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Telephone 815/458-2801 -
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January 9,1990 3
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission '
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Document Control Desk
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- Dear Sir:
' The enclosed Licensee Event Report from Braidwood Generating
' Station is being transmitted to you in accordance with the requirements of
,10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) which requires a 30-day :;ritten report. -
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This report is number 89-017-00; Docket No. 50-456.
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R. E. Querlo j
Station Manager V
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Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report No. 89-017-00 l
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NRC Region III Administrator
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NRC Resident Inspector
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
Form Rev 2.0 facility Name (1) e Docket Number (2)
Pane (3)
Braidwand 1 01 51 01 01 01 41 51 6 1lof!0l4 Title (4)
Control Room Ventilation Actuations Due to Failed Radiation Detector Event bate (5)
LER Number (6)
Reoort Date (7)'
Other Facilities Involved (8)
//j/ Revision Month Day Year Facility Names Docket Number (s) l :.
Ho?.th Day Year Year
/// Sequential ff fjf l
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Number
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None 0151010101 l i I
11 2
'11 0 81 9 Bl 9 0l117 01 0 0l1 01 8 91 0 01SI010101 1 I
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pg TH15 REPORT IS SUSHITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR
((Agek one or more of the followino) (11) 3 20.402(b) 20.405(c)
_X. 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)
POWER' 20.405(a)(1)(1),
50.36(c)(1)-
50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c) 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vil)
Other (Specify LEVEL g
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(101 01 01 0,
20.405(a)(1)(111) 50.73(a)(2)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) in Abstract f jj/jjjjjjjj//jjjj/j/j/jj/jjj/j jjj 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) below and in
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l HHHfHfHHfSHHHHf 20 *5(*H'Hv) 50 73(*)( )(iii) 50 73(*)(2>(x)
Text)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
Name TELEPHONE NU>eER AREA CODE Mike Auer. Technical Staff Enaineer Ext.
2770 8l115 415181 l218101 g
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPON FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) l-
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC-REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC-REPORTABLE TURER TO NPRDS TURER TO NPRDS x
II L 01 El il al*l*l*
NO I
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
Expected Month 1 Day l Year l
Submission lyes (If vos. comg M e EXPECTED SUBMISi}0N DATE)
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e approximately fif teen single-space typewritten lines) (16) l On December 6,1989 the Gas Detector channel of Process Radiation Monitor (PR) OPR31J, Control Room Outside Air L'. In't;ke A, experienced a spike that resulted in an Alert Alarm on the monitor.
During the next several days L
sev:ral alert alarms were received. On December 10, 1989 a spike on the channel resulted in a iligh Radiation l
A1:rm which caused a Control Room Ventilation (VC) actuation for the OA Train of VC. After maintenance
- tr ub1: shooting it was believed the spikes were due to a faulty high voltage connector which was replaced. At 0649 on December 21, 1989, a spike on the channel again resulted in the High Radiation Alarm which caused a VC tetuation for the OA VC train. At 1840 a spike on the channel resulted in another VC actuation for the OA Train of VC. During maintenance troubleshooting, it was discovered that the detector had failed. A new detector was installed and calibrated. Discrepancies with Radiation Monitoring components are being trended. This event has bien-added to that trend. Previous corrective actions are not applicable to this event.
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.2969m(010890)/3
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Form Rev 2.0
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' C' LICENSEE EVENT REPDPT (LER1 TEXT CONTINUATION ~
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- FACILITY.NAfE I1)-
DOCKET NUISER (2): :
_j,ER NUfeER f61-Paae f3)
/j//,/j Revision j/jj Sequential
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1 0 l 5 1 0 1 0 l 0-l 41 51 6 Bl9 Ol117 01 0 01 2
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_ Energy Indur.try Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as (XX).
