ML20236U084
| ML20236U084 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 07/21/1998 |
| From: | Tuckman M DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| TAC-M98964, TAC-M98965, NUDOCS 9807290295 | |
| Download: ML20236U084 (130) | |
Text
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Duke Power Company A Duke Ewy Campexy EC07H
=
526 South Church Street P.O. Box 1006 Charlotte, NC 28201-1006 M. S. Tudunan Executin Vice hnident V04)382-2200 OFFICE Nudear Generation 604)3824360 FAX July 21, 1998 U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Attention:
Document Control Desk
Subject:
McGuire Nuclear Station Docket Numbers 50-369 and -370 Improved Technical Specifications, Supplement 7 TAC Nos. M98964 and M98965 Duke Energy's meeting with the NRC on June 17/18 and July 9/10, 1998 resulted in open items associated with previous RAI responses on Sections 3.3, 3.4,
- 3. 5, 3. 6, 3.8, and 5.0.
Additional clarifications have been identified by DEC on Section 1.0, 3.1, 3.4, and 3.8.
Resolution of all open items and the additional clarifications are included as.
This completes our response to all RAIs.
Immediately following each staff comment or DEC identified additional item are changes to the ITS submittal necessary to resolve the item and supplement the initial ITS submittal.
Changes are denoted by revision bars to facilitate staff review.
The pages provided in Enclosure 1 in this response replace the corresponding pages in the May 27, 1997 submittal, Supplement 1 provided March 9, 1998, Supplement 2 provided March 20, 1998, Supplement 3 provided April 20, 1998,
/l Supplement 4 provided June 3, 1998, Supplement 5 dated June 24,.1998, Supplement 6 dated July 7, 1998.
All changes have been determined to be within the scope of the original PORC and NSRB reviews.
I l
l n
~ n 9807290295 990723 PDR ADOCK 05000369 ;
P PDR q
(
- U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission July:21, 1998 Page 2 Pursuant to'10.CFR 50.91(b)(1), a copy of this amendment has
- been provided to.the appropriate State of North Carolina officials.
If any. additional information-is needed, please. cal] Lee A.
Keller at.704-382-5826.
Very truly yours,
,Y M. S. Tuckman Enclosure 4
xc:
w/ enclosures Mr. L. A. Reyes Administrator, Region II-
.U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St.,
SW, Suite 23T85-Atlanta, GA
.30303-Mr.
F. Rinaldi U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear' Reactor Regulation Washington, DC 20555 Mr.
S. M.
Shaeffer 7
Senior Resident Inspector-McGuire Nuclear Station
(
Mr.-Mel Frye l.
Division of Radiation Protection 3825 Barrett Drive.
L.,
Raleigh,.NC
'27609-7221 l
,, - -,. - - _ _ - - _ - _ _. ~. - _ -, -, -. -, ~.,, _ _ _
_--____..____--____..,____,_______,,_,-__,.__,__n,.,_._
M ENCLOSUREI MCGUIRE. NUCLEAR STATION RESOLUTION OF OPEN ITEMS AND ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATIONS I
l J
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t
Catawba and McGuire Improved TS Review Comments Section 1.0, Use and Application
' 1.0 Additional Items 1.0-1 DOC LA3 1
DOC LA3 currently indicates that the definition of process control program is relocated to procedures. DOC LA3 is revised to indicate that this definition is moved to the Selected Licensee Commitments manual (Chapter 16 of the UFSAR) and is controlled by 10 CFR 50.59.
I mc4_cr_1.0 2
July 15,1998
I 1
Discussicn cf Ching2s l
Section 1.0 - Use and Application TECHNICAL CHANGES - REMOVAL OF DETAILS LA.1 The reactivity condition limitation for the REFUELING MODE of operation in CTS Table 1.2 is being proposed for relocation to the COLR.. Proposed TS 3.9.1 requires the boron concentrations in the RCS, refueling canal, and the refueling cavity to be maintained within the limit specified in the COLR. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
Changes to the COLR will be subject to the administrative controls of proposed Chapter 5 and 10 CFR 50.59.
These controls will assure that any future changes to the COLR maintain the margin of safety provided by this specification.
LA.2 The CTS definitions for MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC, PURGE-PURGING, SITE B0UNDARY, SOURCE CHECK, UNRESTRICTED AREA, VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM, VENTING, and WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM have been deleted since specific Specifications referring to them no longer consider them a defined term, or no longer are retained in the ITS. These definitions will be relocated to Chapter 16 of the UFSAR which contains Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC),
including the Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications which utilize these terms. The removal of a definition which is not used within the TS is acceptable. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
LA.3 The CTS 1.23 definition for PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP) has been moved to the SLC rencved c1cng with the c :ccieted progrcm de:cription specified in CTS 5.0, ?,dmin!:tretive Centrch. The PCP implements the requirements of 10 CFR Parts 20, 61, and 71, therefore, inclusion within the TS is not necessary to ensure safe operation of the facility.
The requirement; cf the CFR cre impicmented by p hnt precedurcs. Changes to the SLC will be subject to a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation which ensures that any changes are appropriately reviewed. -This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
McGuire Units 1-and 2 Page LA - 1 G/20/4Mupplement 7 l l
Catawba and McGuire Improved TS Review Comments Section 1.0, Use and Application 1.0 AdditionalItems 1.0-2 DOC A3 Based on the suggestion by the NRC staff, DOC A3 has been deleted and replaced with a less restrictive change L3 to indicate the phrase "or actual" in reference to injected signals has been added to the CTS definitions for ACTUATION LOGIC TEST and CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COr).
l mc4_cr_1.0 3
July 15,1998 l-i
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l Go uSr Mio OcF/NITION l.1 A tf UEFINITIONSI The defined ter of this section appear in ca italiZed type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specification us ACTION 4LO ACTIObhall be that part of a ([e5ElIB) Specification 6 prescribes am mesura require r designated condition pgy 4
ACTUATION LOGIC TEST
&c 4. ken M
l e
i
@ An ACTUATION LOGIC TEST shall be the application of vari 4
l input combinations in conjunction with each possible interlock logic state and
- i $ verification of the required logic output.
include a continuity checir, as a minimoshof output devices.TheACTUATIONLOGICT9 hEL OPERATIONAL TEST ((OT)
@ Arc am er - -- ua+ um r=u 1 be the injection of a simulated A ret g
sional into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verifyGG) requwc9 OPERABILITY ofAalarm, interlock an@ trip functions. The dOkumrt"-- _ S L
<ewano. mavaa shall include adjustments, as necessary, of th lam, inter-lock ang8y./ripget range anTaccuracy. points hatthegetpointsarewithinthere tred req.,,,
3.
AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD)
@ dflPTA[ Furr U&nKr be the difference in normalized flux signals between the top and bottom halves of a two section excore neutron detector.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION l
.n
(
@ A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be e adjustment, as necessary, of the channe m that it responds wit the required range and accuracy to known I
M i. M input. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel l'
}
includina th*4ensor ny ser' s of sequential,lplappingpor total channel stepsn@ trip func alarm, interi So performed by over I
that the ent r channel is calibrated '
I 4.
rwas.9 m3 @baW9
- I CHANNEL CHECK
@ing operation [by_ observatio3 This determination shall include, whe A CHANNEL CHECK shall belthe qualitative assessment)f channel behavi.or l
dur
( sible, comparison or tne cnennes indication an($ status ther indica-tions g[/or status derived from independent instrument channe measuring the l
same parameter.
L 9
McGUIRE - UNIT 1 1-1 Amendeent No. 166 9
e
G.o uSC AND DerINIT1oh l.1 1 4 QFFINITIONSI A.1 v
- TE*. The defined terms of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specification Q
ACTION O ACTIOhsha11 be that part of a0'erMWaDSpecification prescribes r= J -===6reh fequire under designated condition.
I
^
MTUATIONLOGICTEST
&[ k$
T i
g
@ An ACTUATION LOGIC TEST shall be the appilcation of various simulated /
g,g input combinations in conjunction with each possible interlock logic state and
)
@includeacontinuitychect;fasaminierification of the required logic ou t.
The ACTUATION LOGIC TES Shall
'i of output devices.
r GGiE6D CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (cot)
%s.Q
@ As m ean ruamrrt nor#aTrnmau T NT 1 be the injection of'a simulated A1 signal into'the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY oflalam, interlock an@ trip functions. The GRA N om i
=munuc im shall include adjustment as necessary, of the lam, Inter-lock and@)/ripgetpoints that the tpoints are within the required range and accuracy.
o
.g AXfAL FtuX DIFFERDCE (tiFp)
QD Rura Drumm.a be the difference in normalized flux signals between the top and bottom halves of a two section excore neutron detector.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION 6 A CHANNE LIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel hat it responds wit the required range and accuracy to known h
A1 GEifFCM input. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel
.iik u_ ding thep enso alarm,interlojyan trip function,
may be performed by an se es of se uential,' overlap n r total channel steps that the ent re channel is ca ibrated.
CHANNEL CHECK Q @sible A CHANNEL CH shall be{the qualitative assessmekof channel behavior during operatt y observa yt This determination shall include, where pos-tions
~arisorrci se dannel indication ancEiiA status utn ther indica-r status derived from independent instrument channel Imeasuring the same parameter.
g McGUIRE - UNIT 2 1-1 Amendment No.
148 9
e W
pp l.L 13 l
J Discussicn cf Changes Srcticn 1.0 - Usa and Application I
ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES
{
)
A.1 All reformatting and renumbering are in accordance with NUREG-l 1431. As a result, the Technical Specifications (TS) should be i
more readily readable, and therefore understandable, by plant I
operators as well as other users. The refonnatting, renumbering, and rewording process' involves no technical changes to existing Technical Specifications.
Editorial rewording (either adding or deleting) is made consistent with NUREG-1431. During Improved Technical Specification (ITS) development certain wording preferences or English language conventions were adopted which resulted in no technical changes (either actual or interpretational) to the Technical Specifications. Additional information has also been added to more fully describe each subsection. This wording is consistent with NUREG-1431. Since the design is already approved by the NRC, adding more detail does not result in a technical change.
A.2 Current Technical Specification (CTS) 1.3, 1.5, and 1.37 have been revised to add the word " required" to the alarm and sensor functions. As a requirement for OPERABILITY of a Technical Specification channel, not all channels will have a " required" sensor or alarm. The revised wording in ITS Specification 1.1 more accurately reflects this intent. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
A.3 Not used.
The phra:c "cr actual," in reference to the injected signal, has been added tc CTS Specification 1.0 definition; for ACTUATION LOCIC TEST and CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (C0T),
- an explicit option tc the currently required " simulated" signal.
Sc=c tc;t: are perfc=cd by insertion of the actual signal into the logic.
For other;, there is n0 rea:cn why an actual signal would preclud: ::tisfactory perfe=ance Of the te t.
U c cf an actual signal in tcad of : simulated ;ignal in the ITS 1.1 l
definition; will not affect the perfc= nce of the channel.
OPEESILITY can bc adequately dc=cnstrated in tither cc;c since Qc.ch:.nnel it:cif car not discriminate between " actual" cr
";imulated." Thi; change i; cen;istent with NUREC 1431.
A.4 Specific CHANNEL CALIBRATION requirements in CTS 1.5 for
. thermocouple or RTDs have been revised. The intent of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION is to adjust the channel output so that the channel McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page A-14 Supplement 73 l f
Discussicn cf Changn S:cti:n 1.0 - Use cnd Applicatio TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE L.1 CTS 1.9 definition has been revised to remove the " manipulation of any component within the reactor pressure vessel" from consideration as a CORE ALTERATION. This change maintains CORE ALTERATIONS as movement of only those components which can affect core reactivity.
The basis for this is evident in that the Specifications applicable during CORE ALTERATIONS are those that protect from or mitigate a reactivity excursion event.
In keeping with this, ITS Specification 1.1 provides that movement of equipment other than fuel, sources, or reactivity control components, are not considered CORE ALTERATIONS. Since other equipment (e.g. cameras, thimble plugs, upper internals) will have negligible (if any) effect on core reactivity, any movement has essentially no impact on core reactivity. Therefore, the revised definition places no restrictions on movement of equipment other than fuel, sources, and reactivity control components.
Source range instrumentation is available for monitoring core reactivity and boron concentration is maintained within COLR limits during MODE 6.
This change is less restrictive and is consistent with NUREG-1431.
L.2 Not used.
L.3 The phrase "or actual," in reference to the injected signal, has been added to CTS Specification 1.0 definitions for ACTUATION LOGIC TEST and CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (C0T), as on explicit option to the currently required " simulated" signal.
Some tests are performed by insertion of the actual signal into the logic.
For others, there is no reason why on actual signal would preclude satisfactory performance of the test.
Use of an actual signal instead of a simulated signal in the ITS 1.1 definitions will not affect the performance of the channel. This change permits credit to be taken for unplanned events (actual signals) which provide the necessary data to satify the test.
The actual signal is what is credited within the safety analysis and is sufficient for demonstrating compliance with the test.
In addition, this change is_ consistent with NUREG-1431.
l McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page L - 14 Supplement 73 l
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N3 Significant Hazards C:nsid;raticn S2cticn 1.0 - Use and Application LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE L.3 The McGuire Nuclear Station is converting to the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) as outlined in NUREG-1431, " Standard Technical
?
Specifications, Westinghouse Plants." The proposed change involves making the current Technical Specifications (CTS) less restrictive.
Below is the description of this less restrictive change and the No Significant Hazards Consideration for conversion to NUREG-1431.
The phrase "or actual," in reference to the injected signal, has been added to CTS Specification 1.0 definitions for ACTUATION LOGIC TEST and CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT), as an explicit optton to the currently required " simulated" signal. Some tesis are performed by insertion of the actual signal into the logic.
i For others, there is no reason why an actual signal would preclude satisfactory performance of the test.
Use of an actual signal instead of a simulated signal in the ITS 1.1 definitions will not affect the performance of the channel. This change permits credit to be taken for unplanned events (actual signals) which provide the necessary data to satify the test.
The actual signal is what is credited within the safety analysis and is sufficient for demonstrating compliance with the test.
In addition, this change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
In accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, the McGuire Nuclear Station has evaluated this proposed Technical Specifications
[
change and determined it does not represent a significant hazards 1
consideration.
The following is provided in support of this conclusion.
l 1.
Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?
The proposed changes permits the use of unplanned events in addition to simulated signals to be credited in the performance of the test.
The initiation signals associated with testing are not considered initiators of any analyzed event.
Therefore, the probability of an accident previously evaluated is not l
significantly increased.
The proposed change does not reduce the performance requirements or acceptance criteria for the systems or components, therefore, the consequences of analyzed events are not offected.
McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page B&M of 12MM Supplement 735/20/97l J
No Significant H:zirds Crnsid:;rati n S;;ctien 1.0 - Usa cnd Application I
2.
Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change does not permit operation in a new or different mode, or permit the installation of a new or different type of equipment.
The oroposed changes provides the allowance to l
use on unplanned actuation signal in addition to simulated signals in the performance tests.
The affected systems and components remain capable of performing their design safety functions.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated.
i 3.
Does this changs involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
The proposed change continues to require the same performance and acceptance criteria assumed within the safety analysis for these systems and components.
The ability to credit unplanned events in the performance of tests does not affect these assumptions.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduce a margin of safety.
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McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 98M of 12MM Supplement 735/20/97l
McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments 1
ITS Section 3.1, Reactivity Control Systems 3.1 Additionalitems l
l 3.1-02 DOC LA9 i
in review comments for several sections, the NRC has identified that the deletion of requirements which are redundant to regulation should be classified as less restrictive changes rather than removal of detail changes. Therefore, DOC LA9 is deleted and replaced l
by DOC L14 to be consistent with other changes made to other sections and to eliminate the relocation of a requirement to a procedure.
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mc5_cr_3.1 3,1-12 July 15,1998
I Spee ic.c.urim
- i' 3, i REACTIVITY CONJROL SYSTEMS 3.l.3 MODERATdR TE'MPERATURE COEFFICIEN f,l l
ctIMITDIVCONDITIDPTOR OPEENfl0tD I
l l
L.CO3.l.3t3 AA37 The moderator te_aperature coefficient (MTC) (shall be within the limits specified in the ====~=- m===3 COLR(f. The maximum
- l l
upper limit shall be less than or equal to that shown in F' gure 3.
.g j
\\
Ms vreer mc e.m er)--
m n im m MODES 1 and zr e ni r#1 M '*IA J
APPLICABILITY: Fiaure.s.1-oend un =~"r*
2 fiilNtf Cvth LifeM6L) 3 mit D MODES 1. 2, and 3/on w.#1 48
@r-the sea.aer 44TC s.eeef J
5LC (MturNn fc.nm A
@ the MTC =nra ean - - - %~ limit ppy.iiicu if rigure e on A,l
- --rinn e min i an-z may vuoceed nedridedf l
r + =- i n_i v _
l A
1.
Control rod withdrawal limits are established and maintained sufficient to restore the MTC to less positive than the limit kcnd I
. within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in M a= = >-
within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Jin wunaraws t s inusma D u.xxx.nr-"-~
es a nc i.vni. ' s vb m i s
^ntalncQ wiL~ ri tieu wi kis awal ilmi A'[O establi ed above un ' a subse calculat verifie a
the M has been re cred to wi n its limi for the al rah
- an F it, awn conditi
( A specisi sivu anu umi ucu i i;.. commis on yv s 6 is pi pursuant o Specifica on 6.9.2 thin 10 d s, describ' g the j
.l4 value o the measure HTC, the teria. con ol rod wit rawal limit and the pr icted aver e core bur up necessa for rest ing the pos Ive MTc to
+hia it<
imit for t e all rndt) 9 + Arawn enndit on /
Gof e. rhin /&* *imit 6&cureo in tne tuuo
@ KiiTPYlia MTC enre manars-minil
'--a=
g be in ein wonamhwithin 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
@ DOS W
(
l l
l J
t l
f tWith K n greater than or equal to 1.0.
Aeove.l -fD 4 h'S t
e
'WSee %n*fi a l lef t Freshtion M10.
M,jl l
)
McGUIRE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-4 Amendment No. 166 Pf 'd 4 I
1
$fe-coso cA n
J, l REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3, g,3 f,/,3t!QQERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT h RIMITING CONDFfl0N FORAFFERATiolb A
L.co 3.103 The moderator temperature Coefficient (NTC) shall be within the linius specified in therrnor nFFmrIIIth I IRIM REPQHuTCOLR)t' The maximum upper limit shall be less than or equal to that shown in Figure 3.1Q,,,,,, ; A.
c+,,*u e, a o rX
{ APPLICABILITY: 6iniaW 3.1-0 anfCOLR Mtlure i Mrmite MUUu 1 and 3"/tFnlytp
'A N a
I
@nd # Cycle I M e (EOL M init l M00ES 1, 2, and 3roo47.D El' g
+we i.we, noe 6->c I
ACTI
@4 J'u we
]
f"g a.
@ the MTCapore :ssitive thar tha limit f coed nrovx, AfTe1oQ ksl fjed in 1
Rhe COLVoperatiow rum I m 7 may ed e i 1
I d,1.
Control rod withdrawal
- limits are established and maintained sufficient to restore the MTC to less positive than the limit j
pche8 Dec tie. ann tigure#of the COLf0within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be inCiQ Meh. 7.
2Epwlthin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />._finespantnarawas sEi> s'as j
8.12
- '* M bpe i s aauiu[3.1.3.[e to sn acrsion simM of oecificati f-
{ The contro s are mainta en witnin ene wi arawa simu establis ve until a bsequent calcul on verifies that A,go the MTCh as been restore to within its li t for the all rods j
{withd/ awn conditione a,
/
C3.
