ML17297B554

Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 and 3.Docket Nos. 50-528,50-529 and 50-530.(Arizona Public Service Company)

ML17297B554
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	05/31/1982
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
NUREG-0857, NUREG-0857-S02, NUREG-857, NUREG-857-S2, NUDOCS 8206090227
Download: ML17297B554 (39)

Text

NUREG-0857 Supplement No. 2 Safety Evaluation Re~A related to the operation of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Nos..STN 50-528, STN 50-529, and STN 50-530 Arizona Public Service Company, et al.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation May 1982

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1

INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DISCUSSION.

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1. 1 Introducti on.

1.9 Summary of Outstanding Issues

l. 10 Confirmatory Issues 1.11 License Conditions l-l 1-1 1-2 1-3 3

DESIGN CRITERIA - STRUCTURE, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS......

3.5 Missile Protection.

3-1 3-1 3.5.3 Barrier Design Procedures 3.6 Protection Against Effects Associated With the Postulated Rupture of Piping.

3.6. 1 Plant Desi n for Protection A ainst Pos g

g tulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment Determination of-Break Locations and Dynamic Effects Associated With the Postulated Rupture of Pl pl ngo

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3.6.2 3.7 Se)smic Design 3.7. 1 Seismic Input......................................

3.7.2 Seismic System Analysis and Seismic Subsystem Analysis (Structural)...

3-1 3-1 3-1 3-2 3-2 3-2 3-3 3.9 Mechanical Systems and Components.......

3-4 3.9.2 Dynamic Testing and Analysis of Systems, Components, and Equipment.............

3-4 4

REACTOR...-

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4-1 4.2 Fuel System Design....

4-1 4.2.5 Guide Tube Wear Surveillance.........................

5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AND CONNECTED SYSTEMS 5.3 Reactor Vessel.

5-1 5-1 5.3.3 Reactor Vessel Integrity.

5-1 Palo Verde SSER2

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 6 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES 6.2 Containment Systems 6.2. 1 Containment Functional Design....

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6-1 6-1 6-1

6. 2. l. 5 Minimum Containment Pressur e Analysis for Performance Capability Studies on the Emergency Core Cooling System......

6-1 7

INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS 7.3 Engineered-Safety Features Actuation System.

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7-1 7-1 7.3.2 Actuated Devices..

7. 3. 2. 2 Related Confirmatory Items 7.6 Interlock Systems Important to Safety.

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7-1 7.6.3 Equipment Protection Interlocks......

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AUXILIARYSYSTEMS 9-1

9. 1 Fuel Storage Facility..

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9. 1.3 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System (Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System).............

9-1 ll RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT ll-l 11.2

System Description

and Evaluation.

11.2.2 Gaseous Radwaste Treatment Systems 14 INITIALTEST PROGRAM......

20 FINANCIAL QUALIFICATIONS..

22 TMI-2 REQUIREMENTS.

22.2 Evaluation of TMI Requirements.

II.F.l.1 Noble Gas Effluent Monitor............

II.F.1.2 Sampling and Analysis of Plant Effluents.

III.D.l. 1 Primary Coolant Outside Containment..

14-1 20-1 22-1 22-1 22-1 22"1 22-1 Palo Verde SSER2

APPENDIX A APPENDIX 8 APPENDIX C

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

CONTINUATION OF CHRONOLOGY OF RADIOLOGICAL REVIEW.......

PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS..........

ERRATA TO SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT.

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A-1 B-1 C-1 Palo Verde SSER2

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1 INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL.DISCUSSION

1. 1 Introduction On November 13, 1981, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff issued its Safety Evaluation Report (SER) relating to the application for licenses to operate the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos.

1, 2 and 3

(PVNGS 1-3); Supplement No.

1 to the SER was issued on February 4, 1982.

The applica-tion was submitted by the Arizona Public Service Company (APS or the applicant) on behalf of itself, the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, Southern California Edison

Company, El Paso Electric Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, Southern California Public Power Authority, and M-S-R Public Power Agency.

In the SER and Supplement No. 1, the staff identified certain issues where either further information was required of the applicant or additional staff effort was necessary to complete the review of the application.

The purpose of this supplement is to update the SER by providing (1) the evaluation of additional information submitted by the applicant since Supplement No.

1 to the SER was issued, and (2) the evaluation of the matters that the staff had under review when Supplement No.

1 was issued.

Each of the following sections of'his supplement is numbered the same as the section of the SER and Supplement No.

1 that is being updated

and, unless other-wise noted, the discussions are supplementary to and not in lieu of the discus-sions in the SER and Supplement No.

1.

Appendix A to this supplement is a con-tinuation of the chronology.

Appendix B is the list of principal contributors to the staff review.

Appendix C is the errata to the SER.

1.9 Summar of Outstandin Issues Section 1.9 of Supplement No.

1 contained a list of outstanding issues.

Three of those issues were resolved after the issuance of Supplement No.

1.

These are listed below, along with the section of this supplement wherein their reso-lution is discussed.

(1)

Dynamic effects of pipe rupture (3.6. 1, 3.6.2)

(2)

Containment pressure analysis (6.2. 1.5)

(3)

Financial qualifications (20)

At this time, a number of outstanding issues remain to be resolved.

These are listed below along with the section of the SER and/or its supplements wherein each issue is discussed.

The resolution of these remaining issues will be addressed in a subsequent supplement to the SER.

