ML19263D241
| ML19263D241 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Green County  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1979 |
| From: | Engel D NEW YORK, STATE OF |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19263D239 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7903260350 | |
| Download: ML19263D241 (5) | |
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s UNITED STATES OF AMERICA O
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
_______________________________________x In the Matter of POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE Docket No. 50-549 0F Nn? YORK (Greene County Nuclear Power Plant)
_______________________________________x STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF DEC's INTERROGATORIES TO NRC STAFF Pursuant to 10 CFR $2.720 (h), the Department of Environmental Conservation requests the NRC Staff answer the attached interrogatories no later than March 14, 1979, in accordance with the Joint Order of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board and Judge Cohen issued January 5, 1979, and the motion of DEC to file such interrogato'ies out of time.
r These interrogatories are submitted directly to NRC Staff (through its counsel), and to the Chairman of the Safety and Licensing Board as Presiding Officer pursuant to 10 CFR $2.720(h)(2)(ii).
700326025550
. Answers to these interrogatories are necessary to a proper decision in this proceeding and are not reasonably obtainable from any cource ot.her than the NRC Staff.
The interrogatories seek information regarding the investiga-tions, analyses, and conclusions made with respect to or set forth in the Final Environmental Statement Related to Construction of Greene County Nuclear Power Plant, NUREG -
0512 (January 1979) ("FES").
The FES was issued by the NRC Staff on February 9, 1979, and NRC Staff is best qualified to provide information regarding its content.
No other source can provide the necessary information as to how NRC Staff conducted its investigations and analyses.
Dated:
February 27, 1979 Respectful 1y submitted, David A. Engel Senior Attorney New York State Department of Environmental Conservation 50 Wolf Road Albany, New York 12233 (518) 457-3550 cc:
All Parties
INTERROGATORTES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION TO NRC STAFF 1.
Referring to FES pages 4 4-12 and 4-50, staff recommendation 4.5.2-1, what is the basis for re-quiring the monitoring of phosphates in the discharge of low-volume wastes?
Has a limitation been determined for phosphate which would require recycling for treatment to reduce phosphates concentrations or cessation of discharge?
2.
What is the source of the flush waters and chemicals that will be diluted and treated in sediment detention basin?
(a)
Quantify their flow rates and chemical concentrations.
(b)
What type of treatment will be provided for these waste streams?
3.
The FES indicates that the applicant has made a committment to terminating dredging operations whenever the suspended solids approach an undesirable level (page 4-49, Item 16) and when monitoring for suspended solids at the dredging site in the Hudson River indicates levels of 50 mg/l or higher (page 4-49, Item 29).
(a)
Does the suspended solids concentration refer to that instream resulting from dredging or that resulting in the discharge from the dredge sediment detention basin?
(b)
Has the applicant committed to a cessation of opera-tions should the upstream suspended solids concentrations at a distance.of 200 feet be. increased by an amount greater than 15 ppm?
(c)
At what distance from dredging operations and at what frequency is the applicant proposing to monitor suspended solids concentration?
4.
Referring to FES page 5-49, NRC staff concluded that the Hudson River will experience no measurable adverse effects from the discharge of sewage.
Has staff evaluated the surface discharge of sewage during construction at a
location which will be near to the applicant's temporary makeup-water intake?
,. 5.
Has NRC staff evaluated the effects on aquatic biota from the discharge of hydrazine and m.orpholine from auxiliary boiler blowdown when it is surface dis-charge from the permanent sediment detention basin during construction?
If so, please provide the results of such analysis.
6.
Referring to FES Section 2.4 Geology, is the detailed discussion of the geological features to be included in the staff's Safety Evaluation Report an indication that NRC staff's primary interest is in the impact of geological materials and processes upon the construction and operation of the plant rather than the impacts which the plant could have upon these earth resources?
7.
Referring to FES Section 2.5.2 Groundwater; (a) does NRC staff recognize where recharge and where discharge of groundwater occurs on the site?
(b) were these different areas considered in the evaluation of groundwater impacts?
(c) was groundwater considered as an avenue for surface water contamination rather than merely as a water supply resource?
8.
