ML13231A170

Issuance of Amendments Regarding Use of a Temporary Jumper for Providing Service Water

ML13231A170
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	09/23/2013
From:	Cotton K Plant Licensing Branch II
To:	Heacock D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
Cotton Karen, 415-1438
References
TAC ME9757, TAC ME9758
Download: ML13231A170 (28)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 Septarber 23, 2013 Mr. David A. Heacock President and Chief Nuclear Officer Virginia Electric and Power Company Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711

SUBJECT:

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2, ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS REGARDING USE OF A TEMPORARY JUMPER FOR PROVIDING SERVICE WATER (TAC NOS. ME9757 AND ME9758)

Dear Mr. Heacock:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 279 to Renewed Facility Operating License DPR-32 and Amendment No. 279 to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR 37 for the Surry Power Station (SPS), Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The amendment consists of changes the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated September 26, 2012, as supplemented by letters dated June 4, and September 3, 2013.

The amendments revise the TS requirements and adds a license condition for the SPS, Unit Nos.

1 and 2. The requested changes would allow the use of a temporary 30" seismic, non-missile protected jumper for providing service water (SW) to the component cooling heat exchangers (CCHXs) to facilitate planned maintenance activities on the existing CCHX SW supply piping.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

~~

Karen Cotton, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 279 to DPR-32

2. Amendment No. 279 to DPR-37

3. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-280 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO.1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 279 Renewed License No. DPR-32

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the CommisSion) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Virginia Electric and Power Company (the licensee) dated September 26,2012, as supplemented by letters dated June 4, and September 3, 2013, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

- 2

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-32 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(B)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 279, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1ZrJfZ~*

Robert J. Pascarelli, Chief Plant licensing Branch /1-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to License No. DPR-32 and the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: Septarber 23, 2013

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555*0001 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-281 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO.2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 279 Renewed License No. DPR-37

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Virginia Electric and Power Company (the licensee) dated September 26,2012, as supplemented by letters dated June 4, and September 3, 2013, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

- 2

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-37 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(B)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A. as revised through Amendment No. 279, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. The licensee shall operate the facility :n accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

'/,~.

Robert J. Pascarelli, Chief Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes License No. DPR-37 and the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance Septe1ber 23, 2013

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 279 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-32 DOCKET NO. 50-280 AND TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 279 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-37 DOCKET NO. 50-281 Replace the following pages of the Licenses and the Appendix A Technical Specifications (TSs) with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Pages Insert Pages License License License No. DPR-32, page 3 License No. DPR-32, page 3 License No. DPR-37, page 3 License No. DPR-37, page 3 License No. DPR-32, page 9 License No. DPR-32, page 9 License No. DPR-37, page 9 License No. DPR-37, page 9 TSs TSs TS 3.7-20 TS 3.7-20 TS 3.14-1 TS3.14-1 TS 3.14-4 TS 3.14-4 TS 3.14-4a

-3

3. This renewed license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations: 10 CFR Part 20, Section 30.34 of 10 CFR Part 30, Section 40.41 of 10 CFR Part 40, Sections 50.54 and 50.59 of 10 C FR Part 50. and Section 70.32 of 10 C FR Part 70: and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and the rules. regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified below:

A. Maximum Power Level The licensee is authorized to operate the facility at steady state reactor core power levels not in excess of 2587 megawatts (thermal).

B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.279, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

C. Reports The licensee shall make certain reports in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications.

D. Records The licensee shall keep facility operating records in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications.

E. Deleted by Amendment 65 F. Deleted by Amendment 71 G. Deleted by Amendment 227 H. Deleted by Amendment 227 I.

Fire Protection The licensee shall implement and maintain in effect the provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and as approved in the SER dated September 19, 1979, (and Supplements dated May 29,1980, October 9,1980, December 18,1980, February 13,1981, December 4, 1981, April 27, 1982, November 18,1982, January 1

1984, February 25. 1988, and Surry - Unit 1 Renewed License No. DPR-32 Amendment No. 279

-3 E. Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.

3. This renewed license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations: 10 CFR Part 20, Section 30.34 of 10 CFR Part 30, Section 40.41 of 10 CFR Part 40. Sections 50.54 and 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50, and Section 70.32 of 10 C FR Part 70; and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified below:

A. Maximum Power Level The licensee is authorized to operate the facility at steady state reactor core power levels not in excess of 2587 megawatts (thermal).

B. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment N0279, are hereby incorporated in this renewed license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

C. Reports The licensee shall make certain reports in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications.

D. Records The licensee shall keep facility operating records in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications.

Deleted by Amendment 54 F. Deleted by Amendment 59 and Amendment 65 G. Deleted by Amendment 227 H. Deleted by Amendment 227 Renewed License No. DPR-37 Surry - Unit 2 Amendment No. 279

-9 T. (Continued)

16. For the applicable UFSAR Chapter 14 events, Surry 1 will re-analyze the transient consistent with VEPCO's NRC-approved reload design methodology in VEP-FRD-42, Rev. 2.1-A.

If NRC review is deemed necessary pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, the accident analyses will be submitted to the NRC for review prior to operation at the uprate power level. These commitments apply to the following Surry 1 UFSAR Chapter 14 DNBR analyses that were analyzed at 2546 MWt consistent with the Statistical DNBR Evaluation Methodology in VEP-NE-2-A:

• Section 14.2.7 - Excessive Heat Removal due to Feedwater System Malfunctions (Full Power Feedwater Temperature Reduction case only);

• Section 14.2.8 - Excessive Load Increase Incident;

• Section 14.2.9 - Loss of Reactor Coolant Flow; and

• Section 14.2.10 - Loss of External Electrical Load Prior to operating above 2546 MWt (98.4% RP).