A Special Repor is prepared and su itted to the Consiss n 7
pursuant to Sp ification 6.9.2 w in 10 days, describi g the 1
gg
,value of the asured MTC, the i erim control rod wit rawal limits, and he predicted aver e core burnup necessa for
' restoring e positive MTC to ithin its limit for t all rods ;
i
< withdrawn ondition. J @ e rs.k tc=sa-J
[erfg(CE E th t m MTC ehre naaftive tVthe EOLPlimit rioecifiedsfr the tutx3 A,l be in (ET3HUTXMb Ithin 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
61*.Is 4
i i
)
k l
6ith Km creater than or equal to 1.0
- W2 ** +r/'I' ca l'
- I*'
raresn.nasTT.enrcM in.210.
McGUIRE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-4 Amendment No.
148 i
Discussien of Changas Stetien 3.1 - Racctivity Central Systems LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGES head removal.
Requirements for post modification or post maintenance testing are controlled by procedures and the requirement to verify operability prior to returning equipment to service.
Specific. requirements are not necessary for inclusion within the TS and are inconsistently applied within the CTS. The 18-month frequency is somewhat redundant to the head removal frequency and.is not necessary. The normal refueling cycle is 18
. months at which time the head is removed and the surveillance would be required to be performed. Should an extended mid-cycle outage occur, the 18 month frequency could be reached first, however, in the absence of any head removal, there would be no physical reason to reverify these times. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
L.13 CTS SR 4.1.3.3 requires verifying digital rod position agreement with the group demand counters every 18 months.. ITS SR 3.1.7.1 only requires this verification following head removal. The normal refueling. cycle is 18 months at which time the head is.
removed and the surveillance would be required to be performed.
Should an extended mid-cycle outage occur which did not involve a head r_emoval, it is possible that the'18 month frequency, plus the extensions allowed by-SR 3.0.2, could be reached first. However, in the absence of any head removal, there would be no physical reason to believe that the position indicators and demand counters would not be in agreement.
Mid-cycle outages involving head removal would require.this surveillance be performed more frequently than the existing 18 month frequency. This change is consistent with NRC approved TSTF-89 to NUREG-1431.
l L.14 ' The CTS 3.1.1.3 Action a.3 requirement to submit a special report to the NRC in the event that MTC exceeds the upper limit is
(
deleted. The 10 CFR'50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 requirements clearly identify notifications and reports to be made to the NRC. If a condition were discovered that met'the criteria within these regulations, such as an unanalyzed condition or condition outside th_e. design basis, a report would be required.
The deleting of the special report in this specification does not change the requirement within the regulations for reporting significant issues to the'NRC as defined by the regulation.
This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page L - 5 5/20/97 l
I i
Discussien of Chingas S cticn 3.1 - R;cctivity C:ntral Systems l
TECHNICAL CHANGES - REMOVAL 0F DETAIL are evaluated under the 10 CFR 50.59 criteria. Any change using this criteria will be appropriately reviewed.
This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
i LA.7 Not used, j
i LA.8 Not used.
i 1
LA.9 Not used.The CTS 3.1.1.3 Action a.3 requirement t0 cubmit
]
p^cial rep 0rt to the NRC in the event that MTC cxceed; the upper 3 4. _. 4. +.4.. 2
- 3.. +. m a.. 16..
- s. n e. en..e n..,. o
- i. n. e en,.e n.... _--.4.
___+.
j
+.
+a La
_,Am
+m I
,,a.,m.i.,u
- 4..A.m - +..
- 4. t.,o
- 4. #. 4..o., +. 4. a..
. m.. A.a--.
+ L.. a u. n.n.
--+
.y.
If a Condition ;;cre disc 0vered that =ct the criteri within the:c regulations, a report would be r^ quired.
The deleting Of the j
- pecial rep 0rt in thi: : specification doc: n0t change the requirement within the regulation; for reporting t0 the N"O "cports to the NRC are controlled by plant precedure; ehich implement the regulations.
This chcnge i; consistent with NUREC 4434,-
LA.10 CTS 3.1.3.1 action c allows power operation to continue with one rod not within alignment limits provided the misaligned rod is restored to limits in I hour (action c.1) or the other rods in the group are moved within the alignment limits (c.2).
ITS 3.1.4 only requires that the alignment limit be restored within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The alternatives of how the limit is restored are not necessary for inclusion within the TS and are relocated to the Bases for ITS 3.1.4. The Bases are subject to the controls specified in ITS l
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McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page LA - 3 Supple...at47l l
i t
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N) Significant H:zards C:nsid:raticn S:cticn 3.1 - R: activity Control Systems l
LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE L.14 The McGuire Nuclear Station is converting to the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) as outlined in NUREG-1431, " Standard Technicol Specifications, Westinghouse Plants." The proposed change involves mcking the current Technical Specifications (CTS) less restrictive.
Below is the description of this less restrictive change and the No Significant Hazards Consideration for conversion to NUREG-1431 The CTS 3.1.1.3 Action a.3 requirement to submit a special report to the NRC in the event that MTC exceeds the upper iimit is deleted. The 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 requirements clearly identify notifications and reports to be made to the NRC. If a condition were discovered that met the criteria within these regulations, such as an unanalyzed condition or condition outside the design basis, a report would be required.
The deleting of the special report in this specification does not change the requirement within the regulations for reporting significant issues to the NRC as defined by the regulation.
This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
In accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, the McGuire Nuclear Station has evaluated this proposed Technical Specifications change and determined if does not represent a significant hazards consideration.
The following is provided in support of this conclusion.
1.
Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change deletes a special report from Technical Specifications which is already adequately bounded by reporting requirements in the CFR.
Reporting requirements are not an initiator of any analyzed event, therefore, the proposed change does not offect the probability of any analyzed accident.
The safety analysis assumptions associated with analyzed events are not affected by the source location of regulatory reporting j
requirements, therefore, the consequences of analyzed events are l
not changed.
i i
1 l
l I
McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 30 of 3035 Supplement 75/20/97l
N3 Significant H:z rds C:nsid;ratien S;ctica 3.1 - Rnctivity C!ntral Systems 2.-
Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind 1
of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
The change will not physically alter the plant (no new or different e of equipment wilI be installed).
The changes in methods e Nerning normal plant operation are consistent with current safety analysis assumptions.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3.
Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
The proposed changes delete requirements from Technical Specifications which are already adequately bounded by reporting requirements in the CFR.
The changes do not reduce the margin of safety since the requirements to maintain the required limits are not changed.
l McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 31 of 3135 Supplement 75/20/97l l
lL___-______
McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation 3.3.2-03 ITS 3.3.2, Notes.*ar Required Actions D.1 and J.1
[McGuire only)
STS 3.3.2, Notes for Required Actions D.1 and 1.1 DOC L.22 JFD 14 The Note for ITS Required. x;ons D.1 and J.1 omit the phrase "of other channels" from the corresponding Note in the STS.which states,"....for surveillance testing of other channels."
DOC L.22 and JFD 14 indicate that the omitted STS phrase is adopted. Comment: Revise j
the Note consistent with the STS.
DEC Response:
JFD 14 states that the Note is revised consistent with the approved allowance for testing the affected channels in bypass. The format of the ITS Notes for plants approved to test channels in bypass was previously approved by the IJRC in the Vogtle and Watts Bar Plant ITS. Test in bypass, as described in the JFD, allows the required testing to be performed on the channel which is bypassed as well as other channels. Where testing in bypass has not been approved, bypassing a channel only a: lows for the testing of other channels (the STS q
note is written for this case where testing must be performed with the channel in trip). The STS Note restricts testing to "other channels" which may be placed in trip after an inoperable channel has been bypassed. The revised Note more clearly reflects the allowance to perform
{
testing on any channel (the bypassed channel or other channels). JFD 14 describes the i
expanded test options associated with " test in bypass" approval which may include the "other channels". The OTS markups associated with DOC L.22 on pages 3/4 3-24 and 25 accurrtely show the proposed Note used in ITS Required Actions D.1 and J.1. No additional changes or justifications are required.
l REVISED RESPONSE:
i i
DOC L22 is revised to omit references to testing of other channels, as discussed in the comrnent resolution meeting July 9,1998. The previous license amendments for McGuire approved the routine testing of channels in bypass for those channels with the installed 1
bypass test capability.
mc5_cr_3.3 y7 July 14,1998 l
l a
Discussicn of Chang 2s SIcticn 3.3 - Instrument tirn TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE L.16 CTS 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3 Action 15a for LOP Instrumentation requires I
an entry into CTS 3.8.1.1 with more than one channel inoperable.
l ITS 3.3.5 provides 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to restore one channel to operable status.
If the Required Actions for one channel inoperable, or for two or more channels inoperable are not met, the actions require entry into the applicable Condition (s) and Required Action (s) for the assuciated DG made inoperable by LOP Instrumentation. This action is reasonable to provide a limited time to correct minor inoperabilities prior to declaring the DG inoperable.
If the channel cannot be repaired, the actions for an inoperable DG, LC0 3.8.1 or 3.8.2, provide adequate compensatory actions to assure plant safety.
This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
L.17 CTS 3.3.2 Action 17, for Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation, allows operation to continue with one or more channels inoperable provided the containment purge valves are maintained closed.
Since the CTS does not specify a completion time, it is assumed to be immediately.
ITS 3.3.6 requires ITS LC0 3.6.3 to be entered immediately if one or more manual or automatic actuation trains are inoperable.
ITS LCO 3.6.3 allows 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to isolate the penetration with an inoperable containment isolation valve.
The proposed Action is acceptable because the existing Actions of CTS 3.6.3 permit 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to close and isolate an inoperable containment isolation valve.
The change provides consistency within the Technical Specifications for the requirements associated with these valves. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
L.18-21 Not used.
L.22 CTS Table 3.3-3 Actions 15 and 15b allow operation to proceed with one inoperable channel (placed in trip) until the next performance of the COT.
ITS 3.3.2 Conditions D, J and P contain a note which allows the channel to be placed in bypass for surveillance testing clother channch. Performance of surveillance on other channels cannot be completed because the inoperable channel is in trip and cannot be taken out of trip without the note. Most inoperabilities can be repaired prior to the performance of required surveillance on other channch.
However, should a l
repair be delayed, a surveillance on an inoperable channel would be missed McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page L - 7 Supplement 76l J
[
1 l
l N3 Significant H:zards C:nsid;;ratien S:cticn 3.3 - Instrumentation LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE L.22 The McGuire Nuclear Station is converting to the Improved Technical l
Specifications (ITS) as outlined in NUREG-1431, " Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants." The proposed charge involves making the current Technical Specifications (CTS) less restrictive.
Below is the description of this less restrictive change and the No Significant Hazards Consideration for conversion to NUREG-1431.
CTS Table 3.3-3 Actions 15 and 15b allow operation to proceed with one inoperable channel (placed in trip) until the next performance I
of the COT.
ITS 3.3.2 Conditions D, J and P contain a note which allowsthechanneltobeplacedinbypassforsurveillancetestir.gl cn Other channch. Performance of surveillance on other channels l
cannot be completed because the inoperable channel is in trip and cannot be taken out of trip without the note. Mest inoperabilities can be repaired prior to the performance of required surveillance en cther chameh. However, should a l
repair be delayed, a surveillance on an inoperable channel would I
be missed and the operable channel would be declared inoperable forcing a unit shutdown..This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
I In accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, the McGuire Nuclear Station has evaluated this proposed Technical Specifications change and determined it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. The following is provided in support of this conclusion.
1.
Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?
Surveillance testing of channels in the bypass mode is established by WCAP-10?71 and its supplements and associated SERs.
The proposed change permits a failed channel to be bypassed to permit testing of remaining operable channels in the tripped condition.
This allowance is already provided for many RTS and ESFAS channels in the CTS. The proposed change does not alter the assumptions in the.WCAP, its supplements and SERs, therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated. The function of the ESFAS is not altered by this change, therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not increased.
I McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 40 of 4059 Supplement 76l
N3 Sig31fictnt Haz rds C:nsid:rstien 52cticn 3.3 - Instrumentation 2.
Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind j
of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
This change will not physically alter the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed).
The changes in methods governing normal plant operation are consistent with current safety analysis assumptions. Testing in bypass and with channels bypassed is already permitted for many RTS and ESFAS f9nctions. Therefore, the change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3.
Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting conditions for operation, or setpoints are J
determined. Testing in bypass and with channels bypassed is already permitted for many RTS and ESFAS functions. Therefore, J
the change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of
{
safety.
l l
1' l
l McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 41 of 4159 Supplement 76l
\\
i N___-__________________
McGuire & Catawba Improved TS Review Comments I
ITS 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation 3.3.2-05 ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4.a, b, c, & d, Applicability, footnote (b)
STS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4, a, b, c, & d, Applicability, footnote (b)
DOC A.29 CTS Table 3.3-3, Functional Unit 4.a. b, c, & d ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Note (b) provides an exception to the applicability of the requirements to Modes 2 and 3 when all MSIVs are closed and de-activated, consistent with STS. DOC A.29 says this is consistent with CTS. However, the CTS did not originally contain this except:an.
Comment: Revise the submittal to justify this less restrictive change.
DEC Response:
The CTS does contain this ext eption but in a different form. The plant Systems Section of the CTS contains the system level requirements for the MSIVs. As stated in DOC A.29, the CTS 3.7.1.4 Actions contain an explicit allowance for operation to continue in Modes 2 and 3 provided the inoperable MSIV is closed. The addition of the ITS Note providing a similar allowance to the applicability of the associated instrumentation for the MSIVs is considered a clarification of the existing Plant System Action requirements for the MSIVs. If continued operation in Modes 2 and 3 is permitted when an inoperable MSIV is closed, the supporting instrumentation which automatically closes the affected MSIV is also no longer required. This change makes the CTS requirements internally consistent between the system level and supporting instrumentation for the MSIVs. This type of clarification / consistency issue is considered administrative. No further justification or change is required.
REVISED RESPONSE:
DOC A29 is deleted and replaced by DOC L33 to identify this change as less restrictive.
l I
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l mc5_cr_3.3 f9 July 14,1998 l
___-________O
McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation 3.3.2-06 ITS Table 3.3-3, Function 5 CTS Table 3.3-3, Functional Unit 5 STS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 5 DOC A.32 The Applicable Modes for ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 5 contains a footnote (e), that was not in the corresponding CTS Table 3.3 3, Functional Unit 5. This added footnote was adopted from STS Table 3.3.2-1, Functions 5. The footnote states, "Except when all MFIVs, MFRVs and associated bypass valves are closed and de activated or isolated by a closed manual valve." DOC A.32 provides an explanation about why this change is acceptable. DOC A.32 states, "...this change is administrative in nature...." This change is a less restrictive change because the CTS did not contain this exception. Comment : Revise the submittal to provide the appropriate justification for the proposed change.
DEC Response:
The ESFAS Main Feedwater Isolation instrumentation provides an automatic close signal to the Main Feedwater system valves to isolate the feedwater system. The change addressed in DOC A.32, discussed above, provides a clarification which is consistent with the manner in which most isolation valves are treated in the CTS and ITS. That is, if the system can be
' adequately isolated (safety function of isolation valve performed), continued operation is permitted. Once the feedwater system is isolated, the ESFAS isolation instrumentation is no longer required. This type of change is considered an administrative clarification of existing requirements consistent with the requirements for other isolation valves in the TS. No additional justification or change is iequired.
REVISED RESPONSE:
DOC A32 is deleted and replaced by DOC L34 to identify this change as less restrictive.
mc5_cr_3.3 20 July 14,1998
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Discussien of Ching2s Section 3.3 - Instrumentation j
ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES would also permit an inoperable channel to be removed from the tripped condition and bypassed to support testing on other channels. This change is consistent with the implementation of bypass testing for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant in.their' approved ITS. This change is administrative since the change represents a clarification of testing procedures already approved by the NRC. This change is not applicable to the Loss of. Power function.
-A.29 Not used..a. _.
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A.30 Not used.
A.31 CTS Table 3.3-2, Action 21, has been split to accommodate the
~7 difference in applicability for the associated functions. ~ The CTS action requires the plant to' shutdown to MODE 4 when actions are not met,-however, some of the functions which refer to this action are only applicable in MODES 1.and 2.
ITS 3.3.2 maintains the-
-existing requirements but only requires the plant to shutdown below the mode of applicability for the associated inoperable
' function. This change is administrative in nature and is consistent with'NUREG-1431..
A.32 Not used..A,
- ..m.a 6. _..m &. m
- 4.,
e..
4.La
.A.r _1 4., L i. n.
U. A.n r.e a f, &h JJ J
~
r e
F :dwater I latten Functi n; cf CTc Table 3.3 3 which exenpt+
tL... <...4..,._.,.,
- i.,. u.r.f U.,,
u.r. P u.,.,
..-,4..,.+...;
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=_;
. m.m
... ~.
-, ~..
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.J
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. 2 --
4.
,.. a k,m
..v...
v.
- m. i. m. n.
- u. k.
6L*,m
- m. 1.m..m,
_m
,1. m e..n J,
- 4. L a
- m. e. m_4 4.,
- f. e..m i. + 4.
...,.~,.
.~
_ A.J..J..
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_ n e
- 4.._~.J 4.. f T. C,
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- .. _ e 6 4..=.. 4.,.
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.....,. y.
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~
4.,.,
- t..a _
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- u. rP. U.,,, ' U..E P. U.,., D,a n..,,
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";1ve; :nd "F"/,^,F" "B";," which centain; similar w^rding in it
,.,.. i. a.
. L, 4.,. 4..,m.
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--_,4.,6.-_.6 o l. e. k..u.n.t n EP 1.,A,1
..m McGuire Unit 1 and 2 Page A - 10 Supplement 6l
Discussian of Ch:ngss Section 3.3 - Instrumentation TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE L.30 ' CTS 3.3.3.5 Table 3.3-9 lists the Readout Location for remote shutdown instrumentation. The change moves this level of detail information to plant procedures. This type of information is not necessary in the Technical Specifications.
ITS 3.3.4 retains the controls which require operability of-remote shutdown systems, therefore, there it no reduction in equipment requirements within the.TS and no reduction in any safety analysis assumptions.
This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
L.31 Not used.
L.32 The CTS surveillance requirements for the 3.3.3.6 PAM, 3.6.4.1 Hydrogen Monitors, and 3.3.3 5 Remote Shutdown System Specifications were revised consistent with the STS to only require the channel check surveillance to be performed on normally energized instrumentation. It is not the intent of the CTS or the STS to require that equipment or channels be energized or control transferred in ~ order to perform this surveillance. However, the performance of a Channel Check on de-energi.ed instrumentation does not provide meaningful information for determining the status of an instrument channel and is not a produr.tive use of plant resources. Therefore, the ITS Channel check surveillance in 3.3.3
'PAM and 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System include an exception for the performance of this surveillance on de-energized equipment. The exception provided in the ITS eliminates the existing requirement to perform a Channel Check on de-energized equipment.
Based on the fact that the performance of a Channel Check on de-energized equipment does not yield useful information'for-determining the-Operability of a channel and therefore does not contribute to the safe operation of the plant, the elimination of the requirement to perform such surveillance is acceptable and allows for the more productive use of plant resources.
L.33 - CY3 Table 3.3-3 function 4, " Steam Line Isolation," requires the function to be operable in MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ITS Table 3.3.2-1 exempts this function in MODES 2 and 3 when all MSIVs and
. associated bypass valves are closed and deactivated.
