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Unistar Nuclear Energy, Toxic-Flammable Explosive Transport Hazards in Calvert Cliffs Units 1 & 2 Impact on Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3
	ML13204A401
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs, 05200016
Issue date:	07/19/2013
From:	Finley M; UniStar Nuclear Energy
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of New Reactors
References
	UN#13-096
	Download: ML13204A401 (34)
	v • d • e

Mark T. Finley 750 East Pratt Street, Suite 1400 Baltimore, Maryland 21202 Senior Vice President, Regulatory Affairs & Engineering U400ar" NUCLEAR ENERGY 10 CFR 50.4 10 CFR 52.79 July 19, 2013 UN#13-096 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

UniStar Nuclear Energy, NRC Docket No.52-016 Toxic-Flammable Explosive Transport Hazards in Calvert Cliffs Units 1 & 2 Impact on Calvert.Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3 The purpose of this letter is to provide additional information regarding the impact of the Toxic-Flammable Explosive Transport Hazards in Calvert Cliffs Units 1 & 2 on Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3, as discussed in Section 2.2 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), as submitted in Part 2 of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP) Unit 3 Combined License Application (COLA), Revision 9.

UniStar Nuclear Energy (UNE) identified that there are additional Calvert Cliffs Units 1 & 2 chemical hazard materials transported/stored, which required evaluation for impact on the CCNPP Unit 3 chemical hazards analysis. This condition was entered into the UNE corrective action program for disposition. Corrective action included identifying the additional chemical hazard materials and identifying the COLA impact of the additional information. provides the COLA impact of the additional information to the Toxic-Flammable Explosive Transport Hazards in Calvert Cliffs Units 1 & 2 on Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3.

This additional information resulted in no impact on the control room habitability analysis. A Licensing Basis Document Change Request has been initiated to incorporate these changes into a future revision of the COLA. provides a table of changes to the CCNPP Unit 3 COLA associated with this additional information.

- p6qL

UN#13-096 Page 2 Our response does not include any new regulatory commitments.

This letter, and its enclosures, does not contain any sensitive or proprietary information.

If there are any questions regarding this transmittal, please contact me at (410) 369-1907 or Mr. Wayne A. Massie at (410) 369-1910.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on July 19, 2013 Mark T. Finley

Enclosures:

1)

Changes to CCNPP Unit 3 COLA Associated with the Impact of the Toxic-Flammable Explosive Transport Hazards in Calvert Cliffs Units 1 & 2 on Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3

2)

Table of Changes to CCNPP Unit 3 COLA Associated with the Impact of the Toxic-Flammable Explosive Transport Hazards in Calvert Cliffs Units 1 & 2 on Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3 cc:

Surinder Arora, NRC Project Manager, U.S. EPR Projects Branch Laura Quinn-Willingham, NRC Environmental Project Manager, U.S. EPR COL Application Tomeka Terry, NRC Environmental Project Manager, U.S. EPR COL Application Amy Snyder, NRC Project Manager, U.S. EPR DC Application, (w/o enclosures)

Patricia Holahan, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator, NRC Region II, (w/o enclosures)

Silas Kennedy, U.S. NRC Resident Inspector, CCNPP, Units 1 and 2, David Lew, Deputy Regional Administrator, NRC Region I (w/o enclosures)

UN#13-096 Enclosure I Changes to CCNPP Unit 3 COLA Associated with the Impact of the Toxic-Flammable Explosive Transport Hazards in Calvert Cliffs Units I & 2 on Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3

FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#13-096 clouds (delayed ignition), toxic chemicals, fires, collisions with intake structure, liquid spills, Page 2 of 29 and radiological hazards. The postulated accidents that would result in a chemical release were analyzed at the following locations:

Nearby transportation routes MD 2/4, the Chesapeake Bay navigable waterway, and DCPLNG Pipeline Nearby chemical and fuel storage facilities (DCPLNG)

THIS PAGE Onsite chemical storage (CCNPP Units 1, 2, and 3)

PROVIDED FOR With regard to the DCPLNG facility and Dominion Cove Point LNG pipeline, the Maryland REFERENCE Power Plant Research Program (PPRP) commissioned an independent risk study (i.e., hazard ONLY study), "Cove Point LNG Terminal Expansion Risk Study," to assess the risks associated with the expansion of the DCPLNG facility and associated pipeline to nearby residential communities and the CCNPP site.

