ML20148E859
| ML20148E859 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 03/14/1988 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148E842 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-88-01, 50-324-88-1, 50-325-88-01, 50-325-88-1, NUDOCS 8803280017 | |
| Download: ML20148E859 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000324/1988001
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UNITED STATES -
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, G EoRGI A 30323
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Report Nos. 50-325/88-01 and 50-324/88-01
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Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
P. O. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602
Docket No. 50-325 and 50-324
License No. OPR-71 and OPR-62
Facility Name:
Brunswick 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: January 1 - 31, 1988
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Inspect
W. H. Ruland
Date Signed
Accompanying Personnel:
D. J. Nelson
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S. J. Vias
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Approved By:
P. E. Fredrick's'on, Section Chief
D(te Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine safety inspection by the resident inspector involved the
areas of followup on previous enforcement matters, maintenance observation,
surveillance observation, operational safety verification, preparation for
refueling, followup on inspector identified and unresolved items, onsite
followup of events, inadvertent heatup of Unit 1, and plant modifications.
Results:
In the
reas inspected, one violation was identified - failure to
complete Technic., Specification surveillance within the required time.
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personnel error which allowed an inadvertent heatup of the reactor coolant
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system and a question concerning the seismic class of the Rad stion Monitoring
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System remained unresolved at the conclusion of the inspection.
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8803280017 880315
ADOCK 05000324
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- E. Bishop, Manager - Operations
- S. Callis, On-Site Licensing Engineer
- G. Cheatham, Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control
R. Creech, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)
- C. Dietz, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project
- R. Eckstein, Manager - Technical Support
- K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance
R. Groover, Manager - Project Construction
W. Hatcher, Supervisor - Security
A. Hegler, Superintendent - Operations
- R. Helme, Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety - BSEP
J. Holder, Manager - Outages
- P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Project
R. Kitchen, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)
J. Moyer, Manager - Training
G. Oliver, Manager - Site Planning and Control
- J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Maintenance
B. Parks, Engineering Supervisor
- R. Poulk, Senior NRC Regulatory Specialist
- J.
Smith, Director - Administrative Support
R. Warden, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)
D. Warren, Acting Engineering Supervitor
B. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor
- T. Wyllie, Manager - Engineering and Construction
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
engineers, technicians, operators, of fi:e personnel, and security force
members.
- Attended the exit interview
2.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 3, 1988,
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with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the
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areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed
below. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee. Proprie-
tary information is not contained in this report.
Item Number
Description / Reference Paragrah
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325/88-01-01 &
VIOLATION - Failure to Perform DG Surveillance
324/88-01-01
Within TS Time Limits (paragraph 4.a).
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325/88-01-02 &
URI* - Seismic Requirements for Radiation
324/88-01-02
Monitoring System (paragraph 4.b).
325/88-01-03
URI - Inadvertent Heatup During Cold Shutdown
(paragraph 10.)
325/88-01-04 &
-IFI - Review DG Reliability Assessment (paragraph
324/88-01-04
4.a).
Note: Acronyms and abbreviations used in the report are listed in para-
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graph 12.
3.
Followup on Previous Enforcement Matter (92702)
(OPEN) Violation 325/87-02-05 and 324/87-02-05, Failure to Follow Mainten-
ance Procedures When Installing Motor-0perated Valve Anti-Rotation
Devices.
The licensee found a problem with the anti-rotation device of
valve 1-E51-F022, the RCIC return to the CST. In response to the viola-
tion the licensee had re-inspected the above valve with satisfactory
results.
Based on log reviews and interviews, the inspector found that:
on January 8, QA had found that the anti-rotation device for F022 had
fallen down the valve shaft and the valve shaft-to-ARD key had fallen down
to the bonnet area.
The licensee re-inspected all accessible Anchor-
Darling valves with anti-rotation devices under WR/JO 88-AARJ1 and
88-AARK1.
The only other problem found was with 2-G31-F042, RWCU Return to Vessel
Isolation Valve, which was found with the set screw and key intact but the
ARD loose on the shaft. The licensee had a vendor representative inspect
the F022 valve.
The vendor representative recommended that the licensee
use a tighter fit between valve stem and ARD.
The licensee plans to
inspect the ARDs routinely every 9 months until the inspection results
dictate a change.
(CLOSED) Violation 325/87-13-02, Failure to Properly Implement Surveill-
ance Procedure. During ILRT, one channel of high drywell pressure instru-
ment was not de-energized as required due to a fuse labeling problem. A
reactor steam dome pressure instrument was disabled instead.
