ML20070A364

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Provides Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/94-08,50-260/94-08 & 50-296/94-08.Corrective Actions: Licensee Revised Appropriate Paperwork & Determined That Individuals Who Issued Wrong Badges Did Not Enter Area
ML20070A364
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 06/22/1994
From: Machon R
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9406280328
Download: ML20070A364 (5)


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June 22, 1994 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 CFR 2 ATTN: Document Control Desk Appendix C Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentleman:

In the Matter of

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Dockets Nos. 50-259 Tennessee Valley Authority

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50-260 50-296 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-259, 50-260, 50-296/94-08, REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NOV)

This letter provides TVA's reply to the NOV transmitted from J. P. Stohr to 0. D. Kingsley, Jr., dated May 27, 1994. The subject Inspection Report identified a violation for not controlling access to protected and vital areas resulting from the misissuance of two security access badges.

The enclosure to this letter provides TVA's " Reply to the Notice of Violation" (10 CFR 2.201).

If 3 1 have any questions regarding this reply, please telephone Pedro Salas at (205) 729-2636.

l Sincerely, fA R. D. Mac / g n

Site Vice President Enclosure cc:

See page 2 n r" 9406280328 940622

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission

'Page 2 June 22, 1994 l

cc (Enclosure):

Mr. M. Lesser, Project Chief (w/o Enclosure)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. D. R. McGuire (w/ Enclosure)

Chief, Safeguards Section U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 NRC Resident Inspector (w/o Enclosure)

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35611 Mr. D. C. Trimble, Jr., Project Manager (w/o Enclosure)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 200852 i

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l U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 June 22, 1994 cc (Enclosure):

Mr. M. Lesser, Project Chief (w/o Enclosure)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. D. R. McGuire (w/ Enclosure)

Chief, Safeguards Section U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 NRC Resident Inspector (w/o Enclosure)

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35611 Mr. D. C. Trimble, Jr., Project Manager (w/o Enclosure)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission one White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 200852 PS:RDW: JEW:CSW W/0 Enclosures cc:

E. S. Christenbury, ET 11H-K E. N. Harris, LP 3B-C R. W. Huston, LP 5B-C C. E. Merchant, TCE TR 23-BFN T. J. McCrath, LP 3B-C l

D. E. Hunn, LP 3B-C D. T. Nye, MOD 2A-BFN T. W. Over11d, BR 4J-C Eugene Preston, POB 2C-BFN S. H. Rudge, PAB IC-BFN i

J. R. Rupert, EDB 1A-BFN T. D. Shriver, PSB 1K-BFN E. J. Vigluicci, ET 10H-K

0. J. Zeringue, LP 3B-C RIMS, CST 13B-C j

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ENCLOSURE 1 Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN)

Reply to Notice of Violation (NOV)

Inspection Report Number 19-259, 260. 296/94-08 Restalment of viointion During an NRC inspection conducted on April 25 - 29, 1994, a violation of NRC requirements was identified.

In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, the violation is listed below:

Section 12, Physical Security Instruction Manual (PSIM), Revision 0, dated March 31, 1993, states in part, "The member of the security force shall compare the employee's face to the picture on the badge.

If they do not match, further identification shall be requested until absolute identify and match is complete. This function is the responsibility of the member (s) of the security force issuing the badge."

Contrary to the above, on December 30, 1993, and March 22, 1994, the comparisons, by the member of the security force, of the employees' faces to the pictures on the badges were inadequate in that the wrong security identification badges were issued to two individuals (one on each date) who used the badges to gain access to the protected area.

This is a repeat Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement III).

TVA's Reniv to violation 1.

Reason For Violation l

As was noted in the Inspection Report, the events that led to this violation were identified by TVA and recorded in the Safeguards Event Log. These events resulted from inattention to detail. The inattention to detail occurred due to the failure of the Security Officers to ensure matches of the individuals' faces to the individuals' picturce on their security identification badges prior to issuing the badges.

In addition, the individuals requesting the badges failed to ensure that they had received the correct badges from the Security Officers.

e.

  • O TVA acknowledges that the events described in the HOV constitute a repeat violation. Therefore, following the March 22, 1994 event, TVA recognized that more positive controls were needed to ensure the proper issuance of security badges, as described in the following section.

2.

Corrective Steps Taken and Results Achieved In both events, TVA reviewed the appropriate paperwork and determined that the individuals who were issued the wrong badges did not enter an area for which they were not authorized to access. This conclusion was noted by the NRC Inspectors in the Inspection Report.

The Site Security Manager issued a memorandum that included Inspection Report 94-08.

This memorandum was issued to heighten the awareness of Security Shift Supervisors and Officers to the seriousness of the issuance process and the need to follow approved procedures.

Appropriate personnel corrective action was taken to address the inappropriate Security Officers' actions.

3.

Corrective Steps That Ihave been orl Will Be Taken to Prevent Recurrenng 4

Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Full compliance was achieved on March 22, 1994 l

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