When these
- volves are all closed and deactivated, the safety function is
.being performed and the automatic isolation function is no longer necessary.
This change is less restrictive with respect to instrumentation requirements however, it is consistent with the existing actions of CTS 3.7.1.4, for the MSIVs.
Therefore, this H
McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page L - 10 Supplement 76l w ____- - ____
Discussien of Chang 2s Section 3.3 - Instrumentation l
TECHNICAL CHANGES'- LESS RESTRICTIVE i
change is also considered' acceptable because it maintains consistency,between existing requirements.
This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
L.34 CTS Table 3.3-3 function 5 requires the feedwater isolation functions operable in MODES 1 and 2.
ITS Table 3.3.2-1 exempts these functions in M00E-2 when all MFIVs, MFCVs, and associated bypass valves are closed and de-activated or isolated by a closed manual volve.
When these valves are closed, the safety function is being performed and the autocratic isolation function is no longer necessary.
This change is less restrictive with respect -to instrumentation requirements however, it maintains consistency with proposed ITS 3.7.3 for the valves which contains similar wording in its Applicability.
This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
I McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page L,-
11 Suppleme'nt76l
i N3 Significant HIzards C:nsidiraticn Section 3.3 - Instrumentation LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE L.33 The McGuire Nuclear Station is converting to the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) as outlined in NUREG-1431, " Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants. " The proposed change involves making the current Technical Specifications (CTS) less restrictive.
Below is the description of this less restrictive change and the No Significant Hazards Consideration for conversion to NUREG-1431.
CTS Table 3.3-3 function 4, " Steam Line Isolation," requires the function to be operable in MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ITS Table 3.3.2-1 exempts this function in MODES 2 and 3 when all MSIVs and associated bypass volves are closed and deactivated.
When these volves are all closed and deactivated, the safety function is being performed and the automatic isolation function is no longer necessary.
This change is less restrictive with respect to instrumentation requirements however, it is consistent with the existing actions of CTS 3.7.1.4, for the MSIVs.
Therefore, this change is also considered acceptable because it maintains consistency between existing requirements.
This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
In accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, the McGuire Nuclear Station has evaluated this proposed Technical Specifications change and determined it does not represent a significant hazards
. consideration.
The following is provided in support of this conclusion.
1.
Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change removes the requirement for automatic actuation when the associated volves are closed and deactivated.
This change wili not offect the probability of an accident. The change continues to require the specific plant equipment to remain operable unless the valves are closed and deactivated.
When the valves are closed and deactivated, they are performing the assumed safety function.
Therefore, this change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.
I i
I McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 57 of 5764 Supplement 76l
l I
ND Significant Hrzards C:nsidiratien Section 3.3 - Instrumentation 2.
Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
This change will not physically alter the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed).
The changes in methods governing normal plant operation are consistent with current safety analysis assumptions.
Therefore, the change does i
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
)
from any accident previously evaluated.
l 3.
Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
The margin of safety is not affected by this change.
The proposed change does not alter the TS requirement for this instrumentation to be operable to close an open valve. The change only removes the operability requirement for automatic actuation when all of the associated valves are closed and deactivated.
The applicable safety analysis assumptions continue to be maintained in a similor manner as before, therefore, the change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 58 of 5864 Supplement 76 l
i Na Signific:nt Hazards Ctnsid:ratien Section 3.3 - Instrumentation LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE L.34 The McGuire Nuclear Station is converting to the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) as outlined in NUREG-1431, " Standard Technical
' Specifications, Westinghouse Plants."
The proposed change involves making-the current Technical Specifications (CTS) less restrictive.
Below is the description of this less restrictive change and the No Significant Hazards Consideration for conversion to NUREG-1431.
CTS Table 3.3-3 function 5 requires the feedwater isolation functions operable in MODES 1 and 2.
ITS Table 3.3.2-1 exempts these functions in MODE 2 when all MFIVs, MFCVs, and associated bypass valves are closed and de-activated or isolated by a closed manual valve.
When these volves are closed, the safety function is being performed and the automatic isolation function is no longer necessary.
This change is less restrictive with respect to instrumentation requirements however, it maintains consistency with proposed ITS 3.7.3 for the valves which contains similar wording in its Applicability.
This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
In accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, the McGuire Nuclear Station has evaluated this proposed Technical Specifications
}
change and determined it does not represent a significant hazards consideration.
The following is provided in support of this conclusion.
1.
Does the change _ involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change removes the requirement for automatic actuation when the associated valves are closed and deactivated.
This change will not offect the probability of an accident. The change continues to require the specific plant equipment to remain operable unless the valves are closed and deactivated. When the valves are closed and deactivated, they are performing the assumed safety functton.
Therefore, this change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.
l I
McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page 59 of 5964 Supplement 76l w_---
N2 Significant Haztrds Ctnsid:rzticn Section 3.3 - Instrumentation 2.
Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
This change will not physically alter the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed).
The changes in methods governing normal plant operation are consistent with current safety analysis assumptions.
Therefore, the change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3.
Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
The margin of safety is not affected by this change.
The proposed change does not alter the TS requirement for this instrumentation to be operable to closa on open valve. The change only removes the operability requirement for automatic actuatton when all of the associated valves are closed and deactivated.
The applicable i
safety analysis assumptions continue to be maintained in a similar manner as before, therefore, the change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
)
1 l
I i
l i
h McGuire Units 1 and 2.
Page 60 of 6064 Supplement 76l
McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits 3.4.1-01 DOC A.7 CTS 4.2.5.3 JFD 6 l
STS SR 3.4.1.1 and associated Bases The requirement to conduct an 18 month surveillance to determine total RCS flow rate, CTS 4.2.5.3, has not been retained in the ITS 3.4.1 SRs. DOC A.7 states that this was a "left-over" requirement from a previously deleted requirement to perform a precision heat balance to determine RCS total flow. Justification is not clear why is this requirement should not be retained in the Technical Specifications. Comment: This is a change to both the CTS and_-
STS, and is therefore beyond the scope of the STS Conversion effort; a technical review is necessary. Provide sufficient justification for a review, or retain the SR.
DEC Response:
Amendments 128 to Facility Operating License NPF-35 and 122 to Facility Operating License NPF-52 dated February 17,1995 changed this surveillance requirement to eliminate the reference to " precision heat balance" when referring to the measurement of the total flow rate each 18 months. The remaining surveillance required the Reactor Coolant System total flow rate to be determined by measurement at least once per 18 months. This " measurement" is accomplished using the installed flow indicators. The total flow rate is " measured" and confirmed to be within the limits specified in Figure 3.4.1-1 every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> in SR 3.4.1.3.
I Since the measurement of the total flow rate every 18 months is performed the same way that the flow rate is determined for the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> surveillance, the 18 month surveillance is redundant and is deemed unnecessary.
REVISED RESPONSE:
l 1
The applicable CTS amendments associated with this change for McGuire are Amendments l
153 to Facility Operating License NPF-9 and 135 to Facility Operating License NPF-17 dated l
January 12,1995. This information was inadvertently omitted from the previous response.
l I
l mc4_cr_ 3.4 1
July 14,1998
McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments
{
ITS Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant Systems 3.4, Additional Changes 3.4-08 STS Bases SR 3.4.12.6
- (McGuire only)
ITS Bases SR 3.4.12.6 i
l The STS Bases indicates that the channel operational test on the PORVs for low temperature l
overpressure protection cannot be performed until entering the LTOP mode. This statement is not consistent with current procedures and operating practice and is deleted from the ITS Bases. The specifications do not preclude this testing prior to entry, therefore, no change to the SR is required.
l I
I mc4 cr_3.4 31 July 14,1998 i
1
LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.6 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS A Note has been added indicating that this SR is required to be met 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.after decreasing RCS cold leg temperature to s 300*F. The test must be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after l
entering the LTOP MODES.
SR 3.4.12.7 Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each required PORV actuation channel is required every 18 months to adjust the whole channel so that it responds and the valve. opens within the required range and accuracy to known input.
REFERENCES 1.
2.
3.
ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, 4.
UFSAR, Section 5.2.
5.
10 CFR 50, Section 50.46.
6.
7.
10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
8.
9.
ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI.
McGuire Unit 1 B 3.4-71 Supplement 7 l
LTOP Systcm B 3.4.12 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.6 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS A Note has been added indicating that this SR is required to be met 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after decreasing RCS cold leg temperature to s 300'F. The test must be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after l
entering the LTOP MODES.
SR -3.4.12.7 Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each required PORV actuation channel is required every 18 months to adjust the whole channel so that it responds and the valve opens within the required range and accuracy to known input.
REFERENCES 1.
2.
3.
AShi, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, 4.
UFSAR, Section 5.2.
5.
10 CFR 50, Section 50.46.
6.
7.
10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
8.
9.
ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI.
l McGuire Unit 2.
B 3.4-71 Supplement 7 l
[
LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.
continued)
REQUIREMENTS The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Frequency is considered adequate in view of other administrative controls available to the operator in the control room such as valve position indication, that verify that the PORY block valve remains open.
f~ -
X SR 3.4.12.7 Each 1
M suction relief val shall be demonstrated l
verifying its M suct valve and M suction isolat valve are open and by ting it in accordance wit Inservice Testing P (Refer to SR 3.4.12.4
/
f the M suction valve 111ance and for a descri the requirements of the rvice Testing Program.) ption 1
Thi Surveillance is only perf if the RHR suction relief i
/
valve is being used to tisfy this LCO.
Every 31 days the suction isolation valve is ver ied locked open, with r to the valve operator r
, to ensure that acc al closure will not occur.
" locked open" valve be locally verified in its ope position with the na 1 actuator locked in its inactiv position.
)
The 31 day requency is based on engineering udgment is consist with the procedural controls go rning valve operati, and ensures correct valve posi on.
SR 3.4.12 8 Performance of a COT is required w-in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after I
decreasing RCS temperature to :s F and ever each required PORV to verify anc, as necessary, y 31 days on adjustits lift int. The COT will verify the setpoint is within O(o the allowed maximum limits an Tmrrm. PORV actuation cou' depressurize the RCS and is not required.
The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency considers the unlikelihood of a low t v ature overpressure event during this time.
A Note has been added indicating that this SR is required to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after decreasing RCS cold leg temperature to.
M V N [t$ etno E E he M E [ the)
(continued) jg&$TS B 3.4 71 Rev 1. 04/07/95 hM L
LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES SR 3.4.12 (continued) t The test must be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after I
ng the LTOP MODES.
1 3.4.12.h SR Performance of a CH4!NEL CALIBRATION on each required PORV h
actuation channel is required eve 18Foonthstoadjust the whole charnel so that it re s and the valve opens within the required range and accuracy to known input.
REFERENCES 1.
10 CFR 50. Appendix G.
2.
Generic Letter 8811.
3.
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.Section III.
- 4. hSAR ChaptM M5h{Seb O2) 5.
10 CFR 50. Section 50.46.
6.
10 CFR 50. Appendix K.
8#.
Generic Letter 90 06.
9A.
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.Section XI.
h0CFR.Ib.%,Tecknol spi Sk yXFSTS B 3.4 72 Rev 1. 04/07/95 7&' M I
McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS Section 3.5, Emergency Com Cooling Systems 3.5.1-03 DOC L.1 CTS 3.5.1.e CTS 4.5.1.1.2 CTS 3.5.1.e requires that a water leve! and precsure channel be Operable for each -
accumulator. CTS 4.5.1.1.2 provides the Surveillance Requirements for these instrument channels. These requirements have not been adopted in corresponding ITS 3.5.1 in conformance with the STS and are being deleted from the CTS. Comment: These requirements are important enough to be maintained in a licensee controlled document.
Revise the submittal to move these requirements to a location with appropriate change control, for example, the SLC.
DEC Response:
DEC disagrees that additional control of these instruments is required outside of the technical specifications. The requirement of concern is the quantity of water and nitrogen pressure within each accumulator. There are a number of ways of determining compliance with this requirement. This may include using the installed instrumentation, or it may include the use of portable test equipment. Existing controls already ensure that equipment used to determine surveillance limits are appropriately calibrated. It would be an uneccessary administrative' burden to add an additional layer of contrcl for these specific instruments when they are not required nor may not even be used to determine compliance with the TS limit. There are large numbers of instrumentation used throughout the plant to determine that various limits are within acceptance criteria. These instruments are adequately controlled without being included within the SLC.
- REVISED RESPONSE:
The staff indicated during the comment resolution meeting that the proposed response was not acceptable and that the instruments must be relocated to the SLC. DEC disagrees. The i
proposed instruments do not perform a safety function and are provided for indication. These j
indicators are also not required as category 1 or type A post accident monitoring variables.
Therefore, these instruments do not meet any of the criteria established in 10 CFR 50.36.
The staff position that the instruments be maintained in a licensee controlled document is
)
already met by their inclusion within plant calibration procedures. The addition of these
)
instruments to the SLC does not establish any additional control because no actions would be
' required when the instruments were inoperable. The addition of these instruments would l-create an additional administrative burden on the plant staff by adding an unecessary additional control document. A statement is added to the Bases for the volume and pressure l
survtidilances to indicate that these SRs are typically performed using these installed control l
' room indicators. This change was discussed with the NRC during the second comment l
resolution meeting July 9,1998.
l mc5_cr_3.5 3
July 14,1998 I
l'
Accumulators B 3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS Q1 (continued)
If more than one accumulator is inoperable, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analyses; therefore, LC0 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Each accumulator valve should be verified to be fully open 4
every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This verification ensures that the accumulators are available for injection and ensures timely discovery if a valve should be less than fully open.
If an isolation valve is not fully open, the rate of injection to the RCS would be reduced. Although a motor operated valve position should not change with power removed, a closed valve could result in not meeting accident analyses assumptions.
This Frequency is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls that ensure a mispositioned isolation valve is unlikely.
SR 3.5.1.2 and SR 3.5.1.3 Every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, borated water volume and nitrogen cover pressure are verified for each accumulator. This is typically performed using the installed control room indication. This Frequency is sufficient to ensure adequate injection during a LOCA. Because of the static design of the accumulator, a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency usually allows the operator to identify changes before limits are reached. Operating experience has shown this Frequency to be appropriate for early detection and correction of off normal trends.
SR 3.5.1.4 The boron concentration should be verified to be within ~
required limits for each accumulator every 31 days since the static design of the accumulators limits the ways in which the concentration can be changed.
The 31 day Frequency is adequate to identify changes that could occur from mechanisms such as stratification or inleakage.
Sampling the affected accumulato'r within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after a 1% tank volume increase will identify whether inleakage has caused a reduction in boron concentration to below the required limit.
It is not (continued)
McGuire Unit 1 B 3.5-7 Supplement 7 l
L
Accumulators B 3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS L1 (continued)
If'more than one accumulator is inoperable, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analyses; therefore, LC0 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3. 5.1'.1 l REQUIREMENTS Each accumulator valve should be verified to be fully open every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
This_ verification ensures that the accumulators are available for injection and ensures timely discovery if a valve should be less than fully open.
If an isolation valve is not fully open, the rate of injection to the RCS would be reduced. Although a motor operated valve position should not change with power removed, a closed valve could result in not meeting accident analyses _ assumptions.
This Frequency is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls that ensure a mispositioned isolation valve is unlikely.
SR 3.5.1.2 and SR 3.5.1.3 Every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, borated water volume and nitrogen cover pressure are verified for each accumulator.
This is typically
. performed using the installed control room indication..This Frequency is sufficient to ensure adequate injection during a LOCA. Because of the static design of the accumulator, a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency usually allows the operator to identify changes before limits are reached. Operating experience has shown this Frequency to be appropriate for early detection and correction of off normal trends.
SR 3.5.1.4 The boron concentration should be verified to be within required limits for each accumulator every 31 days since the static design of the accumulators limits the ways in which the concentration can be changed. The 31 day Frequency is adequate to identify changes that could. occur from mechanisms such as stratification or inleakage. Sampling the affected accumulator within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after a 1% tank volume increase will identify whether inleakage has caused a reduction in boron concentration to below the' required limit.
It is not (continued)
McGuire. Unit _2 B 3.5-7 Supplement 7 l
~
1 Accumulators B 3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) s; 1000 psig within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the r
ired plant conditions from full power conditions in an ly manner and without challenging plant systems.
M If more than one' accumulator is inoperable the plant is in a condition outside the accident analyses: therefore. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Each accumulator valve should be verified to be fully open every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This verification ensures that the accumulators are available for injection and ensures timely discovery if a valve should be less than fully open. If an isolation valve is not fully open, the rate of injection to the RCS would be reduced. Although a motor operated valve position should not change with power removed, a closed valve could result in not meeting accident analyses assumptions.
This Frequency is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls that ensure a mispositioned isolattua valve is unlikely.
h SR 3.5.1.2 and SR 3.5.1.3 Every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, br, rated water volene and nitrogen cover h";,P(l 1
l pressure are verified for each accumulator.tThis Frequency is sufficient to ensure adequate injection during a LuLA.
- f" 8 V #f/
Because of the static design of the accumulator, a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Me tathl/td Frequency usually allows the operator to identify cha s
Sl before limits are reached. Operating experience has s on eW4(**. )
m this Frequency to be appropriate for early detection and correction of off normal trends.
(continued)
B 3.5-7 Rev 1. 04/07/95 Maqua l
u_____--______--__-__
McGuits & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems 3.5, Additional Changes 3.5-05 ITS SR 3.5.1.5, page 3.5-3 l
ITS Bases SR 3.5.1.5, page B 3.5-8 l
STS SR 3.5.1.5 and associated bases l
l l
CTS SR 4.5.1.1.1.c requires verification that power is removed to each accumulator isolation l
valve operator when the RCS pressure is > 1000 psig. STS 3.5.1.5 and associated Bases l
use " pressurizer" pressure is > 1000 psig. Changing " pressurizer" to "RCS" is corrected to be l
consistent with the current system design.
l l
REVISED RESPONSE:
l l
The previous submittal for MCuire unit 1 ITS contained a typographical error and did not l
include the word " pressure" following RCS in the SR 3.5.1.5. This error has been corrected in l
the unit 1 ITS for McGuire.
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mc5_cr_3.5 21 July 14,1998
Accumulators 3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.5 Verify power is removed from each 31 days accumulator isolation valve operator when RCS pressure is > 1000 psig.
l 1
I I
J
)
)
i McGuire Unit 1 3.5-3 Supplement 7 l
!I~
J l?
L McGuire & Catawba Improved T5 Iteview Comments
]
.ITS Section 3.6 Containment Systems
(.
3.6.12-'
DOC 'A.3 =
l-DOC LA.1 JFD 6 l'
JFD Bases 6 CTS 4.6.1.1.c CTS 3.6.1.2.s,- b, and c
- CTS 4.6.1.2.d
- CTS 4.6.1.2.d. 3).
' CTS 4.6.1.2.e, h, and i CTS 4.6.1.6
~
STS SR 3.6.1.1 ITS SR 3.6.1.1 ITS B3.6.1 Bases l
CTS 4.6.1.1.c, 3.6.1.2, 3.6.1.2 ACTIONS,4.6.1.2 and 4.6.1.2c, d, e, f, g, h and i specify various leak rate testing requirements and criteria for containment. CTS 4.6.1.6 specifies.
visual examinations to be performed on the containment vessel. STS SR 3.6.1.1 requires the visual examination and leakage rate testing be performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50 J
Appendix J as modified by approved exemptions. ITS SR 3.6.1.1 modifies STS SR 3.6.1.1 to conform to TSTF 52. The STS is based on 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Option A while the ITS is based on 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Option B.' Changes to the STS with regards to Option A
- versus Option B are covered by a letter from Mr. Christopher 1. Grimes to Mr. David J.
