ML13275A059
| ML13275A059 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 09/27/2013 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| Download: ML13275A059 (196) | |
Text
Sequoyah Initial Exam 302 December 2012 Final Material A D 4
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1211 NRC RO ADMIN A.ia
1211 NRCJPMROA.1.a Page 2 of 7 RO JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task:
CONTAINMENT FORMALDEHYDE STAY TIME CALCULATION Task#:
1150010201 Task Standard:
Calculate containment formaldehyde stay time and determine respiratory protection requirements in accordance with 0-TI-OPS-000-001.0.
Time Critical Task:
YES:
NO:
X KIA Reference/Ratings:
2.1.26 (3.4 / 3.6)
Method of Testing:
Simulated Performance:
Actual Performance:
X Evaluation Method:
Simulator In-Plant Classroom X
Main Control Room Mock-up Performer:
Trainee Name Evaluator:
/
Name I Signature DATE Performance Rating:
SAT:
UNSAT:
Validation Time:
12 minutes Total Time:
Performance Time:
Start Time:
Finish Time:
COMMENTS
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EVALUATOR:
1211 NRC JPM ROA.1.a Page 3 of 7 ToolslEquipmentlProcedures Needed:
1.
0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0, Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time Calculation 2.
Calculator
References:
Reference Title Rev No.
1.
0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0 Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time Calculation 7
2.
Read to the examinee:
DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.
HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO EXAMINEE AT THIS TIME!
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
1.
Unit 1 is in Mode 1 at 100% power.
2.
A Level Switch inside lower containment needs repair.
3.
0-PI-OPS-000.01 1.0, Containment Access Control during Modes I 4, has been initiated in preparation for a lower containment entry to investigate the alarm condition.
4.
The containment entry evolution requires at least 120 minutes.
5.
A Chemistry sample taken today at 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> yielded a lower containment formaldehyde concentration of 1.32 ppm.
6.
Section 4.0, Prerequisite Actions, of 0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0 is complete.
INITIATING CUES:
1.
Calculate the allowable containment stay time for the given formaldehyde concentration using 0-TI-OPS-000-001.0 Section 5.1.
2.
Identify all required action(s) if any to complete the level switch repair in accordance with 0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0, Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time Calculation and write them on the JPM briefing sheet.
3.
Assume all required IVs have been completed.
1211 NRCJPMROA.1.a Page 4 of 7 Start Time Obtain a copy of 0-Tl-OPS-000-001 0, Containment Formaldehyde STEP 1
Stay Time Calculation.
SAT UNSAT Standard:
Copy of 0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0, Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time Calculation is obtained.
c Provide a copy of 0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0, Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time Calculation.
Comment NOTES 1)
Section 5.1 may be marked N/A if Unit 1 lower containment entry will not be performed 2)
Section 5.1 may be marked N/A if only the Annulus or Airlock will be entered OR if breathing apparatus will be worn.
3) 0-Tl-CEM-090-016.1 or 0-Tl-CEM-090-016.2 can be used by Chemistry to determine formaldehyde concentration in containment. Previous sample results may be used if Chemistry or Industrial Safety determines they are valid.
STEP 2
5.1 Unit I Lower Containment Entry SAT
[1]
RECORD U-i lower containment formaldehyde sample results and sample date/time (from Chemistry).
UNSAT ppm Date/Time:
The examinee records the lower containment formaldehyde sample Standard:
results.
Comment
1211 NRC JPM ROA.1.a Page 5 of 7 STEP 3
5.1 Unit I Lower Containment Entry SAT
[2]
IF entry to Unit 1 lower containment is required with UNSAT formaldehyde concentration greater than 1.5 ppm, THEN PERFORM the folbwing:
Standard:
The Examinee addresses the step as N/A based on the initial conditions.
Comment STEP 4
5.1 Unit I Lower Containment Entry SAT
[31 CALCULATE Unit 1 Lower containment stay time USiNG the following equation:
UNSA 0.3 ppm X
480 minutes
=
sample recorded Step 5.1(1]
Comment 0.3 ppm X
480 minutes
=________ minutes Examiner sample recorded Step 5.1[1]
Note:
0.3 ppm X
480 minutes 144
= 109.1 minutes 1.32 1.32 STEP 5
5.1 Unit I Lower Containment Entry SAT
[4]
INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY stay time results obtained in Step 5.1(3].
UNSAT Standard Examinee addresses the step as completed based on the initial conditions.
Comment
Unit I Lower Containment Entry IF any required task CANNOT be performed within allowed stay time,THEN PERFORM the following:
[7.1]
CONTACT Industrial Safety for additional guidance.
[7.2]
EVALUATE need for Lower Containment Purge in accordance with O-SO-3O3.
[7.3]
DO NOT CONTINUE task UNTIL one of the following conditions are met:
Job Safety Analysis has been performed.
OR Stay time is acceptable.
Examinee determines the job will take longer than the allowed stay time CRITICAL and writes the following on the JPM briefing sheet.
Contact Industrial Safety.
Standard:
Evaluate need for Lower Containment Purge.
Do not continue until a Job Safety Analysis has been performed.
Notify Work Week Manager (not critical).
Notify Rad Protection (not cntical STEP 6
5.1
[7]
1211 NRC JPM ROA.1.a Page 6 of 7 SAT UNSAT
JPM BRIEFING SHEET DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
The examiner will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
1.
Unit 1 is in Mode 1 at 100% power.
2.
A Level Switch inside lower containment needs repair.
3.
0-PI-OPS-000.01 1.0, Containment Access Control during Modes 1 4, has been initiated in preparation for a lower containment entry to investigate the alarm condition.
4.
The containment entry evolution requires at least 120 minutes.
5.
A Chemistry sample taken today at 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> yielded a lower containment formaldehyde concentration of 1.32 ppm.
6.
Section 4.0, Prerequisite Actions, of 0-TI-OPS-000-001.0 is complete.
INITIATING CUES:
1.
Calculate the allowable containment stay time for the given formaldehyde concentration using 0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0 Section 5.1.
2.
Identify all required action(s) if any to complete the level switch repair in accordance with 0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0, Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time Calculation and write them on the JPM briefing sheet.
3.
Assume all required IVs have been completed.
Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.
HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.
I1I Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit I &2 Technical Instruction 0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0 Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time Calculation Revision 0007 Quality Related Level of Use: Continuous Use Effective Date:
09-26-2012 Responsible Organization:
OPS, Operations Prepared By:
R. Cessna Approved By:
Mike Brubaker Current Revision Description Revised procedure to remove note 3 in sections as it is confusing and the sections handle the note..
I SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-TI-OPS-000-001.0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 L
Page2ofl4 Table of Contents
1.0 INTRODUCTION
3 1.1 Purpose 3
1.2 Scope 3
1.3 Frequency/Conditions 3
2.0 REFERENCES
3 2.1 Developmental Reference 3
3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 4
4.0 PREREQUISITE ACTIONS 5
4.1 PreliminaryActions 5
5.0 PERFORMANCE 6
5.1 Unit 1 Lower Containment Entry 6
5.2 Unit 1 Upper Containment Entry 8
5.3 Unit 2 Lower Containment Entry 10 5.4 Unit 2 Upper Containment Entry 12 6.0 RECORDS 14
SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 3 of 14
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose This procedure establishes requirements and responsibilities for reducing employee exposure to Formaldehyde.
1.2 Scope This procedure covers work where formaldehyde is present inside Unit I and Unit 2 containment building at Sequoyah during plant operation.
A.
Unless otherwise determined through air monitoring data, all work which could expose personnel to Formaldehyde must be assumed to expose personnel above the Action Level of 0.3 TWA ppm until sampling determines current levels of exposure.
B.
When an employees exposure is determined from representative sampling, the measurements used shall be representative of the employees full shift or short-term exposure to formaldehyde, as appropriate.
C.
Representative samples shall be taken prior to the oncoming shift entry unless documented objective data shows that exposures are under the 0.3 ppm TWA.
D.
When using the representative sampling strategy, the Chemistry organization will utilize sampling points described in 0-TI-CEM-090-016.1 and 0-TI-CEM-090-0l 6.2.
1.3 Frequency/Conditions This instruction is to be performed prior to containment entry for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Upper and Lower containments.
2.0 REFERENCES
2.1 Developmental Reference A.
29 Code of Federal Regulations 1910.1048, Formaldehyde
SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 4 of 14 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS A.
Employees who will potentially be exposed to Formaldehyde levels greater than 0.3 ppm Time-Weighted Average (TWA) shall wear respiratory protection.
Exposure with respect to 0.3 ppm TWA is tracked using stay time calculation in this procedure.
B.
If respiratory protection is required (based upon concentration and exposure time), the level of respiratory protection shall be determined from the chart below:
AIRBORNE CONCENTRATION OF REQUIRED RESPIRATOR FORMALDEHYDE less than 7.5 ppm Any full face air-purifying respirator with formaldehyde filters.
7.5 to 75.0 ppm Supplied air respirators with full face piece operated in positive pressure mode.
Above 75 ppm Any full face self-contained breathing apparatus operated in positive pressure mode.
C.
Employees required to wear respirators will be fit tested annually and have a medical review annually.
D.
Cartridges are to be replaced after 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of use or at the end of the work shift, whichever occurs first, unless the cartridge contains a National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) approved end-of-service life indicator to show when breakthrough occurs.
E.
A Job Safety analysis shall be developed for exposures to personnel above the Action Level of 0.3 ppm TWA by the supervision of the work group requiring entry.
F.
Any TVA employee or augmented employee that may be exposed to Formaldehyde shall receive Formaldehyde Awareness training, ATIS 0059188 prior to beginning work and annually thereafter.
SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 5 of 14 Date 4.0 PREREQUISITE ACTIONS NOTE Throughout this Instruction, where an IFITHEN statement is encountered, the step will be N/A if the condition does not exist.
4.1 Preliminary Actions
[1]
ENSURE Instruction to be used is a copy of effective version.
[2]
ENSURE Precautions and Limitations Section 3.0, has been reviewed.
NOTE Previous sample results may be used if Chemistry or Industrial Safety determines they are still valid (based upon the trend of formaldehyde concentration).
[3]
NOTIFY Chemistry to determine containment formaldehyde concentration.
SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-TI-OPS-000-001.0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 6 of 14 Date 5.0 PERFORMANCE 5.1 Unit I Lower Containment Entry NOTES 1)
Section 5.1 may be marked N/A if Unit 1 lower containment entry will not be performed 2)
Section 5.1 may be marked N/A if only the Annulus or Airlock will be entered OR if breathing apparatus will be worn.
3)
O-Tl-CEM-090-016.1 or O-TI-CEM-090-016.2 can be used by Chemistry to determine formaldehyde concentration in containment. Previous sample results may be used if Chemistry or Industrial Safety determines they are valid.
[1]
RECORD U-I lower containment formaldehyde sample results and sample date/time (from Chemistry).
ppm Date/Time:
[2]
IF entry to Unit 1 lower containment is required with formaldehyde concentration greater than 1.5 ppm, THEN PERFORM the following:
[2.1]
NOTIFY Industrial Safety of abnormally high formaldehyde concentration.
[2.2]
INITIATE lower containment purge USING O-SO-30-3.
[2.3]
RETURN TO Step 5.1[1] of this section.
[3]
CALCULATE Unit 1 Lower containment stay time USING the following equation:
0.3 ppm X
480 minutes sample recorded Step 5.1[I]
[4]
INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY stay time results obtained in Step 5.1 [3].
IV
SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 7 of 14 Unit
[5]
I Lower Containment Entry (continued)
IF the Formaldehyde stay time is less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, THEN NOTIFY Work Week Manager of maximum stay time and containment entry requirements.
[6]
NOTIFY Rad Protection of maximum stay time and containment entry requirements.
[7]
IF any required task CANNOT be performed within allowed stay time,THEN PERFORM the following:
[7.1]
CONTACT Industrial Safety for additional guidance.
[7.2]
EVALUATE need for Lower Containment Purge in accordance with O-SO-30-3.
[7.3]
DO NOT CONTINUE task UNTIL one of the following conditions are met:
Job Safety Analysis has been performed.
OR Stay time is acceptable.
END OF TEXT Date 5.1
SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 8 of 14 Date 5.2 Unit I Upper Containment Entry NOTES 1)
Section 5.2 may be marked N/A if Unit I upper containment entry will not be performed.
2)
Section 5.2 may be marked N/A if only the Annulus or Airlock will be entered OR if breathing apparatus will be worn.
3)
O-Tl-CEM-090-016.i or O-TI-CEM-090-016.2 can be used by Chemistry to determine formaldehyde concentration in containment. Previous sample results may be used if Chemistry or Industrial Safety determines they are valid.
[1]
RECORD U-i upper containment formaldehyde sample results and sample date/time (from Chemistry).
ppm Date/Time:
[2]
IF entry to Unit 1 upper containment is required with formaldehyde concentration greater than 1.5 ppm, THEN PERFORM the following:
[2.1]
NOTIFY Industrial Safety of abnormally high formaldehyde concentration.
[2.2]
INITIATE upper containment purge USING O-SO-30-3.
[2.3]
RETURN TO Step 5.2[I] of this section.
[31 CALCULATE Unit 1 Upper containment stay time USING the following equation:
0.3 m X
480 minutes sample recorded Step 5.2[I]
[4]
INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY stay time results obtained in Step 5.2[3].
IV
SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 9 of 14 Unit I
[5]
Upper Containment Entry (continued)
IF the Formaldehyde stay time is less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, THEN NOTIFY Work Week Manager of maximum stay time and containment entry requirements.
[6]
NOTIFY Rad Protection of maximum stay time and containment entry requirements.
[7]
IF any required task CANNOT be performed within allowed stay time, THEN PERFORM the following:
[7.1]
CONTACT Industrial Safety for additional guidance.
[7.2]
EVALUATE need for Upper Containment Purge in accordance with O-SO-30-3.
[7.3]
DO NOT CONTINUE task UNTIL one of the following conditions are met:
Job Safety Analysis has been performed.
OR Stay time is acceptable.
END OF TEXT Date 5.2
SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 10 of 14 Date 5.3 Unit 2 Lower Containment Entry NOTES 1)
Section 5.3 may be marked N/A if Unit 2 Lower containment entry will not be performed.
2)
Section 5.3 may be marked N/A if only the Annulus or Airlock will be entered OR if breathing apparatus will be worn.
3)
O-Tl-CEM-090-016.1 or O-Tl-CEM-090-016.2 can be used by Chemistry to determine formaldehyde concentration in containment. Previous sample results may be used if Chemistry or Industrial Safety determines they are valid.
[1]
RECORD Unit 2 lower containment formaldehyde sample results and sample date/time (from Chemistry).
ppm Date/Time:
[2]
IF entry to Unit 2 lower containment is required with formaldehyde concentration greater than 1.5 ppm, THEN PERFORM the following:
[2.1]
NOTIFY Industrial Safety of abnormally high formaldehyde concentration.
[2.2]
INITIATE lower containment purge USING O-S0-30-3.
[2.3]
RETURN TO Step 5.3[1] of this section.
[3]
CALCULATE Unit 2 lower containment stay time USING the following equation:
0.3 m X
480 minutes sample recorded Step 5.3[1]
[4]
INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY stay time results obtained in Step 5.3[3].
IV
SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-TI-OPS-000-001.0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 11 of 14 Unit 2
[5]
Lower Containment Entry (continued)
IF the Formaldehyde stay time is less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, THEN NOTIFY Work Week Manager of maximum stay time and containment entry requirements.
[6]
NOTIFY Rad Protection of maximum stay time and containment entry requirements.
[7]
IF any required task CANNOT be performed within allowed stay time, THEN PERFORM the following:
[7.1]
CONTACT Industrial Safety for additional guidance.
[7.2]
EVALUATE need for Lower Containment Purge in accordance with O-SO-30-3.
[7.3]
DO NOT CONTINUE task UNTIL one of the following conditions are met:
Job Safety Analysis has been performed.
OR Stay time is acceptable.
END OF TEXT Date 5.3
SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 12 of 14 Date 5.4 Unit 2 Upper Containment Entry NOTES 1)
Section 5.4 may be marked N/A if Unit 2 upper containment entry will not be perlormed.
2)
Section 5.4 may be marked N/A if only the Annulus or Airlock will be entered OR if breathing apparatus will be worn.
3)
O-Tl-CEM-090-016.1 or O-Tl-CEM-090-016.2 can be used by Chemistry to determine formaldehyde concentration in containment. Previous sample results may be used if Chemistry or Industrial Safety determines they are valid.
[1]
RECORD Unit 2 upper containment formaldehyde sample results and sample date/time (from Chemistry).
ppm Date/Time:
[2]
IF entry to Unit 2 upper containment is required with formaldehyde concentration greater than 1.5 ppm, THEN PERFORM the following:
[2.1]
NOTIFY Industrial Safety of abnormally high formaldehyde concentration.
[2.2]
INITIATE upper containment purge USING 0-SO-30-3.
[2.3]
RETURN TO Step 5.4[1]of this section.
[3]
CALCULATE Unit 2 Upper containment stay time USING the following equation:
0.3 pim X
480 minutes sample recorded Step 5.4[1]
[4]
INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY stay time results obtained in Step 5.4[3].
Iv
SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time 0-Tl-OPS-000-001.0 Unit 1 & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 13 of 14 Unit 2 Upper Containment Entry (continued)
[5]
IF the Formaldehyde stay time is less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, THEN NOTIFY the Work Week Manager of maximum stay time and containment entry requirements.
[6]
NOTIFY Rad Protection of maximum stay time and containment entry requirements.
[7]
IF any required task CANNOT be performed within allowed stay time, THEN PERFORM the following:
[7.1]
CONTACT Industrial Safety for additional guidance.
[7.2]
EVALUATE need for Upper Containment Purge in accordance with O-SO-30-3.
[7.3]
DO NOT CONTINUE task UNTIL one of the following conditions are met:
Job Safety Analysis has been performed.
OR Date Stay time is acceptable.
END OF TEXT 5.4
SQN Containment Formaldehyde Stay Time O-Tl-OPS-000-O01.0 Unit I & 2 Calculation Rev. 0007 Page 14 of 14 6.0 RECORDS Retain completed copies of this instruction for inclusion with O-Pl-OPS-000-01 1.0 package..
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1211 NRC SRO ADMIN A.1.a
1211 NRC JPM SROA.1.a Page 2 of 8 SRO JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task:
Determine the Operability of a BAT before use.
Task#:
1190100302 Task Standard:
Determine the operability of BAST C prior to placing tank in service.
Time Critical Task:
YES:
NO:
X KIA ReferenceIRatings:
2.1.25 (3.9/4.2)
Method of Testing:
Simulated Performance:
Actual Performance:
X Evaluation Method:
Simulator In-Plant Classroom X
Main Control Room Mock-up Performer:
Trainee Name Evaluator:
I Name I Signature DATE Performance Rating:
SAT:
UNSAT:
Validation Time:
10 mm Total Time:
Performance Time:
Start Time:
Finish Time:
COMMENTS
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EVALUATOR:
1211 NRC JPM SROA.1.a Page 3of8 ToolslEquipmentlProcedures Needed:
1.
TRM 2.
TRM Figure 3.1.2.6 3.
1-Sl-OPS-000-003.W, Weekly Shift Log page 24 4.
JPM Chemistry Handout
References:
Reference Title Rev No.
1.
TRM Technical Requirements Manual 46 2.
1-Sl-OPS-000-003.W Weekly Shift Log 51 Read to the examinee:
DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM.
I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.
HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO EXAMINEE AT THIS TIME!
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
1.
Unit us at 100% power 2.
Preparations are in progress to place a clearance on BAT A for Maintenance.
3.
BAT C level is indicating 9,600 gallons on 0-Ll-62-242.
INITIATING CUES:
1.
You have been directed to determine operability status for BAT C level using 1 -Sl-OPS-000-003.W, prior to aligning BAT C to Unit 1.
2.
Determine the minimum level required for the operability of BAT C.
3.
Determine if the clearance evolution may continue.
4.
Notify the Examiner of results when determination of operability has been completed.
1211 NRC JPM SROA.1.a Page 4 of 8 Start Time STEP 1
SAT Obtain a copy of 1-SI-OPS-000-003.W, Weekly Shift Log, JPM 421 Chemistry Handout and the TRM.
UNSAT Standar&
Copy of 1-SI-OPS-000-003.W, Weekly Shift Log, JPM 421 Chemistry Handout and the TRM are obtained.
Cue Provide a copy of 1-SI-OPS-000-003.W, Weekly Shift Log page 24,
JPM 421 Chemistry Handout and the TRM figure 3.1.2.6.
Comment STEP 2
SAT Examinee goes to 1-Sl-OPS-000-003.W to review BAT C Level operability requirements.
UNSAT Standard Examinee reviews 1-SI-OPS-000-003.W, Appendix A, SR requirements for BAT C level operability.
Comment
1211 NRC JPM SROA.l.a Page 5 of 8 STEP 3
SAT Examinee utilizes the TRM and reviews TR 3.1.2.6.a.1 requirement for BAT C level.
UNSAT Standard Examinee utilizes the TRM and reviews TR 3.1.2.6.a.1 requirement for BATC level.
Comment STEP 4
SAT Examinee goes to TRM Figure 3.1.2.6.
UNSAT Standard:
Examinee goes to TRM FIGURE 3.1.2.6 Examiner Note The figure required to be used is found on page 3/4 1-10.
Comment STEP 5
I Examinee selects the appropriate line on FIGURE 3.1.2.6, Boric Acid Concentration, as determined from the data on the Operations Information page, Attachment 1, to determine region of acceptable operation.
