ML20148E325
| ML20148E325 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Neely Research Reactor |
| Issue date: | 03/14/1988 |
| From: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Stelson T Neely Research Reactor, ATLANTA, GA |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148E330 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8803250064 | |
| Download: ML20148E325 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000160/1987008
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ATLANTA GEORGIA 30323
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MAR 14 %38
Docket No. 50-160
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License No. R-97
Georgia Institute of Technology
5 ATTN: Dr. Thomas E. Stelson
Vice President for Research
225 North Avenue
Atlanta, GA 30332
Gentlemen:
SUBJECT: ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMMARY
(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-160/87-08)
This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on
February 23, 1988.
This meeting concerned activities authorized for your
Georgia Institute of Technology, Neely Nuclear Research Center facility.
The
issues discussed at this conference related to NRC concerns with management
control of health physics and operation programs precipitated by an August 1987
contamination event combined with previous enforcement issues identified at
your facility.
A sunnary, a list of attendees, and a copy of your handout are
enclosed.
We are continuing our review of these issues to determine the
appropriate enforcement action.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2,
Title 10, Code of Federai Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures
will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact us.
Sincerely,
Wh
.
,
J. Nelson Grace
Regional Administrator
Enclosures:
1.
Enforcement Confererece Summary
2.
List of Attendees
3.
NNRC Action Plan 1988 (Handout)
4.
Incident Report, Cadmium Spill,
August, 18, 1987
1
cp w/ercis 1, 2, & 3
v6r. Ratib A. Karam, Director
,
Neely Nuclear Research Center
900 Atlantic Drive, NW
Atlanta, GA 30332
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ENCLOSURE 1
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SUMARY
The Regional Administrator (RA) opened the meeting (by stating that the NRC was
interested in the Georgia Institute of Technology GT) self assessment of the
August 1987 event as it relates to the effectiveness of management controls.
He also stated that the NRC goal was to ensure public health and safety.
He
referenced the NRC Order restricting experiments and also the GT President's
decision to shut the unit down.
The RA also stated that the NRC wants to be
advised of their proposed corrective actions prior to the restart of the
reactor.
At this time, the President of GT requested that, to keep each party
appropriately advised, the NRC and GT inform each other of press announcements
prior to the release.
The NRC advised GT that it does not coordinate press
releases with licensees. However, it was their standard procedure in enforce-
ment cases to advise the licensee of any press releases just prior to the
release.
The Deputy RA described the NRC's escalated enforcement process.
He discussed
the NRC's concern with the history of the number and nature of items of non-
compliance at GT, and mentioned that the preliminary results of NRC's ongoing
investigation had identified several other apparent safety concerns through
interviews with several personnel. He stated that the combination of potential
issues identified at these interviews along with the past enforcement history
of GT reveals an apparent serious management problem at the Neely Nuclear
Research Center (NNRC), and one purpose of this Enforcement Conference was to
assure that GT fully understood the nature of NRC's concerns and some of the
facts that led to those concerns.
The Deputy RA also stated that GT should be striving to provide an excellent
example for health physics and nuclear engineering students, who someday would
carry that example into the nuclear industry.
He also stated that the viola-
tions listed in the referenced inspection report and in others documented from
1982 through 1987 were largely operations oriented.
Therefore, the NRC's
concern, with respect to management controls, is with the overall reactor
operation and not just health physics.
He also stated that it was apparent
that there was much discontent within the health physics section of the
current organization.
The Vice President (VP) of Research stated that his impression was that during
an Enforcement Conference in May 1987, the NRC had concurred with GT that
health physics had been the major problem.
The VP also stated that the present
GT position continued to be that the fundamental management control problem
existing within the facility is the health physics section.
NRC representa-
tives stated that NRC concerns included inadequate review of expariments and
failure to properly control experiment irradiation times, which were major
I
reasons for the issuance of the January 1988 Order.
Thus the NRC's concerns
about the safety of reactor operations were not limited to the facility health
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physics organization.
A number of other instances of poor operator actions
were described to GT, including failure to follow procedures and regulatory
requirements.