(1) Emergency preparedness (2.3.3, 13.3)

(2) Ultimate heat sink (2.4.4.2, 9.2.5)

(3) Cable tray design (3.7. 1)

(4) Seismic and LOCA loads (4.2. 1)

Palo Verde SSER2

(5) PSI/ISI program (3.9.6, 3.9.7, 5.2.4, 6 ~ 3.3, 6.6)

(6) Equipment qualification (3.10, 3.11)

(7) Hydrogen in RDT room (6.2.5)

(8)

LOCA doses (6.4, 6.5.2, 15.4.8, III.D.3.4)

(9) Control system failures (7.7.2)

(10) Alternate shutdown (7.4.2, 9.5.1.6)

(ll) Undervoltage protection (8.4.7)

(12) Diesel generator tank corrosion (9.5.4.2)

(13) Impurity levels (17.5)

(14)

ACRS comment (18)

l. 10 Confirmator Issues Section

1. 10 of Supplement No.

1 contained a list of issues that had been essentially resolved to the staff's satisfaction, but for which certain con-firmatory information was to be provided by the applicant.

Subsequent to the issuance of Supplement No. 1, the applicant provided the required confirmatory information for several of those issues.

These are listed below, along with the section of this supplement wherein the issue is resolved.

(1)

Missile protection (3 ~ 5.3)

(2)

Seismic system analysis (3.7.2)

(3)

Dynamic testing and analysis of components (3.9.2)

(4)

RCS monitoring (4. 2.5)

(5)

Valve modifications (7.3.2.2)

(6)

Override, interlocks, and alarms (7.3.2.2, 7.6.3)

(7)

Modificati ons to the test programs (14)

(8)

TMI instrumentation (II.F.1.1, II.F.1.2)

(9)

Primary coolant outside containment (III.D.1.1)

For a number of confirmatory issues, the remaining action involves verification by the NRC staff that the applicant has implemented its acceptable commitments with regard to such items as equipment installation or modification, alarms or setpoints, and plant procedures or testing.

The following confirmatory issues are included in this verification category.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Missile protection (3.5. 2)

TMI instrumentation (II.D.3, II.F.1.3, II.F.2)

CPC software (7.2.3)

Instrumentation and control procedures and testing (7.3.2. 1, 7.4.3)

Fire protection modifications (9.5. 1)

Training (13.1.2.3)

Procedures (13.5, 15.3.9, I.A.1.2, I.A.1.3, I.C.2, I.C.3, I.C.4, I.C.5, I. C. 6, II.K. 1, II.K. 3, Item A-44 of Appendix C to SER)

Verification of the above items will be accomplished as part of the ongoing inspection program for PVNGS conducted by the Region V Office of NRC.

The NRC inspection staff will assure that these items are completed prior to fuel loading.

At this time, information on the remaining confirmatory issues is still pending or under staff review.

These are listed below along with the section of the SER and/or its supplements wherein each issue is discussed.

The resolution of these remaining issues will be addressed in a subsequent supplement to the SER.

Palo Verde SSER2 1-2

(1) Exclusion area control (2.1.2)

(2) Maximum earthquake (2.5'.3)

(3)

Pump and valve operability (3. 9'. 2, II.E.4. 2)

(4)

RCS monitoring (4.4.1)

(5) Pressure-temperature curves (5. 3. 2)

(6) Pressurized thermal shock, Units 2 and 3 (5.3.3)

(7) Valve modifications (5.4. 3, 6. 2. 4)

(8) Modifications to test programs (5.4.3, 6.2.6, 6.3. 1, 8.2.2)

(9) Override, interlocks, and alarms (5.4.3, 7.6', 8.3.2. 1)

(10) TMI in'strumentation (6.2.1.1)

(11) Setpoint values (6.2.4, 7.2.4)

(12)

CPC software (7.2.4)

(13) Confirmatory site visits (7.1.3.5, 8.1, 9.5.1)

(14) Containment electrical penetrations (8.4.3)

(15)

Load sequencer (8.4.6)

(16) Procedures (I.C.1, II.B.1, II.F.2)

(17) Control room design review (I.D.l)

(18) Relief and safety valve tests (II.D.l)

1. 11 License Conditions Sections l. 11 of the SER and Supplement No.

1 list several issues for which a condition will be included in the operating license to ensure that NRC require-ments are met during plant operations.

In addition to the 13 issues previously

listed, another issue has been identified in this supplement for which a con-dition will be included in the operating license.

The issue, with an appro-priate reference to the section of this supplement where it is addressed, is listed below.

(14) Guide tube wear surveillance (4.2.5)

Palo Verde SSER2 1-3

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3 DESIGN CRITERIA - STRUCTURE, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS 3.5 Missile Protection 3.5.3 Barrier Design Procedures In the SER, the staff stated that the applicant had verbally committed to meet the staff position on the design of missile barriers with regard to ductility ratios under impactive and impulsive loads (see SRP Section 3.5.3, NUREG-800) and to document compliance in a forthcoming FSAR amendment.

Subsequently, the applicant documented compliance with the above staff position in Amendment 6

to the FSAR.

Therefore, this issue is resolved.

3.6 Protection A ainst D namic Effects Associated With the Postulated Ru ture

~of Pi in 3.6.1 Plant Design for Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment In the SER, the staff indicated that it could not conclude that the applicant has adequately designed and protected areas and systems required for safe shut-down following postulated failures in high and moderate energy piping outside containment, as required by GDC 4, until the staff completed its review of the subcompartment pressure and environmental analyses for the CVCS letdown line and auxiliary steam line.

In a letter dated March 8, 1982, the applicant provided additional information concerning this item.

