ML20097D199
| ML20097D199 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 02/05/1996 |
| From: | Benes G COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9602120240 | |
| Download: ML20097D199 (38) | |
Text
1 Commonwealth Edison Company
- 1400 Opus Place Downers Grove, IL 63515-57o1
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j February 5,1996 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 1
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Subject:
LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 j
l Comed Response to NRC Staff Request for Additional Information (RAI)
Regarding the Main Steamline Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Control System (LCS) Alternate Leakage Treatment (ALT) Path i
NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374
References:
(a)
G. Benes letter to U. S. NRC, dated August 28,1995, LaSalle l
Submittal Regarding Elimination of MSIV LCS.
l l
l (b)
R. Latta letter to D. Farrar, dated November 16,1995, NRC Staff RAI.
(c)
G. Benes letter to U. S. NRC, dated December 15,1995, Response to November 15,1995 NRC Staff RAI.
j The purpose of this letter is to respond to the NRC staffs RAI regarding the Reference (a) and (c) submittals involving LaSalle Station's MSIV LCS ALT Path. Reference (a) provided LaSalle Station's proposal for revising the Technical Specification requirements regarding the MSIV LCS ALT Path. In addition, Reference (a) proposed an exemption l
l request from the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. The NRC staff requested additional information in Reference (b) to support the review of LaSalle's submittal.
Comed responded to the NRC Staffs RAI (Reference (b))in Reference (c). Subsequent to l
Reference (c), the NRC staff has requested additional clarification. LaSalle's responses to l
provide clarification are provided as an attachment to this letter.
If there are any further questions, please contact this ofYice.
Sincerely ry G.
n-Nuclear Licensing Administrator Attachments:
A-Responses to NRC Comments - Main Steamline Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Control System (LCS) Alternate Leakage Treatment (ALT) Path cc:
H. J. Miller, Regional Administrator - RIII M. D. Lynch, Project Manager - NRR P. G. Brochman, Senior Resident Inspector - LaSalle l
Oflice of Nuclear Facility Safety - IDNS k \\nla\\lanalle\\nevics3 wpf 9602120240 960205 PDR ADOCK 05000373 P
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1 A Unicom Company L
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ATTACHMENT Responses to NRC Comments - Main Steamline Isolation Valve (MSIV)
Leakaoe Control System (LCS) Alternate Lenkaoe Treatment (ALT) Path l
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a RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS MAIN STEAMLINE ISOLATION VALVE (MSIV)
LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM (LCS)
ALTERNATE LEAKAGE TREATMENT (ALT) PATH Note: In the following responses, the phrase " prior to Unit start-up" indicates that the work identified on each unit will be completed prior to start-up from that unit's outage in which the MSIV-LCS was eliminated from service.
NRC Comment 1 Confirm that all references to the BWR Owners Groups (BWROG) earthquake experience database will be deleted from the pending amendment request to remove the Main Steamline isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Control System (LCS).
Response to Comment 1 This is confirmed. The BWR Owners Group (BWROG) earthquake experience data base is not utilized to qualify piping and supports in either the primary or secondary Alternate Leakage Treatment paths. The BWR Owners Group earthquake experience data base is also not utilized to qualify the structural ruggedness of the main condenser or Turbine Building roof structure.
NRC Comment 2 Provide a clear description of the MSIV alternate leakage treatment (ALT) path and indicate which portions you take credit for in your radiological dose model. Provide assurance of the reliability of the entire ALT path, including all of its boundary valves. Additionally, state whether all the motor-operated valves which are a part of the ALT path will be included in the plant IST program.
Response to Comment 2 A.
Descriotion of ALT Path and Radiolooical Dose Model As shown in " Isometric View of Leakage Control Path and Boundaries" and the
" Alternate Leakage Treatment Path Functional Diagram", Attachments 2-1 and 2-2 of this submittal, leakage through the outboard MSIVs [1(2)B21 F028A,B,C,D) is contained by the closed isolation valves identified on the " Alternate Leakage Treatment Path Boundary and Control Vaives" table, Attachment 2-3.
i' Leakage from the outboard MSIVs travels down the four 26" main steam lines to either the upstream drain line (Primary ALT Path A) or to the downstream drain line (Primary ALT Path B) into the main condenser and out of the LP Turbine seals.
Each of the leakage paths consists of the following:
f 1.
Four main steam lines from their respective MSIV to their respective drain lines.
4 2.
A 2" drain line connected to each steam line.
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Comed February 5,1996 LaSalle County Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2 Page 2 of 20 BC DOCKETS: 50-373 and 50-374 Responses to NRC Comments - MSIV-LCS 3.
A 12" drain header, receiving leakage from each of the four 2" drain lines.
4.
A 3" line is routed from the 12" drain header and branches into the 1" normal operating orifice drain line and the 3" start-up drain line as follows:
a)
An operating 1" drain line with an 0.875" orifice connected to the condenser at elevation 696'-7" (condenser bottom is 690'-7") and a normally open motor-operated globe valve. [1(2)B21-F071,1(2)B21-F073]
b)
A start-up 3" drain line (no orifice) connected to the condenser at elevation 696'-7" and a normally closed motor-operated globe valve
[1(2)B21-F070,1(2)B21-F072].
During normal plant operation, the operating drains (1(2)B21-F071 and 1(2)B21-F073]
are open and the start-up drains are closed. For the ALT Path mode of operation, the two operating drain valves remain open and either of the start-up drains (1(2)B21-F070 or 1(2)B21-F072] is opened. This assures an initial flow path, although restricted, until a start-up drain [1(2)B21-F070 or 1(2)B21-F072] is open. No credit is taken in the radiological dose model for the two operating drain lines being open.
The radiological dose model took credit for the path from the Reactor Vessel, through the main steam 26" lines, through either of the two drain lines downstream of the outboard MSIV (both paths were analyzed), to the main condenser with leakage from the Turbine Seals. The radiological model showed the difference between the two primary ALT paths to be insignificant.
B.
Reliability of the ALT Path includino Boundarv Valves The ALT Path to the main condenser has high reliability because LaSalle has provided redundant, seismically qualified ALT paths to the main condenser. With two independent seismically qualified ALT paths, mechanical failure of a single valve in one ALT drain path does not prevent routing MSIV leakage through the other full size path to the condenser. Even in the remote chance of failure of all three power sources, two offsite power sources and the Safety Related Diesel Generator, a restricted flow path through the operating drain orifices will exist to the main condenser. LaSalle start-up drain stop valves [1(2)B21-F070 and 1(2)B21-F072] also have local reach rod operators outside of Heater Bay shield walls.
The highly reliable boundary isolation valves fall into four categories; 1) Remote manual motor operated valves powered from ESS Division 2 busses,2) Local manual valves that remain in their normal operating (closed) position in the ALT path mode of leakage treatment,3) EHC operated valves, and 4) Dual acting, quick closing MSIVs.
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Comed February 5,1996 LaSalle County Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2 Page 3 of 20 NRC DOCKETS: 50-373 and 50-374 Responses to NRC Comments - MSIV-LCS 1.
All seven (per unit) of these valves and motor operators [1(2)B21 F418A/B, 1(2)B21-F070/72,1(2)B21-F071/073 and 1(2)B21-F020] were originally i
seismically qualified. They were reclassified as non-safety related; however, they are powered from their original power sources, ESS Division 2 busses and have a reliable source of power.
2.