SAT UNSAT
1211 NRC JPM SROA.1.a Page 6 of 8 STEP 6
Examinee selects the appropriate line on FIGURE 3.1.2.6 based on SAT U-i RWST Boric Acid Concentration as determined from data on the Operations Information page, Attachment 1, to determine the region of UNSAT acceptable operation.
Standard Using the chemistry page the Examinee determines the correct RWST Concentration is 2550 ppm.
CRITICAL Comment STEP 7
Examinee determines minimum BAT C level in gallons by locating the SAT intersection of the line for the RWST and BAT Boron concentrations and verifying the actual level in the tank is less than the minimum level UNSAT indicated on TRM page 3/4 1-10 Boric Acid Tank Levels.
- IIpI:i dmIi tee determines the minimum BAT level in gallons required for operability is 9850 gallons (+50/-100 gal.) by picking the point the Standard:
boric acid concentration lines for the RWST and the BAT intersect, CRITICAL and verifying the actual number of gallons is in the Region of UeptabIe Operatioft Comment If Examinee addresses the statement at the bottom of graph Examiner concerning the indicated values including the unusable volume and Note the instrument error, they should explain the contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available and is discussed in the TRM bases.
STEP 8
1211 NRC JPM SROA.1.a Page 7 of 8 SAT U NSAT Terminating The JPM is complete when the Examinee returns the cue sheet to STOP Cue:
the Evaluator.
Examinee identifies the that the level in the C BAT, 9,600 gallons does not meet the operability requirements for level in accordance with TR 3.1.2.6.a Comment Stop Time
JPM BRIEFING SHEET DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
The examiner will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
1.
Unit 1 is at 100% power 2.
Preparations are in progress to place a clearance on BAT A for Maintenance.
3.
BAT C level is indicating 9,600 gallons on 0-Ll-62-242.
INITIATING CUES:
1.
You have been directed to determine operability status for BAT C level using 1 -SI-OPS-000-003.W, prior to aligning BAT C to Unit 1.
2.
Determine the minimum level required for the operability of BAT C.
3.
Determine if the clearance evolution may continue.
4.
Notify the Examiner of results when determination of operability has been completed.
Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.
HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.
Operations Information Sample Point Units Boron Date ITime Goal Limit UI RCS ppm 660 Today/XXXX Variable Variable U2 RCS ppm 968 Today/X)(XX Variable Variable Ui RWST ppm 2550 Today/XXXX 2550
- 2650 2500
- 2700 U2 RWST ppm 2589 Today/XXXX 2550
- 2650 2500
- 2700 BAT A ppm 6764 TodayIXXXX Variable Variable BAT B ppm 6872 Today/XXXX Variable Variable BAT C ppm 6450 TodayIXXXX Variable Variable Ui CLA #1 ppm 2532 rwo Weeks Ago/XX)C 2470-2630 2400-2700 Ui CLA #2 ppm 2542 rwo Weeks Ago/XXX 2470-2630 2400-2700 UI CLA #3 ppm 2546 rwo Weeks Ago/XXX 2470-2630 2400-2700 Ui CLA #4 ppm 2515 Fwo Weeks Ago/XXXJ 2470-2630 2400-2700 U2 CLA #1 ppm 2555 Last WeekIXXXX 2470-2630 2400-2700 U2 CLA #2 ppm 2502 Last WeekIXXXX 2470-2630 2400-2700 U2 CLA #3 ppm 2579 Last WeekIXXXX 2470-2630 2400-2700 U2 CLA #4 ppm 2540 Last Week/XXXX 2470-2630 2400-2700 Spent Fuel Pool ppm 2659 Last WeekIXXXX
> 2050
> 2000 Lithium Results Date I Time Goal Midpoint UI RCS Lithium ppm 2.44 Today/XXXX 2.26-2.52 2.39 U2 RCS Lithium ppm 3.51 Today/XXXX 3.28-3.54 3.41 Primarj to Secondary Leakrate Information (Total CPM RM-90-99!119)
Indicator Units UI Date ITime U2 Date/Time SI 50 SIG Leakage?
Yes/No No Today/)OO(X No Today / Now SI 137.5 CVE Leakrate gpd
<0.1 Last Week/XXXX
<0.1 Today! Now 5 gpd leak equivalent cpm 1 15 Today / Now 85 Today / Now 30 gpd leak equivalent cpm 490 Today! Now 308 Today! Now 75 gpd leak equivalent cpm 1165 Today / Now 710 Today! Now 100 gpd leak equivalent cpm 1540 Today! Now 933 Today! Now 150 gpd leak equivalent cpm 2290 Today / Now 1380 Today / Now Bkgd on 99 /119 cpm 40 Last Week!XXXX 40 Today! Now Correlation Factor 99/119 cpm/gpd 5.31 Last WeekIXXXX 0.854 Today! Now Steady State conditions are necessary for an accurate determination of leak rate using the CVE Rad Monitor
Operations Information
I,z0
-J
-J C,
Lii 10>
z 0
0 0
0 0
LiiI 0az TRM FIGURE 3.1.26 (Units I & 2)
BORIC ACID TANK LIMITS I BASED ON RWST BORON CONCENTRATION 11000 10500 10000 9500 9000 8500
I I
I I
I i
(EGION_OF ACCEPTABLE OPERATION WST = 2500 ppm B
N /
,fRWST2600ppmJ S
ARWST=2650ppm81 N
,(=27O0ppm]
- 6120 ppm mum)
6990 ppm (Maximum) J
[REGION OF UNACCEPTABLE OPERATION IInc1caLedva rncftidel 140 gal unusable voIuniead 800 ga for rnstrument error 1
I I
I I
I I
1 8000 7500 7000 6500 6000 6100 6200 6300 6400 6500 6600 6700 6800 6900 7000 7100 BORIC ACID TANK CONCENTRATION
- PPM BORON RWST Concentraon 4-2600 PPM
-2550 PPM 4-- 2600 PPM 265O PPM a2700 PPM SEQUOYAH
- UNITS 1 AND 2 3/4 1-10 September28, 2003 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS Revision Nos. 13, 26, 27
TRM flGURE 3.t26 (Units I & 2)
BORIC ACID TANK LIMITS BASED ON RWST BORON CONCENTRATION 314 1-10 September 26, 2003 Revision Nos. 13, 26, 27 I-) j NR(
6500 I
I t
6000 6100 6200 6300 6400 6500 6600 6700 6800 600 7000 7100 1
1 BORiC ACID TANfr CONCENTRATION
- PPM BORON RWST Concnbabon 42500 PPM
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1211 NRC RO ADMIN A1.b
1211 NRCJPM ROA.1.b Page 2 of 14 SRO JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task:
Monitor Critical Safety Status Trees for Degraded Core Cooling Task#:
3110450601 Task Standard:
The Examinee monitors Status Trees and identifies a Red Path for Pressurized Thermal Shock (P.1) and Orange Paths for Core Cooling and Containment.
Time Critical Task:
YES:
NO:
X K/A ReferencelRatings:
2.1.7 (4.4)
Method of Testing:
Simulated Performance:
Actual Performance:
X Evaluation Method:
Simulator In-Plant Classroom X
Main Control Room Mock-up Performer:
Trainee Name Evaluator:
/
Name I Signature DATE Performance Rating:
SAT:
UNSAT:
Validation Time:
6 minutes Total Time:
Performance Time:
Start Time:
Finish Time:
COMMENTS
1211 NRC JPM ROA.1.b SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EVALUATOR:
Page 3 of 14 ToolslEquipmentlProcedures Needed:
1-FR-C UNIT I STATUS TREES
References:
Reference Title Rev No.
1.
1-FR-C UNIT 1 STATUSTREES 2.
JPM BRIEFING SHEET DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
The examiner will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
CD 0
D (0
0 0) 0)
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CD Co CD Cl) 0 0
D CD 0
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(0 C.)
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CO 01 -
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1211 NRC JPM ROA.1.b Page 5 of 14 SIG Pressure S/G NR Levels
- 1 520
- 1 15%
- 2 550
- 2 12%
- 3 550
- 3 12%
- 4 560
- 4 17%
RCS Pressure 0 psig RCS Cold Leg 220 deg F Temperature AFW Flow Containment Pressure 8 psig
- 1 200 gpm Pressurizer Level 0%
- 2 170 gpm
- 3 150 gpm
- 4 150 gpm INITIATING CUES:
1.
You are the Unit 1 CR0.
2.
The SR0 has directed you to monitor the status trees using 1-FR-0 UNIT I STATUS TREES.
3.
Determine if there are any red and/or orange path safety functions.
4.
If you have determined there are red and/or orange path safety functions, write them on the JPM Briefing Sheet.
Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.
HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.
1211 NRC JPM ROA.1.b Page 6 of 14 Start Time Obtain a copy of 1-FR-a UNIT 1 STATUS TREES.
STEP 1
SAT U NSAT Standard:
Copy of 1-FR-O UNIT 1 STATUS TREES is obtained.
Cue Provide a copy of 1-FR-O UNIT 1 STATUS TREES.
Comment
1211 NRCJPM ROA.1.b Page 7 of 14 GO TO FR4.2 CSf 47 STEP 2
Monitor Subcriticality SUBCRITICAUTY SQN I -FR-f)
Rev.
GO TO SAT UNSAT 0070 NOTE I Scurer dnels ernfIy restfe be 1O %on fro,edLve ran Açpx C powes ide marIy reitatgSOUT rge inotn if rces.y.
GO TO FR4.2 CSF A7 Standard:
Examinee determines a green path exists for Subcriticality Comment Examiner The start data is provided to the examinee on the handout sheet.
Note:
1211 NRC JPM RO A.1.b Page 8 of 14 Monitor Core Cooling CORE COOLING HOlE 2:
VOl ge lfl3n fleTCle3vE UNSAT
1211 NRC JPM RQA.1.b Page 9 of 14 Monitor Heat Sink HEAT SINK U N SAT
Monitor Pressurized Thermal Shock UNIT 1 PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK F-O.4 1211 NRCJPMROA.1.b Page 10 of 14 exists for Pressurized Thermal Shock UNSAT UNIT 1 CURVE 1 PTS LIMITS CRITH
1211 NRC JPM ROA.1.b Page 11 ofl4 GO TO Monitor Containment CONTAINMENT SON I-FR-Rev.
I GO TO FR-LI STEP 6
SAT UNSAT Standard:
amee determines an orange path exists for Containment CRITICAL CSF SAT Comment
1211 NRC JPM ROA.1.b Page 12 of 14 Standard:
Examinee determines a yellow path exists for Inventory Comment Examiner The start data is provided to the examinee on the handout sheet.
Note:
Terminating The JPM is terminated when the Examinee returns the JPM STOP Cue:
briefing sheet to the Examiner.
STEP 7
Monitor Inventory Inventory F-O.6 SON t-FR-O Rev.
I SAT UNSAT Stop Time
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
JPM BRIEFING SHEET 1.
The crew is responding to an event in Unit 1 that started 20 minutes ago.
2.
The following data has been obtained.
Source Range 5x10 RCS Subcooling
- 50 deg IR and SR SUR negative RCP Not running GET (XR-94-101)
Quad 1 CET (XR-94-102)
Quad 1 B03 735 A06 685 B05 685 C06 685 D03 725 E06 625 D07 650 G04 725 E02 635 C04 650 FOl XXX C08 625 F05 685 G02 650 HOl 650 G08 XXX GET (XR-94-101)
Quad 2 CET (XR-94-102)
Quad 2 B09 685 AlO 725 811 685 C12 650 Dli 625 E14 635 B13 650 G12 650 D13 xxx C08 625 F09 650 ElO 650 F13 625 G08 XXX F15 650 G14 XXX CET (XR-94-112)
Quad 3 CET (XR-94-102)
Quad 3 Hil 650 J08 650 H15 635 J10 675 K09 625 J14 650 K13 650 L08 625 k15 675 L12 650 Mu xxx L14 XXX M13 650 N10 635 D09 675 N12 625 GET (XR-94-112)
Quad 4 GET (XR-94-102)
Quad 4 HOl 650 J02 625 H03 650 J06 650 H07 625 J08 625 KOl 650 L02 650 K05 650 L04 625 M03 675 L08 625 M07 XXX N02 650 D07 650 N04 650 RVLIS Lower range 40%
RVLIS Lower range 40%
Ll-68-368 LI-68-371
SIG Pressure SIG NR Levels
- 1 520
- 1 15%
- 2 550
- 2 12%
- 3 550
- 3 12%
- 4 560
- 4 17%
RCS Pressure 0 psig RCS Cold Leg 220 deg F Temperature AFW_Flow Containment Pressure 8 psig
- 1 200 gpm Pressurizer Level 0%
- 2 170 gpm
- 3 l5Ogpm
- 4 150 gpm INITIATING CUES:
1.
You are the Unit I CRC.
2.
The SRO has directed you to monitor the status trees using 1-FR-0 UNIT 1 STATUS TREES.
3.
Determine if there are any red and/or orange path safety functions.
4.
If you have determined there are red and/or orange path safety functions, write them on the JPM Briefing Sheet.
Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.
HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EOI PROGRAM MANUAL FUNCTION RESTORATION PROCEDURE 1-FR-O UNIT I STATUS TREES Revision I QUALITY RELATED PREPARED/PROOFREAD BY:
D. A. PORTER RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION:
OPERATIONS APPROVED BY:
K. A. PERKINS EFFECTIVE DATE:
01/09/2007 REVISION DESCRIPTION:
Revised containment status tree setpoints for DCN E21988.
1-FR-O SQN UNIT I STATUS TREES I Rev. I 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides status trees for monitoring Critical Safety Functions which ensure the integrity of fission product barriers.
Appendix A contains a summary of rules of usage for status tree monitoring, if needed.
Appendix B contains a list of preferred instruments for status tree monitoring, if needed.
Appendix C contains guidance on manually reinstating source range indication if needed.
2.0 SYMPTOMS AND ENTRY CONDITIONS 2.1 ENTRY CONDITIONS E-O Reactor Trip or Safety Injection:
status tree monitoring initiated upon transition from E-O.
when directed to monitor status trees by applicable E-O step Page 2 of 16
NOTE I Source range channels automatically reinstate below i0 4 % on intermediate range.
Appendix C provides guidance for manually reinstating source range indication if necessary.
INTERMEDIATE RANGE SUR MORE NEGATIVE THAN -0.2 DPM SOURCE RANGE SUR ZERO OR NEGATIVE SQN 1-FR-O Rev. I CSF SAT CSF SAT SUBCRITICALITY 0
Page 3 of 16
NOTE 2:
RVLIS LOWER RANGE GREATER THAN 42%
SQN 1-FR-O Rev. I Red path requires at least 5 T/Cs greater than applicable limit as follows:
one TIC near core center hottest T/C in each quadrant.
(See Note 2)
CORE EXIT TICs LESS THAN 700°F RVLIS LOWER RANGE GREATER THAN 42%
RVLIS DYNAMIC RANGE GREATER THAN APPLICABLE VALUES IN TABLE 2 RCS SUBCOOLING BASED ON CORE EXIT TICs GREATER THAN 40°F WI WIllill Ii WIIIIIWI WI 1(1111 ii 1WI WI
CORE EXIT TICs LESS THAN 1200°F CORE COOLING F-O.2 Page 4 of 16
CORE COOLING SQN F-0.2 1-FR-0 Table 2 Rev. I NOTE:
RVLIS indication greater than values listed below indicates average system void fraction less than 50%.
RVLIS DYNAMIC RANGE RUNNING RCP CONFIGURATIONS Ll-68-367 Ll-68-370
(%)
(%)
Loop 1 16 10 Loop 2 10 10 Loop 3 10 16 Loop 4 10 10 Loopsland2 23 15 Loops I and 3 23 23 Loopsland4 23 15 Loops2and3 15 23 Loops2and4 15 15 Loops3and4 15 23 Loopsl,2,and3 30 30 Loops 1,2, and4 30 24 Loops 1, 3, and 4 30 30 Loops 2, 3, and 4 24 30 ALLRCPsRUNNING 44 44 Page 5 of 16
SQN 1-FR-O Rev. I HEAT SINK F-O.3 TOTAL FEEDWATER NO FLOW TO S1Gs GREATER THAN 440 GPM YES I,
NARROW RANGE NO LEVEL IN AT LEAST ONE SIG GREATER THAN 10%
[25% ADVI YES PRESSURE IN ALL SIGs NO LESS THAN 1117 PSIG YES
+
NARROW RANGE NO LEVEL IN ALL SIGs LESS THAN 81%
YES 1
rn FR-H.1 GO TO Y
FR-H.2 GOTO FR-H.3 y
GOTO FR-H.4 I
GOTO Y]
FR-H.5 CSF SAT NO PRESSURE IN ALL S/Gs LESS THAN 1064 PSIG YES
+
NARROW RANGE LEVEL NO IN ALL S!Gs GREATER THAN 10%
[25% ADV]
YES Page 6 of 16
UNIT I PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK F-O.4 SQN 1-FR-O Rev. I ANY T-COLD EXCEEDED COOLDOWN LIMIT ALL T-COLDs WITHIN COOLDOWN LIMIT GO TO 1
FR-P.1 o
FR-RI ALL RCS PRESSURE NO vs. T-COLD POINTS TO RIGHT OF LIMIT A ONCURVEI YES 4
I NO ALL T-COLDs GREATER THAN 285°F YES ALL T-COLDs NO DROPPED LESS THAN 100°F IN LAST 60 MINUTES YES I
I-NO ALL T-COLDs GREATER THAN 31 5°F YES NO ALL T-COLDs GREATER THAN 285°F YES RCS PRESSURE NO LESS THAN COLD OVERPRESSURE LIMIT ONCURVE3 YES GOTO T
FR-P.2 ici CSF SAT GOTO FR-P.1 y
GOTO FR-P.2 NO ALL T-COLDs AND T-HOTs GREATER THAN 350°F YES CSFSAT II CSF SAT Page 7 of 16
(j L..
00 C) a Cl)
C.)
UNIT I CURVE I PTS LIMITS SQN 1-FR-O Rev. I 3000 2500 2000 1 500 1 000 500 0
RCS Temperature (Deg F)
Page 8 of 16
9-00 I
-J wa::
D C,)
U)wa::
-a w
Do
-J00 C) w>
D0 00 Cu-o
4-I Ea)
I-00 OQ 00 (0
0 G)3) 00 LO 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 IC) 0 (6isd) OJflSSOJd SON 0
SQN 1-FR-O Rev. I I
1 GOTO R
FR-Z.1 GOTO 0
FR-Z.1 FR-Z.2 GO TO Y
FR-Z.3 iiriri
- i c
CSF SAT CONTAINMENT F-O.5 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE LESS THAN 12.0 PSIG YES 4
CONTAINMENT NO PRESSURE LESS THAN 2.8 PSIG YES I
NO CONTAINM ENT SUMP LEVEL LESS THAN 68%
YES 1
UPPER AND LOWER NO CONTAINMENT RADIATION MONITORS LESS THAN 100 R/HR YES Page 10 of 16
Inventory F-O.6 SQN I -FR-O Rev. I GO TO FR-I.2 CSF SAT GO TO FR-I.3 I
NO AT LEAST ONE RCP RUNNING YES PRESSURIZER NO LEVEL LESS THAN 92%
YES RVLIS UPPER NO RANGE GREATER THAN 104%
YES RVLIS DYNAMIC NO RANGE GREATER THAN TABLE 3 VALUES YES I
GOTO Y
FRI3
[ GOTO FR-I.1 GO TO FR-I.3 GO TO FR-LI PRESSURIZER NO LEVEL GREATER THAN 17%
YES NO AT LEAST ONE RCP RUNNING YES RVLIS UPPER NO RANGE GREATER THAN 104%
YES RVLIS DYNAMIC NO RANGE GREATER THAN TABLE 3 VALUES YES GO TO FR-I.3 it:;;i CSF SAT Page 11 of 16
INVENTORY SQN F-0..4 I -FR-0 Table 3 Rev.
I NOTE:
RVLIS value corresponding to an average system void fraction of 0%.
RVLIS DYNAMIC RANGE RUNNING RCP CONFIGURATIONS LI-68-367 LI-68-370
(%)
(%)
Loop 1 47 16 Loop 2 16 16 Loop 3 16 47 Loop4 16 16 Loops I and 2 56 25 Loops 1 and 3 56 56 Loops 1 and 4 56 25 Loops 2 and 3 25 56 Loops2and4 25 25 Loops 3 and 4 25 56 Loops 1,2, and3 71 71 Loopsl,2,and4 71 43 Loops 1,3, and4 71 71 Loops 2, 3, and 4 43 71 ALL RCPs RUNNING 94 94 Page 12 of 16
1-FR-O SQN UNITISTATUSTREES I Rev.1 Appendix A Page 1 of 1 Summary of Status Tree Rules of Usage If any RED or ORANGE path exists, then Status Trees shall be monitored continuously.
When no RED or ORANGE path exists, Status Trees monitoring may be reduced to once every 10 to 20 minutes, UNLESS a significant change in plant status occurs.
Status Trees shall be monitored and implemented in the order in which they appear in this procedure (Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Containment, and Inventory).
If a RED path is diagnosed, then the applicable FRP for the highest priority RED path condition shall be implemented IMMEDIATELY.
If an ORANGE path is diagnosed, then remaining Status Trees shall be checked.
If no RED path exists, then the highest priority ORANGE path FRP will be implemented IMMEDIATELY.
Once implemented due to any RED or ORANGE path, FRP shall be performed to completion or to a point of transition UNLESS a higher priority condition develops.
When no RED or ORANGE path exists, the YELLOW path FRP may be implemented at the Operators discretion.
