ML20326A008

Attachment 2 - Response to Requests for Additional Information Part 6

ML20326A008
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Site:	HI-STORE
Issue date:	11/20/2020
From:	Holtec
To:	Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
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HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

RAI17:ClarifythedistancebetweentheISFSIandthecontrolledareaboundaryandrevisethe calculationforthedoseatthecontrolledareaboundaryandthedoserateversusdistance,asnecessary.

Table1.0.1oftheHISTORESARstatesthatthedistancefromthenearestloadedUMAXVVMtothe controlledareaboundaryis400meters.However,Section7.4.2.1oftheSARalsostatesthat:[]The nearestresidenceis1.5milesfromtheHISTORECISFacility.Thedosecalculationsconservativelyassume afulltimeresident(8760hours/year)isonly1000metersfromthenearestloadedHISTORMUMAX VVM.Inthecaseofthisnearestresidence,thedoseiscalculatedtobebelowthe25mremannualdose limitprescribedin10CFR72.104.Fromthesestatements,thestaffisunabletoverifythecalculated controlledareaboundarydoseaspresentedinTable7.4.3oftheSARbecauseitisnotclearwhetherthe controlledareaboundaryis400metersor1000meters.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR20.1301(a)(1),10CFR72.104and 72.106.

HoltecResponse:

Thecontrolledareaboundaryisshowninthesitelayoutdrawing10940,andthedistanceisindicatedin Table1.0.1asaminimumof400metersfromthenearestUMAXVVM.10CFR72.104providesa criterionfornormaloperationsfortheannualdoseequivalenttoanyrealindividualwhoislocated beyondthecontrolledarea.Updatedtotalannualdoseatthecontrolledareaboundaryisprovidedin Table7.4.7.

Anothersetofassumptionsisusedforarealindividualatthenearestresidencebeyondthecontrolled areaboundary,assumingthenearesthomeis1000metersfromthenearestHISTOREradiationsource.

Currently,thenearesthomeis1.5milesfromtheHISTORECISFacility,sothisassumptionof1000 meterstothenearestresidence,withfulltimeoccupancy(8760hours/year)isconservative.Annual doseforarealindividualatthenearestresidenceisprovidedinTable7.4.8.

RAI51:Provideabasisforhowtheseismicanalysisforstackup,withrespecttotheUMAXlocation,is theboundingcaseascomparedtothecasktransferfacility(CTF)location.Includearesponsespectrum and/orsupportingcalculationsdemonstratingthatthedynamicbehavioroftheUMAXisboundingfor bothforcesanddisplacementsandupdateanyresults/tablesasnecessary.

Section2.0ofSupplement5toHoltecReportNo.HI2177585,StructuralCalculationPackageforHI STORECISFacility,states:

[]Therefore,theonlydifferencesbetweenstackupattheCTFandUMAXlocationsisthefree length(i.e.unthreadedlength)oftheanchorbolts(approximately4.5inchesand13.5inches, respectively).Thelongerfreelengthoftheboltswillintroducemoreflexibilityintothesystem andpotentiallylargerrockingdisplacementsandloadsinthestack.Hence,stackupatthe UMAXlocationisconsideredboundingandtheboltedconnectionpointsbetweentheCECandHT areincludedinthemodel[]

Itisnotclearhowamoreflexiblesystemduetolongerboltswouldbeboundingintermsofloadingor displacements,sincetheresponseofthestructureisdependentontheresponsespectrumofthesite.

Thatis,astifferstructuremayobservelargerdemandsoncertaincomponentsthanaflexiblesystem

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

andviceversa,giventhecharacteristicsofthesitedescribedbytheresponsespectrum,whichhasnot beenprovided.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.92,and72.103(a)(2).

HoltecResponse:

ThestackupattheUMAXISFSIpadisthelimitingconfigurationforseismicresponseanalysis,as comparedtothestackupattheCTF,because(a)bothlocationsaresubjecttothesamedesignbasis seismicmotionand(b)therockingfrequencyofthestackupattheUMAXISFSIpadislessthanthe rockingfrequencyofthestackupattheCTF(owingtothelongerboltlengthassociatedwiththeformer configuration),whichmeansthatthestackupattheUMAXISFSIpadissubjecttohigherspectral accelerationsandthereforehigherdemandloads.Thisisfurtherexplainedbelow.

ThedesignbasisseismiceventsfortheHISTORECISFacility,whichincludestheHISTORMUMAXISFSI andtheCTFinsidetheCaskTransferBuilding,aredefinedinTable4.3.3oftheHISTORESAR.As discussedinSARSection4.3.6,thestackupconfigurationisaShortTermOperation,andthereforeitis onlyrequiredtobeanalyzedforOBEloading.However,forconservatismthestackupanalysis performedinSupplement5toHI2177585,andalsodiscussedinSARSection5.4.1.4,considersthe DesignExtendedConditionEarthquake(DECE)asinput.PerSARTable4.3.3,theDECEisdefinedasaRG 1.60earthquakehavingaZPAvalueof0.25ginallthreeorthogonaldirections(2horizontaland1 vertical).Insummary,thereisnodifferencebetweenthetwostackuplocationswithrespecttothe designbasisseismicmotion,andaboundingearthquake(DECE)isusedasinputtotheseismicanalysis forstackup.

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Forthereasonsabove,theseismicanalysisofthestackupattheUMAXISFSIpadboundstheseismic responseofthestackupattheCTF.

RAI52:VerifythedensityvaluesforthematerialsusedintheLSDYNAmodel,usedforstackupto simulatetheDesignExtendedConditionEarthquake(DECE)event.Updateandsubmitany results/calculationsasnecessary.

Accordingtothelicensingdrawings(DWG10865),BOM9ismadeofASTMA516Grade70,which typicallyhasamassdensityofaround7.280e004slugs/in^3,butisreportedas9.330e004slugs/in^3in LSDYNAsimulations.Higherdensityvaluesformaterialscouldleadtoerroneousresults,asthe responseofthestructuremaybesignificantlyaltered.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.92and72.122(b)(2)(i).

HoltecResponse:

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

The density of the shield gate top plate is intentionally increased to account for the weight of miscellaneousshieldgatecomponents(e.g.,thehydraulicactuatingsystem)notexplicitlymodeledinthe stackupanalysisLSDYNAmodelinSupplement5ofHI2177585.Sincethosemiscellaneouscomponents arealllocatedbelowtheshieldgatetopplate,includingtheirweightatthetopplateconservatively increasestheoverallcenterofgravityofthestackupfortheseismicanalysis.Therefore,itisnotrequired toupdatetheanalysesasthecurrentonesremainconservativelybounding.

RAI53:JustifytheclaimthattheweightusedtomodeltheHITRACCSinLSDYNAisconservativewith respecttoseismicdemands.IncludeadiscussionofwhentheHITRACCSisfullyloadedversuspartially loaded.Update,asneeded,anyseismiccalculationsrelatedtothesimulationoftheHITRACCSusing LSDYNA.

Page117ofHoltecReportNo.HI2177585,StructuralCalculationPackageforHISTORECISFacility claimsthataweightof380,000lbsfortheHITRACCSisconservativewithrespecttoseismicanalysis.

However,thisclaimisnotjustifiedgiventhatahigherweightmaynotnecessarilyindicateamoresevere seismicresponsedependingontheresponsespectrumthattypifiesthesite,whichhasnotbeen provided.Thatis,apartiallyloadedMPCmayproducehigherdemandsoncertaincomponentsoftheHI TRACCSdependingontheresponsespectrumofthesiteanddynamicbehavioroftheHITRACCS.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.92and72.122(b)(2)(i).

HoltecResponse:

Designedtohaveaverystiffstructure,theHITRACCScaskitselfwillbehavelikearigidbody(i.e.,witha natural frequency above 33 Hz.) in a seismic event. However, the smallest natural frequency of the anchoredHITRACCSstackupsystemiscontrolledbytherelativelyflexibleanchoringbolts.Usingthe bounding cask weight in the seismic analysis can capture the lowerbound natural frequency of the system.BecausetheseismicresponseoftheRG.1.60earthquakereduceswiththeincreaseoffrequency after2.5Hz,itisconservativetousetheupperboundcaskweightintheseismicanalysisoftheHITRAC CSstackupsystemwhoseminimumnaturalfrequencyisshowninthefollowingcalculationtobe19.0Hz.

ApartiallyloadedMPCwouldincreasethenaturalfrequencyofthestackupsystemandthereforereduce theseismicresponseofthestackup.Insummary,usingtheboundingweightisconservative.Unless noted,alltheinputdatausedinthefollowingnaturalfrequencycalculationistakenfromHoltecReport No.HI2177585R0andHoltecDrawingNo.10868R0.

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RAI54:Definethedurationofaworkshiftasitpertainstoseismicqualification.

Section4.3.6oftheHISTORESARstates,inpart:

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

Followingtheuniversallypracticedliftandsetruleatnuclearpowerplants,transient activitiessuchasupendingofacask,attachingofslingsorinstallationoffasteners,aretreated astransientactivitiesthatarenotsubjecttoaseismicqualification.Forclarityofapplication, anyactivitythatspanslessthanaworkshiftisdeemedtobeseismicexempt.

Sinceseismicqualificationofimportanthandlingoperations,suchascaskupending,attachingofslings, orinstallationoffasteners,whichmayincludeimportanttosafetycomponents,isnotperformedbased onaworkshift,aworkshiftshouldbeclearlydefined.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.122(b)(2)(i).

HoltecResponse:

ThetermworkshifthasbeenaddedtotheGlossaryintheHISTORESARandgiventhefollowing definition:

WorkShiftisanycontinuous8hourtimeintervalduringwhichworkiscarriedoutatHISTORE CISFacility.

RAI55:DescribetheconditionoftheloadedHITRACCSwhencarriedbytheverticalcasktransporter andtransitingorperformingdownloadingoperationsfromthecasktransferbuildingtoadesignated ventilatedverticalmodulewhilesubjectedtoatornadoorlightningstrike.

Section5.5.2oftheSARdescribesthescenariowheretheverticalcasktransporterandrelated equipmentiscarryingtheHITRACCSunderseismicloading.However,itisunclearhowthesame systemrespondstoalightningstrikeortornadowhiletravelingtotheventilatedverticalmoduleand performingdownloadingoperations.Providejustificationand/orsupplementalcalculationsandupdate theSAR,asnecessary,showingthatthetransportedcanisterwillnotbebreachedbyamissilestrikeora tipoveroftheverticalcasktransporter.Ifthetipoverscenarioiscredible,thestructural,shielding, thermal,andconfinementanalysesshouldbeupdatedtoconsiderthedamagefromthatevent.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.92and72.106.

HoltecResponse:

ThecalculationsperformedinSupplementNo.2toHI2177585demonstratethatafreestandingHI TRACCS,completelyindependentfromtheverticalcasktransporter(VCT),willnottipoverasaresultof thedesignbasistornadowindandmissileimpact.ThecalculationsalsoshowthattheHITRACCS adequatelyprotectstheMPCagainstpenetrantmissilesduetoatornadoevent.

WhentheHITRACCSisbeingcarriedbytheVCT,theaspectratio(i.e.,ratioofc.g.heighttominimum basedimension)decreasessignificantly,whichenhancesstability.ThephysicalpresenceoftheVCTalso servesasanadditionalbarrieragainstmissileimpactontheHITRACCS.Insummary,thetornadowind andmissileevaluationsforthefreestandingHITRACCS,whicharedocumentedinSupplementNo.2to HI2177585,areboundingfortheVCTcarryingaloadedHITRACCS.

Regardingalightningstrike,theHITRACCScontainsover75,000lbofhighlyconductivecarbonsteel withover600squarefeetofexternalsurfacearea.Suchalargesurfaceareaandmetalmassisadequate

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

todissipateanylightningthatmaystriketheHITRACCS.TherearenocombustiblematerialsontheHI TRACCSsurface.Therefore,lightningwillnotimpairthestructuralperformanceoftheHITRACCS.A lightningstrikeontheVCTcouldcauseanelectricalsystemfailurepreventingfurthertransitoftheHI TRACCS,butaloaddropoftheHITRACCSfromtheVCTwouldnotresultsincetheVCThasredundant dropprotectionfeatures.

RAI56:ConfirmthevaluesprovidedinTable5.4.8oftheHISTORESAR,asneeded,forthetypeof materialusedintheliftingtrunnionsoftheHITRACCS.

Table5.4.8oftheHISTORESARindicatesthatthemaximumnumberoffatiguecyclesforthelifting trunnionsis7,500forSB637N07718material.ItappearsthatSA564Gr.630H1100materialwas intendedtobedescribedinstead.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.122(b).

HoltecResponse:

ThevaluesinTable5.4.8arecorrect.However,therewasatypographicalerrorassociatedwithoneof theitemdescriptions.AsnotedintheaboveRAI,theitemdescriptioncorrespondingto7,500cycles waspreviouslylistedincorrectlyasLiftingTrunnions(SB637N07718).Consistentwiththefatigue evaluationsdocumentedinSupplement10ofHoltecReportNo.HI2177585,theliftingtrunnion materialthatcorrespondstoamaximumof7,500loadingcyclesisSA564Gr.630H1100.Table5.4.8of theHISTORESARhasbeenrevisedaccordinglytocorrecttheitemdescription,sothatitnowappearsas LiftingTrunnions(SA564Gr.630H1100).

RAI57:ConfirmtheweightoftheHISTAR190transportationpackagetobeliftedbythehorizontallift beam.

AccordingtoSupplement9toHoltecReportNo.HI2177585,themaximumweightoftheMPCtobe liftedbythehorizontalliftbeamis110kips;however,theHISTAR190FSAR,Revision0C(DocumentNo.

HI2146214)indicatesthatthemaximumweightoftheMPCis116,400lbsConfirmtheactualweightto belifted,andreviseanycalculationsrelatedtothedesignofthehorizontalliftbeam.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.122(b).

HoltecResponse:

ThemaximumweightoftheHISTAR190transportationpackageusedinSupplement9ofHoltecReport No.HI2177585isconfirmedtobevalidandcorrect.Inparticular,themaximumMPCweightof110kips usedasinputinSupplement9iscorrectsinceitaccordswiththemaximumloadedMPCweightper Table3.2.1oftheHISTORMUMAXFSAR.WhileitistruethataHISTAR190transportcaskcan transportaMPC37thatweighsasmuchas116,400pounds,suchanMPCcannotbestoredattheHI STORECISFFacilitysinceitwouldnotsatisfywiththedesignbasisrequirementsoftheHISTORMUMAX FSARandCoC,whichlimitthemaximumMPCweightto110kips.Therefore,sinceaMPCweighingmore than110kipscannotbeacceptedforstorageattheHISTORECISFFacility,thereisnoneedtoanalyze thehorizontalliftbeamforahigherload.ThatbeingsaidSupplement9ofHoltecReportNo.HI 2177585qualifiesthehorizontalliftbeamforatotalliftedloadof418kips,includingHISTAR190cask,

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

impactlimiters,loadedMPC,andmiscellaneousrigging,anddeterminesthattheliftingdevicehasa minimumsafetyfactorof1.283(or28.3%margin)overandaboveNURE0612andANSIN14.6 requirements.Thismeansthat,althoughitisnotpermissiblefromadesignandlicensingstandpoint, thehorizontalliftbeamiscapableofcarryingsignificantlymoreweight(i.e.,anadditional100kips) withoutexceedingitsdesignstresslimits.

RAI58:Provideabasisfortheassumptionthattheverticalcasktransporter(VCT)isessentiallyarigid bodywhentransportingaloadedHITRACCSandhowtheuseofthepeakgroundacceleration(PGA) alone,forcalculationsinvolvingtippingandsliding,isconservative.Confirmtherigidbodynatureofthe system,incorporatetheresponsespectrumofthesitebasedontheactualdynamicbehaviorofthe system,andupdatethecalculationsusedtodeterminetippingandsliding.