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Enclosure 1
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A general discussion then ensued on the is:ue of harassment of research reactor
personnel. GT representatives stated that individuals had not brought problems
to the proper levels of GT management. Additional discussion was conducted on
whether or not GT management had properly addressed safety issues which had
been brought to their attention, thus prompting personnel to approach the
NRC with their safety concerr.s.
The methods by which individuals can bring
concerns to GT management and the NRC were then discussed. The NRC emphasized
that although the NRC strongly recommends that individuals bring problems
to the GT management, workers have the right to bring safety concerns directly
to the NRC without fear of retribution from GT.
GT representatives discussed
briefly the upgrade of the health physics group, by requiring degreed personnel
in selected staff positions.
The NRC then stated that although effort and
intent are important, safety results are the bottom line for the NRC assessr.ent.
The VP of Research continued the discussion by giving a brief history of the
NNRC management.
He addressed the reorganization of the Safeguards Committee
in 1987 and the current upgrade of operations and health physics areas.
Specifically, he stated that recruitment and hiring of a new health physics
manager was a high priority and that the number of licensed operators was being
increased.
The NNRC Director then commenced a detailed discussion covering the ongoing
progress at GT.
He stated that GT used operators, review connittees, and the
NRC to provide feedback for action.
He discussed the 1988 NNRC Action Plan
(Enclosure 3).
Specifically, he addressed the addition of two operator candi-
dates, for a total of three trainees (five operators total when those are
licensed); the addition of a second operator in the control room; the upgrade
of the health physics staff; the plans for an independent evaluation of the
reactor facility; and improvements to the reactor facility procedures.
Discussion on these changes ensued, with the NRC concerned as to whether
replacing the health physics personnel and adding an additional operator in
the control room would really solve the principal problems.
NRC noted that
GT management needed to provide an expectation of excellence by direction and
example.
The NNRC Director provided a brief discussion on cadmium sublimation as it
related to the August 1987 contamination event.
The NNRC Associate Director
then discussed a recreation of the August 1987 event.
This recreation provoked
discussion concerning la.ge time discrepancies and other matters between infor-
mation provided on the actual event and those portrayed in the recreation.
Also discursed were recent surveys done on surfaces and filters inside the
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reactor building which indicated to the licensee that airborne contamination
was not significant.
NRC representatives initiated discussions concerning the adequacy of the survey
results used by the licensee to evaluate radiological hazards at the facility.
Records of the limited surveys done inside the reactor building (which GT
stated on January 22, 1988, showed no contamination problems) were discussed.
The NRC stated that all surveys conducted were not recorded and that from
,
Enclosure 1
/3
discussions with licensee personnel who conducted radiation surveys, radio-
active contamination had been noted over extensive areas in.the reactor build-
ing, e.g., even on the catwalk which encircles the containment wall.
The NRC
asked whether the reactor building catwalk contamination data had been reviewed
or discussed. The Associate Director stated that a catwalk survey was not con-
ducted during the recent survey because he was not aware of any contamination
in the area.
It was pointed out at this time that this contamination was known
by both the health physics staff and the Director of the NNRC.
In addition,
NRC staff stated that contamination levels on the top of the reactor resulting
from the incident (20 mR/hr) could not be characterized as "no problem." NRC
representatives stated that the failure to coordinate survey data collection,
thoroughly investigate the incident, and evaluate its seriousness was indica-
tive of a lack of effectiveness of licensee management.
At this time, the NRC stated that GT's management regulatory sensitivity and
basic comunications with the NRC did not compare favorably with those at other
major research reactors in Region II.
The President then stated that the reactor would not restart until GT and the
NRC were both convinced that operations and health physics activities could be
safely conducted.
The RA reiterated that although the NRC will be involved in
any decision to restart, the responsibility to decide that the reactor is ready
first rests with GT.
The RA stated that he believed the meeting to be quite
beneficial and enlightening.
The Deputy RA then confirmed with the President
that the, reactor would not start up until GT and NRC agree on the restart.
The
RA stated that it was vitally important for the GT staff to know that safety is
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a GT management requirement, and not something solely to meet NRC requirements.
j
At this time the NNRC Director provided to the NRC a document entitled
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"Incident Report, Cadmium Spill, August 18, 1987" (Enclosure 4).