Modeon, NEl dated 11/2/95 and TSTF 52 as modified by' staff comments. The ITS changes are not in conformance with the letter and TSTF 52 as modified by staff comments, in I
par 1icular, Amendments 173 and 155 for McGuire Units 1 and 2 respectively and Amendments 144 and 138 for Catawba Units 1 and 2 respectively only approved 10 CFR 50 Appendix J L
Option, for the Type A tests'only. The Type B and C tests must still be done in accordance with Option A.- Thus, only those leakage tests associated with Option B Type A test may be relocated to the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This includes CTS 3.6.1.2.a.
]
CTS 3.6.1.2 ACTION a,4.6.1.2,4E.I.2.c and 4.6.1.2.1 with regards to Type A tests only. All j
H
. other CTS requirements specified above including CTS 4.6.1.2.1 must be retained in the ITS as SRs or Notes to the SRs. Comment: Licenses to update submittal with regards to 11/2/95 letter, TSTF 52 as modified by staff comments and the above comments or provide additional justification for deviations.
DEC Response:
CTS 4.6.1.1.c is redundant to the requirements in.10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option A, Ill.D.2.~
' DOC L.33 is added to justify the deletion of this detail. ITS SR 3.6.1.1 is revised to address Type A testing and inspections and new ITS SR 3.6.1.2 is added to capture the Type B and C
- testing consistentwith CTS 3.6.1.'2.b,'4.6.1.2.d 4.6.1.2.d.2 (McGuire),4.6.1.2.d.3 (Catawba),
4.6.1. 2.d.4 (McGuire), 4.6.1.2.h, 4.6.1.2.1 (Catawba), and 4.6.1.2.J (McGuire).. CTS 4.6.1.2.1 for McGuire is relocated to the Bases.' CTS 4.6.1.2,4.6.1.2.c, and 4.6.1.6 are part of the
[
scope of the Type A testing performed pursuant to Option B and are not changed. Discussion
[
of Changes A.3 and LA.1 have been revised accordingly. ITS 5.5.2 is also revised to match.
mc5,,,c r,,3.6 3.6-2 July 14,1998 l
f McGuire & Catawba Improved TS Review Comments l
ITS Section 3.6, Containment Systems l
l REVISED RESPONSE:
During the comment resolution meeting with NRC June 17,1990, a number of consistency issues were identified which are discussed below.
l 1.
(McGuire Only) The CTS markup and STS markup for SR 3.6.1.2 were not consistent with the typed ITS. Note 2 was missing from the STS markup and the second l
paragraph of the surveillance was missing from the CTS markup. These markups I
have been corrected.
2.
(McGuire Only) The CTS markup for CTS 4.6.1.2.d.4 and 4.6.1.2.1 are relocated moved to the Bases and the changes justified by LA1. DOC 8.A1 only describes changes moved to the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, not the Bases. New DOC LA28 has been added to justify the movement of this detail to the Bases and LA1 has been revised accordingly.
3.
References to airlock testing and exemptions not being required in TS should be deleted from DOC LA1. DOC LA1 has been revised to delete these discussions.
4.
(McGuire Only) The STS markup and CTS markup for SR 3.6.1.1 are inconsistent.
The reference to airlock testing has been deleted from the STS markup.
5.
Bases references to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, on pages B 3.6-1 does not specify the applicable Appendix J option. This statement is revised to include option B for SR 3.6.1.1 and add option A for SR 3.6.1.2.
6.
Bases references in SR 3.6.1.1 to Type A acceptance criteria includes a phrase "following an outage or shutdown that included Type A testing." The quoted phrase has been deleted consistent with NRC comments on TSTF-52. Also the "and/or" in the Bases for SR 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2 are replaced with "and" consistent with the STS.
(The previous response inadvertently omitted the changed pages for removing the referenced phrase. These pages have been revised.)
l l
l mc5_cr_3,6 3.6-3 July 14, 1998
Containment B 3.6.1 I
i BASES (continued)
ACTIONS Ad In the event containment is inoperable, containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time provides a )eriod of time to correct the problem connensurate with t1e importance of maintaining containment OPERABLE during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when containment is inoperable is minimal.
B.1 and B.2 If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply.
To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining the containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and Type A leakage rate test requirements of the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
Failure to meet specific leakage limits for the air lock, secondary containment bypass leakage path, and purge valve with resilient seals (as specified in LCO 3.6.2 and LC0 3.6.3) does not invalidate the acceptability of the overall containment leakage determinations unless the specific leakage contribution to overall Type A, B, and C leakage causes one of these overall leakage limits to be exceeded. As left leakage prior to the first startup after performing a required Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program leakage test is required to be < 0.75 L, ired leakage for overall l
Type A leakage. At all other times between requ 4
l (continued) l McGuire Unit 1 B 3.6-4 Supplement 7
Containment B 3.6.1 BASES (continued)
ACTIONS M
In the event containment is inoperable, containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem coinnensurate with the importance of maintaining containment OPERABLE during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when containment is inoperable is minimal.
B.1 and B.2 If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE.3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining the containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and Type A leakage rate test requirements of the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
Failure to meet specific leakage limits for the air lock, secondary containment bypass leakage path, and purge valve with resilient seals (as specified in LC0 3.6.2 and LC0 3.6.3) does not invalidate the acceptability of the overall containment leakage determinations unless the specific leakage contribution to overall Type A, B, and C leakage causes one of these overall leakage limits to be exceeded. As left leakage prior to the first startup after performing a required Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program leakage test is required to be < 0.75 L for overall a
l Type A leakage. At all other times between required leakage (continued) l McGuire Unit 2 B 3.6-4 Supplement 7 L
Containment ace ronomed B 3.6.1 BASES (continued)
ACTIONS
/L1 In the event containment is inoperable, containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> letion Time provides a period of time to correct the pr lem commensurate with the importance of maintaining containment OPERABLE during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when containment is inoperable is minimal.
B.1 and B.2 If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1
=
REQUIREMENTS h P' A Maintaining the containment OPERABL requires compliance with the visual examinations and eakage rate test Q-r, requirements ofAJO tf, u 50. Annandu U Apu i1 M mM1fied) r--
"m'k O -
/
-mti6nsJ Failure to meetrair lock 1, e
P
' O 4 Re.
ov annrov-o h CrE/ "McM l
secon'ary containment bypass leakage path. and ource valve d
I Le,
&/c,
/
with resilient sealfrememispecified in LCO 3.6.2 s (,
j l
land LCO 3.6.3Mdoes not invalidate the acceptability of bN E"T* *"d th @ overallfleaksge determinations unless thedb <
@ ***"' *9 @
contribution to evirarf1 Type A, B, andCC leakeoe caus
- I'Y ki l
l' uo exce#Heith. As left leakage prior to the firs L
-1 red to t>eldh MrvihedAypaJ _I M'"W"**"
(Cvi h w.d-T startup_after performino a required n mw ur Aooend" IM g,g Bal<
1 leakage test is r
- t w r=*
0.75 L, for overall Type A leaka At 4
7g-M p, all'othertid etween required leakage rate tests, t e acceptance criteria is based on an overall Type A leakage le/k9 an Am limit of s 1.0 L,.
At s 1.0 L the offsite dose w
/
th consequences are bounded by th,e assumtions of the safety su 6
analysis. SR Frequencies are as required by,460mnx aar M li Jed fg
((,n/ -
(Ae lenkunnsed leakaf Y'1
(,
A r/c G 5 h+th 4,9 r M (continued)
'N l
WOG STS B 3.6-4 Rev 1, 04/07/95 w<.0
McGuire & Catawba Improved TS Review Comments ITS Section 3.6, Containment Systems 3.6.13-6 JFD Bases 11 STS B3.6.16 Bases - RA B.1 and B.2 and RA C.1 ITS B3.6.16 Bases - RA B.1 and 8.2 and RA C.1 The last sentence in STS B3.6.16 Bases - RA B.1 and B.2 states the following: "If this verification is not made Required Actions D.1 and D.2 not Required Action C.1 must be taken." in addition, the last sentence in STS B3.6.16 Bases RA C.1 states the following:
" Condition C is entered from Condition B only when the Completion Time of Required Action B.2 is not met or when the ice bed temperature has not been verified at the required frequency." Both of these statements have been deleted from ITS B3.6.16 Bases - RA B.1 and B.2 and RA C.1 respectively. The justification for this deletion (JFD Bases 11) states that the Bases discussions are not consistent with the specification nor with the rules of Completion Times as defined in NUREG Section 1.3. The staff believes that the two statements are correct and need to remain. The staff's interpretation of the statements is that if the ice bed temperature is not surveilled in accordance with the frequency limitation l
specified in ITS SR ' 2 due to forgetfulness or inattention to ACTION requirements, rather than inaNiity to peru.n surveillance, a shutdown is required, rather than allowing an additional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to restore the ice condenser door to OPERABLE status. In addition, the staff considers the change to be generic and beyond the scope of review for this conversion.
Comment: Delete this generic change.
DEC Response:
The staff's interpretation is neither consistent with the current technical specification requirements, STS 3.6.16 as written, STS LCO 3.0.2, nor with the rules of Completion Times as described in STS 1.3. The proposed interpretation is also inconsistent with the actions for the ice bed temperature LCO 3.6.12. The stated action in STS 3.6.16, required action B.1, is to verify ice bed temperature is within limits on a periodic frequency of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and requked action B.2 requires the inoperable doors be restored in 14 days. If at any time during the 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br />, the temperature is not within limits, then required action C.1 becomes applicable and requires the ice condenser be restored in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. This is exactly the same action as required by STS 3.6.15, Required Action A.1. This action is also applicable (and intentionally I
identical) because with the temperature limit not met, the LCO is not met and the actions of
{
STS 3.6.15 become applicable. In both STS 3.6.16 and 3.6.15, a completion time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> j
is allowed with the ice bed temp 6rature not within limits. If the temperture limit is not checked, j
the STS Bases provide conflicting statements which also do not agree with the actions as j
written. The Bases for required action B.1 and B.2 state that if the verification is not made, 1
condition D applies. The Bases for required action C.1 states that it applies when the temperature hasmot been verified at the required frequency. Condition D, however, clearly indicates in the Specification that it is only applicable to Conditions A and C.
CTS 3.6.5.3 allows operation for up to 14 days provided the ice bed temperature is monitored every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and is within limits; otherwise, the doors must be restored in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. The mc5,cr_3.6 3.6-52 July 14, 1998
McGuire & Catawba Improved TS Review Comunents ITS Section 3.6, Containment Systems STS Bases cannot establish new rules for the usage of completion times which are not consistent with those already established by STS 1.3, nor can the Bases direct actions which are in direct conflict with the actions of the LCO as written. The STS Bases is incorrect on both counts and is a more restrictive change on the current license. Duke Energy does not accept this more restrictive change for inclusion in the ITS, nor is this change from the STS Bases considered generic because it maintains the current licensing basis.
REVISED RESPONSE:
JFD 11 is revised to justify this change on current licensing basis and CTS.
i mc5_cr_3.6 3.6-53 July 14, 1998
Justifiestien for Devictiens Section 3.6 - Refueling Operations BASES
- 10. The changes are consistent with generic change TSTF-17 to NUREG-1431 provided to NRC by the industry owners groups, except that an 18 month frequency, consistent with the current refuel cycle is proposed.
- 11. The discussions in the STS 3.6.16 Bases for Actions B.1, 8.2, C.1 and C.2 are not consistent with the current licensing basis and technical specificottons and have been deleted.
The stated action in CTS 3.6.5.3, required action a, is to verify ice bed temperature is within limits on a periodic frequency of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and requires the inoperable doors be restored in 14 days.
If at any time during the 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, the temperature is not monitored or not within limits, then the action requires the ice condenser be restored in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or a unit shutdown is required.
These actions are retained in ITS 3.6.13, Required Actions B.1, 8.2 and C.1.
The STS Bases provide conflicting statements which do not agree with the CTS actions as written and therefore cannot be adopted.
- 12. The changes are consistent with generic change TSTF-30 to NUREG-1431 provided to NRC by the industry owners groups.
- 13. Not used.
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McGuire Units 1 and 2 22 Supplement 76 l
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McGuire & Catawba Improved TS Review Conenents ITS Section 3.6, Containment Systems 3.6 Additionalitems 3.6-03 CTS 4.6.5.6.2 (McGuire only)
. lTS SR 3.6.11.7 DOC A22 The CTS requires that the operation of the air return fans function within the setpoints for the containment pressure control system. The ITS provides the explcit functional requirements for the air return system in response to the CPCS setpoints, similar to the CTS requirements for Catawba. ITS SR 3.6.11.7 requires the air return fan dampers to close upon receipt of a terminate signal. This signal will prevent the damper from opening, but does not cause the i
damper to close. The ITS SR is revised accordingly to delete any reference that the terminate signal will close the valve, REVISED RESPONSE:
This change is applicable only to McGuire as a result of a previous modification to the McGuire faciliif only. The previous response inadvertently omitted the McGuire CTS markup inserts. These pages are provided for closure of this itern.
]
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l mc5_cr_3.6 3.6-73 July 14, 1998 I
Specification 3.6. Il INSERT
.'L1-SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.11.6 Verify that each ARS fan is de-energized 18 months or is prevented from starting upon receipt of a terminate signal and is allowed to start upon receipt of a start permissive from the Containment Pressure Control System (CPCS).
SR 3.6.11.7 Verify that ARS fan motor-operated 18 months damper c!c;c; cr i; prevented from Opening upon receipt of : termincte
- igac1 cnd is allowed to open upon j
receipt of a start permissive from the Containment Pressure Control System (CPCS) and is prevented from opening in the obsence of a start permissive.
l McGuire /
Page QL of1L-t I
Specification 3.6. ((
INSERT y
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.11.6 Verify that each ARS fan is de-energized 18 months-or is prevented from starting upon receipt of a terminate signal and is allowed to start upon receipt of a start permissive from the Containment Pressure Control System (CPCS).
SR 3.6.11.7 Verify that _ARS fan motor-operated 18 months damper ci:::: or i: ;;re;;r,ted fr;=
,..,,..,r.,,
- ign
- 1 : d is allowed to open upon receipt of a start permissive from the Containment. Pressure Control System J
(CPCS) and is prevented from opening in the absence of a start permissive.
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l McGuire 2 Page 2. of1
_-_________-____a____
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McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS Section 3.8, Electrical Power Systems 3.8.1-26 DOC LA.9 Catawba CTS 4.8.1.1.2.g.12 Catawba CTS 4.8.1.1.2.g.13 McGuire CTS 4.8.1.1.2.e.13 CTS Table 4.8-2 ITS SR 3.8.1.18 STS SR 3.8.1.18 ITS SR 3.8.1.18 differs from the STS by omitting a value for the interval tolerance for each sequencer load block. CTS specify a unique tolerance for each of the fourteen intervals for Catawba and the eleven intervals for McGuire. STS 3.8.1.18 includes the interval tolerance in brackets, which means that the ITS should contain plant-specific information. DOC LA.9 is incorrect in stating that removal of this information from the TS is consistent with the STS.
Commen2: Revise ITS SR 3.8.1.18 to include the information contained in CTS Table 4.8-2; and also for Catawba, the information contained in Catawba CTS 4.8.1.1.2.g.13.
DEC Response:
j DEC disagrees. The STS does not require the inclusion of specific block interval times and only specifies the tolerance associated with the design intervals. The intent of the STS is that the block Interval values may be adequately controlled in licensee controlled documents. In I
most all of the cases (except T1 and T8 for McGuire and T1 for Catawba), the specified block l
Interval tolerance is well below the 10% example value provided in the STS. DEC does not believe that there is any benefit in incorporating both the tolerance values and the load interval times within the ITS and it will be difficult to include only the tolerance values since they are different for each load block. This information can be adequately controlled within the UFSAR similar to the RTS and ESFAS response times which are relocated to the UFSAR in section 3.3.
REVISED RESPONSE:
l The Bases for SR 3.8.1.18 are revised to reference the applicable UFSAR table where the load sequencer and interval times are located.
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mc4_cr_3.8 24 July 14,1998 I
l
y AC Sources-Operating 8 3.8.1 BASES I
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.18 REQUIREMENTS
- (continued)
Under' accident and loss of offsite power conditions loads
- are-sequentially connected to the bus by the automatic load i sequencer.
The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading of the DGs due to'high motor starting currents. The load sequence time interval tolerance in Table 8-1 of Reference 2
-l ensures that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis assumptions.regarding ESF equipment time delays are not violated.
Table 8-1 of Reference 2 l
provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESF buses.
Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the-SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency.
Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.. This takes.into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.
- SR 3.8.1.19 In the event of a DBA coincident with a loss of offsite
. power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment-design limits are not exceeded.
This Surveillance demonstrates the DG operation, as discussed in the Bases for SR 3.8.1.11, during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal'in conjunction with an ESF actuation signal.
In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows-the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing way include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is-verified.,
The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) Table 1.
h
--~ This SR l's, modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is
't
- to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil (continued)
McGuire Unit 1 B 3.8-29 Supplement 7 l
J S..
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES I
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.18 REQUIREMENTS (continued)
Under accident and loss of offsite power conditions loads are sequentially connected to the bus by the automatic load sequencer. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading of the DGs due to high motor starting currents.
The load sequence time interval tolerance in Table 8-1 of Reference 2 l
ensures that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment l
time delays are not violated. Table 8-1 of Reference 2 l
j provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESF buses.
Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency.
Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. This takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.
SR 3.8.1.19 In the event of a DBA coincident with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.
This Surveillance demonstrates the DG operation, as discussed in the Bases for SR 3.8.1.11, during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with an ESF actuation signal.
In lieu of actual demonstration of connectioli and loading of loads, testing that adequately I
shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable.
This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.
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The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) Table 1.
This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing.
For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby. conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil (continued)
McGuire Unit 2 B 3.8-29 Supplement 7 l
l J
l l
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES 1
SURVEIUJNCE SR 3.8.1.17 (continued)
REQUIREMEMf5 This testing may include any series of sequential.
overlapping. or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.
ThNe18 monthrequenc is consistent with the 3 recommendations of Repu atory Guide 1@Ref.
9 Y A
i anfa7santrf.4J8D takes into consideration unit canditi required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be f
consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.
This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distrhHan eve +==gchallenge safety systems Qiisy be,Mken for DWars,ea ev=sAnat sausTLuf.,
s SR 3.8.1.18 I
Under accident and loss of offsite power conditions loads are sequentially connected to the bus by theJ[ automatic load l
sequencer}& The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent over oading of the DGs due to high motor starting currents.
fB
'ae i ed sea"e"ce t4 e 4"tervei toiere"ceve"s re t"et ri * - 9 suf11cient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis asstaptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are T*b 8-led not violated.yEnference 2 provides a summary of the i
automatic loading of LW buseW-(IheFr cy of [18 month is consistent with l
x A r ations of Regu ry Guide 1.108 (Ref
).
l
[/MUT/
par aph 2.a.(2). t s into consideration it conditions r
ired to perfo the Surveillance, a s intended to be I
nsistent wit ed fuel evele 1 hs.
This x is modifi 'by a Note. The ason for the No)t is J that performi he Surveillance ld remove a r red offsite ci from service.
turb the electri distributi system. and chal nge safety syst Credit e y be en for unplanned ents that satisf this SR.