U. As discussed in the footnote to Technical Specification 3.14.A.2.b, the use of a temporary, safety-related, seismic, not fully missile protected supply line to provide Service Water (SW) to the Component Cooling Heat Exchangers (required by Technical Specification 3.13) to facilitate maintenance activities on the existing SW supply line shall be in accordance with the basis, risk evaluation, and compensatory measures (including a Contingency Action Plan) provided in the licensee's submittal dated September 26,2012 (Serial No.12-615).

4. This renewed license is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight on May 25, 2032.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULA10RY COMMISSION Original signed by:

Samuel J. Collins, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Appendix A, Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: March 20, 2003 Surry - Unit 1 Renewed License No. DPR-32 Amendment No. 279

-9 T. (Continued)

16. For the applicable UFSAR Chapter 14 events, Surry 2 will re-analyze the transient consistent with VEPCO's NRC-approved reload design methodology in VEP-FRD-42, Rev. 2.1-A.

If NRC review is deemed necessary pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, the accident analyses will be submitted to the NRC for review prior to operation at the uprate power level. These commitments apply to the following Surry 2 UFSAR Chapter 14 DNBR analyses that were analyzed at 2546 MWt consistent with the Statistical DNBR Evaluation Methodology in VEP-NE-2-A:

• Section 14.2.7 - Excessive Heat Removal due to Feedwater System Malfunctions (Full Power Feedwater Temperature Reduction case only);

• Section 14.2.8 - Excessive Load Increase Incident;

• Section 14.2.9 - Loss of Reactor Coolant Flow; and

• Section 14.2.10 - Loss of External Electrical Load Prior to operating above 2546 MWt (98.4% RP).

U. As discussed in the footnote to Technical Specification 3.14.A.2.b, the use of a temporary, safety-related, seismic, not fully missile protected supply line to provide Service Water (SW) to the Component Cooling Heat Exchangers (required by Technical Specification 3.13) to facilitate maintenance activities on the existing SW supply line shall be in accordance with the basis, risk evaluation, and compensatory measures (including a Contingency Action Plan) provided in the licensee's submittal dated September 26, 2012 (Serial No.12-615).

4. This renewed license is effective as ofthe date ofissuance and shall expire at midnight on January 29,2033.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Original signed by:

Samuel J. Collins, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Appendix A, Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: March 20, 2003 Surry - Unit 2 Renewed License No. DPR-37 Amendment No. 279

TABLE 3.7~2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ACTION INSTRUMENT OPERATING CONDITIONS Minimum Permissible Total Number OPERABLE Channels Bypass Operator Functional Unit Of Channels Channels To TriQ Conditions Actions

3. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (continued)

e. Trip of main fcedwater pumps - start motor driven 2/MFWpump IIMFW pump 2-1 each 24 pumps

f. Automatic actuation logic 2

4. LOSS OF POWER

a. 4.16 kv emergency bus undervoltage (loss of voltage) 3lbus

b. 4.16 kv emergency bus undervoltage (degraded voltage) 3lbus

5. NON-ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER ISOLATION

a. Low intake canallevel* - Note B 4

b. Automatic actuation logic 2

6. ENGINEERED SAFEGAURDS ACTUATION INTERLOCKS - Note A

a. Pressurizer pressure, P-I 1 3

b. Low-low Tavg, P-12 3

c. Reactor trip, P-4 2

7. RECIRCULATION MODE TRANSFER

a. RWST Level - Low-Low*

4

b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays 2

8. RECIRCULATION SPRAY

a. RWST Level - Low Coincident with High High 4

Containment Pressure*

3 (1j

b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays 2

s MFWpump 2

I 22 2lbus 2lbus 26 2lbus 2lbus 26 3

3 20 2

I 14 2

2 23 2

2 23 2

I 24 3

2 25 2

I 14 3

2 20 2

14 a Note A - Engineered Safeguards Actuation Interlocks are described in Table 4.I-A (1j Note B - When the temporary Service Water supply jumper to the Component Cooling Heat Exchangers is in service in accordance with the a

footnote to TS 3.14.A.2.b, two low intake canal level probes will be permitted to be in the tripped condition. In this condition, two z

o operable channels are required with one channel to trip. Ifone of the two operable channels becomes inoperable, the operating unit must be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

N'"

~

~

• There is a Safety Analysis Limit associated with this ESF function. If during calibration the setpoint is found to be conservative with IJol

....t I

respect to the Setting Limit but outside its predefined calibration tolerance, then the channel shall be brought back to within its predefined IV calibration tolerance before returning the channel to service. The calibration tolerances are specified in a document controlled under o

10 CFR 50.59.

TS 3.14-1 3.14 CIRCULATING AND SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS Applicability Applies to the operational status of the Circulating and Service Water Systems.

Objective To define those limiting conditions of the Circulating and Service Water Systems necessary to assure safe station operation.

