ML20133F889
| ML20133F889 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 07/16/1985 |
| From: | Blake J, Liu W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133F846 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-85-19, 50-325-85-19, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8508080471 | |
| Download: ML20133F889 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000324/1985019
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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- Report Nos.: 50-325/85-19 and 50-324/85-19
Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
P. O. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602
Docket Nos.: 50-325 and 50-324
License Nos.:
Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: June 24-28, 1985
Inspector:
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W. C. Liu
Date Signed
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Approved by:
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J. J. Blake, Section Chieff
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Engineering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 33 inspector-hours on site
in the areas of mechanical maintenance associated with modified and newly
installed pipe support and restraint systems; pipe support baseplate designs
using concrete expansion anchor bolts; and inspector followup items.
Results:
Two violations were identified - Deficiencies in pipe support and
anchor bolt installation and inspection; and failure to meet code requirements in
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pipe support weld design - paragraph 6.b.
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Plant (BNP)
- C. Dietz, General Manager - Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP)
- T. Wyllie, Manager, Engineering and Construction
- E. Bishop, Assistant to General Manager
- J. Holder, Manager, Outages - BNP
- L. Jones, Director - Quality Assurance / Quality Control (QA/QC)
- C. Blackman, Jr., Superintendent - Operations
- K. Enzor, Director, Regulatory Compliance
- J. O'Sullivan, Manager, Maintenance
- B. Monroe, Principal Engineer
- J. McKee, QC Supervisor
- W. Dorman, QA Supervisor
- R. Poulk, Senior Regulatory Specialist
Other licensee employees contacted included QC inspectors, engineers,
security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- W. Ruland, Senior Resident Inspector
- L. Garner, Resident Inspector
- T. Hicks, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 28, 1985, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed
below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
(0 pen) Violation 325, 324/85-19-01, Deficiencies in pipe support and anchor
bolt installation and inspection, paragraph 6.b.
(0 pen) Violation 324/85-19-02, Failure to meet code requirements in pipe
support weld design, paragraph 6.b.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to
or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
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4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Inspector Followup Item (92701)
(Closed) -Inspector Followup Item 324, 325/83-01-02, Plant Unique Analysis
Report - Electric Penetration Box Relocation. The calculations showed that
the maximum stresses at the bottom plate and at the door of the electric
penetration box were unacceptable as compared with the allowable values. As
a result, the licensee decided to eliminate the box and to utilize a splice
approach.
The inspector held discussions with licensee representative and
reviewed related documents.
It was found that the modification had been
completed for both units. This item is considered closed.
6.
Safety-Related Pipe Support and Restaint Systems, and Pipe Support Baseplate
Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts (IE Bulletins 79-14 and 79-02)
a.
Documents and Procedures Review
The -inspector reviewed portions of the following documents and
procedures pertaining to safety-related pipe supports and concrete
anchor bolts to determine whether appropriate procedures have been
established and whether they comply with NRC requirements and the
licensee commitments.
SDG-2
Structural Design Guide for Design of Pipe Supports,
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March 20, 1985
Specification 248-107
Installation of Seismic Pipe Supports and
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Miscellaneous Structural Steel, May 11, 1985
QCP-203, Inspection of Pipe Supports, June 14, 1984
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b.
Field Inspection of Pipe Supports and Concrete Anchor Bolts, Units 1
and 2
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The inspector conducted a general inspection of pipe supports and
concrete anchor bolts in the Units 1 and 2 Reactor Building areas. The
inspector selected and examined the following pipe supports that had
previously been QC inspected for a verification inspection to determine
the effectiveness of the licensee's program.
Support Number
Pipe System
BNP Unit No.
- 1SW-142-PG409, Rev. A
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1E11-128-PG600, Rev. A
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1E11-128-PG249, Rev. A
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PS-4349, Rev. A
1
1RCC-10PG246, Rev. D
Closed Cooling Water
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1PS-9, Rev. O
Residual Heat
Removal (RHR)
1
(inside torus)-
1PS-13, Rev. 0
.RHR inside torus
1
IPS-14 Rev. O
RHR inside torus
1
IPS-18, Rev. O
RHR inside torus
1
- PS-3695, Rev. B
Radwaste Drain
2
- PS-7384, Rev. C
Radwaste Drain
2
- 2E11-127-PG1002, Rev. A
2
2E11-128-PG251 Rev. B
2
2E11-126-PG1001, Rev. A
2
.The above fourteen supports were partially inspected against their
detail drawings for configuration, identification, location, fastener
installation, welds, and damage / protection. These supports were either
modified or newly installed as a result of the torus modifications, IE
Bulletin 79-14 requirements, and the new pipe additions.