Please explain the second sentence of FES Section 4.22, in particular the meaning of the term "the impervious estuary."
9.
With reference to FES page 11-3 in -response to the comments of USDOI (A-53) regarding water use; (a) does NRC staff believe that~ the absence of "downgradient groundwater users" precludes the need to monitor groundwater quality during plant operation?
(b) what is the be. sis for this opinion?
(c) what role would site groundwater conditions play in transmitting to the Hudson River toxic material that may be spilled on site?
~
. 10.
Referring generally to the analysis at FES pages 9-55, 56, 57 and 58, has the NRC staff prepared any photo-graphs, with or without the superimposition of cooling towers and plume, that depict the view towards Athens from any point along the Escarpment Trail such as Newmans Ledge, North Point, Sunset Rock, Artists Rock or the site of the Catskill Mountain house?
If so, please provide such photographs.
11.
Has NRC staff drawn any conclusions concerning visual impacts associated with the overlooks of Newmans Ledge and North Point with regard to the Athens alternative?
12.
Referring to FES page 8-6, please provide three (3) ceptes of the "Chern" Report, "Regicnal Econometric Model for Forecastine Electricity Demand by Sector and State", ORNL/NUREG-49, and all studies, including computations, analyses, worksheets and explanatory material related to the forecasts for PASNY and New York State load (peak and energy).
e e
February 1979 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY THE Of f ifE OF NUCLEAR REAC10R REGULA110N U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM rs NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-338 AND 50-339 7 0.3 %
79032603 D
TABLE OF CONTENTS PAqE 1.
INTR 00UCil0N.
I FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS.
2 A.
Water Supply System.
2 B.
Water Suppression jstems.
2 C
Gas Fire Suppression Systems.
3 0
F ire Detection Systems.
4 111.
01HER IIEMS RELATING TO THE FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM.
6 A.
Fire Barriers and Fire Barrier Penetrations.
6 B.
Fire Doors and Dampers.
6 IV.
v IRE PROTECTION FOR SPECIFI" AREAS.
7 A
ablo Vault and Tunnel Area.
/
B amponent Cooling Pump Area.
8 C.
Fire Protection Inside Containment.
8 D.
Other Plant Areas.
9 V.
ACMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS.
10 VI.
IlCHNICAL SFLCIf! CATIONS.
Il Vil (NVIRONMfNTAL CONSIDERATIONS.
12 Vill CONC L USIONS.
13
O LIST OF TABLES PAGE TABLE 1 - F1RE PROTECTION SYSTEMS MODIFICATIONS SCHEDULE.
15
1.
INTR 0n'ICT10N Our init i. I evaluation of the fire protection system for the North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, was presented in the North Anna Safety Evaluation Report which w<,s issued in June 1976. At that tilne we concluded that the fire protection system met Criterinn 3 of the General Design Criteria and was, therefore,
.ureptable.
Subsequently, we issued revised guidelines for fire protection programs in Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, " Guidelines fer Fire Protec tion f or Nuclear Plants," dated August 23, 1976. As a result, we requested the licensen to perform a reevaluation of the fire protection system and a fire hazards analysis, including a comparison with the guidelines in Appendix A to Branch lechnical Position APCSB 9.5-1.
On April 1, 19 5, the licensee submitted information regarding its fire protection procram in response to our rec h t.
Additional information was submitted by the licensee on December 15, 1977, January 2, 1918 and September 29, 1978 in response to our requests for information re.ulting from our review of the fire protection program. In addition to our review of all the information submitted by the licensee, we made a visit to the North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, to discuss any potential fire hazards that could exist at the plant and, where appropriate, to evaluate the design features and protection systems provided to minimize those hazards.
The pur pose of this report is to present the results of our evaluation of the fire protection program for the North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, which are summarized in the following sections. This evaluation is also being presented in support of an imandment to facility Operating License No. NPF-4 for Unit 1 of the North Anna Power Station. The operating license for Unit 2 will also address this matter. Our review of the fire protection program included an evaluation of the type of automatic and manually-operated water and gas fire suppression systems, the fire detection systems, fire barriers, fire doors and dampers, fire protection administrative controls, fire brigade training, and plant fire protection technical specifications. Since Unit 1 and Unit 2 are of the ss e design, the comments made in this report apply to both units, except where noted.