1toReportNo.HI2177585,Rev.0,detailsthecalculationsusedtodeterminetheamount ofslidingandtippingthattheloadedVCTmayexperience.ThemethodologyusedfromASCEStandard 4305assumesthatwhilecarryingtheHITRACCS,theVCTisarigidbody.Twoconcernsrelatedtothe assumptionthatthesystemisarigidbodyare:

1.ThefundamentalperiodoftheVCThasnotbeenprovided.Whenempty,theVCTweighs approximately210,000lbsandweighsanadditional375,000lbswhencarryingafullyloadedHI TRACCS.TheloadedVCTisexpectedtohaveafundamentalperiodthatis67%largerrelativeto theunloadedVCT,whichcouldallowthefullyloadedVCTtoexperiencelargerseismicdemands.

Thedemandisunclearastheresponsespectrumofthesitehasnotbeenprovided.

2.TheVCT,whilecarryingtheHITRACCS,appearstohaveatleast2dominantperiodsgiven thattheMPCcanswayindependentlyfromVCTduringanearthquake.Thiswouldviolatethe rigidbodyassumptionofASCEStandard4305.

Accordingly,theuseofthePGAforslidingandtipovercalculationsisquestionablesinceitsusewas intendedforrigidbodies.Inaddition,clarifyhowtheuseofthePGAisconservativeforcalculation purposessinceitsmagnituderelativetotheresponsespectrumofthesiteisunclear.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.122(b)(2)(i).

HoltecResponse:

TheHITRACCSisphysicallysecuredagainstthechassisoftheVCTusingatensionedrestraintstrap whileitisintransit.ThispreventstheHITRACCSfromswayingwithrespecttotheVCT.Also,bybracing theHITRACCSagainsttheVCT,theflexiblebeammodesassociatedwiththeVCTlifttowersare diminishedsincethemassiveHITRACCSisrestrainedagainstlateralmotion(relativetoVCT).TheVCT chassisisalargeweldedsteelstructurewithasubstantialcrosssection,whichbehaveslikearigidbody underseismicloading.

ThedesignbasisgroundresponsespectraforthesitearespecifiedinSARTable4.3.3.TheOBE,DBE, andDECEspectraareallRG1.60spectrawithZPAvaluesof0.10g,0.15g,and0.25g,respectively.Per Subsection4.3.6oftheSAR,OBEappliestotheShortTermOperationsrequiredtoloadthearriving canistersatHISTORE,includingtransitoftheHITRACCSusingtheVCT.Supplement6toHI2177585,

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

however,conservativelyconsidersthemostsevereDECEasinputtotheseismicstabilityanalysisofthe VCT.BasedontheshapeoftheRG1.60spectra,theinputaccelerationof0.25g(basedonDECE)is equivalenttoaresponsefrequencybetween12Hzand14HzwithrespecttotheOBEresponsespectra.

Therefore,theseismicstabilityanalysisperformedfortheVCTinSupplement6toHI2177585remains boundingeveniftheVCTisslightlynonrigid.

59:JustifytheimpactloadsontheHITRACCStransfercaskduetocollapseofthecasktransferbuilding (CTB)and/orprovideadditionaljustificationthatthescenariowheretheimpactfromtheW40x324 beamistheboundingaccidentscenarioforabuildingcollapse.

Thecasktransferbuilding(CTB)hasbeenclassifiedasnotimportanttosafety.ItscollapseontotheHI TRACCStransfercaskandHISTAR190transportationpackagehasbeenpostulatedasanaccident scenarioanddetailedinReportNo.HI2177585R0.Inthestructuralcalculationpackage,itisassumed thataW40x324beamfromthebuildingstrikeseithertheHISTAR190packageortheHITRACCS transfercask,whichwassimulatedusingLSDYNA.However,theapplicationdoesnotprovidedetailed drawingsordetailsoftheCTB,soitisnotpossibletoconfirmiftheloadingthattheHITRACCStransfer caskorHISTAR190transportationpackagewouldexperienceasaresultofbuildingcollapseis bounding.Itspossiblethatasmallerobject,suchasapipedrivenbyheavyloadbehinditorsomeother object,maybeamoredamagingscenariothanthecollapseofabeamontothesystem.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.122(b)(2)(ii).

HoltecResponse:

ThesafetyclassificationfortheCaskTransferBuilding(CTB)hasbeenrevisedfromnotimportantto safety(NITS)toITSC,whichisnowreflectedinSARTable4.2.1andthroughouttheHISTORESAR.Asa result,theCTBwillbedesignedtowithstandtheapplicablewindandseismicloadsatthesite,whichwill precludeabuildingcollapseasacredibleevent.AlthoughtheSARhasbeenupdatedtoeliminatethe CTBcollapseasacredibleevent,thepostulatedimpactscenariosanalyzedinSupplement14toHI 2177585usingLSDYNAremainpartofthecalculationpackagefordefenseindepth.

510:ConfirmthefatiguelifeoftheHITRACCS,verticalcasktransporter(VCT),andassociatedlifting ancillariesandrelateittoanticipatedcanisterdeployments.Updatefatiguecalculationswithbothhigh andlowstresscycleinformationandrelateittocanisterdeploymentssothattheVCT,HITRACCS,and liftingancillariescanbeadequatelymaintainedandoperatedinasafemanner.

HoltecReportNo.HI2177585R0,StructuralCalculationPackage,providescalculatedestimatesof fatiguelifefortheHITRACCSandassociatedliftingancillaries,referredtoascomponentsforthe purposesofthisRAI.ThereportestimatesthenumberoffatiguecyclesacomponentoftheHITRACCS andassociatedliftingancillariesmayobservebasedonthemaximumboundingallowablestressthe componentmayexperienceduringitslifetime.Whilefatiguecyclesbasedonmaximumstressofthis natureareuseful,theydontcapturethecompletefatiguelifeofthecomponentsincelowstress,high cyclesobservedduringhandlingandmovementbytheVCThavebeenignored.Inaddition,calculated fatiguecycleshavenotbeenlinkedtoaperiodicinspection,maintenance,repair,orreplacementofthe VCT,HITRACCS,liftingancillariesetc.Fatiguelifeshouldrelatetothenumberofcanister deploymentsorsomeothermeasure,whereacanisterdeploymentisdefinedforpurposesof

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

discussionasthemovementofacanisteruponinitialreceiptfromrailcartoitsventilatedvertical module(VVM)location,orfromtheVVMbacktotherailcar.

Foragivencanisterdeployment,theHITRACCS,VCT,andassociatedliftingancillarieswillobservea combinationofhighstressandlowstresscycles,whichshouldbecombinedtocalculatethefatiguelife ofthecomponentviaacumulativedamagemodelsuchasMinersrule.Highstresscyclesareexpected duringliftingoperationswhilelowstresscyclesareexpectedwhenbeinghandledbytheVCTasit travelsfromtherailcartotheVVM.Thenumberoflowstresscyclesandstressitselfwilldependonthe vibrationalcharacteristicsoftheVCTwhilecarryingtheHITRACCS,theweightofthecanisterbeing moved,thedistancetheHITRACCSiscarried(whichdependsontheVVMlocation),etc.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.122(b).

HoltecResponse:

Supplement10toHI2177585willberevisedtoaddresslowstresscyclesforthevariouslifting equipmentandcorrelatetheresultingfatiguelifetoanumberofcanisterdeployments.

515:Provideanexplanationandjustificationfortheexcessiveamountsofhourglassingenergy observedduringseismicsimulationsduringstackupanalysis.Updatethemodelandanyresultsinthe HISTORESAR,asnecessary.

ComparisonofhourglassingenergytointernalenergyfortheDesignExtendConditionEarthquake (DECE)seismicsimulationoftheCSStackupanalysisattheCTFandUMAX(viaLSDYNA)reaches16%

duringthesimulation,indicatingthatthemodelispotentiallyexhibitingunrealisticbehaviorandlikely leadingtoerroneousstressandstrainoutputoftheanalyzedcomponents.Similarbehaviorwasalso notedfortheSafeShutdownEarthquake(SSE)scenario.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(c)(2)and72.122(b)

HoltecResponse:

ThetimehistoriesofthetotalinternalenergyandthetotalhourglassenergyoftheDECEsimulationare showninthefollowingplot(Figure5151)whichisreproducedfromtheLSDYNAanalysissupporting Supplement5ofHI2177585.Althoughtheratioofthehourglassenergytotheinternalenergyisrelatively largeovera smallduration(i.e.,between8.0and 9.0seconds),themagnitudesof the twotypesof energies are very small relative to the internal energies at other times during the simulation. As demonstratedinFigure5152,wherethetotalkineticenergy(i.e.,seismicenergy)ofthestackupis plottedalongwiththetotalinternalenergyandthetotalhourglassenergy,thehourglassenergyisshown tobeextremelysmallandcanbeconsideredasnoisewhencomparedwiththekineticenergyofthestack up.ThesamebehaviorisobservedintheSSEsimulation.Inconclusion,thereisnoneedtoupdatethe analyses.

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516:Clarifyhowclosurelidhandlingholesaredesigned.Providesupportingcalculationsandupdatethe licensingdrawingsandHISTORESAR,asnecessary.

Note7onSheet1of6,DrawingNo.10875,states:

THEBOUNDINGCLOSURELIDWEIGHTISDEFINEDINTABLE3.2.1OFTHEFSAR.CLOSURELID HANDLINGHOLESAREDESIGNEDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTSOFTABLE2.4.1OFTHEFSAR.

However,supportingcalculationsdonotappeartohavebeenprovidedforthisITScomponent.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(c)(3)and72.120(b).

HoltecResponse:

ThedetailsoftheclosurelidhandlingholesareprovidedonSheet6ofDrawingNo.10875(seeDetail DD).TheliftingevaluationfortheHISTORMUMAXclosurelid,includingthehandlingholes,isdiscussed inSubsection3.4.3.2oftheHISTORMUMAXFSAR[1.0.6].Moreover,theresultsinTable3.4.1of[1.0.6]

demonstratethattheclosurelidhandlingholesmeettherequirementsinTable2.4.1of[1.0.6]forLoad CaseI.D.04(i.e.,Closurelidhandling).

518:Clarifythedrawingdetailsofthecasktransferbuilding(CTB)floorslabrelativetothecasktransfer facility(CTF)buildinganddescribethestructuralstabilityoftheshelllineroftheCTFduringstackupas depictedinthatview.Interactionoflateralloadsduetotheverticalcasktransporterandearthpressure inconjunctionwiththeverticalloadsfromtheloadedtransfercaskandmatingdeviceshouldbe consideredsimultaneouslyinthebucklinganalysisoftheshellandtheSARshouldbeupdated,as needed.

Sheet1of4,ofDrawingNo.10895,depictsanisometricviewoftheCTFthatdoesnotappeartoinclude thedetailsofthecasktransferbuildingfloorslabshownonSheet2of2ofDrawingNo.10912.

Additionally,itisunclearifthefillsurroundingITSBOMpart1(shell)onSheet1of4,ofDrawingNo.

10895isearthorconcreteasdrawn.

Also,itappearsthattheshell(BOM1)wasnotanalyzedforthecasethatincludesthelateralearth pressureexertedbytheverticalcasktransporter(VCT),whichweighs180,000lbs(Table3.2.1ofChapter 3oftheUMAXFSAR)duringstackupoperations.ItwasnotedthatCalculation8fortheCECofthe UMAXsystem(Attachment12toHoltecLetter5025012)appearstobeapplicabletotheshell;however, bucklingoftheshellismostlikelytooccurinthedirectionofthesurroundingearthpressure,wherethe shellmaybuckleinwardsintheventilatedverticalmodulecavityratherthanoutwardsasassumedin 2.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(c)(3)and72.120(b).

HoltecResponse:

ThedetailsofthefloorslabrelativetothebuildingarenotrelevanttoanyanalysissupportingChapter5 oftheSAR.PerHoltecdrawingNo.10912,theshelllineroftheCTFisbackedbyCLSM,whichisfairlystiff with a minimum compressive strength of 1200 psi and thus would not deform like soil to develop significantlateralearthpressuretotheCTFshellundertheweightofthecrawler.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

TheisometricsectionviewoftheCTFdoesnotshowthedetailsoftheCLSMandfloorslabinHoltec DrawingNo.10895,wherethefocusistheCTFdesignwhiletherestissimplifiedandincludedforthe purposeofillustration.However,anotewillbeaddedtotheSheet1ofthedrawingforclarification.

TheCTFshelllinerisessentiallyidenticaltotheUMAXCECshellintermsofmaterialandthicknessbut hasasignificantlyenhancedbucklingresistanceduetotherigidconnectionsbetweentheshellandthe ventpipesembeddedinthesurroundingCLSMandconcretefloorslab.Calculation8inAttachment12 toHoltecLetter5025012concludesthattheUMAXCECshellcantake400,000lbfcompressiveloadwith asafetyfactorofalmost150.Asnotedpreviously,theCTFshellwouldnotexperienceanysignificant lateralpressurefromthestiffCLSMduetothe180,000lbfcrawler.Therefore,bucklingoftheCTFshell isnotarealisticconcern.

RAI519:Clarifythematerialpropertiesandtheirtemperaturedependencyusedforthelifting trunnionsoftheHITRACCS,HITRACCSliftlinks,andtheMPCliftattachment.

Liftingtrunnions(BOM4)onLicensingDrawing10868areidentifiedasbeingmadeofeitherSB637 N07718orSA564H1100Gr.630.However,calculationsinHoltecReportNo.HI2177585assumethat thetrunnionsareonlymadeofSA564Gr.630H1100.Thetrunnionsareassumedtosustaina temperatureof350°F,althoughinHoltecReportNo.HI2177553theconcreteinwhichthetrunnions areembeddedisreportedtosustain642deg.F,whileTable4.4.1oftheHISTORESARreportsa concretetemperatureof572deg.FfortheHITRACCS.AccordingtoHoltecReportNo.HI2177585,the HITRACCSliftlinks,whichareindirectcontactwiththetrunnions,areassumedtoonlyreach300deg.

FandtheMPCliftattachmentisonlyassumedtoobserve500deg.F.

TheSARshouldverifythatthemostlimitingmaterialpropertiesfortheliftingtrunnionshasbeenused, thatthecorrecttemperatureisbeingusedfortheliftingtrunnionsoftheHITRACCS,HITRACCSlift links,andtheMPCliftattachment,andthatthecalculationsasupdatedorrevisedasnecessary.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.122(b).

HoltecResponse:

ThematerialpropertiesandthemetaltemperaturesusedasinputtothestressanalysesfortheHITRAC CSliftingtrunnions,theHITRACCSliftlinks,andtheMPCliftattachmentarevalidandconservativefor normalhandlingconditions.Inparticular,thefollowinginputdatahavebeenconfirmed:

1) ThestressanalysisoftheHITRACCSliftingtrunnionsisbasedonthestrengthpropertiesofSA 564630H100,whichistheweakerofthetwomaterialoptions(i.e.,SB637N07718andSA564 630H1100)specifiedonLicensingDrawing10868.FromSupplement1toHI2177585,SA564 630H100hasyieldandultimatestrengthvaluesof100ksiand138ksi,respectively,at350°F.

SB637N07718hasyieldandultimatestrengthvaluesof139.5ksiand172ksi,respectively,at 350°FperTable3.3.4oftheHISTORMFWFSAR[1.3.7].

2) ThepermissibletemperaturelimitfortheshieldingconcreteintheHITRACCSforshortterm operationsis300°FperTable4.4.1oftheSAR.AccordingtoNote1toTable4.4.1,shortterm operationsincludeallactivitiesintheCTBandattheISFSItoeffectuatecanistertransferand

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

onsitetranslocation(e.g.,liftingandhandlingoftheHITRACCS).Inaddition,themaximum calculatedtemperatureoftheHITRACConcrete,duringnormalonsitetransfer,is271°Fper TableA.7.1ofHI2177553.Thisvalidatestheuseof350°Fasaboundingmetaltemperaturefor theHITRACCSliftingtrunnions.ThehighertemperaturesreferencedinRAI519,namely572°F and642°F,areassociatedwithaccidentconditions,notshorttermoperations(i.e.,liftingand handling).