Status tree monitoring is terminated under two circumstances:
cold shutdown (Mode 5) reached OR Normal GOs are implemented and automatic SI actuation is armed.
Page 13 of 16
SQN UNITISTATUSTREES 1-FR-O Rev.1 APPENDIX B Page 1 of 2 Preferred Instrumentation for Monitoring Status Trees NOTE 1:
Preferred Instrument should be used if available.
Status Tree Parameter Preferred lnstrumentlLocation Alternate Instrument/Location Subcriticality Power Range Xl-92-5005B, 5006B, 5007B, & 5008B [M-13]
Xl-92-5005C, 5006C, 5007C, & 5008C [M-4]
(F-O. 1)
Intermediate Range SUR XX-92-5041
[M-1 3 Comparator & Rate Drawer]
Xl-92-501 1 C & 501 1 D [M-41 Source Range Re-Instated Xl-92-5001B & 5002B [M-131 Xl-92-5001A, & 5002A [M-4]
Source Range SUR XX-92-5041 [M-13 Comparator & Rate Drawer]
Xl-92-501 1A, & 501 lB [M-4J Core Cooling Core Exit T/Cs (Note 2)
Xl-94-101 & 102 [M-4 Exosensor]
ICS (F-O.2)
RCS Subcooling Xl-94-101 & 102 [M-4 ExosensorJ XR-94-101 & 102 (Core Exit Margin to Saturation Recorders) OR determine from PAM Thot and RCS Pressure RCP Running RCP Handswitches [M-4]
Fl-68-6A, 6B, 6D, 29A, 29B, 29D, 48A, 48B, 48D, 71A, 71B, 71D (RCS Flow)
RVLIS Lower Range Ll-68-368 & 371
[M-4]
LR-68-367 RVLIS Dynamic Range Ll-68-367 & 370 [M-4]
LR-68-367 NOTE 2:
Hottest TIC on Exosensor TC TEMPS displays (both trains should be checked) may be used to verify all T/Cs are BELOW Status Tree setpoints.
If the Hottest T/C on either of these displays is GREATER THAN OR EQUAL to Status Tree Setpoints, then all of the individual quadrants on both displays must be checked to determine if the 5 T/C criteria (one T/C in each quadrant and one T/C near the center of the core) is met. To determine specific location of TICs, refer to ICS T/C Temperature display or NDR Incore TC maps.
Page 14 of 16
SQN UNIT I STATUS TREES I-FR-O Rev.I APPENDIX B Page 2 of 2 Status Tree Parameter Preferred Instrument/Location Alternate Instrument/Location Heat Sink SIG Narrow Range Level LI-3-42, 39, 55, 52, 97, 94, 110, & 107 [M-4]
LI-3-38, 51, 93, 106
[M-4]
(F-O.3)
Feedwater Flow Fl-3-163A, 155A, 147A, & 170A
[M-4]
ICS OR Fl 3-142A1M-3 for TDAFW flow SIG Pressure Pl-1-2A, 2B, 9A, 9B, 20A, 20B, 27A, & 27B P1-1-5, 12, 23, & 30 [M-4]
[M-4]
Pressurized T-Cold Tl-68 18, 41, 60, & 83/M-5 TR-68-1, 24, 43, & 65 Thermal Shock T-Hot Tl-68-1, 24, 43, & 65/M-5 TR-68-1, 24, 43, & 65 RCS Pressure Xl-94-101 & 102
[M-4 Exosensor)
PR-68-69 OR Pl-68-66A, 62, & 69/M-6 Containment Containment Pressure PDI-30-44 & 45 [M-6]
PDI-30-43 & 42 [M-61 (F-O.5)
Containment Sump Level Ll-63-178, & 179 [M-6j Ll-63-176, & 177 [M-6]
Upper Containment Rad Monitors RM-90-271 & 272 [M-30]
CS Lower Containment Rad Monitors RM-90-273 & 274 [M-30]
ICS Inventory (F-O.6)
Pressurizer Level LI-68-339A, 335A, & 320
[M-4]
LR-68-339 [M-4]
RCP Running RCP Handswitches [M-41 Fl-68-6A, 6B, 6D, 29A, 29B, 29D, 48A, 48B, 48D, 71A, 71B, 71D [M-5 RCS Flow]
RVLIS Upper Range Ll-68-369 & 372 [M-4]
LR-68-367 RVLIS Dynamic Range Ll-68-367 & 370 [M-4]
LR-68-367 Page 15 of 16
1-FR-O SQN UNITISTATUSTREES I
Rev.1 Appendix C Page 1 of 1 Manually Reinstating Source Range Indication NOTE This appendix may be performed as directed by the Unit Supervisor to restore source range indication. This appendix should be performed by a Unit Operator as time permits and should NOT delay status tree monitoring or other EOP actions.
1.
VERIFY intermediate range flux less than
% power on operable channels.
2.
REINSTATE source range channels by simultaneously placing both SRM TRIP RESET-BLOCK switches to RESET position. [M-4]
END Page 16 of 16
NOTE I Source range channels automatically reinstate below iO % on intermediate range.
Appendix C provides guidance for man ually reinstating source range indication if necessary.
SQN I-FR-O Rev. I L1{ ir4 z SUBCRITICALITY F-O.I 0
GO TO FR-S. I INTERMEDIATE RANGE SUR MORE NEGATIVE THAN -0.2 DPM CSF SAT SOURCE RANGE SUR ZERO OR NEGATIVE Page 3 of 16
SQN (See Note 2)
CORE EXIT TICs LESS THAN 1200°F RCS SUBCOOLING BASED ON CORE EXIT T/Cs GREATER THAN 40°F I
J mi.
rimvm G
GO TO FR-C.2 GO TO FR-C.3 CSF SAT CORE COOLING F-O.2 1-FR-O Rev. I NOTE 2:
Red path requires at least 5 T/Cs greater than appl limit as follows:
one TIC near hottest TIC in each quadrant GO TO FR-C.1 RVLIS LOWER RANGE GREATER THAN 42%
(See Note 2)
CORE EXIT TICs LESS THAN 700°F GO TO FR-C.1 0
GO TO FR-C.2 RVLIS LOWER RANGE GREATER THAN 42%
GO TO FR-C.3 RVLIS DYNAMIC RANGE GREATER THAN APPLICABLE VALUES IN TABLE 2 Page 4 of 16
TOTAL FEEDWATER FLOW TO SIGs GREATER THAN 440 GPM NARROW RANGE LEVEL IN AT LEAST ONE SIG GREATER THAN 10%
[25% ADV]
PRESSURE IN ALL S/Gs LESS THAN 1117 PSIG NARROW RANGE LEVEL IN ALL SIGs LESS THAN 81%
PRESSURE IN ALL S/Gs LESS THAN 1064 PSIG NARROW RANGE LEVEL IN ALL SIGs GREATER THAN 10%
[25% ADVI V
GOTO FR-H.3 HEAT SINK SQN I -FR-O Rev. I Page 6 of 16
ALL RCS PRESSURE vs. T-COLD POINTS TO RIGHT OF LIMIT A ON CURVE I ALL T-COLDs DROPPED LESS THAN 100°F IN LAST 60 MINUTES
- 1 i G
[1 ALL T-COLDs WITHIN COO LDOWN LIMIT RCS PRESSURE LESS THAN COLD OVERPRESSURE LIMIT ON CURVE 3 hi G j CSFSAT cc
$1 ALL T-COLDs AND T-HOTs GREATER THAN 350°F CSF SAT UNIT I PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK F-O.4 t
15 SQN 1-FR-O Rev. I ANY T-COLD EXCEEDED COOLDOWN LIMIT Page 7 of 16
C.)
C m-C I
-1 Cl)
O-Cfl 01 C
C RCS Pressure (psig C
C 01 C
C 0
C0 01o0 C,)00 C
C2 CD co 0
I, 0) 0 Ci) 4 CD CD F
-I CD ci CD 1
010 C
CONTAINMENT SON 1-FR-a F-O.5 Rev. I GO TO FR-Z.1 n
GOTO
FR-Z.2 UPPER AND LOWER CONTAINMENT RADIATION MONITORS LESS THAN 100 R/HR GO TO FR-Z.3 I
UIS1 p G NCSF SAT Page 10 of 16
SQN I -FR-C Rev. I Inventory F-0.6 HI GO TO FR-L3 GO TO Y
FR-I.I RVLIS DYNAMIC RANGE GREATER THAN TABLE 3 VALUES GO TO FR-L3 1
GOTO I
FR-LI
iii_G CSFSAT RVLIS DYNAMIC RANGE GREATER THAN TABLE 3 VALUES GO TO FR-L3 CSF SAT Page 11 of 16
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1211 NRC SRO ADMIN A1.b
1211 NRCJPMSROA.1.b Page 2 of 9 SRO JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task:
Perform an RCS Void Determination and Apply the Result to Determine RCS Pump Sweep Requirements.
Task #:
33440100302 Task Standard:
The examinee will:
1.
Determine that the volume required to pressurize the RCS from 50 to 340 psig is 1733 (1733.4 acceptable) gallons.
2.
Evaluates Steps 19, 20 and 21 of GO-i, Section 5.5.1 and determines that sweeps and vents must be continued.
Time Critical Task:
YES:
NO:
X K/A ReferencelRatings:
2.1.7 (4.7)
Method of Testing:
Simulated Performance:
Actual Performance:
X Evaluation Method:
Simulator In-Plant Classroom X
Main Control Room Mock-up Performer:
Trainee Name Evaluator:
I Name I Signature DATE Performance Rating:
SAT:
UNSAT:
Validation Time:
20 minutes Total Time:
Performance Time:
Start Time:
Finish Time:
COMMENTS
1211 NRCJPM SROA.1.b Page 3 of 9 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EVALUATOR:
ToolsiEquipmentiProcedures Needed:
I.
0-GO-I, UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Section 5.5.1 and Appendix E Handout
References:
Reference Title Rev No.
1.
0-GO-l UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO 65 HOT STANDBY 2.
Read to the examinee:
DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.
HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO EXAMINEE AT THIS TIME!
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
1.
0-GO-i, UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY, Section 5.5.1 RCP Sweeps and Vents, is in progress at step 18.
2.
The first 30 second run of #4 RCP is the only RCP sweep that has been completed.
3.
0-GO-i, UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY, Appendix E, RCS Void Volume Determination, has been completed through step 10.
INITIATING CUES:
1.
Complete 0-GO-i, UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY, Appendix E, RCS Void Volume Determination, starting at step ii to determine the volume (total makeup) that was required during the pressurization of the RCS from 50 psig to 340 psig.
2.
Based on your review determine the required actions (if any) to be taken.
1211 NRCJPMSROA.1.b Page 4 of 9 Start Time STEP 1
Obtain a copy of GO-i, UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO SAT HOT STANDBY, Appendix E, RCS Void Volume Determination, and Section 5.5.1 Individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Maintenance UNSAT Activities.
Copy of GO-i, UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT Standard:
STANDBY, Appendix E, RCS Void Volume Determination, and Section 5.5.1 Individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Maintenance Activities.
Provide a copy of GO-I, UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN Cue TO HOT STANDBY, Appendix E, RCS Void Volume Determination, and
Section 5.5.1 Individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Maintenance Activities.
Comment 1.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOPS FILLED STEP 2
DETERMINATION.
[111 DETERMINE volume required to pressurize the RCS U
S T from 50 psig to 340 psig as follows:
lii.11 Determine makeup volume added based on change in Boric Acid Batch Counter [FQ$2-1 39] totalizer readings.
Final reading Initial reading gallons (step 10)
(Step 6)
Comment
1.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOPS FILLED DETERMINATION.
[112]
Determine makeup volume added based on change in Primary Water Batch Counter [FQ-62-1 42] readings Final reading Initial reading gallons (step 10)
(Step 6) 1211 NRCJPM SROA.1.b Page 5 of 9 STEP 3
1211 NRCJPM SROA.1.b Page 6 of 9 NOTE A higher final VCT level will result in the change in VCT level being subtracted from total totalizer change 1.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOPS FILLED DETERMINATION.
(12]
DETERMINE total volume required to pressurize RCS
+
+1-Examinee adds 709 gallons, 429 gallons and 595 gallons and Standa determines the total makeup required to be 1733 gallons. (1733.4 is CRITICAL acce table)
Comment Examiner The following actions are taken from GO-i, UNIT STARTUP FROM Note:
COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY, Section 5.5.1, RCP Sweeps and Vents.
STEP 6
SAT change in Boric change in Pn.
change in Total makeup Acid totalizer Water totahzer VCT level required (Stepll.1)
(Stepli2)
(Stepii4)
UNSAT
Comment 1211 NRCJPM SROA.i.b Page 7 of 9 QTED 7
5.5.1 Individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Maintenance Activities (continued)
UNSAT
[191 IF total makeup required in App. E is less than or equal to 465 gal Standard Examinee evaluates step 19 of GO-i, Section 5.5.1 and determines step is N/A.
Comment 5.5.1 Individual RCP Sweeps and vents Following Maintenance STEP 8
Activities (continued)
[20j IF total makeup required in App. E is between 465 gal UNSAT and 1723 gal Standar&
Examinee evaluates step 20 of GO-i, Section 5.5.1 and determines step is N/A.
Comment 5.5.1 Individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Maintenance STEP 9
Activities (continued)
[211 IF total makeup required (App. E) is greater than 1723 gal UNSAT OR additional RCP sweeps and vents are desired, THEN PERFORM the following:
[21.11 IF sweeps and vents have NOT been completed for all four individual RCS loops, THEN GO TO Step 5.5.1[6].
C 1
- l_1,*
1211 NRCJPM SROA.1.b Page 8 of 9 rrminating The JPM is terminated when the Examinee returns the JPM STOP Cue:
briefing sheet to the Examiner.
Stop Time
JPM BRIEFING SHEET DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
The examiner will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
1.
0-GO-i, UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY, Section 5.5.1 RCP Sweeps and Vents, is in progress at step 18.
2.
The first 30 second run of #4 RCP is the only RCP sweep that has been completed.
3.
0-GO-I, UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY, Appendix E, RCS Void Volume Determination, has been completed through step 10.
INITIATING CUES:
1.
Complete 0-GO-i, UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY, Appendix E, RCS Void Volume Determination, starting at step 11 to determine the volume (total makeup) that was required during the pressurization of the RCS from 50 psig to 340 psig.
2.
Based on your review determine the required actions (if any) to be taken.
Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.
HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.
[
SQN UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD 0-GO-I Unit I & 2 SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0065 Page 44 of 155 Unit I
Date 5.5 RCS Sweeps and Vents Following Maintenance Activities 5.51 Individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Maintenance Activities C9N Starting RCP with a large AT between RCS and SIGs (secondary side warmer than primary side) could lead to a rapid RCS pressure change. Maximum delta T shall be limited to 25°F.
During UIC16 RFO, 12,385 gallons of borated water was required for sweeps and vents.
PERFORM 0-Sl-OPS-000-004.O on an hourly basis to verify 5
temperatures greater than 70°F (TRM 4.7.2).
N Use of an isolation valve on vent hose is specified to avoid spilling borated water on reactor vessel head when hose is dIsconnected later.
ç7 ENSURE temporary manual valve installed at hose connection for r68-5971 Reactor Vessel vent valve.
NOTIFY Chemistry and Radiation Protection RCS sweeps and Vents activities will be performed.
ENSURE FCV-68-340D1 and IFCV-68-340B1, Normal Spray valves OPEN.
/7 RCP sweeps and vents could cause a crud burst which could impact filter DIP.
,fj NOTIFY AUO to periodically monitor seal water injection filter and reactor coolant filter DfP during and following sweeps and vents.
SQN UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD 0-GO-I Unit I & 2 SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0065 Page4SoflSS Unit I
Date
)A.-i 5.5.1 individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Maintenance Activities (continued)
N4ES P Starting RCP #4 FIRST is preferred in order to sweep air AWAY from the RHR suction on the Loop 4 hot leg.
Ø Each RCP will need individual copy of this subsection for each sweep performed on a loop. Preparations in I (2)-SO-68-2 for RCP start may be in progress on all RCPs to be started prior to completion of this subsection.
(çJ5 SELECTRCPtobeSTARTED, PUMP
/ /
RCPNo,4 El RCPNo.1 D
RCPNo.2 El RCPNo.3 El VERIFY instruments necessary for RCP operation are
/
available.
ON Performing sweeps and vents with PCV-62-81 in AUTO could result in erratic RCS pressure changes and possible overpressure condition. (INPO OE 25091)
ENSURE fjiiC-62-81A1 Letdown Pressure Control in MANUAL.
çj5 WHEN RCS pressure is greater than 100 psig, THEN ENSURE [FCV-62-631, seal return isolation valve OPEN using IHS-62-63A1.
ENSURE [FCV-62-611, seal return isolation valve OPEN using IHS-62-61A1, INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY IFCV-62-631, seal return isolation valve is OPEN.
Iv
SON UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD 0-GO..1 Unit I & 2 SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0065 Page 46 of 155 Unit I
Date 1-5.5.1 Individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Maintenance Activities (continued)
INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY IFCV-62-611, seal return isolation valve is OPEN.
IV CAjN RCS pressure should be maintained at approximately 340 psig. This will provide the greatest margin from the setpoint of the RHR system relief valves and ensure adequate RGP seal DIP.
Flows in the following step may be mismatched to stabilize pressure when RCP is started.
ADJUST [HIC-62-81A1 and/or [HIC-62-93A] to stabilize RCS
pressure at -34O psig.
NOTE Prior to unit cooldowri each Loose Parts Monitoring Channel for shutdown unit is placed in Inhibit to eliminate unnecessary nuisance alarms. Therefore, manual monitoring is required during RCP starts (ref. GOl-6 Sect. W).
4 MONITOR Loose Part Monitoring System (Aux Inst Rm O-R139) for abnormal noise during each RCP start.
CAUTIONS Operators should be alert for pressure changes when RCP is started. Expected Y
response is a drop in pressure due to slight temperature drop as flow is circulated through SIGs and air is compressed.
RCS pressure should be controlled within the following limits:
RCP seal DIP greater than 220 psid.
RCS pressure less than 405 psig (RHR press high alarm, M-6C window E-7).
This prevents lifting RHR reliefs and provides margin from LTOPS setpoint.
If any uncontrollable RCS pressure changes occur, RCP should be immediately V
stopped to allow restoring RCS pressure.
START selected RCP per 1(2)-SO-68-2.
SQN UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD 0-GO-I Unit I & 2 SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0065 Page 47 of 155 Unit I
Date 1°AA-i 5.5.1 Individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Maintenance Activities (continued) 43 WHEN selected RCP has been operated for 30 seconds 7
AND has been STOPPED, THEN CONTINUE with step 5.5I[14].
ADJUST IHIC-62-81Aj and!or [HIC-62-93A1 to initiate RCS V
pressure reduction to 50 psig,
[
WHEN RCS pressure is less than 100 psig, THEN CLOSE [FCV-62-631, seal return isolation valve.
ROS pressure reduction is acceptable when venting head and pressurizer.
[( PERFORM Appendix F to vent reactor head.
PERFORM the following to vent the pressurizer:
?j OPEN one pressurizer PORV.
WHEN level rise observed in PRT, 7
THEN CLOSE pressurizer PORV.
If Appendix E cannot be completed due to equipment unavailability, then Steps 5.5.1 [1 81 through 5.5.1[201 should be marked N/A. Additional sweeps and vents will be performed in Step 5.5,1[21).
WHEN reactor head and pressurizer have been vented, THEN PERFORM Appendix E, RCS Void Volume Determination.
SQN UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD 0.00-1 Unit I & 2 SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0065 Page 48 of 155 Unit_______
Date 5.51 individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Maintenance Activities (continued)
[19]
IF total makeup required in App. E is less than or equal to 465 gal AND no further sweeps and vents are desired, THEN PERFORM the following:
[19.1]
RECORD the following in narrative log:
no further sweeps and vents are required credit CANNOT be taken for a filled RCS and 2 S/Gs per Tech Spec LCO 3.4.1.4 UNTIL the RCS is pressurized to 150 psig.
[19.2]
MARK Steps 5.5.1(20] and 5.5.1(21] as N/A.
EJ
[19.3]
GO TO Section 5.3 Step 5.3(22].
0
[20]
IF total makeup required in App. E is between 465 gal and 1723 gal AND no further sweeps and vents are desired, THEN PERFORM the following:
[20.1)
RECORD the following in narrative log:
no further sweeps and vents are required credit CANNOT be taken for filled RCS and 2 S/Gs per Tech Spec LCO 3.4.1.4 UNTIL two opposing loop RCPs are in service (after bubble is drawn).
[20.2]
MARK Step 5.5.1(21] as N/A.
0
[20.3]
GO TO Section 5.3 Step 5.3(22].
0
SQN UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD 0GO-1 Unit 1 & 2 SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev 0065 Page 49 of 155 Unit_______
Date 5.5.1 Individual RCP Sweeps and Vents Following Maintenance Activities (continued)
[21]
IF total makeup required (App. E) is greater than 1723 gal OR additional RCP sweeps and vents are desired, THEN PERFORM the following:
[21.1]
IF sweeps and vents have NOT been completed for all four individual RCS loops, THEN GO TO Step 5.5.1[6].
U
[21.2]
IF sweeps and vents are complete for all individual RCS loops, THEN PERFORM Section 5.5.2 for Multiple RCP Sweeps.
End of Section
SQN UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD 0-GO-f Unit I & 2 SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0065 Page 144 of 155 Appendix E (Page 1 of 4)
RCS VOID VOLUME DETERMINATION Unit Date I41 1.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOPS FILLED DETERMINATION.
