ML20042C049

PV-2019-10 Draft Outlines Delayed Release Until March 2022

ML20042C049
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	10/12/2019
From:	Kura M Arizona Public Service Co
To:	Scott(Ois) Morris Division of Reactor Safety IV
References
Download: ML20042C049 (51)

Text

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 Facility: Palo Verde Date of Exam: October 4, 2019 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

Total A2 G*

Total

1.

Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1

3 2

4 N/A 3

3 N/A 3

18 6

2 2

2 1

1 1

2 9

4 Tier Totals 5

4 5

4 4

5 27 10

2.

Plant Systems 1

3 3

3 3

2 2

2 3

2 2

3 28 5

2 1

0 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

10 3

Tier Totals 4

3 4

4 3

3 3

4 3

3 4

38 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 1

2 3

4 10 1

2 3

4 7

2 3

2 3

Note: 1.

Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outline sections (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only section, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 radiation control K/A is allowed if it is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 category.)

2.

The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points, and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3.

Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the outline. Systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification. Operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4.

Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible. Sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5.

Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6.

Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.

The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8.

On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics IRs for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. If fuel-handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2. (Note 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9.

For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

G* Generic K/As These systems/evolutions must be included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan. They are not required to be included when using earlier revisions of the K/A catalog.

These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.

ES-401 2

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000007 (EPE 7; BW E02&E10; CE E02)

Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery / 1 Not sampled 000008 (APE 8) Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 X

AK1.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to a pressurizer vapor space accident: Thermodynamics and flow characteristics of open or leaking valves 3.2 12 000009 (EPE 9) Small Break LOCA / 3 X

EK3.21 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the small break LOCA and the following: Actions contained in the EOP for SBLOCA / leak 4.2 13 000011 (EPE 11) Large Break LOCA / 3 X

EA2.08 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: Conditions necessary for recovery when accident reaches stable phase 3.9 14 000015 (APE 15) Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions / 4 X

AA1.07 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the reactor coolant pump malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): RCP seal water injection subsystem 3.5 15 000022 (APE 22) Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup / 2 X

G.2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation 4.3 16 000025 (APE 25) Loss of Residual Heat Removal System / 4 X

AK2.03 Knowledge of the interrelations between the loss of Residual Heat Removal System and the following: service water or closed cooling water pumps 2.7 17 000026 (APE 26) Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 X

AA2.06 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the loss of Component Cooling Water: the length of time after the loss of CCW flow to a component before that component may be damaged 2.8 18 000027 (APE 27) Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 X

AA1.04 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the pressurizer pressure control system malfunction: Pressure recovery, using only emergency-only heaters 3.9 19 000029 (EPE 29) Anticipated Transient Without Scram / 1 X

G2.4.2 Knowledge of system set points, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions 4.5 20 000038 (EPE 38) Steam Generator Tube Rupture / 3 X

EK3.08 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the SGTR: Criteria for securing RCP 4.1 21 000040 (APE 40; BW E05; CE E05; W E12)

Steam Line RuptureExcessive Heat Transfer / 4 X

CE E05 Excess Steam Demand:

EK1.1 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to an ESD:

components, capacities, and functions of emergency systems 3.0 22 000054 (APE 54; CE E06) Loss of Main Feedwater /4 X

AK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of main Feedwater (MFW): Reactor and/or turbine trip, manual and automatic 4.1 23 000055 (EPE 55) Station Blackout / 6 X

EA2.06 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Station Blackout:

Faults and lockouts that must be cleared prior to re-energizing buses 3.7 24

ES-401 3

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 000056 (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power / 6 X

AK3.02 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite power 4.4 25 000057 (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus / 6 X

AA1.01 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Manual inverter swapping 3.7 26 000058 (APE 58) Loss of DC Power / 6 X

AK1.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of DC Power: Battery charger equipment and instrumentation 2.8 27 000062 (APE 62) Loss of Nuclear Service Water / 4 Not sampled 000065 (APE 65) Loss of Instrument Air / 8 X

G2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions 4.2 28 000077 (APE 77) Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 X

AK2.07 Knowledge of the interrelations between Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances and the following: Turbine / Generator Control 3.6 29 (W E04) LOCA Outside Containment / 3 N/A for CE design (W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation / 4 N/A for CE design (BW E04; W E05) Inadequate Heat TransferLoss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 N/A for CE design K/A Category Totals:

3 2

4 3

3 3

Group Point Total:

18/6

ES-401 4

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000001 (APE 1) Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 X

G2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation 4.4 46 000003 (APE 3) Dropped Control Rod / 1 Not sampled 000005 (APE 5) Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 Not sampled 000024 (APE 24) Emergency Boration / 1 X

AK1.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to emergency boration:

Relationship between boron addition and change in Tave 3.4 47 000028 (APE 28) Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction / 2 Not sampled 000032 (APE 32) Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7 Not sampled 000033 (APE 33) Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7 X

AK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation: Termination of startup following loss of intermediate range instrumentation 3.2 48 000036 (APE 36; BW/A08) Fuel-Handling Incidents / 8 Not sampled 000037 (APE 37) Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 Not sampled 000051 (APE 51) Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 Not sampled 000059 (APE 59) Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release / 9 X

AA2.05 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release: The occurrence of automatic safety actions as a result of a high PRM signal 3.6 49 000060 (APE 60) Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release / 9 Not sampled 000061 (APE 61) Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarms

/ 7 Not sampled 000067 (APE 67) Plant Fire On Site / 8 Not sampled 000068 (APE 68; BW A06) Control Room Evacuation / 8 Not sampled 000069 (APE 69; W E14) Loss of Containment Integrity / 5 Not sampled 000074 (EPE 74; W E06 & E07) Inadequate Core Cooling /

4 X

EK2.04 Knowledge of the interrelations between Inadequate Core Cooling and the following:

HPI pumps 3.9 50 000076 (APE 76) High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 X

AA1.04 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity: Failed Fuel monitoring equipment 3.2 51 000078 (APE 78*) RCS Leak / 3 Not sampled (W E01 & E02) Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 N/A for CE design (W E13) Steam Generator Overpressure / 4 N/A for CE design (W E15) Containment Flooding / 5 N/A for CE design (W E16) High Containment Radiation /9 N/A for CE design (BW A01) Plant Runback / 1 N/A for CE design (BW A02 & A03) Loss of NNI-X/Y/7 N/A for CE design

ES-401 5

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 (BW A04) Turbine Trip / 4 N/A for CE design (BW A05) Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 N/A for CE design (BW A07) Flooding / 8 N/A for CE design (BW E03) Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 N/A for CE design (BW E08; W E03) LOCA CooldownDepressurization / 4 N/A for CE design (BW E09; CE A13**; W E09 & E10) Natural Circulation/4 Not sampled (BW E13 & E14) EOP Rules and Enclosures N/A for CE design (CE A11**; W E08) RCS OvercoolingPressurized Thermal Shock / 4 Not sampled (CE A16) Excess RCS Leakage / 2 X

AK1.3 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Excess RCS Leakage:

Annunciators and conditions, indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the Excess RCS Leakage 3.2 52 (CE E09) Functional Recovery X

EK2.1 Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Functional Recovery) and the following: Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features 3.6 53 (CE E13*) Loss of Forced Circulation/LOOP/Blackout / 4 X

G2.2.4 (multi-unit license) Ability to explain the variations in control board/control room layouts, systems, instrumentation, and procedural actions between units at a facility 3.6 54 K/A Category Point Totals:

2 2

1 1

1 2

Group Point Total:

9/4

ES-401 6

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (RO)

System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 003 (SF4P RCP) Reactor Coolant Pump X

X K1.04 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationship between the RCPS and the following system: CVCS A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RCPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: problems with RCP seals, especially rates of seal leak-off 2.6 3.5 1

55 004 (SF1; SF2 CVCS) Chemical and Volume Control X

X K3.06 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CVCS will have on the following: RCS temperature and pressure A4.07 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Boration/dilution 3.4 3.9 2

3 005 (SF4P RHR) Residual Heat Removal X

X K2.03 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: RCS pressure boundary motor-operated valves G.2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

2.7 4.2 4

5 006 (SF2; SF3 ECCS) Emergency Core Cooling X

X A1.14 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ECCS controls including: Reactor vessel level A3.04 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including: Cooling water systems 3.6 3.8 6

