05000338/LER-1982-064-03, /03L-0:on 821005,refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Boron Concentration Fell Below Tech Spec Limits & Boric Acid Storage Tank a Boron Concentration Exceeded Tech Specs.Caused by Constant Blending to Restore RWST Level

From kanterella
(Redirected from ML20027D921)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
/03L-0:on 821005,refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Boron Concentration Fell Below Tech Spec Limits & Boric Acid Storage Tank a Boron Concentration Exceeded Tech Specs.Caused by Constant Blending to Restore RWST Level
ML20027D921
Person / Time
Site: North Anna Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 11/03/1982
From: Cartwright W
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20027D902 List:
References
LER-82-064-03L-02, LER-82-64-3L-2, NUDOCS 8211100393
Download: ML20027D921 (2)


LER-1982-064, /03L-0:on 821005,refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Boron Concentration Fell Below Tech Spec Limits & Boric Acid Storage Tank a Boron Concentration Exceeded Tech Specs.Caused by Constant Blending to Restore RWST Level
Event date:
Report date:
3381982064R03 - NRC Website

text

.-

r U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / / (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/

/V/A/N/A/S/1/ (2)

/0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3)

/4/1/1/1/1/ (4)

/ / / (5)

LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

/1/1/ 0 3/ 8/ 2/ (9)

/L/ (6)

/0/5/0/0/0/3/3/8/ (7)

/1/0/0/5/8/2/

(8)

/

OUR DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/

/ On October 5, 1982, with Unit No. 1 in Mode 6 the boron concentration in the

/

/0/3/

/ Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) fell below the T.S. 3.1.2.7 limit of 2000

/

/0/4/

/ PPM. and the "A" Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) boron concentration went

/

/0/5/

/ above its T.S. 3.1.2.7 limit cf 22,500. Therefore, no borated water sources were /

/0/6/

/ technically operable. Since core alterations were stopped uatil a boron flow

/

/0/7/

/ path was restored, the public health and safety were not affected. This event is/

/0/8/

/ contrary to T.S. 3.1.2.1 and reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

/

SYSTEM

CAUSE

CAUSE COMP.

VALVE CODE CODE.

SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

/0/9/

/R/B/ (11)

/A/ (12)

/A/ (13) /Z/Z/Z/Z/Z/Z/ (14)

/Z/ (15)

/Z/ (16)

SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION LER/R0 EVENT YEAR REPORT NO.

CODE TYPE NO.

(17) REPORT NUMBER

/8/2/

/-/ /0/6/4/

/ss/

/0/3/

/L/

/-/

/0/

ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTL0WN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER

/X/ (18) /Z/ (1s)

/Z/ (20)

/Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /A/ (25) /Z/9/9/_9/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/

/ The loss of all borated water sources was caused by the inaccuracies in constant-/

/1/1/

/ ly making up to the RWST with a blended flow along with attempting to maintain a /

/1/2/

/ consistent boron concentration in the "A" BAST while constantly batching and mak-/

/1/3/

/ ing up to it.

Upon discovery of the out of Limit Condition, core alterations

/

/1/4/

/ were halted until the "A" BAST chemistry was verified to be within its limits.

/

FACILITY METHOD OF I ) DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

STATUS

% POWER OTHER STATUS

/1/5/

/H/ (28)

/0/0/0/ (29)

/

NA

/

/B/ (31)

/ Chemistry Observation /

ACTIVI"Y CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

/1/6/

/Z/ (33)

/Z/ (34)

/

NA

/

/

NA

/

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)

/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38)

/

NA

/

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)

/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) /

NA

/

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (

TYPE

DESCRIPTION

/1/9/

/Z/ (42)

/

NA

/

PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)

NRC USE ONLY

/2/0/

/N/ (44)

/

NA

/////////////

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151 8211100393 821103 l

PDR ADOCK 05000338 S

PDR

1 i

=

Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station, Unit No. 1 Attachment: Page 1 of 1 Docket No. 50-338 Attachment to LER 82-064/03L-0

Description of Event

On October 5,

1982, while in Mode 6 during refueling, it was determined that the boron concentration of the RWST had fallen below its T.S. 3.1.2.7 limit of 2000 PPM (1978 PPM) and that the "A" BAST had gone above its T.S. 3.1.2.7 limit of 22500 PPM (22896 PPM).

Tuerefore, no borated water flow paths were technically operable.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence Upon discovering there were no borated water flow paths available,

all core alterations were halted (core reload had just started).

The "A" BAST was sampled and verified to be operable prior to resuming core alterations; consequently, the public health and safety were not affect-ed.

In addition, since the boron concentration of each source was so close to its T.S. limit, either source could have been used if required with no discernible difference in performance.

Cause of Event

There were several contributing causes to this event.

Initially, there were two borated water flow paths available; one from the RWST through a charging pump to the core and one from the "A" BAST through a charging pump to the core.

The RWST boron concentration was going in and out of specification because of the constant blending to the RWST being done in order to restore its level.

This was necessary in order to make up to the refueling cavity.

The boron samples taken of the "A" BAST were not representative because of the nearly constant batching that was necessary in order to make up to the RWST.

Immediate Corrective Action

The immediate action was to halt all core alterations.

Subsequent actions included sampling the "A" BAST to verify the boric acid solution was within its limits.

The proper boron concentration in the RWST was attained by blending to the RWST with water of a higher boron concen-tration.

l Scheduled Corrective Action No further corrective action is scheduled.

l Action Taken To Prevent Recurrence This is an isolated event; therefore, no further actions are required.

Generic Implications There are no generic implications to this event.