The letter included the results of subcompartment pressure/temperature analyses for the postulated failure of the CVCS letdown line and auxiliary steam line.

The analy'ses indicate that the environment resulting from the postulated letdown line failure would not exceed the quali-fication envelope for safe shutdown equipment or the allowable range for struc-tural loading.

For the postulated failure of the auxiliary steam line, however, additional features to terminate the resulting blowdown are necessary.

The applicant will install redundant, air-operated, automatic isolation valves on the auxiliary steam line upstream of the penetration into safety-related areas of the auxiliary building.

These valves will automatically close on high dif-ferential pressure as would result from a line break and will thus terminate the blowdown prior to exceeding the allowable design pressure loadings for auxiliary building subcompartment walls.

Safe shutdown equipment would not be exposed to environmental conditions above the qualification envelope as a result of the auxiliary steam line failure.

Based on the above, the statf concludes that the applicant has provided adequate protection for safety-related equipment from the effects of postulated piping failures outside containment in accordance with the requirements of GDC 4 and the guidelines of Branch Technical Position ASB 3-1.

Therefore, the staff con-cludes that the plant design is acceptable.

The staff further concludes that the interface requirements for protection of safety-related systems outside containment from pipe breaks, as discussed in CESSAR SER Section 3.6. 1, are satisfied by the above described design.

Therefore, this issue is resolved.

Palo Verde SSER2 3-1

3.6.2 Determination of Break Locations and Dynamic Effects Associated With the Postulated Rupture of Piping In Section 3.6.2 of the SER, the staff identified an open issue regarding the applicant's procedures used to postulate pipe breaks for nonseismic Category I high energy piping.

For breaks in nonnuclear high energy piping systems which are not seismic Category I, the applicant had proposed in the FSAR to postulate breaks at (1) each intermediate location where combined stresses, as calculated by Equa-tions (12) and (13),

Paragraph 104.8 of ANSI B31.1,.Power Piping Code, exceed 0.8 (1.2 S

+ SA), or (2) each intermediate pipe fitting and welded attachment if detailecl stress analyses are not performed.

The staff position is that for high energy piping not designed to seismic Category I standards, worst case breaks should be postulated resulting in the greatest pipe whip and jet impinge-ment loading on the essential item irrespective of the fact that the stress or fitting criteria might not require such a break location to be postulated.

The applicant has responded to this concern in a letter from E.

E..Van Brunt to R. Tedesco, dated March 8, 1982.

The applicant has determined that the only nonseismic Category I high energy piping within a safety-related structure is the auxiliary steam line.

The applicant has performed further evaluations of this piping by considering pipe whip and jet impingement effects due to worst case breaks.

The applicant has determined that as a result of these

breaks, the plant experiences no adverse consequences relative to its ability to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown.

Based on the review of Section 3.6.2 of the FSAR and the supplemental evalua-tion performed by the applicant, the staff concludes that the applicant's pipe break methodologies used in evaluating the systems, components, and structures necessary to safely shut down the plant are acceptable.

The applicant's method-.

ologies meet the guidelines of SRP Section 3.6.2 (NUREG-75/087) which consti-tutes an acceptable basis for satisfying the applicable requirements of GDC 4.

Therefore, this issue is resolved.

In Section 3.6.2 of the SER, the staff stated that the applicant committed to provide the test results of its stainless steel U-bar type pipe whip restraints.

The applicant has provided the test results to the staff in its letter from E.

E.

Van Brunt to R.

L. Tedesco, dated March 22, 1982.

The applicant has tested the performance characteristics of its stainless steel U-bar pipe whip restraints.

The results of both static and dynamic testing verified that the yield and ultimate tensile strengths exceeded (met) the specification for ASTM A479 Type 304L stainless steel.

Therefore, the test results are accept-able and this issue is resolved.

3.7. 1 Seismic Input In the SER, the staff stated that it had a concern on the use of high damping values in the design of cable trays for PVNGS 1-3 and had requested the appli-cant to provide additional information to resolve this item.

Subsequently by letter dated December 30, 1981, the applicant provided additional information in response to this request.

Palo Verde SSER2 3-2

The staff has reviewed the material presented by the applicant related&o the proposed damping values of cable trayways, including the test resul.ts and design calculations, and concludes that it is acceptable subject~to the following conditions:

(1)

Cable trays used at the PVNGS 1-3 are of the same material and configura-tion as those used in the test program.

(2)

No fireproofing spray is used, which is consistent with the actual test conditions.

(3)

Damping values used in seismic analysis of cable trayways are limited to 15 percent, which is conservatively justified by the tests, instead of the 20 percent proposed.

The staff has informed the applicant of the above conditions to which the appli-cant has not yet responded.

Resolution of this matter will be addressed in a subsequent supplement to the SER after the applicant has responded to those conditions.

3.7.2 Seismic System Analysis and Seismic Subsystem Analysis (Structural)

In the SER, the staff stated that it had requested the applicant to furnish justification that the Corridor Building had been designed to meet the staff position (regarding interaction with adjacent Category I structures).

Subse-quently, the applicant provided confirmatory information in a letter dated January 21, 1982, in response to this request.

The staff has reviewed the confirmatory information regarding interaction of the Corridor Building with the adjacent Category I structures.

It found that the method of estimating the impact load due to a postulated collapse of the Corridor Building is reasonable and that the design method of adjacent Cate-gory I structures to resist such impact is proper.

Therefore, the postulated collapse of the Corridor Building should not impair the integrity of the adja-cent Category I structures.

