ML17309A771

Forwards Plant 1995 plant-ref Simulator Certification Rept

ML17309A771
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	02/15/1995
From:	Sager D FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17228B024	List: ML17228B023 ML17309A771
References
L-95-44, NUDOCS 9502230227
Download: ML17309A771 (32)

Text

PR.IC)R.I EY (ACCELERATED RIDS P ROCESSIi REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

I ACCESSION NBR:9502230227 DOC.DATE: 95/02/15 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET-,N FACIL:50=335 St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1, Florida Power

& Light Co.

05000335 50-389 St.

Luci;e Plant, Unit 2, Florida Power

& Light Co.

05000389 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SAGER,D.A.

Florida Power

& Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Forwards plant 1995 plant-ref simulator certification rept.

DISTRIBUTION CODE:

A005D COPIES RECEIVED LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: Simulator Facility Certification GL-90-08 NOTES:

7 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME NO

,J INTERNAL: F Fn,CENTER 0

EXTERNAL: NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

1 1

1 1

1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME NRR/DRCH/HOLB COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

1 YOTE TO ALL"RlDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE iVASTE!CONTACT'If!E DOCL'ifEYTCOYTROL DESK, ROO!if P I -37 (EXT. 504-2033 ) TO ELIllfl.'PATEYOL'R YA!ifE 8ROif DISTRIBUTIOY.LISTS I:OR DOC!.'MEN'I'SYOL'ON"I'EED!

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:

LTTR 4

ENCL 4

0 Florida Power 8 Light Company, P.O. Box 128, Fort Pierce, FL 34954-0128 February 15, 1995 L-95-44 10 CFR 55.45 10 CFR 50.4 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.

C.

20555 RE:

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 1995 Plant-Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.45(b)(5)(ii) and 10 CFR 55.45 (b)(5)(vi),

attached is the 1995 Plant-Referenced Simulator Certification Report for St. Lucie Units 1 and 2.

This report is required to be submitted every four years.

The original certification was submitted on February 21,

1991, by FPL letter L-91-48.

The report is to contain a description and schedule for correcting

test, failures, a

description of the testing completed, and a

description and schedule of testing, if different, to be performed during the next four (4) year interval.

The required information is included in the enclosed report.

Section 1 is a list of certification tests performed by year during the past four (4) years.

Section 2 is a list of open deficiencies identified during the first interval tests and includes the scheduled completion dates.

Section 3 identifies the single plant change/modification that has not yet been incorporated into the simulator.

Section 4 is a list of additions, deletions, and revisions to the certification testing program.

Section 5 is the testing schedule for the next four (4) year interval.

Section 6

includes abstracts of new test procedures to be included in the next interval.

Please contact us if there are any questions about this submittal.

Very truly yours, JiA D. A.

ager Vice resident St.

L ie Plant DAS/GRM cc:

Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St. Lucie Plant an FPL Group company z":QOJB 9502230227 9502i5 PDR ADOCK 05000335 P

PDR

,05

t 4dpPp.

/'~/'

I J

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort ST. LUCIE UNITS 1 AND 2 1995 PLANT REFERENCED SIMULATOR CERTIFICATIONREPORT Accession 0 sz~2yo~~p Date

/

of Ltr

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort SECTION 1 CERTIFICATIONTEST LIST FOR PERIOD 1991-1994

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort TRN-001 TRN-002 TRN-003 TRN-004 TRN-005 TRN-006 TRN-007 TRN-008 TRN-009 TRN-010 SST-001 SST-002 SUR-002 SUR-003 SUR-004 SUR-006 SUR-014 1991 CERTIFICATION TESTS Reactor Trip Loss of all Feedwater Main Steam Valve Closure Loss of all RCP's Loss of one RCP Turbine Trip from <15% power Maximum Rate Power Ramp Large Break LOCA with LOOP MSLB inside Containment Failed open Pressurizer safety valve with no HPSI Steady State Test at 1004 power Steady State Test at 30, 50 and 754 Power Isothermal Temperature Coefficient Determination Rod Worth Measurement ARO Critical Boron Determination Moderator Coefficient Determination at Power Turbine Valve Test NPE-005 Plant Shutdown from Rated Power to Cold Shutdown MAL-002 MAL-005 MAL-006 MAL-008 MAL-010 MAL-015 MAL-017 MAL-031 MAL-035 MAL-045 MAL-046 MAL-050 MAL-054 MAL-058 MAL-062 MAL-068 Rapid Gross Failure of Multiple Steam Generator Tubes Small Break LOCA Failed Open PORV with Loss of Offsite Power Loss of Instrument Air Compressors Loss of Offsite Power with Failure of Both Diesel Generators Loss of all RCP's, Natural Circulation Cooldown Loss of Condenser Level Control One Dropped Bank of CEA's Trip Generator from 100% Power Large Feedwater Line Break inside Containment Wide Range NI Failure T input to RPS Failed High RCS Flow Instrument Failure Containment Radiation Monitor Failure Alarm Window Incorrectly Actuates Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWAS)

