G BOP Commence Cooldown to THOT Less Than 515 F

1.

CHECK Steam Dumps to Condenser available.

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1.1 COMMENCE a cooldown to a THOT of less than 515 F in BOTH loops using EITHER of the following:

• Operation of the ADVs from the control room

• Operation of the ADVs locally OR at Hot Shutdown Panel, C-21, Using EOP 2541, Appendix 6, ADV Local Operation ATC Reduce and Control RCS Pressure

2.

DEPRESSURIZE the RCS in preparation for isolating the affected S/G by performing the following:

a. CONTROL RCS pressure using heaters AND spray

b. ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN pressurizer pressure to meet ALL the following criteria:

Less than 920 psia Within +/- 50 psi of the most affected steam generator Within the RCS P/T curve limits, REFER to EOP 2541, Appendix 2, Figures, Fig. 1 IF the RCPs are operating, THEN maintain RCS pressure above the NPSH curve. REFER to EOP 2541, Appendix 2, Figures, Fig. 2 Block MSI actuation no actions Block SIAS actuation no actions BOP CLOSE MSIVs on a LOOP no actions

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Page 19 of 20 Event

Description:

EOP 2540E, Functional Recovery of Containment Isolation Symptoms/Cues: Directed by Diagnostic Flowpath US Determine the most affected S/G #2 S/G

1. DETERMINE the most affected steam generator by considering all of the following:

Steam generator activities Main steam piping radiation levels Steam generator level rise when NOT feeding Steam generator blowdown activity Steam generator mismatch in level with essentially the same feed and steaming rate for BOTH steam generators Feed flow mismatch between steam generators Steam flow to feed flow mismatch in a SG prior to the trip

Form 3.3-2 Required Operator Actions Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 8 Page 20 of 20 Event

Description:

EOP 2540E, Functional Recovery of Containment Isolation Symptoms/Cues: Directed by Diagnostic Flowpath Critical Task: Isolate the faulted S/G within 60 minutes of the SGTR (time of trip)

BOP Isolate Most Affected Steam Generator

7.

WHEN BOTH RCS THOT temperatures are less than 515 F, THEN ISOLATE the most affected steam generator by performing the following:

Number 2 Steam Generator US

a. RECORD in the placekeeper, time and TCOLD of operating loop

_____________ Time

_____________ TCOLD F BOP

b. ENSURE ALL the following for #2 ADV:

• ADV controller, PIC-4224, setpoint at 920 psia

• ADV controller, PIC-4224, is in A

• ATMOS DUMP, MS-190B - CLOSED

• ADV, MS-190B, is closed RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED a.1 CLOSE ANY of the following:

• 2-MS-3B, ADV manual isolation valve

• 2-MS-190B, Atmospheric dump valve

c. ENSURE the MSIV, MS-64B, is closed

d. ENSURE the MSIV bypass valve, MS-65B, is closed

e. UNLOCK and CLOSE DISC FOR MS-202 (NS6202)

f. CLOSE steam to turbine driven aux feed pump supply valve, MS-202

g. CLOSE BYPASS VLV, LIC-5216, main feedwater regulating bypass valve

h. ENSURE the main feedwater block valve, FW-42B, is closed

i.

PLACE main feedwater isolation air assisted check valve, FW-5B, to CLOSE

j.

ENSURE the steam generator isolation valve, MS-220B, is closed

k. PLACE BOTH auxiliary feed OVERIDE/MAN/START/RESET handswitches in PULL TO LOCK

l.

CLOSE the aux feedwater regulating valve, FW-43B

m. PLACE aux feed isolation air assisted check valve, FW-12B, to CLOSE

n. CLOSE main steam leg low point drain, MS-266B

o. CHECK the main steam safety valves are closed

p. RECORD time #2 steam generator isolated: Time When the event has been addressed to the lead examiners satisfaction, the scenario is complete.

SIMULATOR SCENARIO #4

2 of 19 Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Event No.

Malf. No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

N/A N - US/BOP TS - US Swap RBCCW Pumps 2

N/A N-ATC/US Secure Enclosure Building Purge 3

RX03B I - US/ATC Pressurizer Pressure controller fails low 4

RD0304 C - BOP/US TS - US Dropped CEA 5

NA R - All Rapid downpower 6

TU04C M - All Turbine Lube Oil leak (TRIP criteria) 7 MS01A ESD on trip (#1 S/G, inside CTMT) 8 ES03F C - ATC/US MC - ATC D CAR fan does not start in Slow Speed 9

ES01B C - BOP/US MC - BOP B AFW pump does not start on Auto Aux. Feedwater signal.

• (N)Normal, (R)Reactivity, (I)Instrument, (C)Component, (M)Major, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control Facility:

Millstone Unit 2 Scenario #: 4 Scenario Source:

Op. Test #: ES22LI1 Examiners:

Applicants/

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

100% power, steady state operations, B RBCCW pump in service on A header. Buses 22C &

22D are cross-tied, bus 22C supplying.

Turnover:

No equipment out of service. Swap RBCCW Pumps to A in service, B secured Critical Tasks:

1. Isolate Auxiliary Feedwater to affected S/G within 15 minutes of MSI signal.

2. Establish RCS temperature control prior to RCS temperature reaching 535 F.

3 of 19 Scenario Summary:

The crew will take the shift with the unit at 100% power, steady state, no equipment OOS (IC-21).

Event 1: The BOP swaps RBCCW pumps. The US logs into TSAS 3.7.3.1.

Event 9: The ATC secures Enclosure Building Purge in accordance with OP 2314B, Containment and Enclosure Building Purge; Section 11, Restoring from Enclosure Building Purge using Main Exhaust.

Event 2: Pressurizer Pressure Channel Y (controlling channel) fails low. ARP 2590B-212 PZR PRESSURE SELECTED CHANNEL DEVIATION HI/LO directs the operator to select Pressurizer Pressure Channel X as the controlling channel Event 3: CEA #4 drops. The BOP takes Immediate Actions to stabilize RCS temperature. The crew enters AOP 2556, CEA Malfunctions. The procedure directs the unit be down-powered to a power level less than 75%.