This item is now resolved.

In the SER, the staff stated that it had requested the applicant to provide justification that a Category I buried pipeline had been seismically designed to meet the staff position (Item II.2. 1 of SRP Section 3.7.3).

Subsequently, the applicant responded to this request by letter dated September 23, 1981, which stated that the Category I buried pipeline was designed in accordance with the methodolgoy in BC-TOP-4, "Seismic Analysis of Structures and Equip-ment for Nuclear Power Plants."

The methodology in this topical report is acceptable since it is in conformance with the staff position in SRP Sec-tion 3.7.3.

Therefore, this matter is resolved.

In the SER, the staff stated that it had requested the applicant to demonstrate that both damping and shear modulus values of soil were properly transferred into the actual determination of compliance functions.

The applicant responded to this request by letter, dated December 31, 1981.

In its response, the appli-cant has clarified that the computer program SHAKE is used to estimate the strain-dependent material damping and shear modulus of the soil only and is not applied to the soil-structure interaction analysis.

The resulting soil properties are then transferred into the actual determination of compliance Palo Verde SSER2 3-3

functions by use of the computer program LUCON.

The staff finds this explana-tion to be acceptable and this issue is, therefore, resolved.

3 '

Mechanical S stems and Com onents 3.9.2 Dynamic Testing and Analysis of Systems, Components, and Equipment In Section 3.9.2 of the SER, the staff required that the applicant provide the description of the preservice examination and preoperational test program for snubbers in Chapter 14 of the FSAR.

In Amendments 6 and 7 to the FSAR, the applicant provided the snubber test program as a prerequisite for the pipe shock and vibration test (Appendix 14 B. 11).

The staff has reviewed the description of the snubber test program and finds that it is acceptable since it is in accordance with the position stated in its letter dated May 13, 1981.

Therefore, this issue is resolved.

Palo Verde SSER2 3-4

4 REACTOR 4.2 Fuel S stem Desi n

4.2.5 Guide Tube Mear Surveillance In response to an applicant-s eci pp pecific interface requirement in Section 4. 2.3. 1 o

e SSAR SER, the applicant has committed to perform a uide tube wear surveillance program identified in the CESSAR SER.

The r c bl o ly to th f r t CESSAR a li tub f tt' re ing wear inspection ro ram.

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applicant and pertains to a fuel assembly guid p

g he applicant has stated in Amendment 8

i e be measured during the first refueling a

guide tube wear will be m

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a o

erde Unit 1.

The a

lican pp 'nt wc 11 submit the details of the n p an or RC review and approval six months prior to the Unit 1 The applicant expects that these measureme t measurements will confirm that the wear rates e

ystem 80 design are acceptable, thus precluding the need to us e

u e sleeve inserts or other alleviating remedies.

On the basis of the applicant's commitments, this issue has The operating license for Un t 1 'll ni ws be conditioned accordingly.

Palo Verde SSER2 4-1

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5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ANO CONNECTEO SYSTEMS 5.3 Reactor Vessel 5.3.3 Reactor Vessel Integrity Pressurized thermal

shock, as a consequence of certain postulated accident scenarios, is an issue of concern primarily for vessels that have experienced significant degradation of material properties due to irradiation damage in the beltline region during operation.

The staff's Generic Task A-49 will address this issue for all PWR facilities but initially it is concerned pri-marily with operating facilities.

The rate of degradation of material properties is related to the concentration of trace elements in the vessel materials, especially copper, nickel and phos-phorus.

The phenomenon of radiation damage versus accumulated fluence is accounted for in R.

G. 1.99, which is used by the staff to conservatively pre-dict material property degradation until sufficient data from irradiation specimens are accumulated for a particular vessel.

The Palo Verde Unit 1 reactor vessel has a predicted end-of-life RT at the I. D. surface of about 115~F.

This was calculated for the limiting Imperial in the beltline, the intermediate shell plate, which has 0.06 percent copper, 0.004 percent phosphorus, 0.61 percent nickel, and an initial RT T of g F.

The end-of-life fluence at the inside wall is predicted to be 3.$ x 10 n/cm (E>1MeV).

R. G.

1. 99, Rev.

1 was used to estimate the adjustment of reference temperature;

hence, the value of 115 F end-of-life RTN>T is believed to be conservative.

The staff believes that the Palo Verde Unit 1 reactor vessel will not be jeopardized by pressurized thermal shock for 32 effective full power years because of the relatively low end-'of-life RT (115 F).

However, the staff is continuing to study this issue as Generic Nsk A-49 and, if necessary, may establish new requirements for continued operation of Palo Verde Unit 1.

For Palo Verde, Units 2 and 3, the applicant intends to provide information on the material properties of the reactor vessels to show that they also will not be jeopardized by pressurized thermal shock for 32 effective full power years.

The staff will confirm this in a subsequent supplement to the SER.

Palo Verde SSER2

6 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES 6.2 Containment S stems 6.2. 1 Containment Functional Design 6.2. 1.5 Minimum Containment Pressure Anal sis for Performance Ca abilit Studies on the Emer enc Core Coolin S stem In Sections

6. 2. 1. 5 and 6. 2.4 of the SER, the staff stated that it had requested the applicant to provide an analysis of the effect on the minimum containment pressure analysis for ECCS evaluation resulting from power access purge system operation at the time of a LOCA.

In response to this request, the applicant provided in Amendment 8 to the FSAR a minimum containment pressure analysis for performance capability studies on the ECCS specific to Palo Verde.