Local manual valves used as boundary valves are seismically qualified and remain in their normal operating positions and require no operator action.
3.
The Main Steam High Pressure Turbine Main Stop Valves
[1(2)B21-MSV-1/2/3/4] are operated utilizing EHC pressure and fail closed upon loss of electrical power to EHC, EHC pressure, or upon Turbine Trip. The Main Steam Bypass Valves [1(2)B21-MSBPV-1/2/3/4/5] are also operated utilizing EHC pressure and fail closed upon loss of electrical power to EHC or loss of EHC pressure. These valves were evaluated and determined to be seismically rugged.
4.
The dual acting, quick closing MSIVs are safety-related valves and are selsmically qualified.
The piping and piping supports are highly reliable because the piping and piping supports within the ALT boundary will be seismically qualified prior to start-up from that unit's outage in which the MSIV-LCS was eliminated from service. The majority (piping shown on Attachment 2-2 except the small bore instrument sensing lines and subsystem 2MS71) of the piping and piping supports within the boundary was originally seismically analyzed. The remaining instrument piping and subsystem 2MS71, pipe stands, instrument racks and supports being subsequently analyzed and required modifications being made prior to start-up from that unit's outage in which the MSIV-LCS was eliminated from service. Further details of the piping and piping support capability is provided in response to NRC Comments 3,4 and 6.
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e Comed February 5,1996
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l LaSalle County Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2 Page 4 of 20
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NRC DOCKETS: 50-373 and 50-374 Resoonses to NRC Comments - MSIV-LCS C.
Motor Ooerated Valve Inclusion in IST Proaram:
Motor operated valves utilized as either boundary valves or ALT path control valves will be included in the plant IST program. They will be stroke tested once per fuel cycle.
NRC Comment 3 Provide an independent summary of the seismic analysis of subsystems 2MS-31B and 2 MSS, which you have stated in your letter dated December 15,1995, to have been seismically
)
analyzed. Summary should include, as a minimum, the following:
A.
The basis for selecting these two subsystems as being the representative lines.
B.
A clear functional and physical description of these two lines including their routing, materials of construction, diameters and thickness.
C.
Their analysis methodology and design criteria.
D.
The seismic input motions and design loadings used in their seismic analysis.
E.
A description of the of the computer codes used in the seismic analysis.
F.
A general summary of the analysis which leads you to conclude that the piping system is seismically adequate, including a discussion of the pipe stresses and support loads, as well as a comparison with the corresponding allowables and capacities.
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C Comed February 5,1996 LaSalle County Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2 Page 5 of 20 -
E NRC DOCKETS: 50-373 and 50-374 Responses to NRC Comments - MSIV-LCS Response to Comment 3 Following is a summary of the two subsystems which we submitted with our December 15, 1995 letter. (Please note that the identification number in NRC comments for one of the piping subsystems should be corrected to read 2MS 56 and not 2MS-5.)
l A.
The two subsystems which were submitted,2MS-31B and 2MS-56, were selected arbitrarily from the total population of affected subsystems that were analyzed in accordance with the UFSAR. Subsystem 2MS-71 will have additional seismic qualification and/or modifications performed so that the design of the 2MS-71 piping j
and supports will be in accordance with the UFSAR prior to start-up from that unit's outage in which the MSIV-LCS was eliminated from service. The seven (7) Pressure Sensing Lines per unit are discussed in the response to NRC Comment 6.
B.
Subsystem 2MS-31B is the Warm-up By-pass Line to the Main Steam lines downstream of MSIVs (pressure boundary for ALT path), and Subsystem 2MS-56 is the Upstream Drain Header from the Main Steam lines to the Condenser (ALT flow path to condenser). Material and piping physical information pertinent to these subsystems are provided in the following table:
- 1. Pipe size Combination of pipe sizes Combination of pipe sizes ranging in sizes 3/4' - 12" 1" - 12" i
- 2. Pipe thickness Schedule 80 piping, Schedule 80 piping, thickness ranging from thickness ranging from 0.154' for the 3/4" piping &
0.179' for the 1" piping 0.687" for the 12' piping
& 0.687' for the 12" piping
- 3. Max. Oper. Pres.
1025 psi 1025 psi
- 4. Max. Oper. Temp.
550 'F 550*F
- 5. Design Pressure 1250 psi 1250 psi
- 6. ASME Pipe Class Class D, except Class A Class D piping between Penetration M-22 and Valve 2B21-F019
- 7. Seismic Class Seismically analyzed Seismically analyzed k.bla\\lasalle\\nre q2 wpf
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Comed February 5,1996 LaSalle County Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2 Page 6 of 20 NRC DOCKETS: 50-373 and 50-374 Responses to NRC Comments - MSIV-LCS C.
The seismic analysis methodology is in accordance with the LaSalle County Station licensing commitments as delineated in the appropriate subsections of LaSalle UFSAR, Section 3.7.3. The following table delineates the pertinent data:
Damping Value OBE 1/2%; SRV 1%;
1/2%
Modal Absolute Double Absolute Double Combination Sum Sum Method Cut-Off Above 33 Hz Above 33 Hz Frequency Seismic SRSS SRSS Direction Combination
Load combinations and Acceptance Criteria are as delineated in Table 3.9-16
" Load Combinations and Acceptance Criteria" of LaSalle UFSAR. The following table briefly delineates the pertinent data:
1.
Ploina Load Combinations and Acceptance Criteria A. Subsystem 2MS-31B Load Case Accentance Criteria e Weight + Pressure + (OBE'+SRV')"'
Upset / Service Level B e Weight + Pressure + Faulted Faulted / Service Level D B. Subsystem 2MS-56 Load Case Acceotance Criteria e Weight + Pressure + OBE Upset / Service Level B
= Weight + Pressure + SSE Faulted / Service Level D k \\nla\\lamalle\\nmq2 wg4
s Comed February 5,1996 LaSalle County Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2 Page 7 of 20 NRC DOCKETS: 50-373 and 50-374 Resoonses to NRC Comments - MSIV-LCS II.
Snanart Load Combinations & Accentance Criteria I
i A. Subsystem 2MS-31B Load Case Acceotance Criteria
. Weight + Thermal + (OBE'+SRV )v2 Upset / Service Level B 2
= Weight + Thermal + Faulted Faulted / Service Level D B. Subsystem 2MS-56 Load Case Accentance Criteria
= Weight + Thermal + OBE Upset / Service Level B
= Weight + Thermal + SSE Faulted / Service Level D The pipe stress allowable limits are in accordance with the Section lli of the ASME, B&PV code,1974 edition. Load capacities for pipe supports are in accordance with vendor provided allowables for standard components and the AISC Manual of Steel Construction for Auxiliary Steel design.
D.
The floor response spectra at LaSalle County Station are generated per Section 3.7.2.5 of LaSalle UFSAR. The floor response spectra used for analyzing 2MS-31B and 2MS-56 are:
1.