Ø MONITOR RCS pressure rise by using of the following:
EQUIPMENT INDICATION NUMBER RCS Hot Leg Press Wide Range P-68-68A (P0499A)
Ij RCS Hot Leg Press Wide Range P1-68-62 (P2000A) f5 ADJUST IHIC-62-81A1 and/or LHIC-62-93A1 as necessary to maintain RCS pressure stable at 50 psig.
This appendix will require raising RCS pressure to 340 psig. Performance of 0-SI-OPS-000-004.0 is required to verify SIG temperature prior to exceeding 200 psig.
This SI must be repeated hourly thereafter UNTIL RCS and S/G pressures are less than 200 psig OR until an RCP is placed in service.
4P PERFORM 0-Sl-OPS-000-004.0 on an hourly basis to verify SIG temperatures greater than 70°F (TR 4.7.2).
p ENSURE RCS temperature is between 85°F and 105°F.
ENSURE VCT makeup system is aligned for AUTO operation in accordance with 0-SQ-62-7, Boron Concentration Control.
j SQN UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD 0-GO-I Unit I & 2 SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0065 L
Pagel45of 155 Appendix E (Page 2 of 4)
RCS VOID VOLUME DETERMINATION Unit t
Date l0M._1 I0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOPS FILLED DETERMINATION. (continued)
)
RECORD the following initial values:
5 VCT level using one of the following:
Computer point [LOl 12A] (
OR VCT level indicator [Ll-62-129]
Boric Acid Batch Counter [FQ-62-1 39] totalizer 1H9q1 i1 Primary Water Batch Counter [FQ-62-142] totalizer y
9AJtON Charging flow must be maintained witakeup capacity. CCP suction must remain aligned to VCT to allow accurate measurement of volume changed ADJUST IHIC-62-BIA1 and/or [HIC-62-93A1 to raise RCS T
pressure to 340 psig.
,$J1 WHEN RCS pressure is greater than 100 psig, 7
THEN OPEN IFCV-62-631, seal return isolation valve using IHS-62-63A1.
OPEN IFCV-62-611, seal return isolation valve using IHS-62-61A1.
[j iNDEPENDENTLY VERIFY IFCV-62-631, seal return isolation valve is OPEN.
INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY 1FCV-62i], seal return Isolation valve is OPEN.
I SQN UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD 0-GO-I I
Unit I & 2 SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0065 L
Pagel46of 155 Appendix E (Page 3 of 4)
RCS VOID VOLUME DETERMINATION Unit I
Date I2M-1 1.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOPS FILLED DETERMINATION. (continued)
JJ WHEN RCS pressure is 340 psig,
THEN ADJUST IHIC-62-81A1 and/or EHIC-62-93A1 as necessary to maintain RCS pressure stable at 340 psig.
RECORD the following final values:
VCT level using one of the following:
Computer point [1.01 12A]
2.9 1
OR VCT level indicator [LI-62-129]
Boric Acid Batch Counter [FQ-62-1 39] totalizer Y-7ii5V r
Primary Water Batch Counter [FQ-62-1 42] totalizer Jj1 DETERMINE volume required to pressurize the RCS from 50 psig to 340 psig as follows:
Determine makeup volume added based on change jn Boric Acid Batch Counter [FQ-62-1 393 totalizer readings.
Final reading Initial reading gallons (step 10)
(Step 6)
[11.2]
Determine makeup volume added based on change in Primary Water Batch Counter [FQ-62-142] readings.
Final reading Initial reading gallons (step 10)
(Step 6)
SQN UNIT STARTUP FROM COLD 0-GO-I Unit I & 2 SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0065 Page 147 of 155 Appendix E (Page 4 of 4)
RCS VOID VOLUME DETERMINATION Unit_______
Date 1.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOPS FILLED DETERMINATION. (continued)
[11.3]
Determine change in VCT level.
Initial level Final level
% change (step 6)
(Step 10)
[11.4]
Convert VCT level change to gallons as follows:
X 19.27
=
% change gallons I %
gallons (step 11.3)
NOTE A higher final VCT level will result in the change in VCT level beIng subtracted from total totalizer change.
[12]
DETERMINE total volume required to pressurize RCS.
+
+1-change in Boric change in Pri.
change in Total makeup Acid totalizer Water totalizer VCT level required (Step 11.1)
(Step 11.2)
(Step 11.4)
End of Section
SQN UNIT STARTUP 0-GO-I Unit I & 2 SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0063 Page 144 of 151 Appendix E (Page 3 of 4)
RCS VOID VOLUME DETERMINATION Unit 1
Date REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOPS FiLLED DETERMINATION. (continued)
WHEN RCS pressure is 340 psig, THEN ADJUST [HIC-62-81A1 and/or [HIC-62-93A1 as necessary to maintain RCS pressure stable at 340 psig.
RECORD the following final values:
VCT level using one of the followIng:
/
Computer point [LOII2A]
Z 7 OR VCT level indicator [Ll-62-1 29]
Boric Acid Batch Counter [FQ-62-1 39] totalizer 51iO Primary Water Batch Counter [FQ-62-142] totalizer DETERMINE volume required to pressurize the RCS r
from 50 psig to 340 psig as follows:
[11.1]
Determine makeup volume added based on change in totalizer readings.
[11.2]
Determine makeup volume added based on change in Primary Water Batch Counter tFQ-62-1421 readings.
Final reading Initial reading gallons (step 10)
(Step 6) 1.0 7S1SD
- 79 1
-ILHI
= 7 0cL Final reading Initial reading gallons (step 10)
(Step 6)
I SON UNIT STARTUP FROI COLD 10-GO-I Unit I & 2 SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY Rev. 0063 Page 145 of 151 Appendix E (Page4of4)
RCS VOID VOLUME DETERMINATION Unit 1
Date 1.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOOPS FILLED DETERMINATION. (continued)
[11.3]
Determine change in VCT level.
Initial level Final level
% change (step 6)
(Step 10)
[11.4]
Convert VCT level change to gallons as follows:
9 X
19.27
=
S7 4
% change gallons I %
gallons (step 11.3)
ØE A higher final VCT level will result in the change in VCT level being subtracted from total totalizer change.
to pressurize RCS.
change in Boric Acid totalizer (Step 11.1) change in Pri.
Water totalizer (Step 11.2)
END OF TEXT Lf iij i p1 L
+
q25 sq
=
1733q change in Total makeup VCT level required (Step 11.4)
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1211 NRC RO ADMIN A2
1211 NRCJPMROA.2 Page 2 of 9 SRO JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task:
Perform a Reactivity Balance Calculation using 0-SO-62-7, Appendix E Task#:
0040070101 Task Standard:
Examinee performs 0-SO-62-7 Appendix E, Reactivity Balance Calculation and determines a dilution is required to reduce RCS boron concentration by 100 ppm. (100 to 104 is allowed)
Time Critical Task:
YES:
NO:
X KIA ReferencelRatings:
2.2.12 (3.7)
Method of Testing:
Simulated Performance:
Actual Performance:
X Evaluation Method:
Simulator In-Plant Classroom X
Main Control Room Mock-up Performer:
Trainee Name Evaluator:
I Name I Signature DATE Performance Rating:
SAT:
UNSAT:
Validation Time:
30 minutes Total Time:
Performance Time:
Start Time:
Finish Time:
COMMENTS
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EVALUATOR:
1211 NRCJPM ROA.2 Page 3 of 9 ToolslEquipmentIProcedures Needed:
1.
O-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Control Appendix E
References:
Reference Title Rev No.
I 1.
0-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Control Appendix 65 Read to the examinee:
DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM.
I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.
HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO EXAMINEE AT THIS TIME!
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
1.
Unit 1 is in MODE 1, Cycle 19 with initial conditions as follows:
2.
Time in Core Life is 200 MWD/MTU.
3.
Power is at 25%.
4.
Boron Concentration 1400 ppm.
5.
CBDl85steps.
6.
Current Xenon concentration is -2430 pcm FINAL CONDITIONS:
1.
Power 100%.
2.
GB D 228 steps.
3.
Final projected Xenon concentration will be -2250 pcm.
4.
Power change rate is 3%/hour.
INITIATING CUES:
1.
Perform steps 1 and 2 of 0-SO-62-7, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL Appendix E, Reactivity Balance calculation.
2.
Determine the change in boron concentration, round to the nearest whole number ppm.
1211 NRCJPMROA.2 Page 4 of 9 Start Time STEP 1
SAT Obtain a copy of O-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Control, Appendix E Reactivity Balance Calculation.
UNSAT Standard Copy of O-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Control, Appendix E Reactivity Balance Calculation is obtained.
Cue Provide a copy of 0-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Control, Appendix E Reactivity Balance Calculation.
Comment REACTIV)TY BALANCE CALCULATION NOTE I One calcuation is required for each major change. Cajta5on is an apprximaon of required Boron change Eyeball interpolation of graphs is expected.
NOTE 2 Dilution or Boration value for power clange from Pf % to P% power irt lime period Twith rods moving from step poaitiort Ri to R. (Subscript convention:
1 = current point, 2 = target point)
(lj ENTER the following data STEP 2
DATA REQUIRED DATA Where To Get SAT Current RCS Baron ppm Chem Lab or Estimate usIng P.ppendis 0 Core Bumup MWD(MTU ICS UCI9EI UNSAT CurrentReactorpower NlSorlC5 Final Reactor power As required for plant condItions TotsI Reactor Power change Current and final Reactor power Rate of Reactor power change
%Ihr As required for plant conditions Number of hours to change power hr(a)
As required for plant conditions ICS or MCR Board Current Rod Position steps Estimate number of rod steps required to Final Rod Position steps control il and rod withdrawal requirements for power change.
Examinee records the data from O-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Standard:
Control, Appendix E Reactivity Balance Calculation.
Comment Examiner The start data is provided to the examinee on the JPM briefing sheet.
Note:
1211 NRCJPMROA.2 Page 5 of 9 CAUTION Follow sign conventions explicitly. (See Example Powef Ascension and Power Reduction.)
Figure 1 UICI9 Power Defect 801 NOTE Use eye-bal1 interpolation between closest parameter lines.
STEP 3
[21 CAICU LATE change a boron concentratton by pertormng the following:
Parameter f
Where To Get Calculation vatue Attaohatt Powar Ofot Garven (al P 3ratl Figee I 2 c,3 PD PD
=
Ltnit2Fie8,ga,1o SAT U NSAT
1211 NRCJPMROA.2 Page 6 of 9 flgure 4 UICI9 Inserted Rod Worth BOL NOTE Use eye-baIr thterpdation between cksest parameter Ithes.
12]
CAlCULATE cbange n boron concenirabon by pertonmng the fohowing:
STEP 5
I Parameter Where To Get CalculnUon Value I
SAT c} p AhedRodWothCnrow:
ROIS
- Rods, i,1i3 e
UNSAT Standard:
Examinee determines reactivity change for control rods is +300 pcm.
CRITICAL Comment Examiner Refer to 0-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Control, Appendix E Figure 4.
Note:
Examiner Initial and final rod positions were given in the initial conditions.
Note:
1211 NRCJPMROA.2 Page 7 of 9 (2]
CALCULATE change in boron concentration by perfonmng the following:
Parameter Where To Get Calculation Value l] P va (GIANGE IN noccc*t PEACTCJIN)
X (1)
STEP 7
SAT UNSAT
1211 NRC JPM ROA.2 Page 8 of 9 Terminating The JPM is complete when the examinee returns the JPM briefing STOP Cue:
sheet to the Examiner.
Figure 7 1J1C19 Differential Boron Worth NOTE Use eye-bair inte poiaton between closest parameter lines, 121 CAI,CULATE cflare n boron concentrabor, by pertormeg the foting:
STEP 8
Parameter Where T Get Calcutatton Value SAT (V3 Appm CR coEru
(
1.1 p oc)
÷ (
pnn,Ippnr boron Worth
=
U NSAT frneFrg7J-1)nrrgl4J-2 Comment Examiner Refer to O-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Control, Appendix E Figure 7 Note:
to determine the differential boron worth of -6.18 to 6.17 pcm/ppm.
Examiner Note:
Initial boron concentration was given in the initial conditions.
Stop Time
JPM BRIEFING SHEET DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
The examiner will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
1.
Unit us in MODE 1, Cycle 19 with initial conditions as follows:
2.
Time in Core Life is 200 MWD/MTU.
3.
Power is at 25%.
4.
Boron Concentration 1400 ppm.
5.
CBDl85steps.
6.
Current Xenon concentration is -2430 pcm FINAL CONDITIONS:
1.
Power 100%.
2.
CBD228 steps.
3.
Final projected Xenon concentration will be -2250 pcm.
4.
Power change rate is 3%/hour.
INITIATING CUES:
1.
Perform steps I and 2 of 0-SO-62-7, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL Appendix E, Reactivity Balance calculation.
2.
Determine the change in boron concentration, round to the nearest whole number ppm.
Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.
HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.
SQN 1,2 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 0-SO-627 Rev. 65 Page 164 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 1 of 18 REACTIVITY BALANCE CALCULATION NOTE I One calculation is required for each major change. Calculation is an approximation of required Boron change. Eyeball interpolation of graphs is expected.
NOTE 2 Dilution or Boration value for power change from P1 % to P2 % power in time period T with rods moving from step position R1 to R2 (Subscript convention:
1 = current point, 2 = target point)
[1]
ENTER the following data:
DATA REQUIRED DATA Where To Get Current RCS Boron ppm Chem Lab or Estimate using Appendix 0 Core Burnup MWD/MTU ICS U0981 Current Reactor power NIS or ICS Final Reactor power As required for plant conditions Total Reactor Power change A Current and final Reactor power Rate of Reactor power change
%/hr As required for plant conditions Number of hours to change power hr(s)
As required for plant conditions ICS or MCR Board Current Rod Position steps Estimate number of rod steps required to Final Rod Position steps control Al and rod withdrawal requirements for power change.
SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL O-SO-62-7 1,2 Rev, 65 Page 165 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 2 of 18 CAUTION Follow sign conventions explicitly. (See Example Power Ascension and Power Reduction.)
[2]
CALCULATE change in boron concentration by performing the following:
Parameter Where To Get Calculation Value Attached Power Defect Curves:
(negative Ia] tP POWER DEFECT Unit 1: Figure 1, 2, or 3 pcm PD.,
PD 2 =
for power (current)
POWER DEFECT raise)
Unit 2: Figure 8, 9, or 10.
Xenon,; From ICS* or REACTF (either current conditions or projection to initial condition)
NOTE: Xenon reactivity must be negative (negative for rise in
[b]
XENON Xenon 2
- From ICS* or REACTF Xenon (projection over time period T).
pcm XE 2 -
XE 1 =
pcm conc) iip XENON
(current)
[c] p RODS Attached Rod Worth Curves:
(negative Rods 2 -
Rods 1 =
Unitl:Figure4,5,or6 pcm forrod (current)
Unit 2: Figure 11, IZ or 13.
IP RODS insertion)
[d] Lp POWER DEFECT. XENON + RODS (CHANGE IN REACTIVY DUE TO POWER DEFECT, XENON, AND RODS)
M pcm Ap POWER DEFECT +
fl1 pcm p XENON +
Ed pcm p RODS
[e] Ap BORON (CHANGE IN BORON REACTIVITY) pcm
(
[dI pcmAp POWEROEFECT÷XENON+RODS) X (1) = tri BORON
[f] Appm BORON (CHANGE IN BORON CONCENTRATION)
(negative for dilution,
(
M POrn Ap BORON) ÷ (
pcmlppm Boron Worth) ppm positive for boration) from Fig. 7 (U-I) or Fig. 14 (U-2)
[3]
ENSURE independently verified by SRO in accordance with Appendix J.
(N/A if performed by an SRO to verify data provided by Rx. Eng)
SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 0-SO-62-7 1,2 Rev. 65 Page 166 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 3 of 18 Example Power Ascension NOTE Typical values displayed in this example are Unit and Cycle specific, however, the following example indicates proper sign convention.
Current RCS boron 1000 ppm Core burnup 3000 MWD/MTU Current reactor power 70%
Final reactor power 100%
Total reactor power change 30%
Rate of reactor power change 5%/hr Number of hours to change power 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Current rod position 180 steps Final Rod Position 220 steps Reactivity Balance:
[a]
Ap Power Defect
= 1210 porn PDI 1720 pem PD2
= 510 pcm
[b]
Lp Xenon
= 2262 pcm XE2 (2436) pcm XE1
= +174 porn
[C]
Ap Rs 10 porn Rods2 (275) porn Rods I
= +265 pcm
[d] zp POWER DEFECT + XENON + RODS = 510 porn + 174 pcm + 265 porn
= 71 pcm
[e] Ap BORON 71 porn x (I) = + 71 pcm Change in Boron PPM:
[II (+71) porn Boron ÷ (6.35) pcm/pprn Boron worth = 11 ppm (dilution)
I SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 0-SO-62-7 1,2 Rev. 65 L
PagelG7of2Ol APPENDIX E Page 4 of 18 Example Power Reduction NOTE Typical values displayed in this example are jQ Unit and Cycle specific, however, the following example indicates proper sign convention.
Current RCS boron 500 ppm Core burnup 18000 MWD/MTU Current reactor power 100%
Final reactor power 80%
Total reactor power change
-20%
Rate of reactor power change
-5%/hr Number of hours to change power 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Current rod position 220 steps Final Rod Position 200 steps Reactivity Balance:
[a]
PPOWDeTe
= 2630 porn PDI 2100 porn PD2
= +530 porn
[b]
PXenon
= 3030 porn XE2 (2884) pcrn XEI
= 146 pcm
[c] p Rs
= 220 pcm Rods2 (20) pcm Rods I
= 200 pcm
[d] ip POWER DEFECT + XENON + RODS = +530 porn + (146 pcm) + (200 porn) = +184 porn
[e] zp BORON= +184 porn x (1) = 184 pcm Change in Boron PPM:
[f] (184) pcm Boron
-- (7.47) pornfppm Boron worth = +25 ppm (boration)
SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL O-SO-62-7 1,2 Rev. 65 Page 168 of 201 NOTE APPENDIX E Page 5 of 18 Figure 1 UICI9 Power Defect BOL Use eye-ball interpolation between closest parameter lines.
--rr 7
-.--z--
F
-7
z-7 7---
7
-::E::E:E:
--4Z
EEE::::EEEEEE___
1000 ppm 1400 ppm 1800 ppm UNIT I CYCLE 19 POWER DEFECT
- BOL (150 4,000 MWDIMTU) 1800 1700 1600 1500 1400 1300 1200 1100 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Power Level (%)
70 80 90 100
Reference:
NDR Table 6-23 to 6-27
I SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 0-SO-62-7 12 Rev. 65 L
Page 169of 201 NOTE APPENDIX E Page 6 of 18 Figure 2 UICI9 Power Defect MOL Use eye-ball interpolation between closest parameter lines.
El III IEEE II 11111111 zEzIzzEzzzzIzlIE.E; EEEEEzE EzIzEEzzE:
UNIT I CYCLE 19 POWER DEFECT
- MOL (10,000 MWD/MTU) 2200 2100 2000 4x ppm 1900 1800 1700 9O ppm 1600 1500 l400ppm 1400 1300 1200 1100 EEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
-7
800 700 600
500 400
--..4.-__
300 200 E!EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE 100 ZIZIIEIEEEEEE 0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Power Level (%)
Reference:
NDR Table 6-23 to 6-27.
SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL O-SO-62-7 1,2 Rev. 65 Page l7Oof 201 APPENDIX E Page 7 of 18 Figure 3 UICI9 Power Defect EOL NOTE Use eye-ball interpolation between closest parameter lines.
UNIT I CYCLE 19 POWER DEFECT - EOL (16,000
- 22,655 MWDIMTU) 3000
2900 Oppm 2800 2700=--
2600--------=
2500
2400 2300
2200
= = =
=
=
=
2100=
=== z = = =
2000
1900
=
>1800
1600
=
=
=
Z
=
=
1500==Z=======ZZZ=======
1400
- --i 2EE E 1300 r1200====_==;======
1100 1000 900 700
=
=
=
= = = =
600===
500
=
=
= = = = = = = = = = = = = =
400
300
200
100 0
o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Power Level (%)
Reference:
NDR Table 6-23 to 6-27
SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL O-SO-62-7 1,2 Rev. 65 Page 171 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 8 of 18 Figure 4 UI C19 Inserted Rod Worth BOL NOTE Use eye-ball interpolation between closest parameter lines.
UNIT I CYCLE 19 BOL INSERTED ROD WORTH (150 -4000 MWDIMTU) 0 20 40 80 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 0-I.
-100-
-200
-300
-400
-500
-600
?
-900
-1100*
-1200
[1300
-1400
-1500
-1600
-1700
-1800
-1900 1111! 1111111
[FF1111 HI F 111111111 Fu D Bank Steps Withdrawn (steps) 1100% Power -75% Power 50% Power.25% Power
--- 0% Power
Reference:
NDR Table 6-34.
SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 0-SO-62-7 1,2 Rev. 65 Page 172 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 9 of 18 Figure 5 UICI9 Inserted Rod Worth MOL NOTE Use eye-ball interpolation between closest parameter lines.
UNIT 1 CYCLE 19 MOL INSERTED ROD WORTH (10,000 MWD1MTU) 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 hrrtr
-100 4 N N.W.1 I I fl fI+I+
If fit I
111111
-400
-500
-600 n
-700
-800
-900 1100
-1200
-1300 p
-1400
-1500
-1600
-1700
-18Q0
-1900 D Bank Steps Withdrawn (steps) 100%Power
50%Power 25%PoWer tv. 0%Powerj
Reference:
NDR Table 6-34.
SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 0-SO-62-7 12 Rev. 65 Page 173 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 10 of 18 Figure 6 UICI9 Inserted Rod Worth EOL NOTE Use eye-ball interpolation between closest parameter lines.
UNIT I CYCLE 19 EOL INSERTED ROD WORTH (16,000
- 22,655 MWD!MTU) 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240
-100
-200-300-
-400
-500
-600
-700
)-800
-900 1100
[1200.
-1300
-1400 D Bank Steps Withdrawn (steps) 100% Power 75% Power
50% Power
.-25% Power
- i. 0% Power
Reference:
NDR Table 6-34.
_J 0
0 0
LIJ IIIINI 111111111A11111111111111 1111111111111111 I1IIIIiII!IIIpIIIIIIIIII Ill IIIIIlIIII1I 111111 Ill 111111 Ill F1 1111111 II1H IiiiIiiIiti 111111 C\\JL)i o
,r 0)
G)
CU
-J0 IxIz0 C) z I
Cl, II LU 0-0)
CU
<0 0
C 20
£0 Cu C
E E0 ci wu::
_jO
>-z zw w
IL ILa
[I TI Ill In 111111
- 00a, 00 C
(N C
o
C0 0
o C
cO C
00 C
0 II all ii 11111 11111 ci) 0)
(I)0 0
C ci) ci) ci)
-Q C0 CU 00 ci)
=
C 10)
> ci) w I0z a
IT!Ill II NI I IIfl III I] I III III IIILIIIIIII I 11111 111111 rtwftUNuhIruhIiw:uU lii 11111 Ii 11111 III II lIllPll II lllIlIIIIlllIlllIIlIlI lIaaiiiii
,:ii j..
I Ij 11111 IIIU II 11111 a
llf
- urauanuwu U tt LTh Ill 11111111 a,0 (N
-J0 I
C C
C0
-J0 000 (N
-J0 1
IIIIlIIIIII[
huh II(4.1 I
111111 1.1114+
I I 11111111 LIII Ill Ill (0
0.)
-a CUI Dz a)
C.)C ci)
Ill IllIllIlIll II It II 1
I II C
liIfffflI ti urrnirii ill Ill LU1ffIfI II liii Ill Ill III 111111 (Ill
.11 II III. 11111 1 I
TI LL 3
ILLU HhlllhIJli 1
INlIIa Ililill 411 IiIff.I III, 111111,,,
II H 11111 111111 IL.
III o
C III Ililiflhll liii LI Iii I
IIIIll IiiIl11IlIlIII1l I I
111111111 Uffi Lu liii I
C C
I (4
II I
C C
a CD CO 0)0 (4
c
)
CD
)
C CDcOCD(0(
t--
p.-
f.
__&x.
hlhlhllhllIllhll
SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 0-SO-62-7 12 Rev. 65 Page 175 of 201 NOTE 1900 1800 1700 1600 1500 1400 1300 1200
- 1100 1000 900 0
Q..
800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0
APPENDIX E Page 12 of 18 Figure 8 U2C18 Power Defect BOL Use eye-ball interpolation between closest parameter lines.
UNIT 2 CYCLE 18 POWER DEFECT - BOL (0-4000 MWD/MTU) 7-I
/
/
/
I z: :: ::
EEEEEEEEEEEHEEEEE
- z:::::::zE::ZZ
- z::::::z::::
0 20 40 60 50 Power Leve (%)
l000ppm
l400ppm
18OCpmj 100
Reference:
NDR Table 6-23 to 6-27, Total Power Defect
I SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL O-SO-62-7 1,2 Rev. 65 L
Page 176of 201 APPENDIX E Page 13 of 18 2300 2200 2100 2000 1900 1800 1700 1600 1500 1400 1300 0
1200 1100
!IOOO 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0
Figure 9 U2C18 Power Defect MOL
Reference:
NDR Table 6-23 to 6-27, Total Power Defect NOTE Use ation between closest UNIT 2 CYCLE 18 POWER DEFECT
- MOL (4000-16000 MWDIATU)
E:E:E:E:+/-:EEE::
E:z::E:E:z:::E:E:::
/
z
= :
7,..
- 7Z::::::
7 LL__
EEE 0
10 20 30 40 60 Power Leve 60
(%)
70 80 0
100
SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL O-SO-62-7 1,2 Rev. 65 Page 177 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 14 of 18 Figure 10 U2C18 Power Defect EOL NOTE Use eye-baIl interpolalion between closest parameter lines.
LJNIT2 CYCLE 18 POWER DEFECT - EOL (16000-20682 MWD!MTIJ) 3100 3000 EEEEEEEEEErEEEEI 2900
2800 EEEZEEEZEEZEEEEEZ 2700
1 2500 2200
2100----
EEE :zEI 1600 0
. 1700
1800 6----
1500 :EEEEE:EE2-E:EEE:ZE 1400
&°° EEEE:EEEE:EEEEE 1200 1100 1000 900.11 :
- 111:111 700
500 ---p 400 E1111111__
300 200
100
0
0 20 40 60 100 Power Level (%)
Opprn
-500 ppm
iooornj
Reference:
NDR Table 6-23 to 6-27, Total Power Defect
T SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL O-SO-62-7 J
1,2 Rev. 65
[
Page 178 of 201 NOTE APPENDIX E Page 15 of 18 Figure 11 U2C18 Inserted Rod Worth BOL Use eye-ball interpolation between closest parameter lines.
I
Reference:
NDR Table 6-34, HFP Integral Rod Worth as a function of Steps withdrawn and burnup for Banks CD, CC, CB in overlap.
UNIT 2 CYCLE 18 BOL INSERTED ROD WORTH (0-4000 MWDIMTU) 0
-100
-200
-400
-600
-600
-700 B00 1000 o
-1100 i ::::
t.
1200
/
-1300 400
-1500 7,,
-1600
-1700
- fl((HflHHU 0
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 V B3nk Steps Withdrawn (steps) 100%Power
-75%-Pwe 50%Power
- 25%Powe 0%Power
SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL O-SO-62-7 1,2 Rev. 65 Page 179 of 201 NOTE APPENDIX B Page 16 of 18 Figure 12 U2C18 Inserted Rod Worth MOL Use eye-ball interpolation between closest parameter lines.
UNIT 2 CYCLE 18 MOL INSERTED ROD WORTEI (4000.16000 MWD1MTU i:::::::::::::::::::::::::::
---p;,-
40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 0 Brnik Steps Withdrawn (steps) 100% Power. 7% Power 50% Power
- 25% Power a%.Powerj
Reference:
NDR Table 6-34, HFP Integral Rod Worth as a function of Steps withdrawn and burnup for Banks CD, CC, GB in overlap.
0
-100
-200
-300
-400
-500 00 700
-900 0
-1000
-1100
-1200
-1300
-1400
-1600
-1500
-1700
-1800
-1900
-2000 0
20 220 240
j SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL O-SO-62-7 f
1,2 Rev. 65 L
PagelBOof2Ol APPENDIX E Page 17 of 18 Figure 13 1J2C18 Inserted Rod Worth EOL NOTE Use eye-balI interpolation between closest parameter lines.
LJNIT2CYCLE 18 EOL INSERTED ROD WORTH (16000-20682 MWDIMTU) 0
-100
.200 300
-400
-500 1
-600
/
-700-
-600 U-900 p
b0O0
-1100
-1200 ft 1300
-14001111111111111 iIIII1lIIiII1,1:
1sooHII11IIIfI
-16001111 III I IY, 111111111 V
.1700 1!
-1800
/
/ /
-2000
-2100 0
20 40 60 60 100 120 140 160 160 200 220 244) 0 Bank Steps Withdrawn (stepa) 100%PafA-er
--- Th%Pot 5D%Pow 25%Pewr
Reference:
NOR Table 6-34,
- HFP integral Rod Worth as a function of Steps withdrawn and burnup for Banks CD, CC, CB in overlap.
SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL j O-SO-62-7 1,2 Rev.
jPage 181 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 18 of 18 Figure 14 U2C18 Differential Boron Worth NOTE Use eye-ball interpolation between closest parameter lines.
UNIT2 CYCLE 18 DIFFERENTIAL BORON WORTH (pcmIppm)
-6.0 BOL
-6.1 42
-6.3 p-
-64
-8.5 4.6
-68 SEESSEE S SE ES SEE SESESEE SEES SE
-70
-7.1 EOL
-72
.73
-7.4
-7.5 0
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 8oonQoricentration (ppm)
SOL (0-4000)
, MOL (4000-18000)
EOL (16000-20632J
Reference:
NDR Table 6-7, HFP Differential Boron Worth
SQN BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL O-SO-62-7 1,2 Rev. 65 12.
I I R L Q
Page 165 of 201 APPENDIX E Page 2 of 18 CAUTION Follow sign conventions explicitly. (See Example Power Ascension and Power Reduction.)
[2]
CALCULATE change in boron concentration by performing the following:
Parameter Where To Get Calculation Value Attached Power Defect Curves:
i
?negative
[a] Ep POWER DEFECT Unit 1: Figure 1, 2, or 3 3 0 porn pD 1 -
I 3 Tc pcm PD 2 =
I 2Q pcm for power (current) 1P POWER DEFECT raise)
Unit 2: Figure 8, 9, or 10.
Xenon 1
, From ICS* or REACTF (either current NOTE: Xenon reactivity must be negative (negative conditions or projection to initial condition).
for rise in
[b] tp XENON Xenon 2 From ICS or REACTF Xenon 2Z5D porn XE 2 -
XE 1
pcm conc)
(projection over time period T).
(current)
[C] P RODS Attached Rod Worth Curves:
t pcm Rods 2 -
Rods 1
(negative for rod Unit 1: Figure 4,5, or6 (current)
Unit 2: Figure 11, 12, or 13.
RODS insertion)
[d]
14 POWER DEFECT.XENON+RODS (CHANGE IN REACTIVY DUE TO POWER DEFECT, XENON, AND RODS) porn lal porn Ap POWER DEFECT +
[iJ porn p XENON +
id pcm tp RODS =
( 620 -i -
[e] zp BORON (CHANGE IN BORON REACTIVITY) pcm
(
Ni porn I.p POWER DEFECT + XENON + RODS) X (1) =
[t] ippm BORON (CHANGE IN BORON CONCENTRATION)
(- I, I
L
/ )
- I co 4 - 10%) (negative for dilution,
(
M porn p BORON) ÷ (
I 3 porn/ppm Boron Worth) ppm from Fig. 7 (U-i> or Fig. 14 (U-2)
[3]
ENSURE independently verified by SRO in accordance with Appendix J.
(N/A if performed by an SRO to verify data provided by Rx. Eng) p
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1211 NRC SRO ADMIN JPM A.2
1211 NRC SRO Admin A.2 Page 2 of 8 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task:
Determine the risk level for safety systems as identified by PSA for scheduling maintenance.
Task#:
0001720302 Task Standard:
The Examinee determines the Unit 1 risk level changes from green to orange by using the EQOS test case computer program.
Time Critical Task:
YES:
NO:
X KIA ReferencelRatings:
2.2.14 (3.9/4.3)
Method of Testing:
Simulated Performance:
Actual Performance:
X Evaluation Method:
Simulator In-Plant Classroom X
Main Control Room Mock-up Performer:
Trainee Name Evaluator:
I Name I Signature DATE Performance Rating:
SAT:
UNSAT:
Validation Time:
5 minutes Total Time:
Performance Time:
Start Time:
Finish Time:
COMMENTS
1211 NRC SRO Admin A.2 Page 3 of 8 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EVALUATOR:
Tools!EquipmentlProcedures Needed:
1.
NPG-SPP-09. 11.1 Equipment Out of Service (EOOS) Management 2.
EOOS test case program capability 3.
Ensure the lB-B EDG is removed from service by inserting WO TAGROLLIB using the EOOS test case program
References:
Reference Title Rev No.
1.
NPG-SPP-09.1 1.1 Equipment Out of Service (EOOS) Management 5
Read to the examinee:
DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM.
I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.
HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO EXAMINEE AT THIS TIME!
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
1.
Uniti isinMODEl 2.
lB-B EDG is OOS in preparation for 1-Sl-OPS-082-007.B ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM DIESEL GENERATOR lB-B performance.
3.
lA-A Diesel Generator was found to be unavailable due to loss of jacket water cooling (flood from the heat exchanger.)
INITIATING CUES:
1.
Perform a Risk Assessment for Unit 1 based on the above plant conditions using the EOOS test case program.
2.
Notify the examiner of your results.
1211 NRC SRO Admin A.2 Page 4 of 8 Start Time Obtain a copy of NPG-SPP-09. 1 1.1 Equipment Out of Service (EQOS)
STEP 1
Management.
SAT U NSAT Standard Copy of NPG-SPP-09. 1 1.1 Equipment Out of Service (EOOS)
Management is obtained.
Cue Provide a copy of NPG-SPP-09.1 1.1 Equipment Out of Service
(EOOS) Management.
Comment NOTES 1)
The Operators Screen is typically used to analyze the risk for the current unit configuration.
The What if mode of the Operators Screen may be used to analyze the potential future maintenance configuration.
2)
Changes to the configuration of shared or common systems/components may affect the EOOS model of more than one unit. For example. the unavailability of a diesel generator will have a separate risk impact on each unit.
3)
BFN ONLY
- System alignments in the BFN model can affect EQOS results and therefore must be verified before running an evaluation. Note: The SQN and WBN PRA models do not currently have any system alignments identified.
STEP 2
A.
From appropriately installed location, access EQOS for the desired SAT plant and unit.
UNSAT Standard:
Examinee accesses the test case EQOS program by clicking on the Unit CRITICAL Comment
1211 NRC SRO Admin A.2 Page 5 of 8 STEP B.
Log in using the assigned User Name and Password which are SAT available from the Corporate PRA Group.
UNSAT Standard:
Examinee logs in the test case EQOS program Cue If asked, provide the following cue, The password is OPS.
Comment C. Select the Examinees Screen.
STEP 4
SAT UNSAT The Examinee selects the Examinees Screen from the test case EQOS Standard:
program Comment D. Determine if any Functional Equipment Groups (FEGs) or SAT STEP 5
components are unavailable.
UNSAT Examiner Note The 1 BB EDG was OOS in the initial conditions.
Comment
1211 NRC SRO Admin A.2 Page 6 of 8 E.
Ensure the list of components/FEGs out of service matches the STEP 6
SAT current unit configuration or make updates as necessary. The changes may be made in the What-If mode first to determine the UNSAT risk impact before the component/FEG is actually removed from service.
The Examinee selects lA-A EDG from the drop down menu in the Standard:
CRITICAL change active ftem list in the EOOS test program.
Comment STEP 7
F.
The Examinee determines the step is not applicable.
Comment G. Calculate Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early SAT STEP 8
Release Frequency (LERF) Multiplier (i.e., the risk measure(s) on the Examinees Screen or the risk profile on the Schedulers UNSAT Screen) for the unit configuration using EQOS (Calculate Risk Measure(s) Button).
JTICAL Examiner CDF remains green with a value of approximately 2.44.
Note LERF changes to orange with a value of approximately 7.2.
Comment
Comment 1211 NRC SROAdminA.2 Page 7 of 8 A.
The gilcarce given in this seclion is for clarificalion of the colors shown in EOOS. The values tor KDP and IIERP are based or We caculated UU aid LR1-tar the gven configuration over a seven day penod.
I hese nsk thresholds described in this section are incorporated into the EOOS model. On the Operator Screen, the colors are shown by the risk meters and the CJP Status w-iich is brought up by depressing the Top Probabulties button. Ea& of the thresiods are tiefined below:
3.
Oranj
- Ornqe mprsrds an incr.asd Iul of risk alov yellow. Entry in:o tle oan)e threshold should be i:-ifrequent. Establish ns managernen: actions per NUMARC 3-C1 as given in Attachment 3. In addition, 1VA management expe:taons are to ensure protective measures are established (i.e. rope and slantons around vital equipment).
Terminating The JPM is terminated when the Examinee returns the JPM STOP Cue:
Briefing sheet to the examiner STEP 8
3.2.3 Thresholds for Quantalive EvaILiatoiis SAT UNSAT Examiner The examiner will determine the standard is met by the use of follow-up Note questions.
Stop Time
JPM BRIEFING SHEET DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
The examiner will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
1.
Unit 1 is in MODE 1 2.
lB-B EDG is OOS in preparation for 1-Sl-OPS-082-007.B ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM DIESEL GENERATOR lB-B performance.
3.
lA-A Diesel Generator was found to be unavailable due to loss of jacket water cooling (flood from the heat exchanger.)
INITIATING CUES:
1.
Perform a Risk Assessment for Unit 1 based on the above plant conditions using the EOOS test case program.
2.
Notify the examiner of your results.
Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.
HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1211 NRC SRO ADMIN A3
1211 NRC JPM SROA.3 Page 2 of 8 SRO JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task:
Determine Reporting Requirements for a Contaminated and Injured Worker Task#:
3440030302 Task Standard:
Time Critical Task:
YES:
NO:
X KIA Reference!Ratings:
2.3.14 (3.8)
Method of Testing:
Simulated Performance:
Actual Performance:
X Evaluation Method:
Simulator In-Plant Classroom X
Main Control Room Mock-up Performer:
Trainee Name Evaluator:
/
Name I Signature DATE Performance Rating:
SAT:
UNSAT:
Validation Time:
10 minutes Total Time:
Performance Time:
Start Time:
Finish Time:
COMMENTS
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EVALUATOR:
ToolsiEquipmentlProcedures Needed:
1.
NPG-SPP-03.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements
References:
I NPG-SPP-03.5 Read to the examinee:
DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM.
I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.
HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO EXAMINEE AT THIS TIME!
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
1.
Unit 2 is in a Refueling Outage, no fuel is in the Reactor Vessel.
2.
A vendor was performing work activities in the SIG bowl area.
3.
The vendor was overcome with heat exhaustion and fell into the SIG bowl area.
4.
The fall caused a compound fracture on his right leg that pierced his bubble suit.
5.
Radcon reports the individual was contaminated 9000 cpm in the area of the wound.
6.
Due to congested conditions and other delays in lifesaving activities, the injured individual received an estimated exposure of 16 Rem.
7.
Due to the nature of his injury, he was immediately transferred to Erlanger Hospital.
8.
Site personnel are preparing a news release for immediate delivery to the media.
INITIATING CUES:
1.
You are the Shift Manager.
2.
Determine all applicable (if any) NRC notifications of less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
3.
Determine all applicable (if any) Internal Management Notifications the SHIFT MANAGER is required to make.
4.
Record your answers on the JPM briefing sheet.
1211 NRC JPM SROA.3 Page 3 of 8 L
Reference Title Rev No.
I Regulatory Reporting Requirements 5
1211 NRC JPM SROA.3 Page 4 of 8 Start Time STEP 1
SAT Obtain a copy of NPG-SPP-3.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements.
UNSAT Standard:
Copy of NPG-SPP-3.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements is obtained.
Cue Provide a copy of NPG-SPP-3.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements.
Comment
1211 NRC JPM SROA.3 Page 5 of 8 NOTES 1)
Internal management notification requirements for plant events are found in Appendix U. The Operations Shift Manager is responsible for notifying Site Operations Management and the Duty Plant Manager The Duty Plant Manager is responsible for making the remaining internal management notification&
2>
NRC NUREG-1022, Supplements and subsequent revisions should be used as guidance for determining reportability of plant events pursuant to §50.72 and §50.73.
A text searchable copy of NUREG-1022 is maintained on the WA NPG Nuclear Licensing Webpage at address http:1/tvanweb.cha.tva.gov)licensinglPageslNRC-Industry Guidance Documents.htm -
3.1 Immediate Notification
- NRC STEP 2
SAT WA is required by §5072 to notify NRC immediately if certatn types of events occur. This appendix contains the types of events and the allotted time in which NRC must be notified.
(Refer to Form NPG-SPP-03.5-1 or NRC Form 361). Operations is responsible for making U N SAT the reportability determinations for §50.72 and §50.73 reports. For any event, condition, or issue having the potential for being reportable, contact Site Licensing for consultation and concurrence on the reportabitity determination. In no event shall the lack of licensing concurrence result in a failure to meet specified reporting timeframes. Operations is responsible for making the immediate notification to NRC in accordance with §50.72.
A.
The Immediate Notification Critena of §50.72 is divided into I-hour, 4-hour, and 8-hour phone calls. Notify the NRC Operations Center within the applicable time limit for any item which is identified in the Immediate Notification Criteria.
C.
The following criteria require 4-hour notification:
4.
§50.72(b){2)(xi)
- Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. Such an event may include an onsite fatality or inadvertent release of radioactive contaminated materials.
St d
d-Examinee reviews the data and determines a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> notification to the an ar NRC is required due to the impending news media release.
CRITICAL Comment
NOTE 1211 NRC JPM SROA.3 Page 6 of 8 According to §5012 (b)(3)(vi) events covered by §5012(b)(3)(v) may include one or more procedura errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design.
analysis, fabacation, construction, and/or procedural inadequacies
- However, individual component failures need not be reported pursuant this paragraph if redundant equipment in the same system was operable and available to perform the required safety function.
3.1 Immediate Notification
- NRC STEP 3
SAT WA is required by §5072 to notify NRC immediately if certain types of events occur. This appendix contains the types of events and the allotted time in which NRC must be notitied (Refer to Form NPG-SPP-03.5-1 or NRC Form 361). Operations is responsible for making U N SAT the reportability determinations for §5(172 and §5073 reports. For any event, condition, or issue having the potential for being reportable, contact Site Licensing for consultation and concurrence on the reportability determination In no eent shall the lack of licensing concurrence resut in a failure to meet specified report rig timefrarnes Operations is responsible for making the immedale notification to NRC in accordance with §50 72 D.