The calculations were performed using the CEFLASH-4A computer code to determine the mass and energy released to the con-tainment during the blowdown phase of the limiting loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), and the COMPERC-11 computer code to determine both the mass and energy released to the containment during the reflood phase and the containment pres-sure response.

The limiting large break LOCA (i.e., the break that produced the highest peak clad temperature) is the 1.0 x DEG/PD (double-ended guillotine/

pump discharge leg).

In the CESSAR SER, the staff concluded that this Combus-tion Engineering containment pressure calculation method was acceptable for ECCS evaluation.

The plant dependent input parameters used in the minimum con-tainment pressure analysis were conservatively chosen by the applicant to mini-mize the calculated containment pressure following a LOCA.

These plant-dependent parameters included initial containment internal conditions, containment

volume, active heat sinks, steam water mixing, passive heat sinks, heat transfer to passive heat sinks, and the assumed opepation of the power access purge system at the time of the accident.

The staff has reviewed the applicant's plant-dependent input parameters and finds them to be in compliance with the guidance provided in Branch Technical Position (BTP)

CSB 6-1, "Minimum Containment Pressure Model for PWR ECCS Per-formance Evaluation."

The results of the applicant's analysis show that the minimum containment pressure response for Palo Verde is not more limiting than the minimum containment pressure response used in analyzing the performance of the ECCS.

Therefore, the staff finds that the System 80 ECCS performance results presented in CESSAR FSAR Section 6.3.3 are applicable to Palo Verde since they meet the 10 CFR 50 Appendix K requirement that the containment pres-sure assumed does not exceed a minimum containment pressure conservatively cal-culated for Palo Verde.

Item B.5.c of BTP CSB-6-4, "Containment Purging During Normal Plant Operations,"

has also be adequately addressed since the effect of the power access purge system isolation valves being open at the time of the LOCA has been accounted for in the minimum containment pressure analysis.

This item has been satisfactorily resolved.

Palo Verde SSER2 6-1

7 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS 7.3 En ineered-Safet Features Actuation S stem 7.3.2 Actuated Devices 7.3.2.2 Related Confimator Items In the SER, the staff stated that the applicant had committed to make the follow-ing modifications (to the containment spray system):

(1)

The containment spray pump manual "override" control is to be consistent with the override control on other ESF.

(2)

Position indication for containment spray system Valve HV678 is to alarm if not fully open and for Valve HV688 is to alarm if not fully closed.

The appliant has subsequently submitted electrical drawings and design change documents, by letters dated March 19, 1982 and April 12, 1982, which confirm that the above modifications have been made.

Therefore, these two issues have been resolved.

7.6 Interlock S stems Im ortant to Safet 7.6.3 Equipment Protection Interlocks In the SER, the staff stated that the applicant had committed to make the follow-ing modifications:

(1)

Modify the charging pump manual control in the control

room, such that the operator can run three charging pumps independent of high pressurizer level and low lube seal pressure interlocks by means of a manual override.

(2)

NCW isolation valves will be interlocked to the ECW surge tank level (safety grade) to isolate NCW on low tank level.

The applicant has subsequently submitted electrical drawings and design change

'documents, by letter dated April 12, 1982, which confirm that the above modifi-cations have been made.

Therefore, these two issues have been resolved.

Palo Verde SSER2 7-1

9 AUXILIARYSYSTEMS 9.1 Fuel Stora e Facilit 9.1.3 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System (Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System)

In the SER, the staff had completed its review of the fuel pool cooling and cleanup

system, including the arrangement for fuel pool makeup water, and found it acceptable.

In Amendment 8 to the FSAR, the applicant revised the arrangement for fuel pool makeup water.

Normal makeup to the fuel pool is provided by the seismic Category I refueling water tank through seismic Category I lines rather than from the LRS (liquid radwaste system) recycle monitor tank as indicated in the SER.

Backup makeup is provided by the LRS recycle monitor tank or the conden-sate storage tank.

Thus, the requirements of GDC 61, "Fuel Storage and Handling and Radioactivity Control" and the guidelines of R.G.

1. 13, "Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis",

concerning fuel pool design with respect to provisions for a seismic Category I fuel pool makeup source, are met by the revised arrangement.

Therefore, the staff finds it acceptable.

Palo Verde SSER2 9-1

11 RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 11.2 S stem Descri tion and Evaluation 11.2.2 Gaseous Radwaste Treatment Systems Subsequent to publication of the SER, Appendix I dose commitments to a maximally exposed individual and to the population within 80 kilometers of PVNGS, due to the operation of the station, were reevaluated using the five years (8/73-8/78) of onsite meteorological data.

The reevaluated doses are given in Table C-5 of the Final Environmental Statement (NUREG-0841, February 1982) for PVNGS.

That table shows the reevaluated maximally exposed individual doses to be within the applicable guidelines of Appendix I.

The cost-benefit analysis was also redone using the above mentioned meteorological data.

The analysis shows that the staff's earlier conclusion regarding the adequacy of the gasoues waste treatment systems is still valid, namely, =that there is no cost-effective augment that can be added to the existing augments which will further reduce the cumulative population dose at a favorable cost-benefit ratio.

In view of these considerations, the staff reaffirms its conclusion that the gaseous waste treat-ment systems are capable of maintaining releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents to "as low as is reasonably achievable" levels in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.34a and with Sections II.B, II.C and II.D of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50.