Event 4: The crew enters AOP 2575 and commences a downpower.

Event 5: The Turning Gear Oil pump starts due to low oil pressure, the crew enters AOP 2587, Turbine Lube Oil Leak.

Bearing temperatures are increasing, requiring the turbine be tripped. The crew trips the reactor and turbine and enters EOP 2525, Standard Post Trip Actions. The 30-minute clock to secure feeding the affected S/G starts here.

Event 6: On the trip, an Excess Steam Demand occurs from the #1 S/G inside of CTMT. The crew diagnoses an ESD and transitions to EOP 2536, Excess Steam Demand Event 7: The D CAR fan does not start on the SIAS signal. The ATC takes actions to start the D CAR fan in Slow Speed.

Event 8: B AFW pump does not start on Auto Aux. Feedwater signal. The BOP starts the B AFW pump The scenario will end at the examiners discretion.

Quantitative Attribute Target per Scenario Actual Events after EOP entry 1-2 2

Abnormal events 2-4 5

Major transients 1-2 1

EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions 1-2 1

Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions 1 per scenario set 0

Pre-identified CTs 2 or more 2

4 of 19 INPUT

SUMMARY

Either INPUT or VERIFY the following functions:

ID Num Description Delay Time Ramp Time Event Trigger Severity or Value Final Value Relative Order MALFUNCTIONS C07-C26 TURBINE TGR OIL PUMP RUNNING 1

4 TU01A LOSS OF LUBE OIL TO TURB BRG 1 60 2

20 20 4

TU01B LOSS OF LUBE OIL TO TURB BRG 2 60 2

20 20 4

TU01C LOSS OF LUBE OIL TO TURB BRG 3 60 2

20 20 4

TU01D LOSS OF LUBE OIL TO TURB BRG 4 60 2

20 20 4

TU01E LOSS OF LUBE OIL TO TURB BRG 5 60 2

20 20 4

TU01F LOSS OF LUBE OIL TO TURB BRG 6 60 2

20 20 4

TU01G LOSS OF LUBE OIL TO TURB BRG 7 60 2

20 20 4

TU01H LOSS OF LUBE OIL TO TURB BRG 8 60 2

20 20 4

TU01I LOSS OF LUBE OIL TO TURB BRG 9 60 2

20 20 4

TU01J LOSS OF LUBE OIL TO TURB BRG 10 60 2

20 20 4

TU01K LOSS OF LUBE OIL TO TURB BRG 11 60 2

20 20 4

TU03 SHAFT PP REDUCED CAPACITY 60 2

20 20 4

TU04C TURB LUBE OIL PP (TGOP) FAIL 60 2

20 20 4

RX03B PZR PRESS CNTL (PT-100Y) FAIL 3

1500 1500 2

RD0104 DROPPED CEA #4 4

3 MS01A MN STM HDR #1 RUPTURE IN CTMT 30 1.66 1.66 5

ES03F ESAS SIGNAL FAIL TO ACTUATE AM-615 0

ES01B AUTO AFW B INITIATION FAIL 30 REMOTE FUNCTIONS CCR40 CC PUMP SIAS/LNP BLOCK SW HS-6119D NORM NORM 1

OVERRIDES TU4463R2_2 1

R R

4 TU4463G_1 1

NG NG 4

5 of 19 Critical Task Elements Critical Task Statement Isolate Auxiliary feedwater to the affected S/G within 15 minutes of a MSI signal Initiating Cue EOP 2525, Standard Post Trip Actions, step 7. RCS Heat Removal, RNO step c.2 (S/G pressure < 572#

AND ESD is in progress).

Performance Feedback Affected S/G will boil dry once feedwater is isolated to it.

Success Path Isolating feed to a faulted S/G reduces the amount of energy released to the CTMYT atmosphere, keeping CTMT within design limits.

Measurable Performance Standard The operator places both OVERIDE/MAN/START/RESET switches in PULL TO LOCK and both Auxiliary Feedwater regulating valves, FW-43A&B, are closed.

Critical Task Statement Establish RCS pressure and temperature control to maintain the RCS less than 200 F subcooling.

Initiating Cue EOP 2525, Standard Post Trip Actions, step 7. RCS Heat Removal, RNO step c.3 (S/G boiled dry and CET temperature rising)

Performance Feedback Opening the ADV for the unaffected S/G after the affected S/G boils dry transfers the RCS Heat Removal function to the unaffected S/G. CET temperatures will stabilize, the RCS will not cooldown or heat up.

Success Path Setting the unaffected S/Gs ADVs automatic setpoint to the saturation pressure associated with the CET temperature will stabilize RCS temperature.

Measurable Performance Standard When the affected S/G boils dry, the operator reduces the unaffected S/Gs ADV automatic setpoint to approximately the saturation pressure of the CETs (at the point where the affected S/G boiled dry) using either the PPC SPDS screen or the steam tables.

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:1 Page 6 of 19 Event

Description:

Swap RBCCW pumps (A running, B secured)

Symptoms/Cues: OP 2330A, RBCCW System Section 4.3, Shifting from B RBCCW Pump to A RBCCW Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP ENSURE the following:

A RBCCW Pump breaker (A311) - Racked up.

P11A (A RBCCW Pump) - Pull-To-Lock RB-211A, A RBCCW Pump Suction valve A Header - open RB-4.1D, Header B, Hx B Outlet - closed RB-251A, Pump discharge header A/B cross-tie - open US LCO 3.7.3.1 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM Two reactor building closed cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE APPLICABILITY: modes 1, 2, 3 AND 4 ACTION: With one reactor building closed cooling water loop inoperable, restore the inoperable loop to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

TRMAS 7.1.20 APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN REQUIREMENTS (14 day requirement)

Booth Operator: When directed by crew, Insert Trigger #3 and report HS6119B in BLOCK HS6119D to BLOCK BOP CHECK alarm window RBCCW PUMP B SIAS/LNP START MANUALLY BLOCKED (C-06/7, AA-20) lit.

BOP START P-11A, RBCCW PP A.