The
inspector reviewed records documenting the licensee's corrective actions,
including a review of procedure changes.
(CLOSED) Violation 325/87-17-01, Plant Incident and Post Trip Investiga-
tion Form Not Completed as Required by 01-22.
The inspector reviewed
records, including the revisions to 01-22.
The inspector has no further
questions or concerns.
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No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified.
- An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or oeviati n.
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4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities, interviewed personnel, and
reviewed records to verify that work was conducted in accordance with
approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and applicable industry
codes and standards. . The inspectors also verified that:
redundant
components were operable; administrative controls were followed; tagouts
were adequate; personnel were qualified; correct replacement parts were
used; radiological controls were proper; fire protection was adequate;
quality control hold points were adequate and observed; adequate post-
maintenance testing was performed; and independent verification require-
ments were implemented.
The inspectors independently verified that
selected equipment was properly returned to service.
Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave
priority to safety-related maintenance.
The i nspectors observed / reviewed portions of the following maintenance
activities:
88-AABF2
Inspection of Miller Actuator for 2-G16-F020.
88-AAYJ1
Replacement of JWPSCR Allen-Bradley Relay in DG No. 2.
88-FFG021
Megger E-7 Transformer per MI-10-2L1.
88-KAD021
GE 480VAC MCC Checkout per MI-10-2K1 for Switchgear 1PA.
87-BI2U1
Valve 1-SW-V212 CR205 Auxiliary Contact Replacement.
87-BJ1J1
1-CAC-FS-4409-35 Sample Return Flow Switch Replacement.
a.
Diesel Generator Items
Several apparently unrelated emergency diesel generator failures
occurred during the month that warrant further licensee and inspector
followup. Problems included failed fuel oil level switches, inter-
mittent annunciator relay contacts, and broken wire lug.
The
inspector conducted interviews with plant maintenance personnel,
reviewed logs, examined records and equipment and determined that the
licensee corrected the equipment problem in each case.
However, tne
reliability numbers of the emergency diesel generators were lowered
by the DG outages.
The Onsite Nuclear :afety group developed a
review plan to examine DG reliability.
The plan calls for a review
of recent DG failures using a systematic methodology.
Current DG
availability will be compared to PRA model assumptions, station
blackout requirements and industry averages.
A separate plan and
schedule for reliability centered maintenance may also be developed.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's response to the issue was
appropriate. The plan, schedule, and results will be reviewed during
future inspections.
This is an Inspector Followup Item:
Review DG
Reliability Assessment (325/88-01-04 and 324/88-01-04).
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The inspector found, during a log review on January 5, that the TS
surveillance (quick start and load the DGs for 15 minutes) was not
completed within two hours as required with two DGs declared
On January 4,
at 6:43 p.m. , DG No. 3 was declared
inoperable for a slow start slightly greater than the TS requirement
of 10 seconds. Per TS Action statement 3.8.1.1.b.2, the licensee is
required to demonstrate operability of the remaining diesel genera-
tors by performing TS surveillance requirements 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and .5.
These surveillance tests require the verification that the diesel
starts, and accelerates to at lesst 514 RPM in less than or equal to
10 seconds, and that the generator is synchronized, loaded to greater
than or equal to 1750 KW, and operates for greater than or equal to
15 minutes.
On January 5, at 3:52 p.m. , DG No. I was declared
inoperable for a trip reportedly during paralleling with no alarms,
making two DGs inoperable.
Once two DGs are inoperable, TS ACTION
statement 3.8.1.1.e.1 requires the above surveillance requirements to
be completed within cwo hours. Based on a review of PT-12.8, which
implements the above surveillance, the last surveillance was not
completed until 6:00 p.m., eight minute beyond the allowed time. The
8 minute late surveillance by itself has minimal safety significance.
However, the shift foreman had failed to recognize the two hour
requirement for the surveillance test; thus being late only 8 minutes
was fortuitous.
Both DGs 2 and 4 had their surveillance tests completed satisfac-
torily.
A lug and a relay were replaced and OG No. I was run
satisfactorily and returned to service on January 5 at 9:15 p.m.
No. 3 was returned to service on January 6 at 5:17 p.m. , after the
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licensee discovered they were misinterpreting the start data.
Failure to perform TS surveillance requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 within 2
hours as called for in TS Action statement 3.8.1.1.e.1, with 2 DGs
declared inoperable is a Violation: Failure to Perform DG Surveill-
ance Within TS Time Limits (325/88-01-01 and 324/88-01-01).
b.