Palo Verde SSER2

14 INITIALTEST PROGRAM In the SER, the staff stated that three items were required from the applicant to complete the review of the initial test program, i.e., (1) a description of the low power testing and training program, as required by NUREG-0737, Item I.G. 1, (2) a description of the snubber test program, and (3) modification of the test program description to include an appropriate preoperational test of the atmos-pheric steam dump valves.

In Section 3.9.2 of this supplement, the staff completed its review of the snubber test program description provided by the applicant.

The following discussion completes the staff's review of the remaining two items.

In a letter, dated November 3, 1981, the applicant stated that in response to the requirements of NUREG-0737, Item I. G. 1, it wi 11 conduct a natural circulation

test, as described in Section 14.2. 12.5. 1 of the CESSAR FSAR, to verify the accuracy of the PVNGS simulator model and the PVNGS written procedures.

In addition, in a letter dated August 28, 1981, the applicant stated that the test data from natural circulation testing would be used to supplement an analysis to verify the capability of natural circulation cooldown to cold shutdown conditions, as requested in a generic letter to all OL applicants, dated May 5, 1981.

The proposed test is in conformance with the requirements of NUREG-0737, Item I.G. 1 and is acceptable.

Therefore,, this item has been resolved.

In Amendment 8 to the FSAR, the applicant modified the test program description to include an appropriate preoperational test of the atmospheric steam dump valves.

Therefore, this item has been resolved.

Palo Verde SSER2

20 FINANCIAL QUALIFICATIONS Supplement No.

1 to the SER stated that the staff was evaluating the financial qualifications of the M-S-R Public Power Agency to assume its 3.95K ownership interest as a tenant in common with the other participants in PVNGS 1-3.

Subsequent to issuing Supplement No. 1, the NRC regulations relating to the determination of an applicant's financial qualifications, i.e,

~ Section 50.33(f) of 10 CFR Part 50, were amended effective March 31, 1982.

As amended, the regulations now state that a financial review of an applicant for operation of a production facility (commercial nuclear power plant) shall not be conducted if the applicant is an electric utility.

Since PVNGS is a production facility and since M-S-R Public Power Agency is an electric utility, a financial review of this agency is not required.

Therefore, this matter is now closed.

Palo Verde SSER2 20-1

22 TMI-2 REQUIREMENTS 22.2 Evaluation of TMI Re uirements II.F.1.1 Noble Gas Effluent Monitor In the SER, the staff identified the need for additional information from the applicant in order to complete its review of TMI Action Plan Item II.F;1,.

The information related to (1) background correction for the noble gas monitors, if required, and (2) the area monitors provided for moni-toring noble gas effluent releases via the steam dump and relief valves.

By letter dated April 6, 1982, the applicant has provided the required addi-tional information on noble gas effluent monitors, i.e., (1) the procedures for applying background correction for the instrument readings, if required, and (2) the location of the area monitors relative to the steam dump and relief valves and the procedures for correcting'for the low energy gamma emitters undetected by the area monitors.

Based on the review of the above mentioned submittal, as well as previous sub-mittals relating to Item II.F. 1, Attachment 1, the staff finds that the appli-cant's response is now complete and meets the requirements of the applicable TMI Action Plan Attachment and is, therefore, acceptable.

This item is now resolved.

II.F. 1.2 Sampling and Analysis of Plant Effluents In the SER, the staff stated that the applicant should commit to conformance with the required design basis shielding envelope for sampling media stated in NUREG-0737, Item II.F. 1, Attachment 2.

By letter dated April 6, 1982, the applicant has provided the above mentioned commitment.

Based on the review of the above mentioned submittal, as well as previous sub-mittals relating to Item II.F. 1, Attachment 2, the staff finds that the appli-cant's response is now complete and meets the requirements of the applicable TMI Action Plan Attachment and is, therefore acceptable.

This item is now resolved.

III.D.1. 1 Primary Coolant Outside Containment In the SER the staff stated that it would complete its evaluation of the appli-cant's response to TMI Action Plan Item III.D.1. 1 upon receipt of adequate information relating to this item.

By letter dated April 2, 1982, the applicant has provided a description of the leak reduction measures and of a preventive maintenance program for minimizing leaks from the systems outside the containment that could contain highly radio-active fluids during serious transient or accident conditions.

Palo Verde SSER2 22-1

The applicant has committed to leak test, once per refueling cycle, the contain-ment spray system, the applicable portions of the safety injection systems and the post-accident sample lines.

These systems will also be initially leak tested and a summary of the measured leak rates will be submitted to the NRC prior to initial operation above 5 percent power.

Liquid systems will be leak tested by monitoring applicable sump and tank levels and/or by physical measurement.

Gaseous systems will be leak tested by utilizing an acoustic, bubble or equiva-lent method such as a tracer gas method.

The applicant has also reviewed other potential leakages that can arise due to design and operator deficiencies, such as discussed in the staff's letter dated October 17, 1979, concerning North Anna and related incidents, and based on this review has concluded that such incidents are unlikely to occur at PVNGS.

The staff has reviewed the applicant's leak reduction and leak testing programs including (1) the design of the applicable systems as they relate to the inter-face requirements pertaining to this TMI Action Plan item spelled out in CESSAR System 80 Final Design, (2) the applicant's justification for excluding the reactor coolant makeup and letdown systems and portions of the waste gas system from leak testing, and (3) the applicant's review of the applicability of North Anna and similar concerns to PVNGS.

Based on this review, the staff finds that the design of the applicable systems are consistent with CESSAR System 80 inter-face requirements (staff's evaluation and acceptance of CESSAR System 80's response to this TMI Action Plan item is given in the CESSAR

SER, NUREG-0852, November 1981).