Check normal amperage (30-44 amps)

Check discharge pressure (105-145 psig)

Booth Operator: When directed by crew to close RB-3B, Report valve closed BOP SECURE P-11B, RBCCW PP B, and PLACE in PULL-TO-LOCK CHECK alarms NOT lit:

RBCCW PUMP B SIAS/LNP START MANUALLY BLOCKED (C-06/7, AA-20)

RBCCW HDR A FLOW HI (C-06/7, A-7)

Booth Operator: When directed by crew to open RB-3B, Report valve open US Log exit from:

TS LCO 3.7.3.1 TRM 7.1.20 BOP ENSURE RBCCW header flow between 6,000 and 7,300 gpm (FI-6035)

CLOSE RB-251A, Pump discharge header A/B cross-tie Booth Operator: When directed by crew to verify proper RM flow, Report proper flows A RBCCW pump = 1.5 gpm, C RBCCW pump = 1.5 gpm, FI-6038 = 3.0 gpm When the event has been addressed to the lead examiners satisfaction, proceed to the next event.

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:2 Page 7 of 19 Event

Description:

Securing Enclosure Building Purge Symptoms/Cues: OP 2314B, Containment and Enclosure Building Purge; Section 11, Restoring from Enclosure Building Purge using Main Exhaust Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Perform the following within 15 seconds of each other:

STOP F-23, Purge Supply Fan Close AC-11, Purge Exhaust Filter outlet damper Stop a Main Exhaust fan, F34A or F34B or F34C ATC CLOSE the following dampers:

AC-1, Supply Fan AC-3, Enclosure Building Supply AC-8, Enclosure Building Exhaust Examiner Note: TS-8155 is NOT bypassed When the event has been addressed to the lead examiners satisfaction, proceed to the next event.

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.:3 Page 8 of 19 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Pressure Channel Y (controlling channel) fails low.

Symptoms/Cues: PIC-110Y red indicator needle fails low, PIC-100Y controller needle fails low (to left),

Pressurizer B/U Heaters energize, RCS pressure starts increasing Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, Insert Trigger #3 RX03B, PZR PRESS CNTL (PT-100Y) Fail (0%)

Examiner Note:

The following annunciators will not be in alarm immediately but the crew can utilize them to mitigate the instrument failure:

ARP 2590B-212 PZR PRESSURE SELECTED CHANNEL DEVIATION HI/LO (C-02/3, D-37)

ARP 2590B-220, PRESSURIZER CH Y PRES HI/LO (C-02/3, D-39)

CREW Checks Pressurizer pressure channels and operation of controllers and determines PIC-100Y controller has failed low US Directs actions in either:

ARP 2590B-212, PZR PRESSURE SELECTED CHANNEL DEVIATION HI/LO OR ARP 2590B-220, PRESSURIZER CH Y PRES HI/LO ATC ENSURE PIC-100X is operating properly SHIFT Pressure control to Channel X AFTER the BOP has seen the effects of the boration and commenced turbine load reduction AND the event has been addressed to the lead examiners satisfaction, proceed to the next event.

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 9 of 19 Event

Description:

Dropped CEA (CEA #4)

Symptoms/Cues: Multiple alarms on C-04, Lowering RCS temperature, Lowering Reactor power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, Insert Trigger #4 RD0104, DROPPED CEA #4 BOP Takes Immediate Actions for dropped CEA:

CHECK only one CEA has dropped LOWER Main Turbine load to stabilize TCOLD RESTORE TCOLD to within +/- 2 F of program US Validate AOP 2585, Immediate Operator Actions were completed SAT.

Transition crew to AOP 2556, CEA Malfunctions Examiner Note: Crew transitions to AOP 2556, CEA Malfunctions US Determine trip Criteria met. Trip criteria NOT met.

US reviews trip criteria with crew:

Two or more CEAs are dropped OR One dropped CEA AND one or more CEAs are misaligned OR 2 or more CEAs are untrippable US STOP any evolutions in progress ATC VERIFY CEDM Control system is off US Make notifications:

I&C commence troubleshooting Reactor Engineering OMOC Proceed to Attachment D, Dropped or Misaligned CEA BOP The following actions were completed in AOP 2585 LOWER Main Turbine load to stabilize TCOLD RESTORE TCOLD to within +/- 2 F of program US RECORD CEA Drop Time RECORD CEA number DIRECT Attachment F, CEA Positions Data Sheet, be completed.

LCO 3.1.3.1.1 CEA POSITIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.1.3.1.1 Verify the indicated position of each CEA to be within 10 steps of all other CEAs in its group at the frequency specified in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AN within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> following any CEA movement larger than 10 steps.

US CHECK Reactor power 75 %.

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 10 of 19 Event

Description:

Dropped CEA (CEA #4)

Symptoms/Cues: Multiple alarms on C-04, Lowering RCS temperature, Lowering Reactor power US LCO 3.1.3.1 CEA POSITIONS All CEAs shall be OPERABLE with each CEA of a given group be positioned within 10 steps (indicated position) of all other CEAs in its group, and the CEA Motion Inhibit and the CEA Deviation Circuit shall be OPERABLE APPLICABILITY: modes 1* (1) and 2(1)

ACTION: A.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER to < 70% of the maximum allowable THERMAL POWER within one hour and restore CEA(s) misalignment within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or otherwise be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (1) See Special Test Exception 3.10.2 (Does not apply)

CREW Transitions to AOP 2575, Rapid Downpower

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Page 11 of 19 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower Symptoms/Cues: None Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: AOP 2575, Rapid Downpower, is entered.

US Perform notifications ATC Initiate forcing sprays Places all B/U heaters to ON Adjusts PRES CNTL-Y, PIC 100Y thumbwheel to achieve 50% output CAUTION: In the case of a dropped CEA, rod motion is NOT used to initiate downpower US Determine Reactivity Plan Availability Borate from RWST using 2 Charging Pumps BOP Set up Turbine controls (Attachment G)

Select Load Setpt and enter desired value 14%.