For Subsystem 2MS-31B a)
The enveloped OBE Spectra consists of:
Auxiliary Building Elevation 731'-0" Wall Spectra Auxiliary Building Elevation 731'-0" Slab Spectra Auxiliary Building Elevation 749'-0" Wall Spectra e
Auxiliary Building Elevation 749'-0" Slab Spectra Reactor Building Elevation 740'-0" Wall Spectra Reactor Building Elevation 740'-0" Slab Spectra a
Reactor Building Elevation 761'-0" Wall Spectra a
Containment Wall Elevation 740'-0" Wall Spectra e
b)
The enveloped SRV Symmetric and Asymmetric Spectra consists of:
Reactor Building Elevation 740'-0" Wall Spectra Reactor Building Elevation 740'-0" Slab Spectra k inda\\tanalle\\nre-q2 wpf I
Comed February 5,1996 LaSalle County Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2 Page 8 of 20 NRC DOCKETS: 50-373 and 50-374 Resoonses to NRC Comments - MSIV-LCS Reactor Building Elevation 761'-0" Wall Spectra e
Containment Wall Elevation 740'-0" Wall Spectra c)
The enveloped Faulted (SSE + SRV + BFDL) Spectra consists of:
)
Auxiliary Building Elevation 731'-0" Wall Spectra
=
Auxiliary Building Elevation 731'-0" Slab Spectra e
Auxiliary Building Elevation 749'-0" Wall Spectra Auxiliary Building Elevation 749'-0" Slab Spectra Reactor Building Elevation 740'-0" Wall Spectra e
Reactor Building Elevation 740'-0" Slab Spectra l
Reactor Building Elevation 761'-0" Wall Spectra e
l Containment Wall Elevation 740'-0" Wail Spectra l
l 2.
For Subsystem 2MS-56 The enveloped OBE/SSE Spectra consist of:
Auxiliary Building Elevation 687'-0" Wall Spectra
=
Auxiliary Building Elevation 692'-6" Slab Spectra a
Auxiliary Building Elevation 710'-6" Wall Spectra e
Auxiliary Building Elevation 710'-6" Slab Spectra E.
The seismic analysis was performed using Sargent & Lundy's Piping Analysis Program (PIPSYS). PIPSYS is one of the computer codes listed in LaSalle UFSAR, Appendix F.
F.
The highest seismic stresses in Subsystems 2MS-318 and 2MS-56 and corresponding stress allowable limits are summarized below:
Highest Uoset ghest FadM Uoset Condition Faulted l
Subsystem Allowable Condition ess W W
Lg Q Allowable (osi)
LDSO
$930 7820 25313 9290 50625 C
1 Podion 12800 17100 14200 34200 C
Po h 1
34200 l
Ca Portion Results for a sample of the supports for these two subsystems are provided as part of the response to Comment 4. The support designs meet the UFSAR limits.
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6 Comed February 5,1996 LaSalle County Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2 Page 9 of 20 NRC DOCKETS: 50-373 and 50-374 Resoonses to NRC Comments - MSIV-LCS Since the piping components and supports are within UFSAR limits, Comed has concluded that the piping subsystems are seismically acceptable.
1 i
NRC Comment 4 Provide a summary in tabular form for the evaluation of all piping supports included in the MSIV ALT path, including the calculatej safety margins for the design loads.
i Response to Comment 4 As discussed in the response to Comment 3, the piping systems which constitute the MSIV primary ALT path, with the exception of the sensing line subsystems, were seismically qualified in the original LaSalle County Station design. For Subsystem 2MS71, additional l
seismic qualification and/or modifications will be performed so that the design of the 2MS71 piping and supports will be consistent with the other drain lines to be used in the MSIV alternate leakage treatment system. The tables in Attachments 4-1,4-2 and 4-3 provide representative sample of piping supports associated with the MSIV primary and secondary ALT path. Supports associated with the pressure sensing lines are addressed in the response to NRC Comment 6. 1 "MSIV LCS Support Summary" lists the piping subsystems, quantity of supports selected for this sampling, and the number of supports for each of these subsystems that will provide seismic restraint.
Attachments 4 2 " Load Table - Unit 1" and 4-3 " Load Table - Unit 2" are the detailed listing of the selected supports. Each of these tables have four major sections, as follows:
A.
Sucoort
References:
i Lists the pipe support number and a sequential indexing number to facilitate future references to this data.
B.
Pioina
References:
Lists the piping subsystem number and its associated piping analysis report number for each support. This information is provided for cross referencing purposes only.
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Comed February 5,1996 LaSalle County Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2 Page 10 of 20 NRC DOCKETS: 50-373 and 50-374
' Resoonses to NRC Commants - MSIV-ifs l
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' O.
Structural Comoonents Evaluation:
Lists the limiting structural comcreent for each support and' its associated design j'
margin. included in the struc.msl components are auxiliary steel (rolled steel section which is part of the pipe support), welds, or connection to the main building structure (including anchor bolts). The calculation number is alsr *ovir ed for information.
l D.
Mechanical Comoonents Evaluation:
Lists the limiting standard support component (i.e. strut, rod, clevis...) and its associated design margin. The subsystem calculation number is also provided for information.
\\
I' Supports that provide seismic restraint were arbitrarily selected for this sample from a listing of support drawings associated with each piping subsystem to obtain at least 5% sample population. One support was selected from each of these subsystems and approximately one additional support for each additional 20 supports. The design margin for this evaluation is the Level D (SSE) allowable stress / capacity divided by the actual Level D.
stress / load.
As the sample shows, the supports on the affected piping meet UFSAR requirements. This is' consistent with the remaining population of supports (which are available for further review, if required).
NRC Comment 5 Provide an evaluation demonstrating that the structural components of the condenser are seismically adequate. The potentially significant adverse effects due to components of the condenser impacting on the adjacent foundation piers should also be addressed and resolved.
Response to Comment 5 An evaluation of the condenser structural components and the condenser anchorage has concluded that the condenser structure and anchorage will be adequate for all SSE forces.
The anchorage will be modified and longitudinal supports will be added near the centroid of the condenser to prevent the condenser from impacting on the adjacent turbine piers. The evaluation is summarized below.
Condenser Structure:
I The Turbine condenser is a single shell, single pass, deaerating type condenser with a divided water box constructed in accordance with the Heat Exchange Institute standards.
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Comed February 5,1996 LaSalle County Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2 Page 11 of 20 NRC DOCKETS: 50-373 and 50-374 Resoonses to NRC Comments - MSIV-LCS The hot well contains horizontal and vertical baffles. The circulating water flow is 617,000 gpm. The total effective surface area of the 40,462 tubes is 950,000 square feet. The overall dimensions of the condenser is 70' high,35' wide, and 90' long (tube length). See -1 for an isometric view.
The normal operating pressure in the steam compartment is between approximately 1" HgA and 5" HgA (approximately 0.5 psia and 2.5 psla). The inlet and outlet water boxes, condenser tubes, and wet well at the base of the condenser are full of water during normal operation. The 7/8" thick shell of the condenser is stiffened by the tube support plates interconnected by struts that connect the support plates to the side walls and bottom. These support plates are spaced approximately 40" along the length of the tubes.
Materials used for the major structural elements of the condenser are as follows:
Shell integrally welded composite construction; 7/8 in. thick ASTM A285, Grade C material, flange quality copper bearing carbon steel plate.
Water Boxes 1 in thick ASTM A285, Grade C, flange quality copper bearing carbon steel. 30 psi test pressure.
Tube Sheets 1-1/8 in. A240 type 304 Stainless steel.
Tube Support Plates 3/4 in. thick ASTM A285, Grade C, flange quality copper bearing carbon steel.
The condenser is supported on eight concrete piers arranged in a symmetrical fashion about the condenser's longitudinal and transverse center lines. The four interior condenser piers are 6' x 8'-10" and integral with the substantially larger turbine pedestal piers. The four corner piers are the same size and are also integral with the larger adjacent turbine pedestal piers as depicted in Attachment 5-2. Each support uses six 1-5/8 in diameter A36 bolts to anchor the condenser to the pier. One of the interior supports acts as the stationary anchor point while the other seven are sliding supports used to accommodate the condenser's thermal movement through the use of oversized bolt holes in the base plates.