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, A,i PLANT CONDITIONS.PR10R TO EVENT:
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L Unt't:0 Braidwood I;-
Event Date: December 10, 1989; Event Time: 0718; y
. Mode:, 3 - Hot Standby; Rx Power: 0%;
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'RCS [AB). Temperature / Pressure: NOT/NOP; Unit: Braldwood 1;-
Event Date:= December 21, 1989; Event' Time: 0649:
- Node:' 1. Power Operation;
.Rx Power: 50%;
- RCS Temperature / Pressure: NOT/NOP; Unit: -Braidwood I; Event Date: December 21, 1989; Event Time: 1840; Mode:' l'- Power Operation;'
- Rx Power: 49%:-
RCS Temperature / Pressure: NOT/NOP r
B..
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
F
' Th:re.were no systems or components inoperable at the beginning of the event which contributed to the severity of th) event.
' On December 6,1989 the Gas Detector channel of Process Radiation Monitor (PR)tIL)' 0PR31J. Control Room Outside l Air Intake A,' experienced a spike that resulted in an Alert Alarm on the monitor. The Nuclear Station Operator
~
(NS0) (Licensed Reactor Operator) confirmed that a High Radiation condition did not exist by trending the OPR313 cnd the redundant monitor, OPR32J. A Nuclear Work Request (NWR) was written to address the problem. During the n;xt several days, inspections and filter changes did not identify the cause of the problem. Several alert alarms were received during this period.
[.
At'0718 on December 10, 1989 a spike on the Gas Detector channel of OPR31J resulted in a High Radiation Alarm l
53tpoint being exceeded. This caused a Control Room Ventilation actuation for the OA Train of Control Room IV:ntilation (VC)[VI). As a result the following occurred:
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'.1.
The OA'VC supply Fan Dampers repositioned to provide flow through charcoal adsorbers.
2.
The OA VC Hakeup Fan started.
3.
Dampers repositioned to provide flow through the OA Hakeup Filter Unit.
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. 2969m(010890)/4 i
N LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Form Rev 2.0 FACILITY NAE (1)
DOCKET NUSER (2) J LER NUMER (6)
Pane (3)
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Revision J
A' Year
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Sequential ff fjf
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Number
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traldmaad 1 0 l S l 0 l 0 l 0 1 41 51 6 8I" 0l1I7 01 0 01-3 0F 01 4 TEXTL Energy Industry Identificetion System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as (XX)
.IN.DESCRIPTIONOFEVENT:-(Con't)-
The NSO verified all automatic actions and confirmed that e High Radiation condition did not exist..The moMtor was declared inoperable and the appropriate Technical Specification Action Statement was entered and complied with.
.J The appropriate NRC notification via the ENS phone system was made at 0858 pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(li).
- At 2027.on December 16. 1989 the maintenance troubleshooting of OPR31J was complete. The spiking was
, believed to have occurred due to a faulty high voltage connector. It was believed that the connector was generating occasional electrical noise which created false radiation signals on the Gas detector. The
- connector had been replaced..The Nonitor was declared operable and the Technical Specification Action St:tement was exited.
At'0649 on December 21,'1989 a spike on the OPR31J Gas detector resulted in the High Radiation Alarm setpol'nt being exceeded. This caused the OA VC Supply ran suction Dampers to reposition. The OA VC train was in st ndby. mode. No other components receive actuation signals on a standby VC Train. The NSO verified that a High Radiation Condition did not exist. Due to a smaller spike that occurred on the redundant monitor, OPR32J. it was r:oncluded that the spikes were caused by a radio transmission in the area of the monitors.
Th} appropriate NRC notification via the ENS phone system was made at 0837 pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii).
At 1840 a 'sp'ike on' the Gas Detector channel of OPR31J resulted in a High Radiation Alarm Setpoint being cxceeded.- This caused another Control Room Ventilation actuation for the OA Train of VC. The monitor was d:clared inoperable and the appropriate Technical Specification Action Statement was entered and complied
- - with. A new NWR was written to investigate the cause of the spiking.
Th3 appropriate NRC notification via the ENS phone system was made at 1938 pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(li).