Specification A. The Reactor Coolant System temperature or pressure of a reactor unit shall not exceed 350 0 For 450 psig, respectively, or the reactor shall not be critical unless:

1. The high level intake canal is filled to at least elevation +23.0 feetat the high level intake structure.

2. Unit subsystems, including piping and valves, shall be operable to the extent of being able to establish the following:

a. Flow to and from one bearing cooling water heat exchanger.

b. Flow to and from the component cooling heat exchangers required by Specification 3.13.(*)

3. At least two circulating water pumps are operating or are operable.

4. Three emergency service water pumps are operable; these pumps will service both units simultaneously.

(ote) For the purpose ofcleaning, performing inspections, repairing (as needed), and recoating (as needed) associated with the Service Water (SW) supply piping to the Component Cooling Heat Exchangers (CCHXs), a temporary 30" safety~related, seismic, not fully missile protected supply line (temporary jumper) will be provided to supply SW flow to the CCHXs required by TS 3.13. The basis for using the temporary jumper is provided in Virginia Electric and Power Company's letter Serial No. 12~615, dated September 26, 2012. The use ofthe temporary jumper is permitted two times only for a duration of up to 35 days during each ofthe 2013 and 2015 Unit 1 refueling outages. If non-essential SW isolation is required during the pipe maintenance activities, it will be accomplished consistent with design basis requirements by using operator (manual) action to close the SW isolation valve in the temporary jumper within the time constraints established by the Station Abnormal Procedures. Ifthe temporary jumper becomes inoperable during either 35-day period, the requirements ofSpecification 3.0.1 shall apply. Upon completion of the work associated with the second 35-day period, this footnote will no longer be applicable.

Amendment Nos. 279

TS 3.l4-4 including replacement of an Emergency Service Water pump without forcing dual unit outages, yet limits the amount ofoperating time without the specified number ofpumps.

When one Unit is in Cold Shutdown and the heat load from the shutdown unit and spent fuel pool drops to less than 25 million BTUIHR, then one Emergency Service Water pump may be removed from service for the subsequent time that the unit remains in Cold Shutdown due to the reduced residual heat removal and hence component cooling requirements.

A minimum level of + 17.2 feet in the High Level Intake canal is required to provide design flow of Service Water through the Recirculation Spray heat exchangers during a loss-of-coolant accident for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. If the water level falls below +23' 6",

signals are generated to trip both unit's turbines and to close the nonessential Circulating and Service Water valves. A High Level Intake canal level of +23' 6" ensures actuation prior to canal level falling to elevation +23'. The Circulating Water and Service Water isolation valves which are required to close to conserve Intake Canal inventory are periodically verified to limit total leakage flow out of the Intake Canal. In addition, passive vacuum breakers are installed on the Circulating Water pump discharge lines to assure that a reverse siphon is not continued for canal levels Jess than +23 feet when Circulating Water pumps are de-energized. The remaining six feet of canal level is provided coincident with ESW pump operation as the required source of Service Water for heat loads following the Design Basis Accident.

To facilitate cleaning, inspecting, repairing (as needed), and recoating (as needed) of the Service Water (SW) supply line to the Component Cooling Heat Exchangers (CCHXs), a temporary, safety-related, seismic, not fully missile protected SW supply line (temporary jumper) will be used as discussed in the temporary footnote to TS 3.14.A.2.b. The temporary jumper is required since service water is supplied to the CCHXs by a single concrete-encased line. To remove the SW supply line from service for extended maintenance (i.e., for pipe cleaning, inspection, repair, and recoating), an alternate temporary SW supply path is required to support the operation of the CCHXs during the maintenance activities. The basis for using the temporary SW supply jumper to the CCHXs is provided in Virginia Electric and Power Company's letter Serial No.12-615, dated September 26, 2012. The use ofthe temporary jumper is only permitted for a duration of up to 35 days during each of the 2013 and 2015 Unit I refueling outages and shall be operated in accordance with the compensatory measures (including a Contingency Action Plan) provided in the letter referenced above. The only automatic function in the normal supply line when Unit 1 is in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING SHUTDOWN is Amendment Nos. 279

TS 3.14-4a provided by the SW supply motor operated valves, which close on low Intake Canal level.

Ifnon-essential SW isolation is required during the time the jumper is in service, it will be accomplished consistent with design and licensing bases requirements by using operator (manual) action to close the SW isolation valve in the temporary jumper within the time constraints established by the Station Abnonnal Procedures.

References:

UFSAR Section 9.9 Service Water System UFSAR Section 10.3.4 Circulating Water System UFSAR Section 14.5 Loss-of-Coolant Accidents, Including the Design Basis Accident Amendment Nos. 279

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 279 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-32 AND AMENDMENT NO. 279 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-37 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-280 AND 50-281

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By license amendment request application (LAR) dated September 26, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12279A282), as supplemented by letters dated June 4, 2013, (ADAMS Accession No. ML13161A295) and September 3, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13248A107), the Virginia Electric and Power Company (licensee) submitted a request for the addition of changes to the Surry Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (SPS), Technical Specifications (TSs) and a license condition. The supplements dated June 4, 2013 and September 3, 2013, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

The requested changes would allow the use of a temporary 30" seismic, non-missile protected jumper for providing service water (SW) to the component cooling heat exchangers (CCHXs) while the licensee cleans, inspects, repairs (if necessary), and recoats (if necessary) the existing CCHX SW supply piping. The licensee will use the temporary jumper for up to 35 days during each of the next two Unit 1 refueling outages, which the licensee has scheduled to perform in 2013 and 2015.

2.0 BACKGROUND

The licensee began a SW restoration project in the fall of 1990, which includes inspection, repair, and refurbishment of the SW system piping. The next piping section scheduled for restoration is the SW supply piping to the CCHXs. This single concrete-encased line provides SW cooling for the four CCHXs (shared by both of the Surry units) during normal operating and shutdown conditions. Unit 1 will be shutdown in a refueling outage and Unit 2 will be operating at full power while the licensee removes this SW line from service. With one unit operating and one unit shut down, TS require two CCHXs to be operable. In order to meet the TS operability requirements,

- 2 the CCHXs will require an alternate method of SW supply. The licensee plans to install an alternate SW supply line (Le., a temporary SW jumper) to provide cooling water for the CCHXs during this phase of the SW restoration project.