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort 1992 CERTIFICATION TESTS TRN-001 TRN-002 TRN-003 TRN-004 TRN-005 TRN-006 TRN-007 TRN-008 TRN-009 TRN-010 SST-001 SST-002 SUR-005 SUR-008 SUR-011 NPE-001 NPE-002 NPE-003 NPE-004 MAL-003 MAL-009 MAL-012 MAL-013 MAL-021 MAL-026 MAL-030 MAL-032 MAL-038 MAL-042 MAL-047 MAL-051 MAL-055 MAL-059 MAL-064 MAL-066 MAL-067 Reactor Trip Loss of all Feedwater Main Steam Valve Closure Loss of all RCP's Loss of one RCP Turbine Trip from (154 power Maximum Rate Power Ramp Large Break LOCA with LOOP MSLB inside Containment Failed open Pressurizer.

safety valve with no HPSI Steady State Test at 1004 power Steady State Test at 30, 50 and 75% Power Plant Heat Balance Surveillance requirements for shutdown margin Diesel Generator monthly test Reactor Plant Heatup Cold to Hot Standby Reactor Startup Turbine Startup and Generator Synchronization Reactor Trip and recovery to rated power LOCA outside containment in the letdown system Loss of Offsite Power Loss of the MA Instrument bus Loss of a non-safety related vital A.C. bus Loss of Shutdown Cooling from suction valve Loss of all Feedwater from 1004 Power One Dropped CEA Freeze Control Rod Drive System Pressurizer pressure and level control failures Main steam line break outside Containment Linear Power Range Channel failed high T input to RRS failed high Feedwater flow input to 3 element controller fails RWT level Instrument failure ESFAS failure with small break LOCA MSIS fails to actuate AFAS fails to actuate

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort 1993 CERTIFICATION TESTS TRN-001 TRN-002 TRN-003 TRN-004 TRN-005 TRN-006 TRN-007 TRN-008 TRN-009 TRN-010 SST-001 SST-002 SUR-009 SUR-012 MAL-001 MAL-004 MAL-007 MAL-011 MAL-022 MAL-024 MAL-028 MAL-029 MAL-034 MAL-039 MAL-040 MAL-041 MAL-043 MAL-048 MAL-052 MAL-056 MAL-060 MAL-065 Reactor Trip Loss of all Feedwater Main Steam Valve Closure Loss of all RCP's Loss of one RCP Turbine Trip from <154 power Maximum Rate Power Ramp Large Break LOCA with LOOP MSLB inside Containment Failed open Pressurizer.

safety valve with no HPSI Steady State Test at 100% power Steady State Test at 30, 50 and 754 Power RCS Inventory Balance RPS Logic Matrix Test Complete Rupture if one Steam Generator U-Tube Large Break LOCA with LOOP Loss of Instrument Air Air header rupture Loss of a Safety related A.C. Bus Total Loss of CCW Flow RCS to CCW leak in an RCP seal cooler One Stuck Rod One Uncoupled Rod during startup Turbine trip from <15% power Reactor Coolant Volume Control Failures Reactor trip initiated by low S/G level Double ended MSLB inside containment Failed Open Main steam safety valve S/G Level Instrument Failure RCS Hot Leg RTD failure Steam Flow Input to 3 element controller failure Annunciator Panel failures RAS fails to actuate