At 2040 on December 30, 1989 the maintenance troubleshooting of OPR031J was completed. It was discovered th:t the detector-for the Gas Channel of monitor OPR31J had failed. A new detector was installed and
- - calibrated. The Nonitor was declared operable and the Technical Specification Action Statement was exited.
This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) - any event or condition that resulted in (manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature, including the Reactor Protection System.
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L1rrutrr EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Fem Rev 2.0
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DOCKET NUISER (2) g LER NUMBER (6)
Pane f3)
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Number q
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' TEXT (
Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as (XXT i
' -CCCAUSE'0FEVENT:
The root cause of'this event was the failure of the detector for the Gas Channel of OPR31J.'
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.1-K D(iSAFETY ANALYSIS:L o
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'This event had no effect on the safety of the plant or the public. ;There was no radioactivity present.
(OPR31J operated as designed and generated a Control Room Ventilation Actuation signal for the OA train of
. VC. The OPR32J was operable and available for redundant indication of. the activity level.
.Under more limiting conditions of actual-radioactivity, the Control Room' Ventilation would have shif ted to
- the ESF safe configuration as was the case in this event.
E.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
s
' All= automatic actions were verified for all three incidents.
NS0s~ verified 'that a High Radiation condition did not exist using the redundant monitor and trends on the f0PR31J.-'
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[Thidetector for the Gas Channel of monitor OPR31J was replaced.
- Discrepancies with Radiation Monitoring. components are currently being trended in the Braidwood Station Trend
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R; port program. This event has been added to that trend.
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PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
i Th:re have been previous occurrences of spurious Control Room Ventilation Actuation Signals. In each case L
c:rrective actions'were implemented addressing both root and contributing causes. Previous corrective actions are not applicable-to this event.
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G. ' COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:
Manufacturer-Nomenclature NFG Part Number l.
- - Strento Electronics Gas Detector 0360-2090-02 2%9m(010890)/6
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| | | Reporting criterion |
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| 05000456/LER-1989-001-07, :on 890206,momentary Loss of Output Voltage on Instrument Inverter 112 Caused Reactor Trip Signal Due to Intermediate Range High Flux Bistable from Channel N36 Reverting to ESF Safe Configuration |
- on 890206,momentary Loss of Output Voltage on Instrument Inverter 112 Caused Reactor Trip Signal Due to Intermediate Range High Flux Bistable from Channel N36 Reverting to ESF Safe Configuration
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000457/LER-1989-001-09, :on 890223,loss of RHR 2B Loop Occurred as Result of Procedural Deficiency.Caused by Failure to Identify That Placing Ssps in Test Would Not Block auto- Closure of Pump Valves.Procedure Revised |
- on 890223,loss of RHR 2B Loop Occurred as Result of Procedural Deficiency.Caused by Failure to Identify That Placing Ssps in Test Would Not Block auto- Closure of Pump Valves.Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000456/LER-1989-001, :on 890206,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Spurious Loss of Output Voltage on Instrument Inverter 112. Cause of Momentary Loss of Inverter Under Investigation. Feedwater Isolation Signal Reset |
- on 890206,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Spurious Loss of Output Voltage on Instrument Inverter 112. Cause of Momentary Loss of Inverter Under Investigation. Feedwater Isolation Signal Reset