On January 6, the inspector found a paper towel wedged between the
stack radiation monitor sample pump motor and a nearby support. The
paper towel kept the motor from vibrating.
No trouble ticket had
been issued on the problem at that time.
The licensee wrote a
trouble ticket (88-AAMRI) af ter being informed of the problem.
The
licensee found that one of the motor mount bolts was missing but that
no operability concern existed. The pump supplies stack ef fluent to
the accident monitoring instrumentation (TS 3.3.5.3) ventilation high
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range noble gas monitors and the various radioactive gaseous effluent
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monitoring instrumentation (TS 3.3.5.9).
FSAR section 3.2.1,2 states
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that part of the Radiation Monitoring System is seismic class I.
The
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system engineer reported that the isokinetic probe, which supplies
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the sample to the pump, and stack sample house, which houses the
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pump, had no seismic requirements per plant modification 80-036. The
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licensee agreed in the exit to inform the inspector what portions of
the RMS are seismic class I per the FSAR. This is an Unresolved
Item:
Seismic Requirements for
Radiation Monitoring
System
(325/88-01-02 and 324/88-01-02).
The licensee agreed with the inspector that the "paper towel"
solution vice writing a work request. was inappropriate. They would
take corrective action without waiting for resolution of the. seismic
question.
No significant safety matters, one violation, and no deviations were
identified.
5.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical
Specifications.
Through observation, interviews, and record review, the
inspectors verified that:
tests conformed to Technical Specification
requirements; administrative controls were followed; personnel were
qualified; instrumentation was calibrated; and data was accurate and
complete. The inspectors independently verified selected test results and
proper return to service of equipment.
The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activi-
ties:
IMST-LKDET21R
Leak Detection Containment Sump Flow Integrating
System
Channel Calibration.
DG 3 Trip Bypass Test.
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01-3.2
Control Operator Daily Surveillance.
01-3.3
Outside Auxiliary Operator Daily Surveillance Report,
Completed January 29, 1988.
PT-12.6
Breaker Alignment Surveillance.
No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified.
6.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors verified that Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operated in compliance
with Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirements by direct
observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel,
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reviewing of records and independent verification of safety system status.
The inspectors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 and the Technical Specifications were met. Control operator, shift
supervisor, clearance, STA, daily and standing instructions, and jumper /
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bypass logs were reviewed to obtain information concerning operating
trends and out of service safety systems to ensure that there were no
conflicts with Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Opera-
tions. Direct observations were conducted of control room panels, instru-
mentation and recorder traces important to safety to verify operability
and that operating parameters were within Technical Specification limits.
The inspectors observed shift turnovers to ' verify that continuity of
system status was maintained.
The inspectors verified the status of
selected control room annunciators.
Operability of a selected Engineered Safety Feature division was verified
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weekly by insuring that:
each accessible valve in the flow path was in
its correct position; each power supply and breaker was closed for
components that must activate upon initiation signcl; the RHR subsystem
cross-tie
valve for each unit was closed with the power removed from the valve
operator; there was no leakage of major components; there was proper
lubrication and cooling water available; and a condition did not exist
which might prevent fulfillment of the system's functional requirements.
Instrumentation essential to system actuation or performance was verified
operable by observing on-scale indication and prnper instrument valve
lineup, if accessible.
The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies /
procedures were followed. This included observation of HP practices and a
review of area surveys, radiation work permits, posting, and instrument
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calibration.
The inspectors verified that:
the security organization was properly
manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned
functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the
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protected area; vehicles were properly authorized, searched and escorted
within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identification
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badges; personnel in vital areas were authorized; and ef fective compen-
satory measures were employed when required.
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The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, verified
position of certain containment isolation valves, checked a clearance, and
verified the operability of onsite and offsite emergency power sources.
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No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified.
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7.
Preparation for Refueling on Unit 2 (60705)
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The inspector reviewed the Fuel Handling Procedure FH-11, concentrating on
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completion of prerequisites required prior to defueling.
Two minor
administrative errors were noted:
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Step 3.3 contained an initial for completion and a comment to refer
to "Note 1" but no Note 1 was recorded. Step 3.3 requires completion
of PT-18.1, Refueling Interlocks check, and PT-18.2, Service Platform
check. PT-18.1 had been completed but PT-18.2 was not required to be
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completed since no usage of the platform is planned this outage.