7 007 (SF5 PRTS) Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank X

K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PRTS will have on the following: Containment 3.3 8

008 (SF8 CCW) Component Cooling Water X

K2.02 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: CCW pump, including backup 3.0 9

010 (SF3 PZR PCS) Pressurizer Pressure Control X

K4.03 Knowledge of the PZR PCS design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for the following: over pressure control 3.8 10 012 (SF7 RPS) Reactor Protection X

X A2.07 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of DC control power G 2.4.46 Ability to verify that alarms are consistent with the plant conditions 3.2 4.2 30 31 013 (SF2 ESFAS) Engineered Safety Features Actuation X

X K6.01 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ESFAS system: Sensors and detectors A4.02 Ability to manually operate and or monitor in the control room: Reset of ESFAS channels 2.7 4.3 32 33

ES-401 7

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 022 (SF5 CCS) Containment Cooling X

K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCS will have on the following: Containment equipment subject to damage by high or low temperature, humidity, and pressure 2.9 34 025 (SF5 ICE) Ice Condenser N/A for PV 026 (SF5 CSS) Containment Spray X

A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: failure of spray pump 3.9 35 039 (SF4S MSS) Main and Reheat Steam X

K5.05 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to MRSS: Bases for RCS cooldown limits 2.9 36 059 (SF4S MFW) Main Feedwater X

K4.16 Knowledge of the design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for the following: Automatic trips for MFW pumps 3.1 37 061 (SF4S AFW)

Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X

X G 2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license K5.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the AFW: Relationship between AFW flow and RCS heat transfer 3.6 3.6 38 11 062 (SF6 ED AC) AC Electrical Distribution X

A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ac distribution system controls, including:

Significance of D/G load limits 3.4 39 063 (SF6 ED DC) DC Electrical Distribution X

K4.01 Knowledge of DC electrical system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Manual/automatic transfers of control 2.7 40 064 (SF6 EDG) Emergency Diesel Generator X

K6.08 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ED/G system: Fuel oil storage tanks 3.2 41 073 (SF7 PRM) Process Radiation Monitoring X

K1.01 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the PRM system and the following systems: Those systems served by PRMs 3.6 42 076 (SF4S SW) Service Water X

K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Service water pump 2.7 43 078 (SF8 IAS) Instrument Air X

K1.05 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the IAS system and the following systems: MSIV air 3.4 44 103 (SF5 CNT) Containment X

A3.01 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the containment system, including:

Containment isolation 3.9 45 053 (SF1; SF4P ICS*) Int. Control N/A for CE design K/A Category Point Totals:

3 3

3 3

2 2

2 3

2 2

3 Group Point Total:

28/5

ES-401 8

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 2 (RO)

System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 001 (SF1 CRDS) Control Rod Drive Not sampled 002 (SF2; SF4P RCS) Reactor Coolant X

K5.08 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RCS: Why PZR level should be kept within the programmed band 3.4 56 011 (SF2 PZR LCS) Pressurizer Level Control X

K6.01 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the PZR LCS: Reasons for starting charging pump while increasing letdown flow rate 2.8 57 014 (SF1 RPI) Rod Position Indication X

A1.04 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RPIS controls, including: Axial and radial power distribution 3.5 58 015 (SF7 NI) Nuclear Instrumentation Not sampled 016 (SF7 NNI) Nonnuclear Instrumentation Not sampled 017 (SF7 ITM) In-Core Temperature Monitor X

K4.03 Knowledge of ITM design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Range of temperature indication 3.1 59 027 (SF5 CIRS) Containment Iodine Removal X

K1.01 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CIRS system and the following systems: CSS 3.4 60 028 (SF5 HRPS) Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control Not sampled 029 (SF8 CPS) Containment Purge Not sampled 033 (SF8 SFPCS) Spent Fuel Pool Cooling X

K3.02 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the SFPCS will have on the following: Area and ventilation radiation monitoring systems 2.8 61 034 (SF8 FHS) Fuel-Handling Equipment Not sampled 035 (SF 4P SG) Steam Generator X G2.2.3 Knowledge of the design, procedural, and operational differences between units 3.8 62 041 (SF4S SDS) Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control Not sampled 045 (SF 4S MTG) Main Turbine Generator X

A2.17 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MTG; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Malfunction of electrohydraulic control 2.7 63 055 (SF4S CARS) Condenser Air Removal Not sampled 056 (SF4S CDS) Condensate Not sampled 068 (SF9 LRS) Liquid Radwaste X

A3.02 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the liquid Radwaste System, including:

Automatic isolation 3.6 64 071 (SF9 WGS) Waste Gas Disposal Not sampled 072 (SF7 ARM) Area Radiation Monitoring Not sampled 075 (SF8 CW) Circulating Water Not sampled 079 (SF8 SAS**) Station Air Not sampled

ES-401 9

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 086 Fire Protection X

A4.02 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Fire detection panels 3.5 65 K/A Category Point Totals:

1 0

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 Group Point Total:

10/3

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)

Form ES-401-3 Rev. 11 Facility: Palo Verde Date of Exam: October 4, 2019 Category K/A #

Topic RO SRO-only IR IR

1. Conduct of Operations 2.1.4 Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, no-solo operation, maintenance of license status, 10CFR55, etc.

3.3 66 2.1.15 Knowledge of administrative requirements for temporary management directives, such as standing orders, night orders, Operations Memos, etc 2.7 67 2.1.

2.1.

2.1.

Subtotal 2

2. Equipment Control 2.2.7 Knowledge of the process for conducting special or infrequent tests 2.9 68 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures 3.7 69 2.2.35 Ability to determine Technical Specification Mode of Operation 3.6 70 2.2.

2.2.

2.2.

Subtotal 3

3. Radiation Control 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions 3.2 71 2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

3.2 72 2.3.

2.3.

Subtotal 2

4. Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.17 Knowledge of EOP terms and definitions 3.9 73 2.4.19 Knowledge of EOP layout, symbols, and icons 3.4 74 2.4.31 Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures 4.2 75 2.4.

2.4.

2.4.

Subtotal 3

Tier 3 Point Total 10 10

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Rev. 11 Tier /

Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection 1 / 1 (Q25) 056 AK3.01 056 AK3.01 asks about the order and time to initiation of power for the load sequencer and Question 7 asks about monitoring automatic operation of the ECCS cooling water systems. Since both sequences use the same sequencer, the questions were too similar to preclude question overlap.

Reselected 056 AK3.02.

1 / 1 (Q21) 038 EK3.09 038 EK3.09 asks about the criteria for securing/throttling ECCS and Question 6 asks about predicting/monitoring changes in parameters associated with operating the ECCS controls including reactor vessel level -

which is only really used when determining if SI flow can be stopped/throttled, so questions on both K/As kept coming back to SI throttle criteria. Reselected 038 EK3.08.

1 / 2 (Q46) 001 G 2.2.3 PVNGS does not have any design, procedural, or operational differences between the units for continuous rod withdrawal situations. Reselected 001 G 2.1.7 1 / 2 (Q54)

CE E13 G 2.4.8 There are no AOPs which would be used in conjunction with the LOFC/LOOP or Blackout EOPs at PVNGS. Reselected CE E13 G 2.2.4 2 / 1 (Q11) 010 K5.01 Unable to write a clear question about the condition of the fluid in the Pressurizer due to the mix of saturated and subcooled mixture with no clear delineation between when it transitions from one state to the other, as well as to ask about the operational implications of the status of the fluid. All attempts to write the question to this KA resulted in a question where the distractors had very low plausibility or the question lacked operational validity. The only other K5 KA in 010 asks about constant enthalpy through a valve and we already have a question about Pressurizer Relief Valves.

Reselected 061 K5.01 2 / 1 (Q1) 003 K1.02 003 K1.02 asks about RCP cooling and ventilation, however there are other questions which also ask about RCP cooling and there is no direct ventilation cooling for RCPs at PVNGS so we could not write a question without significantly overlapping with other questions and/or portions of the exam. Reselected 003 K1.04.