A.
Condenser Structural Comoonents The condenser is isolated from the turbine through the use of rubber expansion joints. The condenser was hydro-tested by filling the shell with water to a level 2 feet above the turbine isolation expansion joints. The hydrostatic test loading condition applies twice the operating weight to the condenser base and support pier than is present during normal operating conditions. The reactions on the condenser support pedestals from this hydro test exceed the reactions from operating loads plus vertical k \\nla\\lanalle\\nrc-q2 wpf
4 Comed February 5,1996 LaSalle County Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2 Page 12 of 20 NRC DOCKETS: 50-373 and 50-374 Responses to NRC Comments - MSIV-LCS seismic and overturning by 70% This load test demonstrates the condenser's ability to adequately resist the vertical affects of SSE.
The seismic loads in the N-S direction are resisted by the connections at the base through the axial stiffness of the longitudinal shell plates. The shell is 7/8" thick and is laterauy braced every 40" by struts used to support the tube support sheets. The shell side walls would experience a maximum shear stress of less than 2 ksi from the N-S force. This relatively small stress demonstrates the minor effect SSE has in the N S direction.
The effect of E-W seismic loads on the local load carrying capacity of the shell is also smallin comparison with the hydrostatic test load. The water pressure at the top of the steam compartment walls during hydro is 11 psi and increases to 28 psi at the base of the condenser. The equivalent lateral seismic load that the tubes would apply on the side walls is less than 4 psi. Similarly, the lateral pressure from water in the hot well will be less than 2 psi. Comparison of these equivalent design pressures demonstrates that there is substantial design margin relative to resisting the E-W seismic loads from the condenser tubes and hot well.
The loads associated with the heaters and the water boxes are not distributed loads.
They act more like concentrated loads and are carried to the E-W support points through girder action of the overall condenser. A simple representation of the stresses induced by E-W seismic loads would be to treat the condenser itself as a 35' deep girder, with both ends cantilevering past the interior supports. The resulting moment would cause flexural stresses in the side plates, which act as the flanges of the beam, of less than 1.5 ksi. Finally, the stiffness required to resist the E-W reaction at the interior support points is provided by the interior tube support plates and their support brackets. These large steel plates and internal support components have been assessed and found to be within SSE allowables with respect to the applied reaction.
In summary, the condenser shell and internal components are seismically rugged and will adequately transfer SSE forces to the supporting structure.
B.
Condenser Anchoragg The operating weight of the condenser is 6,206 kips. The seismic loads in each of the 3 principle directions are -
N S 1,862 kips E-W 2,172 kips VERT.1,179 kips As discussed in our response to Comment 8, the Turbine Building shares the north-k \\nla\\taantle\\nreq2 wpf
Comed February 5,1996 LaSalle County Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2 Page 13 of 20 l
NRC DOCKETS: 50-373 and 50-374 Resoonses to NRC Comments - MSIV-LCS south wall with the Auxiliary Building and the Diesel Generator room (both category I structures) and was included in the seismic model. The structural elements i.e., the l
shear walls and slab diaphragms included in the seismic model have been designed for the appropriate seismic forces (shears and moments) obtained from the seismic
)
analysis.
Under normal operating conditions, six of the condenser supports experience a net downward reaction while the other two supports experience minor uplift (9 kips).
The anchor bolts are adequate to resist the tensile effect of operating loads, vertical seismic loads, and overturning from the N-S seismic load using the SRSS method of combination for seismic loads. The most highly stressed bolt group in tension has a margin of 2.0. Overturning from the E-W seismic loads will be eliminated by restraining the condenser in the E-W direction as described below.
Seismic loads in the E-W direction will be resisted by filling the gap between the condenser wall and the turbine pedestals for the four interior supports in a manner that will allow thermal growth as well as provide lateral seismic restraint for the condenser, similar to guided pipe supports. The gaps will be filled with structural steel members l
that will be attached to the condenser as conceptually shown in Attachment 5-3.
To resist the N-S seismic shear loads, guide supports will be added at the base of the condenser. See Attachment 5-4 for the conceptual detail. These restraints will be designed for a 2400 kip seismic load in order to provide additional margin over the 1862 kip seismic force. In addition to these restraints, the existing anchor bolts possess a 1625 kip shear capacity after deducting the affect of tension.
The following is a summary of the applied loads to the condenser and anchorage capacities:
E-W seismic shear load at base 0 kips N-S seismic shear load at base 1862 kips N-S restraint seismic load capacity at base 2400 kips Bolt shear capacity after tension 1625 kips No credit has been taken for friction.
C.
Effects on Turbine Buildina Structures The turbine pedestal piers which are nominally 12' by 12' in section are more than adequate to resist the condenser seismic loads. The centroid of the E-W seismic reaction on the pedestal piers is at el. 712'-6" (refer to Attachment 5-3). The piers on the West side of the condenser are laterally supported to the west by a 3'-6" thick slab at el. 710'-6". The piers on the east side are laterally supported to the east at el.
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l Comed February 5,1996 LaSalle County Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2 Page 14 of 20 NRC DOCKETS: 50-373 and 50-374 Resoonses to NRC Comments - MSIV-LCS 704'-6" by a 5' 0" thick slab. The close proximity of these substantial slabs to the E-W supports limits the amount of bending introduced into the piers. The turbine pedestal piers are capable of resisting the moments and shears generated by the condenser seismic loads by a margin of at least 2.5 in bending and shear.
The slabs also have substantial axial capacity because the load is applied through compression only. These slabs are, in turn, supported by substantial structural elements (shear walls) which are a part of the overall lateral load resisting system.
The condenser piers were evaluated for the effect of tension from the anchors and shear. This evaluation indicated that the desigr. margin for tension is about 3.0 and shear is greater than 2.0 in summary, the condenser supports and foundation (s) will have adequate design 4
margins.
NRC Comment 6 Since the GIP methodology contained in the USI A-46 program is not applicable to piping, provide a separate seismic analysis summary, similar to Item 3 above, for the pressure sensing line which was not seismically analyzed.
Response to Comment 6 There are seven (7) pressure sensing lines in the pressure boundary of the Alternate Leakage Treatment Path for each unit. These lines will be seismically analyzed consistent with the UFSAR and supports modified, if required, prior to start-up from that unit's outage in which the MSIV LCS was eliminated from service. The following is a brief summary for each of these lines similar to the summary provided in the response to Comment 3 above:
A.
Unit 1 Four of the pressure sensing lines are connected to the Main Steam header (1MS-09) near the Main Steam High Pressure Turbine Main Stop valves, routed through the Heater Bay Area (HBA), through a 4'-8" foot thick solid block wall, to the pressure sensors. The block wall is being modified for seismic loads to support the ALT path pressure boundary integrity. The block wall openings through which these sensing lines penetrate are filled with high density silicone as fire and radiation barrier. For analysis purposes the block wall penetration has been considered as an anchor, j
therefore two piping models have been generated for each one of the following lines, in the HBA and outside the HBA:
k \\nlaManalle\\nre-q2 wpf
t Comed February 5,1996 LaSalle County Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2 Page 15 of 20 NRC DOCKETS: 50-373 and 50-374 Resoonses to NRC Comments - MSIV-LCS i
1.