The probability of occurrence of a fatality at CCNPP from hazardous events associated with the existing DCPLNG facility is estimated to be 2.3E-9 per year. The probability of occurrence of physical damage to CCNPP is estimated to be lower still. Further, the probability of occurrence for a fatality involving the proposed expansion of the DCPLNG facility is estimated to be 6.6E-9 per year at CCNPP, with the risk of physical damage to the CCNPP estimated to be even smaller (MDNR, 2006).

The quantified risks to CCNPP presented in the PPRP study are below the threshold of acceptable risks defined by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (i.e., less than 1 E-7 per year). Where more specific analyses are available for individual accident categories than are provided in the PPRP study (e.g., jet fire, flash fire), those results will be presented in the following sections.

2.2.3.1.1 Explosions Accidents involving detonations of high explosives, munitions, chemicals, or liquid and gaseous fuels were considered for facilities and activities in the vicinity of the plant or onsite, where such materials are processed, stored, used, or transported in quantity. The effects of explosions are a concern in analyzing structural response to blast pressures. The effects of blast pressure from explosions from nearby railways, highways, navigable waterways, or facilities to critical plant structures were evaluated to determine if the explosion would have an adverse effect on plant operation or would prevent a safe shutdown.

The allowable and actual distances of hazardous chemicals transported or stored were determined in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.91, Revision 1, Evaluations of Explosions Postulated to Occur on Transportation Routes Near Nuclear Power Plants (NRC, 1978a). Regulatory Guide 1.91 cites 1 psi (6.9 kPa) as a conservative value of peak positive incident overpressure, below which no significant damage would be expected. Regulatory Guide 1.91 defines this safe distance by the relationship R ? kW 113 where R is the distance in feet from an exploding charge of W pounds of TNT; and the value k is a constant. The TNT mass equivalent, W, was determined following guidance in NUREG-1 805 (NRC, 2004a), where W=Mvapor

AHc

Yf/2000 and Mvapor is the flammable vapor mass, AHc is the heat of combustion and Yf is the explosion yield factor.

Conservative assumptions were used to determine a safe distance, or minimum separation distance, required for an explosion to have less than 1 psi (6.9 kPa) peak incident pressure. In CCNPP Unit 3 2-69 Rev 9

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FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#1 3-096 Page 3 of 29 THIS PAGE PROVIDED FOR REFERENCE ONLY each of the explosion scenario analyses, an explosion yield factor of 100 percent was applied to account for an in-vessel confined explosion. The yield factor is an estimation of the available combustion energy released during the explosion as well as a measure of the explosion confinement (NRC, 2004a). This is a conservative assumption because a 100 percent yield factor is not achievable (FMIC, 2005):

For atmospheric liquids (i.e., gasoline, toluene, etc.) the storage vessel was assumed to contain the quantity of fuel vapors in air at the upper explosive limit. This is conservative because this scenario produces the maximum flammable mass given that it is the fuel vapor, not the liquid fuel that explodes (NRC, 2004a). These assumptions are consistent with those used in Chapter 15 of NUREG-1 805 (NRC, 2004a).

For compressed or liquefied gases (i.e., propane, hydrogen), it was conservatively assumed that the entire content of the storage vessel will be between the upper and lower explosive limits, given that the instantaneous depressurization of the vessel would result in vapor concentrations throughout the explosive range at varying pressures and temperatures that could not be assumed. Therefore, the entire content of the storage vessel was considered as the flammable mass.

The onsite chemicals (Table 2.2-5), hazardous materials potentially transported on (MD) 2/4 (Table 2.2-6), and hazardous materials transported on navigable waterways (Table 2.2-7) were evaluated to ascertain which hazardous materials had the potential to explode, thereby requiring further analysis. The effects of selected explosion events from internal and external sources are summarized in Table 2.2-8 and in the following sections relative to the release source.

Pipelines The DCPLNG facility operates a pipeline corridor that passes with in the vicinity of the CCNPP site. Section 2.2.3 addresses the overall risk from the OCPLNG facility and pipeline.