The existing SW supply piping for the CCHXs takes water from the Band/or D circulating water (CW) inlet bays via the 96" CW supply piping, and supplies water to the CCHXs through separate branch lines and component isolation valves. The licensee provides a diagram of the piping arrangement in the September 26, 2012, submittal as Figure 1. The licensee can isolate SW from either the B or D CW inlet bays with a motor-operated valve (MOV) located in each of the flow paths. The MOVs receive an isolation signal in the event of low-inlet-bay level to preserve the capability of the ultimate heat sink (UHS). The temporary jumper will take water from the C inlet bay via the 96" CW supply piping and the manual isolation valve, and deliver it to the A and B CCHXs through a temporary manual isolation valve for each of the two heat exchangers. The jumper size will provide sufficient flow to cool the Unit 1 shutdown heat loads and the Unit 2 operating heat loads simultaneously.

The licensee will install the jumper as a safety-related and seismic system, but will not provide missile protection over the entire length of the jumper. The licensee concluded that the small increase in the probability of equipment malfunction from missile strike or heavy load drop constitutes an unreviewed safety question, and that installation and use of the jumper would require prior NRC review and approval. In addition, the licensee determined that changes to the Surry TSs are necessary to facilitate use of the temporary SW jumper to complete this phase of the SW restoration project. In order to support use of the temporary SW jumper, the licensee defined project constraints and compensatory measures that the licensee would implement. The licensee also proposed a license condition that acknowledges the project constraints, compensatory measures, and changes to TS Table 3.7-2, Item 5.a, TS 3.14.A.2.b, and to the basis section of TS 3.14.

3.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

3.1 USE OF TEMPORARY SERVICE WATER JUMPER The regulation at Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.36( c)(2)(i) states that TSs will include limiting conditions for operation (LeO) which are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of eqUipment required for safe operation of the facility. In addition, when a nuclear reactor does not meet an LCO, the licensee must shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the TSs until the reactor meets the LCO.

The component cooling water system (CCW) is an intermediate cooling system that transfers heat from heat exchangers containing reactor coolant or other radioactive liquids to the SW system. Although SPS does not require the CCHXs for accident mitigation, the TSs do require a reliable source of cooling water to provide a heat sink for the spent fuel and residual heat removal (RHR) heat loads in the non-accident unit. TS 3.13 require two CCHXs to be in service with one unit in operation and the other unit shutdown. In order to meet the TS LCO the licensee must install a temporary SW supply line to feed the two required CCHXs while the licensee dewaters the normal SW supply piping for servicing. The licensee proposes changes to the operating license by adding a license condition and by modifying the TSs in order to facilitate use of the temporary jumper. This will ensure that the licensee will operate the facility within safety limits, and that each unit will continue to meet the LCO.

- 3 3.1.1 License Condition Limited use of a temporary SW jumper is in accordance with the basis, risk evaluation, and compensatory measures (including a Contingency Action Plan (CAP)) as provided in this LAR.

3.1.2 Technical Specification Table 3.7 Revision The licensee will revise Item 5, Non-Essential Service Water Isolation to add a Note B to address channel operability requirements when the CCHX SW jumper is in use. The TS requires a minimum of three operable low intake canal level isolation channels. However, with the jumper in service the licensee will dewater two of the four intake bays and place their associated isolation channels in trip. Note B will allow operation with only two operable isolation channels. The licensee will add Note B to Item 5.a to address the different channel requirements during the use of the temporary CCHX SW jumper.

3.1.3 Modification of Technical Specification 3.14.A.2.b The licensee will add a temporary footnote to TS 3.14.A.2.b to allow use of the temporary jumper.

The footnote dictates that if SW requires isolation during the pipe maintenance activities, the licensee will isolate it consistent with design basis requirements by using operator (manual) action to close the SW isolation valve in the temporary jumper within the time constraints established by the Station Abnormal Procedures. If the temporary jumper becomes inoperable during either 35-day period, the requirements of TS 3.0.1 shall apply. In addition, the licensee will add a paragraph supporting the footnote to the bases section of TS 3.14.A.2.b. The temporary footnote will expire after the second 35-day period in 2015.

The licensee's use of a temporary SW jumper in compliance with proposed license conditions, TS modifications, and all compensatory measures as described in the licensee's September 26, 2012, submittal (and all supplemental information) will ensure that SW system and CCHXs will maintain at least the lowest functional capability or performance levels required for safe operation of the facility. Because the licensee continues to meet 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i), the proposed changes are acceptable.

3.1.4 Risk-Informed Regulatory Criteria/Guidelines The regulatory guide (RG) on which the NRC staff based its acceptance are:

RG 1.174, "An Approach for USing Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis," describes a risk-informed approach, acceptable to the NRC, for assessing the nature and impact of proposed permanent licensing-basis changes by considering engineering issues and applying risk insights. This regulatory guide also provides risk acceptance guidelines for evaluating the results of such evaluations.

RG 1.177, "An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications," describes an acceptable risk-informed approach specifically for assessing proposed permanent TS changes in allowed outage times. This regulatory guide also provides risk acceptance guidelines for evaluating the results of such assessments. RG

- 4 1.177 identifies a three-tiered approach for the licensees evaluation of the risk associated with a proposed Completion Time (CT) TS change, as discussed below.

Tier 1 assesses the risk impact of the proposed change in accordance with acceptance guidelines consistent with the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement, as documented in RG 1.174 and RG 1.177.

