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Rept of TMI-1 Operator Accelerated Retraining Program Review Committee
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Issue date:	06/01/1980
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REPORT OF THE TMI-1 OPERATOR ACCELERATED RETRAINING PROGRAM REVIEW CChMITTEE JUNE 1, 1980 l

t Julien M. Christensen Eric F. Gardner Wi11iam R. Kimel Richard J. Marzec Robert E. Uhrig, Chairman 1

8101060/57

REPORT OF THE i

TMI-l OPERATOR ACCELERATED RETRAINING PROGRAM REVIEW COMMITT JUNE 1, 1980

)4 Ja m Julien M. Christensen

-AA/

Eric F.' Gardner W

M' William R. Kimel WW Rice p J. Marzec G 2

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Robert E. Uhrig, Chairman

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TABI.E OF CONTENTS Chapter 1.

Abstract and Executive Summa r y 1

Abstract 1

Executive Summary 1

Chapter 2.

Introduction 4

Chapter 3.

Reactor Operator Training Progrma 10 Description of Programs 10 Selection Process For Reactor Operators 16 Selection Criteria For Shift Foremen and Shift Supervisors 17 Selection Criteria For Shift Technical Advisors 18 Success of The TMI Operator Selection Process 18 Chapter 4.

Training Department Resources 20 Goals Of The ILiI Station Training Program 20 Organization 21 Financial Picture Of The Training Department 22 Facilities and Equipment 26 Teaching Staff 27 Chapter 5.

Operator Accelerated Retraining Program 31 Introduction 31 OARP Obj e c t i ve s 33 Technical Content Of The Operator Accelerated Retraining Program 34 Program Format 36 Functional Content Of CARP 41 Comparison Of OARP Content With Control Room Activities 42 Inclusion Of OARP Material In Other Operator Training Programs 40 l

Chapter 6.

Evaluation Of The Operator Accelerated l

Re t ra i n i ng Prog r ma 50 Organi:ation And Administration Of The OARP 50 Evaluation Of The OARP 52

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Report Of PQS, Inc., Audit Of The OARP 65 Post-OARP Training 66 Knowledge Evaluation By Oral And Written Comprehensive Ex mmi n a t i on s 66 l

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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

Chapter 7.

The Decision Analysis Training Program 70 Introduction 70 Decision Analysis 70 Good Decisions 71 Methodology Of Decision Analysis 72 Implementation Of Decision Analysis Procedures 74 Chapter S.

Mkn-Wkchine Interaction 76 Introduction 76 Definitions 76 So=e Human Factors Areas For Consideration 79 Relationships To Selection And Training 89 Management Considerations 90 Relationship To Man-Machine Interface Committee 91 Chapter 9.

Use Of Simulators In Operator Training 95 Introduction To Simulation 95 The Metropolitan Edison Simulator Training Progran 104 Chapter 10. Education And Training Requirements For Nuclear Facility Staff 115 Educational And Training Processes 115 Historical Pattern Of Education And Training For Nuclear Facility Operators 117 TMI-2 Lessons Learned 119 Educational Requirements For TMI-1 Operators 120 Meeting NRC And Other Requirements In Training 123 Chapter 11. Observations, Conclusions And Rec ommenda t i on s 135 Introduction 135 Observations 135 Conclusions 141 Recommendations 142 Appendix A. Accreditation 150 l

Definition 150 Engineering Education Accreditation 150 i

Nuclear Power Operator Training Progrmm Review 156 11

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

Appendix B. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Letter 159 NRC Letter To All Power Reactor Applicants And Licensees 159 Enclosure 1.

Criteria For Reactor Operator Training And Licensing

.161 Training In Heat Transfer, Fluid Flow And Thermodynanics 168 Training Criteria For Mitigating Core Damage 172 Control Manipulations 175 Appendix C.

S&W Training Courses Used By Met-Ed 177 New Plant Operator Training /01 178 Replacement Operator Training /03 130 Simulator Requalification Training /04 131 1

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Figure 4-1 Organization Of The Training Department 23 Figure 8-1 A Man-Machine Model 78 l

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TABLES Table 3-1 Success Rate Of NRC License Applicants 19 Table 4-1 Generation Training Expenditures 24 Table 4-2 Expenditures For Maintenance, Health Physics, and Chemistry Training 25 Table 4-3 TWI Unit 1 Training Expenditures 28 Table 4-4 Building Space (Trailers) Available On-Site 29 Table 4-5 Training Equipment Available On-Site 29 Table 4-6 Qualifications Of Teaching Staff At TMI 30 Table 5-1 Percent Of OARP In Functional Areas 46 Table 5-2 Percent Of Time Spent On T%il Control Room Activities 47 Table 5-3 Average Percent Of Time Spent Performing Control Room Activities 48 Table 6-1 CARP Classes Visited By Dr. Gardner 55 Table 6-2 Videotapes Reviewed By Dr. Gardner 56 Table 6-3 Backup Instructor Evaluations Of Primary Instructors On Specific Topics 62 Table 6-4 S muna r y O f OARP Qu i : Results 64 Table 3-1 Some Things People Do Comparatively Well 30 Table 8-2 Some Things Machines Do Comparatively Well 31 Table 8-3 Sanple Page From Task Analysis Of Job Of Postal Service Letter-Sorting Machine Operator 83 Table 8-4 Berliner " Classification Of Behaviors" 84 Table 8-5 Components Associated With Haman Error 88 Table 10-1 Documents Considered By The Training Department Of Metropolitan Edison 124 Table 10-2 Action On Findings And Recommendations Of T(II-2 Accident Reports 125 i

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CHAPTER 1 ABSTRACT AND EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

ABSTRACT The TMI-1 Operator Accelerated Retraining Program Review Committee was asked by Metropolitan Edison to evaluate its Operator Accelerated Retraining Program within the context of the overall training program. The Committee organi:ed its evaluation along the lines of accreditation evaluations of professional engineering education pro-grams by the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology. Its review involved personal observation of training classes by Committee members and review of docu-mentation supplied by Metropolitan Edison.

He Committee concluded that the Operator Accelerated Retraining Program (OARP) was conducted in a satisfactorv :nanner, and that introduction of Decision Analysis training was a beneficial step.

It further concluded that those who sat-isfactorily complete this program will be well prepared to take the NRC reactor operator and senior reactor operator examinations. The Committee further recommended that

nany features of the OARP be applied to all programs conducted by the Metropolitan Edison Training Department.

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

The TMI-1 Operator Accelerated Retraining Program (OARP) Review Committee 1

was formed in November,1979 at the request of Metropolitan Edison to evaluate the O ARP which was then underway. The evaluation was organi:ed along the lines of a professional accreditation review which included a review of the overall operator training program in order to put the OARP in its proper perspective.

This review included the selection process and criteria, as well as the resources available (manpower, money, facilities. equipment and the supporting crgani:stion). The Committee reviewed I

the objectives of the OARP, the procedures for preparation and presentation of classes, the program format (six instructional modules plus the Babcock & Wilcox simulator training module), the functional content of the OARP, and a cornparison of the OARP technical content with control room activities.

In the evaluation of the OARP, Cornmittee members visited various classes, reviewed videotapes of previous classes, observed oral examinations that simulate those given by NRC examiners, reviewed the results of examinations and qui:2es, and reviewed the Personnel Qualification Services, Inc., (an outside consultant) evaluation of OARP instruction. One member of the Committee also participated in the one-week prograrn on Decision Analysis.

The Committee also included certain aspects of human engineering in its study of the interaction between the reactor operator and the nuclear power plant control syst e m.

This work was coordinated with the man-rnachine interisca cornmittee which had previously been appointed by Metropolitan Edison to review the control room situation at the Three Mile Island plant. The Committee also reviewed the use of sitnulators in operator training, the conditions that facilitate the acquisition of skills, the j

role of the simulator in training, the type of skill needed vs. t/.? type of simulation used, and a general discussion of both part-task training devices and full-mission simulators.

The Comtnittee reviewed the present Metropolitan Edison simulator training program which utilizes the B&W simulator in Lynchburg, Virginia. While the Committee recom-l

nended serious consideration be given to Metropolitan Edison purchasing a separate simulator specifically for the TMI units, it did not view the lack of such a facility as an impediment to returning TMI Unit I to operaticn. The Committee did, however, recom-rnend that Metropolitan Edison tailor the simulation training to its specific needs rather than accepting the standard B&W training program.

The Committee attempted to differentiate between education and training proc-esses and to relate this to the historical pattern of education and training for nuclaar 2

k facility operators. The Committee advocated a dual approach to providing education and training for control room operators and supervisors that encourages baccalaureate level personnel to become reactor operators and supervisors while at the same time retaining the present experienced well-trained operators and supervisors.

The Committee recommended programs to upgrade the educational level of present operators and to qualify technically and scientifically trained baccalaureate personnel as operators. The Con 2mittee also reviewed actions being taken in the training area by Metropolitan Edison to meet the recom:rendations made by the Kemeny Commission, the Rogovin Commission. ANSI standards, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and various internal review committees.

ne conclusion of the Committee was that the Operator Accelerated Retraining Program carried out by Metropolitan Edison was a high quality, well-executed program.

having nsany features which should be incorporated into the rep 21ar Operater Retraining Program. The Co:nmittee further believes that personnel who demonstrate satisfactory performance in the OARP should perform well on the NRC Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator Examinations.

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CHAPTER 2 INTRODUCTION In the wake of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) decision to require hearings before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board prier to returning Three Mile Island Unit-1 to power, Metropolitan Edison Company decided to seek an outside review of their training program for the Three Mile Island Unit-1 operators. While their primary concern was the adequacy of the Operator Accelerated Retraining Program (OARP) being carried out for the TMI-1 operators. the scope of the review included other aspects of the current operator training program fcr TMI Unit-1.

The concept of quality assurance has been and is being used successfully in the design, manufacture, construction and operation of nuclear power plants.

Since accreditation is a type of quality assurance, the management of Metropolitan Edison asked five persons representing relevant areas of expertise to serve as an " Accreditation Committee

to review their TMI-1 operator training programs. These individuals were Dr. Julien M. Christensen, Director of the Human Factor Division. Stevens, Scheidler, Stevens and Vossler, Inc., Dayton, OH, representing human factors engineering; Dr. Eric F. Gardner, Professor of Psychology and Education at Syracuse University, Syracuse. NY.

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representing educational psychology; Dr. William R. Kimel, Dean of the College of i

Engineering at the University of Missouri. Columbia. MO, representing nuclear engineering education; Mr. Richard J. Mar:ec. Manager of Technical Training for Duka Power Company, Charlotte, NC, representing nuclear power plant operator traimng: anti Dr. Robert E. Uhrig, Vice President, Advanced Systems & Technology for Florida Power

& Light Company, Miami, FL, representing nuclear power generation. Dr. Uhrig also agreed to serve as Chairman of this Ad Hoc Committee.

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The original concept of this review, as envisioned by Metropolitan Edison m an agement, was that of an accreditation review, directly analogous to accreditation reviews carried out by such professional accreditation groups as the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology which accredit professional engineering degree programs, and comparable professional review groups in business adrninistration, medicine and law. Upon investigation, it becarne clear that the accreditation of training progratns in various professional educational fields was sanctioned by and conducted under rules established by a federal organi=ation known as the Council on Post-Secondary Accreditation (COPA). This group, COPA, is the authori:ing organization that provides legal status and credibidty to the concept of accreditation.

Because COPA has no provisions for the accreditation of reactor operator training programs, and because no other agency is known to sanction such accreditation, the term accreditation" was replaced by the term ' review

for this evaluation. In addition, the Committee noted that there were no accreditation criteria to follow.

Nevertheless, it was the intent of Metropolitan Edison that the TMI-1 Operator Accelerated Retraining Program Review Committee proceed in a manner that is as equivalent as possible to an accreditation review.

The " Statement by the President" issued from the White House on December 7, 1979, includes the following mandate:

"Second, the nuclear industry must work together to develop and to rnaintain in operation a comprehensive training, examination and evaluation program for operators and supervisors. This training program must pass muster with the NRC accreditation of training programs.' (Emphasis Added.)

This Statement gave importance and urgency to the Committee's task but raised a fundamental question as to whether such activities were :nore properly within the domain 1

i of the NRC or a sanctioned industrial group.

It is a publicly stated goal of the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) that they be involved in accrediting activities. Indeed, a bulletin describing the 5

organi:ation plan for the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations listed the following among the general functions of the Education and Training Division:

' Accredit instruction programs for nuclear power operations technology, certify instructors, and assist in the training and development of teaching skills as necessary.

Although INFO is proceeding through its organi:ational phase, the timing of its accreditation activity was deemed to be inconsistent with the needs of Three Mile Island Unit-1, and therefore the TMI-l Operator Accelerated Retraining Program Review Com=ittee proceeded independently with its task. Furthermore, the Committee viewed its efforts as pioneering and expect that they will be valuable to INPO and the NRC in adapting the concept of accreditation to reactor operator training programs. To this end, the Committee met with the President and the Director of Education and Training of INFO to acquaint them with the Committee's activities and time schedule.

As a first step in this task, the Committee examined the basic philosophy of

' accreditation", particularly as it applies to programs of engineering education in the United States, to identify possible parallel principles that could be transferable to accreditation of nuclear reactor operator training programs.

The model chosen for detailed study was the Engineers Council for Professional Development" (ECPD', which recently cecame the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technologv ( ABET. A discussion of the structure of this accrediting organization, as well as a descr:ption of the accreditation process, is included as Appendix A.

The procedure for visit:ng the institution whose program is being reviewed for accreditation is also included. since many of the concepts were adapted to the Committee's review of the TMI-I operator training program.

Two members of the committee have served terms on the Board of Directcrs of ECPD: W. R. Kimel,1972 to 197% and R. E. Uhrig,1%8 to 1972.

E. F. Gardner has served as rnember and chairm an of teams accrediting Colleges of Education.

Agriculture. and Arts and Sc ?nces.

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b During the initial meetings of the Com:nittee, briefings were given by Metropolitan Edison and General Public Utilities personnel regarding the operator training program, as well as an overall review of the accident of March 23, 1979, in TMI Unit-2.

The Cocamittee visited the training facilities and the control rooms of TMI Units-1 and 2 and was given a general briefing on the present and future clean-up activities associated with TMI Unit-2. Metropolitan Edison supplied or made available to the Committee descrip-tive and educational materials generated in connection with the OARP and related activities. After reviewing this :naterial, the Com:nittee asked Metropolitan Edison to supply a detailed self-evaluation study of its operator training program with appropriate docu:nentation supporting the study. The Committee developed an outline of information required for the self-evaluation study (which is included in Appendix A).

The require:nent lor an analytical self-evaluation study of the program being reviewed is a vital, required part of any accreditation review, and the Committee felt this was an essential step in its review of the operator training program.

The Com:nittee was also :nade aware of a study entitled, "A Pedagogical Review of Reactor Operator Training", being conducted by faculty members of the Nuclear Engineering Department of Pennsylvania State University. The Committee : net with two members of that faculty, Dr. Warren Witzig, Professor and Chairman of the Department, and Professor John Penkala, who stated that the goals of the pedagogical review were to:

1) review the original (pre-March 28, 1979) TMI Training Program; 2) review REG GUIDE 1.3 and various revisions for training requirements: 3) review the proposed goals and objectives of the OARP: and 4) perform a review of the OARP course content. Because of the timing of that study, the review results were not available to the Committee when this report was prepared.

The Committee was :nade aware of another evaluation activity undertaken by Personnel Qualification Services, Inc., (PQS), an organi:ation whose primary function is to determine that individual trainees rneet Company criteria ind are therefore ready to 7

take the licensing examination given by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. PQS gives practice oral and written examinations similar to those given by the NRC and spot checks individual training classes (most PQS personnel are former NRC examiners). At times, they have recornmended that certain training classes be given again because of ascertained deficiencies.

I Dr. E. F. Gardner, the educational psychologist, attended OARP classes (including l

oral exarninations) for several days to gain a better understanding of the teaching techniques used, the effectiveness of the teaching and the effectiveness of the oral examinations, and to obtain information about the student's performance (including attitudes, :norale and interest). He also studied the effectiveness of using TV tapes of the class Inaterial.

Dr. J. Ni. Christensen, the human factors engineering specialist, attended a special briefing at the Tennessee Valley Authority's nuclear reactor training simulators. The Com tnittee views the use of simulators to be an extremely impcetant part of the operators' training and has therefore provided an evaluation of the proper role of simulators in the operator training orogram.

Dr. Christensen was asked to explore changes that might be required in the operator training program as a consequence of the human factors engineering design aspects of the TN11 Unit-1 control room.

Dr. W. R. Kitnel, representing nuclear engineering education, was asked to provide 1

a detailed review of the accreditation procedure used for engineering programs in universities and to review the educational level required for participation in the operator training program for control room operators and supervisors.

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Nir. E. J. Niar::ec, representing nuclear power plant operator training programs, was asked to compare the ThiI-1 reactor operator training programs against the various NRC requirements, including lessons learned", both short-term and long-term, NUREG 0660, ANS 3.1 (including the new upgraded requirements suggested in the most recent revision) and 10CFR55. His primary contribution was assistance to the members as questions on i

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requirements arose.

The Chairman, Dr. R. E. Uhrig, had responsibility for coordinating the various activities and putting the individual reports together into a single integrated report. In addition, he participated as a regular class mernber in the special one-week training program in " Decision Analysis

presented at TMI by Management Analysis Company (M AC).

A member of the Committee. Dr. J. M. Christensen, is also participating in a humari engineering study that General Public Utilities Service Corporation (GPUSC) is conducting on the TMI-1 control room. The engineering firm of MPR Associates of

'#ashington, D.C. is the prime contractor.

Dr. Christensen and Professor Thomas B.

Sheridan of MIT (the human factors representative on the Roddis Cornmittee) have been retained by GPUSC to serve as human factors advisers to MPR on this program.

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V CHAPTER 3 REACTOR OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAMS I.

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAMS The TMI plants utilize a complement of reactor operating personnel on each shift consisting of the following:

1.

Shift Supervisor - SS (1 required per shift) 2.

Shif t Foreman - SF (1 required per shift) 3.

Control Room Operators - CRO (2 required per shift) 4.

Auxiliary Operators - AO (3 required per shift) 5.

Shift Technical Advisor - STA (I required per shif t)

The Shift Supervisor and Shift Foreman must hold Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) licenses. The Control Room Operators can hold either SRO or Reactor Operator (RO) licenses, generally the latter. The Auxiliary Operators do not hold Reactor Operator l

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'A", "B" or "C" level (defined later in this section). All personnel at the plant must undergo General Employee Training consisting of instruction in the areas of first aid, fire fighting, security, emergency procedures and radiation safety.

A. Auxiliary Operators Most of the reactor operating personnel noted above, except for Navy trained personnel. move up thrcugh the ranks starting in fossil-fired plants or in a non-operating position at the TMI station. After a minimum of one year of experience in a steam electric generating plant, an employee (usually with a high school education) can apply for training as an auxiliary operator "C" - Nuclear. Upon selection. the trainee is given nine weeks of clastrocm instruction on plant systems and four weeks of on-the-job training. Upon passing a final exam, the trainee is assigned to a regular job and his/her probationary status is removed.

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Over the next two years, as they progress from AO "C" to AO "B" to AO " A", the AO's participate in an integrated program of classroom instruction, self-study and on-the-job training with periodic oral and written examinations. Navy trained personnel who have had nuclear training and experience usually enter this program at the AO "A" level.

B. Control Room Onerator Licensing Program AO "A" operators with a minimum of one year of experience can " bid" for openings in the Category IV Control Room Operator Licensing Program which is designed to prepare an AO "A" for qualification as an NRC licensed Reactor Operator. The nine-

nonth program consists of specific study assignments, oral checkouts in which the individual actually performs or simulates performing certain operational sequences, classroom sessions and oral and written examinations. Each trainee also participates in training conducted at the Babcock & Wilcox Control Room Simulator in Lynchburg, Virginia.

After one year of experience as a Control Room Operator, an operator with a RO license and four years of responsible power plant experience can apply for the Senior Reactor Operator Licensing Program which is designed to prepare a licensed Control Room Operator for qualification as a Senior Reactor Operator.

The contents and duration of the Senior Reactor Operator Licensing Program are varied to fit the needs of each participant. The course nortnally consists of self-study, classroom lectures and oral and written examinations.

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There are two kinds of Reactor Operator license preparatory programs. The " cold" l

license program is used before fuel is loaded into the reactor and is intended primarily to train RO's and SRO's for new nuclear power plants. The " hot" license program takes place while the plant is in operation and is intended to provide replacements for operators who are transferred, promoted or leave the Company.

The lold" program involves a large number of people and is quite formal. In the case of TMI-2, many senior AO's from TMI-1 were given 200 hours0.00231 days 0.0556 hours 3.306878e-4 weeks 7.61e-5 months of classroom 11

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l program involves only a few people and provides nine months of informal training since considerable reliance is placed on the time the individual has spent on that plant as an AO. An exception is the nuclear trained Navy personnel who are hired as AO "A's" and often move rapidly into the licensed operator training program.

I C. Licensed Oeerator Requalification Procram The Licensed Operator Requalification Program is designed to maintain operator competence and proficiency in the quest for continued safe operation. Guidelines for the program are found in 10CFR55, Appendix A. The Licensed Operator Requalification Pro-gram is a continuing one with each requalification cycle lasting one year. The program consists of classroom lectures, on-the-job training and oral and written examinations.

D. Shif t Technical Advisor Training Program In the " lessons learned" promulgated by the NRC in the aftermath of the TMI-2 accident, a requirement was initiated that an individual with a bachelor's degree or l

l equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline must be within ten-minutes of the control room at all times. Since this individual need not be a licensed Reactor Operator, l

Metropolitan Edison and many other utilities selected qualified individuals from their Engineering Departn. '

o serve as Shif t Technical Advisors (STA's). These individuals began a special train.

ogram to assist them with their responsibility to adv:se on-shif t Operations persoi..el with respect to engineering aspects of assuring safe plant operation. The program is to be completed over a two-year period with the ~1essons learned" portien completed by January,1981. It is primarily a self-study program. which also includes classroom lectures, simulator training at the Babcock & Wilcox Control Room Simulator and written and oral exams.

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E. Ooerator Accelerated Retraining Program The Operator Accelerated Retraining Program is a special one-time program initiated by Metropolitan Edison for the primary purpose of retraining the NRC licensed reactor operators (both RO's and SRO's) and to enhance operator performance in preparation for restarting TMI-1. Furtherrnore, Metropolitan Edison management made a commitment to the NRC in raid-1979 to relicense all reactor operators (both RO's and SRO's). This program is discussed extensively in Chapter 5 of this report.

F. Decision Analysis Training Program As a supplement to the OARP, a special training program.n decision analy. sis was developed and implemented to teach decision analysis techniques, to provide case study practice of those techniques and to instruct Shif t Supervisors regarding their command role responsibilities. This 40-hour training course was required for all SRO's and STA's.

Selected management personnel and Dr. R. E. Uhrig, Chairman of the Comtnittee, also participated in this training program.

The selection of topics to be included in the Decision Analysis Training Program was based on perceived needs to (a) improve the Operations team's performance in dealing with problems that have not been anticipated and (b) reinforce the command role posture that is the responsibility of the Shif t Supervisor.

The objectives of the Decision Analysis Training Program were:

1.

Decision Analvsis To improve performance in dealing with situations that have not been a.

previously anticipated and for which written procedures do not exist.

b.

To assure a good understanding of how to use basic decision analysis techniques including the handling of uncertainty.

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To assure a good understanding of the Company's "value structures" or c.

priorities" among personnel responsible for making decisions.

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2.

Shif t Supervisor Cornmand Role

a. To assure the Shif t Supervisor maintains a broad overview of his command all times and rnakes decisions and gives directions as required to assure at safe and reliable operation.

b.

To assure the Shift Supervisor has a thorough knowledge of physical and personnel resources available within and outside the Company that could be utilized, and that he has the knowledge of when and how to use them.

c.

To assure the pro ficiency of Shif t Supervisors at oral and written com munications for issuing clear and concise directions and for giving effective status reports to management.

d.

To assure that in an emergency, the Shift Supervisor has sufficient comrnand and Cornpany perspective to effectively carry out the Emergency Director's responsibilities until properly relieved of those responsibilities.

G. Other Training Programs The Training Department of Metropolitan Edison at the Three Mile Island Station has primary responsibility for 39 separate training programs including those described above. A list of those programs (not all of them are in operation at the time of this report) is given here simply to illustrate the breadth and scope of the training being provided.

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Operator Accelerated Retraining Program 2.

Radiation Emergency Plan Training and Drill 3.

Fire Fighting Training l

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ECS Coordinator 5.

HP/ Chemistry Technicians Initial 6.

TMI-2 New System Trairing for HP Chemistry Technicians 7.

Systems Training for Ma3ntenance Personnel 8.

Unit-1 Operator Requalification 1

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Unit-2 Operator Requalification 10.

TMI-2 New Systems for Operators 11.

Auxiliary Operator Progression Training 12.

Fuel Handling Training for TMI-1 13.

General Employee Training 14.

Accelerated Auxiliary Operator Retraining 15.

Sample Coordinators 16.

HP Training for Operators 17.

Switching and Tagging IS.

HP Apprentice Training for Transferred Personnel 19.

HP/ Chemistry Retraining 20.

ALARA Training for Maintenance Personnel 21.

Shif t Technical Advisor Training Program 22.

Fundamentals Training for Maintenance Perconnel 23.

PORC Function Training for Engineers 24.

SRO Decision Analysis 25.

TMI-2 Containment Re-entry Training 26.

RadWaste Administration Training 27.

RadWaste Processing System Training 28.

HP Certification Program for Auxiliary Operators 29.

Replacement Operator Training Program 30.

Shift Foreman Development Program 31.

Quality Assurance Training i

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Management Training 33.

Instructor Training for Training Department Supervisor i

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Instructor Training for Training Department Instruction i

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Instructor Training for Line Supervisor / Foreman 15

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RadWaste Disposal Systems Procedures Training 3".

Retraining Program for RadWaste Administration 38.

RadWaste Reduction Training 39.

Craft Training 40.

Detection and Use of Controlled Substances 41.

Reactor Building Atmosphere Cleanup l

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Technical Writing and Documentation Techniques II.

SELECTION PROCESS FOR REACTOR OPERATORS Personnel entering Auxiliary Operator "C" classification from outside the company, as well as those bidding from the Plant Bargaining Unit, are interviewed by line man-agement for technical qualifications, leadership potential, trainability, emotional sta-bility and maturi:y, and by the Human Resources Department for leadership potential, trainability, emotional stability and maturity. They also undergo psychological screen-I j

ing for aberrant behavior potential. They must also undergo physical examination bv a I

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physician. In either :nethod of selection, a 90-day probationary period is in force during which line management evaluates whether the new employee meets the qualifications described in the " job description" which, among other things, requires the applicant to have a high school education (including a course in Algebra) or an equivalent G.E.D.

l certificate and one year of power plant experience.

During their first year as AO "C's', in addition to their woris experience, each person receives training, is subjected to mandatory testing and must complete a course in l

Trigonom etry. After one-year experience as an AO "C" and successfully passirg a final exarnination, the person is promoted to the AO *B" level. During the nex year the trainee continues to receive training, must complete a course in Physics, is subjected to mandatory tests, and upon successfully passing the final examination, is promoted to the AO ' A' level. Af ter six-months experience as an AO A" and completion c f a course in 16

Atomic Physics, a person with satisfactory perfor: nance is eligible to bid for a job as a Control Room Operator which requires an RO license issued by the NRC. The selection is by interview of the most senior qualified AO *A's".

Written aptitude tests are not utilized nor is diagnostic testing.

III.

SELECTION CRITERIA FOR SHIFT FOREMEN AND SHIFT SUPERVISORS Shift Forernen and Shif t Supervisors go through cirnilar pre-selection processes consisting of a detailed review by a committee of the existing Shift Supervisors. Prior to opening existing in either the Shift Foreman or Shift Supervisor positions, the an committee identifies a list of potential candidates. This list is periodically reviewed, commented upon by each of the Shift Supervisors and kept up-to-date. Generally, both of these positions are filled from the existing Operations Department complement. In the event an opening is impending in either classification and no candidates are judged by l

the Shif t Supervisors to be sufficiently prepared for the position, candidates from outside the Operations Department or outside the Company are considered. In the event filling is from outside the Company, a number of candidates are identified through resumes and interviewed by one or more of the Shift Supervisors, the Operations Depart ment Supervisor, and the Unit Manager.

Candidates are given physical and psychological The candidate is then selected based upon past experience, direct applicability of tests.

that experience, maturity, judgement, and leadership. Similar qualities are considered in selecting in-house personnel. If the selection is from the existing Operations Department personnel, the candidate is promoted and then enters a Shift Foreman or Shift Supervisor Development Program. This is an extensive prograrn encompassing approximately 16 weeks during which all on-shift time is devoted to training for the anticipated position.