2 / 2 (Q57) 011 K6.05 011 K6.05 asks about the effect a loss or malfunction of the function of post-accident Pressurizer level gauges will have on the PLCS, however the post-accident instrumentation identification (from memory) and all required TS actions for PAMI instruments would be considered SRO level knowledge (below double line and > 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> actions). Reselected 011 K6.01 3

(Q69)

G 2.2.21 Knowledge of pre-and post-maintenance operability requirements is beyond the scope of the RO job function. Reselected G 2.2.12.

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 Facility: Palo Verde Date of Exam: October 4, 2019 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

Total A2 G*

Total

1.

Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1

N/A N/A 18 3

3 6

2 9

2 2

4 Tier Totals 27 5

5 10

2.

Plant Systems 1

28 2

3 5

2 10 1

1 1

3 Tier Totals 38 4

4 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 1

2 3

4 10 1

2 3

4 7

2 1

2 2

Note: 1.

Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outline sections (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only section, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 radiation control K/A is allowed if it is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 category.)

2.

The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points, and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3.

Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the outline. Systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification. Operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4.

Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible. Sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5.

Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6.

Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.

The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8.

On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics IRs for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. If fuel-handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2. (Note 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9.

For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

G* Generic K/As These systems/evolutions must be included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan. They are not required to be included when using earlier revisions of the K/A catalog.

These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.

ES-401 2

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000007 (EPE 7; BW E02&E10; CE E02)

Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery / 1 Not sampled 000008 (APE 8) Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 Not sampled 000009 (EPE 9) Small Break LOCA / 3 X

G2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation (CFR 43.5) 4.4 76 000011 (EPE 11) Large Break LOCA / 3 X

EA2.10 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: Verification of adequate core cooling 4.7 77 000015 (APE 15) Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions / 4 Not sampled 000022 (APE 22) Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup / 2 Not sampled 000025 (APE 25) Loss of Residual Heat Removal System / 4 Not sampled 000026 (APE 26) Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 Not sampled 000027 (APE 27) Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 X

AA2.06 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer pressure Control Malfunction: Conditions which require a plant shutdown (CFR 43.5) 3.9 78 000029 (EPE 29) Anticipated Transient Without Scram / 1 Not sampled 000038 (EPE 38) Steam Generator Tube Rupture / 3 X G2.4.8 Knowledge of how AOPs are used in conjunction with EOPs (CFR 43.5) 4.5 79 000040 (APE 40; BW E05; CE E05; W E12)

Steam Line Rupture-Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 Not sampled 000054 (APE 54; CE E06) Loss of Main Feedwater /4 Not sampled 000055 (EPE 55) Station Blackout / 6 X

EA2.03 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Station Blackout:

Actions necessary to restore power (CFR 43.5) 4.7 80 000056 (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power / 6 Not sampled 000057 (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus / 6 Not sampled 000058 (APE 58) Loss of DC Power / 6 X G2.2.40 Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system (43.2 / 43.5 / 45.3) 4.7 81 000062 (APE 62) Loss of Nuclear Service Water / 4 Not sampled 000065 (APE 65) Loss of Instrument Air / 8 Not sampled 000077 (APE 77) Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 Not sampled (W E04) LOCA Outside Containment / 3 N/A for CE designs (W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation / 4 N/A for CE designs (BW E04; W E05) Inadequate Heat Transfer-Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 N/A for CE designs K/A Category Totals:

3 3

Group Point Total:

6

ES-401 3

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000001 (APE 1) Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 X

G2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits (CFR 43.2) 4.7 82 000003 (APE 3) Dropped Control Rod / 1 Not sampled 000005 (APE 5) Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 Not sampled 000024 (APE 24) Emergency Boration / 1 X

AA2.05 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Emergency Boration:

Amount of boron to add to achieve required SDM (CFR 43.2 / 43.5) 3.9 83 000028 (APE 28) Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction / 2 Not sampled 000032 (APE 32) Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7 Not sampled 000033 (APE 33) Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7 Not sampled 000036 (APE 36; BW/A08) Fuel Handling Incidents / 8 Not sampled 000037 (APE 37) Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 Not sampled 000051 (APE 51) Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 Not sampled 000059 (APE 59) Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release / 9 Not sampled 000060 (APE 60) Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release / 9 Not sampled 000061 (APE 61) Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarms

/ 7 Not sampled 000067 (APE 67) Plant Fire On Site / 8 Not sampled 000068 (APE 68; BW A06) Control Room Evacuation / 8 Not sampled 000069 (APE 69;) Loss of Containment Integrity / 5 X

G2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits CFR (41.5 / 41.7 / 43.2) 4.2 84 000074 (EPE 74; W E06 & E07) Inadequate Core Cooling /

4 Not sampled 000076 (APE 76) High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 Not sampled 000078 (APE 78*) RCS Leak / 3 Not sampled (WE01 & E02) Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 N/A for CE designs (W E13) Steam Generator Overpressure / 4 N/A for CE designs (W E15) Containment Flooding / 5 N/A for CE designs (W E16) High Containment Radiation /9 N/A for CE designs (BW A01) Plant Runback / 1 N/A for CE designs (BW A02 & A03) Loss of NNI X/Y/7 N/A for CE designs (BW A04) Turbine Trip / 4 N/A for CE designs (BW A05) Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 N/A for CE designs (BW A07) Flooding / 8 N/A for CE designs (BW E03) Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 N/A for CE designs (BW E08; W E03) LOCA Cooldown-Depressurization / 4 N/A for CE designs (BW E09; CE A13**; W E09 & E10) Natural Circulation/4 Not sampled (BW E13 & E14) EOP Rules and Enclosures N/A for CE designs (CE A11 W E08) RCS Overcooling-Pressurized Thermal Shock / 4 Not sampled

ES-401 4

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 (CE A16) Excess RCS Leakage / 2 Not sampled (CE E09) Functional Recovery X

EA2.1 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Functional Recovery:

Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations (CFR 43.5) 4.4 85 (CE E13*) Loss of Forced Circulation/LOOP/Blackout / 4 Not sampled K/A Category Point Totals:

2 2

Group Point Total:

4

ES-401 5

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (SRO)

System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 003 (SF4P RCP) Reactor Coolant Pump Not sampled 004 (SF1; SF2 CVCS) Chemical and Volume Control Not sampled 005 (SF4P RHR) Residual Heat Removal X

A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RHRS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Pressure transient protection during cold shutdown (CFR 43.5) 3.7 86 006 (SF2; SF3 ECCS) Emergency Core Cooling Not sampled 007 (SF5 PRTS) Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank Not sampled 008 (SF8 CCW) Component Cooling Water Not sampled 010 (SF3 PZR PCS) Pressurizer Pressure Control Not sampled 012 (SF7 RPS) Reactor Protection X

G2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits (CFR 43.2) 4.2 87 013 (SF2 ESFAS) Engineered Safety Features Actuation X G2.2.40 Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system (CFR 43.5) 4.7 88 022 (SF5 CCS) Containment Cooling Not sampled 025 (SF5 ICE) Ice Condenser Not sampled 026 (SF5 CSS) Containment Spray X

A2.09 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Radiation hazard potential of BWST (CFR: 43.5) 2.9 89 039 (SF4S MSS) Main and Reheat Steam Not sampled 059 (SF4S MFW) Main Feedwater Not sampled 061 (SF4S AFW)

Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater Not sampled 062 (SF6 ED AC) AC Electrical Distribution X

G2.4.6 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies (CFR 43.5) 4.7 90 063 (SF6 ED DC) DC Electrical Distribution Not sampled 064 (SF6 EDG) Emergency Diesel Generator Not sampled 073 (SF7 PRM) Process Radiation Monitoring Not sampled 076 (SF4S SW) Service Water Not sampled 078 (SF8 IAS) Instrument Air Not sampled 053 (SF1; SF4P ICS*) Integrated Control N/A for CE designs K/A Category Point Totals:

2 3 Group Point Total:

5

ES-401 6

Form ES-401-2 Rev. 11 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 2 (SRO)

System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 001 (SF1 CRDS) Control Rod Drive X

A2.12 Ability to a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CRDS; and b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Erroneous ECP calculation (CFR 43.5) 4.2 91 002 (SF2; SF4P RCS) Reactor Coolant Not sampled 011 (SF2 PZR LCS) Pressurizer Level Control Not sampled 014 (SF1 RPI) Rod Position Indication Not sampled 015 (SF7 NI) Nuclear Instrumentation Not sampled 016 (SF7 NNI) Nonnuclear Instrumentation Not sampled 017 (SF7 ITM) InCore Temperature Monitor X