The Deputy RA thanked GT for their presentation and concluded by sumarizing
the two issues which may require further regulatory action:
Evaluation of
certain events as they relate to operator license requirements, and evaluation
of the alleged intimidation and harassment issues.
He also stated that the
GT comitments regarding reactor startup would be documented by the NRC
through official correspondence.
The President concluded with 1 request that
the NRC and GT conduct periodic management meetings to discuss the status of
the Action Plan.
The first such meeting was tentatively set up for about
three weeks hence.
NOTE:
Although the schedule proposed by GT in the Action Plan (Enclosure 3)
proposes an early April lifting of the present NRC Order, in the media
interview conducted
imediately after the Enforcement Conference,
President Crecine indicated a more realistic date may be several months .
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ENCLOSURE 2
LIST OF ATTENDEES
FEBRUARY 23, 1988
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE
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Georgia Institute of Technology
J. P. Crecine, President
T. E. Stelson, Vice President of Research
R. A. Karam, Director, Neely Nuclear Research Center (NNRC)
R. N. MacDonald, Associate Director, NNRC
B. Kahn, Radiation Safety Officer
R. Moore, Director, Communications
J. M. Puckett, Consultant
,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Region II)
J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator
M. L. Ernst, Deputy Regional Administrator
L. A. Reyes, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety
D. M. Collins, Acting) Director, Division of Radiation Safety and
Safeguards (DRSS
G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination
Staff (EICS)
P. E. Fredrickson, Section Chief, DRP
G. B. Kuzo, Senior Radiation Specialist, DRSS
8. Uryc, Senior Enforcement Coordinator, EICS
S. J. Vias, Project Engineer, DRP
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Headquarters)
L. S. Rubenstein, Director, Division of Standardization and Non-Power
Reactors, Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
H. Wong, Senior Enforcement Coordinator, Office of Enforcement
W. Troskoski, Regional Coordinator, Office of the Executive Director
for Operations
A. Adams, Project Manager, NRR
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ENCLOSURE 3
'_
NNRC ACTION PLAN (1988)
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E ACTICN PLAN
1988
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JULY
ALI3UST
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1 3 Additional Operators
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(Oarrpletion expected in 5 to 12 nonths )
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2 Mininun of 2 Operators
(cprplete 2/22/88)
in Control
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3 Upgrade EP Organizat-
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ion,11hD,1 (Ms or
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4a Upgrade IP and Operat-
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lons Procedures to
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Address Order Concerns
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4b Upgrade Procedures for
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Both Operations and
(Ctrrpletion scheduled for 2/28/89)
Health Physics (all)
5 Regulatory Sensitivity
(conplete staf f by 3/22/88 and then ongoing annually)
- Training
6 Outside Evaluation
- (Evaluation i;egins 3/24/88)
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7 Li f t NC Order
+ (Pending results of Outside Evaluation and BEC Review)
Restricting irradia-
tion experiments.
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ENCLOSURE 4
Enf. Conf. Summary
50-160/87-08
INCIDENT REPORT, CADMIUM SPILL
AUGUST 18, 1987
NNRC ACTION PLAN
d
1.
General remarks about NRC & GT talking to each other
2.
Strengthening Programs at NNRC
a.
More operators
5 in 12 months
b.
Minimum of two operators in control room
c.
Upgrade health physics organization -- 1 PhD, 1(MS or
BS), 1 technician (3 months)
d.
Upgrade health physics and operation procedures to
lift concerns expressed in order (March 15)
e.
Upgrade procedures for health physics and operations
(12 months)
f.
Increase regulatory sensitivity (training in safety &
regulatory compliance; immediately and continuing)
g.
Outside expert evaluation (March 24, 1988)
h.
Increase management capabilities
3.
Evaluation of Program
a.
Neakness in health physics
b.
Weakness in operation
c.
Weakness in management
d.
Weakness in administrative control
e.
Low regulatory sensitivity
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4.
Inunediate Corrective Actions
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a.
Experiment approval procedure
b.
shift supervisor approval
c.
Operating log experiment status
d.
Two operator requirement in control room
e.
Sample handling procedures
S.
Incident Specifics
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