At the end of this time, personnel who successfully complete the program and pass the NRC Senior Reactor Operator exarnination are awarded the position.

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IV.

SELECTION CRITERIA FOR SHIFT TECHNIC AL ADVISORS The initial group of six Shift Technical Advisors was selected from a field of 18 applicants. The applicants were obtained from GPU personnel by in-house advertise-ment. Qualifications for the position were: a degree in engineering or science required and with plant systems experience desired but not required. Each applicant was then I

familiarized in detail with the duties, responsibilities and projected training that would be provided, as well as the benefits to be derived from the position.

At the end of these discussions, eight of the original candidates remained as candidates. Six were designated Shift Technical Advisors and put on six-section rotation, with virtually all of their time devoted to training. The two remaining persons were designated STA's in-training.

It is currently anticipated that STA in-training new candidates will be identified to fill-in for attrition in the STA trainee ranks.

V.

SUCCESS OF THE TMI OPERATOR SELECTION PROCESS An indication of the success of the TMI selection process and the operator training program can be obtained by comparing the success rate of 3ree Mile Island NRC licensing examination applicants to all applicants. This is shown in Table 3-1 where 94.4% (102 out of 108) of the TMI applicants were successful, compared to an overall i

success rate of S7.2% (112S out of 1290) for all applicants.

It is apparent that the selection of rnost operators is actually made at the AO "C" l

level, because an individual who continues to perform satisfactorily will automatically be eligible in three years to bid for a CRO position. The process does assure that everv individual has extensive power plant experience before entering the CRO training program.

A proposed alternate path for securing CRO's, SF's and SS's with more technical and engineering training is discusnd later in this report.

1 l

i 13

TABLE 3-1 SUCCESS RATE OF NRC LICENSE APPLICANTS 1971-1974 1975-1978 Total (%)

TMI(%)

Total (%)

TMI (ro) l Applicants 438 33 852 75 Passed 371 (84.8%)

29 (87.9 %)

754 (88.5Fo) 73 (97.3ro)

Failed 67 (15.2'~o) 4 (12.1%)

98 (11.5Fo) 2 (2.7%)

l l

19 l

CHAPTER 4 TRAINING DEPARTMENT RESOURCES I.

GOALS OF THE TMI STATION TRAINING PROGRAM The Training Department Charter describes the philosophy and goals of the Training Department, identifies interfaces and duties / responsibilities, and outlines implemen-tation plans.

It charges the Training Department with providing the comprehensive training direction and implementation necessary to develop and maintain a high level of proficiency in each of the employees working at Three Mile Island.

The primary goals of the TMI Station Training Department are as follows:

A.

Assure TMI Unit 1 and Unit 2 personnel are provided with the knowledge and skills required to carry out routine and emergency tasks in a manner that will assure the safe, effective and efficient execution of their duties.

B.

Provide direction in the adaptation of state-of-the-art training systems and methodology to the TMI Station Unit I and Unit 2 training programs.

C.

Assure TMI training programs are structured to train personnel to qualify them to perform their job proficiently, to meet any Local, State, and Federal regulatory requirements and assure timely requalification.

D.

Document training qualifications achieved by personnel assigned to TMI Units 1 and 2.

E.

Provide educational and training motivation and consultation to TMI station personnel.

F.

Prt. vide facilities and equipment necessary for the conduct of training programs for Units 1 and 2.

All training conducted for Unit I and Unit 2 at the TMI site is the direct responsibility of the Training Department. Since the conduct of effective, meaningful training and retraining is vital to every employee's success in discharging his/her 20

b responsibilities, an interface of cooperation between individual plant groups and the Training Department is necessary. The plant groups possess the technical expertise to determine the type and depth of group training and, in some cases, to provide instructor support. The Training Department assures each program is developed, ad:ninistered and documented in accordance with accepted training :nethods and objectives. Therefore, the ultimate accornplishment of training becomes a joint effort of the individual unit staff and the Training Department in definition of programs, development of programs and implementation of training.

t l

II.

ORGANIZATION A

Station Administrative Procedure addresses the Training Depart ment organization, duties and authorities for conduct of the Station Training Program for Unit I and Unit 2. Additionally. Training Department directives address the qualifications of the Training Department staff and assigned instructors and the method of conduct, responsibilities, course content. evaluations and documentation of all programs conducted under the TMI Station Training Progra:n.

An organization chart for the Training Department as presently constituted is shown in Figure 4-1. This chart indicates authorized positions and the status of personnel filling the positions (permanent or temporary).

In testimony presented January 17, 1980, before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, GPU Chairman William G. Kuhns outlined steps currently underway to form a separate nuclear corporation to operate all GPU nuclear facilities in Pennsylvania and New Jersey and to combine the management structures of GPU's two Pennsylvania operating utilities, Metropolitan Edison Company and Pennsylvania Electric Cornpany.

The separate nuclear company and the combined Pennsyivania utility organi=ation. when implemented in the summer of 1980, will provide cchesive units with single rnanagement, common goals and staffs and strengthened abilities to meet the energy challenge of 21

today's times. The new nuclear organi:ation, GPU Nuclear Corporation, acting as agent for the plant owners, will be charged with design, construction, operation and maintenance responsibility for the two nuclear units at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, as well as the Oyster Creek Station in New Jersey (now operated by Jersey Central Power and Light Company).

It will assume full responsibility for the cleanup and recovery of TMI-2, the Forked River nuclear facility (when reactivated) and continuing plant modifications for safety and environmental and reliability improvements.

The irnpact of this reorganization upon the TMI Training Department is not yet clear. Suffice it to say that the training needs at TMI will continue. To the extent that the new organization brings to bear additional resources or more effective utilization of present resources, it will further s.rengthen the cperation. The Committee can only caution against unrealistic expectations of benefits due to reorganization, per se, which is not a substitute for dedicated efforts and additional resources.

III.

FINANCIAL PICTURE OF THE TRAINING DEPARTMENT The financial picture of the Training Department for the years 1979,1980, and 1981 is described in Tables 4-1 and 4-2.

A breakdown of budget allowances for individual training programs prior to 1979 is not available due to accounting methods used previously.

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TABLE 4-1 GENERATION TRAINING EXPENDITURES 1979 1980 1981 Budget (Thousands of Dollars)

Programs:

Operator Training 233 1408 800 Operator Requalification 35 195 300 l

Radiation Emergency Plan i

Training 7

37 37 l

Fire Fighting Training 17 92 100 l

Auxiliary Operator Progression Program C-B-A 79 209 209 Accelerated Auxiliary Operator Training 0

30 0

Switching and Tagging Training 2

12 2

l General Employee Training 18 e8 68 Emergency Coordinator Control Station Training 0

5 5

Shift Technical Advisor Training 0

80 120 TOTAL 391 2136 1641 4

k l

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TABLE 4-2 EXPENDITURES FOR MAINTENANCE, HEALTH PHYSIC (Includes all maintenancS, AND CHEMISTRY TRAINING e training)

.I2I.2.

J_180_

stry Training Programs:

(Thousands of Dollars) 1981

aining for Technicians 215 590 itial) 700 sining for Transferred 7

sonnel 112 145 o

8 222

_0 710 845

The large increase in budget expenditures from 1979 to 1980 was mainly a result of the TMI-2 accident.

Son 2e of these expenditures were for "one-tim "

the Operator Accelerated Retraining P e

programs such as Training Program. The large number of controgram and the Acceler r

training also contributed to the 1980 b dractor training post-accident u get increase.

creases in the 1981 budget reflect the completion Subsequent de-replacement of temporary personnel with per of these programs and the anticipated manent Met-Ed employees.

Training exper.ditures for TMI-Unit Table 4-3.

I for the past three years are suma2arized in IV.

FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT Facilities and equipment available for trai i personnel, as of June,1980, are given in Tables 4 4n ng Metropolitan E simulator and associated classroom space and e and 4-5. In addition, a control room I

the Babcock & Wilcox simulator trainin quipment are available for periodic use at g facility in Lynchburg, Virginia.

Examination of the classroom facilities and that these facilities are woefully in d equipment at the TMI station indicates a equate.

is minimal, noise level is high a d Space is inadequate, temperature control n

classroom and office space is in temporary tr ilmaintena Most ent.

learning.

a ers that are not conducive to The amount of audio-visual equipment is al tetivities for which the Trainin so inadequate for the scope of training g Department is responsible.

cent is modern, its maintenance and handling s While some of the equip-eems haphazard at best.

While such space and equipment 3parently is no plan to improve th can be tolerated on a short-time basis, there ntrasting the training facilities with the TMI Obe situation in t ep

'ndering if this contrast has been adequately portraservation Center on Rout yed to TMI management.

26

V.

TEACHING STAFF Table 4-6 lists the 38 staff members of the TMI Training Department who are presently teaching in the Training Department or who taught in the OARP, as well as indicators of their qualifications and experience. Seventeen are employed by GPU/ Met-Ed, seven are employed by General Physics, six are employed by NUS, seven are employed by Energy Incorporated and one is employed by Nuclear Energy Services.

People who taught in the OARP are indicated in the table. Twenty-one hold academic de grees (including four Masters degrees),17 hold or have held NRC licenses as RO's or S RO's, 16 have experience with other utilities, three have experience with Architect / Engineer firms, and 11 have other relevant experience in the nuclear industry. In addition, Babcock and Wilcox personnel (not listed in Table 4-6) presented selected portions of the OARP.

The adequacy of the qualifications of the teaching staff is discussed elsewhere in this report.

l 1

l l

27

TABLE 4-3 TMI UNIT 1 TRAINING EXPENDITURES 1977 1978 1979*

(Thousands of Dollars)

Training Services & Programs 86.6 Training 239.5 Refueling Outage-Outside Contractor Training 42.2 44.4 Operations Training (Ind. GET &

Basic & Inter. HP) 480.8 Maintenance Training 55.5 Chem /HP Training 11.0 Speciality Training 3.0 TOTAL **

86.6 281.7 594.7 1979 expenditures are for Unit-1 and one-half of common plant Does not include capital improvements or payroll overhead l

l 28

T-TABLE 4-4 BUILDING SPACE (TRAILERS) AVAILABLE ON-SITE i

l i

Classrooms:

Total area 10,340 sq. ft.

Auditorium:

Total area 900 sq. ft.

O ffices:

Total area 3.690 sq. f t.

Storage:

Total area 440 sq. f t.

Xerox Room:

Total area 80 so. ft.

TOTAL 15,450 sq. f t.

TABLE 4-5 TRAINING EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE ON-SITE 3 Videotape cameras: 2 color,1 black & white 4 Videotape recorders: 4 color 7 Videotape players: 5 color, 2 black & white S Videotape moniters: 4 color,4 black & white 3 Overhead projectors 2 Slide projectors 1 Opaque projector 1 16m:n :novie projector 1 Caromate (self-contained slide and audio unit) 1 Portable cassette recorder 1 Xerox :nachine 29

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lsa. e as.t.lc e e el.e t.e

CHAPTER S i

OPERATOR ACCELERATED RETRAINING PROGRAM I.

INTRODUCTION An NRC letter dated August 9,1979, Order and Notice of Hearing for TMI-1, Page 5, Paragraph 1.(e) contains the following mquirements:

" Augm ent the retraining of all Reactor Operators and Senior Reacter Operators assigned to the control room including training in the areas of natural circulation and small break loss of coolant accidents including revised procedures and the TMI-Z accident. All operators will also receive training at the B&W simulator on the TMI-2 accident and the licensee will conduct a 100 percent re-examination of all operators in these areas. NRC will administer complete examinations to all licensed personnel in accordance with 10CFRSS.20-23."

Metropolitan Edison, through Mr. J. G. Herbein's letter of June 23.1979, GOL 0867, had earlier committed to the substance of item 1.(e) above.

This was the primary rnotivation for initiating the Operator Accelerated Retraining Program.

All RO's and SRO's assigned to the control room of Unit I and all STA's were I

required to participate. The OARP was designed to prepare approximately 40 licensed RO's and SRO's for an NRC licensing examination.

The OARP inch ded approximately sixty presentations and/or practice sessions involving over 200 hours0.00231 days 0.0556 hours 3.306878e-4 weeks 7.61e-5 months of training and covered topics which can be grouped into the

(

following four functional areas:

TMI Plant System Review. TMI P! ant Operational Review, TMI Radioactive Materials Control, TMI Transient Analysis. Topics selected were designed to cover essential information needed to understand TMI-l plant design and operation.

Detailed information on plant syst ems, operating procedures and transient analysis were also included to provide an overall understanding of safe nuclear l

l plant operating practices. An additional period of time was added to repeat lessons which did not meet subject content requiraments and to present additional lessons as needs were identified. A one-week program on Decision Analysis was subsequently added for SRO's. SF's, SS's and STA's.

l 31

For administrative purposes, the retraining program was developed and presented in approximately 60 individual lessons involving classroom presentations, TMI control room 1

walkthroughs and simulator training sessions over a period of five rnonths. These lessons were grouped in seven modules, each of which contained materials having a logical and functional relationship. One module involved instruction on the simulator and the other six were carried out at the Three Mile Island plant. Generally, the training program was presented to the six shif ts individually in one-week segments, with one module being given each week.

The presentation of one module to all six shifts thus covered a 1

six-week period, after which the cycle was repeated for the second module. On occasion, lessons were presented to combined shifts. The Decision Analysis program was presented only three times.

The TMI Unit I and Unit 2 personnel were divided into a nu:nber of administrative sections; th-

~Ser being dependent on the discipline, but generally six or eight. Each of these :....ons was designated to the training section on a rotating basis, and was assigned to training for a previously scheduled period of time. One section so designated frorn each discipline was always in training. While in training status, these persons were available full-time to prepare, conduct or receive training. Personnel on training week were accountable to the Training Department and did not participate in other plant functions.

The only requirement for admission to the O ARP, or portions of that program, was the need to maintain a RO or SRO license or other demonstrated need. Unit 2 licensed personnel attended pcetions of the O ARP which were applicable to TMI Unit 2. All Unit I licensed operators attended the full program, as did the Unit 1 STA's. In addition, selected courses were attended by Auxiliary Operators, Plant Operations Review Committee members and other plant engineers.

32

9 II.

O ARP OBJECTIVES The Operator Accelerated Retraining Program was designed to accornplish several objectives relating to enhancing TMI-l Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator performance.

The achievement of these objectives was a prerequisite to resuming operation of TMI-1. Specific objectives of the OARP were:

A.

To improve operator performance during small break loss of coolant accidents.

B.

To assure operators can r :ognize and respend to concitions of inadequate core cooling.

C.

To improve operator performance during transients and accidents including events that cause or are worsened by inappropriate operator action.

D.

To assure the operators have an in-depth understanding of the TMI-Z accident and *!essons learned.'

E.

To assure operators are knowledgable of operating procedures and actions required upon initiation of the engineering safeguards features including reactor coolant pump rQtirernents.

F.

To assure operators understand the manorneter effects of water levels in the reactor coolant system under different coolant system pressure and temperature conditions.

G.

To assure operators are aware of the extreme seriousness and consequences of the simultaneous blocking of both auxiliary feedwater trains.

1 H.

To assure operators are aware of the prompt NRC notifications required in the case of serious eva.nts.

I I.

To provide operators with an in-depth understanding of the rnethods required to establish and :naintain natural circulation.

33

l J.

To assure operators are knowledgeable of both short and long-term plant systems modifications.

K.

To provide operators with a review of major plant systems.

L.

To provide specialized training on " Operations and Procedural Guidance Require ments."

M.

To assure operators are fully qualified through the administration of Company and NRC administered written and oral examinations.

N.

To provide operators with a review of major administrative, normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

O.

To assure all licensed Unit 1 operators receive training on the B&W simulator covering th TMI-2 accident.

III. TECHNICAL CONTENT CF THE OPERATOR ACCELERATED RETR AINING PROGRAM The technical contene of the Operator Accelerated Retraining Program was determined by an elaboratfs procedure that started with an informal "needs analysis

and evolved into a quality sontrol program that under more-normal circumstances would probably be considere( ' overkill". When it became apparent that additional operator retraining would be -equired prior to the restart of TMI-1, the Unit 1 Superintendent I

(James Seelinger) brought together the Operations Supervisor (Mike Ross), the Metropolitan Edison Manager of Training (L. L. Lawyer) and the Section Head for Operator Training (R. W. Zechman) to develop an outline of subject headings for the Operator Accelerated Retraining Program. In selecting these subjects, they took into account information gained from interviews with TMI-2 operators on duty during and subsequent to the accident, as well as their experience during the recovery (which had not reached " cold shutdown" at that time). The proposed program was reviewed by Gary Broughton, a rnember of the Technical Advisory Group for the Accident Recovery 34

d Organization, and Robert Keaten, Head of the GPU Accident Investigation Team which was charged with making findings and recornmendations for changes. After approval by Metropolitan Edison rnanagement, the proposed prograrn was presented to the NRC along with a comrnitment to relicense all operators prior to TMI-1 restart. While the NRC did not formally approve the progra m, encouragement was given that the prograrn represented a reasonable step to be taken in view of the circumstances.

The next step was the preparation of the Primary and Backup Instructor's Handbook.

D.e very concept of having prirmary and backup instructors in every class is indicative of the dedication to assuring quality instruction, even in the face of time constraints imposed when restart was expected in the latter part of 1979. This feature was retained when the time constraints were elitninated because of the perceived critical importance of the OARP in getting TMI-1 back on-line.

The Primary and Backup Instructor's Handbook provided detailed guides for lesson plan development and administration of the OARP material.

As outlined in the Handbook, preparation for each class was to include: development of a topical cutline (taking into account lesson objectives), lesson plan and training aids preparation (including exam questions and answers) and a rehearsal class presented by the primary instructor to the backup instructor when appropriate (i.e.,

when the rnaterial was unusually complex or being taught for the first time). The backup instructor was to assist in preparation of the topical outline and lesson plan, prepare a formal written review of the lesson plan using a Lesson Plan Development Summary Guide, review the l

adequacy of training aids, attend the class, assist with visual aids as necessarf and perfcrm an instructor evaluation for each lesson.

l l

The Training Department established a special two-man cornmittee to review and approve the lesson plans. This committee determined whether the lesson plans were adequate from the standpoint of technical content, overall integration of material presented. and pedor 'eal adequaev. The two members were the Manager of Training 35

V (who is a baccalaureate graduate in Physics) and a baccalaureate engineer from the GPU Engineering staff who had access to other members of the Engineering staff with expertise in many technical fields.

While subsequent review has shown some OARP material was not developed and/or presented in strict compliance with guides established in the Handbook, the Committee is satisfied that the CARP was a high quality program and that the identified admin-istrative deficiencies did not significantly degrade it.

IV.

PROGRAM FORMAT The modules of the OARP are identified below, including the approximate times devoted to individual topics.

l A.

Sitnulator Training Module l

The initial program training module involved four and one-half days of training at the Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Training Center. The module included classroom training sessions and control room operational sessions.

Individual topics were:

1.

Power Distribution and Rod Withdrawal Limits (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) l 2.

Heat Transfer and Fluid Flow (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 3.

Small Break Analysis (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 4.

Safety Analysis (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 5.

TMI-Z Accident Analysis (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 6.

Unannounced Casualties (16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months ) l The simulator training module provided overview guidance for operators which resulted from analysis of the TMI-Z accident and involvement in simulated plant abnormal and emergency conditions.

This program module supplemented previous operator training and provided a reference point for subsequent program modules dealing with detailed plant systems, operator guidance and nue' ear plant fundamentals.

36

S.

TMI Module One The first module of the program conducted at TMIinvolved four days of classroom training which focused on nuclear plant fundarnentals integrated with specific plant operational characteristics. Individual topics were:

1.

Heat Transfer and Fluid Dynamics (16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months ) 2.

Reactor Theory (16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months )

The content of Module One provided in-depth coverage of fundamental aspects of nuclear reactor control and heat removal. These topics review principles necessary for understanding the purpose and function of nuclear plant systerns, operational procedures and operator actions required for safely operating TMI-1.

C.

TMI Module Two The second : nodule of the program conducted at TMI involved three and one-half days of classroom training covering specific TMI-1 information on selected plant transients, plant systems and the Radiation Emergency Plan. Individual topics were:

1.

TMI-2 Transient (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 2.

Reactor Coolant System (5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months ) 3.

Make-up and Purification System (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 4.

In-Core Instrumentation (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ) 5.

Control Rod Drive System (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 6.

Nuclear Instrumentation (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) 7.

Integrated Control System (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 8.

Radiation Emergency Plan (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months )

The content of Module Two provided detailed coverage of the TMI-2 Transient which occurred March 28, 1979. This put the plant systems and procedural training sessions included in subsequent program lessons into perspective. Detailed plant systems coverage began in Module Two with sessions on key primary plant systems.

37

l l

D.

TMI Module Three The third module of the program conducted at TMI involved four and one half days of classroom training covering specific TMI-1 plant syste:ns and operational procedures.

Individual topics were:

1.

TMI-1 Short Term Modifications (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 2.

Decay Heat Removal System (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ) 3.

Decay Heat Closed Cooling System (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ) 4.

Decay Heat River System (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ) 5.

Core Flood System (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ) 6.

Containment Isolation (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ) 7.

High Pressure Injection (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months )

S.

Use of Procedures (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) 9.

Nuclear Service Closed Cooling System (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ) 10.

Nuclear Service River Water Systern (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ) 11.

Reactor Building Emergency Cooling System (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ) 12.

Intermediate Closed Coolir.g Systern (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ) 13.

Feedwater System (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ) 14.

Condensate System (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ) 15.

Procedure Review-Reactor Coolant Pump Procedure (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) 16.

Emergency Feedwater System (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) 17.

Procedure Review-Emergency Feedwater Procedure (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) 18.

Main Steam System (1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ) 19.

Electrical Distribution (3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months ) 20.

Emergency Diesel (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) 21.

Procedure Review-Electrical Power Emergency Procedure (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) 22.

Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) u

The content of Module Three provided detailed coverage of selected TMI-1 pri: nary and se ondary plant syste:ns. The systems covered in tnis module included systems essential to normal and e:nergency cooling of the reactor.

E.

TMI Module Four The fourth module of the progra:n conducted at TMIinvolved four and one-half davs of classroom training covering specific TMI-1 plant syste=s. operational precedures and radicactive :naterials monitoring / control. Individual topics were:

1.

Procedures Review-Pri: nary System Leak E=ergency Procedure (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) 2.

Procedure Review-Steam Systec: Emergency Procedure (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) 3.

Reactor Protection System (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 4.

Operating Characteristics Review Including Natural Circulation (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 5.

Solid ?! ant Operations (2 hcurs) 6.

Procedure Review-Emergency Procedure (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) 7.

Procedure Review-Operating Procedures (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 3.

Radiation Safety and Radioac:ive Materials Contel I4 hours)

{

0 Radiation Monitoring (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 10.

Radioactive Waste Disposal (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 11.

Liquid and Gaseous Releases (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) 12.

Operational Chemistry (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months )

?e content of Module Four provided detailed coverage of selected TMI-l systems

(

l and plant procedures.

Specific attention was given to normal and abnormal plant l

operating characteristics and relateu procedural guidance. Radiation safety, radiation 1

monitoring, and radioactive :naterials centrol were covered to review existing guidance and present =cdifications =ade following the TMI-2 accident.

39

i F.

TMI Module Five The fif th module of the program conducted at TMI involved five days of classroom training covering specific TMI-1 plant systems, operational procedures, technical specifications and plant operating characteristics. Individual topics were:

1.

Ventilation (3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months ) 2.

Hydrogen Recombiner and Hydrogen Purge il hour) 3.

Technical Specifications-Limiting Conditions for Operation (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 4.

Technical Specifications-Definitions and Safety Limits (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) 5.

Procedures Review-Administrative Procedures and Limitations and Precautions (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) 6.

Technical Specifications Review (3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months ) 7.

Non-Nuclear Instrumentation and Interlocks (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 8.

Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Operator Guidance (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 9.

NRC Prompt Notification Enforcement Policy (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) 10.

Expected Instrument and Plant Response to Transients (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 11.

Reactor Coolant System Elevations and Manometer Effects (3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months ) 12.

Fuel Handling and Core Parameters (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 13.

TMI Control Room Session (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) l The content of Module Five provided detailed coverage of selected TMI-1 systems

[

and plant procedures.

Specific attention was given to normal and abnormal plant l

l operating characteristics and related procedural guidance, including plant technical l

specifications.

The TMI-1 Control Room lesson was used to develop further the l

relationship between expected plant response to operational situations and actual control instrumentation locations and features.

G.

TMI Module Six The sixth module of the program conducted at TMI involved five days of classroom training covering specific TMI-1 plant modifications and extensive coverage of. safety l

40

analysis for TMI-1. Individual topics were:

1.

Computer and Computer Modifications (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 2.

TMI-l Long-Range Design Modifications (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) 3.

Safety Analysis Workshop (32 hours3.703704e-4 days 0.00889 hours 5.291005e-5 weeks 1.2176e-5 months )

The content of Module Six provided an overview of specific changes being planned and accomplished at TMI, and an in-depth presentation of key safety analysis areas and their implication to TMI-1 plant operation. The safety analysis training covered several areas of integrated TMI-1 plant response to normal and abnormal events and provided guidance in evaluating plant performance in real-time. The fundamental principles of plant operation and plant system information were combined with existing plant data to analyze several categories of potential abnormal operating conditions and categories of plant emergencies.

V.

FUNCTIONAL CONTENT OF OARP A breakdown of the OARP subject matter by functional area is useful for analytical purposes. The eight areas chosen by the Committee were somewhat arbitrary and many sessions did not fit perfectly into a single area. Nevertheless, the distribution shown in Table 5-1 was considered to be reasonable in view of the objectives. Except for the addition of thermodynamics and heat transfer, the first five functional areas were primarily review material that was not changed drastically as a result of the TMI-2 accident.

However, the last three functional areas, operations and procedures, emergency preparation and TMI accident analysis, which collectively constitute almost 40% of the total was substantially different from the pre-accident material dealing with these areas. A comparison of the technical content of the OARP with the pre-accident operator training program indicates that approximately one-third of the material presented was new, primarily in the areas of thermodynamics, heat transfer, and thermo-bydraulics of the TMI system. Special emphasis was given to plant transients and related 1

4I

procedures which grew out of the TMI-2 accident, as well as meeting the NRC " lessons learned" training requirements.

he Committee was impressed with the steps taken to assure the adequacy of the technical centent of this one-time program. The Committee performed a general review of the OARP lesson plans, with detailed review of selected lesson plans. In addition, the Committee elected to evaluate the program through participation by Committee members in certain classes coupled with a review of the management control of the Their observations and critiques are given in subsequent sections of this report.

content.

It was the Committee's view that much of the new materi-d presented in the OARP should be incorporated into the AO training programs, the regular (Category IV) Control Room Operator Licensing Program, the Licensed Operator Requalification Program and i

the Shift Technical Advisor Training Program. The material should be reviewed and modified as appropriate to fit into these training programs, to reflect the results of the l

extensive evaluation of the OARP and to keep it current with the latest NRC positions, l

guides, and regulations.

[

l VI.

COMPARISON OF OARP CONTENT WITH CONTROL ROOM ACTIVITIES l

A. Introduction Some form of "needs analysis" should be performed prior to undertaking any educational or training program. Whether this analysis is a formal in-depth activity based on specific procedures, or an informal survey of the situation based on the experience of the manager or instructor, depends upon the situation and the policy of the organization involved. In the case of the Operator Accelerated Retraining Program, the "needs" were fairly clearly spelled out by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the basis of their " lessons learned" investigations. Nevertheless, the Committee has found it instructive to compare the OARP content with the nature of the activities undertaken in the control room by Shif t Supervisors, Shif t Foremen. Control Room Operators, and Shif t 62

Technical Advisors, all of whom participated in the O ARP.

B. Control Room Activities To gain insight into the activities performed by personnel in the control room of the Three Mile Island plant, GPU initiated an on going study to carefully evaluate tasks performed by control room personnel and to develop a job design for each of the positions. After a two-day

brainstorming" session involving control room personnel and several of their supervisors, seven distinct activity :fpes were defined, each having a number of specific tasks. Those activity types and specific tasks are given as follows:

1.

Control Power Generation Manipulate control sod position and adjust baron concentration a.

in reactor coolant system b.

Adjust integrated control system (ICS) load demand Maintain adequate inventory of thermally and chemically suitable water c.

in reactor coolant system d.

Maintain adequate inventory of thermally and chemically suitable water in the secondary coolant system e.

Maintain adequate ultimate heat sink f.

Distribute electric power and other services to the plant auxiliaries g.

Communicate external to the plant h.

Communicate within the plant 2.

Control Radioactivity Operate radwaste systems a.

b.

Control (adjust) radioactive material in primary, secondary & auxiliary systems Maintain containment integrity c.

d.

Maintain control of inventory and location of fuel outside vessel 43

e.

Control access to contamination areas f.

Control spread of radiation from contaminated areas g.

Communicate external to the plant h.