Select Rate Setpt and enter desired value 30%/hour ATC Raise Charging Flow - No actions taken, both charging pumps running from Event #4 ATC Borate from the RWST

a. CHECK Boration from RWST - SELECTED

b. CHECK VCT MAKEUP BYPASS, CH-196 - CLOSED

c. CHECK RWST TO CHG SUCT, CH-504 - OPEN

d. OPEN RWST ISOL, CH-192

e. CLOSE VCT OUT ISOL, CH-501 BOP Reduce turbine load when effects of boron are seen.

When ready to commence load reduction, then select Load Resume.

IF Turbine Load Ramp Rate needs to be adjusted, perform any of the following:

o SELECT Rate Setpt AND ENTER new value.

o SELECT one of the following: 5%, 10%, or 20% per hour o SELECT Raise or Lower (0.25% / hour change).

Maintain TCOLD within 2 °F of program ATC Maintain VCT parameters Level 70 - 90%

Pressure < 30 psig CREW Maintain parameters as specified in Attachment A AFTER the BOP has seen the effects of the boration and commenced turbine load reduction AND the event has been addressed to the lead examiners satisfaction, proceed to the next event.

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 Page 12 of 19 Event

Description:

Turbine Lube Oil Leak Symptoms/Cues: TURBINE TGR OIL PUMP RUNNING (C-06/7, C-26),

No indication of Turning Gear Oil Pump running, Bearing temperatures increasing Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator: When directed by Lead Examiner, Insert Trigger #1 & 2 C07-C26, TURBINE TGR OIL PUMP RUNNING TU01A-K, LOSS OF LUBE OIL TO TURB BRG #1 ->> THRUST (to 20 in 60s)

TU03, SHAFT PUMP REDUCED CAPACITY (to 20 in 60s)

TU04C TURB LUBE OIL PUMP FAIL US REFER to ARP 2590E-143, TURBINE TGR OIL PUMP RUNNING BOP OBSERVE P-62, Turning Gear Oil pump - operating CHECK turbine bearing oil pressure - normal Determine cause of pump start If cause of pump start is due to leak or rupture, GO TO AOP 2587, Turbine Oil Systems -

Leak/Emergency Shutdown CREW Transitions to AOP 2587, Turbine Oil Systems - Leak/Emergency Shutdown US Determine trip Criteria met. Trip criteria met.

US reviews trip criteria with crew:

Main Bearing Oil Pressure < 13 psig. NOT MET Turbine vibrations - > 12 mils AND Sustained. NOT MET Turbine vibrations - > 10 mils for > 15 minutes. NOT MET Turbine bearing temperatures increasing. MET CREW Determines trip criteria met Examiner note: Reactor is tripped, crew transitions to EOP 2525, Standard Post Trip Actions

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7 Page 13 of 19 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip EOP 2525, Standard Post Trip Actions Symptoms/Cues: Directed by TURBINE TGR OIL PUMP RUNNING (C-06/7, C-26),

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Reactivity Control Reactor Trip Ensure Reactor Trip BOP Reactivity Control Turbine Trip Ensure Turbine trip BOP Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries No Open Phase Condition All busses energized BOP Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries RBCCW and Service Water headers operating.

ATC RCS Inventory Control Pressurizer level < 20%

a. Pressurizer level is between 20 to 80%, trending to 35 to 70%.

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED a.1 Start the 3rd charging pump and secure Letdown

b. RCS subcooling > 30 °F ATC RCS Pressure Control

a. CHECK that pressurizer pressure is 1900 to 2350 psia, trending to 2225 to 2300 psia.

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED OPERATE the Pressurizer Pressure Control System. Manually OPERATE pressurizer heaters and spray valves.

IF pressurizer pressure is less than 1714 psia AND SIAS actuated, THEN ENSURE ONE RCP in each loop is stopped.

ATC will secure 2 RCPs due to SIAS actuation

1. RCP - A and RCP - C handswitches to STOP OR

2. RCP - B and RCP - D handswitches to STOP TCOA: IF Pressurizer pressure lowers to less than the minimum of Fig. 2 RCP NPSH Curve THEN STOP ALL RCPs ATC Core Heat Removal

a. CHECK at least 1 RCP is operating, AND loop T < 10 °F

b. RCS subcooling > 30 °F

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7 Page 14 of 19 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip EOP 2525, Standard Post Trip Actions Symptoms/Cues: Directed by TURBINE TGR OIL PUMP RUNNING (C-06/7, C-26),

BOP RCS Heat Removal

a. At least one S/G has BOTH of the following conditions met:

Level 10% to 80%.

Main feedwater or TCOA: TWO auxiliary feedwater pumps operating to restore level between 40% to 70%.

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED a.1 BOP takes action to start the B MDAFW Pump.

b. RCS TCOLD is being maintained between 530 °F to 535 °F RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED b.2 IF RCS < 530 F THEN confirm SG steam and feed rates are not excessive Ensure Feed rate is not excessive Stabilize RCS TCOLD using steam dumps or ADVs If MSI as actuated and terminates the cooldown, THEN operate ADVs to stabilize TCOLD.

c. BOTH S/G pressures are 880 to 920 psia.

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED c.1 IF any S/G pressure is < 572 psia, THEN ensure MSI is actuated c.2 TCOA: If any S/G pressure is < 572 psia and an ESDE is in progress, then perform the following to isolate AFW to the most affected SG:

1. Place both AFW OVERIDE/MAN/START/RESET handswitches in PULL-TO-LOCK

2. Close applicable AFW regulating valve (FW-43A)

3. If necessary, consider the use of FW-44

4. If necessary dispatch on operator to close FW-11A c.3 If any S/G pressure is < 572 psia and an ESDE is in progress, then perform the following:

1. Close #1 ADV

2. When #1 S/G boils dry, as indicated by CET temperatures rising, then operate #2 ADV to stabilize CET temperature

3. Proceed to step 8

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7 Page 15 of 19 Event

Description:

Reactor Trip EOP 2525, Standard Post Trip Actions Symptoms/Cues: Directed by TURBINE TGR OIL PUMP RUNNING (C-06/7, C-26),

ATC Containment Isolation - met

a. CTMT pressure < 1.0 psig RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED - No actions a.1 IF containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.42 psig, THEN ENSURE ALL of the following:

SIAS actuated. (C01)

CIAS actuated. (C01)

EBFAS actuated. (C01)

MSI actuated. (C01)

ATC will secure 2 RCPs due to SIAS actuation

1.

