ML18010B148
| ML18010B148 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1993 |
| From: | CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18010B147 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9308040174 | |
| Download: ML18010B148 (13) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE 5
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NRC DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 REQUEST FOR LICENSE AMENDMENT AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM -
FLOW CONTROL VALVE POSITION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES 9'308040574 930726 PDR
- DOCK 05000400
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/Ass Ph5f - I+clvdld Z~ Zuf'Ohm~fi'an O+'ly 3.7.1.2 At least three independent steam generator auxiliary feedwater pumps and associated flow paths shall be OPERABLE with:
a.
Two motor-driven auxiliary feedwater
- pumps, each capable of being powered from separate emergency
- buses, and
~
b.
One steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump capable of being powered from an OPERABLE steam supply system.
JluullUX:,
a.
With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, restore the required auxiliary feedwater pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
b.
With two auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
c ~
With three auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, immediately initiate corrective action to restore at least one auxiliary feedwater pump to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.
4.7.1.2.1 Each auxiliary feedwater pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:
1.
Demonstrating that each motor-driven pump satisfies performance requirements by either:
a)
Verifying each pump develops a differential pressure that (when temperature
- compensated to 70'F) is greater than or equal to 1514 psid at a recirculation flow of greater than or equal to 50 gpm (25 KPPH), or b)
Verifying each pump develops a differential pressure that (when temperature
- compensated to 70'F) is greater than or equal to 1259 psid at a flow rate of greater than or equal to 430 gpm (215 KPPH).
SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-4 Amendment No. 29
IA SYS UXII.IARY F EDWATER SYSTE URVEILIANCE RE UIREMENTS Continued 2.
Demonstrating that the steam turbine
- driven pump satisfies performance requirements by either:
NOTE:
The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.
a)
Verifying the pump develops a differential pressure that (when temperature
- compensated to 70'F) is greater than or equal to 1433 psid at a recirculation flow of greater than or equal to 90 gpm (45 KPPH) when the secondary steam supply pressure is greater than 210 psig, or b)
Verifying the pump develops a di'fferential pressure that.
"(when temperature
- compensated to 70'F) i.s greater than or equal to 1400 psid at a flow rate of greater than or equal to 430 gpm (215 KPPH) when the secondary steam supply pressure is greater 'than 280 psig.
I 3.
Verifying by flow or position check that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked,
- sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position; and 4.
Verifying that the isolation valves in the suction line from the CST are locked open.
b.
At least once per 18 months during shutdown by:
2.
Verifying that each motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump starts'utomatically, as designed, upon receipt of a test signal and that the respective ressure control valve a
mo r-o ate c r at n i at va e for each motor-driven pump respond as required; Ach gzo~cavfgol yphg wifA~re ~os gsugz~f@vE Verifying that the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump starts automatically, as designed, upon receipt of a test signal.
The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3; and 3.
Verifying that the motor-operated auxiliary feedwater isolation valves and flow control valves close as required upon receipt of an appropriate test signal for steamline differential pressuxe high coincident with main steam isolation.
SHEARON HARRIS
- UNIT 1 3]4 7-5 Amendment No.~
3/4,7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4. 7. 1 TURBINE CYCLE 3/4. 7. l. 1 SAFETY VALVES The OPERABILITY of the main steam line Code safety valves ensures that the Secondary System pressure will be limited to within llOX (1305 psig) of its design pressure of 1185 psig during the most severe anticipated system opera-tional transient.
The maximum relieving capacity is associated with a Turbine trip from 10(C RATED THERMAL POWER coincident with an assumed loss of condenser heat sink (i.e.,
no steam bypass to the condenser).
The specified valve lift settings and relieving capacities are in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure
- Code, 1971 Edition.
The total relieving capacity for all valves on all of the steam lines is 1.36 x 10'bs/h which is ill"of the total secondary steam flow of 12.2 x 10 lbs/h at 100K RATEO THERMAL POWER.
A minimum of two OPERABLE safety valves per steam generator ensures that sufficient relieving capacity is available for the allowable THERMAL POWER restriction in Table 3.7-1.
STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION.is allowable with safety valves inoperable within the limitations of the ACTION requirements on the basis of the reduction in Secondary Coolant System steam flow and THERMAL POWER required by the reduced Reactor trip settings of the Power Range Neutron Flux channels.