Experiments have indicated that detonations of mixtures of methane (greater than 85%) with air do not present a credible outdoor explosion event. (FMIC, 2005) Further, there have been no reported vapor cloud explosions involving natural gas with high methane content-there have been numerous reports of vapor clouds igniting resulting in flash fires without overpressures. (FMIC, 2005) Therefore, an outdoor natural gas explosion resulting from a ruptured gas pipeline is considered an unlikely event. Thus, the ignition of a natural gas cloud within a confined or congested space, such as woodlands, which may produce damaging explosion overpressures, was considered the bounding event and is presented in Section 2.2.3.1.2. Therefore, it was concluded that damaging overpressures from an explosion from a rupture in the DCPLNG pipeline would not adversely affect the operations of CCNPP Unit 3.

Waterway Traffic The nearest safety related structure for CCNPP Unit 3, which is the Ultimate Heat Sink makeup intake structure, is located approximately 11,678 ft (3.6 kin) at its closest distance to potential waterway traffic. This assumption is very conservative, as it is more likely that waterway traffic will be traveling toward the center of the channel where it is deeper (approximately 3 mi (4.8 kin) from CCNPP Unit 3). The hazardous materials transported on barges or chemical parcel tankers that were identified for further analysis with regard to explosion potential were gasoline, benzene, and toluene. Anhydrous ammonia was not included as a point source hazard because ammonia is extremely hard to ignite. Studies have demonstrated that an ammonia-air mixture does not ignite at less than 1562 OF (ANSI, 1989). The U.S. Coast Guard CCNPP Unit 3 2-70

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FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#13-096 designates anhydrous ammonia as "not flammable under conditions likely to be encountered" Page 4 of 29 (USCG, 2006).

The maximum quantity of gasoline, benzene, and toluene assumed to be carried on a vessel was 5.2 million pounds (2A million kg) (CRS, 2005). Using the conservative methodology described in Section 2.2.3.1 (i.e, greater than 1 psi (6.9 kPa) peak incident pressure), the nearest safety-related CCNPP Unit 3 structure (i.e., Ultimate Heat Sink makeup intake structure) to a point on the navigable waterway where potential waterway traffic may pass is outside of the minimum separation distance (i.e., safe distance) where peak incident pressures may be assumed to result in damage to structures.

Therefore, an explosion from any of the identified chemicals potentially transported on navigable waters in the Chesapeake Bay, would not adversely affect the safe operation of CCNPP Unit 3. The minimum separation distance for gasoline is 1,222 ft (372 m); for benzene 1,076 ft (328 m); and for toluene, 1,072 ft (327 m) (Table 2.2-8).

Highways Table 2.2-6 details the hazardous materials potentially transported on MD 2/4 (RAND, 2003)

(BGE, 2006). The materials that were identified for further analysis for explosion potential were:

gasoline, gasoline (aviation), and liquid propane. The maximum quantity of the identified chemicals assumed to be transported on the roadway was 50,000 pounds (22,680 kg).

An analysis of the identified chemicals was conducted using TNT equivalency methodologies, as described in Section 2.2.3.1.1. The results indicate that the minimum separation distances (i.e., safe distances) are less than the shortest distance to a safety-related CCNPP Unit 3 structure from any point on MD 2/4. The closest safety-related CCNPP Unit 3 structure is located approximately 6,119 ft (1.9 km) from MD 2/4. The minimum separation distance for gasoline was calculated to be 263 ft (80.1 m); for aviation gasoline 260 ft (79.2 m); and for liquid propane, 3,559 ft (1.1 km). (Table 2.2-8). Therefore, an explosion involving potentially transported hazardous materials on MD 2/4, would not adversely affect operation of CCNPP Unit 3.

Onsite Chemicals acetone, acetylene The hazardous materials stored onsite that were identified for further analysis with regard to explosion potential were: gasoline, hydrazine (35% solution), dimethylamine (2% solution),

and hydrogen stored at Units 1 & 2. One of the water treatment chemicals, a non-oxidizing biocide containing ethanol, and gas cylinders containing argon-methane, hydrogen, and oxygen stored near Unit 3 were also analyzed for explosion potential.

The 4,000 gallon (15,140 L) onsite gasoline tank is an underground storage tank. Therefore, it was assumed that the explosion would be bounded by an event involving a 3,500 gallon (13,250 I) gasoline delivery tanker, either in route, or during or following a filling operation. A conservative analysis using TNT equivalency methods as described in Section 2.2.3.1 was used to determine safe distances for the storage of the identified hazardous materials.