Line 1MS93AA-1" Pipt.g Analysis:
1MS-M4 in the HBA and 1MS-M40 outside the HBA l
2.
Uni it.f S93AB-1" Piping Analysis:
1MS-M5 in the HBA and 1MS-M50 outside the HBA 3.
Line 1MS93AC-1"
~
L Piping Analysis:
1MS-M6 in the HBA and 1MS-M60 outside the HBA 4.
Line 1 MS93AD-1" Piping Ana%s:
1MS-M7 in the HBA and 1MS-M70 outside the HBA I
The following information is applicable to the above four lines:
Pipe size:
1" and 1/2" Schedule 80 e
Pipe thickness :
0.179", 0.147" (respectively)
=
Design Pressure:
1,250 psi Max. Oper. Pres:
1,025 psi
=
Mcx. Oper. Temp.:
Ambient temperature 140'F in the Heater Bay e
Area and Ambient Temperature 70'F outside the Heater Bay Area. Thermal displacements at the header piping interface will be accounted for in the piping analysis.
ASME Pipe Class:
Class D Seismic Class:
Seismically analyzed, utilizing the envelope of e
Turbine Building wall and slab response spectra curves at Elevations 735'-0" and 768'-0". Header displacements due to seismic loads have been considered in the piping analysis.
j Two of the pressure sensing Lines,1MS68AA/AB 1" and 1MS68BA/BB-1", are composed of P and 1/2" piping and 3/8" stainless steel tubing. They are connected to Main Steam Line 1MS01BC-26". The last pressure sensing Line,1MS69AA-3/4" /
1MS69AB/AC/AD-1/2", is composed of 3/4",1/2" pipirig and 3/8",1/4" stainless steel i
tubing. It is connected to the Main Steam Pressure Equalizing Header 1MS32A-36".
l l
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Comed February 5,1996 LaSalle County Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2 Page 16 of 20 NRC DOCKETS: 50-373 and 50-374 l
Resoonses to NRC Comments - MSIV-LCS The following information is applicable to the above three lines:
Pipe size:
1",3/4",1/2" Schedule 80 Pipe thickness :
0.179", 0.154", 0.147" (respectively)
=
Tubing size:
3/8",1/4"
=
Tubing Wall Thickness:
0.065" Design Pressure:
1,250 psi Max. Oper. Pres:
1,025 psi
=
Max. Oper. Temp.:
Ambient temperature 140*F in the Heater Bay e
Area and Ambient temperature of 70*F outside the Heater Bay Area. Thermal displacements at the header piping interface wi'l be accounted for in the piping analysis ASME Pipe Class:
Class D
=
Seismic Class:
Seismically analyzed, utilizing the envelope of Turbine Building wall and slab response spectra curves at Elevations 710'-6" and 735'-0". Header displacements due to seismic loads have been j
considered in the piping analysis Piping analyses in accordance with the UFSAR requirements have been completed.
The seismic analysis methodology is consistent with the UFSAR requirements. The j
piping analysis results for the pressure sensing lines for Unit 1 are provided in -1. Also provided in Attachment 6-1 is a sample of three existing supports which have been seismically qualified for the newly analyzed loads.
B.
Unit 2 Similar pressure sensing lines will be seismically analyzed in accordance with the UFSAR requirements using the methodology presented in response to Comment 3 and pipe supports modified, if required, prior to start-up from that unit's outage in which the MSIV-LCS was eliminated from service.
Since the pressure sensing lines and supports will be within UFSAR limits, Comed has concluded that the pressure sensing lines will be seismically acceptable prior to start-up from that unit's outage in which the MSIV-LCS was eliminated from service.
k:\\nlaitamalle\\rumi wpf t
Comed February 5,1996 LaSalle County Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2 Page 17 of 20 NRC DOCKETS: 50-373 and 50-374 Resnonses to NRC Comments - MSIV-LCS NRC Comment 7 Confirm that all hardware modifications and actions necessary for resolving these issues will be completed prior to the restart of the plant from the current outage, fiftSDOnse to Comment 7 All required modifications (i.e., mechanical component supports, structural pipe supports, blockwall reinforcements, and condenser supports) and actions necessary for resolving these issues will be completed prior to start-up from that unit's outage in which the MSIV-LCS was eliminated from service.
ADDITIONAL NRC COMMENT NRC Comment 8 Provide an evaluation demonstrating that the Turbine Building roof structure remains elastic under SSE conditions.
Response to Comment a The 1970 UBC seismic zone 1 (z=0.25) was used in the original seismic evaluation of the Turbine Building roof structure. These seismic loads are less than the LaSalle SSE. However, the original design was governed by tornado w'nd lads which, as demonstrated below, impose lateral loads that are larger than the SSE in both the north / south and east / west directions. The following provides a detailed description of the structural framing system of the Turbine Building, seismic modeling. and qualification of roof structure for seismic loads.
A.
Framing System-1 The Turbine Building is an integral part of the plant seismic model for LaSalle. The Turbine Building is a 678'-0" long,122'-0" wide and 75'-6" high (above main floor) structure (Units 1 and 2 combined) located between the Auxiliary / Diesel Generator Buildings (both Category I structures) to the East and the heater bay and radwaste structure to the West.
The Turbine Building roof is in continuation of the Auxiliary Building roof (Elevation 843'-
6"). This roofing system is ultimately connected to the Reactor Building refueling floor which is a very stiff concrete slab diaphragm. (See Attachments 8-1 and 8-2.)
The rigidity of the structural framing system above the Turbine Building Main floor (El.
768'-0") is also evidenced by comparing the corresponding horizontal response spectra at the Main Floor to the spectra at the roof level as shown on pages C-91, C-92, C-110D and C-110E of Design Criteria DC-SE-02-LS, Revision O. No significant amplification in the seismic response is observed.
The Turbine Building roof has 74 inch deep plate girders at every column line, spanning k \\nlauanalle\\nrcq2 wpr
Comed February 5,1996
{
LaSalle County Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2 Page 18 of 20 NRC DOCKETS: 50-373 and 50-374 Resnonses to NRC Comments - MSIV-LCS 122'-0" in the E-W direction. Nine horizontal roof trusses spanning 122'-0" in the east / west direction have been installed to transfer north / south horizontal loads to Column Rows 'R' and 'W. Additionally, a horizontal truss system has been installed along the entire periphery of the roof structure to transfer the north / south and east / west horizontal loads.
Along Column Line 'R', which is a common wall for the Turbine Building and the Auxiliary Building, there is a concrete shear wall from the basemat to the roof level. The vertical bracing system supporting the roof horizontal bracing system is as follows. (See -1.)
1.
North-South Bracino Along Column Line R:
Between Columns 1 through 3 Between Columns 26 through 28
)
i Along Column Line W:
Between Columns 1 through 3 Between Columns 11 through 13 Between Columns 17 through 19 j
Between Columns 27 through 29 2.
East-West Bracina Along Column Line 1:
Between Columns S through V Along Column Line 29:
Between Columns S through V Along Column Line 15:
In Auxiliary Building and Heater Bay Along Column Lines 6, 9,15,21 & 24:
Between Columns R and N B.
Seismic Model:
l Since the Turbine Building is integral with the safety-related structures, the Turbine Building was included in the original seismic model. The structural elements, i.e., the shear walls and slab diaphragms, that were included in the seismic model have been i
designed for the resulting seismic forces obtained from the seismic analyses.