Tier 2 identifies and evaluates any potential risk-significant plant equipment outage configurations that could result if equipment, in addition to that associated with the proposed license amendment, is taken out-ot-service simultaneously, or if other risk significant operational factors, such as concurrent system or equipment testing, are also involved.

Tier 3 addresses the licensee's overall configuration risk management program (CRMP) to ensure that adequate programs and procedures are in place for identifying risk significant plant configurations resulting from maintenance or other operational activities and appropriate compensatory measures are taken to avoid risk-significant configurations that may not have been considered when the Tier 2 evaluation was performed. Tier 3 guidance can be satisfied by the Maintenance Rule 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), which requires a licensee to assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from activities such as surveillance testing and corrective and preventive maintenance, subject to the guidance provided in RG 1.177, Section 2.3.7.1, and the adequacy of the licensee's PRA model for this application.

4.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The licensee did not submit the LAR as a "risk-Informed" application but did provide a supporting probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for use of the jumper that concluded that the risk impact is characterized as "small" consistent with RG 1.174 and is within the acceptance guidelines of RG 1.177. Therefore a traditional and a probabilistic technical evaluation were performed.

4.1 TRADITIONAL TECHNICAL EVALUATION The licensee's submittal and supplemental information discuss the differences in design and operation that exist between the proposed temporary SW jumper and the actual SW supply line for the CCHXs, and describe contingencies that the licensee will take to compensate for the differences. The licensee has requested specific TS changes to facilitate use of the temporary jumper and proposed a license condition to recognize the specific compensatory measures and contingencies that the licensee will take during the two 35-day periods when the licensee will remove the normal CCHX SW supply piping from service for restoration.

Based on the information submitted by the licensee, the temporary jumper will satisfy the same design requirements as the existing CCHX SW supply line, with only a few exceptions. The staff's review focused on the differences that will exist in design and operation between the temporary jumper and the CCHX SW supply line, and on measures the licensee will take to compensate for these differences. In reviewing the information provided by the licensee, the staff identified the following differences in the jumper design and operation:

- 5

1.

The jumper can take water from one inlet bay (C), whereas the existing SW supply line can take water from two inlet bays (B and D).

2.

The licensee will dewater two of the four inlet bays during this phase of the SW restoration work in order to access the existing CCHX SW supply line.

3.

The licensee will use a manual valve for isolating the jumper and automatic isolation capability will not exist, whereas in the existing SW system, MOVs automatically isolate the supply line when 3 out of 4 inlet bay levels are low in order to preserve the UHS.

4.

The jumper will not have missile protection over its entire length, and will be vulnerable to missiles, heavy load mishaps, and vehicular impact.

5.

The jumper will be more limiting in its flow capability than the existing SW supply line and will only provide SW to the A and B CCHXs, rendering the other two CCHXs inoperable.

6.

Interim use of the temporary jumper could be a confusion factor for plant operators and station personnel.

The licensee's submittal and supplemental information recognize these aspects of jumper design and operation, and establish specific project constraints and compensatory measures in order to support interim use of the temporary jumper. Section 5.0 of the licensee's LAR lists the following contingenCies and compensatory measures:

• A safety-related, seismic, not fully missile protected, alternate SW flow path uumper) will be required to provide SW to two CCHXs for Unit 2 operating/shutdown (if required) loads, Unit 1 shutdown/refueling loads, and common heat loads.

• An internal flooding walkdown will be performed after installation of the temporary SW jumper to address Gaps 2 and 11 listed in Table 1 in Attachment 4 of the LAR.

• The jumper will be hydrostatically tested prior to use in accordance with the design change testing requirements and existing Station Procedures.

• The CCHXs will be cleaned prior to placing the jumper into service to reduce the probability that a CCHX will be rendered inoperable due to a tubesheet becoming clogged from biofouling.

• Prior to removing the Unit 1 "B" and "D" inlet bays from service, surveillance testing and cleaning will be performed on the Unit 2 canal level probes, and the trash racks will be cleaned.

• Provisions will be made for temporary instrumentation and procedure changes to assess CCHX operability.

- 6

• Unit 1 shall be defueled or the refueling cavity filled to at least 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange, whenever the jumper is in service as the operable SW flow path. The reactor will be shutdown for 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> prior to placing the jumper in service as the operable SW flow path.

After a decay time from shutdown of 360 hours0.00417 days <br />0.1 hours <br />5.952381e-4 weeks <br />1.3698e-4 months <br /> (15 days), the heat load will be reduced and the constraints of upper internals/reactor vessel head removed and cavity flooded will be removed. From this point forward in the outage, a loss of the jumper would be responded to in accordance with station abnormal procedures. The appropriate Operating Procedure(s) will be revised to control operation of the jumper in accordance with the implementing design change package.

• Two CCHXs will be out of service during implementation of the project. TSs Section 3.13 requires two CCHXs to be operable for one unit operation and three CCHXs for two unit operation. TS 3.14 require the ability to establish SW flow to and from the CCHXs specified in TS 3.13. Therefore, Unit 1 cannot be operating when the jumper is in service as the operable SW flow path. The design change package which implements the restoration project for the SW supply piping to the CCHXs ensures proper unit conditions during the use of the jumper.

• The jumper will not be operated when SW supply temperature is above 80 degree F.

Operating Procedures will be revised to indicate maximum allowable SW temperature while the jumper is in service in accordance with the implementing design change package.

• The jumper will require a 24-hour/day administrative control of the installed manual isolation valve; if required, the operator assigned to the administrative control will be directed to close the valve and isolate the SW flow to the CCHXs to conserve Intake Canal inventory. The normal SW MOVs (1-SW-MOV-102A and 1-SW-MOV-102B) will be out of service during implementation of the project. Valve operation will be controlled by Abnormal and Operating Procedures. The jumper will also require a 24-hour/day flood watch; the flood watch requirements will be delineated and controlled by design change implementing procedures and in accordance with Station Procedures.