The Reactor Trip Setpoint reductions are derived on the following bases:
For 3 loop operation SP =
x (109)
Where:
SP = Reduced Reactor Trip Setpoint in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER, V
= Maximum number of inoperable safety valves per steam line, 109
=
Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoint for 3 loop operation, X
=
Total relieving capacity of all safety valves per steam line in lbs/hour, and Y
=
Maximum relieving capacity of any one safety valve in lbs/hour 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEOWATER SYSTEM the Auxiliary Feedwater System e
eactor Coolant System can be coo n
50'F from normal operating conditions a total loss of offsite pow g pb SHEARON HARRIS " UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-1
LI R EEDW R
YS E
auxiliary feedwater pumps are capable of delivering the 430 gpm (215 KPP feedw flow,rate required to mitigate the most limiting design basis accidents zed in SHNPP FSAR Chapter 15.
The most limiting ac ent scenarios are t ss of Normal Feedwater (LONF) and the Fee 'e Break (FLB).
The accident 1 ses assume the pressure in the earn generators reaches the setpoint of t west set steam genera safety relief valve for at least a portion of the acci duration.
- efore, each of the AFM pumps (motor-driven and turbine-driven) mus e
pable of supplying at least 430 gpm (215 KPPH) total to at least o s generators at a steam generator inlet pressure of 1217 psig.
217 psig pre re is based on the lowest safety relief valve settin us margin for accumula n and setting error.
Each AFW pump must be pable of supplying the full 430 g
215 KPPH) flow following all cr e single failure scenarios.
This capacit s sufficient to ensure a
uate feedwater flow is available to remove decay heat d reduce the Re or Coolant System temperature to less than 350'F so the Residua at R
al System may be placed into operation.
3 4 7
3 CO DENSATE STORAG T
A The OPERABILITY of the condensate storage tank with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with steam discharge to the atmosphere concurrent with total loss-of-offsite power.
The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics, and the value has also been ad)usted in a manner similar to.that for the RUST and BAT, as discussed on page B 3/4 1-3.
4 4
S C
C
~VI The limitations on Secondary Coolant System specific activity ensure that the resultant offsite radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 dose guideline values in the event of a steam line rupture..
This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 1 gpm reactor-to-secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line.
These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
IN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blow down in the event of a steam line rupture.
~ This restriction is required to:
(1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor, Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and (2) limit the pressure rise within'ontainment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment.
The OPERABILITY,of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the Surveillance Requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
3 4 TEAM GENE TOR PRESS TEMPE I
TIO
. The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure-induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum'llowable fracture toughness stress limits.
The limitations of 70'F and 200 psig are based on a steam generator RTNDz of 60'F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.
SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-2 Amendment No.29
INSERT 1 The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Feedwater System ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to less than 350'F from normal operating conditions so that the Residual Heat Removal System may be placed into operation.
The AFW'ystem provides decay heat removal immediately following a station blackout event, and is required to mitigate the Loss of Normal Feedwater and Feedwater Line break accidents analyzed in FSAR Chapter 15.
The pump performance requirements are based upon a 4% degradation of the vendor certified performance curves.
Pump operation at this level has been demonstrated by calculation to deliver sufficient AFW flow to satisfy the accident analysis acceptance criteria.
With regard to the periodic AFW valve position verification of Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.1 Sub-paragraph a.3, this requirement does not include in its scope the AFW flow control valves inline from the AFW motor-driven pump discharge header to each steam generator when they are equipped with an auto-open feature.
The auto-open logic feature is designed to automatically open these valves upon receipt of an Engineered Safety Features System AFW start signal.
As a consequence, valves with an auto-open feature do not have a "correct position" which must be verified.
The valves may be in any position, in any MODE of operation thereby allowing full use of the AFW System for activities such as to adjust steam generator water levels prior to and during plant start-up, as an alternate feedwater system during hot standby, for cooldown operations, and to establish and maintain wet layup conditions in the steam generators.
PLANT SYSTEMS AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE RE(UIREMENTS (Continued) 2.
Demonstrating that the steam turbine
- driven pump satis'fies performance requirements by either:
NOTE: The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.
3.
a)
Verifying the pump develops a differential pressure that (when temperature
- compensated to 70'F) is greater 'than or equal to 1433 psid at a recirculation flow of greater than or equal to 90 gpm (45 KPPH) when the secondary steam supply pressure is greater than 210 psig, or b)
Verifying the pump develops a differential pressure that (when temperature
- compensated to 70'F). is greater than or equal to 1400 psid at a flow rate of greater than or equal to 430 gpm (215 KPPH) when the secondary steam supply pressure is greater than
. 280 psig.
Verifying by flow or position check that each valve (manual, power operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not
- locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position; and b.
4.