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort 1994 CERTIFICATION TESTS TRN-001 TRN-002 TRN-003 TRN-004 TRN-005 TRN-006 TRN-007 TRN-008 TRN-009 TRN-010 SST-001 SST-002 SUR-010 SUR-013 SUR-015 SUR-018 Reactor Trip Loss of all Feedwater Main Steam Valve Closure Loss of all RCP's Loss of one RCP Turbine Trip from <154 power Maximum Rate Power Ramp Large Break LOCA with LOOP MSLB inside Containment Failed open Pressurizer.

safety valve with no HPSI Steady State Test at 1004 power Steady State Test at 30, 50 and 754 Power Wide Range NI Functional Full Length CEA Periodic Exercise Hydrogen Recombiner Test Boron Flow Test MAL-014 MAL-016 MAL-018 MAL-019 MAL-020 MAL-023 MAL-025 MAL-027 MAL-033 MAL-036 MAL-037 MAL-044 MAL-049 MAL-053 MAL-057 MAL-061 MAL-069 Loss of 2B/2BB DC Bus Slow Condenser Vacuum Leak Loss of all CCW Pumps Rupture of one ICW Header Loss of Shutdown Cooling Rupture of "B" CCW Header Loss of Both Main feedwater pumps Failed Power Supply to one RPS channel Excessive Reactor Coolant Activity Inadvertent dilution at power Steam Bypass control system valve fails open Small Feedwater Line Break Outside Containment Containment Pressure transmitter failure RCS Hot Leg RTD failure Steam Generator Pressure Transmitter Failed Low Alarm Window fails to Actuate Hot Shutdown Control Panel Cooldown

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort SECTION 2 OPEN DISCREPANCY REPORTS ON CERTIFICATIONTESTS

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort 920156 NPE-001 940066 MAL-018 As S/G's approached saturation temperature during plant heatup Narrow range level dropped from 654 to 504 almost instantly.

Scheduled Completion Date is July 1, 1995.

On a loss of all ICW pumps the generator monitor temperature alarm (D49) never cleared after 2C ICW pump was started on "A"

header.

Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

940067 MAL-018 "A" ICW header pressure never came above 13/ after 2C ICW pump was started on "A" header.

Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

940108 MAL-053 With TE-1112HA failed high the RCS upper head saturation margin did not show suspect data as it should.

Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

940109 MAL-049 With a containment pressure instrument failed high the ATI fault indicator did not show this.

Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

940122 ALL Main generator H, pressure is much to sensitive to temperature changes.

Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

940125 MAL-025 The SBCS did not, respond correctly after the plant tripped from TLOF at 504 power.

Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

940127 MAL-025 After the plant tripped AFAS-1 did not actuate as a Rupture ID was picked up on feedwater header D/P.

Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

940137 MAL-014 2B steam flow increased to 4.2 E6 LBM/HR 50 seconds into the event, remained there for one minute, then became erratic and blew the S/G dry in approximately 250 seconds.

Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

940138 MAL-019 The CCW and TCW systems had virtually zero heatup from the loss of all ICW flow. Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort 940163 MAL-069 Could not get either BAM pump to start locally and borate the RCS to cold shutdown conditions.

Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

940203 TRN-008 Plenum level dropped to zero then increased to 2.8 feet 20 seconds later and "FROZE" at this value.

Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort SECTION 3 FLAM'HANGES/MODIFICATIONS(PC/M)

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort PC/M 91174-2 The replacement of the DEH Operator Panel B in RTGB 201 has not been installed.

This panel will be purchased and installed by January 15, 1996.

11

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort SECTION 4 ADDITIONS,DELETIONS, At'6) REVISIONS TO THE CERTIFICATIONTEST PROGRAM

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort MAL-018 Loss of all ICW Pumps Change to "Loss of One ICW Header" This willstill meet the requirements of ANSI/ANS 3.5 Section 3.1.4 (6) Loss of Service water or cooling to individual components.

There is no procedural guidance for a single loss of all ICW pumps but there is however a plant procedure that covers loss of a single ICW header.

This will not only allow verification of simulator response to the malfunction (as the current procedure does) but will also test Simulator fidelity by combating the casualty utilizing guidance in the Off-Normal as would be performed in the reference plant.