Oxygen is not explosive by ignition, however gas cylinders have the potential for explosion is OyAia due to overpressure. Therefore, the equivalent mass of TNT from oxygen was calculated using aQu materdals, Lthis methodology (NRC, 1985).

am The reIs using this methodology indicate that the minimum separation distances (i.e., safe distancel sare less than the shortest distance to.-safety-related CCNPP Unit 3 structures and CCNPP Unit 3 2-71 Rev 9

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FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#13-096 the storage location of any of the identified chemicals. Therofoce, a* cxplo*ein from n,"y of the Page 5 of 29 oni;*t haxirdo, -r matpri-*alz c*',*1,,aI Mou I'd not advrzchy a-ffa eperatiO; of CCNPP Unit 3.

The safe distance for gasoline is 196 ft (60 m); for hydra ie (35% solution), 114 ft (35 m); for U11 dimethylamine (2% solution), 85 ft (26 m);Afor hydrogen,'22 ft (62 m.. Gasoline is stored for acetone2i0 ft (8 m):

approximately 310 ft (94 m); hydrazine (35% solution) approximately 891 ft (272 m);

foracetylene. 1.246 ft dimethylamine (2% solution) approximately 462 ft (141 m); Ld hydrogen 745 ft (227 m); from (38m)- for oxygen.

the nearest safety-related structure for CCNPP Unit 3 (Table 7.2-8). The non-oxidizing biocide 103 ft (32 m): and containing ethanol and the argon-methane gas, hydrogen gas, and oxygen gas cylinders are stored at distances greater than those reported in Table 2.2-8.

1 lacetone approximately 1.052 ft (321 m): acetylene approximately Nearby Facilities 1.052 ft (321 m); oxygen approximately 1.052 ft (

I The Dominion Cove Point Liquefied Natural Gas (DCPLNG) facility operates within the vicinity See Insert F for FSAR of the CCNPP site. As described in Section 2.2.2.4.2 the DCPLNG facility is bounded for 12.2.3.1.1 explosions by the LNG pipeline. Furthermore, Section 2.2.3 addresses the overall risk from the DCPLNG facility. Blast overpressure impacts were taken into account in developing the risk analysis. Damaging overpressures from an explosion resulting from a complete tank failure at the DCPLNG facility would not adversely affect the operations of CCNPP Unit 3 (MDNR, 2006).

Explosion Related Impacts Affecting the U.S. EPR Design The U.S. EPR design is acceptable for any site when reasonable qualitative arguments can demonstrate that the realistic probability of severe consequences from any external accident is less than 1 E-6 per year. Regulatory Guide 1.91 (NRC, 1978a) cites 1 psi (6.9 kPa) as a conservative value of peak positive incident overpressure, below which no significant damage would be expected. Safety-related CCNPP Unit 3 structures are designed to withstand a peak positive overpressure of at least 1 psi without loss of function.

The analyses presented in this section demonstrate that a 1 psi (6.9 kPa) peak positive overpressure will not be exceeded at a safety-related structure for any of the postulated explosion event scenarios. As a result, postulated explosion event scenarios will not result in severe consequences.

2.2.3.1.2 Flammable Vapor Clouds (Delayed Ignition)

Flammable gases in the liquid or gaseous state can form an unconfined vapor cloud that could drift toward the plant before ignition occurs. When a flammable chemical is released into the atmosphere and forms a vapor cloud it disperses as it travels downwind. The parts of the cloud where the concentration is within the flammable range, between the lower and upper flammability limits, may burn if the cloud encounters an ignition source. The speed at which the flame front moves through the cloud determines whether it is a deflagration or a detonation. If the cloud burns fast enough to create a detonation an explosive force is generated.

The potential onsite chemicals are shown in Table 2.2-5. Hazardous materials potentially transported on MD 2/4 are shown on Table 2.2-6, and hazardous materials transported on navigable waterways are shown on Table 2.2-7. These chemicals were evaluated to ascertain which hazardous materials had the potential to form a flammable vapor cloud or vapor cloud explosion. For those chemicals with an identified flammability range, the Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA) air dispersion model was used to determine the distances where the vapor cloud may exist between the upper flammability limit (UFL) and the lower flammability limit (LFL), presenting the possibility of ignition and potential thermal radiation effects (ALOHA, 2007).