In general,
the appearance of the supports was good and the supports were installed
in accordance with design documents with the exception of four supports
identified below:
(1) Support No. ISW-142-PG409, Rev. A, in the Unit 1 Service Water
System was inspected.
It was noted that portions of the support
were not installed in accordance with the design drawing and the
manufacturer's instructions.
Both the design drawing and the
manufacturer's instruction showed a bolt connection for the two
strut assemblies.
Studs were actually used in the installation.
Furthermore, the studs were installed with double nuts on one side
and a single nut on the other. No locking device was found on the
single nut side.
(2) Support No. PS-7384, Rev. C, in the Unit 2 radwaste drain s,, tem
was examined.
It was noted on sheet 5 that the l'-3 1/2" and
l' - 1 1/2" measured dimensions were incorrectly marked down on the
as-built drawing in that these two dimensions should have been
interchanged.
(3)_ Support No. PS-3695, Rev. B, in the Unit 2 radwaste drain system
was inspected.
It was found that a 1/8"' fillet weld was specified
by the design drawing for connecting the end attachment to the
baseplate.
Since the end attachment is 3/8" thick and the base
plate is 3/4" thick, in accordance with the American Welding
Society (AWS D1.1) code requirements, the minimum size of fillet
weld should be 1/4".
(4) Support No. 2E11-127-PG1002, Rev. A, in the Unit 2 RHR system was
examined.
It was noted that a 1/4" fillet weld was specified by
the design drawing.
The column and the baseplate had a thickness
of 1/2" and 1", respectively.
In accordance with the American
Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) code requirements, the
minimum size of fillet weld should be 5/16".
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Paragraph 7.1 of Brunswick Structural Design Guide, SDG-2, for
design of pipe supports, requires that welds shown on design
drawings be in accordance with AISC and AWS D1.1 unless otherwise
noter..
In addition, the paragraph requires that welds which are to
be 'n accordance with AISC and ANSI B31.1 conform to the weld deta*1
and joint preparation requirements of AWS D1.1 code.
Paragraph
II.4 of Brunswick specification No. 248-107
Installation of
Seismic Pipe Supports, requires that QC verifications shall be
made to insure that catalogue components identified and called for
on the design drawings have been used in the support and that
construction shall be responsible for insuring that erection
activities are in compliance with the design drawings.
Paragraph
XII.1 of the specification requires that all welding shall comply
with AWS D1.1 unless the design drawing specifies particular welds
to be made in accordance with ASME or ANSI B31.1.
Procedure
QCP-203, Inspection of Pipe Supports, requires that QA/QC verify
that all hardware, such as bolts, nuts, clamps, etc., is installed
as shown on the design drawings.
Missing hardware will be
documented per procedure QCP-401.
Discrepancies identified from the aforementioned (1) and (2)
supports indicate that portions of the supports were not installed
and verified in accordance with the design drawings and the above
procedural requirements.
This is a violation of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V, and is identified as an example of
Violation 325, 324/85-19-01, Deficiencies in pipe support and
anchor bolt installation and inspection.
Discrepancies identified from the aforementioned (3) and (4)
supports reveal that portions of the supports were improperly
designed in that the weld sizes specified by the design drawings
did not meet the applicable code requirements. As a result, these
supports may not be able to perform their intended function as
required by the applicable codes.
This is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, and is identified as Violation
324/85-19-02, Failure to meet code requirements in pipe support
weld design.
During the inspection, the inspector noted that the safety-related
steel frame in the Unit 2 reactor building at elevation 50 foot
was found in an unacceptable condition in that one anchor bolt in
each of the two baseplates was improperly installed. There was no
bearing contact between the nuts and the baseplates. As a result,
these two anchor bolts may not be able to perform their intended
function as required by the design. The inspector held discussions
with licensee representatives with regard to the above anchor bolt
status. The licensee subsequently took immediate action by inspecting
76 anchor bolts in the Unit 1 and 76 anchor bolts in the Unit 2 reactor
building area. The licensee further identified seven anchor bolts in
the Unit 1 area and 12 anchor bolts in the Unit 2 area that were
improperly installed
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in terms of no bearing contact between the nuts and the
baseplates.
The deficiencies identified above are a violation of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, and are identified as another
example of Violation 325, 324/85-19-01, Deficiencies in pipe
support and anchor bolt installation and inspection.
In addition to the above findings, the inspector noted that no
acceptance criteria were found in the licensee's inspection
procedures relative to bolts versus studs installation, tightening
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of locknut installation, and torque requirements for strut and
rigid rod installation.
The inspector held discussions with the
licensee representatives with respect to the above concern.
It
was found that the licensee was very responsive in resolving the
above concern in that the related document was revised immediately
to include the aforementioned acceptance criteria.
Within the areas inspected, two violations were identified.
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