The staff finds that the applicant's leak testing and leak preventive maintenance program meets the requirements of TMI Action Plan Item III.D.l. 1 of NUREG-0737 and is, therefore, acceptable.

This item is now resolved.

Palo Verde SSER2 22-2

APPENDIX A CONTINUATION OF CHRONOLOGY OF RADIOLOGICAL REVIEW January 13, 1982 Letter from applicant transmitting information on training program schedule January 27, 1982 Letter from applicant concerning field code activities per-formed by Combustion Engineering, Inc.-Avery January 27, 1982 Letter from applicant regarding proposed emergency opera-tions facility February 1, 1982 Letter from applicant requesting authorization and pro-viding justification for use of ASME Code Case N-310-1 February 2, 1982 Letter from applicant regarding procedures to be used and/or design of various containment penetrations February 4, 1982 Issuance of Supplement No.

1 to Safety Evaluation Report February 5, 1982 Letter from applicant advising that response to January 19 1982 letter will be provided by April 5, 1982 February 5, 1982 February 8, 1982 Letter from applicant transmitting information concerning emergency spray pond water capacity Generic Letter 82-02, Nuclear Power Plant Staff Working Hours February ll, 1982 Letter from applicant providing information in response to to requests for additional information on certain TMI Action Plan items February 26, 1982 Letter from applicant providing information on containment penetrations March 3, 1982 Letter to applicant concerning schedule for completion of emergency operating procedures March 5, 1982 Letter to applicant requesting additional information on exclusion area control March 8, 1982 Letter from applicant forwarding information on the guide tube wear surveillance program March 8, 1982 Letter from applicant transmitting information on dynamic effects of pipe rupture March 9, 1982 Generic Letter 82 Use of INPO SEE-IN Program Palo Verde SSER2 A-1

March 9, 1982 Meeting with applicant to discuss staff comments on appli-cant's emergency plan March 11, 1982 Letter to applicant advising that cable trayway design is acceptable subject to certain conditions March 15, 1982 Letter from applicant forwarding copy of drawings relative to commitment to provide tornado missile protection for hydrogen recombiner openings in the auxiliary building March 16-20, 1982 Meeting with applicant to discuss status of construction for each unit and to tour the facilities March 19, 1982 March 22, 1982 Letter from applicant transmitting documents that show modi-fications being implemented to make the containment spray pump manual override consistent with the other ESF manual overrides Letter from applicant transmitting information on results of static load tests and results of dynamic load tests March 22, 1982 March 25, 1982 Submittal of Amendment No.

8 to FSAR Letter from applicant transmitting "Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Tornado Missile Damage to Station UHS" March 25, 1982 Meeting with applicant to discuss staff requirements for environmental qualification of equipment (NSSS and BOP scopes)

March 26, 1982 Letter from applicant advising that information on deep draft pumps to be sent by July 1, 1982 March 26, 1982 Issuance of Amendment No.

3 to Construction Permits (to add M-S-R Public Power Agency as co-owner).

March 27, 1982 March 30, 1982 Letter to applicant requesting additional information regarding water contract Letter to applicant advising that ASME Code Case N-310-1 may be used in the construction of components March 31, 1982 March 31, 1982 Letter from applicant concerning undervoltage protection Letter from applicant regarding evaluation of capability of relief and safety valves to operate under expected operating and accident conditons April 1, 1982 Letter from applicant concerning exclusion area access control April 2, 1982 Letter from applicant forwarding information regarding the supply of wastewater effluent Palo Verde SSER2 A-2

April 2, 1982 Letter from applicant transmitting revised pages of TMI-2 Lessons Learned Implementation Report concerning integrity of systems outside containment likely to contain radioactive material April 6, 1982 April 6, 1982 April 6, 1982 Letter from applicant providing responses to several staff questions Letter from applicant transmitting verification for letter of April 2, 1981, concerning wastewater effluent Letter from applicant forwarding information on preservice examination results April 7, 1982 Letter from applicant transmitting draft Technical Specifi-cations Section 6, Administrative Controls, and other replacement pages April 12, 1982 Letter from applicant concerning SER Open Items 10 and 12 and SER Confirmatory Items ll and 13 April 12, 1982 Letter from applicant transmitting ASME Section XI Pump and Valve Testing Program for preservice and inservice testing of pumps and valves April 14, 1982 Letter from applicant forwarding resumes of initial appointees to key plant managerial and supervisory positions through Shift Supervisor level April 16, 1982 April 16, 1982 Letter from applicant concerning certain SER items that it does not plan to include in draft Technical Specifications Generic Letter 82 Transmittal of NUREG-0909 relative to the Ginna Tube Rupture April 20, 1982 Generic Letter 82 Environmental gualitication of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment April 22, 1982 Letter from applicant advising that part of March 31, 1982 submittal on under voltage protection is unrelated and should be discarded April 22, 1982 Letter from applicant advising that its design meets regu-latory impurity level guidelines April 28, 1982 April 30, 1982 Issuance of Amendment No.

4 to Construction Permits (to add Los Angeles Department of Water and Power and Southern California Public Power Authority as Co-Owners)

Letter from applicant transmitting Amendment 3 to the Fire Protection Report Palo Verde SSER2 A-3

May 4, 1982 May 5, 1982 May 10, 1982 Meeting with applicant to discuss its proposed program for independent design verification Generic Letter 82 Post-TMI Requirements Letter to applicant transmitting request for additional information Palo Verde SSER2 A-4

APPENDIX 8 PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS E.