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000456/LER-1989-002-01, :on 890416,main Steamline Low Pressure Reactor Trip,Safety Injection & Main Steamline Isolation Occurred. Caused by Mgt & Procedural Deficiencies.Formal Policy on Use of Extra Operator During Startup Developed |
- on 890416,main Steamline Low Pressure Reactor Trip,Safety Injection & Main Steamline Isolation Occurred. Caused by Mgt & Procedural Deficiencies.Formal Policy on Use of Extra Operator During Startup Developed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000456/LER-1989-002-09, :on 890416,main Steam Line Low Pressure Reactor Trip,Safety Injection & Main Steam Isolation Occurred.Caused by RCS Pressure Above 1,1930 Psig & Main Steam Pressure Less than 640 Psig.Heatup Procedure Will Be Revised |
- on 890416,main Steam Line Low Pressure Reactor Trip,Safety Injection & Main Steam Isolation Occurred.Caused by RCS Pressure Above 1,1930 Psig & Main Steam Pressure Less than 640 Psig.Heatup Procedure Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000457/LER-1989-002-10, :on 890511,unit 345 Kv Bus 11 Received Trip Signal from Transmission Substation 177,resulting in Reactor Trip.Caused by Defective Trip Coil.Phase a Trip Coil Repaired & Relay Time Delays Increased |
- on 890511,unit 345 Kv Bus 11 Received Trip Signal from Transmission Substation 177,resulting in Reactor Trip.Caused by Defective Trip Coil.Phase a Trip Coil Repaired & Relay Time Delays Increased
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000456/LER-1989-003-05, :on 890302,control Room Ventilation Actuations Due to Momentary Loss of Voltage to Radiation Monitors. Caused by Perturbation of 345 Kv Sys.Evaluation Performed on Area & Process Radiation Monitors |
- on 890302,control Room Ventilation Actuations Due to Momentary Loss of Voltage to Radiation Monitors. Caused by Perturbation of 345 Kv Sys.Evaluation Performed on Area & Process Radiation Monitors
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000457/LER-1989-003-10, :on 890322,discovered Mispositioning of Centrifugal Charging Pump 2B Manual Mini Flow Isolation Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Valve Immediately Opened. Independent Verification Program to Be Revised |
- on 890322,discovered Mispositioning of Centrifugal Charging Pump 2B Manual Mini Flow Isolation Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Valve Immediately Opened. Independent Verification Program to Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000457/LER-1989-003-01, :on 890322,centrifugal Charging Pump 2B Manual mini-flow Isolation Valve Mispositioned.On 890601, Recirculation Flow Read Zero.Caused by Personnel Error. Locked Equipment Program Will Be Revised |
- on 890322,centrifugal Charging Pump 2B Manual mini-flow Isolation Valve Mispositioned.On 890601, Recirculation Flow Read Zero.Caused by Personnel Error. Locked Equipment Program Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000456/LER-1989-004-04, :on 890306,auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Started Automatically Following Closure of Governor Valves.Caused by Defective Test Switch.Stable Plant Conditions Established. Temporary Procedure Changes Initiated |
- on 890306,auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Started Automatically Following Closure of Governor Valves.Caused by Defective Test Switch.Stable Plant Conditions Established. Temporary Procedure Changes Initiated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000457/LER-1989-004-09, :on 890907,reactor Trip Occurred as Result of Lightning Induced Voltage Transient Affecting Rod Control Sys.Caused by Lightning Striking Containment.Rod Control Sys Devices Reset |
- on 890907,reactor Trip Occurred as Result of Lightning Induced Voltage Transient Affecting Rod Control Sys.Caused by Lightning Striking Containment.Rod Control Sys Devices Reset
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000456/LER-1989-005-06, :on 890422,instrument Inverter 111 Tripped & Repair Not Completed within 24 H Per Tech Spec.Caused by Shorted Capacitor Due to Normal Wear.Instrument Bus Energized & Inverter Repaired |
- on 890422,instrument Inverter 111 Tripped & Repair Not Completed within 24 H Per Tech Spec.Caused by Shorted Capacitor Due to Normal Wear.Instrument Bus Energized & Inverter Repaired
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) | | 05000457/LER-1989-005-10, :on 891002,discovered That Tech Spec Action Statement Was Not Entered When safety-related Bus Was Removed from Svc.Caused by Procedural deficiency.Out-of-svc Procedure Will Be Revised |