3) TheHITRACCSliftlinksareanalyzedinSupplement12toHI2177585basedaboundingmetal temperatureof300°F.Thisisconservativesinceitexceedsthecalculatedtemperature(200°F) oftheHITRACoutershellperTableA.7.1ofHI2177553,anditmatchesthepermissible temperaturelimitfortheHITRACCSconcreteforshorttermoperations.

4) TheMPCliftattachmentisanalyzedinSupplement7toHI2177585basedaboundingmetal temperatureof500°F.Thisisconservativesinceitexceedsthemaximumcalculated temperatureof482°FfortheMPCclosurelidasreportedinSection4.4oftheHISTORMUMAX FSAR[1.0.6].Italsoexceedsthemaximumcalculatedtemperatureof495°FfortheMPClid whileinsidetheHISTAR190attheCTF,asreportedinTable6.4.5oftheHISTORESAR.

Insummary,thematerialstrengthpropertiesandthemetaltemperaturesusedtoinformthestress analysesfortheHITRACCSliftingtrunnions,theHITRACCSliftlinks,andtheMPCliftattachmentare validandsupportedbythethermalanalysisresults.

RAI520:Specifythesizeofweld(s)51,52,53,54,55,and56shownonSheet5ofLicensing Drawing10868usedtoconstructtheshieldgateoftheHITRACCS.

Theshieldgate,identifiedasITS,ismadeofmultipleplateswhichsupportstheMPCduringtransfer operations.CalculationsinHoltecReportNo.HI2177585assumetheseplatesactinunison(composite action)withrespecttobendingthankstothesewelds(51,52,53,54,55,and56),whichhelp ensurecompositeactionwhensupportingtheMPCasshownonSection5A5A,Section5B5B,and Detail5DofLicensingDrawing10868.However,thesizeoftheseweldsisunspecified,andareexpected tocarrysignificanttransverseshearstress,particularlyattheneutralaxisofthecompositesection.The SARshouldclarifythesizeoftheseweldstoensurethatcompositeactionisensured,orreevaluatethe sectionasnoncomposite,andthelicensingdrawingsandcalculationsshouldbeupdated,asnecessary.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(c)(3)and72.120(b).

HoltecResponse:

Thestructuralcalculationoftheshieldgate,whichisperformedinSupplement1toReportHI2177585, onlycreditsthebottom3minimumthickplateoftheplateassembly,whichisshowninDetail5D.The upperthreethinnerplatesarerequiredforshieldingpurposeonly,notforanyactualstructural need.TheentirestructureisclassifiedasITSasshownintheBillofMaterialonSheet1duetoits combinedstructuralandshieldingsafetyfunctions.However,theweldsmentionedinthisRAIarenot ITSweldsalthoughtheplatesareITSitems.Evenifallthoseweldsfail,allplatesarestilllaterally constrainedthroughinserts(BOM18)andareexpectedtomovetogethertomaintainthefunctionof theshieldgate.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

RAI521:ProvidestressstraincurvesbasedonmaterialtestingforSA516Gr.70at400degreesF.

Supplement5toReportNo.HI2177585providesstressstraincurveswithguessedmaterialproperties (nandkcoefficients)forSA516Gr.70at400deg.F,whichisusedinseismicsimulationsoftheHITRAC CS.MaterialpropertiesusedinITSequipmentshouldbewelldefinedandbasedonphysicaltestingas seismicevaluationsofITSequipmentcannotbeverifiedotherwise.Seismicevaluationsareonlyasgood asthematerialpropertiesthatgointothem,andtheseismicresponsemaybeverydifferentthan observedwhenmaterialpropertiesareassumedarbitrarily.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(c)(3)and72.122(b)(2)(i)

HoltecResponse:

ThetruestresstruestraincurveofmaterialSA516Gr.70isderivedusingMathcadinReportHI2177585.

[

PROPRIETARYINFORMATIONWITHHELDPER10CFR2.390

]Inaddition, theminimumengineeringstrengthsrequiredbytheASMEB&PVCodeat400Fareconservativelyused todevelopthetruestressstraincurveofthematerial.Therefore,thereisnoneedtoperformtestingat 400FtoexperimentallyobtainthetruestressstraincurveformaterialSA516Gr.70.

RAI522:Describethemarginsofsafetyforthetiltframeandsaddlewithrespecttobucklingwhile supportingatransportationcask.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

Calculationshavebeenprovidedforthetiltframeandsaddle,however,marginsofsafetythatdescribe thebucklingofwebplatesandbeams(BOM2,7,12)ofthetiltframeandsaddlehavenotbeen provided.Updatethecalculationsasnecessary.

Thisinformationisneededtoensurecompliancewith10CFR72.122(b).

HoltecResponse:

Thestructuralcalculationofthetiltframeandsaddle,whichisperformedinSupplement13toReportHI 2177585,appropriatelyconsidersthebucklingoftheWbeam(item2ofHoltecDrawing10899)andthe beamsideplate(item7ofHoltecDrawing10899).TheWbeamandthebeamsideplateofthetiltframe, hereafterreferredtoasboxedbeamareevaluatedforbuckling(a.k.acompressive)loadsincombination withthebendingloadsduringtheupending/downendingoperations.Thecombinedcompressionand bendingevaluationoftheboxedbeamisperformedpertheguidanceinASMENFSubsectionNF3322.1(c) and(e).Thelimitingmarginofsafetyagainstcompressionandbendingfortheboxedbeamis1.073as listedonpage1325ofSupplement13toReportHI2177585.

Thesaddlewebplates(item12ofHoltecDrawing10899)are1inchthickplates,whicharewellsupported bythegussetplates(item16,17,and21ofHoltecDrawing10899)oneitherside.Thesegussetplatesare placedatequalintervalsoverthefullwidthofthewebplatesandareweldedtothewebplatesoverthe entireheightofthegussetplates.Asaresult,thebucklingofthesaddlewebplateisnotacrediblefailure modeandthereforehasnotbeenexplicitlyevaluated.Additionally,thevonMisesstressplotforthe saddle(showninFigure13.33ofSupplement13toReportHI2177585)alsoconfirmsthatthestresseson thesaddlewebplatesarenegligible,andthesaddleassemblyisprimarilysubjectedtobearingloads.

Notwithstandingtheabove,acriticalbucklingloadforthesaddlewebplateisconservativelycalculated below.Themarginofsafetyagainsttheconservativelyestimatedcriticalbucklingloadforthesaddleweb platesisgreaterthan2.0asshownbelow.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

[

PROPRIETARYINFORMATIONWITHHELDPER10CFR2.390

]

RAI523:ClarifythemarginsofsafetyformembersoftheTransportCaskHorizontalLiftBeamwith respecttobucklingwhenliftingatransportationcask,andhowitwillbehaveandinteractwithits surroundingsduringaseismicevent.

Figure3.1.1oftheHISTORESARdepictstheTransportCaskHorizontalLiftBeamhandlinga transportationcask.Fromthisdepiction,andthecalculationsinHoltecReportNo.HI2177585,itis unclearwhatthemarginsofsafetyareforBOMmembers13,whicharesubjectedtobucklingloadsdue totheslingsapplyingcompressiveloads.TheSARreferencesanANSYSevaluationthatwasprovidedin theapplication,butbucklingcheckshavenotbeenperformed.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

Theorientationoftheslings(cablepitch)cangreatlyinfluencethebucklingloadonthesemembersand shouldbeplacedonthelicensingdrawingsortechnicalspecificationstoavoidoverloadingthese membersandshouldcorrespondtowhathasbeenprovidedinthecalculations.

Inaddition,itisunclearhowtheslingswhileattachedtotheTransportCaskHorizontalLiftBeamwill behavewhensubjectedtoseismicloadsandhowtheTransportCaskHorizontalLiftBeamwillavoid hittingthecraneandorbuildingwhileinsuchascenario.TheSARscalculationsandlicensingdrawings shouldbeupdated,asnecessary.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(c)(3)and72.122(b)(2)(i).

HoltecResponse:

TheorientationoftheslingswhentheyareconnectedtotheTransportCaskHorizontalLiftBeamis shownonSheet3ofDrawingNo.10894.TheslinganglesmodeledinSupplement9toHI2177585are consistentwiththosedepictedonthedrawing.

Withregardtobucklingloads,thefactthattheHorizontalLiftBeamisdesignedtomeettheincreased safetyfactorsperNUREG0612andANSIN14.6insuresthatthecompressivestressesintheliftingdevice willnotcauseabucklingfailure.Thisconclusionisbasedonthefollowinglineofreasoning.Figure5in Supplement9toHI2177585demonstratesthatprimarystressesintheHorizontalLiftBeamareless thanonesixthofthematerialyieldstrength(i.e.,Sy/6)underthemaximumliftedload.Thisresultcan becomparedagainsttheallowablecompressivestressforalineartypesupportperNF3322.1(c)(1)(a) oftheASMECode,SectionIII,SubsectionNF,whichisexpressedas:

1 2

5 3 3 8

8

Inthelimit,whentheslendernessratioofthesupportmember(Kl/r)isequaltothecriticalslenderness ratio(Cc),theallowablecompressivestressreachesitsminimumvalueof(6/23)xSy.Since(6/23)xSyis greaterthanSy/6,thecompressivestresslimitforlineartypesupportsisautomaticallysatisfiedand, therefore,bucklingisnotaconcern.Lastly,theslendernessratiosofthemaincomponentsunder compression(i.e.,BOMItems1,2and3onDrawingNo.10894)havebeenconfirmedtobelessthanthe criticalslendernessratiofortheirmaterialsofconstruction.Thisadditionalinformationwillbe documentedinthenextrevisiontoSupplement9toHI2177585.

IfaseismiceventweretooccurwhiletheHorizontalLiftBeamwasbeingusedtohandletheHISTAR 190TransportCask,itwouldnotresultinaliftingdevicefailureoraloaddrop.Thisisbecausethe designsafetyfactorsfortheHorizontalLiftBeamandtheslingsarehighinrelationtotheseismic amplificationfactorsassociatedwiththesitedesignbasisearthquake.Inquantitativeterms,the HorizontalLiftBeamisdesignedwithincreasedsafetyfactorsof6and10,respectively,againsttheyield strengthandultimatestrengthoftheconstructionmaterials.Meanwhile,theslingsmusthavea minimumsafetyfactorof10againsttheirultimateload.Bycomparison,thepeakverticalacceleration

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

associatedwiththemostsevereDesignExtendedConditionEarthquake(DECE),whichisdefinedinSAR Table4.3.3asaRG1.60earthquakewithaZPAvalueof0.25ginthreeorthogonaldirections,isonly 0.75g.Thismeansthattheseismicamplificationfactorisnotmorethan1.75.Therefore,evenifa seismiceventweretooccur,theprimarystressesinducedintheHorizontalLiftBeamwouldremainwell belowthematerialyieldstrength,andtheslingswouldstillmaintainatleasta5:1marginwithrespect totheirultimateload.

RAI524:Justifythehowthetitleframe,saddle,TransportCaskHorizontalLiftBeam,slings,andother liftingequipmentusedtoliftatransportationcaskareseismicallyexempt.

Supplement13toHoltecReportNo.HI2177585R0statesthatseismicanalysisofthesecomponentsis notperformedbecausetheyareseismicexemptasperthedocumentLicensingreportontheHISTORE CISFacility,HI2167374,Revision0(i.e.,theHISTORESAR).TheSARstates,inpart,that:[f]ollowing theuniversallypracticedliftandsetruleatnuclearpowerplants,transientactivitiessuchasupending ofacask,attachingofslingsorinstallationoffasteners,aretreatedastransientactivitiesthatarenot subjecttoaseismicqualification.Forclarityofapplication,anyactivitythatspanslessthanaworkshift isdeemedtobeseismicexempt.

ThereisnoreferencewheretheliftandsetruleisstatedandapprovedbytheNRCforuse.In addition,aswritten,itappearsasifonlyonehandlingoperationwilleveroccuratthefacility.However, anundeterminednumberofoperations(workshifts)areexpectedtooccuratthefacility,andthe durationofashiftisnotspecified.Theseshouldbeconsideredinadurationapproachargumentand shouldbedocumentedclearlyinthetechnicalspecifications.Nonetheless,theregulationsdonot exemptaseismicevaluationofthesecomponents.Specifically,10CFR72.122(a)(2)(i)states:

(i)Structures,systems,andcomponentsimportanttosafetymustbedesignedtowithstandthe effectsofnaturalphenomenasuchasearthquakes,tornadoes,lightning,hurricanes,floods, tsunami,andseiches,withoutimpairingtheircapabilitytoperformtheirintendeddesign functions.Thedesignbasesforthesestructures,systems,andcomponentsmustreflect:

(A)Appropriateconsiderationofthemostsevereofthenaturalphenomenareportedforthesite andsurroundingarea,withappropriatemarginstotakeintoaccountthelimitationsofthedata andtheperiodoftimeinwhichthedatahaveaccumulated,and (B)Appropriatecombinationsoftheeffectsofnormalandaccidentconditionsandtheeffectsof naturalphenomena.

Theprovisionsof10CFRPart72donotexemptthisequipmentfrombeingseismicallyqualified.Thus, ITSequipmentsuchasthetitleframe,saddle,TransportCaskHorizontalLiftBeam,slings,andother liftingequipmentusedtolift,andtransportspentnuclearfuelhavetobedesignedwithseismicloading.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.122(b)(2)(i)

HoltecResponse:

Theoccurrenceofanearthquakeduringasingularliftingoperationisanextremelylowprobability event,andthereforeitmaywarrantconsiderationasnoncredible.However,thestaffcorrectlynotes thatamultitudeofliftingoperationsareexpectedtooccurattheHISTORECISFacilityonanannual

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

basis,andthereforeHoltecagreesthatthepossibilityofanearthquakeoccurringduringarepeated liftingoperationcannotberuledout.

Thatbeingsaid,theHISTORECISFacilityisalowintensityearthquakesite,whichmeansthattheload increaseassociatedwithanearthquakeeventisoffsetbytheincreaseddesignfactorsforthelifting equipmentand/ortheincreaseinallowablestressthatisassociatedwithanaccidentlevelevent.The seismicqualificationoftheTransportCaskHorizontalLiftBeamanditsslingattachmentsisdiscussed specificallyintheresponsetoRAI523.ThesamegeneralrationaleappliestotheHISTAR190LiftYoke, theHITRACCSLiftYoke,theMPCLiftAttachment,andtheHITRACCSLiftLinks,astheyarealldesigned andanalyzedasANSIN14.6specialliftingdeviceswithminimumsafetyfactorsof6and10againstthe materialyieldstrengthandtheultimatetensilestrength,respectively.TheHISTAR190TiltFrameand Saddlearefurtherdiscussedbelow.

PerSubsection4.3.6oftheSAR,theapplicableearthquakeeventforShortTermOperations,which includesallliftingandhandlingoperationsfromthetimethetransportpackageisreceivedatsiteuntil thecanisterisplacedinaHISTORMVVMforinterimstorage,istheOperatingBasisEarthquake(OBE).

PerSARTable4.3.4,theOBEeventisdefinedasa2%dampedRG1.60earthquakewithaZPAvalueof 0.10ginthreeorthogonaldirections.Accordingly,thepeakaccelerationassociatedwiththeOBEvertical responsespectrumis0.405g,whichmeansthatthedemandloadontheTiltFrameandSaddlewould increasebynomorethan40.5%underOBEconditions.Ontheotherhand,thepercentageincreasein allowablestressesbetweenASMENFLevelA(normal)andASMENFLevelB(offnormal)is33%per TableNF3251.21.Thesetwopercentagefactorscanbeusedtomakeaconservativeestimateofthe minimumsafetyfactorfortheTiltFrameandSaddleunderOBEconditions.