G2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits (CFR 43.2) 4.2 92 027 (SF5 CIRS) Containment Iodine Removal Not sampled 028 (SF5 HRPS) Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control Not sampled 029 (SF8 CPS) Containment Purge Not sampled 033 (SF8 SFPCS) Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Not sampled 034 (SF8 FHS) FuelHandling Equipment X

K4.01 Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlocks(s) which provide for the following:

Fuel protection from binding and dropping (CFR 43.5 / 43.7) 3.4 93 035 (SF 4P SG) Steam Generator Not sampled 041 (SF4S SDS) Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control Not sampled 045 (SF 4S MTG) Main Turbine Generator Not sampled 055 (SF4S CARS) Condenser Air Removal Not sampled 056 (SF4S CDS) Condensate Not sampled 068 (SF9 LRS) Liquid Radwaste Not sampled 071 (SF9 WGS) Waste Gas Disposal Not sampled 072 (SF7 ARM) Area Radiation Monitoring Not sampled 075 (SF8 CW) Circulating Water Not sampled 079 (SF8 SAS**) Station Air Not sampled 086 Fire Protection Not sampled 050 (SF 9 CRV*) Control Room Ventilation Not sampled K/A Category Point Totals:

1 1

1 Group Point Total:

3

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)

Form ES-401-3 Rev. 11 Facility: Palo Verde Date of Exam: Oct 4, 2019 Category K/A #

Topic RO SRO-only IR IR

1. Conduct of Operations 2.1.34 Knowledge of primary and secondary plant chemistry limits (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 3.5 94 2.1.36 Knowledge of procedures and limitations involved in core alterations (CFR: 41.10 / 43.6 / 45.7) 4.0 95 Subtotal 2

2. Equipment Control 2.2.5 Knowledge of the process for making design or operating changes to the facility (CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 /

45.13) 3.2 96 Subtotal 1

3. Radiation Control 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases (CFR: 41.11 / 43.4 /

45.10) 4.3 97 2.3.13 Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. (CFR 43.4, 43.5) 3.8 98 Subtotal 2

2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.6 99 2.4.30 Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /

45.11) 4.1 100 Subtotal 2

Tier 3 Point Total 7

7

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Rev. 11 Tier /

Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection 1 / 1 011 EA2.03 The loss of CCW would be significant during a small break LOCA since the long term cooling strategy for a small break LOCA is Shutdown Cooling -

which is cooled via CCW. However during a large break LOCA, the long term cooling is provided by Recirculation Actuation Signal - which is cooled by a combination of the volume of the Refueling Water Tank and Containment Spray flow. Reselected 011 EA2.10.

Administrative Topics Outline PVNGS 2019 NRC RO Admin JPM Outline ES-301-1 Rev 0 Facility:

PVNGS Date of Examination:

10/4/19 Examination Level RO Operating Test Number:

2019 NRC Administrative Topic (see Note)

Type Code*

Describe Activity to be Performed (A1)

N, R JPM: Evaluate conditions for a Containment Entry KA:

2.1.26 IR:

3.4 (A2)

D, R JPM:

Manual RCS Water Inventory Balance Calculation KA:

2.2.12 IR:

3.7 (A3)

N, R JPM: Determine which Air Removal Pump suctions are potentially flooded KA:

2.3.14 IR:

3.4 (A4)

D, R JPM: Perform NAN Communicator Duties KA:

2.4.43 IR:

3.2 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (2)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) (2)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected) (0)

Administrative Topics Outline Task Summary PVNGS 2019 NRC RO Admin JPM Outline ES-301-1 Rev 0 A1 The applicant will be directed to determine when conditions will be met for a containment entry using projected containment air samples and the requirements of 40DP-9ZZ01, Containment Entry in Mode 1 Through Mode 4. The applicant will compare purge time requirements and oxygen and hydrogen levels and determine when the purge can be stopped to enter containment without the use of SCBAs. This is a new JPM covering the Conduct of Operations K/A category.

A2 The applicant will be directed to perform a manual RCS water inventory balance calculation per 40ST-9RC05, Manual Calculation of RCS Water Inventory Balance. This is a bank JPM covering the Equipment Control K/A category.

A3 The applicant will be directed to determine which, if any, Air Removal Pump suction lines are potentially flooded following a SGTR per 40DP-9ZZ14, Containment Water Management. This is a new JPM covering the Radiation Control K/A category.

A4 The applicant will be directed to perform offsite notifications following a classifiable event per EP-0902, Notifications. This JPM will be performed in a classroom using the NAN Communicator Phone (disconnected) with the examiner acting as the responding offsite agencies. This is a bank JPM covering the Emergency Procedures / Plan K/A category.

Administrative Topics Outline Facility:

PVNGS Date of Examination:

10/4/19 Examination Level SRO Operating Test Number:

2019 NRC Administrative Topic (see Note)

Type Code*

Describe Activity to be Performed (A5)

N, R JPM:

Perform an online risk evaluation KA:

2.1.39 IR:

4.3 (A6)

M, R JPM:

Assess Fatigue Rule requirements KA:

2.1.5 IR:

3.9 (A7)

D, R JPM:

MSSV Technical Specification Evaluation KA:

2.2.40 IR:

4.7 (A8)

D, R JPM: Determine if release can continue and ODCM actions for loss of RU-143 and RU-144 KA:

2.3.11 IR:

4.3 (A9)

N, R JPM:

Complete PVNGS NAN Emergency Message Form KA:

2.4.38 IR:

4.4 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (2)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) (3)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected) (0)

Administrative Topics Outline Task Summary A5 The applicant will be directed to determine the nuclear risk classification and mandatory risk mitigating strategies for upcoming on-line troubleshooting per 02DP-0RS01, Online Integrated Risk. This is a new JPM covering the Conduct of Operations K/A category.

A6 The applicant will be directed to evaluate the fatigue status of four Reactor Operators and determine which Reactor Operator(s) are eligible to participate in upcoming Just-In-Time training and subsequent reactor startup per 01DP-0AP17, Managing Personnel Fatigue. This is a modified bank JPM covering the Conduct of Operations K/A category.

A7 The applicant will be directed to evaluate a list of Main Steam Safety Valve lift settings provided from engineering and determine evaluate Technical Specifications requirements and, if applicable, document which LCO condition(s) are not met and the associated required actions and operational limitations. This is a bank JPM covering the Equipment Control K/A category.

A8 The applicant will be directed to determine if a release through the Plant Vent may continue and what actions are required to continue (or re-initiate) the release per the PVNGS Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. This is a bank JPM covering the Radiation Control K/A category.

A9 The applicant will be directed to complete the Palo Verde NAN Emergency Message Form, EP-0541, following an Alert classification. The applicant will be provided with plant conditions, meteorological data, and radiation monitor trends, and use these documents/conditions to determine and document the correct wind speed, wind direction, and release status. This is a new JPM covering the Emergency Procedures / Plan K/A category.

ES-301 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 1 of 3 2019 PVNGS NRC Initial Exam ES-301-2 RO and SRO JPM Outline Rev 0 Facility:

PVNGS Date of Examination:

10/4/19 Exam Level:

RO SRO(I) SRO (U)

Operating Test No.:

2019 NRC Control Room Systems (8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code*

Safety Function S1 029 - Commence filling the 1A RCP Bearing Oil Reservoir Level and trip the Reactor when RCP 1A trips A, N, S 1

S2 013 - Perform actions to establish adequate SI flow per 40EP-9EO03, Loss of Coolant Accident A, D, EN, L, S 3

S3 005 - Parallel SDC Pump Operation to Single SDC Pump Operation (RO Only)

L, N, S 4P S4 076 - Respond to a loss of Turbine Cooling Water per 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water, Appendix B, Minimize Cooling Load on TC D, L, S 4S S5 026 - Respond to an inadvertent Train A Containment Spray Actuation Signal steps 3 - 8 A, EN, N, S 5

S6 062 - Perform contingency actions for verification of Vital Auxiliaries in SPTAs A, M, L, S 6

S7 012 - RTCB Trip Test N, S 7

S8 060 - Verify Control Room Ventilation is isolated per 40AO-9ZZ26, Toxic Gas A, EN, N, S 9

In-Plant Systems (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P1 054 - Local operation of AFN-P01 (alt path)