MAL-022 Loss of all CCW Pumps Change to "Loss of One CCW Header" This willstill meet the requirements of ANSI/ANS 3.5 Section 3.1.4 (8)

Loss of component cooling or cooling to individual components.

There is no procedural guidance for a single loss of all CCW pumps but there is however a plant procedure that covers loss of a single CCW header.

This will not only allow verification of simulator response to the malfunction (as the current procedure does) but will also test Simulator fidelity by combating the casualty utilizing guidance in the Off-Normal as would be performed in the reference plant.

MAL-070 Creation of new Certification test "Loss of one Heater Drain Pump from 100%

Power" Plant data available for comparison, IHE-92-067.

MAL-031 One dropped bank of Rods Change to "One Slipped Rod" ANSI/ANS 3.5 has no requirement for a dropped bank of rods. This condition would either cause an automatic trip on Local Power density or require an immediate manual trip per plant procedures.

13

~

~

~

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort SECTION 5 NEXT FOUR YEAR TESTING SCHEDULE

~

~

~

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort 1995 CERTIFICATION TESTS TRN-001

, TRN-002 TRN-003 TRN-004 TRN-005 TRN-006 TRN-007 TRN-008 TRN-009 TRN-010 SST-001 SST-002 SUR-002 SUR-003 SUR-004 Reactor Trip Loss of all Feedwater Main Steam Valve Closure Loss of all RCP's Loss of one RCP Turbine Trip from <154 power Maximum Rate Power Ramp Large Break LOCA with LOOP MSLB inside Containment Failed open Pressurizer.

safety valve with no HPSI Steady State Test at 100% power Steady State Test at 30, 50 and 754 Power Isothermal Temperature Coefficient Determination Rod Worth Measurement ARO Critical Boron Determination NPE-005 Plant Shutdown from Rated Power to Cold Shutdown MAL-002 MAL-005 MAL-006 MAL-008 MAL-010 MAL-017 MAL-031 MAL-035 MAL-045 MAL-046 MAL-050 MAL-054 MAL-058 MAL-062 MAL-068 Rapid Gross Failure of Multiple Steam Generator Tubes Small Break LOCA Failed Open PORV with Loss of Offsite Power Loss of Instrument Air Compressors Loss of Offsite Power with Failure of Both Diesel Generators Loss of Condenser Level Control One Slipped CEA'rip Generator from 100% Power Large Feedwater Line Break inside Containment Wide Range NI Failure T,~ input to RPS Failed High RCS Flow Instrument Failure Containment Radiation Monitor Failure Alarm Window Incorrectly Actuates Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWAS)

'See Section 6

15

V

~

H il

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort 1996 CERTIFICATION TESTS TRN-001 TRN-002 TRN-003 TRN-004 TRN-005 TRN-006 TRN-007 TRN-008 TRN-009 TRN-010 SST-001 SST-002 SUR-005 SUR-008 SUR-009 SUR-018 Reactor Trip Loss of all Feedwater Main Steam Valve Closure Loss of all RCP's Loss of one RCP Turbine Trip from <154 power Maximum Rate Power Ramp Large Break LOCA with LOOP MSLB inside Containment Failed open Pressurizer.

safety valve with no HPSI Steady State Test at 1004 power Steady State Test at 30, 50 and 75% Power Plant Heat Balance Surveillance requirements for shutdown margin RCS Inventory Balance Boron Flow Test NPE-001 NPE-002 NPE-003 MAL-003 MAL-009 MAL-012 MAL-013 MAL-021 MAL-026 MAL-030 MAL-032 MAL-038 MAL-042 MAL-047 MAL-051 MAL-055 MAL-059 MAL-064 MAL-066 MAL-067 Reactor Plant Heatup Cold to Hot Standby Reactor Startup Turbine Startup and Generator Synchronization LOCA outside containment in the letdown system Loss of Offsite Power Loss of the MA Instrument bus Loss of a non-safety related vital A.C. bus Loss of Shutdown Cooling from suction valve Loss of all Feedwater from 1004 Power One Dropped CEA Freeze Control Rod Drive System Pressurizer pressure and level control failures Main steam line break outside Containment Linear Power Range Channel failed high T input to RRS failed high Feedwater flow input to 3 element controller fails RWT level Instrument failure ESFAS failure with small break LOCA MSIS fails to actuate AFAS fails to actuate 16