[

PROPRIETARYINFORMAITONWITHHELDPER10CFR2.390

]

Thus,theTiltFrameandSaddlehavetherequiredstructuralcapacitytoresistthemaximumloads duringanOBEevent,whichistheapplicableearthquakeforShortTermOperationspertheSAR.

RAI525:Clarifythemarginofsafetyoftheliftyokewithrespecttolateraltorsionalbucklingwhen liftingafullyloadedMPC.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

LicensingDrawing10900depictstwostrongbackplates(BOM1)whichactinunisonwhenperforming liftingoperations.Duringliftingoperations,thesetwoplateswillbesubjectedtobendingmomentswith unbracedcompressionflanges,whichcouldundergolateraltorsionalbuckling.Itisnotedthatthinrods (spacers)thatlinkthesetwoplatesaredepictedonthelicensingdrawings,buttheirabilitytobrace thesetwocomponentsisunknown,andtheirdimensionsandmaterialpropertieshavenotbeen provided.Anevaluationoflateraltorsionalbucklingfortheliftyokewasnotprovided.Thecalculations andlicensingdrawingsshouldbeupdated,asnecessary.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.92and72.122(b)(2)(i).

HoltecResponse:

Supplement4toHI2177585willberevisedtoaddresslateraltorsionalbucklingofthestrongback platesassociatedwiththeLiftYokefortheHITRACCS.

RAI526:DemonstratethattheproposedUMAXISFSIstoragepaddesignattheproposedCISFacility wouldnotfailduetoslidingunderdynamicloading.

TheUMAXISFSIpaddesigncreatesanewinterfacebetweenSpaceAandSpaceCinthesubgrade material(Figure4.3.1oftheHISTORESAR).Duetosignificantdifferencesinmaterialstiffnesses (ControlledLowStrengthmaterialinSpaceAisstifferthanthematerialsinSpaceBorC,whichare nativesoil),aseismiceventmaycauseafailureduetoslippageorslidingalongthisinterfaceand/or alongacriticalfailuresurfacewithinthematerialinSpaceBorSpaceC.Theassessmentshouldestablish thattheshearresistanceprovidedbytheinterfaceandthematerialsinSpaceBwouldbeabletoresist suchslidingofthepads.Therefore,ananalysisisneededtoensurethattheproposedstoragepads wouldnotfailbyslidingundertheanticipateddynamicloads.Alternatively,theapplicantmayprovidea referencetospecificboundinganalysesfromtheHISTORMUMAXFSAR,ifany,thatconsiderand analyzethisscenarioorboundsit.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(a),72.103,and72.122.

HoltecResponse:

TheHISTOREsystemislicensedforregionsofmildearthquakes.AsshowninTable4.3.3oftheHI STORESAR,theZPAsofthe10,000yearreturnearthquake(i.e.,theDesignBasisEarthquake)oftheHI STOREsitearenotgreaterthan0.15g.Asaresult,theratiooftheseismicinertiaforceappliedtoSpace AtothetotalweightofSpaceAissmallerthanthestaticfrictioncoefficientbetweenSpaceA(CLSM) andSpaceC(soil)(whichisgreaterthan0.3).Therefore,anearthquakeinducedslidingbetweenSpace AandSpaceCisnotcredibleattheHISTOREsite.Theaboveconclusionisalsoconsistentwiththe NUREG/CR6896,whichconcludesthatseparationbetweenembeddednuclearpowerplantstructure andthesurroundingsoilisnotexpectedforseismicinputswithZPAslessthan0.3g.

RAI66:ClarifyhowlonganMPCwillremainwithintheHITRACCStransfercaskiftheUMAXheat removalsystemisdeclaredinoperable.

TechnicalSpecificationBasesB.3.1.1C.2.2(Page16.A12ofHISTORESAR)indicatesthataMPCcanbe storedwithinaHITRACCS,butdoesnotspecifyatimeperiodwithinwhichitwouldberequiredto returntheMPCbacktoastoragecondition.Therewasnocorrespondingtimeperiodspecifiedforthe

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

MPCtoremainwithintheHITRACCS,recognizingthatanumberofanalyses(e.g.,thermal,structural) aretypicallyperformedtoensuresafeoperationduringlongtermstorage.TheSARshouldprovidean analysistospecifyatimelimitthattheMPCcanremainwithinthetransfercask.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.26and72.122(b).

HoltecResponse:

TechnicalSpecificationBasesB.3.1.1C.2.2statesthatplacingtheMPCintoaHITRACCSwillensure adequatefuelcoolinguntilactionstocorrecttheheatremovalsysteminoperabilitycanbecompleted (emphasisadded).Thedurationis,therefore,notlimitedtoanyparticularvaluebutisthedurationthat isnecessarytorestoretheUMAXtooperablestatus.Thisqualitativedurationisacceptablebecausethe thermalevaluationfornormalonsitetransferintheHITRACCSisasteadystateevaluation,and thereforeboundsanypossibleduration.

Temperaturesandinternalpressureforcaskcomponentsandthecladdingofintactfuelassembliesatthe designbasismaximumdecayheatloadundersteadystateconditionsintheHITRACCSarereportedin Table6.4.6oftheHISTORESAR.TheHISTORESARadoptslongtermtemperatureandpressurelimitsfor theMPCandfuelassembliesfromRevision3oftheHISTORMUMAXFSAR.Allowabletemperaturesfor HITRACCScomponentsaregiveninTable4.4.1oftheHISTORESAR.Thefollowingtablecomparesthe steadystatetemperaturesandpressurewiththeircorrespondingallowablevalues.

Component Temperature,°F LongTermLimitfrom HISTORMUMAX FSAR,°F ShortTerm OperationsLimitfrom HISTORESAR,°F FuelCladding 669 752 FuelBasket 615 752 BasketShims 507 752 MPCShell 461 650 MPCLid 416 752 MPCBaseplate 343 752 HITRACInnerShell 352 600 HITRACConcrete 271 300 HITRACOuterShell 200 600 MPCInternalCavity 96 100

TheseresultsandcomparisonstolimitsshowthatthereisnolimittotimetheMPCmayremainintheHI TRACCSwhiletheUMAXheatremovalsystemisrestoredtooperablestatus.

RAI67:UpdatethedraftDesignFeatureTechnicalSpecificationtoindicatetheminimumHISTORM UMAXmodulepitchjustifiedbythethermalanalysis.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

TheminimumHISTORMUMAXpitchspacing,whichisanimportantparameterforthermal performanceandsafeoperationofthesystem,wasnotincludedintheproposedTechnical Specifications.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.26and72.122(b).

HoltecResponse:

Thepitchof15feet6inches,showninHoltecDrawing10875inHISTORESARSection1.5andevaluated inHoltecReportHI2177591,hasbeenaddedtoSection4.2.3ofAppendixAoftheproposedTechnical Specifications.TheincorrectpitchinTable1.1.1hasalsobeencorrected.

RAI68:UpdatetheTechnicalSpecificationSurveillancerequirementSR3.1.2sothatitconsidersthe32 hourtimeperiodtoreachallowablelimits,asstatedinSectionB3.1C.2.1(HISTORESARChapter16, page16.A11).

TheproposedTechnicalSpecifications(SR3.1.2)suggeststhataventcouldbeblockedfor54hours, basedonthe24hourLCO3.1.1torestorethesystemtooperablestatusandthe24hour(plus25%

factor,perSR3.0.2)SR3.1.2,24hoursurveillancefrequency.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.26and72.122(b).

HoltecResponse:

ThestoragemoduledeployedatHISTOREistheUMAX,whichhasalreadybeenreviewedandcertified bytheNRConDocket721040andthisproposedtechnicalspecificationisidenticaltoLCO3.1.2in AppendixAtotheHISTORMUMAXCoCissuedbytheNRC.Todateithasnotbeenrequiredtoinclude thesurveillanceinterval(24hours)orthetoleranceonthesurveillanceinterval(1.25times)intothe eventduration.

RAI69:ClarifythatinstalledtemperaturemonitoringequipmentistobedesignatedasImportantto SafetyifitisusedaspartofsurveillancerequirementstofulfillTechnicalSpecifications.

TheproposedTechnicalSpecificationSR3.1.2indicatesthatVVMsinstalledwithtemperature monitoringequipmentcanbeusedaspartofthesurveillancerequirementstoensureSFSCintegrity, ratherthanperiodicvisualsurveillance.However,Section3.4oftheHISTORESARindicatesthat temperaturemonitoringequipmentisnotimportanttosafety.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.26and72.128(a)(1).

HoltecResponse:

FollowingtheprecedentoftheHISTORMUMAXgenericlicense(Docket721040)thetemperature monitoringequipmentisonlydesignatedasImportanttoSafetyIfthetemperatureelementsand associatedtemperaturemonitoringinstrumentationareusedasthesolemeansofsurveillance.

Subsection3.4.1oftheHISTORESARhasbeenmodifiedtoreflectthis.

RAI610:SpecifyandprovidethebasisforthecriteriaassociatedwiththeproposedTechnical SpecificationSR3.1.2.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

ThereisnoclearbasisprovidedintheSARforthe91degFtemperaturedifferencebetweentheaverage VVMairoutletducttemperatureandtheISFSIambienttemperaturementionedintheproposed TechnicalSpecificationSR3.1.2.Inaddition,aLCOcriteriawasnotspecifiedintheproposedTechnical SpecificationBasisSR3.1.2inChapter16oftheHISTORESAR.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.26and72.122(b).

HoltecResponse:

The91degFtemperaturedifferenceisthedifferencebetweenthenormalambienttemperaturegivenin HISTORESARTable2.7.1andtheUMAXaverageairoutlettemperaturegiveninHISTORESARTable 6.4.3.ThisbasishasbeenaddedtoSR3.1.2inChapter16oftheHISTORESAR.

RAI611:UpdatetheproposedTechnicalSpecificationLCO3.1.1tostatethatoperabilityisdefinedas 50%ormoreoftheinletventductareasand100%oftheoutletventareasareunblockedandavailable forflow.

Currently,proposedTechnicalSpecificationLCO3.1.1statesthattheSFSCHeatRemovalSystemis operablewhen50%ormoreoftheinletventductareasareunblockedandavailableforflow.However, Section4.6.1.2oftheHISTORMUMAXFSAR,whichisincorporatedbyreference,onlyindicatedthe resultsforthermalperformancewhentheHISTORMUMAXairinletventswere50%blocked(no mentionofoutletvents).

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.26and72.122(b).

HoltecResponse:

ThestoragemoduledeployedatHISTOREistheUMAX,whichhasalreadybeenreviewedandcertified bytheNRConDocket721040.Assuch,theaccident100%ventblockagescenariofortheHISTOREis intendedtobethesameasthatfortheUMAX,namelya100%blockageoftheinletvents.AnyHISTORE SARtextreferringtoblockageoftheoutletventsis,therefore,inadvertent.AllHISTORESARtext concerningtheventblockageaccidentcondition,includingthedescriptionofproposedTechnical SpecificationLCO3.1.1,hasbeenclarifiedtostatethattheoutletventareaisatleast50%unblockedand availableforflow.

Therearetwoprimaryreasonswhyblockageofthestoragemoduleoutletventsisnotconsidereda credibleeventfortheHISTORE.First,ventilationairexitingtheoutletventsisincapableofdrawingitems intothevents.Airflowtowardaninletventcouldentrainlightweightmaterialslikeplasticsheetingor fallenleaves,drawingitupagainstandholdingitagainsttheventscreen.Butairflowawayfromanoutlet ventwouldtendtopushsuchitemsaway.Second,asdescribedinSection2.3.1oftheHISTORESAR, snowfallsignificantenoughtoblocktheoutletventsisnotcredible.Thebottomedgeoftheoutletvents isover12abovethetopofthelidhorizontalsurfacethatcouldaccumulatesnowfall(shownonSheet3 ofHoltecDrawing10875inHISTORESARSection1.5).Thisexceedsthelargesteverrecordedsnowfall forthesite,10inchesinFebruary1956,describedintheSARSubsection2.3.1.Moreover,heatedair exitingtheoutletventswouldmeltsnowasitfalls,furtherreducingaccumulation.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

Additionally,themagnitudeofimpactoncaskheatremovalresultingfrom100%blockageofbothinlet andoutletventshasbeenestimatedfortheHoltecHISTORMFWstoragecask(Docket721032).TheHI STORMFWisanabovegroundcask,butliketheUMAXtobedeployedatHISTOREcoolingairisstill introducednearthebottomoftheMPCwithinandheatedairstillexitsabovethetopoftheMPC.As statedinSubsection4.6.2.4oftheHISTORMFWFSAR:

TheamountofheatremovedfromtheMPCexternalsurfacesbynaturalcirculationofairis reducedtolessthan7%ofthatundernormalconditions(i.e.wheninletandoutletvents completelyunblocked).Therefore,inanunlikelyeventofcompleteblockageofbothinletand outletvents,thatsmalladditionalheatremovalcapabilitybyairthroughoutletventsisalsolost.

Thiswillresultinasmalltemperaturerisecomparedtothelargeavailabletemperaturemargins (greaterthan80°C)establishedfromthetransientstudyofcompleteinletventsblockage.

DuetothefactthatthecoolingairentersthecaskbelowtheMPCandexitsabovetheMPCinboththe HISTORMFWandtheUMAX,andduetotheUMAXalsohavingsignificantmargin(forexample,greater than50°Cforthefuelcladding),itisreasonabletoconcludethatthemarginissufficienttoaccommodate thetemperatureriseduetoacoincident50%outletductblockage.

RAI612:Providethemaximumambienttemperaturelimitforconductingshorttermoperationsinthe TechnicalSpecifications.

ProposedTechnicalSpecification4.2.4indicatesthatoperationsshouldnotbeperformedifambient temperaturesarebelow0degF.Therewasnocorrespondingmaximumtemperaturelimitfor conductingshorttermoperationsandnotransferanalyses,forexample,ataccidentlevelambient temperatures.Themaximumambienttemperatureanalyzedforshorttermoperationswasreportedas 91degFinTable6.4.1oftheHISTORESARandTable1.1ofHoltecReportNo.HI2177553,Thermal AnalysisofHITRACCSTransferCask.However,theHISTORESAR,includinginTable2.7.1,indicates thatambienttemperaturescouldbeabovethatvalue(e.g.,108+degF).

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.26and72.122(b).

HoltecResponse:

Therestrictiononperformingshorttermoperationsatambienttemperaturesbelow0degFisnecessary toprotectagainstfreezingofwater(waterwithantifreezebelow32degF)inatransfercaskcontaining verylittledecayheat.DuetotheconsiderablethermalinertiaoftheHITRACCStransfercask,whichwill preventtheitfromrapidlyrespondingtoinstantaneousambienttemperaturevariations,theappropriate maximumambienttemperaturelimitforconductingshorttermoperationsisthethreedayaverage ambientof91degFreportedinTable6.4.1oftheHISTORESARandusedinHI2177553.Itisnot necessarytoapplyasimilarrestrictiononmaximuminstantaneousambienttemperatures,whichcanbe upto108degFasreportedinTable2.7.1oftheHISTORESAR.

RAI613:UpdatetheproposedTechnicalSpecificationDesignFeature4.2.1toindicatethatthedesign oftheHISTORMUMAXmodulesarelimitedtoTypeSLandTypeXLoftheUMAXVersionCmodule.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

HoltecReportNo.HI2177591,ThermalEvaluationofHISTORMUMAXatHISTORECISFacility,states thatMPCsofcertainheightsaretobeinstalledinTypeSLorTypeXLUMAXVersionCmoduleswith storagecavitydepthsmadeattwodiscretedimensions.Thethermalanalysesandperformanceofthe systemarebasedonthesedesignaspects,buttheywerenotincludedintheTechnicalSpecifications.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.26and72.122(b).