A, D, E 4S P2 064 - Place the A EDG in Standby following corrective maintenance D

6 P3 022 - Vent Charging Pumps and Charging Pump Header D, E, R 2

RO: Will perform all simulator and in-plant JPMs SRO (I): Will perform all simulator and in-plant JPMs with the exception of S3 SRO (U): Will perform S2 / S7 / S8 / P1 / P3 NOTE: S4 and S6, and S7 and S8 can be run in parallel

ES-301 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 2 of 3 2019 PVNGS NRC Initial Exam ES-301-2 RO and SRO JPM Outline Rev 0 All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 (6) / 4-6 (6) / 2-3 (3)

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9 (5) / 8 (5) / 4 (3)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 (2) / 1 (2) / 1 (2)

(EN)gineered safety feature 1 (3) / 1 (3) / 1 (2) (control room system)

(L)ow Power / Shutdown 1 (4) / 1 (3) / 1 (1)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2 (6 - 3A) / 2 (5 - 3A) / 1 (2 - 1A)

(P)revious 2 exams 3 (0) / 3 (0) / 2 (0) (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1 (1) / 1 (1) / 1 (1)

(S)imulator NRC JPM Examination Summary Description S1 The applicant will be directed to fill the 1A RCP Bearing Oil Reservoir per 40OP-9RC01, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation, due to a low Bearing Oil Level alarm. When level has been raised to clear the alarm, the 1A RCP will trip and the Reactor will fail to auto trip.

The applicant will have to recognize the ATWS condition and manually trip the Reactor within one minute. This is a new alternate path JPM covering Safety Function 1.

S2 The applicant will be directed to perform steps 4-7 of 40EP-9EO03, Loss of Coolant Accident. SIAS will have actuated due to the LOCA, however the A HPSI Pump failed to start due to a Train A Sequencer failure and the B HPSI Pump will have degraded discharge pressure causing it to fail to inject. The applicant will manually start the A HPSI Pump and verify injection flow is meeting the requirements of Appendix 2, Figures.

The applicant should determine that two loops are not meeting the minimum flow requirements due to two HPSI Injection Valves failing to auto open and take action to manually open the injection valves. The contingency actions for this step will direct the applicant to ensure operation of ESF auxiliary equipment. The applicant will manually start the Train A Spray Pond Pump, Essential Chilled Water Pump, and the Essential Cooling Water Pump. This is a bank alternate path JPM covering Safety Function 3.

S3 The applicant will be directed to transition from Train B LPSI and Train B CS parallel SDC operation to only Train B LPSI SDC operation per 40OP-9SI01, Shutdown Cooling Initiation, Section 6.25, Removing the Train B Containment Spray Pump From Parallel Operation With the Train B Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump. The applicant will adjust SDC flows to meet the target flow range prior to stopping the CS Pump, then adjust flow after the CS Pump is stopped to reestablish the proper SDC flowrate. This is a new JPM coving Safety Function 4P.

ES-301 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 3 of 3 2019 PVNGS NRC Initial Exam ES-301-2 RO and SRO JPM Outline Rev 0 S4 The applicant will be directed to perform 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water, Appendix B, Minimize Heat Loads on TC, following a manual Reactor trip due to a complete loss of Turbine Cooling Water. The applicant will secure SG Blowdown, establish auxiliary feed flow using AFN-P01, stop both Main Feedwater Pumps, stop all three Condensate Pumps, and stop both Heater Drain Pumps. This is a bank JPM covering Safety Function 4S.

S5 The applicant will be directed to take action in response to an inadvertent Train A CSAS actuation per 40AO-9ZZ17, Inadvertent PPS-ESFAS Actuations. The applicant will stop the A CS Pump, attempt to close the A CS Header Isolation Valve (valve is seized so alternate valves will have to be closed), override NC CIV to restore cooling flow to the RCPs, and restore Instrument Air to Containment. This is a new alternate path JPM covering Safety Function 5.

S6 The applicant will be directed to perform the Vital Auxiliaries verification per 40EP-9EO01, Standard Post Trip Actions. The applicant will have to determine that a loss of the Train B 4kV Bus has occurred and the B EDG has failed to auto start. When the B EDG has been manually started, it will fail to come to rated voltage requiring the applicant to override and raise voltage to enable the auto closure of the B EDG Output Breaker to re-energize the bus. This is a modified alternate path JPM covering Safety Function 6.

S7 The applicant will be directed to perform a Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker functional test per 40ST-9SB01, Reactor Trip Breaker Functional Test. The applicant will open the RTCB from the control room then reset the trip and reclose the breaker at the RPS Cabinet behind the control room. This is a new JPM covering Safety Function 7.

S8 The applicant will be directed to respond to a toxic gas condition in the Control Building per 40AO-9ZZ26, Toxic Gas. The applicant will manually initiate a Control Room Ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal and ensure all components are in their actuated condition. A K-Relay failure will prevent some of the dampers from auto closing and will take action to manually isolate the Control Room Ventilation System. This is a new JPM covering Safety Function 9.

P1 The applicant will be directed to locally start Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, AFN-P01, per Appendix 41, Local Operation of AFN-P01, Attachment 41-A, Local Operation of AFN-P01. When the applicant checks the status of the charging springs, they will not be charged, requiring the applicant to obtain the proper tools and manually charge the charging springs in order to close the breaker and start the pump. This is a bank alternate path JPM covering Safety Function 4S.

P2 The applicant will be directed to place the A EDG in standby following corrective maintenance per 40ST-9DG01, Emergency Diesel Generator A, Section 6.1, Placing Train A Diesel Generator in Standby. This is a bank JPM covering Safety Function 6.

P3 The applicant will be directed to vent the Charging Pumps and Charging Header following the loss of all Charging due to gas binding per 40AO-9ZZ05, Loss of Charging or Letdown, Appendix I, Venting Charging Pumps and Header to the Recycle Drain Header.

This is a bank JPM covering Safety Function 2.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: PVNGS Date of Exam: 10/4/19 Operating Test No.: 2019 A

P P

L I

C A

N T

E V

E N

T T

Y P

E Scenarios 1

2 3

4 (spare)

T O

T A

L M

I N

I M

U M(*)

CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S

R O

O A

T C

B O

P S

R O

O A

T C

B O

P S

R O

O A

T C

B O

P S

R O

O A

T C

B O

P R

I U

R1 RX 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

1 NOR 2

0 2

1 0

1 2

1 I/C 3,6,9 3,4,7 3,4,5 2,3,4, 5

2,3,5, 8

2,4 9

4 MAJ 8

6 6

7 7

7 3

2 TS 0

0 0

4,6 0

0 0

0 R2 RX 0

0 0

0 1

NOR 1

1 2

3 1

I/C 5,7, 10 2,5,7 3,4,5 9

4 MAJ 8

6 6

3 2

TS 0

0 0

0 0

R3 RX 0

0 0

1 NOR 2

0 1

1 I/C 3,6,9 3,4,7 6

4 MAJ 8

6 2

2 TS 0

0 0

0 R4 RX 0

0 0

1 NOR 1

1 2

1 I/C 5,7, 10 2,5,7 6

4 MAJ 8

6 2

2 TS 0

0 0

0 Instructions:

1.

Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2.

Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3.

Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4.

For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: PVNGS Date of Exam: 10/4/19 Operating Test No.: 2019 A

P P

L I

C A

N T

E V

E N

T T

Y P

E Scenarios 1

2 3

4 T

O T

A L

M I

N I

M U

M(*)

CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S

R O

O A

T C

B O

P S

R O

O A

T C

B O

P S

R O

O A

T C

B O

P S

R O

O A

T C

B O

P R

I U

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1 NOR 2

0 1

1 I/C 3,6,9 3,4,7 6

4 MAJ 8

6 2

2 TS 0

0 0

0 R6 RX 0

0 0

1 NOR 1

1 2

1 I/C 5,7, 10 2,5,7 6

4 MAJ 8

6 2

2 TS 0

0 0

0 R7 RX 0

0 0

1 NOR 2

0 1

1 I/C 3,6,9 3,4,7 6

4 MAJ 8

6 2

2 TS 0

0 0

0 R8 RX 0

0 0

1 NOR 1

1 2

1 I/C 5,7, 10 2,5,7 6

4 MAJ 8

6 2

2 TS 0

0 0

0 Instructions:

1.

Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2.

Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3.

Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4.

For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: PVNGS Date of Exam: 10/4/19 Operating Test No.: 2019 A

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6 2

2 TS 0

0 0

0 R10 RX 0

0 0

1 NOR 1

2 2

1 I/C 2,5,7 3,4,5 6

4 MAJ 6

6 2

2 TS 0

0 0

0 R11 RX 0

0 0

1 NOR 2

0 1

1 I/C 3,6,9 3,4,7 6

4 MAJ 8

6 2

2 TS 0

0 0

0 R12 RX 0

0 0

1 NOR 1

2 2

1 I/C 2,5,7 3,4,5 6

4 MAJ 6

6 2

2 TS 0

0 0

0 Instructions:

1.

Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2.

Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3.

Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4.

For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: PVNGS Date of Exam: 10/4/19 Operating Test No.: 2019 A

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0 0

0 R14 RX 0

0 0

1 NOR 1

2 2

1 I/C 2,5,7 3,4,5 6

4 MAJ 6

6 2

2 TS 0

0 0

0 R15 RX 0

0 0

1 NOR 1

1 2

1 I/C 5,7, 10 3,5,7 6

4 MAJ 8

6 2

2 TS 0

0 0

0 R16 RX 0

0 0

1 NOR 0

1 1

1 I/C 3,4,7 3,5,7 6

4 MAJ 6

6 2

2 TS 0

0 0

0 Instructions:

1.

Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2.

Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3.

Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4.

For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: PVNGS Date of Exam: 10/4/19 Operating Test No.: 2019 A

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2 TS 0

0 0

0 R18 RX 0

0 0

1 NOR 1

1 2

1 I/C 5,7, 10 3,5,7 6

4 MAJ 8

6 2

2 TS 0

0 0

0 R19 RX 0

0 0

1 NOR 1

1 2

1 I/C 5,7, 10 3,5,7 6

4 MAJ 8

6 2

2 TS 0

0 0

0 I1 RX 0

0 0

0 1

NOR 1,2 1

1,2 5

1 I/C 3,5,6, 7

2,5,7 3,4,5 10 4

MAJ 8

6 6

3 2

TS 4,6 0

5,6 4

2 Instructions:

1.

Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2.

Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3.

Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4.

For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: PVNGS Date of Exam: 10/4/19 Operating Test No.: 2019 A

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I2 RX 0

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0 1

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1 1,2 4

1 I/C 3,6,9 2,4,5 3,4,5 9

4 MAJ 8

6 6

3 2

TS 0

3,4 5,6 4

2 U1 RX 0

0 0

0 NOR 1,2 1

3 1

I/C 3,5,6, 7

2,4,5 7

2 MAJ 8

6 2

1 TS 4,6 3,4 4

2 U2 RX 0

0 0

0 NOR 1,2 1

3 1

I/C 3,5,6, 7

2,4,5 7

2 MAJ 8

6 2

1 TS 4,6 3,4 4

2 U3 RX 0

0 0

0 NOR 1,2 1

3 1

I/C 3,5,6, 7

2,4,5 7

2 MAJ 8

6 2

1 TS 4,6 3,4 4

2 Instructions:

1.

Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2.

Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3.

Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4.

For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

Facility: PVNGS Date of Exam: 10/4/19 Operating Test No.: 2019 A

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U4 RX 0

0 0

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3 1

I/C 3,5,6, 7

2,4,5 7

2 MAJ 8

6 2

1 TS 4,6 3,4 4

2 U5 RX 0

0 0

0 NOR 1,2 1

3 1

I/C 3,5,6, 7

2,4,5 7

2 MAJ 8

6 2

1 TS 4,6 3,4 4

2 U6 RX 0

0 0

0 NOR 1,2 1

3 1

I/C 3,5,6, 7

2,4,5 7

2 MAJ 8

6 2

1 TS 4,6 3,4 4

2 U7 RX 0

0 0

0 NOR 1,2 1

3 1

I/C 3,5,6, 7

2,4,5 7

2 MAJ 8

6 2

1 TS 4,6 3,4 4

2 Instructions:

1.

Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2.

Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3.

Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4.

For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 PVNGS 2019 NRC Scenario # 1 Rev 0 Facility:

Palo Verde Scenario: 1 Test:

2019 NRC Exam Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% power, BOC, B EDG OOS, C SG-1 Low Flow bistable in bypass, PLCS and PPCS selected to Channel Y Turnover: Remove C SG-1 Low Flow bistable from bypass, start B Essential Cooling Water Pump for a functional test Event Number Event Type*

Event Description 1

N (CRS, BOP)

Take C SG Low Flow bistable out of bypass 2

N (CRS, OATC)

Start B Essential Cooling Water Pump for functional test 3

C (OATC, CRS)

Charging Header Backpressure Controller PDIC-240 Output Fails High in Auto 4

TS (CRS)

MSIV Accumulator Failure 5

C (BOP, CRS)

Degraded Condenser Vacuum 6

I (OATC, CRS),

TS (CRS)

Inadvertent Train A SIAS 7

C (BOP, CRS)

Complete Loss of Condenser Vacuum (5 min ramp) 8 M (ALL)

Feed Line Rupture Inside Containment 9

C (OATC)

Train B 4kV Supply Transformer NBN-X04 Fault 10 C (BOP)

AFAS Fails to Auto Actuate

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 8

Total malfunctions (5-8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4 Abnormal events (2-4) 1 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered requiring substantive actions (1-2) 0 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

Appendix D Scenario Event Summary Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 1 PVNGS 2019 NRC Scenario # 1 Rev 0 2019 NRC Exam Scenario # 1 Overview Event 1 The BOP will remove the C SG Low Flow bistable from bypass per 40OP-9SB02, Plant Protection System Bypass Operations, Section 6.2, Removing PPS Channel Parameters From Bypass.

Event 2 After the bistable has been removed from bypass, the OATC will start the B Essential Cooling Water Pump for a functional test per 40OP-9EW02, Essential Cooling Water System (EW) Train B, Section 6.3, Manual Operation of EW Train B.

Event 3 After the Essential Cooling Water Pump is stopped, Charging Header Backpressure Controller, PDIC-240, output fails high in automatic. The crew will address the ARP and take manual control of PDIC-240 and adjust controller output to restore proper Charging line D/P.

Event 4 An MSIV accumulator will develop a leak resulting in a SG ISOL VLV TRBL alarm due to low accumulator pressure. The crew will address the ARP to determine actual accumulator pressure and the CRS will address Technical Specifications.

Event 5 Condenser vacuum will begin to degrade due to air in-leakage. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ07 and direct a turbine load reduction to attempt to stabilize condenser vacuum. After the crew has taken 3-5% load off the turbine, an AO will report that a loop seal is empty and commence filling the loop seal.

Event 6 When the cause of the air in leakage has been found and corrected, an inadvertent Train A SIAS will occur. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ17, Inadvertent PPS-ESFAS Actuations, and direct the crew to override and stop and/or start components as necessary to stabilize the unit.

Event 7 After the CRS has addressed Technical Specifications for the inadvertent SIAS, a complete loss of condenser vacuum will occur. The crew will manually trip the reactor due to the loss of vacuum.

Event 8 On the trip, a feed line rupture will occur inside containment on SG #1. The crew will align a feed source to SG #2 only and monitor for dryout on the affected SG. After the SG has reached dryout, the crew will take action to stabilize RCS temperature to preclude potentially lifting pressurizer relief valves.

Event 9 Also on the trip, the Train B 4kV Class Bus Supply Transformer will fault, resulting in a loss of PBB-S04 (due to the B EDG being OOS). This will force the crew to ensure that the A HPSI Pump is manually started when SIAS setpoints are exceeded since the A HPSI Pump will not auto start due to being overridden and stopped following the inadvertent A SIAS earlier in the scenario.

Event 10 AFAS will fail to auto actuate (if SG level lowers to the AFAS setpoint) requiring the crew to manually start an Aux Feed Pump, either by manually starting and aligning AFA-P01 or by overriding (trips on SIAS) and starting AFN-P01 and overriding valves which closed on the MSIS to establish a feed path to the non-faulted SG.