Communicate within the plant 3.

Monitor and Evaluate Plant Performance a.

Perform surveillance testing b.

Evaluate surveillance testing c.

Log plant data d.

Evaluate short-term trends l

Communicate with technical support j

e.

f.

Evaluate input from technical support g.

Determine system status (safety radiation & other) i 4.

Manage Industrial Hazards (Materials. Fire. Securitv. Personnel Iniurv. etc.)

a.

Receive notification b.

Evaluate situation c.

Direct necessary action d.

Control potential hazards e.

Communicate external to the plant 5.

Plant Maintenance and Modification a.

Identify maintenance problems b.

Evaluate reported problems c.

Generate work orders d.

Coordinate maintenance activity with operations 6.

Organization Management a.

Identify tasks, assign priorities, schedule activities and verify results b.

Conduct, evaluate and participate in on-the-job training 44

c.

Ensure compliance with procedures, regulatory, insurance and other requirements d.

Plan and arrange adequate staffing e.

Interact with union f.

Coordinate with other departments g.

Manage personnel h.

Handle special assignments i.

Communicate within and external to the plant 7.

Administration Review procedures and procedure changes a.

b.

Initiate procedures and procedure changes Comply with administrative procedures (tags, R'VP, jumpers, lif ted c.

leads, keys, etc.)

d.

Perform routine personnel services e.

Ensure proper housekeeping f.

Review and control personnel radiation exposure After the activity types and specific tasks were defined, the time spent on each of the seven activity type by the various control personnel was estimated, using an interrogation procedure. For the SS's and the SF's, a further breakdown was made of their activities during normal power operation. maneuvering (startup. ;-dutdown, and change of power level) and emergencies. The results of this exercise are given in Table 5-Z.

45

TABLE S-1 PERCENT OF OARP IN FUNCTIONAL AREAS,*

FUNCTIONAL AREA HOURS PERCENT 1

Fundamentals 36 14.5 2

Plant Systems 48 19.4 l

3 Control & Instrumentation 18 7.3 4

Plant Safety 28 11.3 5

Radiation Safety 20 8.0 6

Operations & Procedures 42 16.9 7

TMI Accident Analysis 36 14.5 8

Emergency Preparations 20 8.1 TOTAL 248 100.0

Does Not include training at the B & W simulator.

46

TABLE 5-2 PERCNT TIME SPENT CN "'MI CCN"'ROL ROCM ACTIVITIES Supervisorv Personnel Staff Control Room

~'M! Control Room Shift Supervisor shift Forman Engineer Operators

'Ac r!t Activities NPO M

E NPO M

E STA CROdl CRO*

1. Control Power Generation 5

34 37 26 10 10 0

70 5

2. Control Radicactivity 6

2 2

14 10 7

0 0

0

3. Moniter & Evaluate Plant Performance 10 34 37 17 40 40 80 15 10

4. Manage Industrial Hazards 2

2 0

2 3

3 0

0 0

5. Plant Maintenance and Mcdificatien 32 3

11 22 15 20 10 2

20

6. Organization Management 32 15 11 12 15 10 0

13 0

7. Administratien 13 5

2 7

7 10 10 0

65 NPO - Normal Power Operatien M - Maneuvering (start-up, shutdown, etc.)

E - Emergency

[

l 47

- _ - ~

TABLE 5-3 i

I AVERAGE PERCENT OF TIME SPENT PERFORMING CONTROL ROOM ACTIVITIES 1.

Control Power Generation 28.9 %

2.

Control Radioactivity 3,4 3.

Monitor and Evaluate Plant Performance 21.1 4.

Manage Industrial Hazards 1,0 5.

Plant Maintenance & Modification 14.5 6.

Organization Management 11.2 7.

Administration 19,9 100.0 %

i l

48

Averages of the percentages for the SS and the SF for the three operating conditions are then averaged with the percentages for the two CRO's (excluding the STA, since his training is only a secondary objective of the OARP), to give the " average" percent of effort spent on each activity shown in Table 5-3.

Each of the eight functional areas listed in Table 5-1 bear directly on the ability of the operators and their supervisors to perforrn the activities listed in Table 5-3.

Furtherciore, the emphasis in the OARP has been on the TMI accident analysis, related changes in procedures and emergency preparation.

While direct cor:parison of the percent of time spent in the OARP on various functional areas is not possible, the Committee concurs with this distribution of effort in the OARP.

VII. INCLUSION OF OARP MATERIAL IN OTHER OPERATOR TRAINING PROGR AMS Metropolitan Edison is considering including portions of the Operator Accelerated Retraining Program in future Shift Technical Advisor. Licensed Operator Requal-ification and Cat IV CRO Training Programs. Those subjects currently being considered for inclusion are as follows:

A.

Heat transfer fluid flow, and thermodynamics 3.

Small break LOCA C.

Natural circulation D.

Anticipated transients operating guides E.

Plant transient training F.

Simulator training incorporating depressurization A decision as to which additional courses should be included will be made based on an evaluation of the OARP. The Committee enthusiastically endorses this proposal and further recommends adoption of many of the quality controls initiated for the OARP.

4 ')

CHAPTER 6 EVALUATION OF THE OPERATOR ACCELERATED RETRAINING PROGRAM L

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE OARP To provide a blueprint for the organization and administration of the OARP, a handbook entitled " Prim ary and Backup Instructor Handbook" was developed.

It presented information regarding goals, program format. rationale, instructional procedures, evaluation procedure, and the program schedule. The material is organized around the specific duties of the instructor and contains the following sections. (The references below are to the Primary and Backup Instructor Handbook and its append ces.)

A.

List of program objectives (Appendix A, p. 2-3)

B.

Program ratior. 'le and list of references used to identify program topics (Appendix A, p. 9)

C.

List of topics included in the four functional areas covered ( Appendix A, 1

p.4-8)

D.

List of lesson *opics and the time to be devoted to each for each module l

(Appendix A, p.18-24)

E.

Instructional procedures (Appendix A, p.10-13) 1.

Instructional techniques proposed include:

a.

Classroom lectures b.

Classroom discussions c.

Classroom working sessions 1

i d.

TMI control room training sessions Nuclear plant simulator practice sessions e.

F.

Evaluation procedures for instructors and students ( Appendix A, p.14-171 1

1 1

G.

Daily schedule for each module giving tonic, time and instructor (Appendix A.

unpaged at end of Appendix A)

I 50

A H.

Lesson plan development summary guide for the aid of the instructors (Appendix D)

I.

A sample lesson plan on the Reactor Building Emergency Cooling System illustrating the use of the

lesson plan development summary guide" (Appendix C)

J.

A sample lesson plan develop:nent summary for the lesson plan on the Reactor Building E:nergency Cooling System (Appendix E)

K.

Definition of the duties of the primary and backup instructors (p.1-0)

L.

Form for evaluating the instr.tetor (Appendix F)

The training program was implemented by instructors selected for their knowledge of a particular content area.

Training materials were to be developed according to guidance given in the Handbook (See page 35).

A careful examination of the Handbook as a descriptor of the proposed retraining program indicates that considerable thought and care were involved in planning the OARP.

It provided instructors with a valuable guide for lesson plan development, and a detailed description of their duties.

It also directed them to be co"cerned about effective ways of presenting material, the use of references, the necessity for review l

and reinforcement, the integration of theory and practice, and evaluation of both students and their own performance. While this guide ic'.naterial development was not always strictly followed, the identified administrative deficiencies did not significantly l

1 degrade the program.

Although one could offer some minor criticisms such as slightly different organi::ation and some improved examples of instructional objectives, the program for l

retraining nuclear reactor operators for Three Mile Island Unit One has been carefully developed to be consistent with effective educational and psychological principles.

l l

51

II.

EVALUATION OF OARP A. Introduction To determine the extent to which the preplanning described in the Handbook had been implemented and to evaluate the adequacy of OARP technical content, as well as the educational and psychological characteristics of the procedures used, the Committee i

considered a number of issues and gathered information from a variety of so'urces. For example, to examine the correspondence between the preplanning described in the Handbook and the operation and effectiveness of the OARP, the Comusittee gathered 1

informatien from the following sources:

l l

1.

Classroom visitation l

2.

Interviews with instructors i

3.

Interviews with students l

4.

Viewing videotapes of lessons presented l

l S.

Report of PQS, Inc., audit of the OARP dated January 4.1980 l

6.

Attending preliminary oral examinations 7.

Interview with Frank Kelly, examiner for the preliminary " mock" licensing examination 8.

Meetings, conferences and discussions with L. L. Lawyer, Manager of Training and his staff 9.

Interviews with Dick Zechman, Supervisor, Operator Training Section 10.

Results of quiz:es and tests 11.

Results of instructor ratings 12.

Information about simulator use 13.

Visit to TVA Training Center 14.

Visit to Duke Pawer Company Training Center l

l l

l 52

B. Classroom Visitation On January 16 and 17,1980, Dr. Eric F. Gardner attended classes, interviewed instructors and students and viewed videotapes.

He attended the classes listed in Table 6-1.

Evaluation of the presentations visited were based on:

1.

Quality of presentation Z.

Attitudes of instructor toward students 3.

Student participation 4.

Attitudes of students toward instructor 5.

General teaching / learning situation These lessons occurred at the end of the program and were a small portion of the total number. However, they provided useful information as a sample of the classroom procedure. The lesson plans distributed to the class followed the format described in the Primary and Backup Instructor Handbook.

The instructors presented the :naterial extemporaneously and related it to the students' background. The type of presentation varied with the specific content and the particular instructional objectives, as did the use of visual aids.

Diagrams on handouts, transparencies, and the chalkboard were used effectively. In several instances, additional transparencies could have been developed to focus on portions of the system being considered.

Rapport within the classes was excellent.

The instructors were attempting to present material that was of current concern and expected to be useful to the students.

In return, the students appreciated the instructors' efforts. Questions raised by the students about the functioning of the systern i

and the relationship of the part under discussion to their jobs as operators, were judged by the instructors as important and relevant. On several occasions the questions were outside the field of competence of the instructor, but were considered sufficiently

(

53

l i:nportant to have him take notes and promise an answer at a later time. Several ques-tions by students prompted the design engineer instructors to indicate that additional design changes were needed.

This type interaction not only provided increased motivation, but resulted in additional understanding by both designers and operators.

In accordance with the original plan, the in:tructors were graded on their presentations. A later examination of the ratings given to the instructors of the cla:,ses visited seemed to be fair, made conscientiously and corresponded reasonably well with those the visiting Committee member would have given.

l C. Viewing Videotapes of Lessons i

Since the number of classes that could be visited were so limited, supplernental information was obtained from viewing videotapes of classes. Dr. Gardner viewed nine such videotapes. Five of these showed lessons which had been presented early in the program and which gave information about the functioning of classes not visited and l

their correspcndence with the blueprint described in the Handbook. Two were selected from the classes he visited late in the program. and two on a Safety Analysis Workshop.

The specific cassettes are '.isted in Table 6-2.

54

I TABLE 6-1 OARP CLASSES VISITED BY DR. GARDNER Toeic Instructor Position TMI Unit-1 Long Range Mr. Slear Project Engineering Modification Manger, TMI-1 Restart Modifications GPU Service Corp.

Decay Heat Removal Mr. Dempsey Post-Accident Pump and Motor Vibration Monitoring Systems Design Engineer (B&W)

System Decay Heat Removal Mr.Cond:eck Mechanical Engineer Pump Remote Venting System Non-Nuclear Instru-Mr. Orlandi

=entation and TMIInstrumentation Engineer Interlocks on Modification of Equipment Administrative Proce-Mr. Brown Full-tim e Instructor dures for TMI-1 TMI Training Staff Emergency Feedwater Mr. Husted Full-time Instructor System Operation TMI Training Staff 55

TABLE 6-2 VIDEOTAPES REVIEWED BY DR. GARDNER Topic Instructor Position Heat Transfer 8/29/79 Rankine Cycle Corfield Instructor from General Physics Corporation 8/29/79 Fluid Flow Corfield Review of Reactor Theory (Category A/H) 8/28/79 Reactivity Bolt:

TMI Training Staff 3/28/79 Coefficients Bolt:

TMI-1 Mod III Use of Procedures Ross TMI Operations Supervisor Safety Analysis Workshoo 1/14/80 2 cassettes Broughton GPU Safety Analysis Engineer P ecedures Review I and 2 2

1/17/80 2 cassettes Brown TMI Training Staff l

l l

56

w-d Both the picture and voice of the instructor were clear, but, as would be expected, the audio was less clear for the students' questions and comments. These could be heard clearly only bv increasing the volume. Transparencies used in the class were somewhat small and fu::y when projected on the television screen.

The particular tapes studied were selected for three specific reasons:

1.

To obtain a frame of reference for comparing actual class visits with infor-mation obtained through observing videotapes, the tapes of two lectures (which were a repetition of those actually visited) were studied. With exception of the deficiencies

nentioned above regarding the videotapes, there wss close correspondence between the information obtained from the videotapes and the actual classroom visit.

2.

Since the classes visited occurred at the end of the OARP, it was considered desirable to obtain information about class activity at the beginning of the progratn. The five tapes, four of which were dated August 23, 1979, and August 29, 1979 on heat transfer and review of reactor theory, and one on the use of procedures (undated) were scrutini:ed with the same obje:tives in mind as those for the chss visits.

The presentations on the videotapes followed the outline given in the Handbook and were approximately of the same quality as the Committee :nember observed during the class-room visits. ne taped performance of one instructor was superior to the instruction in the classes actually visited, while those of the other two were about at the same level.

3.

In view of the importance of safe operation as a major objective of the OARP, l

l two videotapes of the Safety Analysis Workshop were examined. These lessons also followed the lesson plan outline in the Handbook, were well organized, had substantial class interacticn and followed good educational and psychological principles.

In general, the infor: nation about the quality of classroom performance obtained frorn viewing videotapes was consistent with that obtained from direct class observatton.

57

V D. Interviews with Instructors 1.

TMI Instructors A meeting was held on February 16th with five of the then seven full-time instructors assigned by TMI to the OARP (Messrs. Eeers, Bolt:, Brown, Frederick and Husted). Thirten additional instructor positions have been authorized, although not all these new positions have been filled.

l During this conference a number of issues were discussed. The instructors made it clear that the students were highly motivated to pass the NRC examination and to restarting the plant. At the same time, all personnel, instructors, and students were somewhat bitter about having to retake the entire NRC examination. They were fearful about being given a more rigorous examination with higher standards than those given to the operators of other plants. Numerous rumors were being circulated which, as would be expected, add to their anxiety. This problem was discussed with Mr. Zechman, and 1

remedial steps are being taken to get rnore information from the NRC about the nature of the new examinations and expected standards.

The students have been operating on regular shif ts with each sixth week devoted f

entirely to the O ARP.

Hence, there is an excellent opportunity for articulation of classroom work and carry-over to the control room activity.

The instructors indicated that videotapes of lectures were used m ain' y for I

documentation and make-up work by those missing the lectures. Little use was :nade of these for review purposes, although they were available in the library.

I Both students and instructors indicated the amount of material covered was very extensive and difficult to absorb in the time allotted. Upon inquiry, it was reported that handouts (lesson plans and diagrams) were not distributed prior to the days on which the classes were held and sometimes were not available until af ter classes were held. There also were no assignments to be completed outside of class. To compensate for these deficiencies, an extensive review period has been added to the program and about half-a-58

dozen lectures on which the instructors had received ratings less than 3.0 were repeated.

(The rating scale used was 4-excellent. 3-good. 2-fair, and 1 poor.)

In addition, the instructors and students were looking forward to taking tuock NRC examinations prior to taking the NRC examinations.

Queries about the functioning of the instructor-backup instructor system indicated that it had broken-down to a considerable extent due to the amount of lesson material generated and the need for more personnel.

In general, the instructors were conscientious about their teaching responsibilities, proud of their training program, and were highly motivated to present an effective training program.

2.

Part-time instructors Brief interviews were held af ter each class with the four part-time instructors (Messrs. Slear, Dempsey, Cond:eck and Orlandi). All seemed interested in helping the students, and were aware of the necessity to present material that would tie-in with the students' backgrounds and would be useful in their jobs as operators.

E. Interviews with Students Comments were elicited with respect to:

t 1.

Opinion of presentations i

2.

Response of instructor to questions f

3.

Attitude toward instructor l

l 4.

Opinion of the OARP l

I 5.

General concerns Four of the studeuts participating in the OARP were informally interviewed during class breaks. Most of the information obtained from the students was consistent with that obtained from the TMI instructors.

i l

59

V Several students seemed to feel that studying procedures based on roodifications of the TMI-1 plant before all changes had been finali:ed was not very valuable. Some introductory material (as the psychologist would say, " Advanced Organi:ers") should be given showing how such discussions at this early stage can result in a better understanding of the system.

In spite of the fact that they would have been paid overtime, only a few students stayed for a short time after class to confer with the instructor. Those interviewed indicated that they were exhausted by 3:00 P.M. and really could not profit from additional time beyond the eight hours already spent in class.

In general, they had respect for the instructors, were satisfied that they were learning worthwhile m aterial, and liked the class interaction encouraged by the instructors.

F. Results of Instructor Ratings After each class the instructor was rated by the backup instructor cr, in his 1

1 absence, by a selected alternate on six variables, each one of which has from five to ten 1

subcategories. The form used is given in the Primary and Backup Instructor Handbook.

These categories include: a) technical content of lesson, b) preparation of instructor, c) presentation techniques, d) com:nunication skills, both oral and visual, e) use of training equipment, f) motivational influence, and g) an overall evaluation and an opportunity to give suggestions for improvement.

Table 6-3 gives the overall evaluation of each l

instructor on a 4 point scale (4.0-excellent 3.0-good, 2.0-fair,1.0-poor) on each of the topics included in the six modules. It does not include instruction on the simulator. As 1

can be seen, the ratings range from a low of 2.31 to a high of 3.72 with a mean of 3.13.

(The mean with the ratings weighted by the number of hours was 3.19.) Of this group of topics,13 presentations were rated below 3.0 and those topics were repeated. Of these 13,10 were above 2.85 and 7 were above 2.90.

I 60 L

1 9

According to the original plan, a minimum grade for each individual presentation was set at 2.5 (on the 4.0 scale) while the rninimurn grade for an entire topic was set at 3.0.

Lectures on those topics for which the instruction was rated less than 3.0 were

~

repeated and are identified in Table 6-3 by a double asterisk.

Since an unsatisfactory lesson may be due to the performance of the class, as well as to a poor presentation by the instructor, an examination was made of the results of l

students' qui :es on topics for which the instructors' ratings did not f

meet rainimum standards.

If trainee performance of 70?o or less was found for an individual presentation, the entire training topic was repeated.

l G. Knowledge Evaluations by Examination Each lessou plan for the program was developed with representative qui questions identified.

During each week of training, quizzes were administered and used for the evaluation of trainee knowledge level.

Detailed standards for the construction and evaluation of the qui::es is given in the Handbook. Each week at least one qui: was adminstered to the students. Table 6-4 presents the average grade received by the class on each topic. However, included in these averages are the intitial scores of students who were required to restudy the material and take a second qui =. Students receiving 80% or less were required to follow the retraining procedure described in the Handbook and take a second qui: on the same content.

The quiz scores for varicus topics ranged from 78.9% to 99.0% with a mean of 88.36%

61

IABit 6-3 BACKUP INSTRUCTOR [VALHAll0NS Of PRIMARY INSikUCIORS ON SPECIFIC 10 PICS i

Time lesson Instructor Module

{llours}

Gradg Heat Iransfer & Fluid Dynamics ruplec*/Corfield*

1 16 3.42 Reactor theory Townsend*/Doltz*

1 16 3.44 IMI-il Iransient Broughton*

2 4

3.46 Reactor Coolant System Anderson / Book / Newton

2 5

2.63 "

In-Core Instrumentation Ranbaugh

2 1

2.91 "

Control Rod Drive System (Mechanical) biandsburg

2 2

2.91 "

Control Rod Drive Systein (Electrical)

A. Urrun

2 2

3.22 Integrated Control System Joyner

2 4

3.24 Nuclear Instrunentation System Allenun/E schbach/ Book

2 2

2.31 "

Hake-Up & Purification System Hitz

2 4

3.63 Radiation Energency Plan Tsa99aris

2 4

3.24 Advarned llealth l'hysics Shannon*/Jentz*

2 8

2.86**

Procedure Review Section #7 H. Brown *

3 4

3.10 a

Procedure Review Section #9 N. Brrun*

3 4

1.11 Procedure Review Section #8 H. Brown *

3 4

3.33 Decay Heat Closed Cooling Hehler

3 1

2.9?"

Use of Procedures Russ

3 2

3.31 Core f lood 111 1 :

3 1

3. 34 Nuclear Service Closed Cooling lewe

3 1

3.18 Q

Nuclear Service River Water Noll

3 1

3.12 R4 Building [mergency Cooling Nuti.hinson

3 1

3.15 Intermediate Closed Cooling Pilsitz

3 1

3.K feed Water Frederl(k*

3 1

3.lC Condensate frederick *

3 1

2.32**

Main Steau Husted*

3 1

3.15

[lectrical Distribution Zenyuth

3 3

2. M" Ener9ency Diesel Bensel

3 2

1.?i Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Sheets

3 6

i.S c==:3 IHl-1 Short Range Modifications Slear

4 4

3. /

c- --=3 Reactor Protec. tion System Bris.te r

4 4

3.

Operating Characteristics Review Corfield*

4 4

.ft l

Solid Plant Operation Corfield*

4 2

.E' i

Procedure Review Sectiwi #1 holtz*

4 2

3. ~. :

l fontainwnt isolation Husted*

4 I

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TABLE 6-4

SUMMARY

OF OARP QUIZ RESULTS Avg. Grade Module I Heat transfer and fluid dynamics 94.3 Reactor theory 92.6 Module II Reactor coolant system 86.8 In-core instrumentation 87.9 Makeup and purification system 86.6 I

Control rod drive system 85.9 l

Integrated control systern 85.9 l

Radiation emergency plan 80.5 Nuclear instrumentation 92.6 Advanced health physics 92.4 Module III l

Procedure review section 7 37.0 Procedure review section 9 87.9 l

Procedure review section 8 78.9 Decay heat closed cooling 38.2 Use of procedures 87.3 Core flood 83.0 Nuclear service closed cooling 89.7 Nuclear service river water 37.5 Reactor building emergency cooling 93.6 Interrnediate closed cooling 85.9 Feedwater and condensate 93.0 l

Main steam 99.0 l

Electrical distribution 37.7 Emergency diesel 93.7 Engineered safeguards actuation system 87.5 Module IV t

l Reactor protection system 89.2 Procedure review section 3 90.9 Containment isolation 82.3 High pressure injection 89.6 l

Decay heat removal 38.3 Decay heat river water 93.7 Radiaticn safety and radioactive materials control 86.6 Operational chemistry 85.3 Module V l

Safety analysis workshop 37.9 i

Module 5 90.5 Module VI Module 6 80.3 NOTE:

The above listing gives average scores for the O ARP lessons and modules.

Some quiz =es were not yet graded and some need to be regiven. All available data up to February 26, 1980 are included. When it was necessary for a student to retake a quiz, only his first score was used.

64

H. Record Keecing Files containing the material used in the OARP as well as individual records of attendance, performance on qui::es, examinations and instructor evaluations have been maintained. In addition, the employment and training record of each reactor operator and each auxiliary operator are kept up-to-date in a computer bank.

CI. REPORT OF PQS. INC.. AUDIT OF THE OARP Prior to the class visitations by Dr. Gardner, an audit of the OARP was conducted on December 18-19, 1979, by Personnel Qualification Services, Inc. An examination of the content and schedule, evaluation program, schedule and logistics, class observation, trainee interview sessions and general records review was conducted and a number of recommendations for improvement of the program were offered. Among recommenda-tions of the PQS report dated January 4,1980 were:

A.

To repeat some lectures among the ten presentations which had been rated less than an average of 3.0 (4.0-excellent, 3.0-good, 2.0-fair,1.0 poor).

B.

Suggestions for some of the instructors with respect to voice level, lack of class participation and presenting material at too fast a pace.

C.

The extension of the training period to include extensive review and a mock NRC examination including both written and oral examinations.

D.

A modified schedule including the review, in-house audit (mock NRC exams) and the NRC examinations.

E.

Improved record keeping and the co mpletion of missing records of attendance and qui =:es.

These recommendations were followed with a resulting improvement in the teaching and quality of the program.

65

IV. POST-O ARP TR AINING Although the original plans for the OARP had made provision for review and reteaching of appropriate topics, the delay in the start-up date for TMI-1 per:sitted a more systematic plan to increase the training of the students, strengthen the program and rectify weaknesses identified.

To achieve these ends, the Post-OARP Training Program was instituted to begin on January ZS,1980.

During this period the Unit 1 Operations Department returned to their normal six shift rotation and attended the Post-OARP Program during their normal training week.

The Post-OARP Program consisted of seven major areas and included the following:

A.

OARP makeup iectures/ qui::es/ mini-walkaround oral examination B.

Selected safety analysis lectures (videotape /B&W)

C.

Rescheduled OARP lectures determined by instructor evaluations D.

Final normal and emergency procedures review E.

Mock NRC written and oral examination audit by POS, Inc.. under the direction of Frank Kelly F.

Final review based upon results of POS audit G.

NRC written and oral examination l

V.

KNOWLEDGE EVALUATION BY ORAL AND WRITTEN CO MPREHENSIVE l

EXAMINATIONS As part of the Post-O ARP Program, an auditor group (Personnel Oualification Services, Inc.) conducted a written and oral evaluation of the trainees. The evaluation l

was designed to be the equivalent of an NRC licensing examination. It included an expanded examination section covering Operator Accelerated Retraining Program objectives.

i l

l l

l 66

i 1

Of the 31 RO's and SRO's (27 were TMI Unit I licensed RO's and SRO's and four were NRC RO license candidates) who took the written examination in early April, eight received grades below 80% on total score. Four of these scored below 70% on two parts of the examination and four on a single part. The other 23 who scored 30% or above on total score obtained at least 70% on all parts of the regular examination. On the one-time special part (" Lessons Learned from Three Mile Island II") the special standard of 90% was obtained by only 15 candidates.

The eight weak condidates have begun additional training and a special class on " Lessons Learned from three Mile Island II" has been scheduled.

Most of the failures on the written examine.tions were those of individuals who had not had the benefit of being at TMI while the plant was in operation.

Of the 31 RO's and SRO's who were given the oral examination at this time, 25 passed, three :narginally passed, and three failed. Two of these failures were new RO license candidates. The third failed at the SRO level but passed at the RO level.

Trainees who did not meet the established standard on these examinations were required to take additional work. The program content and duration of retraining was determined by the nature and severity of the failure on the audit examinations.

Following completion of this supplemental program, a second written and oral evaluation of the trainee was conducted maintaining the original standards.

Previously licensed Unit-1 personnel who successfully completed the O ARP were then judged to be prepared to function with safety in the newly modified TMI-l control room and to take an NRC administered oral and written license examination.

A. Written Comnrehensive Examinatic,ns Copies of the written examination questions administered and graded by the PQS examiners were studied by Dr.Gardner. The questions were penetrating and called upon the student to relate theory to control room operation.

67

B. Oral Examinations To become better acquainted with the oral examining procedure and to evaluate its effectiveness, Dr. Gardner attended two of the auditer administered oral examinations:

one examined by Mr. Kelly from 7:00 A.M. to 11:00 A.M. on April 8,1980 and the other examined by Mr. Cashwell from 7:00 A.M. t:.

1^ 30 A.R an April 9,1980. At the conclusion of each session, the examiner and eraan e & cussed weak and strong areas disclosed by the examination.

Since psychometric literature stresses the weaknesses of one-on-one oral examinations, the Comt:..ttee was especially concerned with their probable effectiveness for reactor operator licensing.

Both oral examinations by a board and by a single examiner can fail to achieve their objectives.

However, the initial bias of the Committee against the single examiner technique was not substantiated by the two oral examinations attended. The examiners used a prepared set of topics to be covered, probed to deter:nine depth of understanding and used questions which required knowledge of important concepts in both theory and practice. Special emphasis was placed on safety, the safety devices built into the syst e m, and the diagnosis needed during transients.

In spite of the evidence supporting the desirability of the one-on-one ora; examination, which also included strong support from the two examiners as well as equally strong support from all students queried (about ten), the Committee is concerneri about potential weaknesses. Among the strengths and weaknesses are:

1.

Strengths The examination takes place during a walk-through of the plant.

a.

b.

A single examiner can start questioning in a particular direction and then vary the questions systematically to probe more deeply in subtle and effective ways. The contributions of multiple examiners are likely to oc tess successful in achieving such an objective.

68

c.

A single examiner can establish rapport more easily than a board, reduce anxiety, and hence elicit a better sample of what the examinee knows.

2.

Weaknesses a.

A single examiner may be expert in one area, stress that area, and fail to l

cover other important areas adequately.

l b.