1
II.
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS A
Water Supply system The water s gply system is common to both units and includes a motor-driven pump and a diesel engine-driven pump. Each pump is capable of delivering 2,500 gallons per minute at a head of 143 pounds per square inch and 117 pounds per square inch, respectively. The system also includes a 75 gallon per minute pressure maintenance pump (jockey pump), a yard loop with sectionalizing post-indicator isolation ses, and two separate water supply sources, i.e., Lake Anna and the service va water reservoir.
The ffre pumps take their suction from separate water supply sources. The fire pumps are located in separate fire protection pump houses and the pump installa-tions are in accordance with the guidance in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard No. 20, " Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps." Separate alarms, which monitor pump running, drive availability or failure to start, are provided in the control room for the fire pumps. The power supply associated with the control signal, which starts the fire pumps automatically, is supplied by the Class IE station battery system.
A sir.gle fire pump can supply the largest fire water demand for either unit, namely, the automatic wet pipe sprinkler system in the turbine building plus flow for two hose stations.
We hive reviewed the water supply system and conclude that the system meets the guidelines of Appe1 dix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 and is, therefore, acceptable.
B.
Water Suppression Systems lhe water suppression systems consist of the sprinkler, xed foam and standpipe systems.
The automatic / manual sprinkler systems and the hose stations each have a separate water supply connection to the site water supply system. The sprinkler and stand-pipe system supply header have redundant feed connections with Underwriters laboratories / factory Mutual approved isolation valves. Actuation of any of these systems will cause a fire pump to operate and initiate a pump running signal to the runtrol room.
Additionally, the automatic sprinkler systems have a water f!v alarm device attached.
2
lhe design and installation of the automatic sprinkler systems, such as the wet sprinkler system, the preaction sprinkler systems and the deluge and water spray systems, are in accordance with the guidance of NFPA Standard Nc. 13, " Instal'a-tion of Sprinkler Systems," and NFPA Standard No. 15. " Water Spray Fixed System."
Manual hose stations are located throughout t%s plant or will be installed to assure that an effective hose stream can be directed to any safety-related area in the plant. These systems are consistent with the requirements of NFPA Standard No.
" Standpipe and Hose Systems," for sizing, spacing, and pipe support requirements.
Areas that have been or will be equipped with automatic water suppression systems are; (1) Cable vault and tunnel,*
(2) Component cooling water pump areas,*
(3) Auxiliary boiler and service builJing warehouse, (4) Turbine building, (5) Miin transformers, (6) Cooling towers, (7) Turbine oil room, (8) Records room, (9) Water house No. 2, and (10) Station service t ansformers.
A manually-actuated, fixed foam system is installed for the aboveground nonsafety-related fuel oil tank and is designed in accordance with the require-ments of rifPA standard No. 11, " Foam Extinguishing Systems." The two 50,000 gallon safety related oil storage tanks are underground and do not pose a potential fire problem.
We hive reviewed the design criteria and bases for the water suppression systems and cnnclude that these systems meet the guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 and are, therefore, acceptable. Until the commi;ted suppression systems are installed and operational, we find that the licensoe's improved administrative procedures for control of combustibles and ign: tion sources, and the fire brigade training, provide adequate protecti(n a,;iinst a fire occurring in these areas. These areas have detection systems to provide an alarm i, the event of a fire, and manual fire fighting equipment is available.
C t;as iire Suppression Sys* ems the ya, fire suppression systems consist of the carbon dioxide systems and Halon systems.
ShprIREler systems to be installed - see target schedule in Table 1.
3
lot il flooding carbon dinxide systems are installed for the following h.eas:
(1) Ul>le vault and tunnel, (2) Nor mal switchgear room, (3) Emera ncy diesel generitor rooms, and (4) f uel oil pump house, rooms 1 and 2.
Inadvertent actuation of a carbon dioxide system will not af fect safety-related
- systems, The diesel generators are air cooled and take their combustion air and
.ooling air direc tly f rom each room. Therefore, the carbon dioxide system for e.ich diesel generator room is interlocked so that it will not automatically actuate when an emergency diesel generator is running. However, these carbon dioxide systems can be manually actuated.