CCNPP Unit 3 2-72 Rev 9

COPYRIGHT PROTECTED UN#13-096 Page 6 of 29 Insert F for FSAR Section 2.2.3.1.1 The evaluation of the explosion events was performed for each of the identified chemicals to determine if the safe distances meet the guidance established in Regulatory Guide 1.91 (NRC, 1978a) and if any qualified as a design-basis event; that is, an accident that has a probability of occurrence on the order of magnitude of 1E-07 per year, or greater, with potential consequences serious enough to affect the safety of the plant to the extent that the guidelines in 10 CFR Part 100 could be exceeded. The expected rate of occurrence for exceeding the guidelines in 10 CFR Part 100 (on the order of magnitude of 1E-06 per year) is acceptable if, when combined with reasonable qualitative arguments, the realistic probability can be shown to be lower. As described above, the distance to 1 psi for an acetylene tank explosion exceeds the distance to the nearest safety-related structure. The frequency of a catastrophic failure of a gas cylinder is 1E-06 per year (Purple Book, 2005). There is considerable conservatism in this failure rate, as follows:

The acetylene tank is stored in a confinement cage inside the Unit 1/2 warehouse building.

The failure rate assumes instantaneous release of the total tank quantity.

The failure rate does not account for the frequency of detonation or mass involved in the explosion after release. That is, 1E-06 failure frequency reflects the instantaneous release of the entire contents of the tank without accounting for detonation or mass involved in the detonation; it assumes that for each release, the total contents of the vessel are released, a detonation occurs, and the total vapor mass is involved in the explosion (100% yield factor, which is not achievable (FMIC, 2005)).

Therefore, an acetylene explosion inside the Unit 1/2 warehouse does not qualify as a design-basis event for CCNPP Unit 3. and an explosion would not adversely affect the safe operation of Unit 3.

FSAR: Section 2.2 IContinuation o ARINearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#13-096 The results of flammable vapor cloud ignition and explosion analyses are summarized in Page 7 of 29 Table 2.2-9.

Onsite Chemicals The hazardous materials stored at the CCNPP Units 1 and 2 site that were iden filed for further analysis with regard to the potential of delayed ignition and explosion of flamrnable vapor clouds were: gasoline; hydrazine (35% solution); dimethylamine (2% solution); nd hydrogen.

One of the water treatment chemicals, a non-oxidizing biocide containing ethanol, and argon-methane and hydrogen gas cylinders stored at Unit 3 were identified for further analysis.

As described previously in Section 2.2.3.1.2, the ALOHA dispersion model was used to determine the distance a vapor cloud can travel before reaching the LFL boundary (i.e., the safe distance for exposure to thermal radiation heat flux) once a vapor cloud has formed from release of the identified chemical. The distances to the LFL boundary from the release point for acgtlene. 411 feet i the identified chemicals are: gasoline, 234 ft (71 m); hydrazine (35% solution), less than 33 ft a1 (10 m); dimethylamine (2% solution), 45 ft (14 m); hydrogen; 492 ft (150 m); argon-methane gas cylinde 69 ft (21 m), nd hydrogen gas cylinderiX5 ft (23 m). Each of these distances is less than the dis ance from a potential release site to the nearest safety-related CCNPP Unit 3 EIl structure. The non-oxidizing biocide containing ethanol and the argon-methane gas and hydrogen gas cylinders are stored at distances greater than those reported in Table 2.2-9.

A vapor cloud explosion analysis was also performed using the methodology described in Section 2.2.3.1.2 to obtain minimum separation distances (i.e., safe distances) for the identified chemicals. With the exception of a postulated release from a gasoline tanker, the results indicate that the minimum separation distance (i.e., the distance required for an explosion to have less than a 1 psi (6.9 kPa) peak incident pressure) are less than the shortest distance to a safety-related CCNPP Unit 3 structure from the storage location of these chemicals.

The minimum separation distance for the 3,500 gallon (13,250 I) gasoline tank truck is 648 ft (198 m). Minimum separation distance for other identified chemicals are: hydrazine (35%

solution), N/A (no explosion can occur at resulting concentrations); dimethylamine (2%

i; solution), 180 ft (55 m); hydrogen, 738 ft (225 m); argon-methane gas cylinder 126 ft (38 m);

acetone. 114 ft (35 m) and acetylene. 828 hydrogen gas cylinder 138 ft (42 ml. Except for gasoline, each of these chemicals is stored t5m).

andaceylfurther away from CCNPP Unit 3 than the minimum separation distance. The filling operation for gasoline occurs approximately 310 ft (95 m) from the nearest safety-related CCNPP Unit 3 structure, which is the Ultimate Heat Sink. The storage of other identified chemicals stored at CCNPP Units 1 and 2 relative to the nearest safety related CCNPP Unit 3 structure, which is the Ultimate Heat Sink makeup intake structure, are: hydrazine, approximately 891 ft (272 m);

dimethylamine (2% solution), 462 ft; and hydrogen, 745 ft (227 m).