RCP - A and RCP - C handswitches to STOP OR

2.

RCP - B and RCP - D handswitches to STOP

b. No primary plant rad monitors have an unexplained rise or are in alarm

c. No steam plant rad monitors have an unexpected rise or are in alarm ATC Containment Temperature and Pressure Control - met

a. CTMT temperature < 120 °F RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED a.1 ENSURE ALL available normal cooling and ventilation systems are OPERATING:

CAR fans operating on the facility with an operating train of RBCCW CTMT Aux Circ fans

b. CTMT pressure < 1.0 psig RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED b.1 IF containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.42 psig, THEN ENSURE ALL of the following:

SIAS actuated. (C01)

CIAS actuated. (C01)

EBFAS actuated. (C01)

MSI actuated. (C01)

ATC BOP Perform Appendix 4, Reactor Trip Subsequent Actions US Diagnose the event

a. Diagnostic Flowchart directs operator to EOP 2536, Excessive Steam Demand.

Examiner note: Crew transitions to EOP 2536, Excess Steam Demand

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Page 16 of 19 Event

Description:

EOP 2536, Excessive Steam Demand Symptoms/Cues: Directed by Diagnostic Flowchart Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US

1.

Confirm Diagnosis of Excess Steam Demand Event

a. Using ATTACHMENT, A, Monitor Safety Function Status Check

b. CHECK Acceptance Criteria - MET BOP

2.

Sample Steam Generators and RCS:

a. Align sample cooling as follows:

1. Check B train RBCCW in service

2. Open RB-210, Sample Cooler isolation

b. Open both S/G sample valves SAMPLE ISOL VLV MS-191A SAMPLE ISOL VLV MS-191B

c. DIRECT Chemistry to sample both S/Gs for boron and activity

d. Using EOP 2541, Appendix 46, Sampling for EAL Determination, DIRECT Chemistry to sample for EAL Determination OR CLASSIFY using alternative methods

e. MONITOR the following for indications of S/G tube leakage:

Rise in SJAE activity or high activity alarm Rise in S/G blowdown activity or high activity alarm Rising S/G level when NOT feeding Feed flow, steam flow mismatch Main steam line radiation monitor alarm N-16 radiation monitor alarm

f. CHECK S/G sample valves open

g. WHEN samples have been taken, THEN CLOSE both S/G sample valves (C-05)

SAMPLE ISOL VLV MS-191A SAMPLE ISOL VLV MS-191B US

3.

REFER to MP-26-EPI-FAP06, Classification and PARS AND CLASSIFY the event

4.

OPEN ATTACHMENT B, Placekeeper AND PERFORM the following:

RECORD EOP entry time ______________

PLACE Master Alarm Silence in NORMAL

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Page 17 of 19 Event

Description:

EOP 2536, Excessive Steam Demand Symptoms/Cues: Directed by Diagnostic Flowchart ATC

5.

SIAS actuation

a. CHECK the following ACTUATED: (C-01)

SIAS CIAS EBFAS

b. Check one complete facility of CRAC is operating in Recirculation mode Facility 1 HV-203A, Fan F-21A exhaust damper - OPEN.

Fan F-21A, supply fan - RUNNING.

HV-206A, Fan F-31A exhaust damper - OPEN.

Fan F-31A, exhaust fan - RUNNING.

HV-212A, Fan F-32A exhaust damper - OPEN.

Fan F-32A, filter fan - RUNNING.

HV-202, minimum fresh air damper - CLOSED.

HV-207, cable vault exhaust damper - CLOSED.

HV-208, exhaust air damper - CLOSED.

6.

Optimize Safety Injection

a. CHECK at least one complete train of the following ACTUATED: (C-01X)

SIAS CIAS EBFAS

b. Check SI pumps - RUNNING (C-01)

c. REFER to EOP 2541, Appendix 2, Figures, Figure 3, Pre-SRAS Minimum required SI Flow, AND CHECK Safety Injection flow - ADEQUATE

d. START all charging pumps

e. CHECK Facility 1 ECCS Train - Operating

f. CHECK Facility 1 Vital Switchgear is operating as follows:

Lower 4160V switchgear room Fan F-134, LOWER 4160VAC SWITCHGEAR COOLING FAN, - ENERGIZED.

SW-178B, COOLER x-182 CONTROL VALVE, - OPEN.

West 480V switchgear room Fan F-51, WEST 480V SWGR RM COOLING FAN, - RUNNING SW-178A, COOLERS X-181A, X-181 SW CONTROL VALVE, - OPEN.

g. CHECK Facility 2 ECCS Train - Operating

h. CHECK Facility2 Vital Switchgear is operating as follows:

Upper 4160V switchgear room Fan F-133, UPPER 4160VAC SWITCHGEAR COOLING FAN, - ENERGIZED.

SW-178C, COOLER X-183 CONTROL VALVE, - OPEN.

East 480V switchgear room Fan F-52, EAST 480V SWGR RM COOLING FAN, - RUNNING F-142, EAST 480V SGWR RM EXHAUST FAN - ENERGIZED.

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Page 18 of 19 Event

Description:

EOP 2536, Excessive Steam Demand Symptoms/Cues: Directed by Diagnostic Flowchart BOP

7.

Close MSIVs to Isolate Leak

a. CHECK MSI - ACTUATED

b. CHECK at least one train of MSI - properly ACTUATED (C-01X)

c. OPEN CND VAC BKR, AR-17 (C-06)

ATC

8.

RCP Trip Strategy

a. CHECK at least one RCP - OPERATING

b. CHECK BOTH of the following conditions exist:

pressurizer pressure is less than 1714 psia AND SIAS has actuated

c. ENSURE ONE RCP in each loop is stopped.

d. PLACE associated pressurizer spray valve controller in MAN AND CLOSE the applicable spray valve:

PZR SPRAY-1A, HIC-100E PZR SPRAY-1B, HIC-100F

e. REFER TO EOP 2541, Appendix 2, Figures, Fig. 2, RCP NPSH Curve, AND CHECK RCP NPSH is within limits.