A totil ffooding Halon system is provided for the new records room, which is not
..f e t e r elated.
An underfloor !!alon system is provided for the control room.
For this system, the dei nered Halon concentration, when activated, is six percent and is to F held for 10 minutes. The system has the capability for two separate and redundant discharges of Halon. System ' -us I. ave verified that the concentration and duration recorded were in excess of the design criteria.
1he carbon di; wide and Halon suppression systems are designed in accordance with the guidelines ut NFPA Standard No. 12, " Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems,"
and NFPA Standard No. 12A, "Halogenated Fire Extinguishing Agent Systems." Based on our review of the design criteria and bases for these fire suppression systems, we conclude that these systems satis (v the provisions of Appendix A to Branch lechnical Positinn APCSB 9.5-1 and are, therefore, acceptable.
O, F ire Detection Systems ihr fire detection systems consist of the detectors, associated electrical power supplies, and the annunciation panels. The two types of detectors used at the North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, are ionization (products of combustion) and thermal (heat sensors). The fire detection systems give an audible and visual alarm, and also annunciate in the control room. Local, audible and/or visual alarms are also provided. Both types of detectors for the fire detection systems are connected to the or.ergency power supply.
Areis that have been or will be equipped with fire detectors are as follows:
(1) Reactor containment,*
(2) Control room (including underfloor),*
'Eliitional detectors to be installed - see target schedule in Table 1.
4
( 1) Cable vault and tunnel, (4) Normal switchgear room, (5) futtery room,
( f. ) tmergency diesel generator room,
(/) luel oil pump house, rooms 1 and 2, (8) Records rooms, (9) Motor generator set house, (10) Spillway gate centrol house, and (11) Auxiliary building.
Itv licensee will survey the control room to verify detector location with respect to sentilation air flow. At our request, the licensee agreed to install additional smoke detectors or each level of the auxiliary t'uilding. These detectors are in addition to the ventilation duct fire detectors.
five detert on systems have been or will be installed in accordance with the i
1he guidelines 01 NF PA Standard No. 720, " Installation, Maintenance and Use of Proprietary Protection Signalling Systems.
We have reviewed the fire detection systems to assure that fire detectors are Mequat + to provide detection and alarm of fires that could occur. We have also r eviewed the f ire detection systems' daign criteria to assure that they conf orm to the applicable sections of NFPA Stardard No. 72D. We conciude that the design and installation of ths fire detection systems, coupled with the additional detectors to be installed, meet the guidelines of Appendix A to B,unch Technical l'osition APC'3B 9.5-1 and are, therefore, acceptable.
5
!!!. OlHIR IIIMS REL ATING TO THE STATION FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM A.
Iire Barriers and Fire Barrier Penetrations All floors, walls and ceilings enclosing fire areas are rated at a minimum of three-hour fire ratings. The licensee has provided documentation to substantiate the f ire rating of the three-hour penetration seals used in the penetrat..'ns for cat 21 e trays, conduits and piping. Based on our review, we conclude that.he fire barriers and barrier penetration, provided, or to be provided, are in accordance with the guidelines of Appendix A to Franch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 and are, therefore, acceptable.
B Ote Doort. and Dampers We have reviewed the placement of fire doors and dampers to assure proper fire rating h3s teen provided.
the licensee has stated that inbout 45 percent of all fire rated doors are locked amt alarmed with the alarm signal terminating in the control rocm. All other fire d= r -.n e kept in the closed position and are controlled by administrative prornfures The licensee has provided three-hour ventilation fire dampers for most of the 3-hour wall, teilino/ floor assemblies. Certain locations have 1 -hour fire dampa s. These cc.,es were analyzed and found acceptable where the fire load was small ani! the estimated fire auration was well below the damper rating; otherwise, dampers will be upgraded to three-hour dampers from the existing l\\-hour fire rating Additionally for Unit 2, the air-handling duct that is rou'.ed through the chiller room will be provided with a three-hour fire rated barrier.
Based on our review, we conclude that the fire doors and dampers provided, cr to be provided, are in accordai.ce with the guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 and are, therefore, acceptable.