HoltecResponse:

ProposedTechnicalSpecificationsSection4.2.1hasbeenupdatedtoindicatethatthe designoftheHI STORMUMAXmodulesarelimitedtoTypeSLandTypeXLoftheUMAXmodule.

RAI614:ProvidetheHoltecEngineeringChangeOrder(ECO)502124,Revision0,anditscorresponding 10CFR72.48evaluation.

Section2ofHoltecReportNo.HI2177591,ThermalEvaluationofHISTORMUMAXatHISTORECIS Facility,statesthatthethermalmodelisbasedonECO502124,butthiswasnotprovidedinthe application.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(d)and72.128(a).

HoltecResponse:

TheECOreferencedwasfullyincorporatedintotheHISTORMUMAXFSARRevision4,andall subsequentrevisions,whichhavebeensubmittedontheHISTORMUMAXdocket.

RAI615:Provideadditionaldiscussionthatexplicitlydescribestheanalysisprinciplesandmethodology forthethermalanalysesfoundinHoltecReportNo.HI2177553.

Section2ofHoltecReportNo.HI2177553,ThermalAnalysisofHITRACCSTransferCask,broadly statesthattheanalysisprinciplesandmethodologyforthecalculationsareadoptedfromtheHISTORM FWFSARandHISTORMUMAXFSAR.TheprinciplesandmethodologyrelevanttotheHITRACCSshould bedescribedorspecificsections/paragraphsoftheHISTORMFWFSARandHISTORMUMAXFSAR shouldbereferencedforstafftoevaluatethethermalanalysesoftheHITRACCS.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(d)and72.128(a).

HoltecResponse:

The thermal analyses principles and detailed methodology adopted for HITRAC CS are described in SectionA.2andSectionB.2ofHoltecReportHI2177553fornormalandaccidentconditionsrespectively.

WhiletheseprinciplesandmethodologiesarebasedonSection4.4.1ofHISTORMUMAXandSection 4.4.1.1(iii)oftheHISTORMFWFSAR,thedetailedmethodologiesincontextofHITRACCSevaluations areincludedintherespectiveappendices.

RAI616:Providethemassandenergyresiduals,massandenergybalances,DObalances,and justificationofgridconvergenceforthethermalanalysesmentionedinSection6oftheHISTORESAR andthoseprovidedinHoltecReportNo.HI2177553,ThermalAnalysisofHITRACCSTransferCask;

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

HoltecReportNo.HI2177591,ThermalEvaluationsofHISTORMUMAXatHISTORECISFacility;and HoltecReportNo.HI2177597,HISTORECTFThermalEvaluation.

Theabovementionednumericalcriteria,whicharepartofcomputationalbestpractices(e.g.NUREG 2152)areneededtoconfirmthattheresultsprovidedinthereferencedthermalanalysesarerelevantto thereview.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(d)and72.128(a).

HoltecResponse:

Toaddresstheregulatorscomment,numericalresiduals,energybalanceandmassbalancesarenow includedintherespectivecalculationspackagestodemonstratenumericalconvergenceoftheresults.It isverifiedthattheenergyandmassbalancesareessentially100%andthatthepeakcladdingtemperature andnumericalresidualshavestabilized.Thisisconsistentwiththeapproachadoptedinotherdrystorage licenseapplicationssuchasHISTORMUMAXFSAR(USNRCDocketNo.721040)andtheHISTAR190SAR (USNRCDocketNo.719373).

Asanexample,thenumericalresidualsfromthenormalstorageconditionevaluationsofHISTORMUMAX documentedinHI2177591areshownbelow.ThenumericalresidualsforHITRACCSandHISTARinCTF evaluationsareaddedtoHI2177553andHI2177597respectively.

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RAI617:ProvideadditionalinformationabouttheairpathwaygeometrythroughthebottomoftheHI TRACCSshieldgateswhiletheHITRACCSandHISTAR190arewithintheCanisterTransferBuildingand clarifyhowtheairpathwayareaiscorrectlyrepresentedinthethermalmodels.

HoltecHITRACCSLicensingDrawing10868,Revision0(referencedinSection7.0ofHoltecReportNo.

HI2177553,ThermalAnalysisofHITRACCSTransferCask)doesnotclearlycallouttheairpathwayor itsdimensions.Thisinformationisneededtodeterminetheappropriatenessofthethermalmodel duringcanistertransferdescribedinHoltecReportNo.HI2177553.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(d)and72.128(a).

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

HoltecResponse:

TheairflowpathwaywithintheshieldgateisshowninthefollowingregionsoftheHITRACCSLicensing Drawing(HoltecDrawing10868,Revision0):

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The above details in the licensing drawing 10868 provide the necessary geometric information and dimensionsforthethermalmodel.Toprovidefurtherclaritytothereviewer,additionalfiguresshowing theasmodelledairflowpathsthroughtheHITRACCSshieldgateandrespectivecomputedpathlinesare addedintherevisedthermalreport(HI2177553).Thedesigndimensionsandmodelleddimensionsare alsotabulatedinAppendixAoftherevisedreport.

While,theHITRACCSisplacedabovetheHISTAR190caskintheCTF,theshieldgatesareintheopen position,allowingdirectflowpaththroughtheHITRACcavityasshowninFigure6.4.3oftheHISTORE FSARandisreproducedbelow.Sincetheshieldgatesareinfullyopenposition,theydonothaveany impactonthethermalevaluationsofHISTAR190inCTFpresentedinHI2177597.

WARM AIR OUT

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

Figure6.4.3ofHISTOREFSAR:VentilationPathwhentheHITRACCSisArrayedonTopofthe CTF

RAI618:ClarifytherelationbetweentheMPCshellsinnerandouterdiametersandthewidthofthe gapbetweentheMPCshellandHITRACCScask(Item5inSectionA.3ofHoltecReportNo.HI2177553, ThermalAnalysisofHITRACCSTransferCask).

HoltecReportNo.HI2177553doesnotprovidetheactualgapandmodeledgapbetweentheMPCshell andHITRACCScask.Staffneedsthisinformationtodetermineifthethermalmodelconservatively estimatesthetemperaturelimits.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(d)and72.128(a).

HoltecResponse:

AsindicatedinFlagNote31oftheMPC37LicensingDrawing(Reference[9]inReportHI2177553),a higherMPCshellthickness(andthereforealargerMPCODof76)ispermittedforuseinHISTORMUMAX System.WhenanMPCwithincreasedshellthicknessisplacedintheHITRACCS,theannulargapbetween HITRACandMPCisreducedascomparedtoasmallerdiameterMPC.

TheprimarymodeofheatdissipationfromtheMPCintheHITRACCSsystemisvianaturalconvection.

Usingalowerboundannulargapisconservativeforthermalevaluationasitoffersmoreresistanceto naturalconvectionflowthroughtheannulus.Therefore,thereducedannulargapcorrespondingtothe MPC with higher shell thickness is adopted for the licensing basis evaluation to ensure bounding temperaturesandpressuresarecomputed.Thereferencegapandboundinggapadoptedintheanalyses areprovidedinthebelowtableforclarity.

NominalannulargapandmodelledannulargapbetweenHITRACandMPC

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RAI619:JustifytheheattransferboundaryconditionsthatareusedduringtheCanisterTransfer Building(CTF)collapseaccidentscenario.

Manyofthedetails,assumptions,andjustificationsfortheheattransferboundaryconditionsdescribed inSectionB.2.2ofHoltecReportNo.HI2177553,ThermalAnalysisofHITRACCSTransferCask,and Section1.0ofHoltecReportNo.HI2177597,HISTORECTFThermalEvaluationwerenotprovided.

Theresponseshouldaddressthefollowing:

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

a)thebasisforonlya25%penaltyontheheattransfercoefficient,recognizingthatatypical buoyantflowpatternaroundaverticalcylinderwouldbedisturbedbyacollapsedstructure; b)thebasisofcertainradiationheattransferparameters,suchasthereported30%penaltyof surfaceemissivity,theexternalambienttemperaturefromalocallyclosestructure(usedfor radiationheattransfercalculations),viewfactor,solarfluxonthebuilding; c)confirmationthattheshieldgateinletsaretheonlyairinlettotheHITRACCSventilatedflow andthatthoseare100%blocked; d)thebasisfor10%oftheexitairarearemainsunblockedandclarifytheexitareas(HITRACCS, CTFpipevents,CTFcavitytop)ofHITRACCSandCTF(refertoHISTORESARFigure6.4.3);

e)explanationofhowthe10%exitarearemainingunblocked,whereaspageB7ofHI2177553 statesthat100%ofthetopopeningoftheHITRACCScavityisassumedtobeblockedinthe thermalmodel; f)thejustificationfortheassumption(HoltecReportNo.HI2177597)thatexcludingtheHI TRACCSfrombeingplacedinthestackuppositionisbounding,consideringthatSection6.1of theHISTORESARstatesthatthelimitingthermalconditionoccurswhenthecanisterisloaded inthetransfercaskanditsshieldgateisclosed.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(d)and72.128(a).

HoltecResponse:

Note,thattheCTBdesignhasbeenrevisedtobeahardenedconcretestructure,andduetoitssecurity relatedfunctions,buildingcollapseisnolongercredible.However,forcompleteness,theresponsetothe reviewersquestionisprovidedbelow.

Thermal evaluation of HITRAC CS under CTB collapse accident is evaluated with certain reasonable assumptionsasexplainedbelow:

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RAI620:ClarifywhetherEquationB.2.1(SectionB.2.1.2ofHoltecReportNo.HI2177553,Thermal AnalysisofHITRACCSTransferCask)ismeanttoprovidethetemperatureriseduetothesolidphase fireorthetotaltemperaturerise.Inaddition,providethetemperatureriseandthermalloadduetothe solidphasefireandthetemperatureriseandthermalloadduetotheliquidphasefireandexplainhow theTwasappliedtothemodeltodeterminethevaluesreportedinTableB.6.1.1.

ThetextprecedingEquationB.2.1statesthattheequationistoprovidethetemperatureriseduetothe solidphasefire;however,theequationusesthesubscripttotal,ratherthansolid,whichisthenused inthesubsequentterminologysection(possiblythereisatypographicalerrorintheequation).Basedon theabove,thestaffdoesnotunderstandtheintentoftheequationaswrittenand,therefore,howits resultsfactorinthevaluesreportedinTableB.6.1.1.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(d)and72.128(a).

HoltecResponse:

ThereisatypographicalerrorinSectionB.2.1.2ofHoltecreportHI2177553.Thetemperaturerise(T) computedhereisthetotaltemperatureriseduetoliquidandsolidphasefirescombined.Thecomputed Tisaddedtotheinitialconditiontoobtainthemaximumtemperaturesduringpostfirecooldown.This iscorrectedintherevisedthermalreport.

ThethermalloadduetothesolidphaseandliquidphasefirescombinedisaddedinAppendixBofthe report.Thetotaltemperatureriseratio(Ttotal/Tliquid)isalsopresentedinTableB.2.1.Sincethisratiois closetounity(1.0048),itisconcludedthattheadditionaltemperatureriseduetoheatfluxcontribution fromthesolidphasefireisnegligible,whichisalsostatedinSectionB.6.1.1ofthereport.

RAI621:Clarifythe640degFHITRACCSconcretetemperatureduringtheCTBcollapseaccident scenario,reportedinHoltecReportNo.HI2177553,ThermalAnalysisofHITRACCSTransferCask, consideringthatHISTORESARTable4.4.1hasa572degFallowablelocalmaximumtemperaturelimit underaccidentconditions.

IntheresponsetoRAI1710,theallowableaccidenttemperatureoftheshieldingconcreteinHISTORE SARTable4.4.1wasrevisedtoalignwiththeHoltecPositionPaperDS289.However,theHITRACCS concretetemperatureduringtheCTBcollapseaccidentscenariowascalculatedtobesignificantlyabove therevisedlimitforaccidentconditions.

Theinconsistencybetweenthecalculatedconcretetemperatureandtheallowabletemperaturelimit shouldbeaddressed.Iftheallowabletemperaturewillbeexceeded,provideatechnicalbasisthat demonstratesthatthetemperatureexposurewillnotdegradetheconcretetoanextentthatcould preventitfromfulfillingitsintendedfunctions.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(d)and72.128(a).

HoltecResponse:

TheNRCstaffiscorrectthatthemaximumlocaltemperatureoftheHITRACCSconcreteexceedsthe revisedaccidenttemperaturelimitof572oFunderthehypotheticalCTBcollapseaccident.However,it mustbenotedthatportionofthecaskconcretethatexceedsthislimitisaccountedforbyusingreduced concrete density (See Table 7.3.1 of the HISTORE SAR) in shielding evaluations (Holtec Report HI 2177599). Consistent with the UST criteria, the amount of concrete that exceeds 554oF1 under this accidentisaddedtoAppendixBoftherevisedThermalReportHI2177553.

RAI622:ConfirmthatthethermalanalysespresentedinChapter6ofHISTORESAR;HoltecReportNo.

HI2177597,HISTORECTFThermalEvaluation;HoltecReportNo.HI2177553,ThermalAnalysisof HITRACCSTransferCask;andHoltecReportNo.HI2177591,ThermalEvaluationsofHISTORM UMAXatHISTORECISFacility,arebasedontheboundingcontenttobestoredattheHISTORECISF.

1TheUSTcriteriasetforthinChapter6ofHISTORESARsuggestsaminimumof10oCmargintolimit.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

Severalreferencesinthelicenseapplicationprovidedifferingdescriptionsoftheboundingcontent assumedinthethermalanalyses.Forexample,CalculationPackageHI2177597referstoFortCalhoun fuel(Page9of26)asboundingcontent.Section6oftheHISTORESARstatesthattheheatloadinany canistercannotexceedthatinthetransportcask(i.e.,HISTAR190),andPage1(4of31)ofCalculation PackageHI2177591statesthatthecontentatthesiteisforthoseapprovedinHISTORMFWFSARand HISTORMUMAXFSAR.Likewise,Section6.4.2.3oftheHISTORESARreferstoSection4.4oftheHI STORMUMAXFSARasprovidingboundingcontentbutNote5ofTable6.4.1ofHISTORESARrefersto Appendix7.CoftheHISTAR190SARastheboundingheatload.Boundingcontentshouldbeanalyzed inordertodetermineboundingtemperatureandpressureconditions.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(d)and72.128(a).

HoltecResponse:

Thereviewerscommentisaddressedbelowintwoparts.

Heat Load: Consistent with the statement in Section 6.0 of the HISTORE SAR, bounding heat load approvedintheHISTAR190SAR(Appendix7.C),isadoptedforalltheevaluationspresentedintheHI STORESAR,aswellasthesupportingcalculationpackages-HI2177585,HI2177553andHI2177591.

Theheatloadpatterns1through6andtheboundingpattern(pattern1)providedinTable4.1.1ofthe HISTORESARisthesameasthatprovidedinTable7.C.7oftheHISTAR190SAR.Therefore,thebounding patternestablishedintheHISTAR190SARisadoptedforalltheevaluationspresentedinChapter6of theHISTORESARandthesupportingcalculationpackageslistedabove.

FuelAssembly:AsdescribedinSection4.4ofHISTORMUMAXFSAR(Docket721040),PWRshortfuel (sometimesreferredtoasFt.CalhouninHoltecreports),isestablishedastheboundingfuelassemblytype forthermalevaluationsintheHISTORMUMAXFSARforpressurizedMPCswiththermosiphoneffect.

Therefore,PWRShortFuelisalsoadoptedforalltheevaluationspresentedinHISTORESARaswellas Holtecreportslistedabove.

Therefore,thethermalevaluationspresentedinChapter6oftheHISTORESARadoptsboundingcontent asexplainedabove.

RAI623:Providedetailsofthepedestalandcorrespondingcutoutstoensureanappropriatedesign ismodeledwithintheCTFthermalanalyses.