He may have a particular interest, even without special expertise, in one area and neglect others.

c.

There is no reliability check on evaluations by a single examiner.

d.

A clash of personalities can result in an unrepresentative performance by the examinee.

e.

Either previous friendship or the establishment of immediate compat-ability can result in a poor examination or too-high grading.

Since one of the major strengths and purposes of the oral examination is to show familiarity with the plant and all aspects of the systern, a walk-through examination is essential. It would be physically difficult for a board of examiners to conduct such a tour.

However, it does seem desirable to have a procedure that would reduce the possibilities of the occurrence of the potential weaknesses. One solution might be to divide the examination into two parts. (It is currently a long examination.) Each part could be adtninistered by a different examiner. There could be a partial overlapping of content and each examiner could give his overall judgement of the candidate as well as l

l l

his rating of the different areas covered. There are other possibilities short of requiring a full board as is done in some situations. However, these will not be discussed in this report.

i l

60

oo o

o D 'kI$

,W oo

=

CHAPTER 7 THE DECTSION ANALYSIS TRAINING PRO I.

INTRODUCTION GRAM In the official analysis of the TMI 2 would have been negligible if the tr accident, it is alleged that the conseq uences Without getting into the reasonsue nature of the acc timely manner.

gnosed in a (this issue is dealt with extensi why it was not diagnosed soon enough any steps above and beyond those alre dvely in the various in

, suffice it to say that dirgnosis of an unfamiliar sequence a y cited, which can be taken to assu re a timely Metropolitan Edison and the NRC th tof events, would provide add a

ance to both properly and in a timely manner.

an unfamiliar occurrence would be d ealt with training was implemented by MIt is in this context that th Analysis" of " Decision Accelerated Retraining Progran:

etropolitan Edison as part of the Operat or L

DECISION ANALYSIS

" Decision Analysis" in this nalysis Company (MAC) of San Diegosituation is a program dev anagement

, California. The i tiqua to MAC nor does the program concepts involved are neither represent the etropolitan Edison.

Nevertheless, the methodology pr only alternative availabl to i proven effective in a wide variety of esented by MAC in this program The central theme is that the shiftmanagement situati nuclear field.

e manager or commander of shift operatiosupervisor, the man on the spot, is ctives of this training program are three f ldns, and hence he is the decisi er. The o :

A.

To improve the ability of the shif t su which written procedures do not e i pervisor to handle complex situations r

x st.

3.

To develop an understanding of a which includes the handling of uncert isystematic decision analysis tech ue, a nty and conflicting information

e 4

C.

To develop an improved understanding of the Company's value system needed to make " good" decisions.

In this regard, the characteristics of a " good" decision are:

1.

A full spectrum of alternatives was considered; 2.

The cause and effect relationships were used in differentiating the alternatives; 3.

The best information available was used; 4.

The uncertainty was quantified by the best experts available; and 5.

The values involved in the decision were quantified by the decision maker.

III. GOOD DECISIONS In Decision Analysis, a " decision

is defined as an irrevocable commitment of resources, rather than simply a mental choice to follow a certain course of action. Once there has been a decision, there can be no returning to the identical situation that l

existed previously. An " outcome

is the result of committed resources, and it is usually influenced not only by a decision itself, but by external events which may be beyond the control of the decision maker.

A

good" decision is one that is evaluated with a carefully defined logic and is consistent with the preferences and information available to the decision maker. Where there is uncertainty as to which external events will occur, that uncertainty should be included in the analysis. It is reasonable to expect that a good decision will lead to a good outcome, where the quality of the outcome is determined by what happened and what influence it had on the plant; i.e., safety, the plant's performance, maintenance cost, etc.

71

The objectives of a for:nali::ed decision analysis are to:

A.

To increase the likelihood of good autcomes by rnaking good decisions, B.

To recognize explicity judgments regarding preferences so that all parties may clearly understand the role of these preferences in a given situation and the trade-offs that are irnplied with thern, and C.

To serve as a communications framework so that all parties to the decision may clearly understand the integrating logic used to evaluate the alternatives.

In arriving at a " good" decision, the shift supervisor must consider what can and carmot be done, what is and what isn't known, and the outcome that is desired.

Then a consistent logic must be used in arriving at a decision. The things that make a decision difficult are usually the uncertainty of the information available and the risk involved in taking a specific action.

Generally, if the decision maker knew enough facts, he/she would know exactly what to do.

Sometimes the problem is that there are too many alternatives available.

Other times, there are too few in the sense that the Shift Supervisor's hands are tied by mandatory procedures dictated by management or the regulatory agencies.

I Sometimes these mandatory procedures are based upon assumed situations which may or c ay not fit the true situation with which the shif t supervtsce is faced.

IV.

METHODOLOGY OF DECISION ANALYSIS The methodology presented by Management Analysis Company consists of two phases; scoping and structuring of a decision tree. The scoping phase involves the listing of alternatives, the uncertainties, and the outcomes of a particular situation.

The structuring of a decision tree is a formal mechanism by which the consequences of various alternate decisions at different points and their influence on the outcome are identified.

Generally, this involves quantifying the various outcomes utili::ing the best inferrnation available to assess the probabilities involved. Next, the various alternatives 72

4 need to be ranked in order of preference.

The decision maker's values, which are generally his/her perception of managernent's values, are a critical part of the decision making process. In situations where time is of the essence, it may well be that scoping is all that is necessary to make a decision. Indeed, in muy cases, the principal value of the decision tree is simply to confirm the shif t supervisor's mental analysis of the situation after properly " scoping" the problem. Perhaps one of the greatest benefits of the scoping exercise is that it brings out alternatives that might not otherwise have been consi-dered. Indeed, one of the most common errors in decision making is to focus too early on one particular alternative and to exclude all others without giving adequate consideration to the uncertainties involved.

Proper scoping of the situation may bring out other alternttives that should be considered and may cause the shift supervisor to seek additional information in areas that might not have otherwise been checked. This may be critically important in stress situations where there is uncertainty or even conflict in the information available. In gathering information from others, the shif t supervisor is utili::ing the concept of group dynamics. Indeed, the major trap to be avoided is that past experien e r=ay lull the operators and shif t supervisors into a " mind-set" (a term that appeared extensively in the various TMI-2 accident investigation reports) that a given set of indications always indicates the same behavioral pattern of the system.

Most decisions require evaluation of the likelihood of future events. Information to evaluate these probabilities must be sought from the most knowledgeable individuals available. This individual's assessment of the probability for future events may change as infor: nation about these events increases, and such changes must be communicated to the decision maker. It must be understood that there are no "right" or " wrong" answers in assessing probabilities, only quantifications of an individual's judgment on the likelihood of future events.

A decision maker may accept, reject or ciodify the probabilities provided te him, but he should have the benefit of the best infe mation available. O f ten 73

1 l

the decision in a particular situation is very sensitive to the assessment of probabilities.

If it is apparent that additional information would influence the decision, more information should be sought. If time is not available or if it is apparent that additional information wouldn't influence the decision, then the time for a decision is at hand. It should be remembered that new information is not likely to be " perfect" and the need for further studies should be viewed in light of the fact that uncertainty can never be totally removed.

V.

IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISION ANALYSIS PROCEDURES The Training Department intends to include decision analysis training as part of their on going six-week training cycle program. In the final analysis, the value of this decision making approach will depend upon the Shif t Supervisor using this tecimique, management's commitment to it, and the credibility that it achieves with the operators in helping them make " good" decisions in both real and simulated situations.

Scoping is an extremely valuable tool, but it can and often must be done rapidly. It is, in effect, an organized brainstorming whose primary function is to stimulate ideas to identify alternatives and uncertainties and overcome preconceived judgments.

Structuring into decision trees is more time consuming, and there may be several tries l

before a satisfactory tree can be established. Indeed, the responsibility for structuring a decision tree might be assigned to the shif t technical advisor. Hence, the STA's training in decision analysis should be carried-out in conjunction with that of the shif t supervisor so that they work together as a team.

The bottom line on any technique introduced into a trainir.g program is, "Will it really do the job?" Could it, for instance, have been effective in preventing the damage to TMI-Unit 2 on March 28, 1979? Would scoping, had it been undertaken on that date, have identified the fact that.the PORV had not closed even though the indicator light on l

the panel indicated that there was power to the closing circuit? Would the valve's actua!

74

position have been identified as one of the uncertainties? Would closing the block valve been listed as one of the alternatives? Would continuing operation of the high pressure injection pumps have been listed as one of the alternatives?

If scoping had been practiced as part of the previous operator training, could it have saved TMI-2 from damage? There are, of course, no certain answ ers to these questions. Decision Analysis, per se, is not a panacea; rather, it is a mechanism for systematically analyzing unfamiliar situations. It is the process chosen by Metropolitan Edison whose management is in the process of implementing it and is committed to a continuing evaluation of its effectiveness.

Dr. Uhrig spent one week in a training program with one-third of the TMI-Unit I and Unit 2 SRO licensees and STA's where they utilized both scoping and structuring of decision trees in a series of postulated problem situations. The results of this one-week training course were impressive because in these examples the SRO licensees and STA's made " good" decisions. On the basis of their perfcrmance in this class, it is reasonable to expect that with continued training and management's commitment to utilize decision analysis, the SRO licensees and STA's would arrive at a " good" decision when faced with an unfamiliar situation as serious as the TMI-Unit 2 accident.

75

CHAPTER 8 MAN-MACHINE INTERACTION I.

INTRODUCTION The length of time from establishment of requirements to operation of a nuclear power plant (approximately 10-12 years) virtually assu: es that man-machine technology will have improved during the developtnent period. The : nan-machine elements of TMI-1 appear to have been designed consistent with the state-of-the ar: procedures that existed in the power plant industry at the time of its inception. However, it is now generally recognized that the control rooms of all nuclear plants were based primarily on traditions and practices of fossil plant design and not on the latest information available in the rna t-enachine area. Certainly they are not consistent with the current state-of-the-art. This current period of down-time provides an onportunity to up-date both TMI-1 and TMI-Z irem the human factors point of view. The Cornmittee heartily endorses the program that GPU has instituted to rework the TMI-l control room through the:r contractor, MPR Associates, Inc., of Washington. D.C.

II.

DEFINITIONS To a significant extent, hutnan behavior reflects the external environrnent. If that environ:nent is reasonably compatible with the inherited and acquired characteristics of man, reflection will be compatible, i.e., the results of the interactions between man and

nachine will facilitate the accomplishment of the system's goals. To the extent that these interactions are negative, errors, declining productivity, and stressed, unhappy people are the result.

Examination of the man-machine model of Figure 8-1 is instructive.

Note especially the two interfaces. The first, on the left. :s of ten referred to as inout tit might be a dial, label, or paragraph in a technical procedure). ne second. on the right.

is often referred to as outnut (a knob. steering wheel. or brake pedal). Note that the m

4 input and output are with respect to man, not the machine.

These interfaces are essentially means for communicating between men and machines. The degree to which these interfaces are compatible with man's perceptual, cognitive and motor capabilities will determine to no small extent how effectively they interact.

Suppose, for example, that a motorist wishes to drive at the legal speed limit. The person glances at the speedometer (the first interface) and perceives it to read 60 mph, compares this with what is stored in the central nervous system, and calculates that the car is going five mph over the speed limit. Now a choice has to be made: (a) depress the brake pedal, (b) release the accelerator pedal, (c) both "a" and "b". The accelerator pedal and brake pedal are control interfaces which *tell" the n:achine what to do. The results of this choice, let's say "b", are fed back to the input interface, a cornparison is again made between what the speedometer says and what is in the motorist's memory, and appropriate adjustments are made until the goal of driving 55 r=ph is reached.

Note the critical part that feedback plays. Feedback, or " knowledge of results" as psychologists used to call it, is essential for effective learning and for sustaining performance at an effective level. Note also that the entire process is embedded in a larger environcient, the parameters of which will interact with the more immediate ma.n-machine parameters and will be reflected in improved or degraded perfortnance.

Finally, it should be noted that while poor interface design (illegible dials, obscure labels, uncoded controls, etc.) can be compensated for, at least up to a point, these deficiencies place an unnecessary burden on the rest of the system in terrns of increased training requirements, increased memory requirements and constant care and attention during the use of those elements that are not optimally designed. It is better to use that capacity in more productive ways.

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III. SOME HUM AN FACTORS AREAS FOR CONSIDERATION A. Functions and Tasks Experience has shown that there are some functions that people generally perform very well while there are other functions that are usually best performed by machines.

Tables 3-1 and 8-2 show examples of each. These are very general guidelines and should not be applied to a specific situation without careful consideration of the special characteristics of that situation. ~ tere is a suggestion in these tables that at the present time man is still preeminent with respect to the perceptual / cognitive (or so-called higher-order) functions.

Dr. Christensen has examined the man-machine interface problems in some detail and specifically in his interaction with GPU and MPR. Sorne of the following material is paraphrased from material he prepared after that examination.

The design of individual displays and controls can be checked by referring to one of a number of available checklists. Some checklists have been developed exclusively for use in design for eue of maintenance. Attention should also be given to the proper arrangements of controls and displays, based on information from functions analysis, task analysis and time-line diagrams and/or operational sequence diagrams (OSD).

Several task analysis projects are being intitiated in the nuclear power industry.

The MPR Associates program for GPU will result in a task analysis, at least for critical operations. Dr. Robert L. Long of General Public Utilities has initiated a program that will describe the activities of all personnel in the control room, including an assessment of the performance characteristics required in each job during normal and emergency conditions. The Committee believes that this analysis will further the understanding of performance requirements for the entire crew as well as each of its mem bers.

t Furthermore, the Committee has given some of the preliminary results in Chapter 5 and attempted to relate them to the OARP content.

79

l TABLE '_.

SOME THINGS PEOPLE DO COMPARATIVELY WELL CODE ITEM S

Detect signals in "high noise fields" S

Be sensitive to a wide variety of stimuli M

Perform fine manipulations M

Exhibit relatively compactness M

Perform when partially impaired M

Remain relatively maintenance-free P/C Recognize objects under widely different conditions P/C Perceive patterns P/C Exhibit long-term memory P/C Handle unexpected or low-probability s?mts P/C Reason tuductively P/C Profit from experience P/C Exercise judgment P/C Exhibit flexibility and improvisation P/C Exhibit creativity P/C Select and perform under conditions of overload P/C Adapt to changing environmental conditions P/C Appreciate and create beauty P/C Express emotion CODE:

S Sensory l

M Motor P/C -

Perceptual / Cognitive 1

30

l TABLE 8-2 SOME THINGS MACHINES DO COMPARATIVELY WELL l

CODE ITEM S

Respond quickly to signals S

Sense energies outside human range Exert enormous power or force M

M Relatively uniform performance M

Rapidly transmit signals Perform several acts simultaneously M

M Become expendable and obsclete Perform precise, routine, repetitive operations P/C Recall and process enormous arnounts of data P/C P/C Monitor men or other machines P/C Reason deductively P/C Respond to time-of-day effects Exhibit resistance to environmental stresses S,M,P/ C CODE:

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P/C - Perceptual / Cognitive 31

t The Institute for Nuclear Power Operations has a contract with the University of Georgia to determine what has already been done with respect to task analysis in the nuclear power industry. The Committee recommends that GPU or its contractor, iiPR Associates, follow this project closely and determine its usefulness to both control room l

modification and the operater training / retraining programs.

Task analysis techniques vary, depending en the use to be made of the results.

Since it isn't yet a generally familiar technique, we have included an example from a study by Hi!Ielsohn (5) (Table 8-3). A typical task analysis might include five factors:

(1) decision to be made, (2) actions to be taken, (3) ongoing plant processes, (4) control parameters, and (5) control limits. One mignt wish to add a time-line diagram to be able to use the results in the development of operational sequence diagrams (OSD).

B. Behavioral Content of Jobs After performing a task analysis, it is frequently helpful to characteri:e the behavioral content of jobs.

For this purpose, the Berliner (2) " Classification of Behaviors" (Table 8-4) is useful, particularly when a job is to be modified significantly and when one wants to determine whether, after modification, the perceptual content.

rnediational content, etc., have been increased. For example, one would expect that the mediational content might increase markedly during abnormal or emergency operations.

C. Communications and Presentation of Information An analysis of the content of all communications in the control room should be

n ade. It might, for example, be found that certain communications contain ambiguities that could be cleared up by the use of standard terminology, standardized messages.

etc. Some content is often found to be more effectively communicated by non-verbal l

rneans (e.g., warning devices). Redundancy by use of a second or alternative rneans of communication is often useful for purposes of both initial comprehension and verification.

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To the extent that optimal design of controls and displays and the layout of the control room, including the communication system, are provided, the burden on the critical interpretive, integrative and retentive capabilities and capacities of the operator will be relieved and available for attention to other, perhaps more important, things.* It is not uncommon to find that poor presentation of infor: nation (interface design and layout, information requirements, communications, etc.) forces operators to work so near their capacity that when an emergency occurs, insufficient capacity remains with which to handle that emergency. It is senseless to devote any more of the operator's capacity than necessary to the interpretation of input interfaces and the execution of output interfaces.

Save that capacity for the more important and significant higher-order considerations, which we usually call " decision making". This implies, of course, that all of the information an operator needs at any moment to asake a correct decision is provided and that it is provided in such a way that he or she is constantly "on top

of the situation. This situation is described as being totally immersed in, or totally dedicated to, control operation (a way of life).

Is it too far-fetched to consider the control room as an extension of the operators, i.e., a :neans to an end in which the operators are central and the control room is there

=erely to enable them to implement their decisions? Certainly the control rcom should be facilitative; it should not be a constant challenge to the operators to read the graphs, view the annunciators, etc.

It should be made clear that the Committee is not necessarily trying to :nake the job easier for the operator, at least that is not our primary goal.

We are sirnply attempting to encourage that this fantastic consponent, the operator, be used m the most judicious way possible, a way that will contribute positively to safety and overall l

systems effectiveness.

l l

35

r D. Environmental Considerations Figure 8-1 shows that the entire man-machine relationships are embedded in an environment.

The environmental variables (noise, lighting, etc.) have a significant bearing on the effectiveness of the entire system, including work schedule. Indeed, nearly everyone who looks at the situation feels that the work schedule may be having a direct effect on operator effectiveness, job satisfaction and operator retention rates.

The Committee is concerned about the adverse effects attributable to the work schedule which involves weekly shift changes.

E. Anthropometric Considerations With the advent of female operators, criteria relating to height, strength characteristics, etc. should receive attention.

For example, all displays should be viewable by anyone with the physical aspects of a 5th percentile female to a 95th percentile male.

F. Alarms. Warnings. and Control Room Errors l

The Lockheed (7) studies suggested that present alarm systems suffer from the following deficiencies:

i 1.

Too much infor: nation 2.

No differentiation according to performance 3.

No clear associations 4.

Not appropriately sized 5.

False / nuisance alarms l

6.

Audibles interfere Interviews with operators by the Lockheed team suggested that alarms are a common source of errors. The most common controi room errors are:

1.

Lack of timely or attention getting indication 2.

Incorrect line-up of valves 3.

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Inadequate procedures The Iowa State study (1) (based on NRC-LER's) identified the components associated with so-called " human error." These components as well as the percent of the human errors associated with the component are given in Table 8-5.

Thus, it appears that the inferrnation and skills are available to improve the design of the control room from the standpoint of effective, safe operator conduct. Studies should be conducted to determine what design changes can and should be made now and at specified times in the future.

G. Monitoring and Mental Workload From the human factors standpoint, one problem with rnany high technology systems is that the job of the operator is reduced to that of being primarily a monitor, a monitor who :nay suddenly have to assume greatly increased responsibility should there be, for example, equipment failure. Humans are not good rnonitors nor can they be expected to take over and do a good job in emergencies unless they are aware of the events that led to the situation. It is irnperative that systems be designed to " keep them up' with the situation. What does this mean in terms of mental workload?

Sheridan (8) has written a short but significant article on mental workload in which he states.

"But when an abnormality occurs (in a largely autornatic system)...the hurnan operator must quickly detect the presence of an abnormality, diagnose its nature, and intervene in the otherwise rnostly automatic control loop to take remedial action."

And, later,

"...t oday's human operator rnay face his greatest mental workload in transient and dynamic situations." (Sheridan. (8))

87

TABLE 8-5 COMPONENTS ASSOCIATED WITH HUMAN ERROR Error Percentage Ccmoonent (to nearest percent)

Valve 40 Switch 16 Control rod 10 Moniter 7

Fuel element 5

Pump 4

Diesel 3

Circuit breaker 2

Senser Steam flow transmitter 2

Miscellaneous

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Measurement of mental work! cad, even on a subjective scale, would be helpful to both the control room design program and the training program.

There must be assurance that operators are not being worked so near their lirmit that t! - likelihood of a break &wn is increased during an emergency. Good design and good training can act in corcert to maintain mental workload at an optimal level.

H. Miscellaneous Considerations For the lang-term, consideration : night be given to the incorporation of predictor displays for selected functions. Predictor displays disclose not only the present value of a parameter but also what that value can be expected to be "x' time units in the future under present conditions of control. Even an indication of the direction (increase or decrease) of the change of the variable would be very helpful.

Since the entire system is, comparatively speaking, a relatively slow-reacting system, and one where contemplation should precede overt action, consideration might be given to making trial inputs into a surrogate system and observing (in f ast-time) the consequences before nsaking a corntnitment on the operating system. This, obviously, is, at present, only a possibility, i.e., one that would require considerable investigation and development before implementation.

IV.

RELATIONSHIPS TO SELECTION AND TRAINING Many opportunities exist for trade-o f fs between design of the : nan-machine interfaces and selection and training. As suggested previously, poor design of interfaces can be compensated for, to some degree, by selecting outstanding people and giving them suecial training. However, such compensation is bought at a price; the price is that (1)

= ore valuable resources in the central nervous system are being used to store the products of the extra learning than was necessary and (2) people have a nasty habit, especially under stress, to revert to earlier learned and/or more compatible modes of response when confronted with a poor design. ~here are, unfortunately, many examples so

that power plants should be designed for an integrated crew and not an unorgani:ed group of individuals. This has specia' implications for communications requirements, as well as selection and assignnient of team members. The philosophy, whatever it is, must be clearly articulated, preferably during the setting of system objectives, and should be altered only when study shows the initial philosophy to be unacceptable.

Systeins functions should be analyzed and allocated on this basis and also, of course, on such practical considerations as cost, availability, etc. Nevertheless, an overall philosophy of human use should be articulated by :nanagement and kept in mind throughout design and development.

Managers should " walk the floors" here, just as good managers do in other industries. Frequent visits should be made to the control rooms on all shifts. The best design, the best training, will mean little unless the operators feel that management is behind them, believes in them and shows a genuine interest in them.

All operators, Shif t Technical Advisors, and maintenance men should be given an opportunity to discuss ways to improve operations. Only a foolish manager would choose to ignore the impressive repository of experience and intelligence that resides at this level in Met-Ed.

Perhaps " quality circles" can be formed; they are reported to be extremely successful in the manufactu ing industries.

Human factors and training representatives should be regular attendees at such meetings. The shift work problem would be a goon one to consider at one of the " quality circle" meetings.

It is manage ment's responsibility to demonstrate that their goals and the operators' goals are essentially the same. The Company, Met-Ed. should be viewed as a means to helping operators (and, in fact, all employees) achieve goals.

l' VI.

RELATIONSHIP TO MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE COMMITTEE j

Dr. Christensen tne human factors member of the Committee, has maintained a i

close working -elationship wit's Dr. Sheridan of the Man-Machine Interface Committee.

91 1

a cf incomp.ble design in the control centers in use today.

As the plant is now designed, it would appear that additional training should be given in the ability to extract information that the operators need from the mass of infor=ation available to them. And, equally important, to ignore what is not needed in specific instances. The Decision Analysis cou.se should be helpful in this request.

Since the man-enachine design characteristics interact so intituately with traf requirements, the Committee feels that it is irnperative that the manage:ne.t of the training progrsms should keep abreast of any changes being conternpla;ed for the control roo ms.

One way to do this would be to have Training Department representatives receive and review all reports that have anything to do with changes in design or procedure.

V.

M ANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS It is i=portant that, as the operating cornpany GPUNC sheuld have experienced human factors personnel per:nanently on their staff (preferah!e) or available in tne for:n of consultants. It has been shown numerous times :n Other industries that goed human factors design adds little, if anything, to the cost of a system if its posstble contr:butions are considered at the very beginning of a progratn (requirements phase) and carr:ed on l

through the conceptual, engineering design, verification, manufacturing anc imple-

nentation phases. The cost of the alternative. extensive retrofit is exorbitant:.ve are witnessing such exnense now in the nuc!aar power industrv and will continue to witness :t for years to come.

Whether in initial design or in retrofit, howevar. it is important that an a splL

.t philosophy be adopted with respect to the intended role of each person in a spac:fic sys t e m.

Is he/she to be primarily a signal detector, a monitor. an intagrator. 1 i

I synthest:er or what? What are thetr secondary riuties' What things should he/she not 59 l

l doing (e.g.. perhaps certain record kaeping encresP Furthar. it should ha kaot in minii l

an L

It appears that our views on man-machir.e interfacing are quite compatible: in fact, a review of their initial set of recornmendations disclosed rena with which the Committee would disagree. Specifically, it is clear that:

A.

The control room of TMI-1 (and TMI-2) should be reworked to the extent that tirne and funds are available to support such a prograrn.

B.

The role of the operators must be careful!y examined. Operators should be designed into the system in such a way as to keep them involved, challenged and contributing positively to the operation of the plant.

C.

Specific evaluations with recommendations for possible redesign need to be carried out in at least the following areas:

1.

Amount and nature of pre processing of information 2.

Proper integration of CRT*s into the control rocm 3.

Proper detailed design of present visual and auditory presentat:en devices 4.

Same for controls 5.

Annunciation - nurnber, type and classification as to importance 6.

Standard color coding schemes 7.

Improved labelling 3.

Consideration of physical requirements of jobs for 5th percentile females through 95th percentile males 9.

Improved design of manuals and technical documents fer both operators and maintenance men 10.

Development and adherence to industry standards with respect to requirements for operator / maintainer qualifications 11.

Requirements for periodic requalification 12.

Standards that maximi::e consistency of design, at least within the family of centers in which an individual is apt to work 92

13.

Consideration of better display of derivative infermation so that trends in functions are :nore easily discerned 14.

Attention to environmental variables (lighting, noise, etc.)

The consideration of any man-machine systern is not completed when the system is delivered. Rather, it is a continuous process that must include systematic follow-up.

Events must be reviewed, changes in procedure must be reviewed, impact of new equipment (e.g., C RT's) must be carefully considered.

It has been suggested that selected events : night be taped, such tapes furnishing the basis for detailed study of equipment and operator response characteristics. Feedback useful to those responsible for equipment design and training will result from such a continuous program.

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Selected References 1.

Adams. S.K., Opentor Error in Nuclear Power Fia.:ts: A Fre!:minarv Assessment.

paper presented at 23rd Annual Meeting, Human Factors Society, Bcston, Mass.,29 Oct. - 1 Nov.,1979.

2.

Berliner, C., Angel D., and Shearer, J.W., Behav: ors. Measures and Instruments fer Performance Evaluation in Simulat d Envirnaments. Aug.1964.

3.

Chapanis, A., Words, Words. Worcs. Human Factors. 7. No.1,1067 4.

DeGreene, K.B., Systems Psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill 3ook Company.

1970.

5.

Hillelsohn.

M.J., Rosenblatt. R.D.

Price.

P., and Seidel.

R.J., "'ask Analvsis of Multiple Position Letter Sorting Machine iM?LSM) Op erator's Jcb. RP-ED-7 6-18, U.S. Postal Service. Sept.,1976.

6.

McCormick, E.H.,

Human Factors in Engineering and Des::n.

Nev York:

I McGraw-Hill Book Company,1976.

7.

Seminara, J.

et al Hurnan Factors Metheds fer Nuclear Con:rol Room Dasign.

EPRINP-1118. SY, Lockheed Missiles & Space Cc.. Inc.. June.1770 3.

Sheridan. T.B., Mental Workload-What Is It? Whv Bocher With It? Human Fac crs Society Bulletin. 23. No. 2, Feb.,1980.

9.

Van Cott.

H.P., and Kinkade, R.G. (eds.). H : man Encirnarir:g ri.:de n Equi.m.rnt D esign. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Pr: :::nc Of fice,1972.

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CHAPTER 9 USE OF SIMULATORS IN OPERATOR TRAINING L

INTRODUCTION TO SIMULATION A. The Training Sub-System The training program is another sub-system of the nuclear power plant system. It is as important that the requirements for the training sub-system be clearly defined as it is 1

that the hardware requirements of the plant be so defined. The objectives of the training program =ust include the development of specific skills to handle all forseeable opera-tiens, normal, abnormal and emergency, as well as the development of unforeseen events, to diagnose them systematically and to implement suitable corrective action. The development of a thoughtful, contemplative demeanor is generally to be preferred over a quick, reflexive type response for control room operators.