6
IV.
IIRE PROTECTION FOR SPEClflC AREA 5 A
C.ihle Vault and Tunne Area lhe carle vault and tunnel area for each unit is separated from the other unit's cable vault and tunnel area and from the balance of the plant by three-hour rated fire assemblies. There are two access doors to each unit's cable vault and tunnel area and the doors are located at opposite ends of the area.
turrently, a fixed automatic total flood carbon dioxide system is installed in this area. Due to the large quantity of redundant safety-division cable and poor access for manual fire fighting, we were concerned that a carbon dioxide flooding system could not suppress a deep seated cable fire. Therefore, at M r request, the licensee has agreed to provide a ceiling mounted sprinkler system to meet the guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 that will require
- n...ual actuation and will serve as a backup to the carbon dioxide system. Addi-tional backup to these fire suppression systems is provided by standpipe systems and portable extinguishers.
Ibe ventilation system is designed to isolate the cable vault and tunnel area and smoke venting can be started from manual control stations, in addition, smoke detectors are installed in the cable vault and tunnel areas which will alarm in the control room.
The licensee has committed to establishing an alternate shutdown method independent of the cable vault and tunnel area and the emergency switchgear and relay room.
The proposed alternate shutdown system will use a cross connection between the charging pumps for both units. The net ef fect here is to be able to provide high pressure borated makeuo water to the reactor coolant system in the event that normal charging for a single unit is incapacitated. The cross connection will be strictly manual in operation. In addition to the cross connection, the licensee will provide additional instrumentation that will monitor primary plant conditions, for example, pressurizer level and primary loop temperature. This instrumentation will be complet91y separate of any existing instrumentation and will have its own uninterruptible power supply. A written operational procedure will be developed for this alternate shttdown system. We have reviewed the pr oposed alternate shutdown cystem and find it to be acceptable.
We ha,e reviewed the licensee's fire hazards analysis and fire protection to be provided for the cable vault and tunnel areas and conclude that, with the modilications to De implemented, appropriate fire protection will be provided 7
wh u h (outorms to the provisions of Appendix A to Branc h Technical Position APCS 0 '3.5-1 and is, theref ore, acceptable.
It foq,. m nt foolipg Pump A_rea The component cooling water pumps are located in the auxiliary building. There are a total of four component cooling pumps, with two pumps for each unit. A cross-connection is provided between units. All four pumps are in the same fire area.
The licensee has demonstrated to our satisfaction that these pumps are not required for hot shutdown, but are required only for cold shutdown. Additionally, only one pump is needed per unit. Therefore, even assuming a loss of both component cooling pumps in a unit, cooling can be provided by using the exist;ng cross-connection.
At our request, the licensee has agreed to provide the following fire protection provisions to protect against an exposure fire:
(1) Area smoke detection system, (2) A sprinkler system that will provide coverage on the pumps and extend at least 15 f eet beyond each pump and a similar area on the floor level above the pumps, and (3) Hose stations for manual fire fighting.
We h we revie ed the component cooling pump area from a fire hazards analysis viewpoint and find the licensee's fire protection provisions to be in accordance with Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 and are, therefore, acceptable.
C iire Prote Qion inside Containment One major fire hazard inside containment is associated with a reactor coolant pump because of the potential for oil spraying under pressure. Each reactor coolant pump is located in its own cubicle. To prevent an oil fire, the licensee has agreed to provide, at our request, an engineered oil containment and collection system in e.ich reactor coolant pump cubicle.
Adjacent to the cAle penetration area, significant quantities of cable exist, composed of redunac t instrumentation and control systems. The licensee has agre"* to do the following with respect to fire protection:
(1) install redundant instrumentation and control cables within conduits which will be independently routed away from the congested cable area to mitigate the offects of a single fire in the congested area.
8
(2) Install fire stops (at 15-foot intervals) in vertical cable trays located in the cable penetration area; vertical trays located in containment but not in the penetration area will be fire-stopped every 30 feet.
(3) hntall fire detectors in the penetration area.
(4) install additional hosa stations just outside the containment.