• When the jumper is in service, the CAP will be in effect through administrative action statements, requiring restoration of the normal SW supply capability if specific plant or environmental conditions exist. These conditions include leakage rates which render the jumper inoperable, weather conditions which are conducive to tornadic activity, hurricane warnings for the Surry site, or plant conditions on Unit 2 which result in RHR being the only available cooling for the reactor coolant system (e.g., no unisolated reactor coolant system loop). Applicable Station Procedures will be revised to control actions required by the CAP.

• Appropriate controls on the movement of heavy loads will be implemented for any lifts which pass over the jumper while it is in service. The implementing design change package ensures proper implementation of the controls on the movement of heavy loads in the vicinity of the jumper.

• SW supply to the control room chiller condensers in Mechanical Equipment Room 3 and the charging pump SW pumps will be from the two Unit 2 supply lines. The Unit 1 supply will be out of service for the duration of the pipe repair work. This will be controlled by the implementing design change package.

- 7

• In accordance with Station Procedures, flooding protection and personnel safety will be provided by requiring double isolation for system boundaries which present a significant source of water. Passive boundaries which have no credible failure mechanism through inadvertent operation or significant lea.kage may have single isolation (e.g., blanked pipe).

• Visual barriers (e.g., ropes, placards, cones, etc.) will be placed around the jumper routing to minimize the likelihood of inadvertent collision of moving vehicles with the jumper.

• The section of existing SW pipe downstream of the SW supply isolation MOVs (1-MOV-SW-1 02A and B) will be filled with water prior to stop log removal using a controllable process.

• Components will be opened under preventative measures that will allow any potential leaks to be controlled prior to the component being fully opened.

• Vehicle traffic (e.g., forklifts) will be restricted in the immediate area of the temporary SW jumper while it is in service. If any vehicle operation becomes necessary in the area of the jumper for any period of time when the jumper is in service, personnel will be specifically designated to serve as a "spotter" to aid the vehicle operator to preclude any adverse interaction with jumper operation.

• During the time periods when the jumper is in service, temporary pipe clamps and other emergency repair equipment will be staged in the area of the jumper in the basement of the Turbine Building to facilitate emergency repair of the jumper, if required, and to assist in recovery from a postulated flooding event. Procedures and training will be provided to the construction personnel to ensure the effectiveness of this measure.

• Operations personnel will be appropriately trained on the purpose of the jumper, administrative control of the temporary jumper isolation valve, the revised abnormal procedures, the TSs that address the use of the temporary service water jumper, and on their individual responsibilities associated with the jumper, as appropriate.

Included in the compensatory measures is a CAP that the licensee will put into effect whenever the jumper is in service. The CAP establishes criteria for restoring the normal CCHX SW supply line to service in the event that certain conditions (e.g., hazardous weather, high river temperature) jeopardize continued use of the temporary jumper or if conditions associated with the operating unit (Unit 2) should warrant such action. Section 4.3 of the LAR describes the CAP as having the following four phases with associated activities:

PHASE I Evacuation

1.

Remove equipment and ventilation from the piping (42" and 96").

2.

Remove debris from the piping. Material which is small enough to pass through the heat exchanger tubes may be left in the piping. (Largest dimension of object must be smaller than 0.25".)

3.

Evacuate personnel from the piping.

4.

Complete preparation for reflooding the system.

- 8 PHASE II Restore System Integrity

1.

Close manways at ("C" and "D") CCHXs.

2.

Close manway at 42" piping.

3.

Blank remaining openings in the system (e.g., 42" piping at piping flange downstream of removed 1-SW-MOV-102X).

PHASE III Reflood

1.

Open stop logs on unblanked 96" inlet bay, as required, to fill piping up to the closed 1-SW -MOV -1 02X.

PHASE IV Flow

1.

Open 1-SW-MOV-1 02X and establish flow to the "c" and "0" CCHXs.

The staff has reviewed the project constrains and compensatory measures with the associated CAP. The staff finds that licensee's proposed project constraints and compensatory measures provide assurance that:

1. The temporary jumper will be able to perform its intended function during each of the two 35-day periods when the licensee will remove the normal CCHX SW line service

2. The licensee can restore the normal CCHX SW supply within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

3. The Unit 1 reactor coolant will remain subcooled for at least 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (during most of the SW restoration work) in the event that flow through the temporary jumper is interrupted.

In Section 4.2.3 of the LAR, the licensee showed that the most limiting condition will occur during a 3%-day time period towards the end of the Unit 1 refueling operation, when the licensee is restoring reactor vessel integrity. The licensee determined that should loss of SW flow through the temporary jumper occur during this period (and the backup action not taken), boiling of the reactor coolant could occur in about 36 minutes, and fuel clad damage could occur in about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The licensee's calculations are conservative in that that they are based on a total loss of the RHR System. The licensee's assumptions do not include any credit for the heat removal capacity of the RHR or CC systems. The RHR and component cooling (CC) pumps continue to operate, with the loss of service water, providing added heat removal capacity and extending the time to boil-off and core damage. As a compensatory, measure the licensee will use Operations Surveillance Procedure 1-0SP-ZZ-004, "Unit 1 Safety Systems Status List for Cold ShutdownlRefueling Conditions," and Abnormal Procedure 1-AP-27.00, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability" to assure availability of alternate cooling to mitigate such an event before and while the licensee is in this limiting condition. The licensee has determined (based on previous simulation) that operators can establish alternate cooling in approximately 15 minutes. The operators should immediately recognize a loss of the temporary SW jumper since the licensee will continuously monitor the line while the jumper is in service. However to be conservative the licensee assume that 10 minutes will elapse before an operator recognizes a loss of SW and takes action. Assuming that 10 minutes will elapse before an operator can take action, and that operators can establish alternate

- 9 cooling in 15 minutes, operators should be able to establish alternate cooling before the reactor coolant begins to boil and well before the onset of fuel clad damage.