C.
Roof Evaluation:
The Turbine Building roof structural steel was originally designed to resist seismic loads, (UBC zone 1) wind loads and tornado wind loads. The design of the roof steel structure was goverred by the tornado wind loads. Using the tornado loading shears in the N-S and E W directions and converting these shears to equivalent seismic acceleration levels, by dividing the shear force by the mass used to generate the seismic load, one obtains an equivalent horizontal acceleration of approximately 0.73g in the N-S direction and approximately 0.57g in the E W direction. The Turbine Building roof response spectra for the two horizontal directions are shown on pages C 110D and C-110E of Design Criteria DC SE-02-LS, Revision O. These spectra give the ZPA 'g' values of 0.39g in N-S and 0.42g in E-W directions. Therefore, the design ;nargins for the roof structure in N-S k:\\nla\\tamalle\\nrt-q2 wgt
Comed February 5,1996 LaSalle County Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2 Page 19 of 20 NBQ DOCKETS: 50-373 and 50-374 Resoonses to NRC Comments - MSIV-ILS direction is 1.87 (=0.73/0.39) and in E-W direction the design margin is 1.35 (=0.57/0.42).
Therefore, the Turbine Building roof structure has a minimum design margin of 1.35 against SSE allowables in the horizontal direction.
In the vertical direction, the increase in allowables for SSE and normal loads for flexure is 1.6. The roof vertical ZPA is 0.35g which is shown on page C-110F of DC-SE-02-LS.
Therefore, the design margin in the vertical direction is 1.19 (=1.6/1.35) based on UFSAR allowables.
Based on the above evaluation, it is concluded that the Turbine Building roof structure remains elastic and meets UFSAR allowables under SSE seismic conditions.
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l Comed February 5,1996 LaSalle County Nuclear Station - Units 1 and 2 Page 20 of 20 NRC DOCKETS: 50-373 and 50-374 Resnonses to NRC Comments - MSIV-LCS LIST OF ATTACHMENTS Attachment Descriotion j
i 2-1 Isometric View of Leakage Control Path 2-2 Alternate Leakage Treatment Path Functional Diagram (ALT Mode) 2-3 Alternate Leakage Treatment Path Boundary and Control Valves (Table) 4-1 MSIV LCS Support Summary 4-2 Load Table - Unit 1 4-3 Load Table - Unit 2 i
5-1 LaSalle Condenser Isometric View 5-2 Condenser Foundation Details 5-3 Condenser East-West Seismic Supports (Conceptual Detail) 5-4 Condenser North-South Seismic Supports (Conceptual Detail) 6-1 Unit 1 Pressure Sensing Line Piping Stress Summary Unit 1 Supports For Pressure Sensing Lines 8-1 Plan (Turbine Building Roof) 8-2 Section A-A l
1 k.\\nla\\tamalle\\nre q2 wpf
MSVS 2B21-MSV 1,2,3,4 s
x BYPASS
'$s g[ ISOLATION STEAM DRAIN LINE Q
- s.
ISOLATION
~
S-MSBPV-VALVES CONDENSER i
VALVES 1'2'3'4'5 2821 -F418 A,8 2821 -F070,F071,F072,F073 (ONE HIDDEN CEHIND RISER)
PROCESS SAMPLE LINE ISOLATION A
CLOSED - UNUSED LINE h
MAIN STEAM d[Q ISOLATION VALVES 2821-F028A,B,C,D s
s s i
s t
ISOMETRIC VIEW OF LEAKAGE CONTROL PATH UNIT 2 SHOWN (UNIT 1 IS MIRROR IMAGE)
ATTACHMENT 2-1 i
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.---- stCONDaRT C#aM PaTM ALTERNATE LEAKAGE TREATMENT PATH FUNCTIONAL DIAGRAM (ALT MODE)
ATTACHMENT 2-2
I h Piece IEEE I ALT M Noun Velve Tune
- Igg r M'
MM dh M
s Ocemllon m
m 1(2)B21-F028A Main Steam A Outboerd Globe Velve Air Operator ESS Div 1 Open Autome#c Remote Manuel Closed
- Isolellon Velve Containment i
Isolomon valve 19)B21f0288 Main Steam B Outboerd Globe Volvo Air Operator ESS Div 1 Open Automatic Remote Manuel Closed
- 1 l
IsoleSon Velve Containment leoleton Velve I
1 1Q)B21-F028C Main Steam C Outboerd Globe Velve Air Operator ESS Div 1 Open Automalle Remote Manuel Closed
- j isolation Velve Contelnment Isoleton Velve 1(2)B21-F0280 Main Steam D Outboerd Globe Velve Air Operator ESS Div 1 Open Automatic Remote Manuel Closed
- i
!soleton Velve Contelnment isolellon Valve 1G)B21-F418A Main Steam Auxitary Supply Gate Velve Motor ESS Div 2 Open Remote Manuel Local Manuel Closed
{
Steem Stop Velve Operated l
19)B21-F4188 Main Stoem AuxWary Supply Gate Velve Motor ESS Div 2 Open Remote Manuel Local Manuel Closed Steam Stop Valve Operated 19)B21-F020 Main Steam Equetzing Une Globe Velve Motor ESS Div 2 Closed Remote Manuel Local Manuel Closed Stop Velve Operated 19)B21-F070 Main Steam Outbourd Globe Velve Motor ESS Div 2 Closed Remote Manuel Local Manuel Open "#
Isole5on Valve Start-up Drain Operated Stop 8
1Q)B21-F071 Main Steam Outboard Globe Velve Motor ESS Div 2 Open Remoto Manual Local Manuel Open**
f isole6on Velve Operating Operated Drain Stop l
i ATTACHMENT 2-3 Page 1 of 4 f ALTERNATE LEAKAGE TREATMENT PATH BOUNDARY AND CONTROL VALVES f
l
n
. w Emdement Pisco
~
Power PeaMon Pdmary Method ALT Pasi Eadament Noun Name Valve Twee
> Onorator Mothed of gg g
rIyatt h
1Q)B21f072 Mein Steam Une Start-up Globe Velve Motor ESS Div 2 Closed Remote Manuel Local Manuel Closed " #
]
Drain Stop Operated 1Q)B21f073 Msin Steam Outboerd Globe Velve Motor ESS Div 2 Open Remote Manuel Local Manuel Open" Isolation Velve Operating Operated Drain Stop 1G)B21f533 Process Sample Stop Velve Globe Velve Manual WA Closed