- on 891002,discovered That Tech Spec Action Statement Was Not Entered When safety-related Bus Was Removed from Svc.Caused by Procedural deficiency.Out-of-svc Procedure Will Be Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000456/LER-1989-006-09, :on 890718,lightning-induced Voltage Transients Experienced,Resulting in Actuation of Multiple Rod Drive Overvoltage Protection Devices.Caused by Inadequate Lightning Protection.Protectors Reset |
- on 890718,lightning-induced Voltage Transients Experienced,Resulting in Actuation of Multiple Rod Drive Overvoltage Protection Devices.Caused by Inadequate Lightning Protection.Protectors Reset
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000457/LER-1989-006-10, :on 890314,nonlicensed Operator Placed Eductor 2B Spray Additive Tank Suction Throttle Valve 2CS021B in Locked Open Position.Caused by Incorrect Valve Labeling. Valves to Be Provided W/High Visibility Labels |
- on 890314,nonlicensed Operator Placed Eductor 2B Spray Additive Tank Suction Throttle Valve 2CS021B in Locked Open Position.Caused by Incorrect Valve Labeling. Valves to Be Provided W/High Visibility Labels
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000456/LER-1989-007-08, :on 890810,containment Bldg Fuel Handling Incident Area Radiation Monitor Went Into Alert Alarm & Interlock Actuation Due to Loss of Pulses.Caused by Failed High Voltage Power Supply in Monitor |
- on 890810,containment Bldg Fuel Handling Incident Area Radiation Monitor Went Into Alert Alarm & Interlock Actuation Due to Loss of Pulses.Caused by Failed High Voltage Power Supply in Monitor
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000457/LER-1989-007-09, :on 891110,w/auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B Pump Control Switch in Pull Out Per Stated Reasons,Automatic Initiation of Pump Sys Unavailable for 6 Minutes.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Keys to Be Color Coded |
- on 891110,w/auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B Pump Control Switch in Pull Out Per Stated Reasons,Automatic Initiation of Pump Sys Unavailable for 6 Minutes.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Keys to Be Color Coded
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(v) | | 05000457/LER-1989-008-10, :on 891228,equipment Attendant Discovered Refueling Water Storage Tank Vent Line Temp Less than 35 F. Caused by Preservice Deficiency.Storage Tank Vent Path Temp Verified at 36 F |
- on 891228,equipment Attendant Discovered Refueling Water Storage Tank Vent Line Temp Less than 35 F. Caused by Preservice Deficiency.Storage Tank Vent Path Temp Verified at 36 F
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000456/LER-1989-008-09, :on 890905,Sargent & Lundy Engineers Evaluation Determined That W/Uncorrected Setpoints,Allowable Tech Spec Value Would Have Been Exceeded.Caused by Unclear Design Documents.Analysis of Setpoints Performed |
- on 890905,Sargent & Lundy Engineers Evaluation Determined That W/Uncorrected Setpoints,Allowable Tech Spec Value Would Have Been Exceeded.Caused by Unclear Design Documents.Analysis of Setpoints Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000456/LER-1989-009-05, :on 890902,failure of Main Steamline Safety Valve to Reseat Occurred.Caused by Preservice Error in Design of Valve.Vendor Recommended Upgrade Will Be Installed on Valve 1MSO17C.Remaining Valves Checked |
- on 890902,failure of Main Steamline Safety Valve to Reseat Occurred.Caused by Preservice Error in Design of Valve.Vendor Recommended Upgrade Will Be Installed on Valve 1MSO17C.Remaining Valves Checked
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000456/LER-1989-010-04, :on 890915,measured Leakrate of Hydrogen Analyzer Containment Isolation Valve Was Larger W/Valve Indicating Closed.Caused by Incorrect Labeling of Coil Leads.Valve Replaced W/Different Model Valve |
- on 890915,measured Leakrate of Hydrogen Analyzer Containment Isolation Valve Was Larger W/Valve Indicating Closed.Caused by Incorrect Labeling of Coil Leads.Valve Replaced W/Different Model Valve
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000456/LER-1989-011-04, :on 890920,high Head Safety Injection Valve 1SI8801A Not Capable of Being Powered by Operable Emergency Power Source.Caused by Diesel Generator 1A Being Out of Svc. Policy Statement Issued & Program Revised |