Alternative ways of meeting each training objective must be examined and appropriate method (s) selected for the achievement of each. Simulators, part-task and full-mission (full-replica). if used properly, can contribute pcsitively to the meeting of training objectives. After implementation, provision must be made for feeding back infor=ation regarding the program (successes as well as failures) to the training planners.

This procedure will assure the development of a systematic approach to training and will provide a means for continually improving the program.

t I

3. Some Conditions nat Facilitate the Acouisition of Skills Human learning is dependent upon such things as stimuli that can become meaningful cues, upon practice, upon contact, upon motivation, upon knowledge of results, and other factors. Once learned, all skills are subject to deterioration as a function of time and interference from subsequently learned materials.

95

i Properly designed and properly used, part-time and full-mission simulators can

neet most of the conditions cited above for effective learning. Full-mission simu.ators can provide realism and enrichment to the learning situation that rival these of the actual system.

C. Simulators as Elements of the Training Sub-System In the present context, a simulator can be defined as a device that can be substituted for all or part of the actual system with respect to the development and maintenance of operator proficienev. Advantages include not having to tie up opera-tional equiprnent for training purposes, being able to stop and examine the problem at any time (re-running, if necessary) and not having to worry about the harm that the execution of an erroneous decision might cause. To be useful, all such devices must provide reliable and valid representations of whatever they are purported to simulate.

Whether or not a full-mission simulator is required for a particula-training progra=

element depends on what is to be learned. Once the performance objectives of a job are defined clearly in detail, excellent instruction can be conductec with something less than a full-mission si:nulator; film strips, sequences of 35mm slides. VuGraph-sequmced scenarios (such as those developed by T. Gary Broughton of GPUSC) reacti* e v:d-o l

I display devices, etc., the list is virtually endless. The most successful devices appaar te have at least two things in common: they demand overt responses from the trainee _.:i they give the trainee fairly immediate knowledge of results as to the quality of his responses. The Committee agrees with the racommendation in the Roddis Report i1C; fpage 10) that serious consideration ba given to tha use of part-task simulators for such i

sub-systerns as condensate polishing control panels, radwasta control panels, and vartous maintenance operations. Part-task trainers ara usually relativaly inexpensive relative to full-mission simulators and constitute a cost-e f fective mathod for maeting c 2rtain training requirements.

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He Committee recommends t'.at Met-Ed take a careful look at what is available in terms of training aids and part-task trainers and evaluate their usefulness in terms of the specific performance characteristics that they want their operators to acquire. The proper place of part-task trainers and other devices and techniques in the overall training plan should be fully assessed. It is the Committee's view that the availability of a full-

nission simulator does not obviate the requirement for part-task trainers.

D. General Nature of Full-Mission Simulation The full-mission simulator consists essentially of control room instrumentation, a computer with appropriate input / output interface equipment and related software. The cost of simulators increases disproportionately with increased fidelity. Ideally, the fidelity of the simulator should be designed to that point where maximum return in terms of effective training is reali::ed per dollar spent. Unfortunately, we know of no precise method for making such a determina tion, although the possibility of relying on a consensus of experts should not be ign red. Users probably err on the side of unnecessary fidelity, at least in terms of cost effectiveness. This is probably a wise direction in which to err until more is known about the quality and amount of psychological * (as contrasted to physical) fidelity, that is needed to meet specific training requirements.

Sy " psychological fidelity" we mean that the skills (whether rnanual or cognitive) that are learned on the simulator are the same as those that would be learned in the real situation for the same operations, i.e., the analyses, the calculations, the planning and so on would be psychologically the same. Psychological fidelity is by far the rnost difficult and expensive to achieve in a simulator. Physical fidelity is important in that it tends to increase the acceptance of the device on the part of the students. Since it's such a relatively small part of the overall cost, we recommend as complete physical fidelity as possible.

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ne Roddis Committee strongly endersed the use of full-c:issicn simulation. !)t-1:: w;;l want to review its overall training plan to assare that its present full-mission s tauiation training is being used to :naximum advantags.

Fortunately, the nuclear control room full-=ission simulators seem co be extrec:ely reliable.

the average full-:nission simulator is not cown : core than five days a year except for down-time associated with preventive maintenance and modifications.

It is important to keep the design of the simulator current with respect to the actual system that it represents to preclude the possibility of negative traasfer effects being developed.

This is not an easy :na"er anc definit:ve procedures should ce established to assure that it is accomplished. (Sre also Roddis Report (page 10).

It should be recognized that even a full-repli:a simulat:r is still on!v a atmu!ator:

i.e., it is not the real thing. (If it were, it wouldn't La a s:mulater!; The user must take special pains to determine those ways in wh:ch the aimulator 4ces not r=.rasent the "rea; world" so that attention can be given to important omissior.s via other means. For exan2ple, we have seen no full-replica simulator that acequately simulates the e.< tensive communications that would be required during ar. eme ganc-. i.?.. conversations wi*h the NRC and other federal officials, conversatiens with the governor'.; office, etc. It is exceedingly ituportant that the differences between the simulation exercise anc. cetua.

operations be identified and that steps be taken :e address these differ nces b f 3o.n.

other means. There i. a danger that the fuli-repilea simulator wi;' 'all one :nto a faa::ng l

that all important aspects of rec,uired traintne have bean envared when, in reality, th ;

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haven't.

Special skills are required of simulator instructors if maximum return for tima and money invested is to be realized. Met-Ed may wish to send at least one qualified p-con to a suitable training course for simulator instructors.

Finally, Met-Ed rnanagement tnust understand and endorsa th= use of simulaters as an integral part of the overall :nanagement-approve:i truning plan.

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E. Amount of Simulator Training The amount of simulator training that should be given in any program depens' i on 4

many factors, including (1) the skill and experience of the operators. (2) the numt er of design changes with which the operators will have to become familiar, (3) the ade tuacy ar.d availability of part-task trainers and other training aids (4) time since last on-the-job experience, etc. Again, the amount for any specific program will depend upon the nature and content of the rest of the training program. Training on a good past-task simulator, for example, :nay be substituted for some full-mission si:nulater training.

Dr. Joseph Johnson, of TVA, reported that each licensed TVA operator is required to take two weeks of simulator refresher training each year. He estimates a need for 1000-1500 hours of simulator time per year for every six nuclear units. Other experts feel that a two-unit plant needs 2000 hours0.0231 days 0.556 hours 0.00331 weeks 7.61e-4 months of simulator time per year. The amount required for a specific program will depend upon many factors. The Committee believes that the two examples cited in this paragraph represent the upper and lowe-bounds on simulator training requirements.

F. Tvpes of Skills versus Type of Simulation Unfortunately, without r-actice all skills deteriorate surprisingly quickly. The entire literature on human leam- ~., and forgetting suggests that practice is constantly required on those skills that one wishes to maintain in top condition.

Simple stimulus-response relationships are best established by repeated drill. For i

l such learning. an actual motor response is generally to be preferred to a written or oral answer.

Part-task trainers are advantageous in such situations aince they allow concentration and repetition on isolatable tasks or families of tasks without tying up an entire full-mission simulat r.

Part-task trainers are particularly useful in introductory training where repeated or concentrated attention needs to be focused on certain requirements. Finally, those ski!!s must be integrated into the entire scenario, for which the actual control room or a full-mission simulator is essential.

99

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lD "D'9'}"A rMe lX m

Perceptual-cognitive learning, including practice i. diagncstics and Scisic n making, depends on increasing the ability of the trainee to identify the significant stimuit in a situation, to comprehend the meaning of the:n, and to integrate them in such a wa--

as to arrive at valid decisions. Even though increasiag!y more integration will probabiy be done for the operator in the future, his training should continue to include practice in the identification and proper integration of appropriate basic plant parameters for va:icus emergencies in the event of failure of the computer or inadequacy of a progrirn.

Learning to ignore the irrelevant stimuli ci particular situations is as important as learning to pay attention to those that are signz!icant. Wi;ile many perceptual-cognitive skills can be learned on part-task trainers. practice of the more complex skills and

putting it all together" usually can be done better in the more reali<. tic surrouncings af a full-:nission simulator, or if available. the control room itself.

In the past, simulators have bean used for such diverse functions as d.:monstratten, acquisitien and :naintenance of skills, skill evaluation (including certification) tnd even as design tools.

Of these, it would appear that Met-Ed snould concentrate on the h

acquisition, maintenance and evaluation of sk!!3.

Chen (4) reported in 1979 that the N ?.C icund that individuals who hv e.ac simulator training understand plant responses to transients and.1bnormal e nd t w better and do a better job of answering question.i about plant response tc vo r.our postulated situations. than those who hava not had simulator training. Such findings should be interpreted with caution; one should bo assur-d that the aiternative en-hob of

{

instruction were as well-developed as possible.

G. Transfer of Training In retma of measures such as time or errors. transfer of training from the simulator to the real-world situation is generally most ef ficiant rr.*n thera is maximum similarit; between the simulator and the actual job situation. 't is axtramalv important that ha' ;ts o

contradictory to those requir-i on the iob not be en anii.si ~i in training. Gna wav3:

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guarding against this, albeit.: expensive way, is to design the simulator so that it is an exact replica of the actual control reorn.

H. Emergenev Procedures One of the advantages of a properly designed full-mission simulator is that it allows repetitive practice on significant opera tions. including emergency procedures, without involving er tying up the actual system. A simulator also permits practice on procedures that might be inappropriate to attempt with the real systern and on events that may seldom, if ever, occur in the actual plant. In addition, as mentioned previously, the action can be stopped at any time for explanatory and remedial purposes.

While a wide spectrum of emergencies can be practiced on a full-mission simulator (and the number will ineease steadily with further improvecients in software), it is impractigl, and usually impossible to simulate every conceivable ernergency. !t should be possible, however, to develop good response patterns with respect to the more cornmon taalfunctions and to improve general trainee awareness and skills in evaluation, transient analysis, integration of information and flexibility.

It is exceedingly important that well-organi:ed de-briefings be held after each sitnulator exercise.

Students must be made aware that the exercise which they experienced on the sitaulator is probably only one example from an entire population of such exercises. Suppose, for example, that a steam leak has been sitnulated. The students must be made aware that in a real situation the size of the leak, the location of the leak, etc, would most probably be different frotn what was ex perienced in the simulator. They must learn at the conceptual level and not just at a specific stimulus-response level. The simulator experience must not be allowed to in:ulcate a false sense of capability in the student. It is expected that the skills acquired in the simulator will transfer positively to a variety of situations, including the unpredicted ones.

Stress can be induced in the simulator situation if one is interested in determining how operators will perform in very demanding situations. Various methods can be used to 101

induce stress; e.g., by exaggerating the importance of performance on the simulator to assessment of overall job performance, by inducing time stress, by selecting cery difficult problems, by peer pressure, by instructor pressure etc. Experienced pilots have come out of aircraft simulators cursing under their breath and wringing wet with sweat.

It should be pointed out, however, that such methods of inducing stress make the assumption that those who perform best under simulated condit%ns will also perform best under actual conditions: while there is no evidence to the contrary, it is an assumption.

I. Simulators and Motivation A competent simulator instructor usually does not find it too difficult to sustain motivation in simulator exercises. Interest can of ten be heightened by having different crews compete on identical emergency problems or by ha cing one crew develop an emergency scenario that the competing craw must then selve. Later, the two crews can change roles. This develops insight on the part of those who develop the scenarios as well as those who solve the problems. This approach is recommended for consideration in the long-term program; it would be diffo:O under present cireurastances of limited simulator availability.

As mentioned previously, management must demonstrate that it considers teatning and niaintenance of proficiency as very significant elements in nuclear power operations and thoroughly supports whatever it takes to achieve excellence. While obviously not the primary reason for them, the acquisition of simulators might convince both trainees and l

operators that management is doing everything it can to provide the very best in equipment and facilities.

J. Team Training One capability that a simulator offers, and one that should be exercised. is that of crew training.

Exercises should be devised that take maximum advantage of this capability; person to person interactions. communications among team memb rs and l

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between the team and others outside the team. We observed both a team that had been together for several years and oae that had been together for only a few months. Le integration of the team that had been together for an extended period of time was clearly superior to the inexperienced team. Simulator exercises should be practiced that help to reduce the time it takes a group of people to become a highly integrated team.

K. Criteria Measurernent, whether on the job, in a simulator or by some other means, irnplies that there are criteria that are reliable, valid and sensitive to those performance changes that are important to job success. Time, errors and instructor (or evaluator) judgments are commonly used measures. Other rneasures should be examined, e.g., degradation allowed before corrective action is taken. The performance requirernents of tl e job are, or should be, those established by the careful gathering and interpretation of data (functions, tasks and time-line analyses).

EPRI is developing a Performance 15easurement System based on the analysis of samples of operator performance.

When available, this system should be especially useful with simulators. Met-Ed should keep abreast of this program.

L. Other Considerations l

The Comtnittee concurs with the Roddis Committee's emphasis on the irnportance l

l of high-fidelity simulation of maintenance operations. particularly those that rnay be conducted in irradiated environments, " full-dress rehearsals" as that committee terms l

l thern. Such practice will help insure safe, efficient clean-up and minimum exposure to hazards.

l The Roddis f(eport (10) (page 9) makes an important point regarding the ready availaoility of simulators to those who are to use them. hot only would such availability signify that management is genuinely concerned, but als, it would put the facility i

directly under the control of Met-Ed training authorities. This is an appropriate long-term goal.

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II.

THE METROPOLITAN EDISON SIMULATOR TRAINING PROGR AM Let us now consider the Met-Ed program and examine it in greater detail in light of the previous points raised.

A. Obiectives Mr. L. L. Lawyer, Metropolit m Edison Manager of Training, has developed the following set of objectives for the simulator traiaing:

1.

To train operators to properly axecute routine and expected plant evoluticns.

2.

To train operators to monitor plant performance and detect abnormal performance.

3.

To train operators in the use of operator aids including procedures, the computer, etc.

4.

To develop an operator's ability to assimilate and integrate information from various sources, make a rapid evaluation of the situation and take corre et action to mitigate or elitninate abnormal operatien.

5.

To develop the operator's ability for contemplative, rational, thoughtful l

response to new or abnormal situations.

6.

To provide a successful means of pre-selection o ' candidates and prospective l

operators.

7.

To provide a means for successful evaluation of an operator's capability.

8.

To emphasi::e frequent and realistic casualty drills.

9 To work effectively as a member of a crew.

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B. Full-Scale Sirnulation I

Since a full-scale simulator is not yet available at TMI, Met-Ed personnal in the OARP were sent to Lynchburg, Virginia, where they received training at the Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Training Center. The B & W facility includes a full-scale contro! room simulator which is similar to, but not a replica of, the TMI-1 control coorn.

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After the March 28, 1979 accident, TMI-1 Control Room Operators attended two different training sessions at B & W. The first of these sessions, conducted shortly after the accident, consisted of a two-hour discussion / demonstration of the TMI-2 Loss of Feedwater incident, followed by a practice session. The discussion / demonstration session allowed the operators to observe the sequence of events which occurred during the accident as well as the resulting effects on the plant. The practical session included methods for recognition of void fermation in the core, pressure recovery and cooldown following loss of pressure accidents.

The second simulator training session, conducted several months later, consisted of 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months of classroom time and 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months of simulator operations.

The individual classroom topics covered were:

a.

Power distribution and red withdrawal limits (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) b.

Heat transfer and fluid flow (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) c.

Small break analysis (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ) d.

Safety analysis (4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months )

Evolutions performed on the simulator included manual and automatic Integrated Control System (ICS) power operations and emergency drills. Each " shift" of operators participated in approximately ten of the following emergency drills:

1.

Failed header pressure signal to integrated control system 2.

Failed "A" main feedwater valve shut, PORV open 3.

Turbine trip, reactor trip, failed code safety valve 4.

Trip feed pump, defeated rod demand 5.

Failed NI power in integrated control system at 65% power 6.

Reactor trip, failed safety in "A" S/G, repaired safety, then ruptured OTSG tube when filling dry OTSG 7.

Double ended tube rupture-cooldown and depressurization on 1 OTSG 3.

Steam line rupture in reactor building, cooldown with dry OTSG 105

9.

Reactor trip-main feed valve failed open, main feed block valve failed open 10.

Blackout (cooldown in natural circulation, utili:ing wide-range temperature instruments) 11 Failed main feedwater valves closed, pressurizer code failed open 12.

Intermediate RC leak (1000 gpm) cooldown and depressuri:ed 13.

Totalloss of feed (cooldown RC feed and bleed on HPI) 14.

Steam line rupture in RB with HPI injection valve stuck open 15.

Loss of main feedwater, no auto start emergency feed, subsequent loss of emergency feed after manual start (PORV failed open) 16.

Degraded "A" turbine header pressure 75 psig 17.

Failed T ave to 570 ICS, reactor trip with "A' S/G safety stuck open, make-up pump "C" blocked 18.

Reactar trip without a turbine trip 19.

Double-ended tube rupture with steam safety stuck open 20.

Failed pressurizer spray valve open (cooldown plant) 21.

Failed main feedwater valve closed pressuri:er code failed open 22.

Loss of pressurizer spray failed open - cooldown with spray 23.

Reactor trip with failed bypass valve (open) 24.

Failed main feed valve and block valve open with reactor trip 25.

Loss of feed without reactor trip 26.

Loss of main feedwater, no auto start emergency feed 27.

Steam rupture in reactor building, loss of pressurizer heaters 28.

Failed raain feed and block valve open This simulator training program for the OARP is in addition to the three principal simulator training courses that Met-Ed purchased from 3 & W for most of the same operators prior to the TM1-2 accident; i.e., Cold Licensing INew Plant Operator, T-301),

Hot Licensing (Repl cement Operator, T-3 03), and Requalification (Simulator 1

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Requalificatics, T-304).

(See Appe= dix D.)

A1 included instructica both in the classroe= and the si=ulater.

This si=ulater =odu!e was the first of the seven =odules of the O ARP =cdules. !

provided training fer the operaters based on an analysis of the TMI-Z accident as well as practice in other si=ulated ahner=al and e=ergency conditiens. ?is initial =cdule supplemented previous operator training, including two weeks of simulater experience, and provided a point of departure fer the six succeeding progra= =odules which dealt with the details of the plant syste=s, nuclear plant fundamentals and related topics.

C. Se Babecek and Wileex Si=ulator Training Oceart=ent Eytchissen (6) in the Technical Staff Analysis Repert to the President's Co==issica en the Accident at TMI has described the 3 & W simulater training progra= in aighly critical ter=s. Met-Ed =anage=ent and training officials also co=e in fer their share of criticis=. Se validity of several of Evtchinson's findings are so apparent that Met-Fd should censider taking steps i==ediately to see that thev are ace==plished. !=cluded are the fol'cw1:g rec==endations.

Dile Met-Ed personnel do not, and probably shculd not, develop the actual 3 & W si=ulater progra=s, they must assure that the programs which thty buy are as relevant a=d respcnsive to Met-Ed r quire =ents as possible. This should include periodic review of syllabi, =anuals and other teaching =aterials, developing syllabi wha.re they do not exist, and assuring that these materials are kept current. (This is especially true now that GP" is =aking =odifications in the TMI-1 centrol roo=.)

Steps =ust be taken hv both 3 & W and Met-Ed to assure the currenev of the si=ulater progra=st 1.e., i=portant *!essons learned *, changes in control rec = design and procedures and other relevant i: puts should be incerporated as soon as possible.

?e si culater preg a= =ust have the overt, active suppcet of the highest !evels of

=anage=ent in both 3 & W and Met-Ed.

107

l Met-Ed must assure that B & W instruction, both in the classroom and simulator, is of the highest quality. The proper use of simulators is a speciali:ed field; Met-Ed training personnel should continue to assure themselves that the B & W simulator instructors know how to instruct on a simulator.

One of the big advantages of a simulator is that, if properly used, it can be used for j

crew training as well as individual training.

Met-Ed should assure that B&W is accomplishing this.

The overall significance of the exercises, particularly those dealing with abnorc:al or ernergency conditions, must not be lost in details of dial reading, knob twiriing, etc. As explained elsewhe e, unless properly conducted, simulator training may induce an uncritical attitude in the students and an inability to assess accurately the risk involved had the situation been real instead of simulated.

Each crew :nember and the crew as a whole must be given therough de-briefing after completien of an exercise. Under certain conditions, the e::ercise should even be hOsd at critical points and the crew given immediate feedback regarding erroneous actions and l

procedures, insisting that they repeat the portion until it is clear that they understand it.

One advantage of a simulator is that the oparator can actually manipulata the controls and perceive the results of those manipulations. There should be a maximum of

" hands-on" experience in the simulator and a minimum of watching others manipulate controls.

The simulator also provides a means for disclosing any unusual response char-acteristics of a particular plant. These should be emphasized in the simulator training progra:n.

Finally, a simulator is a good training device only when it is properly used. Its proper use includes proper integration into a training program that is carefully thought-out and carefully executed.

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D. Other Techniques Other techniques used by Met-Ed to enhance the operator's skills include the use of 35mm slides of the control room for procedures training, drills in the control room in emergency procedures and oral exarninations given during plant walk-throughs. The latter demand demonstrations of knowledge and ability to operate the plant. Operators participate in reactivity manipulations, surveillance testing, and equipment checkout and operation. The three oral exarninations will have included one practice examination, one audit group examination (PQS1 and one NRC licensing examination (postponed until December, 1980).

The details of the Met-Ed Operator Requalification Program, including OJT are shown as Appendix C.

E. Value of Simulator Program P

1.

The B & W Simulator The B & W simulator is not an exact replica of the TMI-l control room. It is capable of simulating some 250 malfunctions,15 at a time. The B&W simulator program is adequate in light of current requirements; however, the acquisition, availability and location of a replica simulator should be seriously considered by Met-Ed in its long-term planning.

The B&W simulator program appears to have been adequately integrated with the remaining OARP modules.

2.

Operator Opinions The operators with whom Dr.Christensen talked generally felt that training on the B & W simulator was vatuable. Several did mention that, "it wasn't like the control room that we were used to" but, in spite of this, still felt it was a helpful experience.

One operator said that the fact that there were differences made, he felt, the first day to day and one-half relatively unproductive, because it took him that long to adjust to the differences between the simulator and the 109

actual control room.

From this admittedli small sample we would conclude that TMI operators feel their present simulator training prograts is valuable and would be even more valuable if the simulator were an exact replica.

3.

NRC-NUREG-0660 As preseatly proposed, NUREG-0660 will require 160-200 hours of simulator experience for hot license training. Further, sitnulator training will be required and not optional in the requalification program. This will require the purchase of additional time on the B & W (or some other) simulator and consideration of the purchase of plant specific simulators.

4.

Input of Met-Ed into Simulator Program In the past, Met-Ed has purchased " canned

progra:ns that were offered by 3 & W. However, Met-Ed personnel appear to have had a significant input into the module devcioped for the O ARP. Such joint development should assure a greater sensitivity to the particular needs of TMI crews. Further training program rnodification is required by the proposed ANS 3.1 (and Letter of Harold Denton, Appendix B, Enc!csure 4).

The Committee understands that the individual who coordinated tne simulator program with 3 & W has resigned and that his duties have been assumed by someone who already has another fu!!-time job. We 4crongly urge that a suitable replacament be found as soon as possible. The responsibilities of someone in the Training Department should include development of long-term plans for simulator use as well as constant checking to assure that the B & W program fulfills Met-Ed requirements.

The person responsible for the simulator portion of the long-term training program might also develop plans for the use of the simulator as a tool for examining alternative procedures deve. loped by '.tet-Ed and others. For 110

example, discussions with the operators suggest there are many good ideas for the improvement d operations at that level. The simulator provides an excellent means for trying out such ideas and, fully as important, helps engender in the operators the feeling that

power plant operation is their way of life", as Mr. " Red" Thomas of Duke Power and INPO so aptly put it.

5.

Negative Effects of Simulater Training Can simulator training ever have negative effect>s? The answer is "yes".

Specifically, if its response characteristics are not of adequate fidelity, if its displavs and the responses required of them are different than those in the control room which it purports to simulate, etc., it should not be used for teaching procedural and simple control response skills. The reason is that habits contrary to those one wishes to inculcate may be established and actually degrade performance in the real situation.

Bartel (1) has other significant concerns regarding simulators. While he was referring to flight simulators, we believe his cornments merit consideration here also. Bartel in 1979 suggested that experience in a simulator may bias one's assessment of risk and that the resultant decision may actually increase some hazards.

Bartel agrees that simulators usually reduce training costs (at least in the area of flight training), are effective in developing basic procedural skills, and are somee hat less effective for the development of proficiency in handling emergencies and other situations where all of the data required for decision making rnay not be readily available.

Most important, however, Bartel feels that simulators should be viewed with genuine concern as a means of rnaking accurate assessments of risk.

...once a trainee has experienced a critical event (i.e.. emergency) 111

l without the perception of real consequences there may be no reason to believe that a similar circumstance in flight will evoke a judgment that a real hazard exists or that the same decision nsaking processes will occur.

In such a case the synthetic experience :nay impede the assessment of real risks and destabilize, delay, or paralyze decision making " Bartel goes on to say that stress and other factors in the real emergency situation may significantly alter those judgmental processes that were developed in a no-consequences situation.

Obviously, more research is needed on this irnportant point. Until more data are available, however, and since it is clear that simulators of some nature will be used, it would appear prudent to have instructo.-s vigorously call attention to significant errors made during simulation exercises.

They must assure that the real-world consequences of such errors are clearly understood by the trainees and that such errors are placed in proper perspective with respect to other error patterns. As rnentioned previously, the development of a cool, analytic, flexible, adaptable approach to the handling of emergencies is needed. The dev'slopment of t

sterotyped, inflexible response patterns to all but the st:nplest most straight-forward conditions must be avoided. Again, the importance of i

I l

I instructors highly skilled t.ot only in operations but also in the proper use l

l of simulators in a carefully, well-integrated training program can hardly be over-emphasized.

l r

112-

i 1

Selected References 1.

Bartel, R. C., Synthetic Training and Evaluation: Some Current Issues, SAFE,9, No. 3,1979 2.

Bockhold, G. and Roth, D. R.,

Performance Measurement System for Training Simulators. EPRI-783. Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, Ca., May,1973.

3.

Caro, P. W., Sheinutt, J. B. and Spears, W. D.,

Utilization of Aircrew Training Devices. TRS0-01. Seville Res. Co.,

Pensacola, Fla., Feb.,1980. (Program under enonitorship of Dr. Bert Cream, AFHRL. Report to be published as an Air Force technical report.)

4.

Chen, W. L., Training Simulators for Nuclear Power Plants.

IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science. NS-26 No.1 Feb.,1979.

5.

Chiles, W. D., Complex performance: the development of research criteria applicable in the real world. In Singleton, W. T., Fox, J. C., and Whitfield, D.

Measurement of Man at Work, Taylor & Francis,1971.

6.

Eytchison, R.,

Selection. Training, Oualification, and Licensing of Three Mile Island Reactor Operating Personnel. Technical Staff Analysis Report to the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, Oct.,1979.

7.

Kemeny, J. G. (Chm.), The Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three-Mile Island.

31 Oct.1979.

113

Selected References (Cont'd) 8.

Malone, T. B., Kirkpatrick, M.. Mallory. K.. Eike, D..

Johnson, J. H., and Walker, R. W., Human Factors Evaluation of Control Room Design and Operator Performance at Three-Mile Island-2. NUREG/CR-1270.

i I. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Jan. 1980.

9.

Mcdonald, W. L.,

Training Economy D. rough Simulation.

Keynote address. Seventh NTEC/ Industry Conference.

Kahler Plaza Inn, Orlando, Fla., Nov. 1974.

10.

Roddis, L. H. Jr. (Chm.), Report of Ad-Hoc Advisory Committees on Personnel Selection and Training (and) Man-Machine Interface and Communications.

GPUC unnumbered report, 22 Jan.1980.

11 Senders, J. W. and Foley, P. J.,

Human Factors in Nuclear Power Plant Design. Oneration. and Safatv.

Paper prepared for the Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning, Canada, Sept.,1978.

i I

12.

Sheridan, T. B.,

Mental Workload - What Is It?

Why Bother With It? Human Factors Society Bulletin.

23, No. 2,Feb.,1980.

l l

l i

1 l

114

i i

CHAPTER 10 EDUCATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR FACILITY STAFF I.

EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING PROCESSES The education, training and experience of the shift personnel of a nuclear facility has come under critical review by many groups since the accident at Three Mile Island.

The Kemeny and Rogovis Commissions, engineering educators, utility tnanagers, other professionals and the citizens of this country have expressed their views on the subject.

Inevitably, this involves a discussion of the difference between training and education.

The Committee feels that a determination of exact definitions is less important than a consideration and understanding of the snultiple types of mental functioning encompassed by both, and by their relationship to on-the-job performance. Although both can be considered to be along the same continuum,'it is profitable to differentiate between the two by the extent to which the operations to be learned form a closed or open set. The two obviously overlap.