)
ma (continued)
WBCr$TS B 3.8 30 Rev 1. 04/07/95 l
ncGm l
l l
I t
I McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS Section 3.8, Electrical Power Systems
' 3.8 A&T4ui.alitems 3.8-01
' STS SR 3.8.'1.11, 3.8.1.12, and 3.8.1.19 STS Bases Background, SR 3.8.1.11. and 3.8.1.12 ITS SR 3.8.1.11,3.8.1.12, and 3.8.1.19
[
ITS Bases Background, SR 3.8.1.11 and 3.8.1.12 i'
CTS 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.b,4.8.1.1.2.e.5 (McGuire)
CTS 4.8.1.1.2.g.4.b,4.8.1.1.2.g.5 (Catawba)
DOC M4, M6 During subsequent reviews of the ITS, it was discovered that the addition of SR 3.8.1.12.e related to load sequencing and associated Note 2 are significantly more restrictive than the CTS. This test is currently performed with the unit at power. With the STS note 2, and item
[
e, this could no longer be done. Therefore, these items are deleted from the ITS and the CTS requirements are maintained. The STS SR 3.8.1.12 is bracketed to reflect the intent to l
incorporate the CTS requirements. Proper operation of the load sequencer is verified during testing for ITS SR 3.8.1.19 for a combined loss of offsite power and Si and in SR 3.8.1.11 for l
Additionally, STS SR 3.8.1.11.c.1 and c.5, SR 3.8.1.19.c.1 and c.5, and STS 3.8.1.12.d and applicable Bases sections are also revised to delete statements relative to permanently connected loads. The design is such that all loads are stripped from the emergency buses.
These items are revised to indicate that the emergency bus is energized or remains energized, as applicable.
REVISED RESPONSE:
The previous response inadvertently retained Note 2 for SR 3.8.1.12 in the McGuire ITS. The l
Note was deleted in the ITS Bases and in the CTS and STS Markups. The error has been corrected and new pages are provided. Additionally, on STS Bases page B 3.8-2, the statement referring to load strips is awkward and the ITS Bases for Catawba and McGuire is revised based on discussions with NRC in the July 9,~ 1998 comment resolution meeting.
r W
mc4_cr_3.8 71 July 14,1998 L
AC Sources-Operating 3.8.1 l
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.12
NOTE-------------------
All DG starts may be preceded by prelube l
period.
Verify on an actual or. simulated Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation signal each
.DG auto-starts from standby condition and:
18 months a.
In s 11 seconds after auto-start f
signal achieves voltage of 2 3740 and I
during tests, achieves steady state
. voltage 2 3740 V and s 4580 V; b.
In s 11 seconds after auto-start signal achieves frequency of 2 57 Hz and during tests, achieves steady l
state frequency 2 58.8 Hz and i
s 61.2 Hz; c.
Operates for 2 5 minutes; and
'd.
The emergency bus remains energized from the offsite power system.
l (continued)
I-l l
l l
l McGuire Unit 1" 3.8-10 Supplement 7
l AC Sources-Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLA!;CE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.12
NOTE-------------------
All DG starts may be preceded by prelube l
period.
Verify on an actual or simulated Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation signal each DG auto-starts from standby condition and:
18 months a.
In s 11 seconds after auto-start signal achieves voltage of a 3740 and
{
during tests, achieves steady state j
voltage 2 3740 V and s 4580 V; b.
In s 11 seconds after auto-start signal achieves frequency of 2 57 Hz and during tests, achieves steady state frequency 2 58.8 Hz and s 61.2 Hz; 1
l c.
Operates fer 2 5 minutes; and l
d.
The emergency bus remains energized from the offsite power system.
(continued) l 1
l l
l McGuire Unit 2 3.8-10 Supplement 7
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1
-BASES BACKGROUND safety injection (SI) signal (i.e., low pressurizer pressure (continued) or high containment pressure signals) or on an ESF bus degraded voltage or undervoltage signal (refer to LC0 3.3.5,
" Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation"). After the DG has started, it will automatically tie to its respective bus after offsite power is tripped as a consequence of ESF bus undervoltage or degraded voltage, independent of or coincident with an SI signal. The DGs will also start and operate in the standby mode without tying to the ESF bus on an SI signal alone.
l Following the trip of offsite power, a sequencer strips loads from the ESF bus. When the DG is tied to the ESF bus, loads are then sequentially connected to its respective ESF bus by the automatic load sequencer.
The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading the DG by automatic load application.
In the event of a loss of preferred power, the ESF electrical loads are automatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) such as a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
Certain required unit loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading the DG in the process. Within 1 minute after the initiating i
signal is received, all loads needed to recover the unit or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service.
Ratings for Train A and Train B DGs satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). The continuous service rating of each DG is 4000 kW with 10% overload permissible for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.
The ESF loads that are powered from the 4.16 kV ESF buses are listed in Reference 2.
l l
APPLICABLE The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the SAFETY ANALYSES UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 5), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE.
The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, l
redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of l
necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not I
(continued) l McGuire Unit 1 B 3.8-2 Supplement 7 i
1 AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 i
l
)
BASES BACKGROUND safety injection (SI) signal (i.e., low pressurizer pressure (continued) or high containment pressure signals) or on an ESF bus degraded veltage or undervoltage signal (refer to LC0 3.3.5,
" Loss of Po.cr (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation"). After the DG has started, it will automatically tie to its respective bus after offsite power is tripped as a consequence of ESF bus undervoltage or degraded voltage, independent of or coincident with an SI signal.
The DGs will also start and operate in the standby mode without tying to the ESF bus on an SI signal alone.
l Following the trip of offsite power, a sequencer strips loads from the ESF bus. When the DG is tied to the ESF bus, loads are then sequentially connected to its respective ESF bus by the automatic load sequencer.
The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading the DG by automatic load application.
In the event of a loss of preferred power, the ESF electrical loads are automatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basi'. Accident (DBA) such as a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
Certain required unit loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading the DG in the process. Within 1 minute after the initiating signal is received, all loads needed to recover the unit or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service.
Ratings for Train A and Train B DGs satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). The continuous service rating of each DG is 4000 kW with 10% overload permissible for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. The ESF loads that are powered from the 4.16 kV ESF buses are listed in Reference 2.
APPLICABLE The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the SAFETY ANALYSES UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 5), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of f
necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not l
(continued) l McGuire Unit 2 B 3.8-2 Supplement 7
AC Sources-Operating 8 3.8.1 BASES BACKGROUND automatic' ally on a safety injection (SI) signal (i.e., low
(
(continued) pressurizer oronan>{ESbessureorhighcontainmentpressuresignals) bus degraded voltage o 7h l
(refer to LCO 3.3.5,
- Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrissentation"). After the DG has started. it will automatically tie to its respective bus after offsite
(
power is tripped as a consequence of ESF bus undervoltage or i
degraded voltage. independent of or coincident with an SI signal. The DGs will also start and operate in the staney mode without tying to the ESF bus on an SI signal alone.
Following the trin of offsite power #a sequencenSP CunoervoJtage s aihP](stripsdorpermanwrn loads from the ESF l
Dus.,,,-.. Ine DE is tied to Ine tx ms, loads are then sequentially connected to its mspective ESF bus by the automatic load sequencer. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent l
overloading the DG by automatic load application.
In the event of a loss of preferred power, the ESF electrical loads are automatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) such as a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
Certain required unit loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading the f-uti in the process. Within9[1}0 minute after the initiating I
L signal is received, all loads needed to recover the unit or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service.
Ratings for Train A and Train B DGs satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). The continuous service _ g rating of each DG is kW withX10]Lpverload permissible for up to rs in any 24 fiour period. The ESF loads that are powered from the 4.16 kV ESF buses are listed in Refererce 2.
APPLICABLE The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the SAFETY ANALYSES FSAR, Chapter,X6}8(Ref. 4) and Chapterj[15]MRef. 5), assume I
ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources 04,
i are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, ig redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not (continued)
ME.STS B 3.8 2 Rev 1, 04/07/95 Wh 1
i
)
i L_____.____
i McGuire & Catawba improved TS Review Comments ITS Section 3.8, Electrical Power Systems 3.8 Additionalitems 3.8-12 STS LCO 3.8.1 ITS LCO 3.8.1 The language of the STS LCO statement implies that there are three AC sources - the offsite circuit, the DG, and the sequencer. There are only two sources - the circuit and DG. The sequencer is required for both of the AC sources. The ITS LCO statement is revised to delete the "c" label designation from the sequencer and shift the requirement to the left and require the sequencer operable independent of the sources. This does not change any requirement for the equipment operability, but corrects a misleading presentation format. This change was discussed with the staff during the July 10,1998 comment resolution meeting.
i l
mc4_cr_3.8 82 July 14,1998 l
AC S'ources -Operating 3.8.1 3
3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS q
L l
3.8.11 AC. Sources -Operating l
-The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:
a.
s Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission j
network ~and the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power System; I
- and-1
?
~b.
Two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power Systems; l
'M
'l The automatic load sequencers for. Train A and Train B shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4'.
1 ACTIONS.'
CONDITION-REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
'A.
One offsite circuit A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> l
inoperable. -
for OPERABLE offsite circuit.
M Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter M
A.2
' Declare required 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from
-feature (s) with no discovery of no offsite power offsite power to available inoperable one train when its redundant concurrent with-required feature (s) inoperability of is inoperable, redundant required feature (s)
I E
(continued) f l
3.8-1 Supplement 7 l
McGuire Unit'1 o
AC Sources-Operating 3.8.1 3.8. ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating LC0~ 3.8.1
.The. following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:
a.
Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power System; and~
b..
Two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power Systems; M.
l The automatic load sequencers for Train A and Train B shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1,.2, 3, and 4.
~ ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One offsite circuit A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable.
for OPERABLE offsite circuit.
M Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter-M A.2 Declare required 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from feature (s) with no discovery of no offsite power offsite power to available inoperable one train when its redundant concurrent with required feature (s) inoperability of
~
is inoperable, redundant required feature (s)
[.<
M (continued)
McGuire' Unit.2 3.8-1 Supplement 7 l
i-l Qu:A.+ ',
3348 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS I f]
3H.s.1 A.C. SOURCES OPERATING dIMIMus a.uiuu1 Tim nur ortaATIotD
( co 3.8 6A$e following A.C. electrical @ sources shall be OPE E:
' TwoGhystsil'y indesenaenocircuits between the offsite transmission ha a.
network and t h Onsite Esse Auxiliary Power System.
=8
_ _ _ - ~.+ g 4 b.
'Two pesaranrana F-i9-esel generators, daaFUTitQQ6g, gg
. 31)
A separate day tee containing a mini-- "- af IZU gallon d
J. 6. l.1 l '
- I f** W
/)
A separate rues Morage System containing a minimum volumej ggd 2
/
\\ 39,500 gallons of fuei L
g, Q)
A separate fuel transfer pumpD g
fg A
ILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
@ % /r P L;-3 m:
Ce fesD ACTse) A (W
(
f te circut't 6f "Ava '**"a r
='=~*'Ar=r " "
l citnDEWIlinoperable:
- A./ @ Demonstrate the 0PDtABILITY of the remaining tagstBy offsite circuit by perfoming Surveillance Requirement $8.1.1dD 1h A
A.2 within I hour andet imettTonce per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter; and '
/ /
A.3 @ Restore the #iiiiii3i4illoffsite circuit to OPERA 8LE status within b'
72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> >or be in at least HDT STAND 8Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> OMprr.4 a//ve,.2 Jand in c0LD SHUTDOW within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
l MhrwD m. Alh s&e offsite circuit and one diesel generator dF'M"Ti2Ih f
nstsett.c. eieur-nower s a41; inoperable:GaLedr referAS
\\
(arTmuren I
NsetA Myrer a J/
Q,,Demonstra OPERA 81LITY of remaining requi ffsite circuit performing Servell nee Requirement 4.8..Isla.
iwithi hour and at least e per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> the ter: a A.3' t
)
l McGUIRE - WIT 1 3/4 8-1 Amendment No.170,
9 0
fy / o f /6 4
i
$g&ciM*b 3@8 ELFCTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3 I' I p
30G_R.1 A.C. trwES -
l OPERATINE TIMIIME COEITIGIWOR OPFRAIJGO
@ OPERABLE:
I 3.8.13 B*A = lam = 1A m following A.C. electrical 4DNiB sources shal1 be f,q Twotbhystef11v 1ani=^B circuits between the offsite transmission l a.
network and the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power Systa=-
=8 b.
Two menrraw and indecArndenD diesel generators, w tKJ f, W f*'
s ate day tank containing a minimum volume of 120 No.v4 b (LTs2.t.5l H
A separate Fuel Storaw System containing a minimum volume of]
9.500 ga11ons of fue'.r M
A.1 31 A====-ate fumi transfer ne
"* M /**2 Afasaa m.
I LE A/7='
AP ILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
(Slmlfk O M b i ACTION:
AcT4Y A U Wit its circult (ef the.4bove reauirad i.C. alerteir #M
}
csouMes3 inoperable:
4.1 @ ' Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaini offsite A'1 circuit by performina Surveillance Requirement ta/sf7
- within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> andratmasn once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> therearter; ano.1.1GT
(
A,3- @ Restore the reaperse offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 71 hour8.217593e-4 days <br />0.0197 hours <br />1.173942e-4 weeks <br />2.70155e-5 months <br />smor be in at least H0T STAE8Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> M5mh G,1/G.2Jand in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
!cred)lb/ WMBde offsite circuit and one diesel generatorif tA A
reautmeer A.c. electrJCIl PD sources inoperable: Gald referial A,
/Nsa h d*f8 J /
pomons the OPERA 81LI f the remaint i nd offsite' ci by performing 111ance Requi t 4.8.1.1.la. j w
n 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at st once per 8 h thereafter: and l
l McGUIRE - UNIT 2 3/4 8-1 Amendment No.152 p
f c n.
L l
i
t AC Sources-Operating
}
3.8.1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS l
3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:
a.
Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission
+
netwo't and the fnsite cioss it MiectricaDPower I
dim 32iiif'IEFs System:([cp(J C E**' <t An4,E3:D b.
Two diesel oenerators (DGs) capable of supplyi the
/nsite cines le err murH=uiun e vstemt
- and 1 M
(g w<
eA,.u.a~ w svsria
@ futomatic load sequencers for Train A and Train B { h i
N k N@-)
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4.
ACTIONS C0f0lTION PIQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One EreaucedDoffsite A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> I
circuitiinoperable.
for (TdijiimRrb I
OPERABLE offsite NQ circuit.
Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter 8!@
A.2 Declare required 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from feature (s) with no discovery of no offsite power offsite power to available inoperable one train when its redundant concurrent with I
required feature (s) inoperability of is inoperable.
redundant required feature (s)
(continued)
W 3.8 1 Rev 1. 04/07/95 n/ G
i McGuire & Catawba Improved TS Review Comments ITS Section 3.8, Electrical Power Systems 3.8 Addhio.al items i
3.8-13 STS LCO 3.8.5, LCO 3.8.8 STS Bases 3.8.5, Bases 3.8.8 ITS LCO 3.8.5, LCO 3.8.8 ITS Bases 3.8.5, Bases 3.8.8 CTS 3.8.2.2, 3.8.1.2 (Catawba only), 3.8.3.2 CTS 3.8.3.2.c requires a single train (two channels) of AC vital busses connected to their ascociated inverters and respective DC sources in MODES 5 and 6. STS 3.8.5, for DC sources, and STS 3.8.8, for inverters, requires that DC sources and inverters be CPERABLE to suppor1 the distribution systems required OPERABLE by STS 3.8.10 in MODES 5 and 6.
In certain instances, two trains of a plant system, e.g. control room filtration, is required OPERABLE and requires an OPERABLE power supply. CTS 3.8.3.2.c, however, does not require that the distribution system for the second filtration train be provided with an inverter or battery and charger pair. The only requirement is that the required filtratio.'. cain be OPERABLE. The definition of OPERABILITY only requires the normal or emergency power source be OPERABLE. The 4160 V bus powering either filtration train could be powered from either an offsite circuit or a DG. Likewise, the AC vital bus distribution systems could be powered from either a battery or charger backed inverter or the regulated transformer and would be considered OPERABLE. This is consistent with the operability descriptions in the STS 3.8.10 Bases for distribution systems, that is, the distribution systems must be energized to be OPERABLE. However, the STS 3.8.7 and 3.8.8 Bases for inverters requires them to be connected to their associated AC vital buses for tha inverters to be considered OPERABLE.
The STS 3.8.4 and 3.8.5 Bases for DC sources requires both a battery and charger to be OPERABLE to have an OPERABLE DC source. Since STS 3.8.10 sometimes requires portions of both electrical power distribution trains to be OPERABLE (i.e., energized), the STS LCO 3.8.5 and 3.8.8 statements, as written, would require a second complete train of OPERABLE inverters and DC sources. This is significantly more restrictive than the CTS requirement which only requires one complete train of normal and emergency power supplies in these MODES. Therefore, the ITS LCO 3.8.5 and 3.8.8 are revised, consistent with the current licensing basis, to only require one train of DC sources and inverters OPERABLE and clarifies that the second distribution system train, if required OPERABLE by 3.8.10, only be energized from an appropriate source. An appropriate source would be either the battery or charger for the DC vital bus, and the inverter or regulated voltage transformer for the AC vital bus. JFD 19 is added to justify this exception to the STS.
mc4_cr_3.8 83 July 14,1998 l
l 1
l l
DC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.5 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.5 DC : Sources - Sh0tdown :
I LC0 3.8.5 The following s' hall be OPERABLE:
a.
Two channels of DC ' sources. capable. of supplying one train of the ~DC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10, " Distribution Systems-Shutdown," and' b.
One source of DC electrical power, other than that required by LC0 3.8.5.a. capable of supplying the remaining train of the DC electrical power distribution
. subsystem (s) when required by LCO 3.8.10.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME-A.
One or more requ' red A.1.1 Declare affected Immediately i
channel (s)_of-DC required feature (s) source (s) inoperable.
DE A.2.1 Suspend CORE Imediately
~ ALTERATIONS.
E A.2.2- -Suspend movement of Immediately t
irradiated fuel assemblies.
M (continued) l.
J McGuire Unit1 3.8-25 Supplement 7 l
l
DC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.5
. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
(continued)
A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.
N A.2.4 Initiate action to Immediately channel (s) quired restore re of DC source (s) to OPERABLE status.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l
NOTE--------------------
The following SRs are not required to be performed: SR 3.8.4.6, SR 3.8.4.7, and SR 3.8.4.8.
For DC sources required to be OPERABLE, the In accordance following SRs are applicable:
with applicable SRs SR 3.8.4.4 SR 3.8.4.7 SR 3.8.4.1 SR 3.8.4.2 SR 3.8.4.5 SR 3.8.4.8.
SR 3.8.4.3 SR 3.8.4.6'
)
1 l McGuire Unit 1 3.8-26 Supplement 7 I
l' Inverters - Shutdown 3.8.8 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.8 Inverters-Shutdown i:
LCO' 3.8.8-The following . hall-be OPERABLE:
i
!+
a.
Two inverters capable of supplying one train of the
.onsite. Class 1E AC vital bus. electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LC0 3.8.10, L
" Distribution Systems-Shutdown," and
' b.
One source of AC vital bus power, other than that:
. required by LC0 3.8.8.a. capable of supplying the i
remaining onsite Class 1E AC vital bus electrical power i
distribution ~ subsystem (s) when required by LCO 3.8.10.
L APPLICABILITY:
MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME L
A.