Verifying that 'the isolation valves in the suction line from the CST are locked open.
At least once per 18 months during shutdown by:
Verifying that each motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump s'tarts automatically, as designed, upon receipt of a test signal and that the respective pressure control valve for each motor-driven pump and each flow control valve with an auto-open feature respond as required; 2.
3.
Verifying that the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump starts automatically, as designed, upon receipt of a test signal.
The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3; and
'erifying that the motor-operated auxiliary feedwater isolation valves and -flow control valves close as required upon receipt of an appropriate test signal for steamline differential pressure high coincident with main steam isolation.
SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1
3/4 7-5 Amendment No.
I
, 3 4.7 PLANT SYSTE
.BASES 3 4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE 3 4.7. 1:1 SAFETY VALVES The OPERABILITY of the main steam line Code safety valves ensures that the Secondary System pressure will be limited to within 110% (1305 psig) of its design pressure of 1185 psig during the most severe anticipated system opera-tional transient.
The maximum relieving capacity is associated with a Turbine trip fr'om 100%
RATED THERMAL POWER coincident with an assumed loss of condenser heat sink (i.e.,
no steam bypass to the condenser).
The specified valve lift settings and relieving capacities are in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure
- Code, 1971 Edition.
The total relieving capacity for all valves on all of the steam lines is 1.36 x 10'bs/h which is 111% of the total secondary steam flow of 12.2 x 10'bs/h at 100%
RATED THERMAL POWER.
A minimum of two OPERABLE safety valves per steam generator ensures that sufficient'elieving capacity is available for the allowable THERMAL POWER restriction in Table 3.7-1.
STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION is allowable with safety valves inoperable within the limitations of the ACTION requirements on the basis of the
'eduction in Secondary Coolant System steam flow and THERMAL POWER required by the reduced Reactor trip settings of the Power Range Neutron Flux channels.
The Reactor Trip Setpoint reductions are derived on the following bases:
For 3 loop operation SP (X)
(Y)(V) x (109)
X Where:
SP Reduced Reactor Trip Setpoint i,n percent of RATED THERMAL POWER, V
= Maximum number of inoperable safety valves per steam line, 109
=
Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoint for 3 loop operation, X
=
Total relieving capacity of all safety valves per steam line in lbs/hou'r, and Y
=
Maximum relieving capacity of any one safety valve in lbs/hour 3 4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Feedwater System ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to less -than 350;F from normal operating conditions so that the Residual Heat Removal System may be placed into SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-1 Amendment No.
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM operation.
The AFW System provides decay heat removal immediately following a station blackout'event, and is required to mitigate the Loss of Normal Feedwater and Feedwater Line break accidents analyzed in FSAR Chapter 15.
The pump performance requirements
.are based upon a
4% degradation of the vendor certified performance curves.
Pump operation at this level has been demonstrated by calculation to deliver sufficient AFW flow to satisfy the accident analysis acceptance criteria.
With regard to the periodic AFW valve position verification of Surveillance Requirement 4.7. 1.2. 1 Sub-paragraph a.3, this requirement does not include in its scope the AFW flow control valves inline from the AFW motor-driven pump discharge header to each steam generator when they are equipped with an auto-open feature.
The auto-open logic feature is designed to automatically open these valves upon receipt of. an Engineered Safety Features System AFW start signal.
As a consequence, valves with an auto-open feature do not have a
"correct position" which must be verified.
The valves may be in any position, in any MODE of operation thereby allowing full use of the AFW System for activities such as to adjust steam generator water levels prior to and during plant start-up, as an alternate fee6water system during hot, standby, for cooldown operations, and to establish and maintain wet layup conditions in the steam generators.
3 4.7. 1.3 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the condensate storage tank with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with steam discharge to the atmosphere concurrent with total loss-of-offsite power.
The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank-discharge line location or other physical characteristics, and the value has also been adjusted in a manner similar to that for the RWST and BAT, as discussed on page B 3/4 1-3.
3 4.7.1.4 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY The limitations on Secondary Coolant System specific activity'nsure that the resultant offsite radiation dose will be limited to a small" fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 dose guideline values in the event of a steam line rupture.
This
'dose also includes the effects of a coincident 1
gpm reactor-to-secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line.
These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
3 4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation 'valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blow down in the event of a steam line rupture.
This restriction is required to:
(I) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and (2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment.
The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the Surveillance Requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
3 4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure-induced stresses in the steam, generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits.
The limitations of 70'F and 200 psig are based on a steam generator RT~, of 60'F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.
SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-2 Amendment No.