LicensingDrawing10895doesnotprovidedesigndetailsofthepedestal,butrathernotesthat[t]he pedestalshallbemadetomeettherequiredheattransferrequirementsintheCTF.Inaddition,there arenobasesforcertainaspectsofthepedestalthatarebrieflymentionedinSection2.0ofHoltec ReportNo.HI2177597,HISTORECTFThermalEvaluation.Forexample,thereisnobasisforthe boundingnatureofthe1W/mKthermalconductivity,nodescriptionoftherelativesizesbetweenthe pedestalandcutouts,whichwouldaffectheattransfer,andnodiscussiontoindicatehowthe thermalmodelscorrectlyrepresentthepedestaldesign.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(d)and72.128(a).

HoltecResponse:

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

ToaddresstheNRCstaffscomment,thepedestaldesignisnowpresentedinthedrawing10895.

ThethermalevaluationsinReportHI2177597modelsthepedestalasasolidcylinderwithanunderstated thermalconductivity.Thepedestaldesignindrawing10895,hasahighermetalvolumefractionand thereforehighereffectivethermalconductivitythanthatadoptedinevaluationspresentedinreportHI 2177595.Theevaluationsalsoconservativelyneglectradiativeheattransferbetweenthepedestaland theground,aswellasnaturalconvectioninthegasspaceswithinthepedestalshell.

The description in Section 2.0 of Holtec Report HI2177597 has been revised to include the above information.

RAI624:ClarifythatthemaximumpressuresfortheshorttermCTFnormaloperation(e.g.,Table6.3of HoltecReportNo.HISTORECTFThermalEvaluation)andtheCTBcollapseaccidentscenarioarebased onhavingthemaximuminitialbackfillpressureforthepressurerangereportedinSection2.0ofHI 2177597,MethodologyandAssumptions.

Thecalculationpackagestatesthattheminimumbackfillpressureisusedinthethermalanalysesto understatethethermosiphoneffectwithintheMPC.However,thedeterminationofmaximum pressure,whichshouldbereported,isbasedonthemaximumbackfillpressurefornormal,offnormal, andaccidentconditions.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(d)and72.128(a).

HoltecResponse:

Yes,themaximuminitialheliumbackfillpressurevaluesareusedincomputingtheMPCcavitypressure underallscenariospresentedinthereport.ThishasalsobeenstatedinSection6.3ofreportHI2177597.

RAI625:ConfirmthatthecomponenttemperaturesintheHISTORESARandHoltecReportNo.HI 2177597,HISTORECTFThermalEvaluation;HoltecReportNo.HI2177553,ThermalAnalysisofHI TRACCSTransferCask;andHoltecReportNo.HI2177591,ThermalEvaluationsofHISTORMUMAXat HISTORECISFacility,satisfytheunconditionallysafethreshold(UST)afterconsideringtheeffectsdue tomodelinguncertainties(e.g.,gridconvergenceuncertainty).

TheacceptabilityofcomponenttemperaturesshouldbereviewedconsideringthattheHITRACCS concreteaftertheCTBcollapseaccidentscenarioappearstoindicatethatthe640degFtemperature maynotsatisfytheunconditionallysafethreshold(UST)definedinSection6.0oftheHISTORESAR, whichdidnotaddresstheeffectsduetogridconvergenceuncertainty.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(d)and72.128(a).

HoltecResponse:

ThecomputationalgridsadoptedforthethermalevaluationspresentedinHoltecReportsHI2177553, HI2177591 and HI2177597 are consistent with the converged mesh established in past thermal evaluations.

HI2177553(HITRACCS):ThecomputationalmeshforMPC37isexactlythatadoptedforthelicensing basiscalculationsperformedinHISTORMUMAXFSAR(DocketNo.721040).Thecomputationalmesh

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

densityadoptedfortheHITRACgeometry,particularlyintheannulargapissimilartothatadoptedinthe NRCapprovedlicensingbasisevaluationsperformedforHISTORMUMAXunderDocketNo.721040.The gridconvergenceindexforthisgridisthereforeexpectedtobeinthesameorderasthatfortheHISTORM UMAXthermalevaluationswhichis~1.07%.Sincetherearerobustmargins(>10oC)forallcomponents,it canbeconcludedtosatisfytheunconditionallysafethreshold.AsoutlinedinRAI621andaddressedin therevisedthermalreportHI2177553,theportionofHITRACconcretethatexceedthetemperature limitalreadyconsiderstheUSTcriteriaandadoptsa10oCpenalty.

HI2177597(HISTAR190/CTF):ThecomputationalmeshadoptedforevaluationtheHISTAR190cask with MPC37 canister in the CTF at HISTORE CISF is same as that presented in the licensing basis evaluationspresentedininHISTAR190SAR(719373).ThecomputationalgridfortheCTFcomponents andtheairvolumearoundtheHISTARcaskfollowsbestpracticeguidelinessuchasmaintainy+below4.

Consideringthelargemarginsoncomponenttemperaturesandpressureavailableunderbothnormaland accidentscenarios,itisconcludedthatthethermalevaluationsinHI2177597satisfytheunconditionally safethreshold.

HI2177591(HISTORMUMAX):Thecomputationalmeshadoptedinthethermalevaluationsdocumented inHI2177591isthesameasthatadoptedforalllicensingbasisevaluationspresentedinSection4.4of theHISTORMUMAXSAR.Additionally,duetothelowerallowabledecayheatloadsandmorefavorable ambientconditionsinHISTORESAR(thanthatforHISTORMUMAXqualifiedunderdocket721040),

robustmargins(>10oC)areavailabletotheHISTORMUMAX/MPC37temperaturelimitsatHISTORE CISF.TheGCIestablishedunderdocketinChapter4ofHISTORMUMAXFSAR(DocketNo.721040)is 1.07%onthepeakcladdingtemperature.Therefore,itcanbeconcludedthatthethermalevaluations presentedinHI215591meetstheUSTcriteriasetforthinChapter6oftheHISTORECISFFSAR.

RAI626:ProvidetheHISTAR190Oringminimumandmaximumtemperaturelimitsandits temperatureforthebuildingcollapsescenario.

TheapplicationdidnotincludetheallowabletemperaturelimitsfortheOrings.Inaddition,Table6.2of HoltecReportNo.HI2177597,HISTORECTFThermalEvaluation,listedHISTAR190component temperaturesbutdidnotincludetheOring.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(d)and72.128(a).

HoltecResponse:

The maximum temperature limit of the HISTAR 190 Oring under normal and accident conditions is providedinTable4.4.4oftheHISTORECISFFSAR.ThisOringisratedtoaminimumtemperatureof40oF since it is also used in transport condition (see Chapter 3 of USNRC Docket No. 719373).Under the hypotheticalCTBcollapseevaluation,theHISTARcavityisassumedtobefilledwithnitrogen/airi.e.no creditistakenforthepresenceofheliumwithintheHISTARcavity.ThesealingfunctionalityoftheHI STARlidisnotrelieduponunderthisscenarioandthereforetheOringtemperatureisnotreported.To addressreviewersspecificrequestontheOringtemperatures,thetemperatureofOringunderthis accidenthasbeenpostprocessedandfoundtobe243oC.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

RAI627:ClarifyinChapter3oftheHISTORESARthattheHISTAR190istheonlytransportation packagethatisusedtoshipcontenttotheHISTORECISF.

Chapter3(Page33)oftheHISTORESARstatesthattransportationpackagesotherthantheHISTAR 190wouldbeusedtotransportcontent.However,thethermalanalysesthatareprovidedto demonstratecompliancewithsitespecificparametersanddesignfeaturesarebasedonlyontheHI STAR190package.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(d)and72.128(a).

HoltecResponse:

TheNRCrevieweriscorrectthattheHISTORECISFapplicationandbasisforevaluationiscurrently limitedtotheuseoftheHISTAR190transportationcaskforreceivingloadedcanisters.Revisionshave beenmadetoChapters1and3toclarifythisfurther.SeeresponsetoRAI31forfurtherdetails.

RAI628:Specifythetimelimitsassociatedwiththecorrectiveactionsassociatedwiththeblockageof airflowmalfunctionspecifiedinItem8ofSection10.3.3.5oftheHISTORESAR.

Theoperationsprocedurementionstheneedtoperformacorrectiveactionassociatedwithblockageof airflow,butatransientHITRACthermalanalysiswithblockedairflowandatimelimittoperformthe correctiveactionwereneitherlistednorprovided.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(d)and72.128(a).

HoltecResponse:

First,itshouldbestatedthattheclosureoftheshieldgatesandremovaloftheHITRACisnota malfunctionbutisaplannedstep.Thisconditionisboundedbytheburialunderdebriseventin Paragraph4.6.2.3ofRevision3oftheHISTORMUMAXFSAR,whichprovidesanequationfor determininganallowableduration.Thatequationisusedtowiththemaximumallowabledecayheatand theminimumallowablecomponentrisetotheshorttermoperationstemperaturelimittodeterminethe allowabledurationfortheHITRACtoberemovedfromatoptheUMAX.

TheinitialconditionforthisdeterminationisthesteadystateMPCinHITRACcondition.Themaximum decayheatis32.15kWfromTable4.1.2oftheHISTORESAR.Theminimumtemperatureriseisforthe fuelcladding,whichisthedifferencebetweenthecalculatedvaluefromHISTORESARTable6.4.6and thelimitof390°C(400°CfromISG11Rev.3minus10°CperSARSection6.0),or734°F-669°F=65°For 36°C.TheUMAXweightandspecificheatcapacityarefromTable4.6.8oftheHISTORMUMAXFSAR.For theseinputstheallowableblockagetimeis:

46000 419

36 32150 21582 6.0

IftheHITRACcannotberemovedfromatoptheUMAXwithinthistime,thiswouldbeconsideredan accidentconditionandwouldbeboundedbythe100%ventblockageevent.Paragraph6.5.2.5oftheHI STORESARincorporatesParagraph4.6.2.3oftheHISTORMUMAXFSARforthisaccidentcondition.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

ThisdiscussionhasbeenaddedtoSection6.4oftheHISTORESAR.

Finally,itisnotedthatthecautionnotereferstotimelimitsdescribedinSection4.5,whichisa typographicalerror.ThecautionnotefollowingItem6inSection10.3.3.5hasbeencorrectedtoreferto timelimitsdescribedinSection6.4.

RAI629:SpecifythechangesintroducedinHISTORMUMAXVersionCsystemthatarenotedinTable 15.0.1ofHISTORECISSARChapter15andconfirmtherearenoimpactstothethermalmodelor performance.

TheHISTORESARstatestherearechangesintheUMAXsystemfromthatpreviouslyanalyzed.

However,descriptionsofthosechangeswerenotprovidedsuchthatassessmentsbytechnical disciplinescouldnotbeperformed.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(d)and72.128(a).

HoltecResponse:

TheminordesigndifferencesbetweentheHISTORMUMAXVersionCandtheHISTORMUMAXlicensed underdocket721040areprovidedinSections1.2.1and6.4.1oftheHISTORECISFSAR.Tosummarize, theyare:

1. HISTORMUMAXVersionCdoesnotcontaintheultrahighearthquakerestraintoptionspresent inthedesignlicensedinUSNRCDocketNo721040.Themostsevereearthquake(MSE)option underdocket721040hasspeciallyengineeredlockingwedgesbetweenMPCandtheUMAX dividershellat8circumferentiallocations.Thisfeature(orabsencethereof)hasnoimpactonthe thermalperformanceofthesystem.

2. UMAXcavitydepthisfixedtotwodiscretevaluesandnotvariableaspermittedinthedesign licensedin USNRCDocketNo.721040.AsalsohasbeendescribedinSection6.4.1,thermal performanceofUMAXVersionCiseitherthesameorimproved.

Asstatedtherein,neitherofthesedesignchangesadverselyaffectthermalperformanceofthissystem, norhaveanyimpactonthethermalmodelspresentedinChapter6oftheHISTORECISFSAR.

RAI630:ClarifytheapplicabilityofthereferencetoParagraph4.6.2.3oftheHISTORMUMAXFSARfor the100%blockageofairinletsandoutletHISTOREUMAXscenario.

Table6.0.1ofHISTORESARindicatesthatParagraph4.6.2.3oftheHISTORMUMAXFSARprovides informationthatappliesforthescenarioof100%blockageofairinletsandoutlet.However,Paragraph 4.6.2.3discussesthescenarioof100%blockageofairinletsonly.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(d)and72.128(a).

HoltecResponse:

SeeresponsetoRAI611above.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

RAI631:Clarifythedefinitionofmaximumsectionaveragetemperatureandbulkaverage temperaturedenotedinthenotestoTable6.4.3andTable6.4.5oftheHISTORESAR.

Thedefinitionsarerequiredforstafftohaveaclearunderstandingofthetemperaturesreportedinthe tables.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(d)and72.128(a).

HoltecResponse:

Sectionaveragetemperatureisdefinedasthelinealaveragetemperaturethroughthethicknessofa component.Maximumsectionaveragetemperature,therefore,isthelargestsectionaverage temperatureofallsectionsthroughacomponent.Bulkaveragetemperatureisthespatiallyintegrated averageoftemperaturesofanentirecomponentvolume.Thesedefinitionshavebeenaddedtothe glossaryoftermsinthebeginningoftheHISTORESAR.

RAI632:ClarifytheeffectsofthermalstressesonthesitesSSCs(includingUMAXmodule/VVM,HI TRACCS,andCTF)duetothetemperaturegradientsfromtheheatgeneratedbythecontentsdecay heat.

TherewasnomentionofthermalstressesinChapter5oftheHISTORESAR,eventhoughmanyofthe SSCsarenew(e.g.,HITRACCS,CTF)orhavenewdesigns(e.g.,module).Thermalstressesareexpected toimpactsafetymarginsalreadycalculated(e.g.,seismicandtornadicwindeffects)sincetheyexistin theanalysisoftheSSCsapriori.Thatis,theyshouldbeconsideredconcurrentlywithbothseismicand tornadiceffects.Updateanyrelevantcalculationsasnecessary.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24(d)and72.128(a).

HoltecResponse:

TheweldedsteelportionsoftheHISTORMUMAXVVM,theHITRACCS,andtheCTFarealldesignedto meetthestresslimitsgiveninASMESectionIII,SubsectionNFforClass3supports.Assuch,thermal stresseswithinthesupportneednotbeevaluated,asexplicitlystatedinnote(5)toTableNF3251.21.

ThestructuraldesigncriteriafortheHITRACCSandtheCTFaresummarizedinParagraphs4.3.3.1and 4.3.5.1oftheHISTORESAR,respectively.Theapplicablestresslimitsforthemetalliccomponentsof theHISTORMUMAXVVMareconfirmedinSection2.6oftheHISTORMUMAXFSAR.

RAI633:IdentifythepotentialonsitesourcesoffireorexplosioneventsinSARChapter6,Thermal Evaluation.

TheSARdoesnotdescribethesource(s)ofdifferentfuelsneededforoperatingonsitevehicles,suchas theVerticalCaskTransportersandheavyhaultractor/trailers(SARSection3.1.4.7,Maintenance Operations),orthoseusedforheatingandotheroperationalpurposes.Existenceorpresenceoflarge fuelsource(s)(e.g.,afuelstoragetankoratankertruck)nearimportanttosafetystructurescouldbea potentialhazardthatneedstobeassessed.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

Theinformationshould,ataminimum,includethefollowing:

a)ConfirmwhethertheproposedCISFwouldhaveanyonsitestoragetanksforgasoline,diesel, naturalgas,orothercombustiblematerialsneededforoperation; b)Describehowthestoragetankswillbereplenishedperiodically,includingthefrequency,and therouteswithinthefacilitythatwouldbetakenbythesupplyvehicle(s)toreachthestorage tanks; c)Specifythenearestdistancetotheimportanttosafetystructuresandsystemsfromthe storagetanksandsupplyvehiclesroutes;and, d)Confirmthatthestoragetanksandthesupplyvehicleswouldnotposeanysafetyhazardsto theimportanttosafetystructuresandsystemsandaloadedcasktransporterenroutetothe caskstoragepadarea.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.24,72.90(a)through(d),72.94, and72.122.