Using this latter approach, training would refer to teaching students to learn a closed or relatively closed set of operations, where the possible tasks to be mastered are limited, can be anticipated, and are few enough in number that learned responses for them are feasible. The emphasis e such teaching is on drill and practice on the set of tasks to be learned. There are a number of duties of the control room reactor operator that fall into this category.

By contrast, one educates when the set of operations to be learned is an open set, where the eventualities cannot be entirely anticipated, or where the possibilities are too numerous to be learned individually. In these latter instances, generalizations are ac-quired inductively or deductively, and the means for applying them to a task are learned. The emphasis is on " transfer of knov. ledge" to new situations. There are a 115 u

number of duties involving the process of analysis anc diagnosis required of the control room reactor operator that are included in this category.

The most impcrtant consideration is not defini:fon or classification but an under-standing cf the necessary mental processes of the learner and capitali::ing on them in the teaching / training process to insure safe operation of the power plant. Within the past decade, special efforts have been undertaken by psychologists to develop new learning theories that are specifically relevant to classroom situations. One of the more widely accepted is Ausubel's (1) (2) assimilation theory for cognitive learning in which he makes the distinction between rote and meaningful learning and the central role of concepts in facilitating meaningful learning. Most classrooom learning (reception learning) takes place through the development of new concept meanings using the language labels of concepts the students have already acquired. If " reception

1 earning is to be meaningful, the learner must form unique linkages between the concepts already possessed and the new descriptions of concepts to be learned. ne successful use of appropriate techniques to achieve this goal constitutes good teaching (Novak (31).

Concepts are only a few of the things learned. Learners also acquire sati:s, at-titudes and values. Skill learning is facilitated through modeling or displaying proper performance and practice. Attitudes are acquired during cognitive or skill learn:nq depending upon success and/or failures. For most academic learning, the crucial issue is how to convey concepts meaningfully and successfully enough to foster positive atti-tudes. Skills enable us to do things, but attitudes and values determine what we choose to do.

We think with concepts. Concept learning and the use of language to label concepts are vital human traits.

l The use of higher-level cognitive mental processes neaded by reactor operators to I

diagnose causes of transients and to evaluate unusual and contradictory instrument information requires education and well-developed concepts related to the system of 1

l which they are a part.

[

llo l

l

In surnmary then, education and training are closely related.

Simply stated, training requirernents are based on specific task analysis (or needs analysis) that identify elements of learning or behavior relevant to a position of employment. Education addresses elements of learning or behavior that are of interest or prepare one for a wide variety of needs associated with an entire class of positions. Many of these elements of learning or behavioral objectives are the same, whether given as part of education or as part of training.

The training programs for some technologies may have 3reater conceptual depth than related education, but without comparable mathematical rigor. The educational credits received in a particular area of study may have no relation to the length of the training program on the same material. Similarly, the hours of training may not have equivalence in an educational program. These issues must be resolved on a case-by-case basis.

Experience has a limited relationship to education and training. Education and/or training should minimize the experience required to achieve a desired level of learning (competence).

Education and training should, therefore, lessen requirements for experience, but cannot directly substitute for the majority of the experience require-nent.

II.

HISTORICAL PATTERN OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR NUCLEAR FACILITY OPERATORS ne earliest systems capable of sustaining a nuclear chain reaction. the nuclear

" piles" of World War II vintage and subsequent nuclear research reactors at Atomic Energy Commission National Laboratories, were usually operated either by Ph.D. level physists or directly under their control. As the novelty of reactors wore off and the interests of the researchers turned to other scientific phenomena, the routine operation of nuclear facilities was turned over to experienced collegues who were quite capabla of 117

operating the facilities of that era. Since all nuclear facilities were then owned by the Government, operator training was relatively informal and experience was the primary basis for operating or supervising the operation of a nuclear facility. Never-the-less, a baccalaureate degree was the generally accepted : minimum level of education for the person in charge of operation.

With the development of nuclear power for naval propulsion, a new pattern developed. Traditionally, the Navy operated its ships with enlisted men in charge of the power plant, under the direct supervision of one or more officers. Enlisted men, usually with only a high school education, became the reactor operators. Instrument technicians, auxiliary operators, etc., of the nuclear navy after an intensive and extensive training program. A land based prototype of the naval reactor was used to train the reactor operators, and a continuing training program after graduation assured that the operators remained qualified. Furthermore, the operators worked directly under the supervision of officers who not only had a baccalaureate degree but had also undergone an even more rigorous academically oriented program in nuclear power. Since officers and enlisted men were aboard the same vessel whose safety was dependent upon proper operation of the nuclear reactor, the system that emerged has worked well over a period of 25 years.

The existence of rnilitary discipline and the almost dictatorial control of perfectionist Admiral Hyman Rickover undoubtedly contributed to the success of the Navy's nuclear pro gram.

Since the civilian nuclear power program was an outgrowth of the Navy nuclear program, a similar pattern for nuclear power plant operators emerged, with seme significant differences. The utility industry tended to view the early nuclear power plants as just another power plant. Persons who operatad fossil oower plants ware trained to become Control Room Operators for nuclear power plants, and the fossil plant supervisors became Senior Reactor Operators and Shift Supervisors. there was a direct analog between the Navy enlisted operaters and the utility Control Room Oparator foften 11A

a member of a union) but there was less correlation between the college educated and technically trained naval officer and the utility nuclear plant supervisor. Nuclear steam supply vendors (Westinghouse, General Electric, etc.) provided the nuclear power plant training for the utility personnel at their training centers. As the number of com=ercial power plants increased, and operating personnel moved into the supervisory ranks to fill the racanc:es that occurred as supervisors moved into corporate staff and :nanagement positiens. the average educational level of the personnel operating the plant asymptotically approached the 12th grade level.

On-the-job training and operates requalificatien training became the principal means of i= proving an operater's qualificatiens.

In the aftermath of the TMI-2 accident, a public used to associating high technology with higher education was ' shocked" to learn that TMI-2 was being operated by personnel who were "only high school graduates.*

The ensuing investigations raised serious questions about the qualifications of the control room personnel, and a major thrust of the NRC in the past year has been directed toward the " upgrading

of the education and training of control room personnel. The creation of the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations is tacit recognition by the utility industry of the i:nportance of this area of concern. The president of a :najor electric utility recently observed:

"If I, as president, set out to deliberately bankrupt this company, there's very little I could do because of the controls and regulations under which I operate, but an operator in ene of our nuclear plants could bankrupt this company in an hours time."

IIL 31I-2 LESSONS LEARNED With the issuance of NUREG-0573, " Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short Term Recommendations", the utility industry got its first view of the torrent of new regulatiens and requirements that continues to flow from the NRC. Among other things, NUREG-0578 required that all plants take steps by January 1,1980, to have a qualified technically trained parson (i.e., holder of a bachelor's degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline) within ten minutes of the control room at all times.

119

[

This person was to be available in the event of an emergency to advise the Shif t Supervisor on the technical or engineering aspects of any situation that rnight arise. The general pattern was to select graduate engineers fro m the utility's Engineering Department and give them an intensive plant familiari::ation program followed by a two year on-the-job self-study program that involved at least 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months per week. The NRC left no doubt thr.t they viewed the Shift Technical Advisor u strictly a temporary arrangement and that their long-term goal was to require more formal education for Senior Reactor Operators and fer Shif t Supervisors. The specifics of this long term educational " upgrading" were spelled out in a March 26, 1980 letter from Harold R.

Denton, Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) of the NRC to "All Power Reactor Applicants and Licensees."

This letter, and its four enclosures, are included in this report as Appendix B.

In Enclosure 1. " Criteria for Reactor Operator Training and Licensing", the NRC provides the following "Long Range Criteria and/or Require ments*:

A.

Shift Supervisors shall have an engineering degree or equivalent qualifications.

B.

Senior Operators shall have successfully completed a course in appropriate engineering and scientific subject equal to 60 credit hours of college level subjects.

The Director of NRR urged the utilities "to start planning for the long-range requirernents so that they could be rapidly implemented upon completion of the rule

naking procedure."

IV.

EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR TMI-I OPER ATORS In view of the letter from the Director of NRR, it would appear that the future educational requirements for nuclear plant operators and supervisors are fairly well set, and the principal concern should be the steps that TMI-1 (and TMI-2) can take to meet these requirements. The Committee does not take exception to the desirability of the 120.

I

proposed NRC educational requirements. Its principal concern is the perturbations that the premature and inelegant irnposition of such requirements could cause. The vast rnajority of the current Control Room Operators and Senior Reactor Operators of power plants throughout the country (including TMI-1 and TMI-2) have little formal education beyond high school. It will take considerable time for operators, tnany who have been out of high school for 15 to 20 years, to accumulate 60 credits of acceptable college credit and even longer for Shift Supervisors to earn a technical or engineering baccalaureate degree. Many, for financial and/or personal reasons, will have to work full-time while pursuing a college program. Others will undoubtedly seek new positions with the utility, leave for other work, or even take demotions to rid themselves of the educational requirements. While such action does not seem logical to the Committee members, discussion with operators at TMI and elsewhere lead us to believe the threat is real, unless the education requirement can be pursued as part of their normal work and the pay scale is improved significantly upon completion of the education program.

The concept of an engineering educated, highly trained, experienced " Nuclear Power Plant Commander" is, in the Committee's view, not an unreasonable goal.

Unfortunately, if the utility industry snrted today with a " crash" program, it would take a decade or more to produce enough qualified persons to meet their needs. The principal concern is that such an "elitis t " approach may drive the present experienced, well-trained operators and supervisors out of the field.

For the reasons outlined above and others the Committee believes that a dual approach to " upgrading" control room personnel should be undertaken. The present Auxiliary Operator route to the control room should be continued with increased opportunities for formal technical or engine:ering education (in addition to the present training program) being made available and supported by the utility. Many utilities l

already have an education program that coul be used if the necessary course work could be made available on a schedule consistent :vith shift work. A clearly defined career 121

)

l i

path, including such eventualities as failure in school, voluntary withdrawal, etc., and opportunity for advancement must be defined for this group of operators.

An alternate career path for young degreed engineers to work through the pro-gressive stages of control room operator training / operation / supervision in a path parallel to the Auxiliary Operator C, B, A, Control Room Operator, Senior Reactor Operator, Shif t Foreman and Shift Supervisor path should be defined. This career path should provide potential for further promotion into middle-level and upper-level company management. Adequate financial inducements will help encourage high-abilky degreed engineers to pursue this career choice. The Committee believes that, in time, the Shift Technical Advisor might be phased out if the aforementioned career path plan for degreed engineers is successful in attracting qualified persons. Indeed, the STA's are pritne candidates for the alternate career path.

It is emphasized that this proposed plan is not envisioned as a replacement for the current non-degreed personnel in the operator program at Metropolitan Edison, but ra-ther as a supplement to it. The Committee believes that this mixture of training and educational backgrounds wfl! ultimately prcvide a commendable ' cross fertilizatirn* and

" enrichment" to both the operational and the management staffs of the utility.

The Committee is not unaware of the potential problems associated with this dual com. The issue of union career path approach to providing leadership in the control membership for operators will need to be resolved. The fricti.n presently being reported in some plants between STA's and control room personnel could become endamic to the dual approach. The Committee believes, however, that this dual career path approach is the only tocans by which the " upgrading" of the educational level of control room personnel required by the NRC can be reached, and that this goal is so important to the utility industry and to the country that it is worthy of the best efforts of everyone in-volved to solve the problems that inevitably will arise.

122

V.

MEETING NRC AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS IN TRAINING In the flurry of investigative reports and NRC documents (bulletins, orders, recommendaticns, etc.) that have been issued in the aftermath of the TMI-Z accident, there were mary specific findings, recommendations and orders which dealt with training in general and some which dealt specifically with operator training. Every utility has had to address each of these items in a timely manner since deadlines have been provided for response in many cases. The Training Department of Metropolitan Edison has a large effort underway to respond. The specific reports which had to be considered are listed in Table 10-1.

The Training Department has summari:ed the findings and recomme.ndations of these reports in Tabla 10-Z and indicated the status of their efforts in responding and the relevance of the finding or recommendation to TMI-1. The document references are keyed to the numbering of the report:. given in Table 10-1.

In addition to the above requirements in training, the TMI Trainir( Department Self Evaluation includes other recommendations and states Met-Ed's,mition on those re-quire,ents.

123

TABLE 10-1 D O'~~

N CONSIDERED BY THE TRAINING DEPARTMENT OF METROPOLITAN EDISON 1.

NUREG 0578. TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations.

2.

NUREG 0585.TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report.

3.

NUREG 0660 (3/5/80 DRAFT). NRC's Post-TMI Action Plan.

4.

ANSI 3.1 (DRAFT REVISION 12/06/79). Standards for Qualification and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants.

5.

KEMENY REPORT (a)

The Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island (Volume 1).

(b)

Technical Staff Analysis Report en Selection, Training, Qualification and Licensing of Three Mile Island Reactor Operating Personnel.

6.

ROGOVIN REPORT. NRC SpecialInquiry Group (a)

Three Mile Island - A Report to the Commissioners and the Public -

Volarne 1.

(b)

Human Factors Panel Report.

7.

RODDIS COMMITTEE REPORT.

Report of Ad-Hoc Advisory Comrnittee on Personnel Selection and Training, Man-Machine Interface and Communication.

8.

TMI-LESSONS LEARNED - Oyster Creek 124

TAbl.E 10-2 ACTIOra OtJ Pltll>ItJGS At416 RECOMMCtJDATIOilS OP 1NI-2 ACCIDI:14T kt;Pul4TS Pindings aar l<ecomnkendationu -

Status Sosne Ano Heworded to iteduce Duplication Ikicumient u

'IN I - !

Itenus ks Helated to 'INI-l A.

Operator trainirig needs to be added or improved in the following areas 1.

llazards and motliods winicli would be H

Completed Training was in;-aded in the (parator Accelerat.

employed to keep plasit in sato slaut.-

_ltetraisiing Program (OARP) anti simulattor-traisilse.

sk,wn condi tion post. accident.

coutuus including natural circulat.iosi.

Pro-cedures have licen revised.

i 2.

Stress on the pr oper l>es spect.ive U

Ik>sie Safety lias licen stressed by counselling instr uc-lie tween reactor sa fety asid eqisipmerit.

Lors and t.raitices to th, poisit t iia t t ainees p ro t e c t. ion.

stuestion almost any con idere' ion otlier tisan safety.

U 1.

Include finidamental processos and 4, $ a,il llo ing in-tiext prios ity af ter the OAkP, is t o r evise: pas.-

liasic subjects incliading ph, ics, corteorated slaams pa-ior to testart.

Isitu ract.loiss leavit l a:iti.

I chemistry, heat t ran s fe r, the mo-in operator includuit in ma te r ia ls pa upa red.uid t augh t in dyniamics arid their letteract iosis trainin*I t he 8)AltP.

in plant operationi for alniorrmal paograms conditions and transient restonses.

4.

Itecoquition of signi ficancu of high Sa In 1; PIP's This area has leecn included in OAlti' and in taais sadiation levels.

cuarently be-inq on the 1,ime:9ency Plan In.plement ing [ro-ing Iaught ceduses (l; PIP 's).

5.

l<ecognition of loss of coolant. accident

$a Gunpleted "liae ATOG information has licesi iracluded ici the and response for the first. several OARP as.d piocedures have licen revised to re-4 hours.

'lec t ope ra t ion a t te r t he transient is cuider ce n t.rol. Also covered in "Real Time Transient Analysis" presentation in the OAlt P.

4 I

1 t

L

_m TAllIJ: 10-2 (Cont'd.)

Pindings or Recommesidations -

Status Some Are Heworded to Heduce Dnplicati<nt Docannonts FMI-l Hemarks Holdt:3d to THI-l 6

Diagnosing and controlling unextweted 4,Sa,6a,6b Completed Diagnostic training has been included in the egnipment mal f unction, serious trans-OAHP-ATOG training, Simulator training and the lents and events that cannot be easily Decision Analysis course. 1hese coursch weae understood.

given to HO's, SHO's and management.

7.

Training of operating personnel in 1,4 In plan-Job descriptions and definit.lons of responsi-their job duties and responsibilities.

ning bilities have not. been revised bist a procedure is being prepared which defines the responsi-bilities of Shift Supervisors, Shift Foremen, Shif t Technical Advisors and higher levels of i

management. Some training in position responsi-bilities was included in the Decision Analysis cource for the Shitt Supervisor.

H.

Comprehensive ongoing training anat re-2,4,5a, tl ih me for Hetraining of licensed operatons is done.

Aux-C training of all levels to maintain HO's and iliary olarrator retraining is in l>rogreas.

All their level of knowledge.

SHO's ol =3 ra tor-ret.t aisilsig prog ams are unidergoing revision.

'i.

Formally defined training for all So Wonking on Memoranila and other administrat ive doctments operators (should not be self-study).

defined taaining (2-year individual programs),

but. there wene no procedures to fonaalize tin i s.

This area is being worked on.

10.

Supervisory skills training for all 1,4, tl l*lanning A supervisory skills training program was in supervisory personnel.

progresh prior to March 28, 1979. Not all supervisory lersonnel had been given the cour se asul not all sinb.jects had been given. This was terminated on March 28, but reinstatement of the program is luming planned by the Career Development Section of the THI Training Depart-ment.

t 1

TAlli.E 10-2 (Cont'd.)

Findings or Hecommendat ions -

Status

_ Some Ate leeworded to iteduce Duplication ik >eumo n t s

Itt i - 1

_ _ ltemarks He l a t ed t o 'Itll - 1 11.

Interactions of surveillance and il Planning and No t a aining is provided to olourators on Sur-n.aintenancu activities.

in progtess veillance Ps ocedur es, lloweven, systesas train-ing for nuintesiance personnel is in progress.

1.!.

Integration of operating experience.

2,4,5a, t1 Plasuiing I. ice:sisisig lias prepared a procedisse for review completed, and evaluation of industry expenlence. The implementa-Training Depart ment Administn ati ve Procedure Lion ongoing for review and incorporation of industry exper-ience into all training programs is implenientent.

11.

Direct training of skills and knowledge 4,613 Ongoing Training Evaluation Advisory Copalttees are required of the ol>erators to satisfy being chartered or are funct ioning to review job requirements, position descriptions, perfoam needs analysis and coordinate with the Training DispartJuesit.

C 14.

Include the use of plant systems 2

Completed Inclialed natusal circulation and staessed cose already installed to control or miti-cooling in OAHP t raining and at the simulator.

gate the consequences of accidents in which the core is severely damaged.

15.

Include additional training of the 6a,61>

Completed incitiduit group participation at the simulator, combined sliift crew.

in drills at the station, and in decision analysis.

I t>.

Include training to ptovide the 6a Complete ex-Ailded diagnostic training ( A*lo;) and Decision necessary combinatiosi of teclinical ca. pt p lasit.

Asialysis t o operator and benior cima ator train-competence and familiarity with the plant management ing and taaining of Shift. Technical Advisors t o diagnose a totally autanticipated training and plant managewient.

uituation and to upgrade technical analysis

'liialifications of onsite supervisors Jind maliagem.arit.

1/.

Shift managers knowledgeable in reactor 6a In progress Shif t Technical Advisor t raining is in progteur engineering and physics should le pro-and will incliale training equivalent to Sito videil t t aining in plant characten ist ics I;*inin9 at least equivalent to Sito with special enq.hasis on integrated response, in-

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TAl:I.E 10-2 (Cont'd.)

Findings or Heconnes.dat.lons -

Status Souse Are hworded to Nduce Duplication lucionen t s THI-l Nmas ks Helated to 1NI-l H.

Enuargency Plan training should provide for tt aillinig in the following areas I

l 1.

Ensure that all plant and staf f personnel H

In progreau A three-l>habe approach to training was planned:e are thoroughly familiar with their in-Hasic Indoctrination in the Emernency Plan (thi?

volvement with the revised Dnergency has beesi cosupleted), (2) Emergency Plan Imple-Plan and the Emergency Preparedness Plan.

menting Procedure (EPIP) troisiing - a snatrix has been prepased for this troisiting, (3) Eme s'-

I gency Plan Drill and indoctrination of state and local officials in emergency plan inter-i faces, (1) has been completed, (2) is in progre:

and (3) is being planned.

1 2.

Personnel should be lustructed in how H

Planned 1his t[ill be a part of Emergency Plan training wy to perform routine evolutions in a high in Radiat. ion Protection.

radiation environpa:nt.,

e.g., drawing samples, surveying, etc.

1 4

3.

Establish drills and l>rovide training 3

Planned Part. of Phase 3 of Einergency Plast training.

j which involve Federal, State and Local agencies.

l 4.

Training in proper cor.aunication tech-H Planning Part or Emergency Plans traisiing.

niques and practices is needed.

I c.

Training of personnel other than operating 3,4,H Planning A needs analysis which will cover all lee r sonne l Imrsonnel should be reviewed and ade<1nate is being planned to determine the scope and programs established. This should in-content of needed training. Maintenance, IIP elude interactions with Operations during and Chemist ry are on-going. Professional train-1 testing and maintenance activities.

ing is being planned and developed.

3 D.

si:neral linployee Traissisig in the area of 1,4,8 Plansiing A needs analysis which will cover all liersonnel lcrsonnel and radiation safety shoisld kas is being pla.ined to determine the scope and linproved as well as t aissisig on procedutes cositesit of steeded training s GET has been tip-which involve all site 1ersonnel.

graded in the indicated areas.

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l'indings or Recommndations -

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_ some Are Heworded to Heduce Duplication Documents TMI-l Ituinac ks He lated to " INT-1 5.

Determinationi of tiie characteristics 7

Inste r A trainisig participa it asialysis f ollows lujicall-and capabilities of trainees (partici-af ter the needs and task analyses. Some of this analysis was {*erformed in preparing the Indiv d-

[>afit alialysis).

ual employee two-year trainisig packages, but.

there is considerable work remaining.

6.

Establishmerit of criteria or objec-7 f.a te r Although some of the training courses include tives for each course in consonance criteria and objectives, there is a need for review and innprovement in this area.

New with plant requirent'nts.

lesson plans are being prepared with objectives.

7.

Design and document cournes to extend 7

I.a te r The two-year curriculum for people done several the cal > ability of trainees to meet years ago included some work in this area but the criteria or objectives for considerably more e f fort is required to improve the ef fectiveness and ef ficiency of training O

bl>cci fic courses.

courses. This includes a need for improved lesson plans.

8.

P ovide for training and periodic 6b,7 Planning Program 33, 34 and 35 (Che ter III section IG) updating as well as supervision of are being developed to comply with this cousse developers and instructors, reconunendat ion,

including how to reinforce lesson objectives and how to assist trainees in understanding materials, to ensure ef ficiesit and ef fective delivery of well-designed courses.

9.

Development of techniques and 4,6b,7 I.it e r

'line principles employed in the OAHp Instr uctor Handbook will be utilized.

procedures for evaluating the quality of course material and instruction as wel1 as the students' success in meet-ing course objectives, including tests and quizzes which measure trainees' ability to perform ef fect.ively.

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Selected References 1.

Ausubel, D.P. The Psychology of Meaningful Verbal Learning.

New York: Grune and Stratton,1963.

2.

Ausubel, D.P. Educational Psvehologv: A Cognitive View.

l New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,1908.

3.

Novak, Joseph D. Applying psychology and philosophy to the i:nprovement of laboratory teaching. The American Biology Teacher.1979, H. 466-474.

l l

e 134

CHAPTER 11 OBSERVA"ITONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I.

INTRODUCTION "I am sure it will be the position of Met-Ed to meet all regulatory requirements, all requirements of the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations, and requirements to conform to industry standards such as ANSI 3.1. We will, of course, make judgments as to how best to comply with the intent of those requirements and standards. From our experience during the past five months. I am led to believe that we are capable and will be successful in staving slightly ahead of the industry in these areas."

L. L. Lawyer Manager-Training Metropolitan Edison With these prophetic words in a March 6,1980 memorandum, Mr. L. L. Lawyer, Manager of Training for Metropolitan Edison, expressed the prevailing determination to do what needs to be done to get TMI Unit-1 back on-line as soon as possible.

II.

OBSERVATIONS A. General Comments The Committee concurs in this assesstnent of Metropolitan Edison's determination to return Three Mile Island Unit-1 to full-power operation as soon as possible. While their observations and analyses are generally confined to the reactor operator training area, ether observations are included where deemed appropriate by the Committee.

i In order to secure authorization to restart Three Mile Island Unit-1, Metropolitan Edison will have to present to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission adequate evidence that the plant can be operated in a safe and competent manner without undue risk to the public. Metropolitan Edison is aware of the fact that the burden of proof is upon them, and for this reason they have initiated a number of training activities that, under more normal circumstances would be considered extraordinary. The commitment to relicense all r-actor operator, prior to the restart of TMI-l is an example. Even subjecting their training program to an accreditation type review by this Committee is a pioneering 135

effort initiated fer purposes of assuring that the quality of the OARP is satisfactcry. :n the incident of February 25, 1980 at Crystal River, which was very similar to the early stage of the TMI-2 accident, the operators took the proper action to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition. These operators benefited from the training implemented after the TMI-Z accident; they truly learned the lesson of " lessons learned.'

Ultimately one has to deal with the question. "Given a situation different from, but equally as serious as, that which occurred on March 23, 1977, what assurance can one have that the operators will respond properly and take the appropriate steps to bring the reactor to a cold shutdown condition without endangering either the public health and safety or the physical well-being of the plant?" Metropolitan Edison has every bit as much of an incentive as the NRC in assuring itself that its operators will take the proper action in a serious but unfamiliar situaticn.

Metropolitan Edison's response to this problem has been, among other things, the initiation of the Operator Accelerated Retraining Program (which included a significant expansion of previous course material; thermodynamics, heat transfer, instrumentation, new transients, new procedures, etc.i and the Decision Analysis Program (which was designed to help the shift supervisors and shift foremen make " good decisions" in the face of insufficient and even conflicting information.) This upgrading of the training and education of the control room operators and their supervisors, as well as the introduction of Shift Technical Advisors, is the essence of Metropolitan Edison's answer to the question posed earlier in this paragraph.

B. Specific Comments on the O AR1j, A careful examination of the Primary and Backup Instructor Handbook as a descriptor of the retraining program indihted that considerable thought and care were involved in the planning of the OARP. It presented the program rationale, program objectives, list of topics to be covered and the time to be devoted to each. It provided the instructors with a valuable guide for lesson plan development and a det ailed description of their duties. It also furnished them with information about affe tive ways 136

of presenting material, the use of references, the necessity for review, the need for retnforcement, the integration of theory and practh e, and conducting evaluations of both students and their own perfcrmance.

An examination of the prepared lesson plans indicates that in their preparation, i.e.,

organi:ation, sequencing, emphasis, reinforcement, cd evaluation of the content met the intent of guidelines established in the Primary and Backup Instructor Handbook.

Evidence of the qsality and effectiveness of the instructional :nethods was provided to the Committee through classroom visitation, reviewing video:ane presentations of specific lessons, evaluation g-ades given to instructors and large numbers of qui::es and examinatiens given to students. Despite the tremendous amount of work required to prepare lessons in limited time, the OARP.as condue:ed in a well-otanned fashicn.

Se concern for adequate : mastery of the course content was evidenced in the original planning. Specific steps taken to insure success include external audit by Personnel Qualification Services during the operation of the OARP, and the additien of the OARP activities to strengthen the operatcr training progra:n by systematically focusing on necessary reteaching and additional review of important topics.

One of the major strengths of the program was that the classroom presentations were not ' canned

productions, although the carefully prepared lesson plans were followed. Le type of presentation and the training aids used varied with the specific content, and instructional objectives elicited considerable instructor-student inter-action. De rapport within the class was excellent. The instructors attempted to present

naterial that was related to the concerns and backgrounds of the studenta and which was designed to be useful to their jobs as safe nuclear reactor operators.

Cresschecks :nade by Dr. Gardner by cornparing classroom visitation with videotape viewing and by observing other presentations on videotape indicated that (with the usual amount of variation) the lessons were consistently of high quality throughout the OARP.

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In accordance with the original plan, the instructors were graded on each presentation. These evaluations were made conscientiously and seemed fair. The ratings given to the instructors of the classes visited, as well as those seen on videotape, correspond reasonably well with those Dr. Gardner would have given. There was also general agreement between Dr. Cardner and Frank Kelly of Personnel Qualification Services on the quality of the instruction.

In conclusion, the OARP for retraining nuclear reactor operators for Three Mile Island-Unit One has bee:S carefully developed and implemented to be consistent with effective educational and psychological principles.

C. Soecific Comments on the Decision Analysis Training Program The mere introduction of a one-week program on Decision Analysis training to supplement the Operator Accelerated Retraining Prograrr will not assure its usefulness or effectiveness in an emerg ncy situation. It must be made an integral part of the regular Operator Retraining Program, and drills on its use should be introduced into regular operation. Decision analysis shculd also be incorporated into simulator training l

where it could be particularly effective. A real-time decision analysis could be carried out and then critiqued in the light of what happened when the simulated event was completed.