As a result of our review of the licensee's fire hazards analysis for the areas insio (ontainment, we find that, with the additional protection to be provided for the ve.n tor coolant pumps and the instrumentation and contron cable tray,h onduits, as stated above, the fire protection provisions.aeet the guidelines of Appridix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 and are, theartore, acceptable.
1)
Other Plant Areas e have also reviewed the licensee's fire hazards analysis for other plant areas.
For those areas, the licensee has committed to install ad.,'tional detectors, portable entinguishers, hose stations, and some additional emergency lighting as ide.tified in Tahle 1.
Based on our review and as a result of those commitments, f ind these other plant areas to be in accordance with the guidelines of Appendia A to Branch Iechnical Position APCSB 9.5-1 and are, therefore,
.uce, oIe.
9
V.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS The idministrative controls for fire protection consist of the fire protection organization, the fire brigade training, the controls over combustibles and ignition snurces, the prefire plans, and procedures for tighting fires.
in response to the gu Melines in Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APC58 9.5-1, the licensee described those procedures and controls that were already in existence and discussed the proposef additional items which will be included to bring the administrative controls into conformance with Appendix A guidelines.
The licensee has also agreed to review its administrative controls and training procedu.es, where necessary, to follow supplemental staff guidelines contained in "huclear olant F ire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Cont rols and Quality Assurance," dated June 14, 1977.
lhe olant t ire lirigade, consisting of at least five members, is organized to provide immediate response to fires that may occur at the site. Spare air g linders and rechirge capability are provided to satisfy the guidelines of Appendin A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1.
The plant fire brigade will ilso be equipped with pressure-demand breathing apparatus, portable communicaticns equipment, portable lanterns, and other necessary fire fighting equipment.
The tire fighting brigade will participate in periodic drills. Liaison between the plant fire brigade and the local fire departments has been established. The local fire departments have been on plant tours and have also been involved in training sessions with the plant fire brigade.
We contfude that the fire brigade equipment and training conform to the retanmendations of VPA standards, Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APC5B 9.5-1, and supplemental staff guidelines and are, therefore, acceptable.
10
VI.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS lhe t ec hnical specif ications for the fire protection systems f or North Ar,na Po.er stat ion, tinit 1, were issued on June 23, 1978. The same star.dard fire pr otect von technical specifications will also be issued for Unit 2 with the initial Unii 2 Plant lerhnical Specifications.
We have reviewed the technical specifications proposed by the licensee and find that they are consistent with our Standard Technical Specifications for fire protection, which were issued for Unit 1 on June 23, 1978, and are, therefore, acceptable, 11
VII. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we further conclude that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standr.oint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR Saction 51.5(d)(4), that an environmental statement or neaativa declaration and environmental impact appraisa need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
12
Vill. CONCLUSIONS We have reviewed the fire protection program and fire hazards analysis submitted by t y licensee for North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2.
The fire protection program was reviewed against the guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APC58 9.5-1, supplemental staff guidelines dated June 14, 1977, and applicable NFPA standards. As part of the review, we visited the plant site to examine the relationship of safety-related components, systems and structures in specific plant areas to both combustible materials and to associated fire detection and suppression systems. The overall objective of our review of the fire protection program for the North Anna Power Station, Units I and 2, was to assure that, in the event of a fire at the facility, both units would maintain the ability to safely shut down, remain in a safe shutdown condition, and be able to minimize the release of radioactivity to the environment.
In response to our guidelines, the licensee has either made modifications to improve or will improve the fire resistance capability for fire doors, dampers, fire barriers, and barrier penetration seals. The licensee has also proposed to install additional sprinkler systems for areas such as the cable vault and tunnel areas, component cooling pump area, and various other areas. To assure that fires can be detected rapidly and that plant operators are informed promptly, additional detectors will be installed in various areas of the plant. In addition, the licensee has committed to establishing emergency shutdown procedures to bring either unit of the plant to a safe cooldown condition in the event of a damaging fire in the cable vault and tunnel areas, the main control room, or the emergency switchgear and relay room.