Appendix D Critical Task Summary Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 1 PVNGS 2019 NRC Scenario # 1 Rev 0 Critical Task # 1: Following an Excess Steam Demand event, control RCS temperature and throttle SI flow as necessary to prevent lifting any Pressurizer Relief Valves.

Safety Significance: Failure to control RCS pressure below the lift setpoint of a pressurizer relief valve will result in compounding the ESD by unnecessarily creating a loss of coolant event.

Cueing: Rising pressurizer pressure and RCS temperature following termination of the ESD (dryout).

Measurable Performance Indicator: Trending of pressurizer pressure and pressurizer relief valve status to ensure the reliefs did not lift throughout the duration of the event.

Performance Feedback: Red LED pressurizer relief valve position on Board 4 and ERFDADS pressurizer pressure trends.

Critical Task # 2: Restore Feedwater to the non-faulted SG prior to the non-faulted SG reaching 0% WR.

Safety Significance: The crew will have to take manual action to restore feed to the non-faulted SG to ensure adequate inventory in the SG to remove decay heat from the core.

Cueing: The crew will have indication of a complete loss of feed water due to the MSIS isolates Main Feedwater, AFAS failing to auto actuate, and the loss of Train B 4kV power (loss of AFB-P01). There is also indication provided by all feed water flow indicators indicating 0 gpm to each SG.

Measurable Performance Indicator: The crew will restore feed either by using AFA-P01 by manually starting and aligning feedwater valves from the control room, or by overriding the trip of AFN-P01 (trips on the SIAS) and aligning feedwater valves from the control room.

Performance Feedback: When the crew has started either AFW Pump and aligned a feed path to the non-faulted SG, the crew will have indication of feed flow, a rising trend on SG level, and depending on feed flow rate, a lowering trend on RCS temperature.

• Any improper action or inaction by the crew which results in a reactor or turbine trip will be evaluated as a potential write-in critical task

Appendix D Driver Set-Up Instructions Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 1 PVNGS 2019 NRC Scenario # 1 Rev 0 Driver Setup Instructions Reset to IC-20 Run scenario file NRC Scenario # 1 Ensure PLCS and PPCS are selected to Channel Y Hang OOS tags on the B EDG Bypass Channel C SG-1 Low Flow bistable at the PPS cabinet

Appendix D Crew Turnover Sheet Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 1 PVNGS 2019 NRC Scenario # 1 Rev 0 Plant Conditions:

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power, BOC The Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control Systems are both selected to Channel Y Channel C SG-1 Low Flow bistable is in bypass due to a failed instrument o The C SG-1 Low Flow instrument was replaced at the end of the last shift and is ready to be placed back in service Equipment Out of Service:

The B EDG was taken out of service last shift for preventive maintenance o LCO 3.8.1, Condition B has been entered o SR 3.8.1.1 was last completed one hour ago and is not due again for seven hours Planned Shift Activities:

Upon taking the shift:

o Take Channel C SG-1 Low Flow bistable out of bypass per 40OP-9SB02, Plant Protection System Bypass Operations When Channel C SG-1 Low Flow bistable has been taken out of bypass:

o Start the B Essential Cooling Water Pump for a functional test per 40OP-9EW02, Essential Cooling Water System (EW) Train B, Section 6.3, Manual Operation of EW Train B All personnel are standing by in the field to support the evolution

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 PVNGS 2019 NRC Scenario # 2 Rev 0 Facility:

Palo Verde Scenario: 2 Test:

2019 NRC Exam Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% power, BOC, B EDG OOS, C SG-1 Low Flow bistable in bypass, PLCS and PPCS selected to Channel Y Turnover: Perform a 50 gallon dilution to the VCT Event Number Event Type*

Event Description 1

N (CRS, OATC)

Perform a 50 gallon dilution to the VCT 2

C (CRS, OATC)

Running Reactor Makeup Water Pump trip, standby fails to auto start 3

I (BOP), TS (CRS)

Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter RCD-PI-102D Fails Low 4

C (CRS, BOP),

TS (CRS)

Both NC Pumps Trip / Cross-Tie NC with EW 5

C (CRS, OATC)

Extended Loss of Letdown 6

M (ALL)

Loss of Offsite Power 7

C (OATC, BOP)

AFA-P01 Degraded Discharge Head / AFN-P01 Seized Suction Valve (loss of feed)

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 6

Total malfunctions (5-8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3 Abnormal events (2-4) 1 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

Appendix D Scenario Event Summary Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 2 PVNGS 2019 NRC Scenario # 2 Rev 0 2019 NRC Exam Scenario # 2 Overview Event 1 The crew will commence a 50 gallon dilution to the VCT to maintain Tave upon taking the shift per 40OP-9CH01, Section 6.39, Makeup - Dilution Mode For Normal Power Operations.

Event 2 When the dilution commences, the running RMW Pump will trip and the standby pump will fail to auto start. The crew will address the ARP and manually start the standby RMW Pump to complete the dilution.

Event 3 Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter RCS-PI-102D will fail low. The crew will address the ARP and validate actual pressurizer pressure using alternate indications. The CRS will address Technical Specifications for the failed transmitter and direct the crew to bypass the affected RPS bistables.

Event 4 The running NC Pump will trip, followed by the standby NC Pump tripping, resulting in a complete loss of NC flow. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water, and direct the crew to cross-tie NC with EW to restoring cooling flow to the RCPs. The CRS will address Technical Specifications to determine the required actions from the subsequent inoperability of EW due to the cross-tie.

Event 5 The loss of NC will also result in a loss of letdown. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ05, Loss of Charging or Letdown, and direct the crew to establish conditions for an extended loss of letdown.

Event 6 A loss of offsite power will occur, resulting in an automatic reactor trip. The crew will perform 40EP-9EO01, Standard Post Trip Actions.

Event 7 The loss of offsite power concurrent with the B EDG being OOS will result in a loss of Train B 4kV Class Bus PBB-S04. When AFN-P01 is attempted to be started, one of the two suction valves will fail to open (both remotely and locally) preventing the pump from starting. When AFA-P01 is started, it will fail to produce adequate discharge head to feed the SGs. The loss of feed and loss of power to AFB-P01 will cause the CRS to transition to 40EP-9EO09, Functional Recovery. The CRS will direct the crew to re-energize PBB-S04 using the Train A EDG and start AFB-P01 to restore feed to the SGs.

Appendix D Critical Task Summary Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 2 PVNGS 2019 NRC Scenario # 2 Rev 0 Critical Task # 1: Restore sufficient cooling water to all four RCPs to clear all 8 of the RCP LO NCW FLOW alarms within 10 minutes of the loss of Nuclear Cooling Water Safety Significance: Failure to complete the NC-EW cross-tie and restore cooling water to the RCPs will result in a procedurally directed reactor trip.

Cueing: The crew will be alerted to the loss of Nuclear Cooling Water by low NC flow and discharge pressure alarms on B07 as well as RCP low NCW flow alarms on B04.

Measurable Performance Indicator: Successful performance can be verified by ensuring the A EW pump is started, the NC-EW cross-tie valves are open, and the RCP LO NCW FLOW alarms are in slow-flash prior to 10 minutes from the loss of NC flow.

Performance Feedback: The crew will have indication of successfully restoring adequate cooling water for to the RCPs by the RCP LO NCW FLOW alarms changing from solid to slow-flash.

Critical Task # 2: Restore power to Train B Class 4kV Bus PBB-S04 prior to exiting MVAC-2, DGs, and restore feed to at least one SG prior to exiting HR-1, SG with no SI Safety Significance: The crew will have to restore feed water to at least one SG to ensure adequate inventory in the SG(s) to remove decay heat from the core.

Cueing: The crew will have indication of a complete loss of feed water due to the loss of offsite power tripping both Main Feedwater Pumps, the loss of power to PBB-S04 (loss of AFB-P01), the seized suction valve on AFN-P01, and the degraded discharge head on AFA-P01. There will also be indication provided by all feed water flow indicators indicating 0 gpm to each SG.

Measurable Performance Indicator: The crew will have to close breakers to connect the A EDG to PBB-S04, start AFB-P01, and open flow control valves to commence feeding at least one SG.

Performance Feedback: When the crew has restored power to PBB-S04, started AFB-P01, and aligned a feed path to at least one SG, the crew will have indication of feed flow to at least one SG as well as a rising trend on SG level(s), and depending on feed flow rate, a lowering trend on RCS temperature.