The effectiveness of the Decision Analysis training will be dependent upon uti;t:ing realistic examples in which the decisions to be made are indeed those that the shift l

supervisor would have to make in a real situation. Particularly important would be i

malfunctions from other similar nuclear units reported by tha NRC or INPO. m nage-nient personnel or a consultant (perhaps Managemant Analysis Corporation) could convert these incidents into realistic decision analysis exercises for operater retraining and 1

sirnulator training.

The results of this one-week training course wera impressive because in these l

exercises the SRO licensees and STA's dealt with problems that have actually occurred in i

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nuclear power plants and made " good" decisions. On the basis of their performance in this class, it is reasonable to expect that with continued training and management's commitment to utili::e the decision analysis process, the SRO licensees and STA's would arrive at a " good" decision when faced with an unf amiliar situation that was as serious as, or more serious than, the TMI-Unit Z accident.

D. General Comments on Simulation Nearly everyone the Committee contacted offered laudatory comments regarding replica full-mission simulators; they are often viewed almost as the saviers of the industry. The Committee feels that the full-replica simulator can make an important contribution to a well-developed training program. They are expensive, sophisticated instruments, and their proper use requires the availability of a highly sophisticated, specially trained instructional staff. As Admiral Mcdonald, the keynote speaker at the Seventh NTEC/ Industry Conference put it, "...*how to use* simulation is the undefined portion" (of the Navy prograrn).

The Committee is concerned that it has been unable to find within the nuclear power industry definitive studies that examine not only the simulator as a means for teaching certain skills but also the feasibility and utility of alternative approaches. A mix of a general sim.Stor designed to teach concepts, conternplation, integration of l

information sources, etc., (as contrasted to practice in dial reading and knob twirling),

aided and abetted by carefully selected part-task trainers, mock-ups, film strips and other relatively inexpensive training aids might be equally effective (because they can be made :nore generally available to mcre operators) than putting so much money into full-rnission replica simulators. As one tr.- i to obtain complete fidelity in a simulator, the cost curve accelerates positively aid dramatically. What is really wanted is psycholog-ical fidellty and this might be ar-hievable by less costly means. It may sound harsh, but the Committee has gained the impression that, lacking careful studies concerning the 1

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exact nature of the tasks (cognitive as well as motor) tnat the operators must perform, the industry now has no viable alternative but to turn to full-mission simulators.

E. General Comments o Man-Vachine Interface I.ess than optimal man-machine design puts an extra burden on the training program. Strong selection and training programs can compensate, at least partially, for design inadequacies; however, this is not the best way to use one's resources.

Simple, clean, straightforward design, based on a thorough analysis of systems requirernents and careful assignment of functions to men and machines, can ease pmblems of training, reduce possibilities of error and make human capacities in the system available for other, perhaps more challenging and more important, functions (e.g.,

decision making).

Ideally, of course, one would hope for both trnproved training and improved human engineering. Such a need is indicated in both TMI-I and 2.

The svnergism that results from the intera tion of optimal training and optimal human angineering is usually quite surprising and can contribute to improved safety and new levels of excellence.

l In the Committees' view, a good task analysis is fundamental to the establishment of training requirements as well as human engineering requirements. The Training l

Departruent should assure that an adequate description of the tasks of the control room operators is developed anr', that this description accurately reflects any changes made in the design of individual instrurnents and controls, changes in the alarm system, the l

communications system and the integration and layout of these and other sub-systems.

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One way of helping to assure that this awareness is realized is to have a Training l

Department representative working with those members of Mr. Keaten's staff who are establishing the requirements for, and monitoring the work of, the contractor (MPR) that has been given the responsibility to redesign the TMI-I contro! room.

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F. General Comments on the Training Environment The Committee observes that there has been a significant, positive change in the TMI plant management philosophy toward training. This is manifested by significantly increased resources allocated for training and planned for the future. The Committee, however, continues to be concerned with the temporary housing facilities provided for training classes.

These facilities are not conducive to learning nor to attracting well qualified instructional personnel.

I.

CONCLUSIONS Le Committee is satisfied that the completed OARP for TMI-l operational personnel and the addition of Shift Technical Advisers, who are degreed engineers, provide a blend of training and education adequate for safe, reliable operation of TMI-1.

It is the Committee's conclusion that the OARP has provided the operating staff with

comprehensive knowledge of theory, principles of operation, kinetics, thermodynamics and heat transfer, which will enable operators to correctly interpret information available to them in the control room." OARP represents training increments that should result in an improved confidence and competence of TMI-l operators to ef'.iciently and effectively assure reactor operational safety.

The Committee further concludes that the introduction of Decision Analysis training provides a useful procedure which will, if pioperly implemented, provide an effective means of diagnosing unfamiliar situations.

The Committee notes that the requirements of NUREG 0578,Itern 1.e., for " natural circulation and small break loss of coolant accident training

have been met. The NRC exams will be eligible to sit for an NRC administered examination for an Operator or Senior Operator license."

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e IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS The recommendations of the Committee are not confined to the various operator training programs.

Rather, the recomtnendations deal with the broader subject ol training needed to properly operate a nuclear power plant, i.e., those activities normally handled by the Training Department. Although the Committee has generally limited its recommendations to the subject matter dealt with in this report, it has not hesitated to

nake recommendations in other areas when it felt there was a compelling reason to do so.

Recommendations which can and should be implemented within the next two years are, for purposes of this report, considered short term. Those which will require an atensive study or more than two years to implement, will be considered as long term.

When a specific time scale is appropriate, it will be indicated at the end of the recommendation. Many of th,s suggestions have no specific time scale and can be dealt with by the Training Department as time is available.

A. Overator Accelerated Retraining Program (Short Range)

The OARP is superior to other operator training programs at TMI and a number of its elements should be incorporated in the other basic training programs. The Committee specifically recommends adoption of rnany of the quality controls initiated for the OARP. Furthermore, the following subjects should be added to other operator trainin.;

programs:

1.

Heat transfer, fluid flow and thermodynamics 2.

Small-break LOCA 3.

Plant transient training (including anticipated transient operating guides) 4.

Simulator training incorporating depressurization and natural circulation The OARP has profited from continuous internal self-evaluatlion and a periodic external review. This pattern should be continued.

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B. Alternate Onerator Career Path (Short Range)

It is recommended that Metropolitan Edison consider an alternate career path for young degreed engineers to work through the progressive stages of control room operator training / operation / supervision in a path parallel to the Auxiliary Operator C, B, A.

Reactor Operator, Senior Reactor Operator, Shif t Foreman and Shif t Supervisor. This career path should provide potential for further prociotion into middle-level and upper company management. Adequate financial inducements should be provided to encourage young high-ability degreed engineers to pursue this career choice.

In time, the Shift Technical Advisor might be phased out if the aforementioned career path plan for degreed engineers is successful in attracting qualified persons. It is emphasi:ed that this proposed plan is not envisioned as a replacement for the current non-degreed engineer in the operatcr program at Metropolitan Edison, but rather as a supplement to it.

C. Training Facilities (Short Range)

The Committee recommends that Metropolitan Edison begin planning immediately to replace their present temporary training facilities with permanent training facilities more conducive to learning.

The Committee recommends that Metropolitan Edison familiari:e themselves with training programs and facilities at other utilities that are l

recogni:ed in the industry as outstanding facilities.

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D. Use of B & W Simulator (Short Range)

Met-Ed should take steps to assure the content and conduct of the B & W sirnulator programs which they procure are exactly what they want, are complementary to the operators' other training, and are responsive to changes that may occur in Met-Ed control room design and/or procedures.

This should include assurance that all supporting materials (syllabi, manuals, etc.) are adequate and that their currency is maintained.

Important " lessons' learned" (Appendix B, Enclosure 4) should be incorporated as quickly as possible.

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The simulator, if properly used, is an excellent vehicle for crew (as well as individual) training. Met-Ed should send crews together for s:mulator training and assure the B & W programs are responsive to this requirement.

Operators must realize the limitations as well as the advantagea of simulator training.

Differences between the simulator world and the real world should be emphasized. This is particularly important since the 3 & W simulator does not duplicate the TMI-1 (or TMI-2) control room.

E. Simulator for TMI Operators Given the present attitude within NRC, it appears inevitable that every nuclear plant will require extensive access to an exact-replica simulator. The principal questton seems to be the degree of fidelity in the si:nulation. In developing its plans for operator training facilities and programs, Met-Ed should carefully consider the proper function of each individual instructional element and procedure and the interrelaticnships among them. Full-mission siaulation is an important element; its proper place in the program must be carefully considered along with the other elements of the program. Management must overtly support the importance of simulator training.

For the long-term, the feasibility and advisability of employing a surrogate of the actual control room for the evaluation of consequences of proposed control room acticn:,

prior to their implementation should be considered. This might be a part-task " fast" simulator with a predictor display which could guide the operators in the next steps to be taken in an emergency.

F. TMI-l Control Room Modifications (Short Rante)

The human engineering study of the TMI-l control room being conducted by MPR Associates will result in recommendations for changes in controls and display.s. panel layout, control room layout, communications. warning ystems, etc.. that will up-grade the control room with respect to efficiency and safaty of operation. GPU should attempt to take advantage of advancements that have bean made in control room design and 144

o layout since the TMI-1 control room was first deveicped without rnaking changes which are so drastic that they would invalidate the operator training program or delay the startup beyond that associated with the present ASLB hearing.

Specific reconsmendations regarding the redesign of the TMI-1 control room are being made by a Inernber of this Committee (Dr. Julien M. Christensen) and a member of the Roddis Committee (Dr. Thomas Sheridan) to MPR Associates. The engineering feasibility of these and other recommendations, now and for the future, has not been ascertained. However, the Committee emphasizes the necessity for someone in the Training Department to maintain an awareness of the changes that are tnade and carefully to assess any implications for procedure or content in the training program.

The Committee recom=2 ends that human factors evaluation of the control room and the operational procedures used therein be a continuous program. Review of events, design implications of revised procedures. etc. should be carried out continuously; human factors, or man-machine interface consideration, is not a "one-shot

affair. Simple, clean, straightforward design, based on a thorough analysis of systems requirements and careful assignment of functions to men and to machines, can ease problems of training, reduce possibilities of error and make human capacities in the system available for other, perhaps more challenging and tuore important, functions (e.g., decision making). Less-than-optimal man-c achine design puts an extra burden on the training prograc2. While strong selection and training programs can cornpensate to some extent for design inadequacies, this is not the best way to use one's resources.

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The Committee generally concurs with the recom mendations of the Reddis Comtnittee that relate to the : nan-machine interface features of the control room and urges MPR Associates to give them careful consideration.

G. Metronolitan Edison Training Denartment l

The Metropolitan Edison Training Department is operating under difficult circumstances; some directly attributable to the TMI-2, accident and some due to pre-145

accident neglect. The Training Department personnel perceive their status to be that of

second-class citizens".

Equality of authority, financial considerations, career development, and reporting level within the company would help change this situation.

Progress in the acquisition of proper physical facilities (classrooms, study rooms, library, offices,etc.) :s also extremely important.

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The Committee recommends that ar. instructor program be identified and implemented for those assigned to full or part-time teaching duties. This program should present a wide variety of topics; including curricular development, behavioral objective preparation, lesson outline and lesson plan formats, utilization of audio-visual equipment, specification and preparation of audio-visual aids, instructor teacning techniques, exam preparation, evaluation techniques and counseling. This program should be modeled after components of both military instructor schrois and university education programs.

Formal instruction in education (especially classroom teaching techniques; and psychology (classroom learning) should be initiated for members of the permanent training staff.

Training personnel need specific training in how to deal with m,tivationally heterogeneous classes (20 year old to 60 year old). They also need instruction in the most e fficient use of time, taking into account motivational and f atigue factors. In particular, training courses should prescribe study time outside of but integrated with classroom presentations. Extensive work including research needs to be performed by the industry to better understand the optimal approach to repetitive r

retraining.

Instructor schools need to be established and al! traimng personnel qualified to clearly stated criteria. The OARP Primary and Backup Instructor Handbook should he modified as appropriate and adapted as a Training Department Instructor Handbook. The system in the OARP which includes specific functions for an instructor and backup instructor was effective in the OARP. Th:s procedi:re should be especially important for instructors who have had little or no training in teaching methodology, but it is not 146

o justified when the instructor is experienced and qualified.

It would be desirable to include as members of the permanent training staff several instructors with baccalaureate engineering degrees.

H. Training Aids Considering the facilities available to thern, Met-Ed perconnel have shown ingenuity and considerable insight in the development of various trarting aids and training techniques.

Le Committee recommends that a modern, sophisticated training aids section be developed immediately to support an immediate requirement for the identification and develop:nent of additional training aids. De use of " state-of-the-art" training aids needs to be reviewed, their integration into the total training experience carefully defined and that review and integration implemented. These aids include tape players, film, TV film, part-task simulators, simulators, and interactive computers.

Metropolitan Edison should develop an improved capability for the use of its instructors.

The most effective use of simulation requires instructors specially trained in this area.

I. Decision Analysis Training (Short Range)

The Committee recommends the introduction and development of the Decision Analysis procedure into the normal operator training programs (CAT IV, relicensing and simulator programs.)

Indeed, the effectiveness and usefulness of this program is dependent upon successfully integrating this procedure with normal training and operating activities.

J. Ooerator Shif t Schedule ne Committee recommends that an analysis of the environmental conditions specifically include, in addition to the :nore prosaic conditions (lighting, noise, etc.), an examination of the current shift schedule of the control room operators. The practice of changing an operator's work schedule every week is not recommended. It may be one of the reasons that the tenure of the average operator is so low. Human factor studies show 147

that shift changes more often than every 4-o weeks leads to poor performance, dissatisf action, and low motivation.

K. Institute for Nuclear Power Coerations (Short Range)

Train..g Department personnel should be aware of the " benchmarks" program being developed by the INPO. Benchmarks are essentially envelopes or standards of excellence that will have very significant implications for bota man-machine design programs and training programs. The INPO program should be monitored, especially as it relates to a review of work in the area of task analysis.

L. Oral Examinations To achieve uniformity and reliability of oral examinations, it would be desirable to study the standardization of the probes, promptings, and accepted responses during oral examinations. (The Stanford-Binet is an example of such an approach. The flight checks of pilots is another.) A more detailed table of specifications for oral examinations with specific proportions of questions or time assigned to each category should be developed.

The use of microphones and a tape recorder during oral examinations would provide a record and make the examination public to appropriate personnel. Information from this source would also be useful in training instructors. Ne feasibility of obtaining such data should be studied.

It would be desirable to experiment during the mock examination stages with alternatives to one-on-one oral examining techniques.

[

M. Task Analysis l

A good task analysis is fundamenta; to the establishment of both training requirements and human engineering requirements. It is recommended that a description of the tasks of the control room operators be developed and kept current. A thorough task analysis should disclose the nature and degree of the mental workload that require-

nents, both normal and emergency, of a particular control room impose on its cre v. The Committee recommends that the task descriptions being developed be used as a haris for 148

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determining more exactly the nature of the workload imposed on members of the control room crew. ~ hen, as changes in control room design or procedures are considered Met-Ed will have an improved data base for estimating their impact on operator duties.

N. Communications The Committee recommends that management's philosophy with respect to nuclear power plant operation be clearly articulated and made known to all personnel. It further recommends that communication channels between top management and the operating crews be kept open and supported by visible actions on the part of all levels of management such as visits to the control rooms (including visits during the back shif t),

facilitation of = cans for the consideration of operators ideas, etc. Top management needs to keep aware of the r=al and perceived problems of its employees.

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APPENDIX A ACCR EDITA~ITON I

DEFINITION ACCREDIT

'To put into a reputable or outstanding category; to cor. sider, recognize, or acclaim as rightfully possessing an uncontested status; to give official authorization to or approval of; to vouch for officially; recogni:e or clear officially as bona fide, approved, or in conformity with a standard,...* WEESTER II.

ENGINEERING EDUCATION ACCREDITATION A. Introduction In the field of engineering education, the Engineers Council for Professional Development (ECPD), which has become the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET), is the recogni:ed professional body for accrediting engineering curricula. ECPD/ ABET derives its accreditation authority, as do ace: editing bodies for other professional education pro gra ms, fro m the Council on Post-Secondary Accreditation (COPA), an agency of the Department of Education. ECPD/ ABET is a federation of engineering societies (17 Participating Bodies and two Member Bodies).

Such organizations as the American Society for Mechanical Engineering, American Institute for Chemical Engineers, American Society for Civil Engineers and American l

Nuclear Society are Participating Bodies of ECPD/ ABET.

I B. Authority for Accreditation l

ECPD/ ABET derives its authori=ation fr.r accrediting professional engineering education programs from the Council on Post-Secondary Accreditation (COP A), and must reapply for such authorization through a periodic process of formal application, public hearing, due process and action by COPA. The formal application from ECPD/ ABET to COPA must include a description of the accreditation process and the structure, criteria.

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and due process procedures followed by ECPD/ ABET for accreditees.

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This authori:ation process is an important factor in enabling ECPD/ ABE~ to enjoy justified credibility and the aforementioned attributes of the meaning for " accreditation" by Webster.

A Board of Directors (BOD) is the governing group of ECPD/ ABET. The BOD is comprised, urrently of 37 persons including president, vice president, secretary, treasurer and past president: and there is also an executive director. Members of the BOD are appointed by the Participating Bodies. Each Member Body has at least one representative on the BOD and the maximum number on the BOD from the largest Partic:pating Bodies is three. That is, the number of eligible representatives from Participating Bodies is determined by formula based on the number of members in the Participating Body. For example, IEEE, ASME and ASCE have three representatives each, AIChE has Z representatives and ANS has one representative on the BOD. Each Participating Body also appoints alternates to serve in the event a BOD = ember cannot attend a particular :necting. All major actions approved by the BOD must be ratified by a specified majority of the Participating Bodies of ECPD/ ABET. In response to recent demands of COPA, ECPD/ ABET may add members to its BOD who represent the public at large and also students, consistent with the " Consumer Representation" thrust in the U.S.

Past experience indicates that Participating Bodies do a good job in achieving balanced representation from education, industry and government in their appointments to the BOD of ECPD/ ABET. This is a goal of ECPD/ ABET.

The Engineering Education and Accreditations Committee EE& A) of ECPD/ ABET will soon become the Engineering Accredita'.on Committee (EAC). This committee will be identified as EE&A/EAC in thi, report to reflect the aforementioned on-going transitien. EE& A/EAC is self generating in the sense that its :nembers are selected frotn the Participating Bodies (although the Participating Bodies have veto power) and are persons who will com nit the time essential to the task. Members of EEL A/EAC are identified by the Chairman of this committee to serve as chairman of each Visitation 151

I Team. Visitation Teams are sent to each university requesting accreditation reviews.

The Visitation Team Chairman selects his/her own Visitation Team from the liat of qualified visitors supplied by each Participating Body. This list of qualified visitors is published in the ECPD/ ABET Annual Report. ror example, if a university asked for an accreditation review of its electrical, mechanical, chemical, civil and nuclear l

engineering programs, then the Visitation Team Chairman would select his/her Visitation Team from the approved list of visitors provided by IEEE, ASME, AIChE, ASCE and ANS. In addition, the Visitation Team Chairman requests a representative-observer from the board of professional engineering registration in the state in which the university seeking the accreditation review is located. Performance of each Visiting Team tuember is rated by the Visiting Team Chairman; and it is based on these evaluations of performance that the aforementioned EE& A/EAC members are selected.

Visitation Team members visit only once in their lifetime at any given university and are carefully selected to avoid conflicts of interest. The dean of the college of engineering has veto power over any Visitation Team member, in which case another person is selected by the Chairman.

C. Self Evaluation Report With its request for accreditation review, the university must submit a so-called Self Evaluation Volume I for central administration data and Volume 2 for data relating to each program for which an accreditation review is requested. Volurnes 1 and 2 are l

submitted on forms provided by ECPD/ ABET. Data requested are very detailed and include such things as central institutional budget, depart mental budgets, library holdings, computer facilities, equipment inventories, space available for prograrr s, faculty dossiers, ruission statements, admission policies, enrollments, professional program attributes, course listings in curricula identified by required area categories of minimum specified depth, minority program emphasis, coordination methodologies with supporting departments both in engineering and other dependent areas, etc.

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documentation constitutes an internal self-evaluation of each program against stated ECPD/ ABET criteria.

The importance of this self-evaluation cannot be over-emphasized.

The Visitation Team receives Volumes 1 and 2 prior to the actual accreditation visit.

D. Site Visit by Visitation Team During the site visit, :nembers of the Visitation Team spend 3 days in discussions with the deans, directors, department chairmen, professors and students. Team members study detailed course recitation and laboratory syllabi, texts, grading practices, samples of students' homework and examinations, ranging from poor through average to excellent. T..ey visit laboratories, libraries, and computer facilities. Prior to departure, the Visitation Team schedules an exit interview with the Dean, Chancellor / President of the university being visited. During this exit interview, each rnember of the Visitation Team discusses findings in his/her areas of responsibility during the visit.

These discussions are usually specific enough that any glaring deficiencies of program evaluation will be apparent. But the Visitation Team member is not authorized to state whether he/she will recommend or not recommend accreditation to the EE&A/EAC.

E. Visitation Reports After the visit, each individual team member must submit a detailed report of his/her findings to the Team Chairman according to the following outline:

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CHECK LIST FOR REPORT ON EVALUATION OF (NAME OF INd m unON)

RE-ENGINEERING CURRICULUM IN 1.

Persons consulted:

2.

Chairman's statement of purposes and objectives of curriculum:

3.

Organization, method of coordinating work:

4.

Staff:

(a)

Academic qualifications:

(b)

Experience:

(c)

Research accomplishments:

(d)

Professional activity:

(e)

Attitude:

5.

Teaching loads (compare with rest of institution):

6.

Opportunities for research:

7.

Balance in curriculum with respect to basic science, mathematics, engineering sciences, humanities and engineering design or analysis:

8.

Progression of courses from elementary to advanced, use of early training in later courses:

9.

Texts and lab. direction sheets:

10.

Plan of instruction - lectures, recitations, laboratory work, homework:

11.

Size of sections:

12.

Adequacy of facilities for work attempted:

i 13.

Quality of student work:

14.

Standards of grading:

15.

Major needs:

16.

Graduate work and research and its effect on the curriculum being evaluated:

17.

Enrollment - significant trends:

18.

==

Conclusions:==

19.

Recom:nendations on action on accreditation:

20.

Proposed state:nent to Institution:

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t CHECK LIST FOR REPORT ON EVALUATION OF (NAME OF INSTITUTION)

RE-SERVICE DEPARTMENT OF 1.

Persons consulted:

2.

Staff:

(a)

Academic qualifications:

(b)

Experience:

(c)

Research accomplishments:

(d)

Professional activity:

(e)

Attitude:

3.

Teaching loads:

4.

Opportunities for research:

5.

Adequacy of facilities for work attempted:

6.

Si:e of sections:

7.

Plan of instruction - lectures, recitations, laboratory work, homework:

8.

Subject : natter covered - fundarnental or descriptive, emphasis on understanding or manipulation:

9.

Adequacy for and attitude towards needs of engineering students:

10.

Texts used:

11.

Quality of student work:

12.

Standards of grading:

13.

Conclusions and recommendations:

Each of these reports :nust include a specific accreditation recommendation of the program for which the visitation team member was prima'rily responsible.

These accreditation recorn:nendations :nust be one of a range of accreditation actions specified by ECPD/ ABET, and can vary from "Recornmend accreditation for a full six year period" to " Recommend removal of accreditation /"show cause".

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4 The Visitation Team Chairman edits these reports into a coherent single report and sends it to the EE&A/EAC.

The Visitation Team Chairman then gives a verbal presentation to the EE& A/EAC and answers questions from members of that Committee. At this point, he or she is evidently an advocate for the position of the Visitation Team.

The EE& A/EAC then votes to establish its recornmendation on accreditation which is submitted to the BOD for its action. Then a preliminary program statement, positive or negative with reasons stated, is sent to the Chancellor / President of the university i

whose programs are under accreditation review to effect "due process" requirement and entitlement. The university can respond to this preliminary program staternent and this will be considered prior to final action of the BOD. A final, carefully edited statement announcing results of program accreditation reviews, with stated reasons for a negative judgment if that should be the case, is then transmitted to the university Chancellor / President.

III. NUCLEAR POWER OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM REVIEW l

A. Introduction Under date of September,1979, the published organization plan for the newly organizing Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) includes in its philosophy of operation the statement, "The philosophy of INPO is to... accredit training programs and certify instructors".

i l

It is believed that INPO is currently organizing its accreditation effort, and that it i

is therefore premature at this time to expect INPO to have de-eloped organizational j

characteristics of the type described earlier for ECPD/ ABET. It is also believed that it would be presumptuous, and Metropolitan Edison has agreed, for this Committee which has been selected by Metropolitan Edison to serva as an accreditation committee.

Accordingly, this Committee identified itself, again with concurrence of Metropolitan Edison, as a Review Committee for the TMI-I Operator Accelerated Retraining Program, I

l l

156

r but did follow as many as possible of the requirements and procedures described earlier in the ECPD/ ABET accreditation process.

Currently there exists no authori:ed parallel to COPA, ECFD/ ABET, its BOD or its EE& A/EAC with respect to nuclear plant operator training and/or retraining. Also, there are no accreditation criteria. But this Committee does recogni:e its similarity to.;

Visitation Team without portfolio, and therefore, its. opportunities to develop and utilize procedures that parallel the aforementioned ECPD/ ABET methodology where possible.

In this sense, then, this Committee's effor ts are a pioneering effort toward the development of a bona fide accreditation process for nuclear power operator training programs.

As a first step, this Committee established requirements in outline form for a GPU/ Metropolitan Edison internal self-evaluat.on. That outline follows:

B. Self-Evaluation Reeort

The Self-Evaluation Report should include the following information:

1.

Financial Picture of Organization (Annual Report) 2.

Financial Picture of Training Department (Budget) a.

Last 3 years b.

Future Projections 3.

Company Structure a.

Organi:ation b.

Communications and Feedback 4.

Training Department C'rgani:ation a.

Organization b.

Personnel (Including Qualifications) 5.

Training Programs a.

Scope (CRO, AO, OPS, RO, SRO, SF, SS, STA) b.

Objectives and Philosophy If information changed as a result of the 3/23/79 accident at TMI-1, provide both before and af ter information.

157

i l

6.

Facilities and Use Building Space (Classrooms, Labs, Library, Offices) a.

b.

Equipment -Including Simulator (Indicate Ownership) 7.

Admission Process a.

Entrance Requirements b.

Selection Criteria 8.

Programs to be Reviewed Program Description and Course Syllabi a.

b.

Resource Allocation c.

Schedule (Time of Day, Sequence of Courses, Instructors) d.

Auditing and Evaluation Procedures 9.

Future Plans Beyond OARP a.

Incorporation of OARP into Future Programs b.

New Directions 10.

Regulatory Requiren:ents & Met-Ed Responses a.

Current Rer Nns 10CFR55 b.

Reg Guide 1.s c.

ANS 3.1 d.

NUREG 0094 11.

Anticipated Requirements a.

Lessons Learned (NUREG 0578) b.

Lessons Learned (NUREG 0585) c.

Lessons Learned (NUREG 0660) d.

Draf t ANS 3.1 e.

Rogovin Report i

158

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.nr r T.. w s h :.)

[

'o.

UNITED STATES

[ g *, ( j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E

WASHINc TO N. O. C. 20555

\\. W.v/sl s %*

3

,., _,0

c ALL POWER REACICR APPLICAVIS AND LICENSEES Centlemen:

SUFJECr: QUALIFICATICNS CF REACIR CPGATCRS In a let er dated Septenber 13, 1979, w informed you of NRR requirements established as of that date based en cur review of de 'IMI-2 accident.

Sciosure 9 to the letter outlined the staff reccacendations ccccernkg i prwements in the area of cperator training for your inferratien.

Since that time, the Cmmission has acted en the staff recocmendaticns.

It is de pumose of this letter to set forth de revised criteria to be used by the staff in evaluating reactor operatcr training and licensing dat can be irplemented under the current regulations and to establish an effective date for deir innlementation.

Other criteria that will be established require additional staff -erk are also addressed.

Fc.ever, L clementation dates cannot be provided at this time.

Cm.J.ssien review in de area of cperator training and qualificacien is continuing and can be expected to result in additional criteria.

Finally, requirements will be established thrcugh rule aking proceedings.

)

Sciesure 1 details the revised criteria and the effective date for deir 1 olementaticn.

Ycur attentien is specifically directed to Sections A,

3 and C cf Encle:c.me 1 since dese call out new criteria that will be inclenented in de near future; derefore, your plans regarding trabing and licensing activities shculd be prccutly revised to confo=s to dese criteria.