As a result of our review, we conclude that the control of combustibles in safe'y-related areas of the plant, the barriers between fire zones, the existing fire detectio., ard suppression systems, the trained onsite fire brigade, and the opa-bility to extinguish fires manually provide auequate protection frcm the adverse effects of a fire during the interim period prior to implementation of the modifica-tions listed in Table 1.
We further conclude, that, with the completion of the modifications listed in Table 1, the fire protection program for North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, meets the guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 and conforms with Criterion 3 of the General Design Criteria, and is, therefore, a:ceptable.
On the basis of the considerations discussed in this report, we conclude that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previmly considered or a significant decrease in any safety margin, it does not involve a significant hazards consideration; 13
(2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner; and (3) such activities will De conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. Also, we reaffirm our conclusions as otherwise stated in our Safety Evaluation Report and its supplerents.
f or Unit 1 of the plant, we require that the modifications listed in Table 1 be completed prior to the end of its second refueling outage. For Unit 2, we require that the modifications listed in Table 1 be cor91eted prior to the end of its first refueling outage. The licensee's target dates for completiun, which are shown in Table 1, are compatible with the above requirements.
O 14
TABLE 1 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS MODIFICATIONS SCHEOULE NCRTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY Modification: Smoke Detection Systems Additions Target Date: November, 1980 Ftre Area No.
Location and Description 1
Reactor Containment Recirculation air system Residual heat removal pump area Cable penetration area 2
Control Room General area (above floor)
Return air duct 6
Emergency Switchgear and Instrument Room General area 8
Water Chiller and General area Air Conditioning Room 10 Fuel Oil Pumphouse Motor Control Center Room General area 11 Auxiliary Building Charging pump cubicles Component cooling pump area Resin and filter storage area exhaust duct Exhaust duct of small cubicle General area of each level 12 Service Water Pump House -
General area 13 Auxiliary Service Water Pump House General area 14 Auxiliary feedwater Pump House General a'ea (motor and turbine pomp rooms)
IS Quench Spray Pump House -
Ventilation system exhaust duct General area of lower elevation 16 Safeguards Area Ventilation system exhaust duct 17 Main Steam Valve House -
General area 18 Fuel Building General area 19A Waste Disposal Building -
General area 198 Boron Recovery Building -
General area 20 Decontamination Building -
General ares 26 Fire Pump Rooia General area 32 Intake Structure Control House General area 38 Fost-Accident Vaults General area 15
TABLE 1 (Continued)
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS H0DIFICATIONS SCHEDULE Modification: Smoke Detection Systems Additions Target Date: November 1, 1980 (Continued)
Fire Area No.
Locction and Description 39 Auxilia y Power Supply Building General area 41 Casing Cooling Pump House General area Modification: Sprinkler Systems Additions Target Date: Unit 1 - October 1, 1979 Unit 2 - November 1, 1980 Fire Area No.
Location and Description 3
Cable Vault and Tunnel Open head type for 40-foot ceiling area; closed (Target Date - July 1979) head for remainder of vault and tunnel to the gas barrier 11 Auxiliary Building Comp 3nent cooling pumps area at elevations 244.5 feet and 259.5 feet Modification: Fire Hose Standpipe Connections, Target Date: October 1, 1979 Racks and Cabinets Unit 2, Fire Area 1 -
November 1, 1980 Fire Area No.
Location and Description 1
Reactor Containment Add dry hose connection standpipes at elevations 291 feet and 262 feet Place lengths of hase at each station 4
Cable fray Spreading Room Add hose rack with 100 feet of hose near door from Unit 1 to Unit 2 6
Emergency Switchgear and Instrument Room Add hose rack with 100 feet of hose near door to cable vault (one in each unit) ft lurbine Building Increase to 100 feet the hose length of racks located at elevation 279 feet immediately outside the main control room and diesel generator rooms 11 Auxiliary Building Aad hose rack with 100 feet of hose at elevation 253 feet near Unit 2 cable tunnel door Increase to 100 feet the hose length of racks at elevation 259 feet near Unit 1 cable tunnel Increase to 100 feet the hose length of racks at elevation 274 feet 16
TABLE 1 (Continued)
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS MODIFICATIONS SCHEDULE Modification: Fire Hose Standpipe Connections, Target Date: October 1,1979 Racks and Cabinets Unit 2, Fire Area 1 -
(Continued)
November 1, 1980 Fire Area No.