HoltecResponse:

a)

TheHISTOREfacilitysiteplanincludesasingle2500galloncapacitydieselfuelstoragetank,no gasolinestorageorpropanestoragetanksandnonaturalgaspipelines.SeeHoltecDrawing 10940inHISTORESARSection1.5.

b)

Thedieselfuelstoragetankwillberefilledasnecessary,butprobablynomorethanonceper month.AsupplytrucktorefillthedieselfuelstoragetankwouldtravelfromU.S.Highway 62/180(about1mileaway)toLeaCountyRoute55totheentrancetotheHISTOREfacility.The dieselfuelstoragetankisapproximately250feetinsidetheentrancetotheHISTOREfacility.See HoltecDrawing10940inHISTORESARSection1.5.

c)

Thedieselfuelstoragetankisoutsidethesecurityfencesotherearenocombustiblematerials storednearthecasks.Theminimumdistancefromthedieselfuelstoragetanktoastoragecask isover1700feet.Asupplytrucktorefillthedieselstoragetankwillnotneedtobeanycloser thanapproximately1650feetfromastoragecask.SeeHoltecDrawing10940inHISTORESAR Section1.5.

d)

Withsuchlargeseparationdistancesneitherthedieselfuelstoragetanknorasupplytruck refillingitwouldposeanysafetyhazardtoastoragecask.Transporttruckdelivering transportationcaskstotheHISTOREfacilityenterthefacilityanddrivepastthedieselfuel storagetank,sorefuelingwillbeprohibitedwheneveratransportcaskisenteringorexitingthe facility.Thisrequirementwillbeimplementedinwrittenoperatingprocedures.

RAI71:JustifyhowtheshieldingperformanceoftheISFSIwillbeimprovedunderearthquakeeventsor revisetheshieldingcalculationandtheSARtomaketheshieldingcalculationconsistentwiththeresult ofthestructuralanalysesfordesignbasisaccidentconditionsofthesystem.

Section1.2.1oftheSARstatesthat:[t]heheightofthelateralseismicrestraintatthetopofthecanister isadjustedtoaccordwiththeheightofthecanisterthatwillbestoredinthecavity,andasecondsetof seismicrestraintsaresituatedbetweentheDividerShellandCavityEnclosureContainer(CEC)atthe sameheightandlocationasthelateralseismicrestraint.Asaresult,thestructuralperformanceofthe

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

systemremainsunaffectedandothersafetymetricssuchasshieldingandthermal(heatrejection)are eitherunaffectedorimproved(dependingontheheightofthecanisterbeingstored).However,the staffnotesthatthesestatementsseemtoshowadiscrepancy.Ifthedesignbasisearthquakewillnot affectthestructuralperformanceoftheVerticalVentilatedModule(VVM),thereshouldnotbeany impactontheperformanceofthethermalandshieldingfunctionsofthesystem.Moreimportantly,the staffdoesnotunderstandhowtheshieldingfunctioncanbeimprovedbythedamagesresultingfroman earthquakeeventeither.Theanalysisshoulddiscusshowtheshieldingfunctionwillnotbeaffectedor improvedifthecanisterendsupleaningtoonesideoftheVVMandformsabiggergapbetweenthe canisterandtheVVMwallthatresultsinabiggerstreamingpathforradiation.Thestaffsunderstanding isthatthedoserateatthetopoftheVVMmayincreasebecausetheincreasedstreamingpathonone sideofthecanisterandtheVVM.Theanalysisshouldprovideadditionaldiscussionofhowdesignbasis earthquakeswillnotaffecttheshieldingperformanceorrevisetheanalysestomakemodelsfor shieldinganalysesconsistentwiththeresultsofthestructuralanalysesforthesystemunderdesign basisaccidentconditions.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.106.

HoltecResponse:

Toremoveanunnecessarypointofcontentionandconfusion,thewordingischangedtoremovethe claimthatshieldingorthermalperformancecouldbeimprovedasaresultofanearthquake.

RAI72:ClarifyifanyhighburnupfuelwillbeauthorizedforstorageattheHISTORECISF.

Section7.1.2oftheHISTORESARstatesthat:Assemblieswithhigherburnups[:]Thosewouldalsohave correspondinglyhighercoolingtimestomeettransportrequirements.However,Table7.1.1oftheHI STORESARstatesthatthemaximumburnupis45GWd/MTU.Itisnotclearifthisstatementimpliesthat spentfuelwithburnupshigherthan45GWd/MTUwillbestoredattheCISF.SincetheUMAXdesign allowsforstorageoffuelwithamaximumburnupof68.2GWd/MTUforPWRfuelassembliesand65 GWd/MTUforBWRassemblies(ML14202A032,UMAXFSAR),theapplicantshouldclarifythis discrepancybetweentheburnuplimitusedintheshieldinganalysisandtheseSARstatements.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.104(a),(b),(c)and72.106(b).

HoltecResponse:

ThehighburnupfuelisbeingauthorizedforstorageattheHISTORECISF.

ThepermissiblecontentsfortheHISTORECISfacilityisdescribedinSubsection4.1.1oftheHISTORE SAR,wheretheauthorizedmaterialsareincorporatedbyreferencefromSection2.1oftheHISTORM UMAXFSAR.Theauthorizedcontentsincludefuelwithamaximumburnupof68.2GWd/mtUforPWR fuelassembliesand65GWd/mtUforBWRassemblies.Todemonstratecompliancewiththeregulatory requirements,theshieldinganalysisisrevisedusingtheboundingsourceterms.Foradditionaldetails aboutthesourceterms,thereviewerisreferredtotheresponsestoRAIs73and74.

RAI73:Providespecificminimumcoolingtimeforhigherburnupfueltodemonstratethatfuelwith higherburnupwillmeetthedesignbasissourcetermslimitoftheHISTORECISF.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

Section7.1.2oftheHISTORESAR,statesthat:Assemblieswithhigherburnups[:]Thosewouldalsohave correspondinglyhighercoolingtimestomeettransportrequirements.However,theapplicantdidnot providespecificminimumcoolingtimerequirementforeachfuelburnupandenrichmentlimit.Without specificminimumcoolingtimesforburnupandenrichmentcombination,thestaffcannotverifyifthe higherburnupfuelmeetsthedesignbasissourcetermsusedintheHISTORECISFdoseanalyses.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.104(a),(b),(c)and72.106(b).

HoltecResponse:

SincethecanistersarriveattheHISTORECISfacilityinaNRCcertifiedtransportcasksuchasHISTAR190, thefuelspecificationsfortheHISTAR190transportcask,presentedinTables7.C.7through7.C.10ofthe HISTAR190SAR,areusedasthebasisoftheshieldinganalysisandtheyareexplicitlyprovidedinChapter 7oftheHISTORECISFSAR.

RAI74:JustifythatthecalculatedsourcetermsconsideredintheHISTORMUMAXFSARareapplicable totheHISTORECISFdesignorrevisetheshieldinganalysesaccordingly.

Table7.1.1oftheHISTORESARprovidestheparametersforthedesignbasis(DB)fuelassemblyusedto performtheshieldingevaluationfortheHISTORECISF.Specifically,Table7.1.1statesthattheDBfuel hasaburnupof45GWd/MTU,8yearsofcoolingtime,andaninitialU235enrichmentof3.2weight percent(wt%).Section7.1.2ofHISTORESARfurtherstatesthattheDBsourcetermsfortheHISTORM UMAXSystemwereusedinthesitespecificshieldinganalysesfortheHISTORECISF.However,Table 5.2.2oftheUMAXFSARshowsthattheDBsourcetermsfortheMPC37canisterwerecalculatedbased on45GWd/MTUburnupand4.5yearcoolingtime,butdoesnotstatetheminimalinitialenrichment.

Instead,theUMAXFSARstatesthatitsdesignbasissourcetermsarethesameasthosefromtheHI STORMFWFSAR.TheHISTORMFWFSARreferencedintheHISTORMUMAXFSARstatesthatthe sourcetermscalculatedforthedesignbasisPWRfuelarebasedonaWE17x17fuel,with45GWd/MTU burnup,4.5yearsofcoolingtime,andaninitialenrichmentof3.6wt%.

TheseparametersdonotmatchthedesignbasisfuelparameterspresentedinTable7.1.1oftheSARfor theHISTORECISF.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.104(a),(b),(c)and72.106(b).

HoltecResponse:

Todemonstratecompliancewiththeregulatoryrequirements,theshieldinganalysisisrevisedusingthe boundingsourcetermsbasedonthefuelspecificationsfortheHISTAR190transportcask,presentedin Tables7.C.7through7.C.10oftheHISTAR190SAR.Specifically,foreachbasketloadingregionofthe MPC37andMPC89baskets,themaximumdecayheatloadisdeterminedfromTables7.C.7and7.C.9:

MaximumDecayHeatLoadperAssembly(kW)

Description Region1 Region2 Region3 MPC37 0.95 1.70 0.84/1.1 MPC89 0.35 0.62 0.35

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

Then,foreachregion,alltheapplicableburnup,enrichmentandcoolingtimecombinationsinTables7.C.8 and7.C.10oftheHISTAR190SARareconsidered,andthemaximumsourcestrengthforeachenergy groupofneutrons/gammasandthemaximumcobaltactivityaredeterminedusingthedesignbasissource termsforthePWRWE17x17,PWRCE16x16andBWRGE10x10fuelassemblies,asapplicable.The establishedartificialbutconservativesourcetermsthatboundtheentirefuelspecificationuptothe maximumallowableburnupareusedintheshieldinganalysisfortheHISTORECISF.

RAI75:Justifytheadequacyofthe2000hoursoccupancyassumptioninthecalculationoftheannual doseatthecontrolledareaboundary.

Section7.4.2.1oftheHISTORESARstatesthat:[t]hemaximumcontrolledareaboundarydoserate (assuminganoccupancyof2,000hoursperyear)isbelowthe25mremannualdoselimitof10CFR 72.104.However,theSARdoesnotprovidethebasisforassuming2000hoursoccupancyofareal individualatthecontrolledareaboundary.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.104(a),(b),(c).

HoltecResponse:

Occupancyassumptionsofarealindividuallocatedbeyondthecontrolledareaboundaryarenow changed,clarified,andjustifiedtotheextentpracticableasdescribedinmoredetailinresponsetoRAI 17.

RAI76:Justifythatthecalculatedannualdoseat1000meterisappropriatefordemonstrating compliancewiththerequirementsof10CFR72.104and72.106.

Section7.4.2.1oftheHISTORESARstatesthat:[t]henearestresidenceis1.5milesfromtheHISTORE CISFacility.Thedosecalculationsconservativelyassumeafulltimeresident(8760hours/year)isonly 1000metersfromthenearestloadedHISTORMUMAXVVM.However,Table1.0.1oftheSAR, OverviewoftheHISTOREFacility,statesthatthedistancefromnearestloadedUMAXVVMtoSite Boundary(ControlledAreaBoundary)is400meters.Thesestatementssuggestthatthereisa discrepancyintheassumptionsusedtocalculatetheannualdoseforarealindividualatthecontrolled areaboundary.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.104(a),(b),(c)and72.106(a),(b) and(c).

HoltecResponse:

Occupancyassumptionsofarealindividuallocatedbeyondthecontrolledareaboundaryarenow changed,clarified,andjustifiedtotheextentpracticableasdescribedinmoredetailinresponsetoRAI 17.Table7.4.4providesboundingHISTORECISFacilitysiteaccidentconditionsdoseat100metersto meettherequirementsof10CFR72.106.

RAI77:DemonstratethattheHISTORECISstoragesystemdesignissufficientlysimilartothatofthe HISTORMUMAXdesignsothattheanalysesforHISTORMUMAXareapplicabletotheHISTORECIS system.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

Section7.2.2.1oftheHISTORESARstatesthat:[t]heversionoftheHISTORMUMAXstoragesystem usedhereisslightlydifferentfromthatdescribedin[1.0.6].However,thedifferencesareminor,anddo notaffecttheprincipaldesignfeaturesofthesystem.Adiscussionoftheshieldingdesignfeaturesofthe storagesystemseeSubsection5.1.1in[1.0.6].ThisSubsectionisincorporatedherebyreference.

However,thereisnodetailedcomparisonbetweendesignfeaturesofthesetwosystemswithrespectto shieldingdesign,particularlywithrespectto:(1)theauthorizedcontents(e.g.,PWRfuelburnupof68.2 GWd/MTUforUMAXvs45GWd/MTUforHISTORECIS),(2)theVVMdesigndimensions,(3)the materialsusedinthebackfillmaterials(ControlledLowStrengthMaterial(CLSM)inHISTORECISvs concreteandsoilforUMAX(Table5.3.2ofUMAXFSAR(ML14202A029)),andtopcovershieldingdesign, includingthestreamingpathsformedbyinletandoutletvents.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.104(a),(b),(c)and72.106(a)and (b).

HoltecResponse:

ThesourcetermsusedintheupdatedreportboundtheauthorizedcontentsoftheHISTAR190SAR Appendix7.Cwithrespecttoburnup,initialenrichmentandcoolingtime,whichisfurtherdetailedin Section7.1andReference[7.1.1].Highburnupfuel,asitisallowedintheregionalizedloadingpatterns intheHISTAR190SARAppendix7.C,isconsideredintheupdatedshieldinganalyses.

ThedesignoftheHISTORMUMAXVersionCisprovidedinthelicensingdrawingpackage,drawing 10875,inSection1.5LicensingDrawingsoftheHISTORESAR.TheHISTORMUMAXVersionBis consideredintheUMAXShieldingcalculationsandyieldslowerdoseratesthantheUMAXVersionA, whichhasdoseratetablesintheUMAXSAR[1.0.6].TheUMAXVersionBVVMandVersionCVVMare geometricallyidentical,withthekeydifferencebeingthattheVersionBusesstainlesssteelforcertain itemswhiletheseitemsfortheVersionCarecarbonsteelthatmaybepaintedorcoated.

RAI78:JustifythatthedoseratecalculationsunderaccidentconditionsfortheHISTORMFWHITRAC underaccidentconditionsareapplicabletothesitespecificHITRACCStobeusedattheHISTORECISF.

Section7.4.2.2oftheHISTORESARstatesthat:[t]heonlyoffnormaloraccidentconditionapplicable totheHISTORMUMAXstoragesystemisthemissileimpactduringconstructionnexttoaloaded canister.ThisconditionisanalyzedandmodeledinSection5.1and5.3oftheHISTORMUMAXFSAR.

However,theHITRACCSfortheHISTORECISusesconcretefilledsteelannularshellsstructure, whereastheshieldingdesignoftheHITRACtransfercaskdescribedintheHISTORMUMAXSystem FSAR,referencedfromtheHISTORMFWFSAR,iscomprisedofalead,waterjacket,andsteelshell structure.Therefore,thesameaccidentmayresultindifferentdamagemodesandhencedifferentdose ratesforthesetwotransfercaskdesigns..

ThestaffalsonotesthatSection7.4.2.2statesthataseparateshieldingcalculationfortheHITRACCS withassumptionofsubstantiallydegradedconcretewasperformed.However,theSARdoesnotdiscuss theamountofconcretedegradationassumed.TheSARshouldexplicitlydiscussandjustifytheamount ofconcretedegradationassumedintheshieldingcalculationsfortheHITRACCStodemonstrate compliancewiththeregulatoryrequirementsof10CFR72.106.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.104(a),(b),(c)and72.106(a)and (b).