The following criteria require 8hour notfication.
5
§50.72(b)(3)(xii)
- Any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment Examinee reviews the data and determines an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> notification to the Standard:
NRC is required due to the required transport of the contaminated and CRITICAL injured worker to Erlanger Hospital.
Comment I
NOTE The Operations Shift Mariaer is responsible for notifytog Site Operatons management and the Ouy Plant Manager. The Duty Plant Manager is esponsibie fcc
[re47aining ttemal management notificatons as noted in the matrix.
STEP 4
Appendix 0 (Page 2 of 21 Site Event Notification Matnx hos, 4 tee. Shoi, picne cats.
Nxti& Re EwetiCondition Outyptet PManagc 0psOutySp&
Site VP Coporafe l
,d 4 hoe cab Yes ice ce 5ps slxcdcves.
secçol I yined xc it hos e,d for less c Comment
1211 NRC JPM SROA.3 Paqe 7 of 8 Terminating The JPM is complete when the examinee returns the JPM briefing STOP Cue:
sheet to the Examiner.
Stop Time
JPM BRIEFING SHEET DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
The examiner will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
1.
Unit 2 is in a Refueling Outage, no fuel is in the Reactor Vessel.
2.
A vendor was performing work activities in the SIG bowl area.
3.
The vendor was overcome with heat exhaustion and fell into the SIG bowl area.
4.
The fall caused a compound fracture on his right leg that pierced his bubble suit.
5.
Radcon reports the individual was contaminated 9000 cpm in the area of the wound.
6.
Due to congested conditions and other delays in lifesaving activities, the injured individual received an estimated exposure of 16 Rem.
7.
Due to the nature of his injury, he was immediately transferred to Erlanger Hospital.
8.
Site personnel are preparing a news release for immediate delivery to the media.
INITIATING CUES:
1.
You are the Shift Manager.
2.
Determine all applicable (if any) NRC notifications of less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
3.
Determine all applicable (if any) Internal Management Notifications the SHIFT MANAGER is required to make.
4.
Record your answers on the JPM briefing sheet.
Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.
HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1211 NRC RO ADMIN A4
1211 NRCJPMROA.4 Page 2 of 6 SRO JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task:
Complete a NRC Event Notification Worksheet Task#:
0001460501 Task Standard:
The examinee completes an Appendix D from procedure EPIP-5, General Emergency with no errors on items annotated with a
- and selects ONE NRC contact number to the NRC as stated on EPIP-5 Appendix D step 2.
Time Critical Task:
YES:
X NO:
KIA ReferencelRatings:
2.4.39 (3.9)
Method of Testing:
Simulated Performance:
Actual Performance:
X Evaluation Method:
Simulator In-Plant Classroom X
Main Control Room Mock-up Performer:
Trainee Name Evaluator:
I Name I Signature DATE Performance Rating:
SAT:
UNSAT:
Validation Time:
10 minutes Total Time:
Performance Time:
Start Time:
Finish Time:
COMMENTS
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EVALUATOR:
1211 NRCJPMROA.4 Page 3 of 6 ToolslEquipmentlProcedures Needed:
1.
EPIP 5, GENERAL EMERGENCY Appendix D 2.
Marked up copy of EPIP 5, GENERAL EMERGENCY Appendix A
References:
Reference Title Rev No.
1.
EPIP-5 GENERAL EMERGENCY 42 Read to the examinee:
DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM.
I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.
HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO EXAMINEE AT THIS TIME!
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
1.
Unit 1 has experienced a Reactor trip and Safety Injection Today at 1500.
2.
Unit 1 was in MODE 1 before the event.
3.
Unit 1 was in MODE 3 after the event.
4.
The Shift Manager declared a General Emergency at 1510.
5.
The reason for the General Emergency is as follows a.
LOSS of the Fuel Clad Barrier EAL Designator 1.1.2.L.
b.
LOSS of the RCS Barrier EAL Designator I.2.3.L.
c.
Potential LOSS of the Containment EAL Designator 1.3.4.L 6.
The Shift Manager has issued a Protective Action Recommendation #2 to the State of Tennessee.
7.
The CECC has not yet been staffed.
INITIATING CUES:
1.
Using the information provided complete an EPIP 5, GENERAL EMERGENCY Appendix D, NOTIFICATION OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.
2.
Notify the Examiner of your results.
1211 NRCJPMROA.4 Page 4 of 6 Start Time STEP 1
SAT Obtain a copy of the in progress State Notification Form Handout and NRC Event Notification Worksheet.
UNSAT Standard:
Copy of NRC Event Notification Worksheet is obtained.
Provide a copy of the completed State Notification Form Handout iA (Appendix A) and a blank NRC Event Notification Worksheet (Appendix D).
Comment NOTES a
NRC Emergency Notification System (ENS) should he used (if available) or, if NRC ENS is unavailable, any plant telephone may be used.
a Ensure prior to making this notification that all previously made emergency classifications have been communicated, Fast breaking plant conditions may have resulted in classifications that have not been officially communicated.
a Completed Appendix A should be used for determining information below.
STEP 2
[1]
COMPLETE applicable portions of table on next page.
U NSAT Standard:
GENERAL EMERGENCY Appendix D with CRITICAL Examiner Note; See copy of the attached key for correct answers.
Comment
[2]
CONTACT NRC USING one of the foIIowng telephone numbers 9-1 may be required):
Main 800-532-3469 OR Backup 1 800-449-3694 OR Backup 2 301-415-0550 Backup 3 301-415-0553 Fax 301-816-5151 301-816-5100 301-951-0550 817-860-8100 1211 NRC JPM ROA.4 Page 5 of 6 Terminating The JPM is complete when the examinee returns the JPM briefing STOP Cue:
sheet to the Examiner.
STEP 3
SAT UNSAT Region IV (alternate site)
Stop Time
JPM BRIEFING SHEET DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
The examiner will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
1.
Unit 1 has experienced a Reactor trip and Safety Injection Today at 1500.
2.
Unit 1 was in MODE 1 before the event.
3.
Unit 1 was in MODE 3 after the event.
4.
The Shift Manager declared a General Emergency at 1510.
5.
The reason for the General Emergency is as follows a.
LOSS of the Fuel Clad Barrier EAL Designator 1.1.2.L.
b.
LOSS of the RCS Barrier EAL Designator 1.2.3.L.
c.
Potential LOSS of the Containment EAL Designator 1.3.4.L 6.
The Shift Manager has issued a Protective Action Recommendation #2 to the State of Tennessee.
7.
The CECC has not yet been staffed.
INITIATING CUES:
1.
Using the information provided complete an EPIP 5, GENERAL EMERGENCY Appendix D, NOTIFICATION OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.
2.
Notify the Examiner of your results.
Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.
HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.
L (
5L::
lZt2 At Lj SQN GENERAL EMERGENCY EPIP-5 Unit 0 Rev. 0042 Page 18 of 31 Appendix 0 (Page 2 of 2)
NOTIFICATION OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)
(NRC EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET) 1.0 NRC NOTIFICATION (continued)
NOTE Caller should be prepared to answer other questions from NRC based upon the event.
[3]
PROVIDE the following information to NRC.
[4]
RETURN completed Appendix D to Site Emergency Director.
jL1 r%j1cc-
)LQ
/41.1 HAp 1 uT SON GENERAL EMERGENCY EPIP-5 Unit 0 Rev. 0042 Pagel2of3l Appendix A (Page 1 ofl)
GENERAL EMERGENCY INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM
- 1. tJ This is a Drill C This is an Actual Event
- Repeat
- This is an Actual Event 2.
i4 t 1T T\\AA A4&1
, the SED at Sequoyah, has declared a GENERAL EMERGENCY.
L34 L
- 4. Brief Des ription ofjhe Event: l 2
-p4vreA.
ii4 1A F+ t 4A 5/
_jiVA
\\L
- 5. Radiological Conditions: (Check one under both Airborne and Liquid column.)
Airborne Releases Offsite Liquid Releases Offsite C Minor releases within federally approved limits*
C Minor releases within federally approved limits*
C Releases above federally approved limits*
C Releases above federally approved limits*
Release information NOT known LRelease information NOT known
(*Tech Specs/ODCM)
(*Tech Specs/ODCM)
- 6. Event Declared:
Time:
ç Date:
TL2PA Eastern 7.The Meteorological Conditions are: (Use 46 meter data from the Met Tower. IF data is NOT available from the MET tower, contact the National Weather Service by dialing 9-1-423-586-8400. The National Weather Service will provide wind direction and wind speed.)
Wind Direction is FROM:
210 degrees Wind Speed:
p m.p.h Li,rninaverae (15 mm averagej 8.Provide Protective Action Recommendation USING Appendix H: Jçheck either I or 2 or 3)
C Recommendation 1 J
WIND FROM Recommendation 2 a
EVACUATE LISTED SECTORS (2 mile
)
DEGREES 0
EVACUATE LISTED Radius & 10 miles downwind)
(Mark wind SECTORS (2 mile radius & 5 a
Shelter remainder of 10 mile EPZ.
direction from miles downwind) a Consider issuance of POTASSIUM Step 7)
SHELTER remainder of 10 IODINE in accordance with the State mile EPZ.
Plan.
Consider issuance of POTASSIUM IODIDE in accordance with the State Plan Ai 81 Ci Di C2 6
7 8 D2 3
5 6
Frorni2 49 Al 81 Ci Di C2 02 A-i, B-i, C-i, 0-i, D-2, -3, -4, -5, -6
From 5O-7O<
A-i, B-i, C-i, D-i, 0-2 A-i, B-i, Cl, 0-i, A-3, -4, 0-2, -3, -4, -5
From 71-ii2° A-i, B-i, C-i, 0-1, A-3, 0-2 Al Bi Cl Di A2 3
4 5
6 0-4 Fromll3 146 Ai Bi Ci Dl A2 A3 A-i, B-i, C-i, 0-i, A-2, -3, -4, -5, -6, 8-2
From 147<-173 A-i, B-i, c-i, D-i, A-2, A-3, 8-2 A-i,B-i,C-l,D-1,A-2,-5,-6,8-2,-3,-4
From l74-2i4° A-i,B-l,C-i,D-1,A-2,B-2 A-i, B-i, C-i, 0-i, 8-2, -3, -4, -5, -6, -7, -8
From 2i5-258° A-i. B-i, C-i, D-l, 8-2, 8-5 A-i. B-I, C-i, 0-1, 8-2, -3, -5, -6, -7, -8, C-2, -3, -4, -5, -6 From 259-33i A-I, B-i, C-i, 0-i, 8-2, 8-5, C-2 A-1,B-1, C-i, D-1,B.5,C-2,-3,-4,05, -6, 8 Frorn332-11
A-lB-iC-I. 0-1, 8-5, C-2 C Recommendation 3 a
SHELTER all sectors a
CONSIDER issuance of Potassium Iodide in accordance with the State Plan.
Completed By:
Approved By:
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT I2IINRC SRO ADMIN A.4
1211 NRC JPM SROA.4 Page 2 of 9 SRO JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task:
Classify the Event using the EPIP-1 and Complete a WA INITIAL NOTIFICATION.
Task#:
3440190302 Task Standard:
The Examinee classifies the event as a GENERAL EMERGENCY based on EAL 1.1.2.L and 1.2.3.L and 1.3.4.L and the Examinee issues a Protective Action Recommendation #3.
Time Critical Task:
YES:
X NO:
KIA Reference!Ratings:
2.4.41. (2.9/4.6)
Method of Testing:
Simulated Performance:
Actual Performance:
X Evaluation Method:
Simulator In-Plant Classroom X
Main Control Room Mock-up Performer:
Trainee Name Evaluator:
I Name! Signature DATE Performance Rating:
SAT:
UNSAT:
Validation Time:
20 minutes Total Time:
Performance Time:
Start Time:
Finish Time:
COMMENTS
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO EVALUATOR:
1211 NRC JPM SROA.4 Page 3 of 9 ToolslEquipmentlProcedu res Needed:
1.
EPIP-1, EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX 2.
EPIP-5 General Emergency.
3.
A clock must be available in classroom that all examinees and evaluator can see
References:
Reference Title Rev No.
1.
EPIP-1 Emergency Plan Classification Matrix 43 2.
EPIP-5 General Emergency 39 Read to the examinee:
DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM.
I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.
HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO EXAMINEE AT THIS TIME!
1211 NRC JPM SROA.4 Page 4 of 9 INITIAL CONDITIONS:
1.
Unit 1 and Unit 2 have experienced a Reactor trip due to major storms that have occurred in East Tennessee.
2.
The State of Tennessee has issued notifications of road closures in Northern Hamilton County and Hixson due to flooding.
3.
Unit 1 has had a Safety Injection.
4.
Security reports that at the time of the trip, steam started blowing from the roof of the Unit 1 east valve vault and steam flow is still in progress at this time.
5.
Steam Generator #2 is isolated per E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
6.
CR0 has informed you that SG #2 pressure is slowly lowering.
7.
Containment pressure is 0.1 psig and steady.
8.
RCS pressure is 1500 psig.
9.
Core exit TCs 532 °F and slowly rising.
- 10. The most recent Chem Lab sample of RCS indicates that RCS activity has risen to 345 pCi/gm Dose Equivalent Iodine-i 31.
- 11. There are no indications of an Onsite Security Event.
INITIATING CUES:
1.
Using the data provided and the applicable procedure (s) classify the event.
2.
Raise your hand when you have classified the event.
3.
Determine what, if any, Protective Action Recommendations are required.
4.
Raise your hand when you have completed the Protective Action Recommendations.
5.
Record your answers on the JPM briefing sheet.
6.
There is (are) an element (s) of this task that is (are) time critical.
1211 NRC JPM SROA.4 Page 5 of 9 Start Time Obtain a copy of EPIP-1, EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION STEP 1
MATRIX.
SAT UNSAT Standar&
Examinee obtains a copy of EPIP-1, EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX.
Provide a copy of EPIP-1, EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION
MATRIX.
Comment Examiner Annotate start time when the examinee acknowledges the task is Note understood. Start time____________
INSTRUCTIONS Note:
A condition is considered to be MET if, in the judgment of the SED, the Procedure condition will be MET IMMINENTLY (i.e.:
with two hours). The classification shall be made as soon as this determination is made.
STEP 2
t.
In the matrix to the left, REVIEW the SAT initiating conditions in all three barrier columns and circle the conditions that UNSAT are MET.
2.
In each of the three barrier columns, IDENTIFY if any Loss or Potential Loss INITIATING CONDITIONS have been MET.
Examinee reviews the EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Standard.
and identifies initiating conditions provided in the initial conditions.
Comment
1211 NRC JPM SROA.4 Page 6 of 9 3.
COMPARE the number of barrier STEP 3
Losses and Potential losses to the SAT criteria below and make the appropriate declaration.
UNSAT Emergency Class Criteria General Emergency LOSS of any two barriers and Potential LOSS of third barrier The examinee compares barrier losses and classifies the event as a General Emergency within 15 minutes of starting the task.
LOSS of the Fuel Clad Barrier 1.t2.L due to RCS sample activity greater than 300 pCi/gm dose equivalent 1131 Standard:
AND CRITICAL LOSS of the RCS Barrier 1.2.3.L due to the SGTR AND Potential LOSS of the Containment I.3.4.L RUPTURED SIG that is also faulted outside contaInment (E2 and E3.
Comment EXAMINER NOTE:
Annotate the stop time for the event classification here.
EXAMINER Annotate the start time for the Protective Action Recommendation NOTE:
here.
EXAMINER NOTE:
The start data is provided to the examinee on the JPM briefing sheet.
EXAMINER NOTE:
Examinee transitions to EPIP-5, GENERAL EMERGENCY
1211 NRCJPMSROA.4 Page 7 of 9 Obtain a copy of EPIP-5 GENERAL EMERGENCY STEP 4
SAT UNSAT Standard:
Examinee obtains a copy of EPIP-5, GENERAL EMERGENCY.
Provide a copy of EPIP-5, GENERAL EMERGENCY Comment
STEP 6
1211 NRC JPM SROA.4 Page 8 of 9 Terminating The task is complete when the Examinee has classified the event STOP Cue:
and issued Protective Action Recommendations.
[41 EVALUATE Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) USIfl9 Appendix B.
SAT U NSAT Stop Time
JPM BRIEFING SHEET DIRECTIONS TO TRAINEE:
The examiner will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
1.
Unit I and Unit 2 have experienced a Reactor trip due to major storms that have occurred in East Tennessee.
2.
The State of Tennessee has issued notifications of road closures in Northern Hamilton County and Hixson due to flooding.
3.
Unit I has had a Safety Injection.
4.
Security reports that at the time of the trip, steam started blowing from the roof of the Unit I east valve vault and steam flow is still in progress at this time.
5.
Steam Generator #2 is isolated per E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
6.
CR0 has informed you that SG #2 pressure is slowly lowering.
7.
Containment pressure is 0.1 psig and steady.
8.
RCS pressure is 1500 psig.
9.
Core exit TCs 532 °F and slowly rising.
- 10. The most recent Chem Lab sample of RCS indicates that RCS activity has risen to 345 pCi/gm Dose Equivalent lodine-131.
- 11. There are no indications of an Qnsite Security Event.
INITIATING CUES:
1.
Using the data provided and the applicable procedure (s) classify the event.
2.
Raise your hand when you have classified the event.
3.
Determine what, if any, Protective Action Recommendations are required.
4.
Raise your hand when you have completed the Protective Action Recommendations.
5.
Record your answers on the JPM briefing sheet.
6.
There is (are) an element (s) of this task that is (are) time critical.
Acknowledge to the examiner when you are ready to begin.
HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.
j SEQUOYAH j
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-i FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1 -4)
I 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3 2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire Table 4-1 4.2 Explosion Table 4-2 4.3 Flammable Gas Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-B 4.5 ControL Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5.2 Tornado 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7 2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-2 7.3 Radiation Levels Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Page 9 of 49 Revision 47
j SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP1 Definitions and Abbreviations:
BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.
CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY consists of MPC shell, bottom baseplate, MPC lid (including the vent and drain port cover plates). MPC closure ring, and associated welds.
CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFS): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs; Subonticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink. Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licensee has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EA8.
EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.
EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,
steam or feed tine break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive bells or overheated electrical components do not constitute a lire.
Observation of flame is pireferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke andlor heat are observed.
FLAMMAELE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.
HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, andlor intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land or water: using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should NOT be construed to include acts of Civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part or a concerted attack on the nuclear power plant.
HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.
IMMINENT Within two hours.
INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.
INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSIONJINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.
ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.
00CM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls. Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor atarmltrip setpoints.
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one orrnore CSFs by FR-U which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge: prompt operator action is required.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled, RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, arid other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves.
RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSF5 by FR-U which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge: prompt operator action is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threal)compromise to site securIty, threetirisk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2)
Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load: (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation: (5) Thermal Power Oscillations 10%.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA, The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine. CO 2
, etc.)
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operalions. testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (OP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP. (e.g., alarm setpoirlts, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates. andlor discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.
Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes, VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observabte without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.
VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
Page 10 of 49 Revision 47
j SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 PotentiáI LOSS OR Heat Sink RED (FR-H.1) and RHR Shutdown Cooling not in service Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED, indicates loss or potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above.
Potential LOSS Pressurized Thermal Shock Red (FR-RI)
OR Heat Sink RED (FR-Hi) and RHR Shutdown Coolinq not in service
-OR
,*1 Potential LOSS RCS leak results in Non Isolatable RCS leak subcooling <40 °F as exceeding the capacity indicated on Xl-94-101 of one charging pump in or 102 (EXOSENSOR) the normal charging alignment OR RCS leakage results in entry into E-1
-OR-
- 3. Steam Generator Tube Rupture Ie1*
Potential LOSS SGTR that results in a Not Applicable Safety Injection actuation OR Entry into E-3
- OR 4.
potential LOSS VALID RVLIS level Not Applicable
<42% on Ll-68-36e or Ll-68-371 with no RCP running OR-
- 5. SED Judgment Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED, indicates loss or potential loss of the RCS Barrier comparable to the condItions listed above.
- 1. Critical Safety Function Status Core Cooling Red (FR-Cl)
Core Cooling Orange (FR-C.2) 1.2 RCS Barrier
- 1. Critical Safety Function Status Not Applicable
-OR
- 2. Primary Coolant Activity Level i*
Potential LOSS RCS sample activity is Not Applicable greater than 300 pCilgm dose equivalent 1131
-OR-
- 3. Incore Thermocouple Hi Quad Average
.1*
Potential LOSS Greater than 1200 °F on Greater than or equal to Xl-94-10I or 102 700 °F on Xl-94-101 or (EXOSENSOR) 102 (EXOSENSOR)
-OR-
.i*
PótentiaILOSS Not Applicable VALID RVLIS level
<42% on Ll-68-368 or Ll-68-371 with no RCP running
-OR-
- 5. Containment Radiation Monitor
!.1*
Potential LOSS VALID reading of Not Applicable greater than:
2.5E+02 Rlhron RM-90-271A and -272A OR 1.5E+02 R/hr on RM-90-273A and 2.1E+02 Rlhron RM-90-274A (see instruction note 4)
-OR
- 6. SED Judgment Page 11 of 47 Revision 46
) SEQUOYAH I
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 1.
In the matrix to the left, REVIEW the initiating conditions in all three barrier columns and circle the conditions that are MET.
2.