By establishing appropriate project constraints and compensatory measures, the licensee has adequately addressed the differences that exist in design and operation of the temporary SW jumper as compared to the normal CCHX SW supply line. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that interim use of the temporary SW jumper is acceptable. Further, the staff finds that the proposed license condition provides adequate assurance that the licensee will implement the project constraints and compensatory measures and that the requested changes to TS Table 3.7-2, Item 5, TS 3.14.A.2.b and to the bases section of TS 3.14 are necessary and acceptable for facilitating use of the temporary jumper.

4.2 RISK-INFORMENED TECHNICAL EVALUATION RG 1.174 clarifies that in implementing risk-informed decisionmaking, risk-informed changes are expected to meet a set of key principles. These principles include the following:

1.

The proposed change meets the current regulations unless it is explicitly related to a requested exemption (Le., a specific exemption under 10 CFR 50.12, "Specific Exemptions").

2.

The proposed change is consistent with a defense-in-depth philosophy.

3.

The proposed change maintains sufficient safety margins.

4.

When proposed changes result in an increase in CDF or risk, the increases should be small and consistent with the intent of the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement.

5.

The impact of the proposed change should be monitored using performance measurement strategies.

4.2.1 Key PrinCiple 1: Compliance with Current Regulations The licensee does not propose to deviate from existing regulatory requirements and compliance with existing regulations is maintained by the proposed LAR.

4.2.2 Key PrinCiple 2: Evaluations of Defense-in-Depth As discussed above, the deterministic review concluded that the compensatory measures in a CAP that the licensee will put into effect whenever the jumper is in service establish criteria for restoring the normal CCHX SW supply line to service in the event that certain conditions (e.g.,

hazardous weather, high river temperature) jeopardize continued use of the temporary jumper or if conditions associated with the operating unit (Unit 2) should warrant such action. Therefore the NRC staff concludes that the philosophy of defense in depth is maintained because system redundancy, independence, and diversity are maintained commensurate with the expected frequency of challenges to the system.

4.2.3 Key Principle 3: Evaluation of Safety Margins As discussed above, the temporary jumper will satisfy the same deSign requirements as the existing CCHX SW supply line, with only a few exceptions. The deterministic evaluation concluded that through establishing appropriate project constraints and compensatory measures,

- 10 the licensee has adequately addressed the differences that exist in design and operation of the temporary SW jumper as compared to the normal CCHX SW supply line. Therefore adequate safety margins have been maintained because the licensee identified and adequately addressed all differences in design and operation.

4.2.4 Key Principle 4: Increase in risk should be small The Licensee stated that the Surry PRA was utilized to evaluate the impact on Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large, Early Release Frequency (LERF) for the LAR for the temporary SW jumper. The analysis evaluates the risk of canal level instrumentation out of service for durations in excess of current limits (TS Table 3.7-2 5a) and the risk of rupture of the temporary SW jumper causing previously nonexistent flooding events. The evaluation addresses the NRC staff's three-tiered approach.

4.2.4.1 Tier 1: Assesses the risk impact of the proposed change The first tier evaluates the impact of the use of a temporary 30" seismic, non-missile protected jumper for providing service water (SW) to the component cooling heat exchangers (CCHXs) for up to 35 days during each of the next two Unit 1 refueling outages. The licensee has scheduled maintenance on the existing SW line in 2013 and 2015 refueling outages. The Tier 1 staff review involves two aspects: (1) evaluation of the validity of the PRA and its application to the proposed CT extension, and (2) evaluation of the PRA used to support this application.

PRA Technical Adequacy To determine whether the PRA used in support of the proposed one time use of the SW jumper the staff evaluated the relevant PRA information provided by the licensee in its submittal, and considered the findings of recent PRA peer reviews and evaluations. The staff's review of the licensee's submittal focused on the capability of the licensee's PRA model to analyze the risks resulting from the proposed use of the SW jumper instead of the current SW configuration.

The licensee stated that one unit is defueled or the refueling cavity filled to at least 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange, whenever the jumper is in service as the operable SW flow path. The reactor will be shut down for 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> prior to placing the jumper in service as the operable SW flow path. Therefore, the only degradation in capability for the operating unit, and source of increased risk, is the increased risk of flooding and the reduction in canal level logic evaluated below. Increased risk from degradation in capability of the shutdown unit is addressed qualitatively by compensatory measures as discussed above.

The licensee reported that its PRA underwent a 1998 NEI PRA Peer review, a 2007 Surry PRA self-assessment, and a 2010 PRA focused scope peer review. The licensee provided detailed results of these reviews in the submittal along with explanations about why each peer review finding has no or very limited impact on the evaluations done to support this submittal. As clarified in RG 1.174, the scope, level of detail, and technical adequacy of the PRA are to be commensurate with the application for which it is intended and the role the PRA results play in the integrated decision process. The NRC Staff did not review these reported peer review results in detail because the estimated changes in risk, reported below, are orders of magnitude below the acceptance guidelines. The NRC Staff concludes that the peer reviews performed by the licensee, and the disposition of the findings reported in the application, provide sufficient confidence to conclude that the very low risk estimates reported demonstrate that the acceptance guidelines in RG 1.174 have been met.