Af ter the inspector questioned the absence of a "Note 1",
it was
added. to the procedure and adequately explained the above circum-
stances,
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Step 3.10 requires completion of Appendix B, System Electrical Lineup
Checklist. This step was initialled as completed on Step 3.10 but
the actual appendix had no approval, signature or time started /
finished recorded. Thia was promptly corrected when pointed out by
the inspector.
The inspector verifieo that Appendix B had actually
been completed.
FH-11 also contains a step which requires the operators to ensure only
appropriately qualified personnel operate the refueling bridge.
The
inspector questioned a senior control operator in the control room on how
this requirement was satisfied.
The operator was not sure how this step
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was completed.
The licensee stated and the inspector verified that
qualification cards were completed and maintained on each qualified
operator. A list of these qualified refueling bridge operators was
normally maintained in the SOS office but had not been placed there this
refueling outage.
This situation was corrected by obtaining the list.
The qualification cards were filed in the same folder as FM-11 for easy
accessibility to control room operators.
The inspector reviewed GP-07, Preparations for Core Alterations, Revision
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No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified.
8.
Fellowup on Inspector Identified and Unresolved Items (92701)
a.
(CLOSED)
Unresolved Item (325/87-42-04), Thermometer in Unit 1
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Standby Liquid Control Tank.
As described in the subject report, a thermometer was discovered
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inside the SLC tank. Inspection Report 50-325/86-12 and 50-324/86-13
discussed a similar situation in which the resident inspector in May,
1986 f( Jnd a small piece of Opaque plastic wrap floating in the tank.
As a result of that occurrence the licensee revised procedure No.
1130, Monthly Determination of Sodium Pentaborate Solution in the SLC
Tank, to include a step (7.4) which requires a tank inspection after
samples are obtained.
The tank hatch has a permanent caution tag
attached to it with directions to contact the shift foreman prior to
opening the hatch.
The procedure also requires independent verifi-
cation of hatch closure. While performing step 7.4 of E&RC No. 1130
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on December 23, 1987, the E&RC technician observed the thermometer on
the bottom of the tank.
The thermometer was removed from the tank.
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The licensee's investigation of the incident was unable to determine
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how the thermometer got into the tank. No procedures now or recently
in use require such thermometers to be used in the SLC tank.
The
licensee concluded the thermometer has -been in the tank for an
extended time and remained undiscovered until now.
The inspector reviewed drawings of the tank to obtain arrangement and
dimensional information on the tanks sparger piping, ' structural
support members, and the location of the outlet (to suction of SLC
pumps) of the tank.
The inspector then conducted a visual examina-
tion of the tank. Although the water clarity was good and the bottom
of the tank was visible, the sparger piping and structural supports
inside the tank could cause the thermometer to remain undiscovered
despite monthly inspections of the tank.
The inspector did not
observe any foreign objects in the tank and verified the outlet was
free of debris.
Based on the location where the thermometer was
found, the arrangement of the sparger piping with respect to the
outlet location, and the low velocities expected in the tank, the
inspector concluded that blockage of the tank outlet by the thermo-
meter was unlikely.
The inspector ' did bring to the licensee's
attention that apparently the sparger air supply isolation valve was
leaking, allowing some air flow through the sparger piping into the
tank, reducing visibility. The licensee has lockwired shut the hatch
on the tank.
Based on the above information, action to prevent
material entering the tank in the future appears adequate and the
probability that the thermometer could have adversely affected the
operability of the SLC system appears very small.
b.
(CLOSED)
Inspector Followup Item (325/87-17-02 and 324/87-17-02),
01-41, Operator Aids Discrepancies.
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The inspector verified, through document review, that the licensee
performed the revised sudit of operator aids and verified that no
"Information Only" copies of procedures were maintained in logbooks.
The inspector also reviewed the latest revision of 01-29, Operations
Internal Audits, Rev. 13, January 27, 1988.
The procedure now
contains additional controls to ensure audit completion.
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c.
(OPEN)
Inspector Followup Item (325/87-42-09 and 324/87-43-09), DG
Building Supply Fan "A" Failure.
The licensee will complete the metallurgical analysis of the fan
blade by February 12, 1988. The liquid penetrant tests on the B&C
fan blades will be completed by May 10, 1988. The inspector reviewed
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the NDE report for a liquid penetrant test conducted on a "D" supply
fan that the system's engineer reported had been in service for about
8 years.
No indications of cracks were found.
Based on the exam
results, the inspector concluded that the licensee's schedule of
future inspections and evaluations was appropriate.