Sciosures 2 and 3 provide guidance for establishing training progra=s in

. heat ransfer, fluid ficw and de: :cdmamics; and mitigating core da age.

Sciesure 4 details centrol manipulatices for recualificatien progrars.

i j

3ased en cur understanding of the industry's reascns for establishing the Institute of Nuclear ?cwr Oceratiens and cur reviea of de latest revisiens-to applicable ANSI standards, w believe ycu share cur desire to significantly upgrade the recuirements for operatiens perscnnel.

l 159 1

i I

~

?.erefore, we urge you to effect de i.plementation of de criteria _m.

seen as oracticable rather $an sait for de stated i::nla.mntaticn date.

Also, we urge you to _s_ tart planning for the long range recuire-nents so that dey any be rasidly 1::clemented upon cocpletien cf de rule nking procedure.

MNb i n Marold R. Anton, Directcr Office of Nuclear Reacter Regulation Fr. closures.

1.

Requiremnes for Reactor Operator Training and Licensing 2.

Traimng in Heat Transfer, Fluid Flow and 7.e:redynandes 3.

Traininsj; Criteria For Mitigating Core Damage 4

Centrol Manipulations l

l D**0

'T~

3-I WD D

U l

l l

1 160

l ECISGE 1 l

CRITERIA FCR REACICR OPEFj~CR l

B AINING AND LICESI!G A.

Eligibility Reg.:irements to be Administered an E.unfracion.

I 1.

Emerience*

Applicants for' senior cperator licenses shall have 4 a.

years of responsible pcwr plant experience. Responsible pcwer plant experience shculd be dat ebtained as a centrol recm cperator (fcssil or nuclear) er as a pcwer plant staff engineer involved in da day-to-day activities of the facility, c:xmencing with de fi:.al year of constructien.

A maximum of 2 years pcwer l

plant experience may be fulfilled by academic or i

l related technical traini:ug, en a one-for-one time basis. ?.c years shall be nuclear pcwer plant experience.

At least 6 :mnths of the nuclear pcwer plant excerience i

j shall be at the plant fer tich he seeks a license.

i l

Effective date:

Applications received en or after May 1, 1080.

l l

l

Precritical acplicants will be recuired to : met unique g:alificatiens designed to ace:rnedate the fact that their facility has not yet been in cperatien.

I 1

161

D"*D

D T

M o.

. 3.

_ L o;

b.

.,n L,eants ror sen,.cr operator.icenses 3.a n..ree c.c r.

cperator's license for '. year.

m Effective da:e:

Acplica:icns received after 2ece:ter 1, 1980.

2.

Training a.

Senior cpera:cr*:

Acplicants shall have 3 renths of shift training as an extra :.an en shift.

b.

Control rocm cperator*:

Amplicants shall have 3 cenths training en shift as an extra persen 5 the centrol rean.

Effective date:

Amplicaticns received aftar August 1,

t.o. 80.

c.

Training progrs: s shall be redified, as necessa9, :o f

provide:

1)

Training in heat transfer, fluid ficw and che:-c-dynamics.

2)

Trabing in the use of i. stalled plant systrs to centrol or nitigate an accident in which the core is severely damaged.

3)

Increased emr..hasis on reactor and clan:

ansients.

o ecri:ical app'ican s will ' e regiired :c eet uni:ue plificati.~ s desig.ed to accan ndate -he fact tha: their facility '...;.ot ye: 5.mn -.

-m 102

9 D

D aj\\jtn!b 10)

!d d u-

.e Effetive date:

hesent prega. s hxte been cdified in respense to Su'.le:1 s and C ders.

F.evised p cpa=s shculd be submi::ed for C' 3 review by August 1,1980.

d.

Trabing center and facility instruc:crs do teach systems, integated respenses, transient and si..ulater ccurses shall demons::sta their ec=etence :c SRC by successful ex=letica cf a senic: cpera c exa:-inatien.

Effective date:

Aoplications should be submitted no Iater than August 1,1980 fcr individuals *.c do not already hold a senior cperator license.

Inst =c crs shall be enre11ed in apprcpria:e regaal-e.

ificatien preps:s Oc assure they are cognizant of curent cperating histery, proble=s, and c'unges to

'h precedures and ahistrative li.rita:icns.

Effec:ive date:

Prepa=s shculd be ini:iated May 1, 1980.

Prepa=s shculd be submitted c CLS for review by Aug.se 1, 1980.

3.

.racili:v Certifications Certificatiens cc cleted cursuan: Oc Fections 55.10(a)(6) and 55.33a(4) and (5) of 10 CE Par: 55 shall be sip ed by the highes: level of corporate a:e.gement fer plant meratien (for e.u cle, ' lice hesident for Cperatiens).

163

1 l

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4 co p

g-

=

o A'A b

l-oo m

Effective date:

Applica:icns caccived en er af ter "ay '.,

1980.

1 3.

S'RC Exa:-inations 1.

Increased Sccce of Exa:-iratiens

(

a.

A new catescrf shall be added to the operator wi::en l

exas iratien entitled, "P-inciples of 'deat Transfer and Fluid N chanics."

b.

A new categorf shall be added to de senicr operator written exarriration enti: led,

'"heerf of Fluids and "Jtermodyn mics."

c.

Time limits shall be L posed for c:noletien of de witten exa."linaCiCCs.

1.

Operator:

9 hcurs.

~

2.

Senior Operator:

7 hcurs.

d.

"he passing pade for the written exa.-iratien shall be 30 overall and 700 in each categorf.

e.

All applicants for senior operatcr licenses shall he required Oc be ad::i.nistered an operating test as well as the written exa.iinaticn.

f.

Applicants will pant permission to NRC to inform their facilirf anagement regarding de results of the e:cm-inations for surpcses of enroll: rent in requalificatien programs.

Effective date:

Exrinatiens administered en er a':er 'ay 1, 1980 for items a.

thrcugh e.

Acplications received on or af:er ".,y 1, 1080 for Item f.

lha

e C.

Recualification ?rc7:r:s 1.

Content of de licensed cperator recualificarica progres shall be :rdified to include instruction in heat transfer, fluid flow, therredynamics and mitigation of accidents involving a degraded core.

Effective date:

ay 1, 1980.

2.

7.e criteria for recuiring a licensed individual to participate in accelerated requalificatien shall be ::rdified to be censistent with de new passing grade for issuance of a license; SO:

cverall and 70 each category.

Effective date: Ccncurrent with the nex: facility ad:dnistered arnual requalificatien examinaticn after de issue date of this letter.

3.

?:cgrams should be cdified to recuire de control esnipulations t

f listed in Enclosure 4 Nor::al centrol ranipulaticns, such as plant or reacter start:=s, :ust be perferred.

Centrol can-ipulations during abnor: al er emergency cperatiens cust be alked 6:cugh wid, and evaluated by, a me:ser of de training staff at a minirum.

An appropriate sirulater ray be used to satisfy the recuirements for centrol naniylaciens.

l l

l Effective date: Progra=s :cdified by August 3. 1980.

Renewal i

applications received after "cveder 1,

1980 us: ref'.ec:

cc:mliance with the preip cm.

In3

O h U;

-} U i uj f 6 0

D D

9f' 3 I

D.

U ne Ranze Criteria and/or Recuire.ents

~he follcwing require additicnal staff wrk and/cr rule-sing pric:

o their irrie untation.

1.

Cualificarices a.

Shift supervisors shall have an engineering degree or equivalent 9:alifications.

b.

Senior cperators shall have successfully cecple:ed a ecurse in acpropriate engineering and scien:ific subjec:

equal to 60 credit hcurs of college level subjects.

2.

Training a.

All applicants shall attend simulator traini.g progrc. s.

Required centrol

ranipulations and e.wrcises to be performed shall be the same for

" cold" and " hot" applicants.

b.

Eligibility requirements shall be developed for f.s::rxters, in addi:icn to dat listed in A.2 above.

3.

NRC.~xcinatices a.

NRC shall administer the certificatien ex.:::inaciens tha:

are presently administered at the.:cnclusien of de off-site portien of :he cold : raining pregers.

b.

All applicants shall be re7; ired to he ad;ninistered a si=ulater examination in additien to de..ritten exr-inations and plant oral tests.

c.

NRC shall administer the requalificacica prog r annual e.u::inatien.

un

4 F

i 4

Recualification Preerams

/dl licensees shall ' participate in siculater programs as part of the requalification programs. Centrol manipulations shall be performed pursuant to inclosure 4

'l b

167

3 DCDSt3E :

TRAINING IN HF.C JN:SFG, REID RlM A2:0 ~'8820DY"MICS l.

Basic Precerties of Fluids and Matter.

This secticn shculd ::ver a basic introduction to t atter and its properties.

This section shculd include such cencepts as tecperaere measurements and effects, densirf and its effects, specific wight, bacyancy, visecsity and oder prcperties of fluids.

A wrking k.cwledge of stea:n tables shculd also be included.

Energy ::cvecent shculd be discussed beluding such f:.r.damentals as hea:

.pecific heat, latent heat of vapcrizatien and sensible heat.

exchange, 2.

Fluid Statics.

This section should cover de pressure, ter=ersere 2nd volt.me effects en fluids.

Fxarole of dese pararetric changes shculd he illustrated by the instractor and related calculations shculd be perfcr ed by the students and discussed 6 de aining sessicns.

Causes and effects of pressure and tecperature changes in the varicus cc penents and system should be discussed as applicable to the facilirf wid particular eq>hasis on saferf significant features.

"he characteristics of fcree l

and pressure, pressure in 1:..qu:.ds at rest, pr:.nc:.ptes c:. hyc.rau cs, sacration pressure and tecperature and subeccling should also be Sciuded.

3.

Fluid Dvnamics.

~his secticn should cover de ficw of fluids and such concepts as Bernculli's prbeiple, energy in :mving fluids, ficw ruasure theerf and devices and cressure lesses due to friction and crificing.

Other concepts and terr:s to be discussed in this section are NPSH, carrf 1

cver, carry under, kinetic energy, head-loss relaticnships and tw phase 168

ficv f= cit entals.

? 2c:ical applica:icns rela:i.g :c de reac:cr ecolan systen and s:ca:t generatcrs shculd aise he Ecluded.

4 Mea: Transte by Ccndactien. Ccnvecticn a.d Fadiarien.

~his sectica shculd ccver de fr.danen:als cf hea: ransfer by ecndac-ices. ~his sec:icn shculd include diseassi=s en such c=cepts and ta=s as specific heat, heat f1tec and atoc:ic acticn.

Hea: transfer charac: eristics of feel reds and heat exc' angers shculd be included b :his secticn.

~his secticn shculd cever de fe?mtals cf hea transfer by cen-vection. Leral and forced cir=latien shculd be discussed as a:clicable tc de varicus systec:s at de facilief.

2 e ccnvection cr en: patte=s created by expand 6g fluids 6 a cenfbed area shetald be Scluded in dis sec:icn. Hea: ::ansecr: and fluid ficw reducticns er s:cppage sh 21d be disee.ssed de.e :: s ea:n and/or ncnc=densible gas ferr:atien dri-nc=:a1 and accident conditiens.

l I

.i Bis secticn shculd ccver de f=damentals of hea: ransfer by de=al i

t radia:icn in de fc= cf radian energy. ~he ele: rec:agne:ic energy ed.:ed by a bc6 as a result of its temeraere shculd be dis =ssed and f

illustrated by $e use of egaatiens and sa cle calcula:i=s. Cecra'risens shculd be ade of a black bedf abscrier and a size bc6f er:i::er.

l I

i 5.

C anze of Base - Scilinz.

~his secticn shculd include descriptics of de state of :st:er, deir inherent characteristics and de=rdy-.a:-ic preter-ies such as endalpy and entrcpy.

Calculaticns shculd be perfc=ed involving stea:n cualief and veid fracti= precerries.

~he rjees l

l IW

of boiling shculd be discussed as applicable to de faci'i-/ bri.;

nor al evolu:icns and accident condi:icns.

6.

Su = cut and Ficw Instabili:v.

This section shculd ccver descrip:icns and rechanisms for calculating such ter=s as critical flux, critical pcwr, Ot3 ratio and hot channel factors.

This section shculd also include instruccices for preventing and renitoring fc clad or fuel damage and ficw instabilities.

Samle cale.:1ations shculd be illusc a:ed by de instructor and calculatiens should be perforred by the st2. dents and dise.:ssed in de training sessiens. Methods and procedr es for using de plant ccrouter to deterriine cuantitative values of varic.:s fac:crs 6 ming plant cperatien and plant beat balance dete=inations shculd also be ccvered in this section.

7.

Reac:cr Heat Transfer Limits.

mis secticn shculd include a discussion of heat transfer limits by cumining fuel rod and reacecr design and limitatiens.

~he basis fer the limits shcu'.d be ccvarad in $1s see:ica l

along with recceended nethods to enscre that IL-its are net appreased or exceeded.

This section shculd cover discussiens of pesi.; fac::rs, l

radial and axial pcw: distributiens and changes cf these fac:crs due :0 1

1 the influence of other variables such as cdera:Or tercerature, xencn and centrol red positicn.

m M 9'%

19 x

i 1

170 L

a Suggested

References:

l i

Collier, J. G. Convec,tien Sciline and Cende isatien.

New Yc k:

McGrra-Mill, 1972.

Eckert, E. R. G. and Drake, R. M., Jr. Analvsis of Feat and Mass Sar.sfer.

New Y :k: McGraw-Hill, 1973.

E14?akil, M. M. Nuclear Feat Transoort.

Scranten, PA:

Inten.ational, 1971.

Gebhart, 3.

Feat Transfer.

5d ed. New Yc:k: McGree-Hill, 1971.

M:eney, D.

Mechanical Engineering 3er cdvnamics.

Prentice

Hall, 1953.

)

l l

17!

s D:CLOSLE 3 TRAINING CRITTJ FCR MITIGATING C:RE DM%GZ A program is to be developed to ensure that all cperating personnel are training in the use of installed plant systems to control er mitigate an accident in Jiich the core is severely damaged.

he training program should include de follcwing tcpics.

A.

Incore Inst unentation 1.

Use of fixed or :n:vable incere detectors to determi..e extant m core

~

da age and geometry changes.

2.

L'se of therrocet. ales in determining peak tenceratures; :nethods fer extended range readings; methods for direct readi.gs at ta=inal junctions.

3.

Pethods for calling up (printing) incere data fran de plant ccmouter.

l t

i 3.

Excore !belear Inst: antation (NIS) 1.

Use of NIS for deter-ination of void for:atier.: void locaticn basis for NIS response as a function of core te:=eratures and densi y changes.

C.

Vital Insert.uncation l

1.

Inst:.=untation respense in an accident envircament; failure secuence l

l (time to failure, method of failure); indicaticn reliability (ac ual l

vs indicated level).

172

2.

Alter: ative rechods for masuring ficws, pressures, levels, and te=eratures.

Ceterdnatien of pressuriser level if all level transminers a.

fail.

b.

Ceterdnation of letdesn flow with a clogged filter (Icw ficw).

Deterndnation of cther Reactor Coolant System parameters if the c.

prirary method of reasurenunt has failed.

D.

Pri arr Otemiserv 1.

Fxpected cherris=y results with severe core damage; consecuences of ansferring small gaantities of ligaid cutside centai:rnent; i=crtance of using leak tight systems.

2.

F2pected isoccpic breakdo-n for core danage; for clad damage.

3.

Corresten effects of extended i.uersien in primary water; time to failure.

T.

%diatien !'enitoring 1.

Respense of Process and Area l'cnitors to severe damages; behavicr of detectors een saturated; method for detecting radiatica readings by direct masure ent at detector output (overranged detector); expected accuracy of detectors at different locatiens; use of detectors to l

determine extent of core da age.

i 2.

Methods of deterr:ining dose rate inside centainrent frem ruasurerents taken cutside centairr:ent.

t t

a F.

Cas Ce.eration

~

1.

"otheds of generatien during an accident; other scurets of gas (Xe, Ka); techniques for venting or disposal of ncn-cend.insibles.

2.

M flam ability and explosive limi:; sources of 0 in containment er 2

2 Reacter Ccolanc System.

L w

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174

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A i

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ro.s myb.s o.. ~t. u...o,-s =g.

w.

4. -

.*.e..

2.e ic11 wing c= ::1 Sanipulati=s and plant evclu:i=s *.ere a:plicable to de plan: design are acceptable for vre:1.g de reactivi:7 cent::1 arl ula-

icns regaired by A:pendix A, Paragraph 3.7. cf 10 CFR Par: 55. Be s arred i:ecs shall be perf =ed en an at: ual basis; all cder 1:ers shall be perferred en a rc-year cycle.

Fcsever, the rece.alificatien preg a s shall cen:ain a c:cr::iren: da: each individual shall peric= c: participa:e in a 4

c=hinati:n cf reac:ivity c=t::1 :anipulatiens based en :he availabili y cf plan: equiprent ar.d syst es.

Sese con:::1 ranipula-icts

.16 are n.0:

perf.- ed at de plan:. ay be per#:=ed en a sf.-.21ater. Be use cf de " ec'.r -*'

d Specifica:i.~.s shculd be wxi..ized dri g de si ulater con:::1 anipulaticns.

Persc=e1 wi-h senic: li.:enses are credi:ed wi-h dese ac:ivi:ies if dey direc: c: evaluate cen: 01 : anipula:icns as dey are perfer ud.

.;?./L?./12

(1)

?! ant c: reae::: scare s

c ine'.ude a tr.ze da: reactivi:.r feedbad f:cm nuclear hea: addi:i= is nc:iceable r.d heae:: rate is established.

(2)

Plant s? u: dew..

(3)

.".z aal c=c: 1 of s:er. 3enera::rs r.d/c feed ater durirs s.arr.::

and sh.::dcw..

(4)

Scratien and er dilutien during pmer c:eratien.

(5) k.r siz.nifican: ( > 101) *cw: ch r.ges in anual ::d cent::1 ::

r

.e,a

,,a.;. n m. w.

(6)

Anv. react::

c.>er danz.e of 10; c: z ea:a: dere '. cad c M 2e is

.e '~. =^

- ' '. '..c.A ~'.'. ~.~....'.~.~..'.a..-=

~~., <. -a..=...-=..

u.

. ca.?

. ~. '. ' a-. ~ ~

?., a.

!..^,~.. *..D...

D""D fj' S

L oo a

(7) 2ss of coolan: includ'.ng:

~

1.

si nifican: ?<.3 steam genera:cr leaks 5

2.

inside and cu side pri:a:f cen:ai. en:

3.

large and s: all, f..cluding leak-rate de:e=.atica 4

sacrated Reac:cr Coolan: respctse (?a2).

(3)

Icss of instrrent air (if sirula:ed plan: specific).

(9)

Icss of electrical pc a (and/c dag aded sewer scur:es).

(10) kss cf core coolan: ficw/na: ural circula:icn.

(11)

Icss of condenser vac rn.

(12) kss of service water if reqdred for safety.

(13) kss of shutdewn cooling.

(14) bss of czpenent cocling system er ecoli.g :: an 1.dividu.21 cer=ccent.

(15)

Oss of ec=al faedsater or non al feed.:ater sys:a: failure.

(16) kss of all feedsater (nor al and emergency).

(17)

7. css of protec:ive sys:em channel.

(13)

"ispcsitiened cer. trol rod or reds (cr red d::ps).

l l

(19) nabili:v. :: drive centrol reds.

(20)

Candi:icns regdring use of energency horatien or s:anc:7.:.gic control system.

(21)

Fuel cladding failure er Sigh activirf in reactc: c clan: c:

ff as.

3 (22)

Turbine or generator :-ip.

(23)

Falfr.cticn of au:cratic control system (s) which affec: reactiviry.

(24)

"alfunc:icn of reac:cr ecolant pressure / volt-e cen:rol sys:em.

(25)

Reac:or trip.

(26)

'ain stea= '.i.e ':re s (inside or outside centai: nen:).

(27)

Nuclear ins:- rentatica failure (s).

170

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APPENDIX C 3 3 W I?AltilliG COUP,SES USED BY FiET-ED i

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' New Plant Operator Training /01.

l New p'. ant operator training provides utility perronnel with the training necessary to become reactor plant 3

operators. This program has been certified by the a

Nuclear Regulatory Commission to meet all pre-i M *:4 p.,,74 requisites for the " cold" license operators to support 7 5.,.

l The complete program consists of five different

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, an ininal plant start.up.

I courses, designed as a package to fulfill current NRC f g \\.

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" cold" operator license requirements. Included are

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courses in basic nuclear theory, observation exper.

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w the-job training. The complete program leading to a bo l "ble, or B&W can provide only those courses neces.

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cold" licensing of new operating personnelis avail.

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start.up.

p Basic Nuclear Theory /01-A

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f This course provides the basic information neces-g a, if

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s, sazy to qualify as a nuclear power plant operator.

Successful completion provides the prospective N \\,i _

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N operator with a foundation in engineering and N '

l physics. This enables him to later pursue the phases perform a minimum of ten start-ups each. Addition-of instruction covenng operations, construction' teen, nical specifications and plant operations under al laboratory experience will be provided in hedth normal and abnormal conditions. The course is physics and instrumentation.

given in two parts - a lecture series anc a laboratory Duration:

Two weeks

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Class Size: 6 l Lectures series Location:

Lynchburg Research Center i Prospective nuclear pow 2r plant operators are Typical course content j provided a basic foundat;on in nuclear engineering, I reactor and nuclear phy',tes.

Experience will cover: control rod calibraticn;

! Otfration: Ten wee'.<s E **' di'*#iD"ti " * ***"#** *"t* 3 i"##'*** ""l ?'i cation with rods and fuel; detection systems.'i 3.c Class Size: 24 health physics; and reactivity effects.

Location:

Customer's site or Lynchburg, Virginia Plant Operation Observation /01-E i

Typical course content This course familiarizes operators, not possessing

' Subjects covered include: atomic and reactor nuclear plant experience, with an actual facility physics; heat transfer and flow; introduction to similar to the one they will be operating. The course

! nuc! ear instrumentation; and health physics, shield.

ts conducted at an operating PWR piant and com.

ing and radiation safety.

F,,r rnore information contact vour nearmt MW f Critical facility laboratory Sdl". O*c""' Mdad*" 8"'ai PrAuns and S.m e Marketin:. Nuclea r l'o wer Genera mn Divmon.

. Trainees will operate the B&W pool reactor in at l r.ynchburg. v,\\ c ar,os or phone imii u s.:t :1.

I least three different core configurations and wil!

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.m bines operation observations with study of the Aa examination similar to NRC examination.(

nuclear systems under the supervision of a full-is given by experienced B&W staff members to time B&W coordinator. It is designed to partia!!y determine student elicbility for certification of satisfy Nuclear Regulatory Commission require-satisfactory program completion.

ments concerning practical, experience and t provide the trainee with insights mto actual plant Nuclear Steam Systems /01-D operation and procedures.

This course provides a detai!ed description of NSS B&W's full time coordinator will schedule classes, components and the functions of the operator's conduct instmetion, validate and sign-off preplan-plant. A series of lectures covers the system and its ned progr:un check-lists, generate necessary docu.

operation, and allows personnel to study the de-mentation and genera!Iy ensure that the trainees tailed charactenstics of major components, auxiliary become familiar with operations both inside and and control systems.

outside of the control room.

Duration:

Four weeks Duration:

Eight weeks Class Size: 21 C! ass Size: S Location:

Customer's site or Lynchburg Training Location:

Operating PWR power plant Center Simulator Operations /01-C Typical course content The course consists of prectical inst:uction on the full-scale, B&W PWR simulator, related classroom Trainees are instructed on the design details of the instruction and individual study time. When com.

Nuclear Steam Supply System including the primar/

bined with Plant Operation Observation /01 B. The coolant system and components: once-through studant will fulfill the practical experience require.

steam generator: auxiliary, secondary, fuel handling, men t for " cold" license eligibility in accordance instrumentation, and control systems. Safety analy-with NRC regulations Title 10, Part 55.

si: and basic water chemistry presentations are The program censists of two weeks ofinstruction pr vided.

"in the classroom, five weeks of PWR simulator and

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one week of NRC-type written and operational On-The-Job Training /01-E examinations.

This course provides on site supervision of operator training during the pre-operational and hot func-Duration:

Eight weeks tional testing, in precaration for " cold" license Class Size: Groups of 3 examination. Dunng t'his pened, a resident B&W Location:

Lynchburg Training Center training coordinator, knowledgeable in design and operation of the nuclear plant, will work on site Typical course content to assist the plant supenntendent in estabikhing and I

conducting an effective predicense during the final Trainees are instructed in the control room in phase of operating.;taff trar.ing. Iris responsibilities groups of three, with every student operating the include: scheduling; maintainmg training records:

simulator at each of the three operating positions.

conducting evaluations; nasistin;; in development of Emphasis is on operational onentation with the lesson plans; wntme reports: assisting the review and trainee concentrating on learning the basic plant preparation for NRC " cold" license examinations; operations, casualty procedures, performing assigned assisting in developing the plant training program.

evolutions and handling imposed casualities. Lec-conducting oral and wa:k.tnrough examinations.

tures reviewing plant systems from an operational and functional viewpoint are used to supplement Duration:

Approximately 10 months simulator operation. Plant operating procedures Class Size: 24 are presented as a planned sequence coinciding Location:

Customer's site I

with actual operations on the simulator.

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l Replacement OperatorTraining/03 During this program students gain a practical under-standing of plant operations by operating 3&W's

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PWR Simulator. The course is divided between the L

classroom (40 hours4.62963e-4 days 0.0111 hours 6.613757e-5 weeks 1.522e-5 months ) and the simulator (40 hours4.62963e-4 days 0.0111 hours 6.613757e-5 weeks 1.522e-5 months ).

The course instruction consists of classroom discus-

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exercises on the simulator. The simulator exercises I g;.g are designed to provide the student with experience I[.

g in controlling normal and emergency plant evolutions

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including emphasis on Integrated Control System N i' Y

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operation. The course also includes an NRC. type

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startup examination on the simulator. Certification is made to the sponsoring utility's management for

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Class Size: Groups of 3 9 b?

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Typical schedule 5

Day 1 Introduction Day 7 Control panels Engineered safety features actuation system review.

Stan-up procedures Reactor coolant system leaks.

f Reactorc:iticality Reactor coolant pump and/or feedwater pump trips.

Day 2 Day 8 Reactivity balance calculations Steam leaks, turbine by-pass valve and feedwater i

' Plant shutdown (hot shutdown to 25% power) sub-system operation.

Plant start-up (hot shutdown to 25% power with Turbine by-pass valve and feedwater sub-system turbine-generator in operation) failure.

Day 3 Day 9 Technical specifications related to start up.

Control rod drive operation.

Power operations and major malfunctions.

Control rod drive malfunction and instrument Day 4 Review of start-up procedure.

Day 10 Reactor start-up practice.

Review and power operation with unannounced casualties.

Day 5 i Start up examination.

For more information contact your nearest R&W l

Sales OITice or Manager. Special Products and %rvwa f

I Day 6 Marketing. Nuclear Power Generation Division.

l Manual / automatic ICS power operation including Integrated control systems (ICS) operation.

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turbine and reactor trips.

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Tra..ining services

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y Simulator Requalification Training /04 The Simulator Requalification Training program provides assistance to the utility's training staff to help meet operator on-the-job requirements for an O

operator requalification program as defined by NRC

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l Regulation 10CFR55, Appendix A.

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The procam includes a review of recent abnormal n

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occurrences applicable to B&W plant operations as

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N i well as a review of the utility's abnormal and emer-gency procedures. Instruction consists of 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months

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cf practical exercises on the B&W simulator and 20

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hours of classroom instruction.

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F.ive Days c%:.,

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' Day 1

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W pa-r Introduction Review of procedures: reactor start-up and control-6 i

i rod dnve operation.

Day 4 l Controlroom orientation.

Reveiw of procedures-reactor trip, turbine trip, l Practical exercise: plant s'. art-up (from all rods in steam nipture.

j to 20% power).

Review of selected transients and plant response.

Day 2 Practical exercise:

power operations, manual l

,i Review of procedures:

Jeneral power operations.

integrated control system operations, instrumentat-I i n failures.

Integrated control system review.

Control-rod drive mah' unctions.

Day 5 j

Review plant response to selected non-nuclear l Review of operating curves and limits.

instrumentation failures.

Practical exercise: plant start-up (17. shutdown to 100re power), integrated control system operation Review of safety analysis and reactor protective in auto and manual, control rod drive malfunctions.

system setpoints.

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Practical exercise:

pov.vr op-r:'tions, manual integrated control system operations. instrumen-l Day 3 tation failures.

t Review of technical specifications.

I Evaluation of leak rates.

l Practical exercise: reactor coolant system rupture, l ror n nr information eintact your n. arest IM W i

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k-steam generator 'ube-leaks.

Sales Ollio or Wna:;er. Sweral l'rnduct,. and S ervice

'.!a rketin.:. We'e t r l'ower (;e > oration Divivon.

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ML19340D688

Contents

Text

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

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References:

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