HoltecResponse:

TheHITRACVWanalyzedintheHISTORMFWSAR,whichhasradiallayersofsteelleadsteelwater steel,isnotusedattheHISTORECISF;therefore,accidentconditionsdoseratesoftheHITRACVWare notapplicableattheHISTORECISF.TheHITRACCS,whichhasradiallayersofsteelconcretesteelis usedattheHISTORECISF,soaccidentconditionsrelatedtothistransfercaskarerelevanttotheHI STORECISFacilitySAR.FortheboundingaccidentconditionfortheHITRACCS,whichiseitherburial underdebrisorafireaccident,anyconcretethatexceeds1100oFisconsidereddegraded,asmentioned inChapter4and6,andisnotcreditedforshieldingunderaccidentconditions.Underthefireaccident conditions,lessthan1%ofthetotalconcretevolumeisconsidereddegraded,andunderburial conditionslessthan10%ofthetotalconcretevolumeisconsidereddegraded,whichisdetailedfurther inReference[6.5.4]oftheSAR.Althoughconcretedegradationisnotuniformdownthelengthofthe sideoftheHITRACunderthethermalaccident,therearenolocalizedradiationstreamingpathsthat couldincreasedoseratesbeyondwhatisanalyzedwiththereducedconcretedensityintheaccident conditionsHITRACCSmodel.Conservatively,theshieldinganalysisassumesasubstantiallossof concretearealdensityfollowingthefireaccident,withthedensityreducedfrom3.05g/cc(normal conditions)to2.4g/cc(accidentconditions)oradecreaseintotalconcretearealdensityof21.3%for accidentconditions.HITRACCSboundingaccidentconditionsdoseresultsdemonstratingcompliance with10CFR72.106arepresentedinTable7.4.4.

RAI79:ProvideanassessmentoftheamountofCarbon14thatcanbegeneratedbyneutronradiation oftheairpassingthroughtheannularspacebetweenthecanisterandtheVVMandanestimateofits contributiontothecontrolledareaboundarydose.

Carbon14(C14)isaradioactivematerialthatcanbeproducedbyneutronirradiationofNitrogen14, Oxygen16,andOxygen17thatexistsintheatmosphericair.ForsmallISFSIs,thegenerationofC14is generallyinsignificantand,accordingly,thestaffhasnotbeenconcernedwithitspotentialcontribution tothedosetothegeneralpublicandoccupationalworkersinsideoroutsidethecontrolledarea boundary.However,largerspentfuelstoragefacilities,suchasthatproposedfortheHISTORECISF, couldgeneratehigheramountsofC14duringitsoperation.Accordingly,theSARshouldprovidean assessmentorestimateoftheamountofC14thatcanbegeneratedduringitsoperationtodetermine itscontributiontothetotaldosetoworkersandthegeneralpublic.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.104(a),(b),and(c).

HoltecResponse:

ThedoserateversusdistanceasaresultofC14productionfromaHISTORMUMAXsystemis documentedinthenewreportHI2200954R0.TheresultsareusedinHISTOREdoseversusdistance report(HI2177599R2),andoccupationaldosereport(HI2177600R2),anddiscussedintheHISTORE storageSAR.

RAI710:Providejustificationforexcludingthemanufacturingtolerancesforimportanttosafety structuresandcomponentsintheshieldinganalysesfortheHISTORECISF.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

TheHISTORECISFincorporatesbyreferencetheshieldinganalysesfromtheHISTORMUMAXSystem, specificallythoseinChapter5ofHISTORMUMAXFSAR,Rev.1(HoltecReportHI2115090).Section5.3 oftheHISTORMUMAXFSARstatesthat,[t]henominaldimensionsinthesedrawingswereusedto createtheMCNPmodelsusedintheradiationtransportcalculations.However,theHISTORESARdoes notprovideajustificationforwhythisassumptionisacceptable.Moreimportantly,theHISTORECISF VVMsandtheHITRACCStransfercask(TC)havedifferentgeometriesanddimensionsthanthose assumedintheHISTORMUMAXFSAR.Specifically,theVVMstoragemodulehasdifferenttopliddesign andtheHITRACCSTCisanewconcreteshielddesigninsteadofaleadandwaterlayershielddesignof theHITRACTCfortheUMAXsystem.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.104(a),(b),(c)and72.106(a)and (b).

HoltecResponse:

For the staffs information, the following tolerances are standard manufacturing tolerances that are containedonHoltecfabricationdrawings:

[

PROPRIETARYINFORMATIONWITHHELDINACCORDANCEWITH10CFR2390

]

These tolerances are controlled in manufacturing under Holtecs NRC approved QA program. The manufacturing drawings including these tolerances are similarly controlled, and any changes are evaluatedunderHoltecs process,whichincludesanynecessaryreviewsbytechnical disciplines(i.e.,

shielding)andlicensing.

Thesetightlycontrolledtolerancesshouldprovidereasonableassurancethattherewillbenodrastic reductioninshielding,andkeepingthesetolerancesoncontrolledmanufacturingdrawingsandnotinthe FSARisconsistentacrossHoltecstoragesystems.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

RAI711:JustifyneglectingthecontributiontothecontrolledareaboundarydosefromISFSIloadingand unloadingoperationsorrevisetheestimatedannualdosethatincludesthecontributionfromthese operations.

TheHISTORESARprovidesanestimateoftheannualdosefromtheISFSIloadedwith500designbasis casks.However,itisnotclearwhythedoseestimatesatthecontrolledareaboundarydonotconsider thecontributiontodoseofISFSIloadingandunloadingoperations.BecausetheHISTORECISFis designedtostoreupto500canistersintheinitialphase,theSARshouldprovideajustificationforwhy thedosesfromISFSIloadingoperations,includingloadingofthecanisterintothetransfercask,moving theloadedtransfercasktotheVVM,andunloadingthecanisterintotheVVM,donotmakea substantialcontributiontothedoseatthecontrolledareaboundary.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.104(a),(b),(c)and72.106(a)and (b).

HoltecResponse:

Loadingoperationsarenowtakenintoaccount.ThedosecontributionfromtwoloadedHITRACCS transfercasks,andHISTAR190transportationcasksarecalculatedandaddedtotheannualdosesum toarealindividualbeyondthecontrolledareaboundaryinSection7.4.

RAI712:ClarifythestatementinSection7.4.2.2oftheHISTORESARregardingtheoffnormaland accidentconditionscenariosconsideredintheshieldinganalysesfortheHISTORECISF.

Section7.4.2.2oftheHISTORESARstatesthat:[t]heonlyoffnormaloraccidentconditionapplicable totheHISTORMUMAXstoragesystemisthemissileimpactduringconstructionnexttoaloaded canister.ThisconditionisanalyzedandmodeledinSection5.1and5.3oftheHISTORMUMAXFSAR.

However,Section15.2and15.3oftheHISTORESARlistsalloftheoffnormalandaccidentscenarios thatwereconsideredandanalyzedfortheHISTORECISF.Thestatementshouldberevisedtoeither clarifythatthescenarioofmissileimpactduringconstructionnexttoaloadedcanisterwasthe boundingscenarioconsideredintheshieldinganalyses,ortootherwisereferencethatallotheroff normalandaccidentscenarioslistedinSection15.2and15.3wereboundedbyit.

Thisinformationisnecessarytodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.106(b).

HoltecResponse:

ThetextisclarifiedinSection7.4.2.2tostatethatthescenarioofmissileimpactduringconstruction nexttoaloadedcanisteristheboundingaccidentscenariofortheUMAXVVM.

RAI111:JustifytheexclusionofasitespecificdoseestimateforISFSIexcavationactivitiesattheCISF.

Table11.0.1oftheHISTORESARreferencesthespecificaspectsoftheHISTORMUMAXFSARRadiation Protectionevaluationsthatareincorporatedbyreference,aswellasthosethatrequireadditionalsite specificevaluations.Specifically,Table11.0.1statesthat[i]ntheevent,itisdesiredtoexpandtheHI STORECISFacility'sHISTORMUMAXVVMISFSI,radiationprotectionoftheexcavationactivitiesis achievedonasitespecificlevelusingthesameprescriptionasinthegenericcase(i.e.prescribinga minimumdistancebetweentheexcavationareaandtheloadedVVMs,aswellasradiologicalmonitoring

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

oftheexcavationarea.TheshieldingdesignbasisaccidentdosepresentedintheHISTORMUMAXFSAR fortheHISTORMUMAXsystemdemonstratescompliancewith10CFR72.106[1.0.5]fortheHISTORE CISFacility.However,thestaffcouldnotfindasitespecificradiationprotectionevaluationanddose assessmentforthistypeofsiteoperation,especiallywithrespecttoaminimumdistancebetweenthe excavationarea,distancebetweenpadsandtheloadedVVMs,aswellasradiologicalmonitoringofthe excavationarea,includingwhetherthedesignbasisaccidentdosepresentedintheHISTORMUMAX FSARisstillapplicabletotheHISTORECISF.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.104(a),(b),(c),and72.106(a)and (b).

HoltecResponse:

ThefollowingtextisaddedtothequotedsectionintheRAIofTable11.0.1.All500UMAXVVMswill beconstructedpriortoloadinganycanistersintothesestoragesystems.Ifatsomepointinthefuture, thefacilityplanstoexpandbeyond500UMAXVVMs,anupdatedlicenseapplicationwillberequiredto befiledwiththeNRC,whichwillconsiderradiationprotectionoftheexcavationactivities.

RAI112:Provideadditionaldetailsandclearmarkingsonthesitemapfortheboundaryofthe RestrictedArea,RadiationAreas,andHighRadiationAreasanddiscussspecificaccesscontrolstothese areaswithradiationprotectionrequirements.

Section11.2.1oftheSARstatesthat,[c]ertainareaswithintheRestrictedAreaaredesignatedas RadiationAreas,andspecificlocationswithintheRadiationAreasharethepotentialtobeHigh RadiationAreasandarepostedandcontrolledinaccordancewithapplicablerequirementsof10CFR 20.TheapplicantneedstoclearlydelineatethedesignatedRadiationAreas,theboundaryofRestricted Area,andthespecificlocationfortheHighRadiationAreasinthesitemap.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR20.1302,10CFR72.122(h),and10CFR 72.104.

HoltecResponse:

Thefollowingtextisaddedinsection11.2.:

TheProtectedAreaperimeterismarkedastheRestrictedArea.TheCaskTransferBuildingismarkedas aradiationareaorhighradiationareaper10CFR20limits.Theparkingareafortheloaded transportationcasks,andtheUMAXVVMISFSIaremarkedasradiationareas.HISTARAccesscontrols isusedtopreventunauthorizedaccesstotheRestrictedAreaforthepurposeofradiationprotection.

PhysicalbarrierssuchasfencingandgatesareusedtopreventaccesstotheRestrictedAreawithdetails outlinedinthePhysicalSecurityPlan[3.1.1].Theprovisionsof10CFR20.203(b)or10CFR20.1902(a)

(b)[7.4.1]requirethateachradiationareaandhighradiationareabeconspicuouslypostedwithasign orsignsbearingtheradiationcautionsymbolandthewords:"CAUTION,RADIATIONAREA"or CAUTION,HIGHRADIATIONAREA,respectively.Therestrictedareaandradiationareasareshownin Figures11.2.1and11.2.2.

AccesscontrolisdiscussedfurtherinSection11.2.2.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

RAI141:Justifytheassumptionthatnolowlevelradioactivewasteswillbeproducedduringsite operations.

Section14.1oftheHISTORESARstatesthat:[r]adioactivewastestypicallygeneratedduring operationsatanISFSIfallintothecategoriesbelow.However,asdiscussedinSections14.3,14.4,and 14.5,theHISTORECISdoesnotgenerateradioactivewastesinanyformduringoperations.Therefore, implicitly,theHISTORECISFcomplieswiththeradioactivewastesandradiologicalimpactcriteriain10 CFR20and10CFR72.However,Chapter3and10oftheSARbothstatethatspecificsurfacesofthe canisterandtransportationcaskwillbeswipedandtestedforcontamination.Thewastesgenerated fromtheseactivitiesmaycreatesmallamountsoflowlevelradioactivewastesandmeasurestoensure propermanagementanddisposalofthesewastesshouldbediscussedintheSAR.

Thisinformationisneededtodeterminecompliancewith10CFR72.44(d)

HoltecResponse:

Holtecagreesthatcontaminationsurveysoftheshippingcaskandcanister,whichareperformedduring receiptinspectiontoverifysurveysperformedpriortoshipment,havethepotentialtogeneratesmall amountsoflowlevelsolidradioactivewaste.Thiswastewouldbeintheformofpaper,clothorother materialusedtoperformchecksforloosesurfacecontamination.Thestatedassumptionthatnolow levelradioactivewastescanbeproducedduringsiteoperationsinthereforenotcorrect.Facilitiesand proceduresarethereforerequiredtobeestablishedattheHISTORECISsitetocollectandpreparethis potentialsolidwasteforshipmenttoalicenseddisposalfacility.Sections14.0,14.1,and14.4ofChapter 14arethereforerevisedasfollows:

Section14.0,FirstParagraph:

Section14.1,FirstParagraph:

Sig_,nificant uanhhes of radioactive wastes are not ex ected to be generated as.. a _result. of handling and storage oeerations for spent fuel or high-level waste @L W at the HI-STORE CIS site. Small volumes of solid low-level radioactive waste may be produced from routin contamination surveys and potential decontamination of transpo1tation casks and other equi ment surfaces. The canisters bearing SNF and other approved contents for storage in HI-STORM UMAX systems at the HI-STORE CIS serves as the confinement system during storage and related operations, as noted in Chapter 9 of this repo1t. There is no breaching or opening of the confinement canister during storage operations. The integrity of the confinement system has been proven via analysis to be maintained during normal, off-normal and hypothetical accident conditions as discussed in Chapters 9 and 15 of this report.

HISTOREConsolidatedInterimStorageFacility RequestsforAdditionalInformationPart6 HoltecLetter5025061

Section14.4,FirstandSecondParagraphs:

Radioactive wastes typically generated during operations at an ISFSI fall into the categories ~

and b) below. As discussed in Sections 14.3, 14.4 and 14.5, the HI-STORE CIS bas the potential to generate small volumes of low-level solid radioactive waste from contamination smveys conducted durin o erations. There are no other sources for significant radioactive wastes. The HI-STORE CIS complies. with the radioactive wastes and radiol,ogical impact criteria in 1 0CFR20 and 1 0CFR 72, as gaseous or liquid effluents are not generated onsite and provisions are made for the packaging of site-generated low-level solid waste in a form suitable for storagg onsite awaiting transfer to disQ_osal sites.

As explained in Subsection 14.3, liquid waste (radioactive or non-radioactive) is not generated f!~..

a.result of facility normal operations and off-normal events as defined in Chapters 9 and 15 of this repo11. As such, solidified wastes esulting from liquid waste stream(s) are not generated at the HI-STORE CIS.

Transportation casks and canisters received at the site are expected to be free of loose surface contamination but are nonetheless smveyed for confirmation. Although unlikely, solid low-level adioactive wastes may therefore be generated at the HI-STORE CIS. typically consisting of paper or cloth swipes, paper towels, protective clothing, and other similar solid materials.

Subsequent to contamination surveys and confirmation of canister integrity during receipt, canisters ar transferred to the HI-STORM UMAX VVM usin a Q_rocess that at no time req!!_ires the canister o b opened and waste handled or treated. If breach of the canister is detected during receipt leak testing of the transpo1t cask and loaded canister, the package is transported back to the site of origin or other site authorized to handle the radioactive contents of the package for unloading and other remediation activities. Therefore, it is not expected that an)'l solid radioactive wastes will b generated as.a. result.of CIS facility operations. However, any low-level solid adioactive wastes that might be generated will be collected in containers and temporarily stored in an appropriate repository in the CTB. Small volumes of solid radioactive wastes are anticipated. These low activity wastes will be transpo1ted to, and disposed of at, a low-level

waste disposal facility licensed in accordance with 1 OCFR61 and in compliance with other applicable federal and state regulations.