- 11 Internal events risk evaluation Intake canal level probes 1-CW-LE-1 02 and 1-CW-LE-103 are being rendered inoperable requiring the level instrument channels to be placed in their tripped condition. Placing the level probes in a tripped condition requires converting the 3-out-of-4 logic to a 1-out-of-2 trip logic for the Unit 2 turbine trip and isolation of non-essential SW and CW supplies.

The licensee calculated the ICCDP and the ICLERP associated with the canal level logic change to be 4.71E-12 and 2.05E-14 respectively.

Flooding Risk Evaluation The total length of 30-inch diameter temporary SW jumper will be approximately 225 feet. The internal flooding analysis for the Turbine Building flood frequencies was adjusted to include the additional 225 feet of SW pipe and the human actions to monitor and operate the jumper were identified and evaluated.

The licensee estimated the ICCDP and the ICLERP associated with the new pipe as 7.67E-11 and 1.92E-12 respectively.

Fire, Seismic, and Other External Risk Evaluation The licensee stated that these initiating events have little or no impact on the risk, and were screened out from further analytic modeling. The !\\IRC staff finds that the relatively short exposure time of this one time configuration (a total of 70 days over two years) combined with the generally equivalent capability of the SW for the single unit allowed to be operating support the licensee conclusion that the additional risk would have little or no impact.

4.2.4.2 Tier 2: Avoidance of Risk Significant Plant Configurations The Licensee stated that in order to avoid risk significant plant equipment outage configurations during the extended allowed outage time of two canal level instruments out of service, the impact of having other equipment unavailable is evaluated. The licensee concluded that the evaluation did not identify any configurations that could occur during the temporary SW jumper use that would require Tier 2 restrictions per RG 1.177. This evaluation meets the requirements to search for potential risk significant configuration identified in RG 1.177 and the conclusion that none such configurations exist is consistent with the very limited risk impact of the configuration.

4.2.4.3 Tier 3: Risk-Informed Plant Configuration Control and Management The licensee stated that the 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) program at Surry performs full PRA analyses of planned maintenance configurations in advance. The licensee further clarified that individually, the SW piping maintenance activity does not approach the required risk management thresholds of the 10 CFR50.65(a)(4) regulation. While combinations of unavailable eqUipment and/or maintenance evolutions may approach the limits and even require risk management actions, the risks arising from these configurations will be dominated by factors other than the temporary SW jumper or canal level instrumentation.

- 12 4.2.5 Key Principle 5: Monitor the Impact of the Proposed Change RG 1.174 and RG 1.177 establish the need for an implementation and monitoring program to ensure that extensions to TS CTs do not degrade operational safety over time and that no adverse degradation occurs due to unanticipated degradation or common cause mechanisms.

An implementation and monitoring program is intended to ensure that the impact of the proposed TS change continues to reflect the reliability and availability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) impacted by the change. RG 1.174 states that monitoring performed in conformance with the Maintenance Rule, 10 CFR 50.65, can be used when the monitoring performed is sufficient for the SSCs affected by the risk-informed application.

The licensee stated that Surry's 10CFR50.65(a)(4) compliance program requires analysis and management of configuration risks. The CC Water System, SW System, and canal level instrumentation are included in the 1 OCFR50.65(a)(4) scope, and their removal from service will be monitored, analyzed, and managed. Therefore Key principle 5 is satisfied because the monitoring of the affected systems is accomplished with the Maintenance Rule.

4.2.6 Conclusion Although the licensee did not submit the LAR as a risk-informed submittal, it provides risk information to support the request, including the information required by RG 1.177. The licensee identified only two degradations from the normal operating configurations that contributed to an increase in risk when only one unit is operating as required by the proposed amendment. The estimated risk increases from these degradations are very small. The small impact on risk is supported by the failure to identify any risk-significant configurations that should be avoided in the Tier 2 evaluation.

RG 1.174 states that the scope, level of detail, and technical adequacy of the PRA are to be commensurate with the application for which it is intended and the role the PRA results play in the integrated decision process. In this submittal, the PRA results playa very minor role and the review of the PRA was limited to a review of the licensee's process to demonstrate adequacy and a conclusion that the licensee had appropriate process in place to evaluate the adequacy of the PRA.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Virginia State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no signiHcant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there

- 13 has been no public comment on such finding (77 FR 76082, December 26,2012). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR S1.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR S1.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need to be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations disclJssed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Michael Levine, NRRlDSS Steve Dinsmore, NRR/DRA Date: ~ta"rt:er 23, 2013

September 23, 2013 Mr. David A. Heacock President and Chief Nuclear Officer Virginia Electric and Power Company Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711

SUBJECT:

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2, ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS REGARDING USE OF A TEMPORARY JUMPER FOR PROVIDING SERVICE WATER (TAC NOS. ME9757 AND ME9758)

Dear Mr. Heacock:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 279 to Renewed Facility Operating License DPR-32 and Amendment No. 279 to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR 37 for the Surry Power Station (SPS), Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The amendment consists of changes the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated September 26,2012, as supplemented by letters dated June 4, and September 3,2013.

The amendments revise the TS requirements and adds a license condition for the SPS, Unit Nos.

1 and 2. The requested changes would allow the use of a temporary 30" seismic, non-missile protected jumper for providing service water (SW) to the component cooling heat exchangers (CCHXs) to facilitate planned maintenance activities on the existing CCHX SW supply piping.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely, IRA!

Karen Cotton, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 279 to DPR-32

2. Amendment No. 279 to DPR-37

3. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:

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