One or more required A.1 Declare affected-Immediately l
AC vital bus power-required feature (s) i.
sources inoperable.
DR A.2.1
' Suspend CORE Imediately i
ALTERATIONS.
M A.2.2:
Suspend movement-of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.
E (continued) s L
l.
l McGuire Unit 1 3.8-32 Supplement 7
Inverters - Shutdown 3.8.8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
(continued)
A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.
AffD A.2.4 Initiate action to Innediately restore required inverters to OPERABLE status.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.8.1 Verify correct voltage and alignments to 7 days l
required AC vital buses.
i 1
I McGuire Unit 1-3.8-33 Supplement 7 l
l
)
DC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.5 3.8. ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown LCO 3.8.5 The following shall be OPERABLE:
a.
Two channels of DC sources capable of supplying one train of the DC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LC0 3.8.10. " Distribution Systems-Shutdown," and b.
One source of DC electrical. power, other than that required by LC0 3.8.5.a. capable of supplying the remaining train of the DC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) when required by LC0 3.8.10.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
t ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME-A.
One or more required A.1.1 Declare affected Inunediately channel (s) of DC required feature (s) source (s). inoperable.
DR I
A.2.1 Suspend CORE Ininediately ALTERATIONS.
AND A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.
b80 V
l (continued) l l
McGuire Unit 2 3.8-25 Supplement 7 l
b-
DC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.5 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
(continued)'
A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions..
A!E A.2.4 Initiate action to Immediately restore required channel (s) of DC source (s) to OPERABLE status.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.5.1
NOTE--------------------
The following SRs are not required to be performed:
SR 3.8.4.6, SR 3.8.4.7, and SR 3.8.4.8.
For DC sources required to be OPERABLE, the In accordance following SRs are applicable:
Mth applicable SRs SR 3.8.4.1 SR 3.8.4.4 SR 3.8.4.7 SR 3.8.4.2 SR 3.8.4.5 SR 3.8.4.8.
SR 3.8.4.3 SR 3.8.4.6 1
l_ McGuire Unit 2 3.8-26 Supplement 7
Inverters -Shutdown 3.808' 4
3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS j
3.8.8-Inverters-Shutdown LCO. 3.8.8 The following shall be OPERABLE:
l a.
Two inverters capable of supplying one train of the ont.ite Class 1E AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LC0 3.8.10
" Distribution Systems-Shutdown," and b.
One source of AC vital bus power, other than that 1
required by LC0 3.8.8.a capable of supplying the remaining onsite Class 1E AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem (s) when required by LC0 3.8.10.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One or more required A.1 Declare affected Immediately AC vital bus power requiredfeature(s)
- sources inoperable.
QR A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.
M A.2.2 Suspend movement of Innediately irradiated fuel assemblies.
M (continued) l McGuire Unit 2' 3.8-32 Supplement 7
Inverters - Shutdown 3.8.8 ACTIONS
. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A,
(continued).
A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.
Afin A.2.4 Initiate action to Immediately restore required inverters to OPERABLE status.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.8.1 Verify correct voltage and alignments to 7 days l
{
required AC vital buses.
I l
i McGuire Unit 2 3.8-33 Supplement 7 l
1 l
l
DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL' POWER SYSTEMS l
B 3.8.5" DC Sources-Shutdown l
l BASES BACKGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources-Operating."
APPLICABLE' The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and l
- SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter'6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume that Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal control and switching during all MODES of operation.
The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.
The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies ensures that:
a.
The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods; l
b.
Sufficient ~ instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and c.
Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as a fuel handling accident.
L The DC sources _ satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 3).
LCO-The DC electrical power subsystems, with 1) at least one subsystem consisting of two channels of DC; and 2) when the redundant train of DC electrical power distribution subsystem.is required by LCO 3.8.10, the other subsystem consisting of-either a battery or a charger, and 3) the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling (continued) l McGuire Unit 1; B 3.8-56 Supplement 7 l
DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 BASES LC0 within the channel,-are required to be OPERABLE to support (continued).
required channels of thr. distribution systems required OPERABLE by LC0 3.8.10. " Distribution Systems-Shutdown."
This ensures the mailability of sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents).
l APPLICABILITY The channel of DC sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, i
provide assurance that:
i a.
Required features to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel
. assemblies in the core; 4
b.
Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available; c.
Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and j
i d.
Instrumentation and control capability is available j
for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold
. shutdown condition or refueling condition.
The DC electrical. power requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.4.
-ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 l
l If two trains are required by LCO 3.8.10, the remaining train with DC power available may be capable of supporting j
suffic'.ent systems to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS and fuel movement. By allowing the option to declare required features inoperable with the associated DC power source (s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions will be I
- : implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCO ACTIONS.
In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the l
(continued)
McGuire Unit 1 B 3.8-57 Supplement 7 l
1 l
Inverters - Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES (continued)
LC0 The inverters ensure the availability of electrical power for the instrumentation for systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated' operational occurrence or a postulated DBA. At least two AC vital buses on one train energized by their associated-battery powered inverters provide uninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to associated loads even if the 4.16 kV safety buses are de-energized. OPERABILITY cf the inverters requires that the AC vital bus be powered by the inverter. When the redundant train of class 1E AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem is required by LC0 3.8.10, the power source for these AC vital buses may consist of 1) the associated inverter powered by its associated battery; or 2) the regulated voltage transformer.
This ensures the availability of sufficient power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g.,
fuel handling accidents).
APPLICABILITY The inverters required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that:
a.
Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup j
are available for the irradiated fuel in the core; b.
Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available; c.
Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and d.
Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring-and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.
Inverter requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LC0 3.8.7.
I (continued) l l McGuire Unit 1 B 3.8-72 Supplement 7
Inverters - Shutdown
]
B 3.8.8 BASES (continued)
ACTIONS A.1. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 i
If two trains are required by LC0 3.8.10. " Distribution Systems-Shutdown," the remaining OPERABLE Inverters may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for positive reactivity additions.
By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with the associated inverter (s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCOs' Required Actions.
In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of' irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations. involving positive reactivity additions). The Required Action to suspend positive reactivity additions does not preclude actions to maintain or increase reactor vessel inventory, provided the required SDM is maintained.
Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.
j These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of i
postulated events.
It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required inverters and to continue'this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary inverter power to the unit safety systems.
The, Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required inverters should be completed as i
quickly as possible in_ order to minimize the time the unit safety systems may be without power or powered from a regulated voltage transformer.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the power sources are l
functioning properly with all required circuit breakers L
closed and AC vital buses energized from the required power
[
source. The verification of proper voltage ensures that the (continued)
McGuire Unit 1 B 3.8-73 Supplement 7 l
Inverters -Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.8.1 (continued) 1
- REQUIREMENTS
~
required power is readily available for the instrumentation connected to the AC vital buses. The 7 day Frequency takes j
into account the redundant capability of the power sources and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to inverter malfunctions.
REFERENCES-1.
UFSAR, Chapter 6.
2.
UFSAR, Chapter 15..
13.
10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
l L
l McGuire Unit 1 B 3.8-74 Supplement 7
]
l DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 i
i B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown -
BASES BACKGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources-0perating."
~ APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref.1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume that Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE.
The DC electrical power system provides normal control and switching during all MODES of operation.
The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.
'The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies ensures that:
a.-
The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods; b.
Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and c.
Adequate DC electrical ' power is provided to mitigate _
events postulated during shutdown, such as a fuel-handling accident.
The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 3).
l 1
H LC0-The DC electrical power subsystems, with 1) at least one
. subsystem consisting of two channels of DC; and 2) when the redundant' train of DC electrical power distribution subsystem is-required by LC0_3.8.10, the other subsystem consisting of either a battery or a charger, and 3) the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling (continued)
I l McGuire Unit -2_
B 3.8-56 Supplement 7
)
[f I
DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 BASES LC0 within the channel, are required to be OPERABLE to support (continued) required channels of the distribution systems required OPERABLE by LC0 3.8.10, " Distribution Systems -Shutdown. "
This ensures the availability of sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during
]
shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents).
l APPLICABILITY The channel of DC sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, provide assurance that:
a.
Required features to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core; b.
Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available; c.
Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of I
events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and d.
Instrumentation and control capability is available
)
for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.
The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LC0 3.8.4.
ACTIONS A.1. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 If two trains are ' required by LC0 3.8.10, the remaining train with DC power available may be capable of supporting l
sufficient systems to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS and fuel movement. By allowing the option to declare required features inoperable with the associated DC power source (s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions will be l
implemented in accordance with the affected required l
features LC0 ACTIONS.
In many instances, this option may l
involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the (continued)
(
McGuire Unit 2 B 3.8-57 Supplement 7 l
I LL-
f Inverters - Shutdown l
l B 3.8.8 i
i BASES (continued)
LC0 The inverters ensure the availability of electrical power for the instrumentation for systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA. At least two AC vital ouses on one train energized by their associated batter, powered inverters provide uninterruptible supply of AC eler trical power to associated loads even if the 4.16 kV safr ty buses are de-energized. OPERABILITY of the inverters requires that the AC vital bus be powered by the inverter. When the redundant train of class 1E AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem is required by LC0 3.8.10, the power source for these AC vital buses may consist of 1) the associated inverter powered by its associated battery; or 2) the regulated voltage transformer.
This ensures the availability of sufficient power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g.,
fuel handling accidents).
i APPLICABILITY The inverters required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that:
a.
Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core; b.
Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available; c.
Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and d.
Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.
Inverter requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LC0 3.8.7.
l (continued) l McGuire Unit 2 B 3.8-72 Supplement 7 i
Inverters - Shutdown B 3.808 BASES (continued)
ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 If two trains are required by LC0 3.8.10. " Distribution Systems-Shutdown," the remaining OPERABLE Inverters may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for positive reactivity additions. By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with the associated inverter (s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCOs'
' Required Actions.
In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts.
Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions).
The Required Action to suspend positive reactivity additions does not preclude actions to maintain or increase reactor vessel inventory, provided the required SDM is maintained.
Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.
These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events.
It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required inverters and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary inverter power to the unit safety systems.
The Completion Time of imediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention.
The restoration of the required inverters should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the unit safety systems may be without power or powered from a regulated voltage transformer.
3 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.8.1 REQUIREMENTS i
This Surveillance verifies that the power sources are l
functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and AC vital buses energized from the required power l
source. The verification of proper voltage ensures that the (continued)
McGuire Unit 2 B 3.8-73 Supplement 7 l
1
.m
Inverters - Shutdown i
B 3.8.8 i
BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.8.1 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS required power is readily available for the instrumentation connected to the AC vital buses.
The 7 day Frequency takes l
-into account the redundant capability of the power sources and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to inverter malfunctions.
9 REFERENCES 1.
UFSAR, Chapter 6.
2.
UFSAR, Chapter 15.
3.
10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
I i
I l
l McGuire Unit 2 B 3.8-74 Supplement 7 L____
Specification 3.8.5 INSERT 1 The foilowing shall be OPERABLE:
a.
Two Channels of DC sources capable of supplying one train of the DC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LC0 3.8.10
" Distribution Systems-Shutdown," and b.
One source of DC electrical power, other than that required by LCO
.3.8.5.a, capable of supplying the remaining train of the DC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) when required by LCO 3.8.10.
INSERT 2
.\\
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.'
One or more required A.1.1 Declare affected Immediately channel (s) of DC required feature (s) source (s) inoperable, inoperable.
OB A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.
AND A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.
l AND A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations l
j involving positive i
reactivity additions.
AND f
r McGuire Page 7-of 3
_---_---..___------_------_o
I i
rY f
5 V, 2 JM ELECTRICAL p0WER SYSTEMS 3,),g d53IIt30WER DISMTBUT10[,<Wert'e#5 h,,
QHUTDOW)N CLIRJrInu CONOR 10N FOR OPERATION)
L.CO 3.8.@f a minimum. the followino A.C. electrical huurt a nto yertgrg shall be OPERABLE _\\nnd energizedf l
GEAR p
T a.
One - 4160-volt emergency bus, i
i D
g,cfgj
.b.
- 600-volt emergency busses in a single train, and l
[ ((. '
N#
l' wo - 120-volt A.C. vital busses energized from their respectivo N* #
inverterspnnected to their respective D.C. channels. J-
-4.4.15
\\$be.,f of trad.sMlub:= W
'" Q
[
ACTION:
M#
jith less than tne aDove compjw-cTit of A.L. Dusses UVtKABLE and energized) 2.
\\ establish CONTAlpetENT INTEGRITY within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. /ispeciprcation/5.anyzc.j b, 4
[4ppliepto Dotn UInts I and &
l
. l, l
.N' SURVEllt.ANCE REQUIREMENTS
~s$$ (
l Ssea.t.8.1 4.543 fh?specirteas<c.nussesena/nvertersshallbedeterminedenergized
)
Yin the requirea manner et least'once p4r 7 days by verifyQ@correctaitonmenTJ Unftsilfish voltag they_ buss _es.
n (Veairso q%.=4 Aci,Q l' r j
1 l
hequigfor botVdnits th 4
McGUIRE - UNIT 1 3/4 8-19 Amendment No. 166 ft
Specification 3.8.8 The following shall be OPERABLE:
a.
Two inverters capable of supplying one train of the onsite Class 1E AC l
vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LC0 3.8.10. " Distribution Systems-Shutdown," and l
b.
One source of AC vital bus power, other than that required by LCO 3.8.8.a, capable of supplying the remaining onsite Class 1E AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem (s) when required by LCO 3.8.10.
INSERT 2
,p CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION flME A.
One or more required A.1 Declare affected required Immediately AC vital bus power feature (s) inoperable.
sources inoperable.
QR A.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.
AND A.2.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
AND Immediately A.2.3 Initiate action to suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.
AND Immediately L
A.2.4 Initiate action to j
restore required inverters to OPERABLE status.
i Page Aof 2.
'McGuire L
Specification 3.8.5 l'
l INSERT 1 l-e 3
L The following shali be OPERABLE:
I a.
Two Channeis of DC sources capable of supplying one train of the CC electrical powe'r distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10
" Distribution Systems-Shutdown," and b.
One' source of DC electrical power, other than that required by LCO
\\
3.8.5.a, capable of supplying the remaining train of the DC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) when required by LCO 3.8.10.'
l INSERT 2 l'
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
.A.
One or more required A.1.1 Declare affected Immediately.
. channel (s) of DC required feature (s) source (s) inoperable.
l E
l I'
A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.
AND 1
L A.2.2 Suspend movement.of.
Immediately L
irradiated fuel p
assemblies..
AND' A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.
AND
-McGuire W Page2 of 3 l-
38 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 6 pet ricgrsW 33,g ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION (inn 4sXTEX5 W]
f1MIJfffG CONDITIOE#0R OPERAufND i
3.8.Qsms_a mini
, the foll=ian A L electrical bucces =mNverters
~ Lco s 11 be OPERABLF had *aara b e g L
F a.
One - 4160-volt emergency bus, N AAM b
wo - 600-volt emergency busses in a single train, and pff Leo 3.f '"
Two - 120-volt A.C. vital busses energized from their resoective inverters / connected to their__ respective u.t.. channels)
A.2 3 hm h [ rsliakt 41ee.; L ACTION:
v ps1 fifith sless than the above complement of A.C. busses OPERA 8 LIE and enerefreld
/MT establish CONTAlletENT NTEGRITY within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.fSoecNica-:imn 3.8.3Ec./
/
Z jpplie rto both4Ntits And _
~
AcfteJA
.hL Ip SURVEILLANCE RE0UIREMENTS Sfs L4*
f [ $.f.i M 6he d ified A J buss d aad h verters shall be determined energized 3
t
- in the_reoutred manner at least once per 7 days by verifyEp correct 41tansen3
~
d Ac v@
l
.lo8 s
,R r. nts,., g a M IRE - UNIT 2' 3/4 8-19 Amendment No. 148 fT N*
]
/
Specification 3.8.8 INSERT 1 A42 The following shall be OPERABLE:
Two inverters capable of ' supplying one train oj the onsite Class 1E AC l
a.
vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10. " Distribution Systems-Shutdown," ~ and l
b.
One source of AC vital' bus power, other than that required by LCO 3.8.8.a, capable of supplying the remaining onsite Class 1E AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem (s) when required by LCO 3.8.10.
INSERT 2 g
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION
-COMPLETION TIME A. -One or more required A.1 Declare affected required Immediately l-AC vital bus power.
. feature (s) inoperable.
sources' inoperable.
08 Immediately A.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.
AND Immediately A.2.2 Suspend movement of q
irradiated fuel assemblies.
AND Immediately A.2.3 Initiate action to suspend operations involving positive
]
reactivity l additions.
H AND-Immediately A.2.44 Initiate action to
- restore required inverters to OPERABLE status.
j 1
t L
LMcGuire A Page.20f1 t
[
~
1
Discussien of Ching2s S:cticn 3.8 - Elcctrical Power Systems l
ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES A.33 CTS LC0 3.8.2.2 is converted to ITS LC0 3.8.5 for the requirements of DC sources during shutdown.
The LCO statement is also l
clarified to indicate that only a single DC source (battery or charger) is required to support a second operable distribution train whenever a second distribution train is required.
This is consistent with the definition of operability that either the normal or emergency power source is necessary for equipment operability.
The technical requirements are maintained with only changes in wording and format and clarification of existing a
requirements.
Therefore these changes are considered I
administrative in nature and the change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
A.34/A.35 Nct used.
A.36 Constructed from CTS LCO 3.8.2.1 is ITS LC0 3.8.6, " Battery Cell Parameters". The new LC0 requires the battery cell parameters to be within limits when the associated batteries are required to be OPERABLE. The Actions of the LC0 are modified by a Note which allows separate Condition entry for each battery. The technical-requirements of the CTS are maintained and only format changes are made, therefore, the change is acceptable and classified as administrative. The change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
A.37 CTS Table 4.8-3 Table Notations (1) and (2) are used as the basis to construct the ITS 3.8.6 Actions A.1 and A.2.
Action A.1 1
requires the verification of pilot cell parameters of electrolyte level and float voltage. A time period of one hour is discussed in a more restrictive change, M.14, later in these discussion of changes. Action. A.2 calls for the verification of all Category C limits within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and a verification every 7 days thereafter.
Currently,.only 7 days is allowed for the parameter to exceed the 1
listed value, but this is extended to 31 days in a less restrictive allowance L.16, which is discussed later in these changes. With the noted exceptions, this change is administrative iq., nature and consistent with NUREG-1431.
A.38/A.39Notused.
A.40 Notes (b) and (c) are added to ITS Table 3.8.6-1.
Note (b) is created by combinin'g CTS Table 4.8-3 notes (5) and (6). These I
state, " corrected for electrolyte temperature and level, or McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page A - 7 Supplement 57l l
1
)
l l
Discussicn of Chang:s S:cticn 3.8 - Elsctricci Power Systems ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES battery charging current is less than 2 amps when on charge." The two notes are tied together with the phrase, " Level correction is not required, however". Note (c) is added, in conjunction with Action A, to allow the specific gravity requirements to be verified by a battery charging current of < 2 amps for a period of up to 7 days. This change maintains the intent of the CTS and does not significantly modify the technical requirements of the notes.
These changes are considered administrative and consistent with NUREG-1431.
A.41 A Note is added to CTS 3.8.3.1 Action. The Note requires the entry of applicable Conditions and Required Actions of ITS LC0 3.8.9, " Distribution Systems - Operating" if a train becomes de-energized with the loss of an inverter. The Note reflects the current requirements that would require the entering of LCOs that are applicable and thus provides no additional technical requirements.