ATC

9.

RCP Operating Within Limits

a. CHECK at least ONE RCP operating

b. REFER to EOP 2541, Appendix 22, RCP Operating Parameters, AND CHECK RCP limits satisfied

c. CHECK both of the following - MET RCS TCOLD - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 500 °F All 4 RCPs - OPERATING RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED PROCEED TO step 10 US

10. Determine Most Affected Steam Generator Considering All Of The Following: ( #1 S/G)

High steam flow from steam generators Lowering steam generator pressures Lowering steam generator levels Lowering RCS cold leg temperatures

Op. Test No.: ES22LI1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Page 19 of 19 Event

Description:

EOP 2536, Excessive Steam Demand Symptoms/Cues: Directed by Diagnostic Flowchart BOP Isolate most affected S/G:

a. Check ESDE leak path - REMAINS UNISOLATED.

b. Check #1 S/G - MOST AFFECTED

c. ISOLATE #1 S/G by performing the following:

1. Close #1 ADV by both of the following: (C-05 or C-21)

• ADV controller, PIC-4223, in M

• ATMOS DUMP, MS-190A - CLOSED

2. Place ADV Quick Open Permissive to OFF

3. CHECK MSIV, MS-64A - CLOSED (C-05)

4. CHECK BYPASS, MS-65A - CLOSED (C-05)

5. CLOSE TDAFP SPLY VLV, MS-201 (C-05)

6. CHECK BLDN ISOL VLV, MS-220A CLOSED (C-05)

7. PLACE BOTH aux. feed OVERIDE/MAN/START/RESET handswitches in PULL TO LOCK (C-05)

8. CLOSE AFW FCV, FW-43A (C-05)

9. CLOSE AFW ISOL CK, FW-12A (C-05)

10. CLOSE FW REG BYPASS VLV, LIC-5215 (C-05)

11. CHECK BLK VLV, FW-42A - CLOSED (C-05)

12. CLOSE FW ISOL, FW-5A (C-05)

13. CLOSE MAIN STM LEG LOW PT DR, MS-265B (C-06/7)

14. CHECK Main Steam Safety Valves - CLOSED (C-05, PPC or local)

15. RECORD time #1 steam generator isolated: Time When the event has been addressed to the lead examiners satisfaction, the scenario is complete.

Form 4.1-PWR Pressurized-Water Reactor Examination Outline Notes: CO = Conduct of Operations; EC = Equipment Control; RC = Radiation Control; EM = Emergency Procedures/Plan These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample when Revision 2 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan These systems/evolutions are only included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 2 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan Facility: Millstone Unit 2 Date of Exam: Fall 2022 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G Total A2 G

Total

1.

Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1

4 4 2

N/A 4 3 N/A 1

18 3

3 6

2 2 1 1

1 1 2

8 3

1 4

Tier Totals 6 5 3

5 4 3

26 6

4 10

2.

Plant Systems 1

2 2 1

2 3 3 2 5 2 2

4 28 2

3 5

2 2 0 1

2 1 0 1 0 0 1

1 9

0 2

1 3

Tier Totals 4 2 2

4 4 3 3 5 2 3

5 37 4

4 8

3.

Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories CO EC RC EM 6

CO EC RC EM 7

2 2

1 1

2 2

1 2

4. Theory Reactor Theory Thermodynamics 6

3 3

Form 4.1-PWR PWR Examination Outline Page 2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO)

E/APE # / Name K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G K/A Topic(s)

IR 000007 (EPE 7; BW E02&E10; CE E02)

Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery X

EK 2.09 Knowledge of the relationship between a reactor trip and the AC distribution system 3.5 000008 (APE 8) Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident X

AK1.03 Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the consequences due to a PZR vapor space leak as they apply to a pressurize vapor space accident.

4.0 000009 (EPE 9) Small-Break LOCA X

EA1.17 Ability to operate and/or monitor the PRT/quench tank as they apply to a Small-Break LOCA 3.2 000011 (EPE 11) Large-Break LOCA X

EA1.03 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to a Large-Break LOCA: RCPs 3.9 000015 (APE 15) Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions X

AA2.15: Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions:

Natural Circulation Flow 3.2 000022 (APE 22) Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup X

AK1.03: Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup:

Relationship between charging flow and PZR level 3.6 000026 (APE 26) Loss of Component Cooling Water X

AK3.02 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to loss of component cooling water: the automatic actions (alignments) within the CCWS resulting from the actuation of the ESFAS 3.9 000027 (APE 27) Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction X

AK2.12 Knowledge of the relationship between a Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction and the following systems or components: PZR code safety valves 3.7 000029 (EPE 29) Anticipated Transient Without Scram X

EA2.12 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to an Anticipated Transient Without Scram: AFW flow 3.5 000038 (EPE 38) Steam Generator Tube Rupture X 2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.

3.3 000040 (APE 40; BW E05; CE E05; W E12)

Steam Line RuptureExcessive Heat Transfer X

AK2.07: Knowledge of the relationship between a Steamline Rupture and the following systems or components: NIS 3.2 000054 (APE 54; CE E06) Loss of Main Feedwater X

AA1.05: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Loss of Main Feedwater: MFR regulating control valves 3.3 000055 (EPE 55) Station Blackout X

EK1.05: Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following as they apply to a Station Blackout: Load Shedding 3.8 000056 (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power X

AK3.02: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to Loss of Offsite Power: Actions contained in AOPs 4.1 000057 (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus X

AA2.21 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus:

RWST level 3.1 000058 (APE 58) Loss of DC Power X

AK1.03 Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following as they apply to Loss of DC Power: Effect of battery discharge rate on capacity 3.7 000062 (APE 62) Loss of Service Water X

AK2.04: Knowledge of the relationship between Loss of Service Water and the following systems or components:

Chilled water systems 3.0 000077 (APE 77) Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances X

AA1.02 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: Turbine/generator controls 3.6 K/A Category Totals:

4 4

2 4

3 1

Group Point Total:

18

Form 4.1-PWR PWR Examination Outline Page 3 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO)

E/APE # / Name K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G

K/A Topics IR 000001 (APE 1)

Continuous Rod Withdrawal X

2.2.42 Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for TS 3.9 000024 (APE 24)

Emergency Boration X

AA1.09 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Emergency Boration: ECCS 3.5 000033 (APE 33) Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation X

AA2.12 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation: Maximum allowable channel disagreement 3.1 000037 (APE 37)

Steam Generator Tube Leak X

AK1.02 Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following as they apply to a Steam Generator Tube Leak:

Leak rate versus D/P across tube 3.8 000061 (APE 61) Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarms X

AK1.02 Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following as they apply to Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarms: Adverse containment conditions 3.6 000069 (APE 69; W E14) Loss of Containment Integrity X

2.1.29 Knowledge of how to conduct system lineups, such as valves, breakers, or switches 4.1 000076 (APE 76) High Reactor Coolant Activity X

AK3.06 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to High Reactor Coolant Activity: Actions contained in EOPs or AOPs for high reactor coolant activity 3.5 (CE E09) Functional Recovery X

EK2.13 Knowledge of the relationship between Functional Recovery and the following systems or components:

Shutdown cooling system 3.5 K/A Category Point Totals:

2 1

1 1

1 2

Group Point Total:

8

Form 4.1-PWR PWR Examination Outline Page 4 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (RO)

System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G K/A Topic(s)

IR #

003 (SF4P RCP)

Reactor Coolant Pump X

A2.06 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Reactor Coolant Pump System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: CCWS malfunction 3.5 004 (SF1; SF2 CVCS)

Chemical and Volume Control X

K4.10 Knowledge of Chemical and Volume Control System design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following:

Minimum temperature requirements on borated systems 3.0 005 (SF4P RHR)

Residual Heat Removal X

X K2.02 Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following:

Containment isolation valves G (Component) 191008: Breakers, Relays and Disconnects K1.11: Control room indication of a breaker status 3.3 3.3 006 (SF2; SF3 ECCS)

Emergency Core Cooling X

X K3.03 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Emergency Core Cooling System will have on the following systems or system parameters: CSS A3.06 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Emergency Core Cooling System, including: Valve lineups 3.8 3.7 007 (SF5 PRTS)

Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank X

A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: A PORV that is stuck open, or code safety valve 4.5 008 (SF8 CCW)

Component Cooling Water X

X K1.06 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the Component Cooling Water System and the following systems: EDGs K6.14 Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the Component Cooling Water System: Temperature control valves for loads cooled by CCW 3.8 3.3 010 (SF3 PZR PCS)

Pressurizer X

A3.03 Ability to monitor automatic features of the Pressurizer Pressure Control System, including: PZR heater operation 3.3 012 (SF7 RPS) Reactor Protection X

X K2.01 Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following:

RPS channels, components, and interconnections A4.07 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: M/G set breakers 4.0 3.8 013 (SF2 ESFAS)

Engineered Safety Features Actuation X

A1.02 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System, including: Containment pressure, temperature, and humidity 3.9 022 (SF5 CCS)

Containment Cooling X

X K6.09 Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the Containment Cooling System: ESFAS G(Component) 191004 Pumps K1.12 Runout of a centrifugal pump (definition, indications, causes, effects, and corrective measures) 4.0 2.7 026 (SF5 CSS)

Containment Spray X

K5.03 Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the Containment Spray System: Stratification of liquids:

concentrated sodiuim hydroxide solution has a higher specific gravity than weak boric acid solution; therefore, the two solutions must be vigorously mixed to make an effective spray 2.5

PWR Examination Outline SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (RO) (continued)

System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G K/A Topic(s)

IR #

039 (SF4S MSS) Main and Reheat Steam X

K5.10 Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the Main and Reheat Steam System: Use of T-ave. program control when steam dumping through atmospheric relief/dump valves, including T-ave. limits 3.6 059 (SF4S MFW) Main Feedwater X G 2.1.45 Ability to identify and interpret diverse indications to validate the response of another indication.

4.3 061 (SF4S AFW)

Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X

A.2.04 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations:

AFW pump failure or improper operation 4.1 062 (SF6 ED AC)

AC Electrical Distribution X

X K5.04 Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the AC Electrical Distribution System: Operation of a static inverter A2.16 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the AC Electrical Distribution System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Degraded system voltages 3.1 3.7 063 (SF6 ED DC)

DC Electrical Distribution X

K6.07 Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the DC Electrical Distribution System: Loss of all AC power 4.3 064 (SF6 EDG)

Emergency Diesel Generator X

K1.07 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the Emergency Diesel Generators and the following systems: EDG building ventilation system 3.3 073 (SF7 PRM)

Process Radiation X A4.04 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Alarm and/or interlock setpoint checks and adjustments 3.2 076 (SF4S SW) Service Water X G (Component) 191006 Heat Exchangers and Condensers K1.13 Consequences of heat exchanger tube failure 2.9 078 (SF8 IAS) Instrument Air X

K4.05 Knowledge of the Instrument Air System design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following:

Isolation of instrument air to containment 3.2 103 (SF5 CNT)

Containment X

A2.06 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Containment System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: High containment pressure 4.5 053 (SF1; SF4P ICS*) Integrated Control X

A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the Integrated Control System, including: T-ave 3.9 K/A Category Point Totals:

2 2 1 2 3 3 2 5 2 2 4 Group Point Total:

28

Form 4.1-PWR PWR Examination Outline Page 5 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 2 (RO)

System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G K/A Topic(s)

IR 002 (SF2; SF4P RCS) Reactor Coolant X

K3.02 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Reactor Coolant System will have on the following systems or system parameters: Fuel 4.3 015 (SF7 NI) Nuclear Instrumentation X G 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgements based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation 4.4 016 (SF7 NNI) Nonnuclear Instrumentation X

A4.03 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Removing a failed channel from the circuit logic 3.4 017 (SF7 ITM) In-Core Temperature Monitor X

K4.01 Knowledge of In-Core Temperature Monitor System design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following:

Input to subcooling monitors 3.9 027 (SF5 CIRS) Containment Iodine Removal X

K1.02 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the Containment Iodine Removal System and the following systems: Containment 3.1 034 (SF8 FHS) Fuel Handling Equipment X

K4.02 Knowledge of Fuel Handling Equipment System design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following:

Fuel movement 3.0 056 (SF4S CDS) Condensate X

K1 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the Condensate System and the following systems: IAS (Instrument Air System) 2.6 072 (SF7 ARM) Area Radiation Monitoring X

K5.03 Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the Area Radiation Monitoring System: Containment Isolation 3.6 086 (SF8 FP) Fire Protection X

A1.06 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the Fire Protection System, including: Lights and alarms 3.0 K/A Category Point Totals:

2 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 Group Point Total:

9

Form 4.1-PWR PWR Examination Outline Page 2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (SRO)

E/APE # / Name K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G K/A IR 000007 (EPE 7; BW E02&E10; CE E02)

Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery X

2.1.34 Knowledge of RCS or balance-of-plant chemistry controls, including parameters measured and reasons for the control 3.5 000008 (APE 8) Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident X

2.1.8 Ability to coordinate personnel activities outside the control room 4.1 000009 (EPE 9) Small-Break LOCA X

EA2.15 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to a Small-Break LOCA: RCS parameters 3.8 000025 (APE 25) Loss of Residual Heat Removal System X

AA2.07 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of the Residual Heat Removal System: Pump cavitation 4.0 000057 (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus X

2.2.43 Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable alarms 3.3 000065 (APE 65) Loss of Instrument Air X

AA2.07 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to Loss of Instrument Air: Determination of whether backup nitrogen supply is controlling the valve position 3.2 K/A Category Totals:

3 3

Group Point Total:

6 Form 4.1-PWR PWR Examination Outline Page 3 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (SRO)

E/APE # / Name K1 K

K A

A2 G K/A Topic(s)

IR #

000032 (APE 32) Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation X

AA2.01 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation: Normal and/or abnormal power supply operation 3.0 000067 (APE 67) Plant Fire On Site X

AA2.12 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to Plant Fire on Site: Location of vital equipment within fire zone 3.6 (CE A16) Excess RCS Leakage X

AA2.06 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to Excess RCS Leakage: RCS temperature and pressure 3.5 (CE E13*) Loss of Forced Circulation/LOOP/Blackout X

2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps 4.6 K/A Category Point Totals:

3 1

Group Point Total:

4

Form 4.1-PWR PWR Examination Outline Page 4 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (SRO)

System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K A1 A2 A A4 G

K/A Topic(s)

IR 003 (SF4P RCP) Reactor Coolant Pump X

A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Reactor Coolant Pump System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Problems with RCP seals, especially seal leakoff rates 4.0 004 (SF1; SF2 CVCS) Chemical and Volume Control X

2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management 4.6 061 (SF4S AFW)

Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X

2.2.42 Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for TS 4.6 063 (SF6 ED DC) DC Electrical Distribution X

2.4.17 Knowledge of emergency and abnormal operating procedures terms and definitions 4.3 053 (SF1; SF4P ICS*) Integrated Control X

A2.08 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Integrated Control System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Plant computer failure 3.2 K/A Category Point Totals:

2 3

Group Point Total:

5 Form 4.1-PWR PWR Examination Outline Page 5 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 2 (SRO)

System # / Name K1 K 2

K 3

K4 K 5

K 6

A 1

A2 A 3

A 4

G K/A Topics IR 033 (SF8 SFPCS) Spent Fuel Pool Cooling X

A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Abnormal water level 3.7 035 (SF 4P SG) Steam Generator X

A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Steam Generator System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: Reactor trip/turbine trip 4.2 072 (SF7 ARM) Area Radiation Monitoring X 2.1.35 Knowledge of the fuel handling responsibilities of SROs (SRO Only) 3.9 K/A Category Point Totals:

2 1

Group Point Total:

3

Form 4.1-COMMON Common Examination Outline Facility: Millstone U2 Date of Exam: Fall 2022 Generic Knowledge and AbilitiesTier 3 (RO/SRO)

Category K/A #

Topic RO SRO-Only IR IR

1.

Conduct of Operations 2.1.30 Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls 4.4 2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply system precautions, limitations, notes, or cautions 3.8 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, and tables (reference potential) 4.2 2.1.40 Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements 3.9 Subtotal 2

2

2.

Equipment Control 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures 3.7 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures 4.1 2.2.5 Knowledge of the process for making design or operating changes to the facility, such as 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests and Experiments, screening and evaluation processes, administrative processes for temporary modifications, disabling annunciators, or installation of temporary equipment 3.2 2.2.20 Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting activities 3.8 Subtotal 2

2

3.

Radiation Control 2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles and procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, or alignment of filters 3.2 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases 4.3 Subtotal 1

1

4.

Emergency Procedures/

Plan 2.4.2 Knowledge of system setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with emergency and abnormal operating procedure entry conditions 4.5 2.4.4 Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures 4.7 2.4.51 Knowledge of emergency operating procedure exit conditions (e.g., emergency condition no longer exists or severe accident guideline entry is required) 4.0 Subtotal 1

2 Tier 3 Point Total 6

7

Form 4.1-COMMON Common Examination Outline (continued)

TheoryTier 4 (RO)

Category K/A #

Topic RO IR Reactor Theory 6

192002 K1.07 Define K-eff and discuss its relationship to the state of a reactor (critical, subcritical, and supercritical) 3.1 6

192006 K1.03 Describe the production of xenon-135 2.8 6

192005 K1.09 Describe the effect on the magnitude of control rod worth for a change in the following:

fission product poisons 2.8 Subtotal 3

Thermodynamics 6

193009 Core Thermal Limits K1.07 Describe factors that affect peaking and hot channel factors 3.3 6

193001 Thermodynamic Units and Properties K1.01 Convert between absolute and gauge pressure and vacuum scales 2.7 6

193008 Thermal Hydraulics K1.23 Describe means by which natural circulation can be enhanced 4.1 Subtotal 3

Tier 4 Point Total 6