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort 1997 CERTIFICATION TESTS TRN-001 TRN-002 TRN-003 TRN-004 TRN-005 TRN-006 TRN-007 TRN-008 TRN-009 TRN-010 SST-001 SST-002 SUR-010 SUR-012 SUR-013 SUR-014 SUR-015 NPE-004 MAL-001 MAL-004 MAL-007 MAL-011 MAL-022 MAL-024 MAL-028 MAL-029 MAL-034 MAL-039 MAL-040 MAL-041 MAL-043 MAL-048 MAL-052 MAL-056 MAL-060 MAL-065 Reactor Trip Loss of all Feedwater Main Steam Valve Closure Loss of all RCP's Loss of one RCP Turbine Trip from <154 power Maximum Rate Power Ramp Large Break LOCA with LOOP MSLB inside Containment Failed open Pressurizer. safety valve with no HPSI Steady State Test at 100% power Steady State Test at 30, 50 and 75% Power Wide Range NI Functional RPS Logic Matrix Test Full Length CEA Periodic Exercise Turbine Valve Test Hydrogen Recombiner Test Reactor Trip and recovery to rated power Complete Rupture if one Steam Generator U-Tube Large Break LOCA with LOOP Loss of Instrument Air Air header rupture Loss of a Safety related A.C. Bus Loss of One CCW Header~

RCS to CCW leak in an RCP seal cooler One Stuck Rod One Uncoupled Rod during startup Turbine trip from <154 power Reactor Coolant Volume Control Failures Reactor trip initiated by low S/G level Double ended MSLB inside containment Failed Open Main steam safety valve S/G Level Instrument Failure RCS Hot Leg RTD failure Steam Flow Input to 3 element controller failure Annunciator Panel failures RAS fails to actuate

~See Section 6

17

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort 1998 CERTIFICATION TESTS TRN-001 TRN-002 TRN-003 TRN-004 TRN-005 TRN-006 TRN-007 TRN-008.

TRN-009 TRN-010 SST-001 SST-002 SUR-006 SUR-011 MAL-014 MAL-015 MAL-016 MAL-018 MAL-019 MAL-020 MAL-023 MAL-025 MAL-027 MAL-033 MAL-036 MAL-037 MAL-044 MAL-049 MAL-053 MAL-057 MAL-061 MAL-069 MAL-070 Reactor Trip Loss of all Feedwater Main Steam Valve Closure Loss of all RCP's Loss of one RCP Turbine Trip from <154 power Maximum Rate Power Ramp Large Break LOCA with LOOP MSLB inside Containment Failed open Pressurizer.

safety valve with no HPSI Steady State Test at 100% power Steady State Test at 30, 50 and 754 Power Moderator Coefficient Determination at Power Diesel Generator monthly test Loss of 2B/2BB DC Bus Loss of all RCP's; Natural Circulation Cooldown Slow Condenser Vacuum Leak Loss of one ICW Header~

Rupture of One ICW Header Loss of Shutdown Cooling Rupture of "B" CCW Header Loss of Both Main feedwater pumps Failed Power Supply to one RPS channel Excessive Reactor Coolant Activity Inadvertent dilution at power Steam Bypass control system valve fails open Small Feedwater Line Break Outside Containment Containment Pressure transmitter failure RCS Hot Leg RTD failure Steam Generator Pressure Transmitter Failed Low Alarm Window fails to Actuate Hot Shutdown Control Panel Cooldown Loss of One Heater Drain Pump from 100%

Power4

~See 4See Section 6

Section 6

18

~ ~

~

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant eferenced Simulator Certification Re ort SECTION 6 ABSIRACTS OF NEW TEST PROCEDVRES

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort MAL-018 LOSS OF ONE INTAKE COOLING WATER (ICW)

HEADER APPROACH This test examines a loss of one ICW header due to a breaker failure on the "A" ICW pump. All of the alarms and indications will be verified. Data will be collected to demonstrate the correct response of the simulator to the loss of one ICW header. After the response is verified the "C" ICW pump will be started on the "A" ICW header to reestablish cooling water flow.