The evaluation of the vapor cloud explosion events was performed for each of the identified chemicals to determine if the safe distances meet the guidance established in Regulatory Guide 1.91 (NRC, 1978a) and if any qualified as a design-basis event; that is, an accident that has a probability of occurrence on the order of magnitude of 1 E-07 per year, or greater, with potential consequences serious enough to affect the safety of the plant to the extent that the guidelines in 10 CFR Part 100 could be exceeded. The expected rate of occurrence for exceeding the guidelines in 10 CFR Part 100 (on the order of magnitude of 1 E-06 per year) is acceptable if, when combined with reasonable qualitative arguments, the realistic probability can be shown to be lower.

CCNPP Unit 3 2-76

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FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#1 3-096 Flammable Vapor Cloud (Delayed Ignition) Related Impacts Affecting the U.S. EPR Page 8 of 29 Design The U.S. EPR design is acceptable for any site when reasonable qualitative arguments can demonstrate that the realistic probability of severe consequences from any external accident is less than 1 E-6 occurrences per year. Regulatory Guide 1.91 (NRC, 1978a) cites 1 psi (6.9 kPa) as a conservative value of peak positive incident overpressure, below which no significant damage would be expected. Safety-related CCNPP Unit 3 structures are designed to withstand THIS PAGE a peak positive overpressure of at least 1 psi without loss of function.

PROVIDED The analyses presented in this section demonstrate that a 1 psi (6.9 kPa) peak positive FOR FERE overpressure will not be exceeded at a safety-related structure for any of the postulated REFERENCE flammable vapor cloud, delayed ignition event scenarios, except for gasoline. For the vapor ONLY cloud, delayed ignition event involving gasoline, it was demonstrated that the event probability is less than 1 E-6. As a result, each of the postulated vapor cloud, delayed ignition event scenarios has been demonstrated to either not result in severe consequences, or to have an event frequency that is less than 1 E-6 per year.

2.2.3.1.3 Toxic Chemicals Accidents involving the release of toxic or asphyxiating chemicals from onsite storage facilities and nearby mobile and stationary sources were considered. Toxic chemicals known to be present on site or in the vicinity of the CCNPP site, or to be frequently transported in the vicinity were evaluated. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.78, Revision 1, Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release (NRC, 2001), requires evaluation of control room habitability after a postulated external release of hazardous chemicals from mobile or stationary sources, offsite or onsite.

The potential onsite chemicals are identified in Table 2.2-5; hazardous materials potentially transported on MD 2/4 are identified in Table 2.2-6; and hazardous materials transported on navigable waterways are identified in Table 2.2-7. These chemicals were evaluated to ascertain which hazardous materials were subsequently analyzed with respect to their potential to form a toxic or asphyxiating vapor cloud after an accidental release.

The ALOHA air dispersion model was used to predict the concentrations of toxic or asphyxiating chemical clouds as they disperse downwind. In the case of a toxic vapor cloud, the maximum distance a postulated vapor cloud would travel before it dispersed enough to fall below the associated National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) defined Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) threshold value or other defined toxicity limit concentration in the vapor cloud was determined. Asphyxiating chemicals were evaluated to determine the maximum distance an asphyxiating cloud would travel prior to falling below a concentration which could result in the displacement of a significant fraction of the control room air. The ALOHA model was also used to predict the post-release chemical concentrations in the control room to ensure that under a worst case scenario event the control room operators will have sufficient time to take appropriate action.

The IDLH is defined by the NIOSH as a situation that poses a threat of exposure to airborne contaminants when that exposure is likely to cause death or immediate or delayed permanent adverse health effects or prevent escape from such an environment. The IDLH values determined by NIOSH are established such that workers are able to escape such an environment without suffering permanent health damage. Where an IDLH value was unavailable for a toxic chemical, the time weighted average or short term exposure limit, CCNPP Unit 3 2-78 Rev 9 Q 2007-2012 UniStar Nuclear Services, LLC. All rights reserved.