This item
remains open pending the completion of the licensee inspections and
evaluation.
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No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified.
9.
Onsite Followup of Events on. Units 2 (93702)
The inspector reported to the site on January 3,1988, to followup on a
manual scram and failures of the drywell equipment and floor drain contain-
ment isolation valves. The inspector conducted the initial event assess-
ment, forwarding the information to regional management.
Based on the
information supplied by the inspector, NRC sent an AIT to followup on the
event. The results of the AIT are documented in report nos. 325/88-03 and
324/88-03.
Conclusions are contained in the AIT report.
13.
Inadvertent Heatup of Unit 1 (93702)
The unit operator inadvertently allowed the reactor coolant system to
heatup to about 210 degrees F.
The unit had been in cold shutdown prior
to the event, maintaining RCS temperature at 120 degrees F using the
Division II RHR system in shutdown cooling and running the "D"
RHR pump.
The operator had been maintaining temperature by throttling the 18 RHR
heat exchanger outlet valve, 1-E11-F0038.
Based on temperature recorder
-traces, the F003B valve was shut about 2:45 a.m.,
on January 26, 1988. At
4:30 a.m.,
the operator discovered the F003B valve shut and immediately
cpened the F005B valve and shut the heat exchanger bypass valve,
1-E11-F348B, commencing a cooldown. The operators reported no indications
of boiling in the RCS. This is confirmed by recorder traces observed by
the inspector.
The licensee instituted a review of the event and put short term correc-
tive actions in place shortly af ter the event.
The operators are now
required to record RHR heat exchanger temperatures every half hour.
Operators wera instructed on the event prior to assuming the shift. Since
the operator had caught his own error, reported it to management, and
corrective action has been aggressive so far, enforcement action
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consideration will be
deferred until af ter the licensee's review (0ER) has been completed. The
licensee, during the exit, committed to complete the OER by February 29,
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1988. This matter remains Unresolved pending inspector review of the OER:
Inadvertent Heatup During Cold Shutdown (325/88-01-03).
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A significant personnel error occurred which will be reviewed during
future inspections; no violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Plant Modifications (37700)
The inspectors reviewed plant modifications to verify compliance with
10CFR50.59, Technical Specifications, and ENP-03, Plant Modification
Procedure, Revision 35. The inspectors verified, through record reviews,
interviews and observation of work and equipment, that the licensee
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performed plant modification work satisfactorily.
Specifically, the
. inspector verified chat;
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The modifications were reviewed and approved in accordance with
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QA/QC signoffs were appropriate and completed as necessary.
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Work was contrclied by approved procedures and drawings.
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Appropriate procedure and drawing revisions were identified,
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Procedures were in place to include modification in annual 50.59(b).
The inspector reviewed PM-84-004, Addition of Accumulators for Safety
Relief Valves 2-821-F0138, E & G, using the above criteria. Observation
of work activities was also performed for:
Provide Alternate Feed for 2-821-F016 and Local Control for
2-B21-F019.
Enhance Control for 2-E51-F013, 2-E51-F019, and Vacuum and
Condensate Pumps.
No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified.
12.
List of Abbreviations for Unit 1 and 2
AI
Administrative Instruction
4
Augmented Inspection Team
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A0
Auxiliary Operator
ARD-
Anti-Rotation Device
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant
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Condensate Storage Tank
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Diesel Generator
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E&RC
Environmental & Radiation Control
ENP
Engineering Procedure
ERFIS
Emergency Response Facility Information System
Engineered Safety Feature
F
Degrees Fahrenheit
Final Safety Analysis Report
General Procedure
Health Physics
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High Pressure Coolant Injection
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Heating, Ventilating, Air Conditioning System
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Heat Exchanger
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Instrumentation and Centrol
NRC Inspection and Enforcement
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Inspector Followup Item
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IPBS
Integrated Planning Budget System
J0
Job Order
KW
Kilowatt
LER
Licensee Event Repcrt
MI
Maintenance Instruction
Motor Control Center
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operating Experience Report
01
Operating Instruction
OP
Operating Procedure
Protected Av.
-
Procedure M
'ication
Probabilist.. Risk Assessment
Periodic Test
PNSC
Plant Nuclear Safety Comreittee
0A
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
Residual Heat Pemoval
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
Radiation Monitoring System
Revolutions Per Minute
Standby Liquid Control-
SOS
Shift Operating Supervi:or
Special Procedure
TS
Technical Specification
Unresolved Item
Work Request
h
.
I