Therefore, this change is considered administrative. The Note is added in ITS LCO 3.8.7 Action A and is an exception to ITS LCO 3.0.6.
The change is consistent with NUREG-1431.
A.42/A.43/A.44 Not used.
A.45 Not Used.
A.46/A.47 Not used.
1 A.48 CTS SR 4.8.2.1.1 and 4.8.3.1 have been combined and reworked to form ITS SR 3.8.9.1.
This SR maintains the technical requirements of verification of the correct breaker alignment and voltage limits for the AC (4160 and 600 volt buses), the DC channels, and the 120 VAC vital buses required for the units to operate in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. Therefore, the change does not change the l
technical requirements and is considered administrative and consistent with NUREG-1431.
l 1
l McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page A - 8 Supplement 67 l
E i
Discussicn cf Ch:nget.
)
S:cticn 3.8 - Elcctrical Power Systems l
ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES a loss of safety function exists. The clarification in ITS 3.8.9 will ensure that with a loss of any electrical power distribution system, no loss of function will occur without the appropriate l
action being taken. Therefore, this change is administrative and l
is consistent with NUREG-1431.
l A.68 CTS LCO 3.8.3.2 is converted to ITS LCO 3.8.8 for the requirements of inverters during shutdown.
The LCO and SR statement is also clarified to indicate that only a single AC vital bus power source (inverter or regulated voltage transformer) is required to support a second operable AC vital bus distribution subsystem whenever o second distribution subsystem is required.
This is consistent with the definttton of operability that etther the normal or emergency power source is necessary for equipment operability.
The technical requirements are maintained with only changes in wording and format and clarification of existing requirements.
Therefore these changes are considered administrative in nature and the change is consistent with format of NUREG-1431.
l i
McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page A - 1242 Supplement 67l f
L
J2stificatien fcr Divicticns-Section 3.8 - Electrical Power Systems TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS is available to support all required DG operation. No significant consumption cf lube oil has been noted during required 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> testing.
Lube oil level is verified by sightglass indication prior routine testing and periodically on routine operator rounds. Therefore, it is justifiable to delete the requirements for lube oil.
- 15. The proposed change is consistent with generic change TSTF-38 submitted
~
to the NRC by the industry Technical Specifications Task Force.
- 16. The emergency diesel" generator (DG) starting air system requirements as specified in LCO 3.8.3 Action D requires two starting air receivers to be OPERABLE. With one receiver degraded, less than 210 psig of air pressure, the air receiver must be isolated immediately.
Forty eight hours is allowed to restore the inoperable receiver to within limits before declaring the associated DG inoperable. The requirement to isolate the inoperable receiver is nec!ssary because of starting air system design. The remaining OPERABLE starting air receiver tank will contain sufficient air pressure to start the DG,
- 17. Not Used.
- 18. A note to CTS LC0 3.8.2.1 provides allowance for a vital bus to be disconnected from its DC source for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> provided the other vital buses are OPERABLE and energized. A similar note in CTS LC0 3.8.3.1 provides this allowance for a inverter during a battery equalizing charge provided the associated AC vital bus is OPERABLE and energized and the three other AC vital busses are OPERABLE and energized. The
)
deletion of the bracketed Note in NUREG-1431 is acceptable because the inverter, being source of power for the vital bus, remains connected to the required DC Source, with a qualified battery and battery charger.
- Therefore,- the allowance is not needed and is deleted.
19.
CTS 3.8.3.2.c requires a single train (two channels) of AC vital busses connected to their associated inverters and respective DC sources in MODES 5 and 6.
STS 3.8.5, for DC sources, and S1S 3.8.8, for inverters, requires that DC sources and inverters be OPERABLE to l
support the distribution systems required OPERABLE by STS 3.8.10 in MODES 5 and 6.
In certain instances, two trains of a plant system, e.g. control room filtration, is required OPERABLE and requires on t'
OPERABLE power supply.
The CTS, however, does not require that the distribution system for the second filtration train be provided with t
McGuire Units 1 and 2 3
Supplement 67 l t-
Justification fer Divicti ns Section 3.8 - Electrical Power Systems TECHNIChl SPECIFICATIONS-an inverter or battery and charger pair.
The only requirement is that -
-the required filtration train be OPERABLE.
The definition of OPERABILITY only requires the normal or emergency power source be OPERABLE.
The 4160 V bus powering either filtration train could-be powered from either an offsite circuit or a DG.
Likewise, the DC vital bus and AC vital bus distribution systems could be powered from either a battery or charger backed inverter or the regulated transformer and would be considered OPERABLE.
This is consistent with the operability
' descriptions in the STS 3.8.10 Bases for distribution systems, thct is, the distribution systems must be energized to be OPERABLE.
- However, the STS-3.8.4 and 3.8.5 Bases for inverters requires them to be connected to their associated AC vital buses for the inverters to be considered OPERABLE.
The STS 3.8.7 and 3.8.8 Bases for DC sources requires both a battery and charger to be OPERABLE to have an OPERABLE OC source.
Since STS 3.8.10 sometimes requires portions cf both electrical power distribution trains to be OPERABLE (i.e., energized),
the STS LCO 3.8.5 and 3.8.8 statements, as written, would require a.
second complete train of OPERABLE inverters and DC sources.
This is significantly more restrictive than the CTS requirement which only requires one complete train of normal and emergency power supplles in these MODES.
Therefore, the ITS LCO 3.8.5 and 3.8.8 are revised, consistent with the current licensing basis, to only require one train of DC sources and inverters OPERABLE and clarifies that the second.
distribution' system train, if required OPERABLE by 3.8.10, only be energized from on appropriate source. An appropriate source would be either the battery or charger for the DC vital bus, and the inverter or regulated voltage transformer for the AC vital bus.
p l
McGuire Units 1 and 2 4
Supplement 57l
[
DC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.5 9
3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS j
3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown Quels of) f LCO 3.8.5 dTettrini r-suosys1 shall be LE to support the DC eT 1 power distribution system (s) renuirwi J
. ly i rn ~4 R -
- Distribution Syst
_sht W -
1 i
F45t%
APPLICABILITY:
H00ES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
l CONDITION RE WIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One or more required A.1.1 Declare affected Immediately ai neeer> S required feature (s)
+yAnoperable i
(c4 4 (500M 5@
E A.2.1 Suspend CORE Innediately 1
ALTERATIONS.
M A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.
M A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.
M (continued)
MNH5TT 3.8 28 Rev 1. 04/07/95
- c 65444 I
i
5 INSERT 1
\\
The folIowing shall be OPERABLE:
Two Channels of DC sources capable of supplying one train of the DC a..
electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10,
" Distribution Systems-Shutdown," and b.
One source of-DC electrical power, other than that required by LCO 3.8.5.a, capable of supplying the remaining train of the DC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) when required by LCO 3.8.10.
i I
l INSERT Page 3.8 - 28 i
McGuire l
L
i Inv:rtzrs-Shutdown 3.8.8 I
i 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.8 Inverters-Shutdown LCO 3.8.8 (Tsverters s I be OPERABLE support the onsite Clas
]
AC vital s electrical distribution subs t l
l l
V equi by LCO 3.8.10 distribution Systems-A hm." j APPLICABILITY:
NODES 5 and 6 During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS C0lOITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME krequired[
A.
One A.1 Declare affected Immediately noperable, required feature (s)
I
- c. v A,1 (si inoperable.
E l
'Powerswrtes I
A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.
i
(
(
S A.2.2 Suspend movement of Linediately l
irradiated fuel l
assemblies.
i l
A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately i
sus operations i
in ving positive reactivity additions.
M l
(continued)
I l
.aDG-STS 3.8 36 Rev 1. 04/07/95 htc W
l 1
i INSERT 1
]
The following shall be 0PERABLE:
1 c.
Two inverters capable of supplying one train of the onsite Class 1E AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10, " Distribution Systems-Shutdown," and
.b.
One source of AC vital bus power, other than that required by LCO 3.8.8.0, capable of supplying the remaining onsite Class 1E AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem (s) when required by LCO 3.8.10.
I i
1
)
L l'
l f
INSERT Page 3.8 - 36 McGuire 1
Invirttrs-Shutdown 3.8.8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
(continued)
A.2.4 Initiate action to Immediately restore required inverters to OPERABLE status.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.8.1 Verify correctrime r evoltage/
7 days
\\
(fregat5ncy3 ana a igrunents to required AC g
I vital buses.
9 4dlXPSTS 3.8 37 Rev 1, 04/07/95 N&
I l
L-
DC Sources-Rhutdown B 3.8.5 B 3.8 ' ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS P 3.8.5 ' DC Sources-Shutdown '
i BACKGROUM)
A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4. *DC Sources-Operating.*
n APPLICABLE h The initial conditions of ign Basis Acc and l
SAFEIY ANALYSES
, transient analyses in the FSAR. ChapterX6
- f. 1) and 1
Chapter {15PfRef. 2), assume that Engineered Safety Feature j
i systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system providesnoregljano iww wai pc, er ror tne Q Qiesel Mators. _f~y aux 11 verc ries an Mcontrol and
- sw11;cning during all nuuts of operation.
The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.
The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies ensures that:
a.
The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods:.
b.
Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and c.
Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown. such as a fuel handling accident.
DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of Die Moliev7 h
to o c pg fo, g win: ll aild *eh LCO The DC electrical power subsystems, subsystem l
peo6unels of Oc] h consisting of two hn==s one nxterv c=
GiitRfReand the corresponding control equipment and 3
>I$if$ $
(continued)
^'
410G-fi?5 B 3.8 60 Rev 1. 04/07/95 htC U I
I
l
\\
1
)
l' INSERT l
2)'when the redundant train of DC electrical power distribution subsystem is required by LCO 3.8.10, the other subsystem consisting of either a battery or
\\
a charger, and 3) l I
i i
l 1
INSERT Page B 3.8 - 60
. McGuire
Inverters-Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES (continued)
LCO The inverters ensure the availability of electrical power for the instrumentation for systems required to shut down rM lu.5)- Q g the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an g
anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA.
ery powered inverters provide uninterruptible supply ~
g y g?!*^
h5 nude 91.
AC eleuracas power to ne AC vftal aise even if the
,' ho tw3nej h no** asseddeJ>I 4.16 kV safety buses are de energized. OPERABILITY of the
~__
inverters requires that the AC vital bus be powered by the in This ensures the availability of sufficient power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner g
and to a tigate the consequences of postulated events during i
shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents).
APPLICABILITY The inverters required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that:
a.
Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup cce available for the irradiated fuel in the core:
b.
Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available; c.
Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available: and d.
Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.
. Inverter requirements for H0 DES 1, 2, 3. and 4 are covered in LC0 3.8.7.
ACTIONS A.1. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 If two trains are required by LCO 3.8.10. " Distribution Systems-Shutdown." the remaining OPERABLE Inverters may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS. fuel movement, and operations with a potential for positive reactivity additions. By the allowance of the option to declare (continued)
~
WOS-STS B 3.8 76 Rev 1, 04/07/95 41c6k41.A-
INSERT-When the redundant train of class '1E AC vital bus electrical power (distribytton subsystem is required by LCO 3.8.10, the power source for these AC vital buses may consist of 1) the associated inverter powered by its
.ossociated battery; or 2) the regulated voltage transformer.
l i
1 L1 i
l'
-s t.
l
)
)
INSERT Page B 3.8 - 76 McGuire
!=
McGuire & Catawba improved TS Fleview Comments ITS Section 3.8, Electrical Power Systems 3.8 Additionalitsms 3.8-14 CTS 3.8.1 DOC LA12 DOC LA12 indicates that the CTS detail related to CTS 3.8.1 action c for the turbine driven AFW pump operability verification is moved to the Bases for 3.7.5. The correct location is
, 3.8.1. The DOC has been corrected.
i t
l l
I mc4_cr_3.8 84 July 14,1998 l
l Discussien cf Changis Section 3.8 - Electrical Power Systems TECHNICAL CHANGES - REMOVAL 0F DETAILS I
LA.11 CTS SR 4.8.1.1.29 2 requires tests on the diesel fuel oil system tanks. These requirements have been moved from the TS to the Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) (UFSAR Chapter 16) consistent 2
with NUREG-1431. This level of detail is not necessary for
)
inclusion within the TS. Changes to the SLC are reviewed and controlled in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.
These controls are adequate to assure any change is properly
)
reviewed.
t LA.12 CTS 3.8.1.1 Action c requires an evaluation of the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump to determine OPERABILITY when the plant l
is in Modes 1, 2, or 3 with steam pressure greater than 600 psig.
ITS 3.8.1 actions require a verification that redundant required features are operable.
The steam driven pump is a redundant required feature, therefore, the CTS detail has been moved from the TS to the Bases of ITS 3.8.1.
This level of detail is not necessary for inclusion within the TS and more appropriate to.the Bases. This is consistent with NUREG-1431.
Changes to the Bases are reviewed and controlled in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and the Bases control program as defined in Chapter 5, " Administrative Controls" of the ITS. These controls are adequate to assure any change is properly reviewed.
LA.13/LA.14 Not used.
LA.15 CTS 3.8.1.2 Action requires the immediate suspension of operations of loads over fuel storage pool. These requirements have been moved from the TS to the Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC)
(UFSAR Chapter 16) consistent with NUREG-1431.
This level of detail is not necessary for inclusion within the TS. Changes to l
the SLC are reviewed and controlled in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. These controls are adequate to assure change is properly reviewed.
l I
LA.16 CTS SR 4.8.1.1.2.c contain specific information on the ASTM i
standards to which a sample must be subjected.
This information l
is moved from the TS to ITS SR 3.8.3.4 Bases.
This is consistent with NUREG-1431. This level of detail is not necessary for I
inclusion within the TS and more appropriate to the Bases.
Changes to the Bases are reviewed and controlled in accordance l
with.the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and the Bases control McGuire Units 1 and 2 Page LA.- 3 Supplement /l I
i t.
L McGuire at Catawba Improved TS Review Comments Section 5.0, Administrative Controls 5.3, Unit Staff Qua'L ms,s 5.3.1 Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.8, Revision 2, was released concurrent with the 1987 change to 10
)
CFR Part 55 and describes an acceptable means of meeting the rule. The Statement of 1
. Consideration for the Par 155 rule change states, "Those facility licenses that have made a commitment that is less than that required by the new rules must conform to the new rule automatically." The Statement of Consideration for the Part 55 rule change further states,
" Details regarding other training and qualification will not be required to be supplied on Form NRC-398, if these requirement are contained in an NRC-approved training program that uses a simulation facility acceptable to the NRC under 9 55.45(b). Subject to continued Commission endorsement of the industry's accreditation process under the Final Policy Statement on Training and Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel (50 FR 11147; March 20,- 1985), a facility licensee's training program would be approved by being accredited by the National Nuclear Accrediting Board."
Comment: When the NRC endorsed the industry's accreditation process as an acceptable alternative to providing specific information on the license application, the eligibility guidance in the accredited training programs was considered to be equivalent to the NRC criteria in RG 1.8, Revision 2. Your proposed requirement, on the other hand, references Rev. O of RG 1.8, dated September 1975. Please describe how your proposed requirement which is different i
from RG 1.8, Revision 2 meets the intent of the Statements of Consideration for 10 CFR Part L
- 55. Alternatively, you may consider revising your proposed requirement.
DEC Response:
The staff comment does not appear to be related to the actual TS content. CTS 6.3.1 and ITS 5.3.1 make reference to RG 1.8, Rev. O only with regards to the Radiation Protection Manager and makes no reference to operator licensing and training programs.10 CFR 55 is related to the requirements for licensed operators and does not relate to the Radiation
' Protection Manager position or other staff positions. Requirements for operator training and l-accreditation are not addressed by ITS 5.3.1 nor by the STS 5.3.1. CTS 6.4.1 does discuss the operator training and replacement programs and explicitly states that it complies with 10 CFR 55. However, this section is deleted from the ITS consistent with NUREG 1431 on the basis that the requirements of the regulation are directly implemented and enforceable. DFC does not believe that the proposed requirements for the Radiation Protection Manager and reference to RG 1.8, Rev. O for that position are in any way related to 10 CFR 55 and j
. believes that the proposed ITS 5.3.1 for personnel qualifications is consistent with current licensing basis._,
REVISED RESPONSE:
DEC will review RG 1.8, R2, and consider an appropriate TS change for operator qualification,
' if necessary, however, this will be done separate from the iTS conversion effort.
mc5._cr._5.0 21 July 14.1998 l
1 f
i
l McGuire at Catawba Improved TS Review Comments Section 5.0, Administrative Controls 5.0, Additional items 5.0-1 STS 5.5.11 ITS 5.5.11 CTS 3.9.4 The CTS requirer.ents for containment purge filter package testing specify the flow rate in terms of both einaust fans rather than for a single train. The ITS and STS markups are corrected to ide 1tify that this flow rate is a two fan flow rate. Additionally, the STS language uses the term $ (stem flowrate" when describing the required testing. This is misleading
+
since for some s/ stems, the flowrates are for individual trains, rather than for the " system.
To avoid confusic 1, the word " system" is deleted. This is an administrative clarification and does not affect the specific flow rate requirements, since where two fans are required, it is stated in the reguli ement.
For McGuire, the Feal Building Ventilation Exhaust system is a non-ESF system. There is only one filter packag i per unit and there is no redundancy. The term non-ESF is added to the system name sinc 3 the STS headings generical!y refer to the fitration packages as ESF systems.
fi rnc5_cr._5.0 22 July 14,1998
Programs and Manuals.
5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals (continued) 5.5.10 Secondary Water Chemistry Proaram This program provides controls for monitoring secondary water chemistry to inhibit SG tube degradation and low pressure turbine disc stress corrosion cracking. The program shall include:
a.
Identification of a sampling schedule for the critical variables and control points for these variables; b.
Identification of the procedures used to measure the values of the critical variables; c.
Identification of process sampling points, which shall include monitoring the discharge of the condensate pumps for evidence of condenser in leakage; d.
Procedures for the recording and management of data; e.
Procedures defining corrective actions for all off control point chemistry conditions; and f.
A procedure identifying the authority responsible for the interpretation of the data and the sequence and timing of administrative events, which is required to initiate corrective action.
l 5.5.11 Ventilation Filter Testina Proaram (VFTP)
A program shall be established to implement the following required l
testing of Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) filter ventilation j
systems in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, and ANSI N510-1975, with exceptions as noted in the UFSAR.
a.
Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that an inplace test l
of the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters shows the following penetration and system bypass when tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, and ANSI N510-1975 (N510-1980 for Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust) at the flowrate specified below i 10%.
l ESF. Ventilation System Penetration Flowrate Annulus Ventilation
< 1%
8000 cfm Control Area Ventilation
< 0.05%
2000 cfm Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust (2 fans) < 1%
45,700 cfm Containment Purge (non-ESF) (2 fans) < 1%
21,000 cfm Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF)
< 1%
35,000 cfm~
(continued) i McGuire Unit 1.
5.0-19 Supplement 7 l
l-i Programs and Manuals 5.5 l
5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.11 Ventilation Filter Testina Proaram (VFTP)
(continued) b.
Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems tlaat an inplace test of the charcoal adsorber shows the following penetration and system bypass when tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, and ANSI N510-1975 (N510-1980 for
- 1 Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust) at the flowrate specified below i 10%.
ESF Ventilation System Penetration Flowrate Annulus Ventilation
< 1%
8000 cfm Control Area Ventilation
< 0.05%
2000 cfm Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust (2 fans) < 1%
45,700 cfm Containment Purge (non-ESF) (2 fans) < 1%
21,000 cfm Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF)
< 1%
35,000 cfm c.
Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that a laboratory test of a sample of the charcoal adsorber, when obtained as described in Regulatory Guide '1.52, Revision 2, shows the methyl iodide penetration less than the value specified below when tested in accordance with ASTM D3803-1979 (ASTM D3803-1989 for Annulus and Control Area Systems) at the temperature and relative humidity (RH) specified below.
ESF Ventilation System Penetration RH Temp.
I Annulus Ventilation
< 4%
2 95%
5 30*C Control Area Ventilation
< 0.95%
2 95%
5 30*C Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust
< 10%
a 95%
5 30*C Containment Purge (non-ESF)
< 1%
2 95%
5 80*C l
Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF) < 1%
2 95%
5 80*C d.
Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters, the prefilters, and the charcoal adsorbers is less than the value specified below when tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52,
. l.
Revision 2, and ANSI N510-1975 at the flowrate specified below
- 10%.
ESF Ventilation System Delta P Flowrate Annulus Ventilation 6.0 in wg 8000 cfm Control Area Ventilation 5.0 in wg 2000 cfm Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust (2 fans) 6.0 in wg 45.700 cfm Containment Purge (non-ESF) (2 fans) 6.0 in wg 21,000 cfm Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF) 6.0 in wg 35,000 cfm (continued) l McGuire Unit 1 5.0-20 Supplement 7
---._.______._________.m.__________._________-.2
i Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals (continued)-
j 5.5.10 Secondarv' Water Chemistry Proaram This program provides controls for monitoring secondary water chemistry.to inhibit SG tube degradation and low pressure turbine (the stress corrosion cracking. The program shall include:
l a.
Identification of a sampling schedule for the critical l
variables and control points for these variables; b.
Identification of the procedures used to measure the values of the critical variables; c.
Identification of process sampling points, which shall L
include monitoring the discharge of the condensate pumps for evidence' of condenser in leakage; i-d.
Procedures for the recording.and management of data; e.
Procedures defining corrective actions for all off control point chemistry conditions; and f.
A procedure identifying the authority responsible for the interpretation of the data and the sequence and timing of administrative events, which is required to initiate i
corrective action.
)
l 5.5.11 Ventilation Filter Testina Proaram (VFTP) l A program shall'be established to implement the following required testing of Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) filter ventilation systems in accordance with Regulatory Guide. l.52, Revision 2, and ANSI N510-1975, with exceptions as noted in the UFSAR.
- a..
Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that an inplace test of the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters shows th.e following penetration and system bypass when tested in
~accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, and ANSI f
N510-1975 (N510-1980 for Auxiliary Building Filtered l'
Exhaust) at the flowrate specified below
- 10%.
l ESF Ventilation System Penetration Flowrate Annulus Ventilation
< 1%
8000 cfm Control Area-Ventilation
< 0.05%
2000 cfm-i Aux. Bldg. ' Filtered Exhaust (2 fans) < 1% '
40,500 cfm i
Containment Purge- (non-ESF) (2 fans) < 1%
21,000 cfm I
Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF)
< 1%
35,000 cfm (continued) 1 McGuire Unit 2
'5.0-19 Supplement 7 l
l
Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.11 yfBtilation Filter Testina Proaram (VFTP)
(continued) b.
Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that an inplace test of the charcoal adsorber shows the following penetration and system bypass when tested in accordance with Regulatory
)
Guide 1.52, Revision 2, and ANSI N510-1975 (N510-1980 for I
l Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust) at the flowrate
{
specified below i 10%.
ESF Ventilation System Penetration Flowrate Annulus Ventilation
< 1%
8000 cfm Control Area Ventilation
< 0.05%
2000 cfm 1
Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust (2 fans) < 1%
40,500 cfm Containment Purge (non-ESF) (2 fans) < 1%
21,000 cfm Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF)
< 1%
35,000 cfm c.
Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that a laboratory test of a sample of the charcoal adsorber, when obtained as described in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, shows the methyl iodide penetration less than the value specified below when tested in accordance with ASTM D3803-1979 (ASTM D3803-1989 for Annulus and Control Area Systems) at the temperature and relative humidity (RH) specified below.
ESF Ventilation System Penetration-RH Temp.
Annulus Ventilation
< 4%
2 95%
5 30*C Control Area Ventilation
< 0.95%
2 95%
5 30*C Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust
< 10%
2 95%
5 30*C Containment Purge (non-ESF)
< 1%
a 95%
5 80*C I
l Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF) < 1%
2 95%
5 80*C d.
Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters, the prefilters, and the charcoal adsorbers is less than the value specified below when tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, l
Revision 2, and ANSI N510-1975 at the flowrate specified below i 10%.
L ESF Ventilation System Delta P Flowrate l
Annulus Ventilation 6.0 in wg 8000 cfm Control Area Ventilation 5.0 in wg 2000 cfm Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust (2 fans) 6.0 in wg 40,500 cfm Containment Purge (non-ESF) (2 fans) 6.0 in wg 21,000 cfm Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF) 6.0 in wg 35,000 cfm (continued) l McGuire Unit 2 5.0-20 Supplement 7
Specification 5.5.11 INSERT Sa (Unit 1)
A.//
i-5.5.11 Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VITP)
A program shall be established to implement' the following required testing of Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) filter ventilation systems in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, and ANSI N510-1975, with exceptions as noted in the UFSAR.
Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that an inplace test of the high a.
efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters shows the following penetration and system bypass when tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, and ANSI N510-1975 (N510-1980 for Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust) at the flowrate specified below
- 10%.
ESF Ventilation System Penetration Flowrate Annulus Ventilation
<1%
8000 cfm Control Area Ventilation
< 0.05%
2000 cfm l
Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust (2 fans)
<1%
45,700 cfm Containment Purge (non-ESF) (2 fans)
<1%
21,000 cfm Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF)
<1%
35,000 cfm b.
Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that an inplace test of the charcoal adsorber shows the following penetration and system bypass when tested in i
accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, and ANSI N510-1975 (N510-1980 for Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust) at the flowrate specified below i 10%.
ESF Ventilation System Penetration Flowrate l
Annulus Ventilation
<1%
8000cfm Control Area Ventilation
< 0.05%
2000 cfm Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust (2 fans)
<1%
45,700 cfm Containment Purge (non-ESF) (2ftms)
<1%
21,000 cfm Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF)
<1%
35,000 cfm c.
Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that a laboratory test of a sample of the charcoal adsorber, when obtained as described in Regulatory Guide 1.52, L
Revision 2, shows the methyl iodide penetration less than the value specified i
below when tested in accordance with ASTM D3803-1979 (ASTM D3803-1989 for Annulus and Control Area Systems) at the temperature and relative humidity specified below.
McGuire /-
PageJIof 4 f 4
_ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ = _ _ _ _ _ _.
Specification 5.5.11 INSERT 5a (continued) (Unit 1) 4 /4 ESF Ventilation System Penetration RH Temp.
Annulus Ventilation.
<4%
2 95 % s30 C Control Area Ventilation
< 0.95%
2 95 % s30 C Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust
< 10% -
2 95 % s 30 C Containment Purge (non-ESF)
<1%
2 95 % s80 C Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF)
<1%
2 95 % s80 C l
d.
Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters, the prefilters, and the charcoal adsorbers is less than the value specified below when tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, and ANSI N510-1975 at the flowrate specified below 10%.
ESF Ventilation System Delta P Flowrate Annulus Ventilation 6.0 in wg -
8000 cfm Control Area Ventilation.
5.0 in wg.
2000 cfm Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust (2 fans) 6.0 in wg 45,700 cfm L
_ Containment Purge (non-ESF) (2 fans) 6.0 in wg.
21,000 cfm l
Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF)
' 6.0 in wg 35,000 cfm l
f l
e.
Demonstrate that the heaters for each of the ESF systems dissipate the value j
specified below when tested in accoidance with ANSI N510-1975, i'
ESF Ventilation System Wattage @ 600 VAC Annulus Ventilation 43.0 6.4kW Control Area Ventilation 10.0 1.0kW The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the VFTP test frequencies.
McGuire /
Page.4 of Gf
l 4
Spe ification 5.5.11 INSERT Sa (Unit 2).
5.5.11 ~ Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP)
A*
I A program shall be established to implement the following required testing of l
Engineered Safety Feature (ESP) filter ventilation systems in accordance with 1
Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, and AN41 N510-1975, with exceptions as noted in the UFSAR.
i Demonstrate for each of the.ESF systems that an inplace test of the high a.
)
efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters shows the following penetration and 1
system bypass 'when tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, f
Revision 2, and ANSI N510-1975 (N510-1980 for Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust) at the flowrate specified below 10%.
ESF Ventilation System Penetration Flowrate Annulus Ventilation
<1%
8000 cfm Control Area Ventilation
< 0.05%
2000 cfm Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust (2 fans)
<1%
40,500 cfm Containment Purge (non-ESF) (2 fans)
<1%
21,000 cfm Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF)
<1%
35,000 cfm b.
Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that an inplace test of the charcoal adsorber shows the following penetration and system bypass when tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, and ANSI N510-1975 (N510-1980 for Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust) at the flowrate specified below
- 10%.
ESF Ventilation System Penetration Flowrate Annulus Ventilation
<1%
8000 cfm Control Area Ventilation
< 0.05%
2000 cfm Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust (2 fans)
<1%
40,500 cfm Containment Purge (non-ESF) (2ftms)
<1%
21,000 cfm Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF)
<1%
35,000 cfm c.
Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that a laboratory test of a sample of
_the charcoal adsorber, when obtained as described in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, shows the methyl iodide penetration less than the value specified below when tested in accordance with ASTM D3803-1979 (ASTM D3803-1989 for Annulus and Control Area Systems) at the temperature and relative humidity specified below.
McGuire 2. '
Page.5fof M
Sp::cification 5.5.11 INSERT 5a (continued) (Unit 2)
A.lY i
1 ESF Ventilation System Penetration RH Temp.
Annuius Ventilation
<4%
2 95 % $30 C Control Area Ventilation
< 0.95%
2 95 % s 30 C Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust
< 10%
2 95 % s30 C Containment Purge (non-ESF)
<1%
2 95 % s80 C Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF)
<1%
2 95 % s80 C l
d.
Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters, the prefilters, and the charcoal adsorbers is less than the value specified below when tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, and ANSI N510-1975 at the flowrate specified below i 10 %.
ESF Ventilation System Delta P Flowrate Annulus Ventilation 6.0 in wg 8000 cfm Control Area Ventilation 5.0 in wg 2000 cfm Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust (2 fans) 6.0 in wg 40.500 cfm Containment Purge (non-ESF) (2 fans) 6.0 in wg 21,000 cfm Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF) 6.0 in wg 35,000 cfm e.
Demonstrate that the heaters for each of the ESF systems dissipate the value specified below when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.
ESF Ventilation System Wattage @ 600 VAC Annulus Ventilation 43.0 6.4kW Control Area Ventilation 10.0 1.0kW The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the VFTP test frequencies.
i l
McGuire A PageJ4 of 49
Programs and Manuals 5.5 f
5.5 Programs and Manuals (continued) 5.5.10 Secondary Water Chemistry Prooram This program provides controls for monitorino secondary water chemis_try to inhibit SG tube _. degradation 4nd 1Aw nressure turbi giscA treps corrpsion crfck13l>. The program shall include:
j
~
a.
Identification of a s ling schedule for the critical variables and control ints for these variables:
b.
Identification of the procedures used to measure the values of the critical variables:
c.
Identification of process sampling points, which shall include monitoring the discharge of the condensate ptmps for evidence of condenser in leakage:
d.
Procedures for the recording and management of data:
e.
Procedures defining corrective actions for all off control point chemistry condit!ons; and f.
A procedure identifying the authority responsible for the interpretation of the data and the sequence and timing of administrative events. which is required to initiate corrective action.
5.5.11 Ventilation Filter Testino Prooran (VFTP)
Aprodrasshallbeestablishedtoimplementthefollowingrequired testing of Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) filter ventilation _
systems (sF tne rfeguenewunacirierin e xmadmory Guictsr J An) i accorda wittetR. latory Guide 1.52. Revision z.(amn
^'sr N510-1 p m m ph=4=cn.w e g g a.
te fon each of the ESF systems thiat an inplace test of the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters shows
+Lt.
penetration and systes bypass <
.0 when tested in l
Il9 accordance wit (5758E) owrate specified beloyi10{Q.
egulato Gui vision 2 and
{
gU.;.
.N510 t
j
&My 5
[ ts ven 'lation Systesy" E10wrat{
[JusetT ta J
f
- ~
d l
i (continued)
WOGg 5.0 12 Rev 1. 04/07/95 lAc Guwe.
INSERT 7a (Unit 1) 5 ESF Ventilation System Penetration Flowrate Annulus Ventilation
< 1%
8000 cfm-Control Room Area Ventilation
< 0.05%
2000 cfm Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust (2 fans)
< 1%
45,700 cfm Containment Purge (non-ESF) (2 fans)
< 1%
21,000 cfm Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-EST)
< 1%
35,000 cfm
)
i l
INSERT Page 5.0-12
' McGuire [
Programs and Manuals I
5.5 1
l 5.5 Programs and Manuals l
l 5.5.11 Ventilation Filter Testino Proaram (VFTP) (continued) b.
Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that an inplace test of the cha adsorber shows @ penetration and system (ik AllWh ss when tested in accordance wit Regulatory Gu de 1.b2. Revision 2 and 10 M.at is513tBF flowrate specifled belopi 10%
ygg 5 )
wrio-ig n A,.
2 i
Edt ventilation tem lowrate Arm'lf gj,Jg, I
s
[lMcut %>--
C 6
s c.
Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that a laboratory I
test of a s le of the charcoal adsorber, when ained as
]
I described i Regulatory Guide 1.52. Revision 2 hows the i
i methyl iodi penetration less than the value specified l
below when tested in accordance with obi 9 uoova-@_qt g )
{
t rature and w eo - -" -- - -N"Asrs bue m9) i rel tive humi ied below.
ca ey Penetrat[
[
'ESF Ve M io ystem s.. n u
,n 4
r Reviewer's Note:
lowable penetration
[100%
metnyi lodide efficiency for c rcoal credited in s f safety evaluations /
(safety factor.
Safety fa r = [5] for systems th heaters.
= [7] for system without heaters.
d.
Demonstrate for each of the ESF systems that the pressure l
drop across the combined HEPA filters, the prefilters, and j
the charcoal adsorbers is less than the value specified j
below when tested in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, 4
l l
l
\\
l l
(continued)
WOfyds 5.0 13 Rev 1. 04/07/95
)
)
I 1
l J
4 INSERT 7b (Unit 1) i ESF Ventilation System Penetration Flowrate
)
Annulus Ventilation
< 1%
8000 cfm Control Room Area Ventilation
< 0.05%
2000 cfm q
Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust (2 fans)
< 1%
45,700 cfm Containment Purge (non-ESF) (2 fans)
< 1%
21,000 cfm Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF)
< 1%
35,000 cfm I
INSERT 7c (Unit 1)
S ESF Ventilation System Penetration RH Temp I
Annulus Ventilation
< 4%
= 95%
5 30aC Control Room Area Ventilation
< 0.95%
= 95%
5 30aC Auxiliary Buildir,g Filtered Exhaust
< 10%
= 95%
5 30aC Containment Purge (non-ESF)
< 1%
= 95%
5 808C Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF)
< 1%
= 95%
5 80aC l
INSERT Page 5.0-13 McGuire - [
1- - _ _ __
Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.11 Ventilation Filter Testino Procram (VFTP) (continued)
Revision 2. and GrN510 ikat the @flowrato specified below p 10* W Q g g
ESF Ventilation System Delta P _ _ _ Elowrate
~
losedT 1d
[
~
l--
-i u
e.
Demonstrate that the heaters for each o" ESF systems s
the ue fi when tested 4
g g([F,0 g
ESF Ventilati ten Wattage s
ImEAT 1<.
The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the VFTP test frequencies.
5.5.12 Exolosive Gas and Storaae Tank Radioactivity Monitorina Prooran This program provides controls for potentially exp!
sive gas mixtures contained in the (Waste Gas Holdup System the quantity of radioactivity containe)d in pas storage tanks or into the offgas treatment system and the quantity of radioactivity contained in unprotected outdoor liquid storage tanksW The
/7, gaseous radioactivity quantities shall be determined following the W
methodo1 1ry{ Branch Technical Position (BTP) ETSB 11 5 "Postula Radioactive Release due to Waste Gas System Leak or Failure" The liquid radwaste quantities shan N determined in accordance witMStandard Review Plan. Section h.l.3. " Postulated Radioactin Release due to Tank Failures *7 j
The program shall include:
a.
The limits for concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen in the paste Gas Holdup System}%nd a surveillance program to ensure the limits are maint:ined. Such limits shall be (continued)
I
@S 5.0 14 Rev 1. 04/07/95 t\\Ac Ga n
INSERT 7d (Unit 1)-
C ESF Ventilation Gystem Delta P Flowrate Annulus Ventilation 6.0 in wg 8000 cfm Control Room Area Ventilation 5.0 in wg 2000 cfm Aux. Bldg.' Filtered Exhaust (2 fans) 6.0 in wg 45,700 cfm Containment Purge (non-ESF) (2 fans) 6.0 in wg 21,000 cfm Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF)-
6.0 in wg 35,000 cfm INSERT 7e (Unit 1)
ESF Ventilation System Wattage 9 600Vac Annulus Ventilation 43 1 6.4 kW Control Room Area Ventilation 10 1 1.0 kW i
INSERT Page 5.0-14 McGuire [
INSERT 7a- (Unit 2)
ESF. Ventilation System Penetration Flowrate Annulus' Ventilation
< 1%
8000 cfm Control Room Area Ventilation
< 0.05%
2000 cfm Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust (2 fans)
< 1%
40,500 cfm Containment Purge (non-ESF) (2 fans)
< 1%
21,000 cfm Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-EST)
< 1%
35,000 cfm INSERT Page 5.0-12 McGuire 3
INSERT 7b (Unit 2)
ESF Ventilation System Penetration Flowrate
' Annulus Ventilation
< 1%
8000 cfm Control Room Area Ventilation
< 0.05%
2000 cfm Aux.' Bldg. Filtered Exhaust (2 fans)
< 1%
40,500 cfm Containment Purge'(non-ESF) (2 fans)
< 1%
21,000 cfm Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF)
< 1%
35,000 cfm INSERT 7c (Unit 2) p$
ESF Ventilation System Penetration RH Temp i
Annulus Ventilation
< 4%
= 95%
5 30aC Control Room Area Ventilation
< 0.95%
= 95%
5 30aC Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust
< 10%
= 95%
5 30aC Containment Purge (non-ESF)
< 1%
= 95%
5 80aC Fuel Bldg. Ventilation (non-ESF)
< 1%
= 95%
5 80aC l
1 l
l
)
INSERT Page 5.0-13 i.
- McGuire M
_J
INSERT 7d (Unit 2)
ESF. Ventilation System Delta P Flowrate Annulus Ventilation 6.0 in wg 8000 cfm Control Room Area Ventilation 5.0 in wg 2000 cfm Aux. Bldg. Filtered Exhaust (2 fans) 6.0 in wg 40,500 cfm Containment Purge (non-ESF) (2 fans) 6.0 in wg 21,000 cfm Fuel Bldg. ' Ventilation (non-E5f) 6.0 in wg 35,000 cfm INSERT 7e,(Unit 2)
ESF Ventilation System-Wattage 0 600Vac Annulus Ventilation 43 1 6.4 kW Control Room Area Ventilation 10 1 1.0 kW i
INSERT Page 5.0-14 McGuire p J