INITIALCONDITIONS 1004 Power, Steady State, Middle of Life, Equilibrium Xenon FINAL CONDITIONS 1004 Power, Steady State, Middle of Life, Equilibrium Xenon with the "C" ICW pump running on the "A" ICW header.

OPTIONS The simulator is capable of several different malfunctions in the ICW system.

The traveling screens can be failed or overloaded, the ICW pumps can have a

sheared shaft or any degree of bearing

wear, and the ICW pump breakers can be failed in either the open or closed position.

There is also local start/stop capability of the pumps.

LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS This test only involves the loss of one ICW header and does not include any other possible malfunctions.

No emergency procedures will be

used, however, Off-Normal Procedure 2-0640030 is referenced.

TEST OBJECTIVES Verify the proper response of the simulator to the loss of one ICW header.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.2)

Ensure that the operator was required to take the same action on the simulator to mitigate the consequences of the loss of 20

~ ~

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort one ICW header as would have been required on the reference plant using the plant procedures.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3)

Verify that the operators/instructors did not observe a

difference between the response of the simulator control room instrumentation and the reference plant.

(ANSI 3.5, Section

3. 1)

Ensure that the malfunction showed plant operations of the reference plant which occurred continuously and in real time.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.)

Verify that the critical parameters and the other parameters which were important to the successful completion of this evolution were displayed on the appropriate instrumentation, and provided proper alarm or protective system action or both.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.1.)

Verify that the loss of one ICW header interaction with the other simulated systems provides total system integrated response.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.3.1)

Verify that the simulator does not fail to cause an alarm or automatic action that would occur in the reference plant and, conversely, does not cause an alarm or automatic action that would not occur in the reference plant for this malfunction.

(ANSI 3.5, section 4.2.1 (c)).

Verify that the operator was able to control the malfunction to a

steady state condition provided that the simulator operating limits were not exceeded.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3).

21

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort MAL-022 LOSS OF ONE COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW)

HEADER APPROACH This test examines the loss of one CCW header due to a breaker failure on the "A" CCW pump. All of the alarms and indications will be verified. Data will be collected to demonstrate the correct response of the simulator to the loss of one CCW header.

After the response is verified the "C" CCW pump will be started on the "A" CCW header to reestablish cooling water flow.

INITIALCONDITIONS 1004 Power, Steady State, Middle of Life, Equilibrium Xenon FINAL CONDITIONS 100% Power, Steady State, Middle of Life, Equilibrium Xenon with the "C" CCW pump running on the "A" CCW header.

OPTIONS The simulator is capable of several different malfunctions in the CCW system.

The CCW pumps can have a sheared shaft or any degree of bearing wear. The CCW pump breakers can be failed in either the open or closed position.

There is also local start/stop capability of the pumps.

LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS This test only involves the loss of one CCW header and does not include any other possible malfunctions.

No emergency procedures will be

used, however, Off-Normal procedure 2-0310030 is referenced.

TEST OBJECTIVES Verify the proper response of the simulator to the loss of one CCW header.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.2)

Ensure that the operator was required to take the same action on the simulator to mitigate the consequences of the loss of one CCW header as would have been required on the reference plant using the plant procedures.

(ANSI= 3.5, Section 3)

Verify that the operators/instructors did not observe a

difference between the response of the simulator control room 22

E

~

~

~

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort instrumentation and the reference plant.

(ANSI 3.5, Section

3. 1)

Ensure that the malfunction showed plant operations of the reference plant which occurred continuously and in real time.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.)

Verify that the critical parameters and the other parameters which were important to the successful completion of this evolution were displayed on the appropriate instrumentation, and provided proper alarm or protective system action or both.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.1.)

Verify that the loss of one CCW header interaction with the other simulated systems provides total system integrated response.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.3.1)

Verify that the simulator does not fail to cause an alarm or automatic action that would occur in the reference plant and, conversely, does not cause an alarm or automatic action that would not occur in the reference plant for this malfunction.

(ANSI 3.5, section 4.2.1 (c)).

Verify that the operator was able to control the malfunction to a

steady state condition provided that the simulator operating limits were not exceeded.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3).

23

~

~

~

~

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort MAL-070 LOSS OF ONE HEATER DRAIN PUMP FROM 1004 POWER APPROACH This test examines a loss of one heater drain pump from 1004 power due to a breaker failure on the "B" heater drain pump.