• Any improper action or inaction by the crew which results in a reactor or turbine trip will be evaluated as a potential write-in critical task

Appendix D Driver Set-Up Instructions Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 2 PVNGS 2019 NRC Scenario # 2 Rev 0 Driver Setup Instructions Reset to IC-20 Run scenario file NRC Scenario # 2 Ensure PLCS and PPCS are selected to Channel Y Hang OOS tags on the B EDG Bypass Channel C SG-1 Low Flow bistable at the PPS cabinet

Appendix D Crew Turnover Sheet Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 2 PVNGS 2019 NRC Scenario # 2 Rev 0 Plant Conditions:

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power, MOC The Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control Systems are both selected to Channel Y Channel C SG-1 Low Flow bistable is in bypass due to a failed instrument Equipment Out of Service:

The B EDG was taken out of service last shift for preventive maintenance o LCO 3.8.1, Condition B has been entered o SR 3.8.1.1 was last completed one hour ago and is not due again for seven hours Planned Shift Activities:

Upon taking the shift:

o Perform a 50 gallon dilution to the VCT to maintain Tave per 40OP-9CH01, Section 6.39, Makeup - Dilution Mode For Normal Power Operations

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 PVNGS 2019 NRC Scenario # 3 Rev 0 Facility:

Palo Verde Scenario: 3 Test:

2019 NRC Exam Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% power, EOC, B EDG OOS, C SG-1 Low Flow bistable in bypass, PLCS and PPCS selected to Channel Y, CEA 4 is 145.5 withdrawn, CEDMCS in STANDBY Turnover: Withdraw CEA 4 to 150 withdrawn per 40OP-9ZZ05, Power Operations, Appendix K, Routine Operation of CEAs During Power Operation, and start the standby NC Pump and stop the running NC Pump per 40OP-9NC01, Nuclear Cooling Water, Section 6.3, Shifting Nuclear Cooling Water Pumps Event Number Event Type*

Event Description 1

N (CRS, OATC)

Withdraw CEA 4 to 150 withdrawn 2

N (CRS, BOP)

Shift Nuclear Cooling Water Pumps 3

I (ALL)

Control Channel NI #1 Fails Low 4

I (CRS, BOP)

Steam Flow Transmitter FT-1011 Fails Low 5

C (ALL), TS (CRS)

CEA 4 Slips to 30 Withdrawn 6

M (ALL), TS (CRS)

Small Break LOCA (~200 gpm ramped over 7 minutes) 7 C (OATC)

CIAS K-Relay Failures (Loss of Containment Isolation)

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 6

Total malfunctions (5-8) 1 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4 Abnormal events (2-4) 1 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered requiring substantive actions (1-2) 0 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 3 Critical tasks (2-3)

Appendix D Scenario Event Summary Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 3 PVNGS 2019 NRC Scenario # 3 Rev 0 2019 NRC Exam Scenario # 3 Overview Event 1 The OATC will withdraw CEA 4 to 150 withdrawn following the replacement of a faulty ATCM per 40OP-9ZZ05, Power Operations, Appendix K, Routine Operation of CEAs During Power Operations.

Event 2 The crew will swap running NC Pumps per 40OP-9NC01, Nuclear Cooling Water, Section 6.3, Shifting Nuclear Cooling Water Pumps.

Event 3 Control Channel NI #1 will fail low. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ16, RRS Malfunctions, and direct the crew to take CEDMCS out of automatic and select the unaffected Control Channel NI at the RRS Cabinet.

Event 4 SG #1 Steam Flow Transmitter, FT-1011, will fail low. The crew will address the ARP and take action to place the faulty bistable in maintenance and remove the 3-element lockout.

Event 5 CEA 4 will slip to 30 withdrawn. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ11, CEA Malfunctions, and direct the crew to commence a power reduction. The CRS will address Technical Specifications for the deviated CEA.

Event 6 A small break LOCA will occur. The leak will be ~ 200 gpm and will ramp in over 7 minutes. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ02, Excessive RCS Leakrate, and direct the crew to start all available Charging Pumps, isolate letdown, and attempt to determine the leakrate. The CRS will also address Technical Specifications for the RCS leakage. When the leakrate exceeds Charging Pump capacity with letdown isolated, the CRS will direct a manual reactor trip.

Event 7 The crew will perform 40EP-9EO01, Standard Post Trip Actions. When CIAS actuates, the crew will determine that not all Containment penetrations automatically isolated and will take action to ensure every containment penetration has at least one CIV closed. After SPTAs are complete, the CRS will transition to 40EP-9EO03 and direct the crew to place Hydrogen Analyzers in service.

Appendix D Critical Task Summary Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 3 PVNGS 2019 NRC Scenario # 3 Rev 0 Critical Task # 1: Commence a power reduction within 10 minutes of the slipped CEA deviating from its subgroup by > 6.6 inches Safety Significance: Failure to commence a power reduction within 10 minutes of the CEA deviation could result in a failure to meet Shutdown Margin per the PVNGS Core Operating Limits Report (COLR).

Cueing: The crew will have indication of the deviated CEA via multiple alarms on B04 as well as CEA position indication on the CEA Position CRT Monitor. 40AO-9ZZ11, CEA Malfunctions, also provides direction to commence the downpower within 10 minutes.

Measurable Performance Indicator: The crew will commence the power reduction by lowering turbine load using the load set potentiometer on B06. After the initial downpower, the crew will commence a boration and continue the turbine load reduction to ensure power remains on the acceptable side of the power reduction chart in the AOP and the COLR.

Performance Feedback: The crew will have indication of power using various power indications on the control boards as well as the ERFDADS computer terminals throughout the control room.

Critical Task # 2: Ensure at least one Containment Isolation Valve is closed at each Containment penetration within 30 minutes of the CIAS actuation Safety Significance: The loss of coolant accident in conjunction with the failure to isolate containment degrades the ability of containment to minimize the release of fission products and radiation outside containment.

Cueing: The crew will have indication of the CIAS actuation via alarms on B05 and will have indication that some CIVs failed to automatically close on the CIAS actuation via alarms on the SESS panel on B02.

Measurable Performance Indicator: The crew will ensure the Containment Isolation safety function is met by manually closing at least one CIV in each line which had both CIVs fail to auto close.

Performance Feedback: The crew will have indication of adequate containment isolation by verifying at least one valve is closed at each containment penetration on the control boards, by using the SESS panel alarm status, or by verifying the status of CIAS actuated CIVs on any ERFDADS terminal in the control room.

• Any improper action or inaction by the crew which results in a reactor or turbine trip will be evaluated as a potential write-in critical task

Appendix D Driver Set-Up Instructions Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 3 PVNGS 2019 NRC Scenario # 3 Rev 0 Driver Setup Instructions Reset to IC-20 Run scenario file NRC Scenario # 3 Ensure PLCS and PPCS are selected to Channel Y Hang OOS tags on the B EDG Bypass Channel C SG-1 Low Flow bistable at the PPS cabinet Insert CEA 4 to 145.5 withdrawn in Manual Individual Ensure CEDMCS is in STANDBY

Appendix D Crew Turnover Sheet Form ES-D-1 NRC Exam Scenario # 3 PVNGS 2019 NRC Scenario # 3 Rev 0 Plant Conditions:

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power, EOC The Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control Systems are both selected to Channel Y Channel C SG-1 Low Flow bistable is in bypass due to a failed instrument CEA 4 is 145.5 withdrawn following a CEA slip last shift o The ATCM card for CEA 4 has been replaced and the CEA is ready to be withdrawn to 150 o CEDMCS was placed in STANDBY following the slipped CEA Equipment Out of Service:

The B EDG was taken out of service last shift for preventive maintenance o LCO 3.8.1, Condition B has been entered o SR 3.8.1.1 was last completed one hour ago and is not due again for seven hours Planned Shift Activities:

Upon taking the shift:

o Withdraw CEA 4 in Manual Individual to 150 per 40OP-9ZZ05, Power Operations, Appendix K, Routine Operation of CEAs During Power Operations When CEA 4 has been withdrawn to 150, place CEDMCS in AUTO o After CEA 4 has been withdrawn to 150, swap running NC Pumps per 40OP-9NC01, Nuclear Cooling Water, Section 6.3, Shifting Nuclear Cooling Water Pumps