In each of the three barrier columns, IDENTIFY if any Loss or Potential Loss INITIATING CONDITIONS have been MET.
3.
COMPARE the number of barrier Losses and Potential losses to the criteria below and make the appropriate declaration.
4.
Containment Radiation Monitors are temperature sensitive and can be affected by temperature-induced currents. These monitors should be used for trending only until containment temperature has been stable for approximately 5 minutes after a Steam Line Break or LOCk Note:
MONITOR the respective status tree criteria if a CSF is listed as an INITIATING CONDITION.
- 1. Critical Safety Function Status Not Applicable
- ptentiaiLoss Containment Red (FR-Z.1)
OR Actions of FR-Cl (Red Path) are INEFFECTIVE (i.e.; core TCs trending up)
INSTRUCTIONS Note:
A condition is considered to be MET if, in the judgment of the SED, the condition will be MET IMMINENTLY (i.e.:
with two hours). The classification shall be made as soon as this determination is made.
-OR
- 2. Containment Pressure I H droen Potential LOSS Rapid unexplained pressure Containment Hydrogen decrease following initial increases to >4% by volume on increase on PDI-30-44 or 45 H2l-43-200 or 210 2a Containment pressure or sump Pressure >2.8 PSIG (Phase B) level not increasing on Ll with < one full train of 178 and 179 with a LOCA in containment spray progress
-OR-
- 3. Containment Isolation Status i:.i.
Poteal LOSS Containment isolation, when Not Applicable required is incomplete and a release path to the environment exists.
-OR-
- 4. Containment Bypass Pbtental LOSS RUPTURED SIG that is also Unexpected VALID increase in faulted outside containment (E2 area or ventilation RAD and E3) monitors adjacent to Q
containment (with LOCA in
>4 hour secondary side release progress).
outside containment from a SIG with a S/G tube leak >T/S limits (AOP R.01 App A)
-OR-
- 5. Significant Radiation in Containment
- I-PotentiaftOSS Not Applicable VALID reading of greater than:
5.8E+03 R/hr on RM-90-271A and RM-90-272A OR 3.4E+03 R/hr on RM-90-273A and 4.9E+03 Rihr on RM-90-274A (see instruction note 4)
-OR I 6. SED Judgment Emergeny Class Criteria General Emergency LOSS of any two barriers Potential LOSS of third barrier Site Area Emergency LOSS or Potential LOSS of any two barriers Alert Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier OR Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of RCS barrier Unusual Event LOSS or Potential LOSS of Containment barrier Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED, indicates loss or potential loss of the Containment Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above.
Page 12 of 49 Revision 47
j SEQUOYAH I
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP1 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1 -4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1 2 RCS Barrier I.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2
2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety LimIt LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire Table 4-1 4 2 Explosion Table 4-2 4.3 Flammable Gas Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5 2 Tornado 5 6 Watercraft Crash 5.3 Aircrafi/Projectile Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-2 7.3 Radiation Levels Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Page 13 of 49 Revision 47
I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX j EPIP-1 Definitions and Abbreviations:
BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.
CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY consists of MPG shell, bottom baseplate, MPC lid (including the vent and drain port cover plates), MPG closure ring, and associated welds.
CRJTICAL$AFETY FUNCTION (CSFS): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) arid Inventory (RCS).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licensee has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, arid for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.
EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.
EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force, FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,
steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heal and light. Sources 01 smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.
Observalion of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke andlor heat are observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations> than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the Site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.
HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, andlor intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land or water; using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included, HOSTILE ACTION should NOT be construed to include acts of cl/il disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the nuclear power plant.
HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.
IMMINENT: Within two hours.
INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.
INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSIONI)NTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.
ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.
00CM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual isa supporting document to the Tech Specs, that contain Red Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarmltrip setpoints.
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.
ROS: The RCS primary side and ils connections up to and including the pressurizer safety arid relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves.
RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater then the capacity one charging pump.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable, SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threatlcompromise to site security, threatirisk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power, (2)
Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations 1 0%.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on WA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g.. chlorine, CO 2
, etc.)
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the OP. (e.g., alarm setpoints. minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, andlor discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.
Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safOty structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches. etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.
VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
Page 14 of 49 Revision 47
1 SEQIJOYAH I
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Mod 0
- Mod, Not Applicable.
j! Condition Not Applicable.
Refer to °Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Radiological Effluents (Section 7) and Continue in This Column.
On either unit an inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress (1 and 2 and and 4):
1, Loss of> 75% of MCR annunciator windows AND the annunciator printer AND the annunciator CRT in the 1,
horseshoe OR> 75% of safety system indications.
2, 2.
LossofiCS.
3.
Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs:
3, Subcriticality PTS Core Cooling Containment Heat Sink Inventory
4.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress.
On either unit an UNPLANNED loss of >75% of the MCR annunciators and annunciator printer or> 75%
of safety system indications for> 15 minutes with a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or (CS i
unavailable.
(land2 and3):
2 1.
UNPLANNED loss of >75% of both channels of
MCR annunciator windows AND the annunciator printer AND the annunciator CRT in the horseshoe 3,
for> 15 minutes OR> 75% of safety system indicators for> 15 minutes.
4 2.
SM/SED judgment that increased surveillance is required (> shift complement) to safely operate the unit.
3.
(aorb) a.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress.
OR b.
Loss of ICS.
On either unit an UNPLANNED loss of 75% of the MCR annunciators or> 75% of safety system indications for> 15 minutes and (CS available.
(1 ancf2and3):
1.
UNPLANNED loss of >75% of both channels of MCR annunciator windows AND the annunciator 2,
printer AND the annunciator CRT in the horseshoe for> 15 minutes OR > 75% of safety system indicators for
> 15 minutes.
2.
SM/SED judgment that increased surveillance is A
required (> shift complement) to safely operate the
unit.
3.
The ICS is capable of displaying requested data.
Not Applicable.
Significant Loss of Communications (1 or 2) 1.
UNPLANNED loss of all in-plant communication capabilities listed below (a and b and c):
- a. UNPLANNED loss of EPABX phones.
- b. UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phones.
- c. UNPLANNED loss of all in-plant radio A
frequencies.
L I L 2.
UNPLANNED loss of all offsite communication capabilities listed below: (a and b and c and d and e and I)
- a. UNPLANNED loss of all EPA6X phones
- b. UNPLANNED loss of all offsite radio frequencies
- c. UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microwave) system
- d. UNPLANNED loss of all 1-FB-Bell fines
- f. UNPLANNED loss of all satellite phones
Page 15 of 49 Revision 47
SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I E-1 1 I
Reactor not decreasing after VALID trip signals and loss of core cooling capability.
(1 and 2):
1.
FR-S.1 entered and immediate operator actions did not result in a reactor power of 6% and decreasing.
2.
(aorb) a.
CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red (FR-C.1).
OR b.
CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (FR-H.1)
Reactor power> 5% and not decreasing after VALID auto and manual trip signals.
I NOTE:
Althou9h a mode change may occur before classifIcation this event will still be classified and declared as SAE, Reactor power> 5% and not decreasing after VALID auto trip signal but a manual trip from the Control Room Is successful. (1 and 2) 1.
Reactor power> 5% and not decreasing following auto tiip signal.
2.
Manual trip in the Main Control Room successfully 2
reduces reactor power 5%.
NOTE:
Although a mode change will occur, this event will still be classified and declared as an ALERT.
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1).
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Main..
i 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
lcor mOfl I
Reactor coolant system specific activity exceeds LCO (Refer to SON Tech. Spec. 3.4.8);
- 1. Radiochernistry analysis indicates (a or b):
I, a.
Dose equivalent Iodine (l-131)>0.35 Ci/gm for
>48 hours or in excess of TIS Figure 3.4-1 with 2
Tave 500 F.
OR 3
b.
Specific activity> 100/ E )LCI!gm with Tave 500 °F.
Page 16 of 49 Revision 47
LSEQUOYAH j
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP1 I
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage
>10 GPM.
1.
Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.)> 10 SPM as indicated by (a orb):
OR b.
With RCS temperature and PZR level stable, the VCT level on Ll-62-129 or Ll-62-130 is dropping at a rate > 10 GPM.
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Con!mue in This Column.
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
RCS Identified lealcage>25 GPM.
1.
Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.>
> 25 GPM as indicated by (a orb or C):
a.
Sl-OPS-06B-137.0 results or RCS Flow Balance Calculation (AOP.R.05, Appendix I or J)
OR b.
Level rise in excess of 25 GPM into PRT, RCDT or CVCS holdup tank (Refer to Tl-28).
OR c.
RCS leakage through a steam generator to the secondary system (primary to secondary leakage).
Refer to Shutdown Systerris Degradation Seclion 6.33.
Mode Referto 1 Continue in This Column, Refer top, Continue in,
- 1) and Column.
- 1, 2,
3 1,
4 2,
4 Refer to Shutdown Systems Degradation (Section 6.3).
I Page 17 of 49 Revision 47
I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Referto 1 Continue in This Column.
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue Fr, This Column.
UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the main steam system resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown and safety injection initiatIon. (1 and 2):
1.
Rapid depressurization of any or all steam generators or the main steam system to 600 psig on Pl-1-2A, 2B or 9A,98 or 20A, 208 or 27A, 27B.
2.
Safety injection has initiated or is required.
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Turbine failure has generated projectiles that cause visible damage to any area containing safety related equipment.
1.
Turbine generated PROJECTILES have resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any of the following areas:
Turbine failure results in casing penetration or main generator seal damage.
1.
Turbine failure which results in penetration of the turbine casing or damage to main generator seals.
Mode LL Refer to,,,
t Barrier !
Continue in This Column.
ion 1) and 1,
2, 3
Control 8uilding Auxiliary Building Unit #1 Containment Unit #2 Containment ERCW Pumping Station Addi Equipment Bldgs.
Diesel Generator Bldg.
RWST Intake Pumping Station Common Ste. Serv. Xfmrs Condensate Storage Tanks 1,
2, 3
1, 2,
3 Refer La Hazards and SED Judgment (Section 4.3)
Page 18 of 49 Revision 47
[SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 j Not Applicable.
Not Applicable.
Not Applicable.
1.
The combination of thermal power, RCS temperature and RCS pressure > safety limit indicated by SON Tech. Spec. Figure 2.1-1 Reactor Core Safety 2,
Limit.
Initiatinq I Condition 1,
Safety Limits have been exceeded. (1 or 2):
3, OR 4
2.
RCSlPressurizer pressure exceeds safety limit
(>2735 psig).
Page 19 of 49 Revision 47
I SEQUOYAH I
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX j EPIP-1 This Page Intentionally Blank Page 20 of 49 Revision 47
SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1 2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.2 Explosion 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.2 Tornado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.4 River Level High SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage RCS Unidentified Leakage RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Safety Limit Table 4-1 Table 4-2 Figure 4-A Figure 4-B 5.5 River Level Low 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A (Modes 1-4) 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 I
Page 21 of 49 Revision 47
SEQUOYAH I
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I
Definitions and Abbreviations:
BOMB: An explosive device, (See EXPLOSION)
CIViL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB vklentiy protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.
CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY consists of MPC shell, bottom baseplate, MPG Ild (including the vent and drain port cover plates), MPG closure ring, and associated welds, CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink. Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit In this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes, EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licensee has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area, For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.
EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent. unconlined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.
EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the Site by threat or force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,
steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.
Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations> than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.
HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land or water; using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Othe acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should NOT be conslrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the nuclear power plant, HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.
IMMINENT: Within two flours.
INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.
INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSION/1NTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.
ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Red Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoinls.
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-O which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge: prompt operator action is required.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the prolectile may be orisite or offsite.
PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.
RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves.
RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge: prompt operator action is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved seci.irity contingency plan that constitutes a threalicompromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power (2>
Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load: (3) Reactor Trip: (4) Safety Injection System Activation: (5) Thermal Power Oscillations 10%.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on WA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine. CO 2
, etc.)
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the OP. (e.g., alarm setpoinls, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, anchor discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered lobe VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.
Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
ViSIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.
VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of. could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
Page 22 of 49 Revision 47
I SEQUOYAH j
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSiFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I
l Prolonged loss of all and all onsite AC power to either unit. (1 and 2):
1.
Both unit related 6.9 KV shutdown boards de-energized for> 15 minutes.
2.
(aorb) a.
Core Cooling Status Tree Red or Orange Path.
1 U,
1, 2,
3, 4
Initiatina I Condition OR b.
Restoration of either a 6.9 Ky shutdown board or a 6.9 KV unit board is not likely within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of the loss, Not Applicable.
Not Applicable.
Loss of all offslte and all onsite AC power to either unit for> 15 MInutes.
1.
Both unit related 6,9 KV shutdown boards de-energized for> 15 minutes.
2, 3,
4 Loss of offsite power to either unit with degraded onsite AC power for> 15 minutes. (fIa and 1bJ or 2):
1, la.
AD four (4) 6.9KV unit boards do-energized for
> 15 minutes.
2, lb. One (1) unit related 6.9 KV shutdown board do-energized for> 15 minutes.
OR 4
2.
Any AC power condition lasting> 15 minutes where a single additional failure will result in a unit blackout.
UNPLANNED loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to either unit for> 15 minutes.
1.
Both unit related 6.9KV shutdown boards de 6,
energized for> 15 minutes.
D E
F U
E Also Refer to GLass of Shutdown System& (6.1) and L
continue in this column.
E D
Loss of offaite power to either unit for> 15 minutes.
(1 and 2):
1.
All four (4) 6.9KV unit boards do-energized for> 15 1,
minutes.
2 2.
Both unit related 6.9KV shutdown boards are
energized.
3, 4
UNPLANNED loss of all offsite power to either unit for> 15 minutes. (1 and 2):
1.
All four (4) 6.9KV unit boards de..energized for 6,
> 15 minutes.
o
- 2. One (1> unit related 6,9KV shutdown board do E
energized for> 15 minutes.
F U
E I
E D
Page 23 of 49 Revision 47
j SEQUOYAI-I j
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Loss of Communication (2.2) and Continue in This Column.
Loss of all vital DC power for> 15 minutes.
1 Voltage < 105 V DC on 125V DC vital battery board 1,
buses I
dlIlIlrjIVfor> 15 minutes.
2, 3,
4 Also Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1), Loss of Communication (2,2) end, Loss of Instrumentation (2.1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1).
Loss of Communication (22), and Loss of Instrumentation (2.1).
UNPLANNED loss of a required train of DC power for 15 minutes: (1 or 2>.
1.
Voltage < 105 V DC on 125V do vital battery board buses I and III for> 15 minutes.
5 QB.
2.
Voltage < 105 V DC on 125V do vital battery board 6
busses II and IV for> 15 minutes.
I Initiating I Condition Page 24 of 49 Revision 47
I SEQUOYAH I
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 1
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4
4.1 Fire Table 4-1 4.2 Explosion Table 4-2 4.3 Flammable Gas Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.2 Tornado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.4 River Level High SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage 5.5 RiverLevelLow 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A (Modes 1-4)
/
4 kI Page 25 of 49 Revision 47
I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSWICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Definitions and Abbreviations:
BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)
CIViL. DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsile operations or activities at the site.
CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY consists of MPC shell, bottom baseplate. MPG lid (including the vent and drain port cover plates), MPC closure ring, add associated welds, CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFS): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs; Subcriticalily, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock.
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAR): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licensee has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shalt be defined as the EAB.
EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent stwOtures or equipment.
EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,
steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized, FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.
Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and!or heat are observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.
HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and!or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end, This includes attack by air, land or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should NOT be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the nuclear power plant.
HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.
IMMINENT: Within two hours.
INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.
INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identity an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.
ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.
00CM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Red Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offaite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoints.
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which Indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsile.
PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.
RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves.
RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threatlcompromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2)
Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation: (5) Thermal Power Oscillations 10%.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on WA. TIre STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g.. chlorine, CO. etc.)
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases. unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the OP. (e.g., alarm setpoints. minimum dilution flow, minimum release limes, maximum release rates, and!Or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.
Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
Page 26 of 49 Revision 47
SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Referto I Continue in This Column.
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting safety related equipment required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. (1 and 2):
1.
EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1.
2.
(aorb) a.
VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structures or to safety related equipment in the specified area is due to the EXPLOSION.
OR b.
Control room indication of degraded safety system or component response due to the EXPLOSION.
Refer to Security (Section 4.6).
UNPLANNED EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any permanent structure equipment.
Mode Initiatinci I Condition I
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
fl 1) and Refer to Control Room Evacuation, (4.5) and Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
FIRE in any of the areas listed In Table 4-1 that is affecting safety related equipment required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. (1 and 2):
1.
FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1.
A
- 2. (sorb)
a.
VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or L
safety related equipment in the specified area is observed due to the FIRE.
OR b.
Control room indication of degraded safety system or component response due to the FIRE.
FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) threatening any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is not extInguished within 15 minutes from the time of control room notificatIon or verification of control room alarm.
A L
L
A L
L A
L L
I Refer to Security (Section 4.6).
Page 27 of 49 Revision 47
SEQUOYAH I
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSiFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Initiatinq I Condition Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
UNPLANNED release of FLAMMABLE GAS within a facility structure containing safety related equipment or associated with safe operation of the plant.
1.
Plant personnel report the average of three (3) readings taken in an 10 ft. Triangular Area is>
25% Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitoring instrument within any building listed in Table 4-2.
A.
UNPLANNED release of FLAMMABLE GAS within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY that may affect nonnal operations.
1.
Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in an 10 ft. Triangular Area is>
25% of the Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitoring instrument within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B).
OR B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State officials that a large offsite FLAMMABLE GAS release has occurred within one (1) mile of the site (Figure 4-B) with potential to enter the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B) in concentrations >25% of Lower Explosive Limit.
Refer to the MSDS for the LEL.
Referi Continue in This Column.
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Release of TOXIC GAS or smoke within a facility structure which prohibits safe operation of systems required to establish maintain Cold SID.
(land 2and3):
1.
Plant personnel report TOXIC GAS or smoke within any building listed in Table 4-2.
2.
(aorb) a.
Plant personnel report severe adverse health reactions due to TOXIC GAS or smoke (i.e.,
burning eyes, nose, throat, dizziness).
OR b-.
Sampling indication> Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL).
3.
Plant personnel unable to perform actions to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment.
Refer to the MSDS for the PEL.
A. Safe operations impeded due to access restrictions caused by TOXIC GAS or smoke concentrations within a facility structure listed in Table 4-2.
OR B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State officials that an offsite TOXIC GAS release has occurred within one (1) mile of the site (Figure 4-B) with potential to enter the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 4-B) in concentrations > the Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) causing a site evacuation.
Refer to the MSDS for the PEL.
Mode I
Mode
- 1) and A
L L
Refer to the MSDS for the LEL, A
L L
A I
L A
L L
Page 28 of 49 Revision 47
SEQUOYAH I
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 HOSTILE ACTION Resulting in Loss of Physical Control of the Facility:
(I cr2) 1.
A HOSTILE ACTiON has occurred such that plant personnel are unable to operate equipment required to maintain CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONs.
2.
A HOSTILE ACTION has caused failure of Spent Fuel Cooling Systems and IMMINENT fuel damage is likely for a freshly off-loaded reactor core in pool.
HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA.
A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor.
Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of PROTECTED AREA.
HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat:
(1 or 2) 1 A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor.
A validated notification from NRC of an airliner attack threat within 30 minutes of the site.
Note: The Owner Controlled Area is defined by the Physical Security Plan.
Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of PROTECTED AREA.
Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant (1 or 2cr 3) 1.
A SECUR1Y CONDITION that does NOT involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor.
2.
A credible SQN security threat notification.
3.
A validated notification from NRC providing information of an aircraft threat.
Mode Refer to Fission Pivduc..Jarrier M.tnx (......,...
Continue in This CoJumn.
Mode A
L L
A I
I Evacuation of the control room has been initiated and control of alt necessary equipment has not been established within 15 minutes of staffing the auxiliary control room. (1 and 2):
A 1.
AOP-C.04 Shutdown from Aux Control Room I
entered.
1 2.
Control has not been established within 15 minutes of staffing the auxiliary control room and completing transfer of switches on panels Li l and LI lB to the AUX position.
Evacuation of the Control Room is Required.
- 1. AOP-C.04 Shutdown from Aux Control Room has been entered.
A I
I A
I I
2 Not Applicable.
A I
L Page 29 of 49 RevisiOn 47
I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP1 I
I A
L L
Events are in proce ur wolve Actual g Imminent Substantiai Core Degradation Melting With Potential for Loss of Containment Integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY, refer to Figure 4-B.
A I
I Events are in process have occurred which involve Actual Likely Major Failures of Plant Functions needed for the Protection of the Public or HOSTILE ACTION that result in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevents effective access to equipment needed for the Protection of the Public. Any releases are not expected to result in Exposure Levels which Exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels beyond the EXCLUS1ON AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 4.B.
Events are in process have occurred which involve Actual Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant or a Security Event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any A
releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of I
the EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure I
Levels.
Events are in process have occurred which indicate a Potential Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant or indicate a Security Threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of Radioactive Material requiring Offsite Response Monitoring are expected unless further degradation of Safety Systems occurs.