- on 890920,high Head Safety Injection Valve 1SI8801A Not Capable of Being Powered by Operable Emergency Power Source.Caused by Diesel Generator 1A Being Out of Svc. Policy Statement Issued & Program Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000456/LER-1989-012-05, :on 891016,momentary Loss of Power to Fuel Handling Bldg (Fhb) Area Radiation Monitor Caused Fhb Charcoal Booster Fan to Auto Start.Caused by Personnel Error.Fan Secured & Isolation Signal Reset |
- on 891016,momentary Loss of Power to Fuel Handling Bldg (Fhb) Area Radiation Monitor Caused Fhb Charcoal Booster Fan to Auto Start.Caused by Personnel Error.Fan Secured & Isolation Signal Reset
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000456/LER-1989-013-04, :on 891005,discrepancy W/Design of Steam Generator Blowdown Sys Identified,Minimizing Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Requirements.Caused by Preservice Design Deficiency.Temporary Design Changes Made |
- on 891005,discrepancy W/Design of Steam Generator Blowdown Sys Identified,Minimizing Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Requirements.Caused by Preservice Design Deficiency.Temporary Design Changes Made
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000456/LER-1989-014-05, :on 891030,inadvertent Safety Injection Occurred on Train B During Installation of Card Holders. Caused by Personnel Error Design Deficiency.Sys Mod Request Submitted |
- on 891030,inadvertent Safety Injection Occurred on Train B During Installation of Card Holders. Caused by Personnel Error Design Deficiency.Sys Mod Request Submitted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000456/LER-1989-015-04, :on 891020,sample Canisters for Auxiliary Bldg Vent Stack Radiation Monitor Removed & Not Analyzed within 48 H.Caused by Programmatic Deficiencies & Personnel Error. Procedures & Training Programs Revised |
- on 891020,sample Canisters for Auxiliary Bldg Vent Stack Radiation Monitor Removed & Not Analyzed within 48 H.Caused by Programmatic Deficiencies & Personnel Error. Procedures & Training Programs Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000456/LER-1989-016-05, :on 891201,RHR Pump Suction Relief Valve Premature Actuation Occurred & Failed to Reseat.Caused by Deficient Work Practices & Pesonnel Error.Maint Procedures Reviewed.Training Conducted |
- on 891201,RHR Pump Suction Relief Valve Premature Actuation Occurred & Failed to Reseat.Caused by Deficient Work Practices & Pesonnel Error.Maint Procedures Reviewed.Training Conducted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000456/LER-1989-017-05, :on 891206,gas Detector Channel of Process Radiation Monitor Experienced Spike,Resulting in Alert Alarm.On 891210,spike on Channel Resulted in High Radiation Alarm.Caused by Failed Detector |
- on 891206,gas Detector Channel of Process Radiation Monitor Experienced Spike,Resulting in Alert Alarm.On 891210,spike on Channel Resulted in High Radiation Alarm.Caused by Failed Detector
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000456/LER-1989-018-04, :on 891215,as Lead on volt-ohm Meter Landed, Containment Bldg Fuel Handling Incident Area Radiation Monitor Went Into Alert Alarm & Interlock Actuation.Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Signal Reset |
- on 891215,as Lead on volt-ohm Meter Landed, Containment Bldg Fuel Handling Incident Area Radiation Monitor Went Into Alert Alarm & Interlock Actuation.Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Signal Reset
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000456/LER-1989-019-04, :on 891219,discovered That Procedure Did Not Adequately Test Response Times for High Steamline Pressure Rate Steamline Isolation Signal.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedures Re Response Time Revised |
- on 891219,discovered That Procedure Did Not Adequately Test Response Times for High Steamline Pressure Rate Steamline Isolation Signal.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedures Re Response Time Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000456/LER-1989-020-04, :on 891223,failure to Verify Safety Injection Accumulator Boron Concentration within Specified Time.Caused by Programmatic Deficiency.Procedure Revised to Include Action Requirement Sheet |
- on 891223,failure to Verify Safety Injection Accumulator Boron Concentration within Specified Time.Caused by Programmatic Deficiency.Procedure Revised to Include Action Requirement Sheet
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) |
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