- Manuel WA Closed from Main Steam Une B 1Q)B21f302A Mein Steam Une A Drain to Globe Velve Manuel WA Closed Manuel WA Closed Redweste Upstroom Stop valve 1G)B21f302B Main Steam Une B Drain to Globe Velve Manuel WA Closed Local Manuel WA Closed Redweste Upstroom Stop Velve 1Q)B21-F-302C Mein Steam Une C Drain to Globe Velve Manuel WA Closed Local Manuel WA Closed Redweste Upstroom Stop Velve 1G)B21f302D Main Steam Une D Drain to Globe Velve Manuel WA Closed Local Manuel WA Closed Redweste Upstream Stop Velve 1G)B21f306A Main Steam Une A Steam Globe Velve Manuel WA Closed Local Manuel WA Closed l
Tunnel Drain to Redweste Upstream Stop Velve 1Q)B21-F306B Mein Steam Une B Steam Globe Velve Manuel WA Closed Local Manuel WA Closed Tunnel Drain to Redweste Upstroom Stop Velve ATTACHMENT 2-3 Page 2 of 4 {
ALTERNATE LEAKAGE TREATMENT i
l PATH BOUNDARY AND CONTROL VALVES i
l
(
8 I
l
~
Volvo g
Eminment Place h
h Tm
' h-Power Poaluon Pdmary Method ALT Path -
g M
Igen AdusNon s
onorasen 1(2)B21-F306C Main Steam Une C Stoem Globe Velve Manuel WA Closed Local Manuel WA Closed Tunnel Drain to Redweste Upstroom Stop Velve s
1(2)B21-F306D Main Steam Une D Steam Globe Velve Manuel WA Closed Local Manuel WA Closed I
Tunnel Drain to Redweste l
Upstroom Stop Velve i
Unnumbered Drain Velve for instruments PI-Instrument Manuel WA Closed Local Manuel WA Closed 1(2)B21-R500 & 1(2)B21-N511 Velve j
+B21-MSV-1 Main Steam Hgh Pressure Globe Velve Electro /
EHC Open Auto Close on WA Closed i
Turbine Main Stop Velve #1 Hydroutc Turbine Trip
- Control i
(EHC)
I 1(2)B21-MSV-2 Main Stoem High Pressure Globe Velve EHC EHC Open Auto Close on WA Closed j
Turbine Main Stop Velve #2 Turbine Trip ~
i j
1(2)B21-MSV-3 Main Steam Hgh Pressure Globe Velve EHC EHC Open Auto Close on WA Closed l
Turbine Main Stop Velve #3 Turbine Trip ~
t 1(2)B21-MSV-4 Main Steem High Pressure Globe Velve EHC EHC Open Auto Close on WA Closed Turbine Main Stop Velve #4 Turbine Trip "
i 1(2)B21-MSBPV-1 Main Stoom Bypass Velve #1 Globe Velve EHC EHC Closed Auto Close on WA Ciceed l
EHC Presswo i
Contrd "
l l
1(2)B21-MSBPV-2 Main Steam Bypass Velve #2 Globe Velve EHC EHC Closed Auto Close on MA Closed EHC Pressure i
Control
- ATTACHMENT 2-3 Page 3 of 4 ALTERNATE LEAKAGE TREATMENT PATH BOUNDARY AND CONTROL VALVES I
/
h Secondary Eadament Pleos hb Vh Tm h
Iengt Poolton Pdmary Method AliPath '
g thanber M
Durina Unt ofActuadon Pooldon,
.{'
OperaSon 1(2)B21-MSBPV-3 Main Steam Bypass Valve #3 Globe Valve EHC.
EHC Closed Auto Close on N/A Closed EHC Pressure Control ***
1 1(2)B21-MSBPV-4 Main Steam Bypass Valve #4 Globe Valve EHC EHC Closed Auto Close on N/A Closed EHC Pressure w.
i 1(2)B21-MSBPV-5 Main Steam Bypass Valve #5 Globe Valve EHC EHC Closed Auto Close on N/A Closed EHC Pressure Cm -
w, originsey designed as normany open. Sample era is no ioneer used. valve we be administrouvely controned unillline is removed or bisnked.
- Valves used to controlleakage path to condenser
" Fall closed on loss of power l
8 For Primary ALT Path A; For Primary ALT Path B,1821-F070 is closed and 1821-F072 is open l
kN0 =pt i
i i
S ATTACHMENT 2-3 Page 4 of 4 f ALTERNATE LEAKAGE TREATMENT PATH BOUNDARY AND CONTROL VALVES t
l UNIT 1 Piping Total Sampled Subsystem Supports Supports 1M505 4
1 1MS06 4
1 1MS07 4
1 1MS08 4
1 1MSO9 31 3
1MS31 A 32 2
j 1MS$1 A Note 1 0
1 1MS52 11 1
1MS$3 9
1 iMS54 11 1
1MS55 11 1
1MS56 47 3
1MS57 46 3
1MS70 58 2
1MS71 73 5
1LC01 Note 2 0
Totais 345 26 7.5 % Sampling of Supports j
UNIT 2 Piping Total Sampied Subsystem Supports Supports 2MS05 4
1 2MS06 4
1 2MS07 4
1 2MS08 3
1 2MSO9 39 3
2MS31 25 1
2MS51A Note 1 0
2MS52 11 1
2MS53 12 1
2MS$4 10 1
2MS55 10 1
2MS56 37 1
2MS57 37 2
2MS70 50 1
2MS71 Note 3 0
2LC01 Note 2 0
Totals 248 16 6.5 % Sampling of Supports Notes: 1. 1(2)MS$1 A subsystem conosts of four lines each w.,eGE,v to the body of one outboard MSlV (on the upstream side). Eact. of these lines currently branch, with one branch poing to the MSIV leakage control system (LCS) and the other branch to Main Steam drains. The branch to LCS wHI be eliminated as pe t of the MSIV altemate leakage treatment system modrlicabon. The remaining porbon of the piping wis conhnue to serve as Main Steam drains.
Since this remaining piping is not part of the ALT path, no supports are included in this samphng.
- 2. Subsystems 1(2)LC01 are the outboard drain piping for the ongnal MSIV leakage control system. As part of the modrlicahon for the MSIV altemate leakage treatment system theses hnes wil be cut and capped near (approximately 8 inches) the Main Steam headers. No support sampling is provuled since 1(2)LC01 wiu have no remaining supports for the pipe segment for the MSlV altemate leakage treatment system.
- 3. As explemed in the response to queabon 4, for subsystem 2MS71, addlbonal sessme -
- n-w and or moddicabons wil be performed so that the desgn of 2MS71 piping and supports wlE be consstent with the other drain lines used in the Unit 2 MSIV altemate leakage treatment system. Therefore, no support sampling is provided for this subsystem at this time.
ATTACHMENT 4-1 MSIV-LCS SUPPORT
SUMMARY
i supportaderences epheawarences saraceurer componerne evasuoson Meenerdear Componerws Evasussen Suppport Pipe Support Subsystem Piping Analysis Auxiliary Umiting Aux Steel Standani Undling Component l
Count Number Number Report No.
. Steel Structural Design C- ;-- - _
^
Standard Design CaleNo.
Oc _ - - - ^
Mergin Cale. No.