All of the alarms and indications will be verified. Data will be collected to demonstrate the correct response of the simulator to the loss of one heater drain pump. After the response is verified the malfunction is corrected and the heater drain pump is restarted.

INITIALCONDITIONS 100% Power, Steady State, Middle of Life, Equilibrium Xenon FINAL CONDITIONS 1004 Power, Steady State, Middle of Life, Equilibrium Xenon OPTIONS The simulator is capable of several different malfunctions in the heater vent and drain system.

Heater normal and alternate drains can be failed open or closed.

The heater drain pumps can have a sheared shaft or any degree of bearing wear, and the heater drain pump breakers can be failed in either the open or closed position.

There is also local start/stop capability of the pumps.

LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS This test only involves the loss of one heater drain pump from 100%

power and does not include any other possible malfunctions.

No emergency procedures will be used,

however, Off-Normal Procedure 2-0700030 is referenced.

TEST OBJECTIVES Verify the proper response of the simulator to the loss of one heater drain pump from 1004 power.

Ensure that the operator was required to take the same action on the simulator to mitigate the consequences of the loss of one heater drain pump as would have been required on the reference plant using the plant procedures.

Verify that the operators/instructors did not observe a

difference between the response of the simulator control room 24

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort instrumentation and the reference plant.

(ANSI 3.5, Section

3. 1)

Ensure that the malfunction showed plant operations of the reference plant which occurred continuously and in real time.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.)

Verify that the critical parameters and the other parameters which were important to the successful completion of this evolution were displayed on the appropriate instrumentation, and provided proper alarm or protective system action or both.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.1.)

Verify that'he loss of one heater drain pump interaction with the other simulated systems provides total system integrated response.

Verify that the simulator does not fail to cause an alarm or automatic action that would occur in the reference plant and, conversely, does not cause an alarm or automatic action that would not occur in the reference plant for this malfunction.

(ANSI 3.5, section 4.2.1 (c)).

Verify that the operator was able to control the malfunction to a

steady state condition provided that the simulator operating limits were not exceeded.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3).

25

~

I

~

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort MAL-031 ONE SLIPPED CONTROL ELEMENT ASSEMBLY (CEA)

APPROACH This test examines a slipped CEA at 1004 power. All of the

alarms, and indications will be verified.

Data will be collected to demonstrate the correct response of the simulator to the slipped CEA. After the response is verified the CEA is withdrawn to it's proper position.

INITIALCONDITION 1004 Power, Steady State, Middle of Life, Equilibrium Xenon FINAL CONDITIONS 1004 Power, Steady State, Middle of Life, Equilibrium Xenon OPTIONS The simulator is capable of several different malfunctions in the Control rod drive system.

Any number of CEA's can be partially or fully inserted, the drive system can be frozen or move without operator control, and the rod block circuitry can be failed.

LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS This test only involves the slippage of one CEA from 1004 power and does not include any other possible malfunctions.

No emergency procedures will be

used, however, Off-Normal Procedure 2-0110030 is referenced.

TEST OBJECTIVES Verify the proper response of the simulator to the slippage of one CEA.

Ensure that the operator was required to take the same action on the simulator to mitigate the consequences of the slipped CEA as would have been required on the reference plant using the plant procedures.

Verify that the operators/instructors did not observe a

difference between the response of the simulator control room instrumentation and the reference plant.

(ANSI 3.5, Section

3. 1) 26

Q I ~ w

~

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2

Docket Nos.

50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort Ensure that the malfunction showed plant operations of the reference plant which occurred continuously and in real time.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.)

Verify that the critical parameters and the other parameters which were important to the successful completion of this evolution were displayed on the appropriate instrumentation, and provided proper alarm or protective system action or both.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.1.)

Verify that the slippage of one CEA interaction with the other simulated systems provides total system integrated response.

Verify that the simulator does not fail to cause an alarm or automatic action that would occur in the reference plant and, conversely, does not cause an alarm or automatic action that would not occur in the reference plant for this malfunction.

(ANSI 3.5, section 4.2.1 (c)).

Verify that the operator was able to control the malfunction to a

steady state condition provided that the simulator operating limits were not exceeded.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3).

27

~'

~

((P'lj