Location and Description 12 Service Water Pump House -
Add fire hose cabinet near northeast door 18 Fuel Building Relocate hose rack from elevation 272 feet to elevation 288 feet and increase hose length to 100 feet M<>dification-Portable ExtinguisMrs Target Date: April 1, 197?
(see Response No. 2t, for extinguishers code)
Fire Area No.
Location and Description 3
Cable Vault and Tunnel Replace ET-C-3 with a type W extinguisher 3
Motor Control Center Room Replace MCC-C-2 with a type D extinguisher 6
Emergency Switchgear Room LJd two type W extinguishers near ESW-C-2-3 6
Instrument Rack Room Replace IR-C-2 with a type W extinguisher 12 Service Water Punip House -
Add a type C extinguisher in proposed hose cabinet near northeast door 13 Auxiliary Service Water Pump House Add a type C extinguisher near door 15 Quench Spray Pump House -
Add a type D extinguisher near door 16 Safeguards Area Replace SG-C-1 with a type D extinguisher 17 Main Steam Valve House Add two type D extinguishers near doors Modification:
'le f ense-i n-Dep th Target Date: November 1, 1980 fire Area No.
Location and Description
?
Reactor Containment Add instruments to primary plant for loop temperature, pressurizer pressure and pressurizer level 11 Auxiliary Building Add cross-connection of Unit I and Unit 2 charging pumps discharge 18 Fuel Building Add new auxiliary instrument panel ar.d power supply 17
TABLE 1 (Continued)
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS MODIFICATIONS SCHEDULE Modification: Fire Dampers / Doors Target Date: October 1, 1979 Fire Area No.
Location and Description 7
Control Room Replace 1-1/2-hour damper with 3-hour damper in wall contiguous to turbine room 3
Cable Vault and Tunnel Motor Control Center Room Replace 1-1/2-hour ratcd damper with 3-hour rated damper 6
Imergency Switchgear and Instrument Room Provide 3-hour fire rated barrier for air-handling duct routed through chiller room 8
Turbine Building Replace door between water chiller room ard air conditioning room with 3-hour fire rated door Modification: Miscellaneous Target Date: Unit 1 - October 1, 1979 Unit 2 - November 1, 1980 fire Area No.
Location and Description 1
Reactor Containment Add oil leak collection system for reactor coolant pump motors Add heat detection system in electrical penetration area Add fire stops for vertical cable tray risers 2
Control Room Additional electrical separation between esin control board circuits and auxiliary shutdown panel via 43X contacts 1
Battery Rooms Add loss of ventilation flow alarm 11 Auxiliary Building Add 4-inch dike around ladder opening to charging pus;- tt.bicles Madification: Emergency Lighting Target Date: October 1, 1979 fire Area No.
Location and Description 2
Control Room Add 8-hour battery packs 3
Cable Vault and Tunnel and Motor Control Center Room Add 2-hour battery packs for egress 6
Lmergency Switchgear and Instrument Room Add 8-hour battery packs for auxiliary shutdown panel and 8-hour battery packs for egress 18
TABLE I (Continued)
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS M00lFICATIONS SCHEDULE Modification. fmergency Lighting Target Date: October 1, 1979 (Continued)
Iive Area N9.
Location and Description 6
Emergency Diesel Generator Cubicles Add 2-hour battery packs for egress 11 Auxiliary Building Add 2-hour battery packs for egress s
15 Quench Spray Pump House -
Add 2-hour battery packs for egress p
16 Safeguards Area Add 2-hour batterj packs for egress 17 Main Steam Valve Housi Add 2-hour battery packs for egress IH Iuel Building Add 8-hour battery packs for proposed auxiliary instrument panel and 8-hour battery packs for egress and access routes to the panel Note-1.
farget dates are projected dates for completion of the modification; however, all modifications will be completed by second refueling.
Refer to Fire Protection Systems Review and Supplement Nos. 1, 2 and 3
(<11ted April 1, 1977, December 15, 1977, January 2, 1978 and October 1, 1978, respectively) for fa ther details.
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