Ow-^
Margin 1
M09-MS01-1288X 1MS05 65681 828 EMB. PLATE 1.84 1MS05-5 CLAMP 3.03 2
M09-MS01-1291X 1MS06 65683 828 EMB. PLATE 1.49 1MS06-5 CLAMP 5.60 3
M09.MS01-1287X 1MS07 65684 813 EMB. PLATE 1.49 1MS07-4 R/E BRACKET 1.16 j
4 M09-MS01-1286X 1MS08 65682 813 EMB. PLATE 1.84 1MS08-5 R/E BRACKET 3.99 5
M09-MS01-1213S 1MS09 L1-MS.09 M09-MS01-1213S EMB. PLATE 2.08 M09-MS01-1213S SNUBBER 1.67 6
M09-MS01-1229S 1MSO9 L1-MS-09 M09-MS01-1229S EMB. PLATE 1.52 MC-MS01-1229S R/E BRACKET 2.08 7
M09-MS01-1341S 1MSO9 L1-MS-09 M09-MS01-1341S STR. STEEL 1.27 M09-MS01-1341S SNUBBER 1.79 8
M09-MS19-1027X 1MS31A 37809 L-000184 AUX. STEEL 3.45 1MS31A-52 R/E BRACKET 3.39 9
M09-MS14-1004G 1MS31A 37809 L-000184 AUX. STEEL 1.23 1MS31-54 Note 1 Note 1 10 M09-MS25-1009G 1MS$2 19815 829 AUX. STEEL
>2 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 11 M09-MS25-1055X 1MS53 17644 815 AUX. STEEL 5.00 L-000184 STRUT 1.66 12 M09-MS25-1031G 1MS54 17645 815 AUX. STEEL 3.00 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 13 M09-MS25-1054X IMS55 17646 815 AUX. STEEL
>5 L-000184 STRUT 324 14 M09-MS25-1078X 1MS56 14662 815 AUX. STEEL 1.03 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 15 M09-MS25-1152X 1MS56 14662 815 BASE PLATE 1.06 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 16 M09-MS28-1097G 1MS56 14662 815 BASE PLATE 1.06 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 I
17 M09-MS28-1013X 1MS57 18805 830 AUX. STEEL 7.10 L-000184 U-BOLT 428 i
18 M09-MS28-1099X 1MS57 18305 830 AUX. STEEL 2.86 L-000184 STRUT 8.00 19 M09-MS30-1008S 1MS57 18805 830 ANCHORS
>5 L-000184 SNUBBER 1.05 20 M09-MS25-1114S IMS70 31315 830 STR. STEEL 2.50 1MS70-14 SNUBBER 19.7 i
21 M09-TEE 2-1008G 1MS70 31315 830 STR. STEEL
>10 1MS70-54 U-BOLT 19.4 i
22 M09-MS28-1037S 1MS71 30823 L000065 STR. STEEL 5.77 L-000057 SNUBBER 10.7 j
23 M09-MS28-1057S 1MS71 30823 L000065 STR. STEEL 10 L-000057 SNUBBER 8.83 24 M09-MS28-1078S 1MS71 30823 L000065 AUX. STEEL
25 M09-TEE 3-1004X 1MS71 30823 L000065 STR. STEEL 10 L-000058 EXT. PtPE 4.55 26 M09-TEE 3-1010X 1MS71 30823 L000065 AUX. STEEL
>1.2 L-000058 STRUT 10.9
[
i Note 1.
This support consets of auxiliary steel members only. It does not include any standard pipeg components to evaluate.
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i ATTACHMENT 4-2 j
LOAD TABLE - UNIT 1 l
1
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t_^- :-iReentences Piping Referencee Structural C&.,~.
- 4. Eva0uenon niechanicalComponents Evoluenon Suppport Pipe Support Subsystem Piping Analysis Auxillery Limieng Aux Steel StantJard Limiting Component i
Count Number Number Report No.
Steel Structural Design Component Standard Design Calc No.
r' 7. : n.:
Margin Calc. No.
Com s -.;
Margin 1
M09-MS01-2807X 2MS05 65380 839 EMB. PLATE 1.84 QUAD 1-81-937 STRUT ASSY 3.11 2
M09-MS01-2816X 2MS06 65381 L-0000185 EMB. PLATE 5.78 2M306-5 STRUT ASSY 5.60 3
M09-MS01-2825X 2MS07 65382 839-PLATE 1.49 65382 STRUT ASSY 1.16 l
4 M09-MS01-2837X 2MS08 65383 839 EMB. PLATE 1.84 QUAD 141-937 STRUT ASSY 3.65 l
5 M09-MS01-2850X 2MSO9
.27044 M09-MS01-2860X WELD 1.25 M09-MS01-2850X CLAMP 1.18 6
M09-MS01-2873X 2MSO9
'27044 M09-MS01-2873X WELD 1.08 M09-MS01-2873X CLAMP 1.18 7
M09-MS01-290$S 2MSO9
-27044 M09-MS01-2905S WELD 1.08 M09-MS01-2905S SNUBBER 1.23 8
M09-MS25-2968G 2MS52
'30176 QUAD 141-504 AUX. STEEL 5.55 Note 1 '
Note 1 Note 1 l
9 M09-MS25-2993S 2 MSS 3 30178 QUAD 1-81-505 AUX. STEEL 10.0 QUAD 141-505 U-BOLT 3.61 i
10 M09-MS25-2984G 2 MSS 4 27048 QUAD 1-81-606 AUX. STEEL 8.67 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 11 M09-MS25-2961G 2MS55 30177 QUAD 1-81-507 AUX. STEEL 3.84 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 1
12 M09-MS27-2802X 2MS56 37954 L-0000185 AUX. STEEL 5.00 2MS56-36 STRUT ASSY 6.65
[
13 M09-MS28-2808R 2MS57 37840 L-0000185 AUX. STEEL 4.00 2MS57-13 ROD ASSY 3.37 14 M09-MS30-2999X 2MS57 37840 L-0000185 AUX. STEEL 5.00 2MS57-39 STRUT ASSY 3.14
{
15 M09-MS25-2944G 2MS70 33124 L-0000185 AUX. STEEL 1.38 2MS70-113 STRUT ASSY 2.12
{
16 M09-MS19-2803X 2MS31B d2129 QUAD 1-81-937 AUX. STEEL 10.0 2MS318-27 STRUT ASSY 22.2 l
l Note 1.
This support consists of auxiliary steel members only. It does not include any standard piping components to evaluate.
1 I
ATTACHMENT 4-3 i
LOAD TABLE - UNIT 2 i
TURBINE SUPPORT LOWER
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ATTACHMENT 5-4
s i
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UNIT 1 - PRESSURE SENSING UNE PIPING STRESS
SUMMARY
SUBSYSTEM SERVICE LEVEL ALLOWABLE L
I IDENTIFICATION D STRESS EQ.9 STRESS LIMITS COMMENTS 1
1MS93AA CLASS D 15,800 38,000 0.44 A
,M. for ppng rede Hester Boy i
1MS93AA CLASS D 18.000 38.000
- 0.44 A_,.:. for e, n=duri= Hester Bey 2
IMS93AB CLASS D 32,000 38,000 0.89
"., for pyng inside Hester Boy i
IMS93AB CLASS D 5,020 38.000 0.14 A2,_ for es autode Hester Boy 3
IMS93AC CLASS D 28.100 38,000 0.78
",, for ppng inede Hester Boy 1MS93AC CLASS D 4,870 38.000 0.13
",_,_ for M. outade Hester Boy 4
1MS93AD CLASS D 35,800 38.000 0.99
- k.,_ for piping twide Hester Boy l
1MS93AD CLASS D 4,880 38.000 0.13 A..",_ for -, outside Hester Boy 5
1MS88AA/AB CLASS D 8,730 38.000 0.24
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8 1MS88BA/BB CLASS D 8,730 38,000 0.24 A,_ wee for -, both inside and outesde Hester Bay 7
1MS89AA/AB/AC/AD CLASS D 31,000 38,000 0.88
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UNIT 1 - SUPPORTS FOR PRESSURE SENSING UNES
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1 1MS89AA/AD NP 280 L-000188 Aux. Steel 1.74 U-Bolt
>10 2
1MS93AD NP 90 L-000188 Cone. Emp. A4-.
2.7 U-Bolt
>10 3
1MS88BA/BB NP 130 L-000188 Conc.Emp. A J -.
1.49 U-Bolt
>10 ATTACHMENT 6-1
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