A I
I Page 30 of 49 Revision 47
SEQUOYAH j
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EP1P-1 TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS Unit #1 Containment Unit #2 Containment Auxiliary Building Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station ERCW Pumping Station Control Building Additional Equipment Buildings CSSTs RWST Condensate Storage Tanks TABLE 4-2 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GAS OR SMOKE EALs Unit #1 Containment Unit #2 Containment Auxiliary Building Turbine Building Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station ERCW Pumping Station Control Building Additional Equipment Buildings COWE Building Page 31 of 49 Revision 47
I SEQUOYAH I
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX
[EPIP-i Figure 4-A Protected Area Figure 4-B Exclusion Area Boundary Page 32 of 49 Revision 47
j SEQUOYAH j
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 FISSiON PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1 2 RCS Barner 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 1
2.2 Loss of Communication 2.6 RCS identified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 41 Fire Table 4-1 1,
4 2 Explosion Table 4-2 4.3 Flammable Gas Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5.2 Tornado 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-2 7.3 Radiation Levels Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Page 33 of 49 Revision 47
I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 Definitions and Abbreviations:
BOMB: At explosive device. (See EXPLOSIONI CIVIL. DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.
CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY consists of MPG shell, bottom baseplate, MPG lid (including the vent and drain port cover plates), MPG closure ring, and associated welds.
CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, I-teat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment withIn 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licensee has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.
EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, uncontined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment, EXTORTION: An attempt to cause art action at the site by threat or force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generalor) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,
steam or feed line break) that results in an unoontrolted decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.
Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOS1VE LIMIT (LEL).
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the Site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.
HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land or water; using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should NOT be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part 01 a concerted attack on the nuclear power plant.
HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.
IMMINENT: Within two hours.
INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of seventy of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.
IN1TIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.
ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation 00CM: Otfsile Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpolnts.
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-U which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required.
PROJECTILE: An object elected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.
RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, arid other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves.
RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFS by FR-U which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; (2)
Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip: (4) Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations t10%.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on WA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine, CO
- 2. etc.)
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (OP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases. unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP. (e.g.. alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) art instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.
Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.
VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
Page 34 of 49 Revision 47
rsEQU0YAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFCAT)ON MATRIX I EPIP-1 Refer to Fiss a Prc t ier (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Earthquake detected by site seismic Instruments.
(1 and 2):
1.
Panel XA-55-15B alarm window 22 (D-1) activated.
2.
(aorb) a.
Ground motion sensed by plant personnel.
OR b.
National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.
A L
L Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation. (1 and 2):
1.
Panel XA-55-158 alarm window 30 (E-2) plus A
window 22 (0-1) activated.
L L
2.
(aorb)
- a. Ground motion sensed by plant personnel.
OR b.
National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.
Tornado or high winds strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1 and results in VISI8LE DAMAGE. (1 and 2):
1, Tornado or high winds (sustained >80 m.p.h. > one minute on the plant computer) strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1.
2.
(aorb) a.
Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE.
- b. Control room indications of degraded safety system or component response due to event.
Note:
If site met data is unavailable, National Weather Service Morristown 1-(423)-586-8400, can provide additional information if needed.
A L
I-Tornado within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.
A L
1 1.
Plant personnel report a tornado has been sighted within the EXCLUSiON AREA BOUNDARY (Figure 5-A)
Page 35 of 49 Revision 47
I SEQUOYAI-I I
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP1 Refer to ion Product.
(Section 1) and Continue in 7 Refer to the (Section 1).
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Conimue in This Column.
River reservoir level is at Stage II Flood Warning as reported by River Operations.
Refer to the Fission Product Bamer Matrix (Section 1).
Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (strikes) any plant structure listed in Table 5-1 resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE. (1 and 2):
1.
Plant personnel report aircraft or PROJECTILE has A
impacted any structure listed in Table 5-1.
2.
(sorb) a.
Confirmed report of VISIBLE DAMAGE, OR b.
Control Room indications of degraded safety system or component response due to the event within any structure listed in Table 5-1.
Aircraft crash or projectile impact (strikes) within the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.
1.
Plant personnel report aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the EXCLUSION AREA A
BOUNDARY (Figure 5-A).
L I..
IA 1
L L
River reservoir level Is at Stage I Flood Warning as reported by River Operations.
L Page 36 of 49 Revision 47
SEQLJOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSiFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 I
Refer to (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
Watercraft strikes the ERCW pumping station resulting in a reduction of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW). (1 and 2):
1.
Plant personnel report a watereraft has struck the ERCW pumping station.
2.
(sorb) a.
ERCW supply header pressure Train A 1(2)-P)..67493A is < 15 psig.
OR b.
ERCW supply header pressure Train B 1(2)-PI-67-488A is < 15 psig.
Mode I
ml Refer to Fission rQcJJf L (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.
River reservoir level is 670 Feet as reported by River Operations.
A L
L
River reservoir level is <674 Feet as reported by River Operations.
A L
L A
L L
Page 37 of 49 Revision 47
I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I
TABLE 5.1 Plant Structure Associated With Tornado!High Wind and Aircraft EALs Unit #1 Containment Auxiliary Building Turbine Building RWST Unit #2 Containment Diesel Generator Bldg.
CDWE Building Condensate Storage Tanks Control Building ERCW Pumping Station Additional Equipment Bldgs Intake Pumping Station Common Station Service Transformers Page 38 of 49 Revision 47
SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX (EPiI-l FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX A
1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.2 Explosion 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.2 Tornado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.4 River Level High SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage RCS Unidentified Leakage RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Safety Limit Table 4-1 Table 4-2 Figure 4-A Figure 4-B 5.5 River Level Low 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A (Modes 1-4) 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 a
I Page 39 of 49 Revision 47
TSEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I Definitions and Abbreviations:
BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20> or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.
CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY consists of MPC shell, bottom baseplate, MPC lid (including the vent and drain port cover plates), MPC closure ring, and associated welds.
CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety funlion required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs; Subcriticalily. Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock.
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognit/on is made that one or more of the initialing conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licensee has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.
EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.
EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator> Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,
steam or feed line break> that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light, Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.
Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations> than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.
HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land or water; using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should NOT be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the nuclear power plant.
HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged In a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.
IMMINENT: Within two hours.
INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.
INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.
ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.
00CM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls. Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarmitrip setpoints.
ORANGE PATH; Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge: prompt operator action is required.
PROJECTiLE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.
RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves.
RED PATH; Moniloring of one or more CSFs by FR-C which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or roisoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power (2)
Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations i0%.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on WA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g.. chlorine, CO 2, etc.)
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the OP. (e.g.. alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge ol incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.
Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration. rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., painl chipping. scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.
VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems. devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
Page 40 of 49 Revision 47
[SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I
Loss of water level in the reactor vessel that has or will uncover active fuel in the reactor vessel, (1 and 2 and 3):
1.
Loss of RHR capability.
2.
VALID indication that reactor vessel water level ci. 695.
3.
Incore TCs (if available) indicate RCS temperature
> 200 F.
Note: If containment is open refer to Gaseous Effluents (Section 7.1) and cor,tthue in this column.
Not Applicable.
Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain hot shutdown. (1 and [2a or 2b]):
1.
Hot shutdown required 2a. CSF status tree indicated Core Cooling Red (FR Ci).
OR 2b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (FR-H.1)
(RHR shutdown cooling not in service).
Note: Refer to Reactor Protection System Failure (Section 2.3) and Continue in This Column.
Note: Also refer to Failure of Rx Pmtectian (Section 2.3) and Continue in This Column.
Inability to reach required shutdown within Tech.
Spec, limits.
1.
The unit has not been placed in the required mode within the time prescribed by the LC0 action statement.
I Mdde
!9L Refer to Gaseous L...uents,...n I.,,..
in This Column.
Not,.
5, 6
1, 2,
Note: if containment is open refer to Gaseous Effluents (Section 7.1) and continue in this column.
4 Inability to maintain unit in cold shutdown when required (1 and 2):
1.
Cold shutdown required by Technical Specs.
2.
Incore TCs (if available) indicate core exit temperature
>200F.
5, 6
Complete loss of function needed to achieve cold shutdown when cold shutdown required by Tech.
Specs. (1 and 2 and 3):
- 1. Cold shutdown required by Tech. Specs.
- 2. Loss of RHR shutdown cooling capability.
- 3. Loss of secondary heat sink and main condenser 1,
2, 3,
4 I
1, 2,
3, 4
Page 41 of 49 Revision 47
SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 1.
Reactor cootant system is pressurized above atmospheric pressure.
2.
Unplanned decrease in RCS or pressurizer level requiring initiation of makeup to the RCS.
Ude ReferIo in This Column.
Refer to Gaseous Effluents (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Column.
Refer to Gaseous Effluents (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Column.
Loss of REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM inventory with inadequate makeup. (1 and 2 and 3):
5, 6
3.
With reactor coolant system temperature stable, the pressurizer level continues to decrease following initiation of RCS makeup.
Page 42 of 49 Revision 47
[QUOYAH J
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 1 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.9 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire Table 4-1 4.2 Explosion Table 4-2 4.3 Flammable Gas Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Figure 4-B 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.5 River Level Low 5.2 Tornado 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5.3 AircraftlProjectile Table 5-1 5.4 River Level High Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7
7.1 Gaseous Effluent Table 7-1 7.2 Liquid Effluent Table 7-2 7.3 Radiation Levels Figure 7-A 7.4 Fuel Handling 7.5 Spent Fuel Storage Page 43 of 49 Revision 47
I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-1 I
Definitions and Abbreviations:
BOMB: An explosive davce. (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.
CONFINEMENT BQUNDRY; Spent Fuel Storage Cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY consists of MPC shell, bottom baseptate, MPC lid (including the vent and drain port cover plates), MPC closure nog, and associated welds.
CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling. Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more or the initiating conditions associaled with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAL3): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licensee has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.
EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent. unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.
EXTORTION; An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,
steam or feed tine break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.
Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL),
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.
HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an and. This includes attack by air, land or water: using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should NOT be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the nuclear power plant.
HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.
IMMINENT: Within two hours, INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.
INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event [or purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.
ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation ODUM: Otfsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and monitor alarm/trip setpoints.
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-U which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.
RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves.
RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-U which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power (2)
Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations 210%.
STRIHE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STR1KE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chtorine, CO 2, etc.)
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity Is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank>.
VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.
Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.
VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
Page 44 of 49 Revision 47
I SEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP1 I
Mode 1.
1 8 from an actual or imminent release of gaseous radloactvity > I Rem TEDE or
>5 Rem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of release. (1 or 2 or.3):
A L
L Mo Not Applicable.
A VALID red monitor reading exceeds the values under General Emergency in Table 7-1 for >15 nun, unless assessment within that 15 mm confirms that the criterion is not exceeded.
2.
On 3.
OR Field surveys indicate >lRemlhr amma or an I..131 concentration of 3.9E-06 LlCilcm at the EAB (Fig. 7-A)
Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >1 Rem TEDE or >5 Rem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Fig. 7-A).
EAB dose resulting from an actual or Imminent release of gaseous radioactivity >1 00 mr-em TEDE or
>500 mr-em thyroid CDE for actual or projected duration of release. (1 or 2 or 3):
1, A
L L
2.
3.
A VALID rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under Site Area for> 15 mirt, unless assessment within that 15 mm confirms that the criterion is not exceeded.
OR Field surveys indicate >100 mremlhr gamma or an 1-131 conc of 3.9E-07 pCWcnu at the EAB (Fig. 7-A).
OR Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >101) mmcm TEDE or >500 mmem thyroid CDE for actual or projected duration of the release (Fig. 7-A).
Not Applicable.
Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the 00CM Section 1.2.2.1 Limit for >15 minutes. (1 or 2 or 3 or 4) 1.
A L
L 2.
A VALID red monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under Alert for >15 minutes, unless assessment within that 15 minutes confirms that the criterion is not exceeded.
OR Field surveys indicate >10 mrenhr gamma at the EAB for
>15 minutes (Fig 7-A).
3.
4.
OR Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >10 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Fig. 7-A).
E Sample results exceed 200 times the 00CM limit value for an unrnonitored release of gaseous radioactivity >15 minutes in duration.
1.
Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 2 times the 00CM Section 1.2.2.1 Limit for >60 minutes. (1 or 2 or 3 or 4)
A L
L 2.
A VALID rad monitor reading > Table 7-1 values under liE for >60 minutes. unless assessment within that 60 minutes confirms that the criterion l not exceeded.
OR Field surveys indicate >0.1 mrenulhr gamma at the EAB for 760 minutes (Fig 7-A>
Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the 00CM Section 1.2.1.1 LimIt for >15 mInutes. (1 or 2) 1.
A VALID red monitor reading > Table 7-1 values A
under Alert for >15 minutes, unless assessment L
within this time period confirms that the criterion is not exceeded.
OR 2.
Sample results indicate an ECL >200 times the 00CM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in duration Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds 2 times the 00CM Section 1.2.1.1 Limit for >60 minutes.
(lor2)
A 1.
A VALID rad monitor reading> Table 7-1 values L
under UE for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the criterion is I
not exceeded.
OR 2.
Sample results indicate an ECL >2 times the 00CM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >60 minutes in duration,
3.
4.
OR Dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >0.1 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Fig. 7-A).
Sample results exceed 2 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of gaseous radioactivity >60 minutes in duration Page 45 of 49 Revision 47
SEQUOYAH I
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASS1FICATON MATRIX I EPiP-i Refer to Fissi (Sclion 1) or Gaseous Effluents (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Section.
UNPLANNED increase in radiation levels within the facility.
1.
A VALID area radiation monitor reading increases by 1000 mremlhr over the highest reading in the past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> excluding the current peak value.
Note:
In either the VE orALERT EAL, the SED must determine the cause of increase in radiation levels and review other initiating conditions for applicability (e.g., a dose rate of 15 mrern/hrin the control room could be caused by a release associated with a DBA).
Refer to
,. i) and Continue in This Section.
Refer to Gaseous Effluents (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Section.
Major damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level that has or will uncover irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel. (1 and 2):
1.
VALID alarm on 0-RM-90-101 8 or 0-RM-90-1 02 or 0..RM-90-103 or 1-RM-90-130 or 2-RM-90-130 or 1-RM-90-131 or 2-RM-90-131 1-RM-90-1 12A or 1-RM-90-1 128 or 2-RM90-1 12A or 2-RM 1128.
2.
(a orb):
a.
Plant personnel report damage to irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods.
OR b.
Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered in the spent fuel pool or transfer canal.
UNPLANNED loss of water level in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity or transfer canal with fuel remaining covered. (1 and 2 and 3):
1.
Plant personnel report water level drop in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity, or transfer canal.
2.
VALID alarm on 0-RM-90-IO1B or 0-RM-90102 or 0-RM-90-1 03.
3.
Fuel remains covered with water.
Mode Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Section 1) or Gaseous Effluents (Section 7.1) and Continue in This Section.
UNPLANNED increases in radiation levels within the facility that impedes safe operations or establishment or maintenance of cold shutdown.
(1 or 2):
A 1.
VALID area radiation monitor readings or survey L
results exceed 15 mrem/hr in the control room or CAS.
OR 2.
(sandb):
a.
VALID area radiation monitor readings exceed values listed in Table 7-2.
b.
Access restrictions impede operation of systems necessary for safe operation or the ability to establish cold shutdown (See Note Below).
A L
L A
L L
A L
L Page 46 of 49 Revision 47
TSEQUOYAH j
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX 1 EPIPml I
Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY from: (1 or 2 or 3) 2.
Accident (e.g: dropped cask, tipped over cask.
explosion, missile damage, fire damage, burial under debris, etc).
I Not Applicable.
Not Applicable.
Not Applicable, 1.
Natural phenomena (e.g., seismic event, tornado, flood, lightning, snowlice accumulation. etc.).
A I
L OR OR 3.
Judgment of the Site Emergency Director that the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY damage is a degradation in the level of safety of the ISFSI Page 47 of 49 Revision 47
[iEQUOYAH EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX I EPIP-Il TABLE 7-I EFFLUENT RADIATiON MONITOR EALS NOTE: The monitor values below, if met or exceeded, indicate the need to perform the required assessment. If the assessment can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the appropriate emergency classification shall be made based on the VALID reading.
GASEOUS MONITORS Unitst 21 tiE Alert SAE General Site Total Release Limit p.Ci/s 4.90E÷05 4.SOE+07 1.34E+08 1.34E+09 1-Rl9O40O (EFF LEVEL) - U-I Shield Bldg p.CiIs 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 1.34E+08 1.34E+09 2-Rl9Q-4OO (EFF LEVEL) 2 Shield Bldg gCi/s 4.90E+05 4.90E+07 I.34E+08 1.34E+09 O-RM-90-IOIB -Auxiliary Bldg cpm 1.03E+05 Offscale Offscale t1 Offscale O-RM-90-1328
- Service Bldg cpm 2.62E÷06 Offscale tt1 Offscale Offscale<
1 1-Rl-90421 thru 424 U-I MSL Manitors jiCi/cc 1,71 E-01 1.71 E+O1 4.68E+01 4.68E+02 2-RI-90-421 thru 424 - U-2 MSL Monitors isCi/co 1.71 E-01 1.71 E+01 4.68E+01 4.68E+02 1-RM-90-255 or 256A - U-I CVE mR/h 4.1OE+02 4.IOE+04 I.12E+05 1.12E+06 2-RM-9Q..255 or 256A - U-2 CVE mR/h 4.1OE+02 4.10E+04 1.12E+05 1.12E+06 RELEASE DUFA TION minutes
>60
>15
>15
>15 LIQUID MONITORS Units tiE Alert Site Area General Site Total Re/ease Limit pCi/mI 8.20E-03 8.20E-01 N/A N/A O-RM-90-122 - RadWaste cpm 1.74E+06 Qffscale t
N/A N/A 1-RM-90-120,121 - S!G Bldn cpm I.27E+06 Ofiscale N/A N/A 2-RM-90-120,121 - S1G Bldn cpm 1.27E÷06 Offscale t1 N/A N/A 0-RM-90-225 - Condensate Demin cpm 1.65E+06 OffscaleW N/A N/A O-RM-90-21 2 - Turbine Building Sump cpm 2.92E+03 2.92E+05 NIA N/A RELEASE DURATION minutes
>60
>15
>15
>15 ASSESSMENT METHODS:
- Airborne Dose Assessment per SON EPlP13 Dose Assessment
- ODCM Liquid Release Rate assessment per SON 0-Tl-CEM-030.030.0
- Integrated Airborne Release Rate assessment per SQN 0-TI-CEM-030.030.0 (1) The calculated value is outside of the upper range for this detector. The maximum monitor output which can be read is I.OE÷07 cpm. Releases in excess of monitor capacity should be evaluated for proper classification by use of Dose Assessment.
(2)
These unit values are based on flow rates through one PORV of 890,000 lb/hr at 1078.7 psia with 0.25% carry over (0.9975 quality). Before using these values, ensure a release to the environment is ongoing, (e.g., PORV).
NOTE 1:
These EALs are based on the assumption that an emergency release is restricted to one pathway from the plant.
In all cases, the total site EAL is the limiting value.
Therefore, in the case where there are multiple release paths from the plant, it is the total release EAL (obtained from ICS and/or SQN 0-Tl-CEM-030-030, Manual Calculation of Plant Gas, Iodine, and Particulate Release Rates for Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (00CM) Compliance) that will determine whether an emergency classification is warranted.
NOTE 2:
In the case when there is no CECC dose assessment available, the length and relative magnitude of the release is the key in determining the classification. For example, in the case of the NOUE EAL of 2 times the Tech Spec limit, the classification is based more on the fact that a release above the limit has continued unabated for more than 60 minutes, than on the projected offsite dose.
NOTE 3:
See REP Appendix B for basis information.
Page 48 of 49 Revision 47
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SON GENERAL EMERGENCY EPIP-5 Unit 0 Rev. 0042 Page 27 of 31 Appendix H (Page 1 of 2)
INITIAL - PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATiONS Note 1: iF flowchart decision block conditions are unknown THEN answer NO.
Note 2: State agencies have provided prior knowledge of offsite impediments to evacuation (such as flooding, bridge/road closures, etc.) and recommend that any needed PAR should be sheiter(Rec #3)
Note 3 A short term release is defined as a release that does not exceed a 15 minute duration ABLE,1 Picthie Act on Gukb (PAG)
LIMIT I
3.9 6 mlcbCi/ccIodlne 131 I
is I
I v IPROJECTED
-OR a.,-
S IIM Thyroid CCE Evacuate 2 mile radius and 10 mile downwind and Shelter remainder of 10 mile El Evacuate 2 nil e fadluS and 5 mde downwind and Shelter remainder of 10 mile EPZ
SQN GENERAL EMERGENCY EPIP-5 Unit 0 Rev. 0042 Page 28 of 31 Appendix H (Page 2 of 2)
INITIAL - PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS UPGRADE - PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION Note 1: IF flowchart dec4epn block conditions ore uflkhown THEN answer NO.
Note 2: State agencies have provided prior knowledge of offslte impedments to evacuation (such as flooding. bridge/road closures, etc.) and recommend that any needed PAR zhouid be shelter (Rec #3)
Note a: A short term release Is defined us a release that dOes not e,tceed a 15 mInute duration Note 4: Plant conditions ate undovstoOd (Source term). Reldaw, pathway undorstood(flltorediunfiitered. olOvatod.
monitored), and meteorologIcal informatiOn Is available.
Note 5: Refer to site EAL (EFN 231. SON 1.3.5. WBN 1.3.5)
C..t.*n PAR b.od on change. in any oV the follOwing areas:
- moron. In dose assessment projected values.
- Increase in field team measured dose vaiu.
- Shift in 15 rain vantga wind diroOtlon resulting in additional soctorS belnO affected.
State provides infomwtlon that Oftalie impediments no iong.r exist.
Hostile Action Eent has b.on terminated.
- Cont&nlnent Red L.Ovois 20 % (sea Note S)
TABLE j.Proteciis.o Aefien Guide. (PAO)
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