Licitra S.

Chan J.

Wermeil D. Terao D.

Powers B. Elliot J.

Huang J.

Rosenthal T. Chandrasekaran W.

Long M. Karlowicz Project management Structural engineering Auxiliary systems Mechanical engineering Core performance Materials engineering Containment systems Instrumentation and controls Effluent treatment systems Procedures and test review Financial qualifications Palo Verde SSER2 B-1

APPENDIX C

ERRATA TO SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT Section

6. 1.1 Pa e 6-1 Second Para ra h

First Line Change

"> 1720 ppm boron" to "4000 ppm maximum."

Section 6.2.4 Pa e 6-17 Second Para ra h

Ninth Line Change "CH-HV525" to "CH-HV524."

Section 6.3.3 Pa e 6-25 Last Para ra h

Change "pre-service inspection program (see Section 6.6 of this SER)" to "preoperational test program (see Section 14 of this SER)."

Section 8.4.5 Pa e 8-20 Second Para ra h

Second Line Change "JSIAUV534" to "JSIAUV634."

Section 10.2. 1 Pa e 10-2 Third Para ra h

Item 5

Add "Coolant" after "Prolonged Loss Generator Stator."

Section

10. 4. 9 Pa e 10-16 Item d Third Line Change "storage pool" to "storage tank."

Section ll.1 Pa e ll-l First Para ra h

Fourth Line Change "shim bleed wastes" to "letdown wastes.

Section 11.2. 1 Pa e 11-2 Second Para ra h

Second Line Change "shim bleed" to "letdown."

Table 11. 1 Pa e 11-3 Seventh Line Change "shim bleed rate" to "letdown rate."

Section 11.2. 1.2 Pa e 11-9 First Para ra h

Fifth Line Change "shim bleed rate" to "letdown rate."

Section 11.2. 1.3 Pa e 11-10 Second Para ra h

Fourth Line Change 'him bleed" to "letdown."

Section

12. l. 1 Pa e 12-2 First Com lete Sentence Replace sentence with the following sentence:

"The applicant has committed to implement its radiation protection program in accordance with Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8. 10, which include (1) provisions for periodic reviews of operating procedures and exposure records to determine how exposures can be lowered and (2) radiation protection reviews of new or modified designs and equipment."

Section 12.1.5 Pa e 12-4 Second Para ra h

Sixth Line Change "foreman" to "personnel."

Section

12. 5. 4 Pa e 12-11 First Line Add "entering restricted areas" after "plant personnel."

Palo Verde SSER2 C-1

Section

13. 1. 1.2 Pa e 13-6 Third Para ra h

Second Line Change "imcumbent" to "incumbent."

Section

13. l. 1.2 Pa e 13-7 Seventh Para ra h

Sixth Line Change "Plant Manager" to "Manager of Nuclear Operations.

Section

13. l. 1.2 Pa e 13-9 Last Para ra h

First Line Change "Chemical and Environmental" to "Technical."

Section 13.2.2 Pa e 13-19 First and Third Lines Change "Training Director" to "Training Manager.

Section 15.4.9 Pa e 15-8 First Para ra h

Third Line Change "shim bleed" to "letdown."

Table 20.2 Pa e 20-10 Change "South Carolina" to "Southern California."

Section 20 Several Pa es Change "South California Public Power Authority" to "Southern California Public Power Authority."

Change "Los Angeles District of'ater and Power" to "Los Angeles Department of Water and Power."

Palo Verde SSER2 C-2

NRC FORM 335 (7 77)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BIBLIOGRAPHICDATA SHEET

1. REPORT NUMBER (Assigned by DDCJ NUREG-0857 Supplement No. 2

4. TITLE ANDSUBTITLE (Add Volume No.,ifappropriaseJ Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3

7. AUTHOR(s)

2. (Leave blankJ

3. RECIPIENT'S ACCESSION No.

5. DATE REPORT COMPLETED

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILINGADDRESS (Include Zip Code/

I U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, D.C.

20555 MONTH May DATE REPORT ISSUED MONTH

6. (Leave blank/

B. (Leave blank/

YEAR 1982 YEAR 1982

12. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILINGADDRESS (Include Zip Code/

Same as 9. above

10. PROJECT/TASK/WORK UNITNo.

11. CONTRACT No.

13. TYPE OF REPORT PE RIOD COVE RED /Inclusive dates/

15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. (Leave blankJ Pertains to Docket Nos.

STN 50-528, STN 50-529 8c STN 50-5 0

16. ABSTRACT 1200 words or less/

Supplement No. 2 to the Safety Evaluation Report for the application filed by Arizona Public Service Company, et al, for licenses to operate the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 (Docket Nos.

STN 50-528/529/530),

located in Maricopa County, Arizona has been prepared by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regula-tion of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The purpose of this supplement is to update the Safety Evaluation Report by providing (1) the evaluation of additional information submitted by the applicant since Supplement No. 1 to the Safety Evalu-ation was issued and (2) the evaluation of the matters that the staff had under review when Supplement, No. 1 was issued.

17. KEY WORDS AND DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 178, DESCRIPTORS I jb. IDENTIFIERS/OPEN ENDED TERMS IB. AVAILABILITYSTATEMENT Unlimited NRC FORM 335 17 77) 19, SECURITY CLASS (Tnis report/

Unclassifie

20. SECU RI TY CLASS (Tbis page/

Unclassxf3.ed 21, NO. OF PAGES

22. PRICE S