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FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#13-096 for further evaluation if the releases are of low frequencies (1 E-6 per year or less) because the Page 9 of 29 resultant low levels of radiological risk are considered acceptable. Regulatory Guide 1.78 also THIS PAGE provides a screening criteria for mobile sources, which defines shipments of more than 50 per PROVIDED year within a 5 mi (8 kin) radius of a nuclear power plant as being frequent for barge traffic.

FOR REFERENCE Release events involving mobile sources that do not meet this criteria (i.e., 50 or fewer ONLY shipments annually, and therefore not frequent) are not required to be evaluated for control room habitability. This frequency is based on transportation accident statistics and conditional spill probability given an accident. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers estimates that there are less than 5 shipments per year of ammonia passing within the vicinity of the CCNPP site.

Given that the frequency of ammonia shipments is less than 50 per year passing within the vicinity of the CCNPP site, the probability of an accident occurring involving a barge within the exposure distance from the control room is below the screening criteria established by Regulatory Guide 1.78 (NRC, 2001).

Therefore, the ammonia spill event does not qualify as a design-basis event for CCNPP Unit 3, and toxic vapor clouds formed from the chemicals analyzed would not adversely affect the safe operation of Unit 3.

Highways The CCNPP Unit 3 control room is located 6,531 ft (2.0 kin) from MD 2/4 at its closest approach.

The hazardous materials potentially transported on MD 2/4 that were identified for further analysis with regard to the potential of forming a toxic vapor cloud after an accidental release and traveling to the control room were: ammonium hydroxide (119% solution), gasoline, gasoline (aviation), and liquid propane.

The methodology presented in Section 2.2.3.1.3 was used to determine the distance from the release site to the point where the toxic vapor cloud reaches the IDLH limit boundary. For gasoline and gasoline (aviation) the time weighted average (TWA) and short term exposure (STEL) toxicity limits were conservatively used since no IDLH value is available for either of these hazardous materials. The TWA is the average value of exposure over the course of an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months work shift. The STEL is a 15 minute TWA concentration that may not be exceeded, even if the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months TWA is within the standards.

The maximum concentration of the evaluated chemicals attained in the control room, under worst case meteorological conditions, during the first hour of the release was also determined for the identified hazardous materials. In each scenario, it was conservatively estimated that the transport vehicle lost the entire contents, 50,000 pounds (22,680 kg), as provided in Regulatory Guide 1.91 (NRC, 1978a). The results indicate that any toxic vapor clouds that form after an accidental release on MD 2/4 and travel toward the control room will not cause an airborne concentration above the IDLH limit (or TWA/STEL in the case of gasoline or aviation gasoline) in the control room.

Therefore, toxic vapor clouds resulting from chemical spills on MD 2/4 will not adversely affect the safe operation of CCNPP Unit 3. The effects of toxic chemical releases are summarized in Table 2.2-10.

Onsite Chemical Storages The hazardous materials stored onsite that were identified for further analysis with regard to the potential of the formation of toxic vapor clouds formed after an accidental release are:

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FSAR: Section 2.2 Continuation AR

.2,231.3.

Fnclosure 1 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#13-096 Page 10 of 29 gasoline; ammonium hydroxide (28% solution); sodium hypochlorite; hydrazine (35%

solution); monoethanolamine; dimethylamine (2% solution); hydrochloric acid (30% solution);

carbon dioxide; hydrogen (asphyxiant)-, =:,ei-ld,"tee, (asp,,'.-.. Two water treatment chemicals, a non-oxidizing biocide co tdining ethanol and sodium hypochlorite, gas cylinders stored at CCNPP Unit 3 containing argon, argon-methane, hydrogen, and nitrogen, which are 311 asphyxiants, were identified for further analysis for the formation of toxic/asphyxiating apor clouds.

As described in Section 2.2.3.1.3, the identified hazardous materials were analyzed utilizing the ALOHA dispersion model to determine whether the formed vapor cloud will reach the control room intake and what the concentration of the toxic chemical will be in the main control room after an accidental release. The worst case release scenario in these analysis included either a total loss of the largest vessel into an unconfined puddle or direct release over 10 minutes under determined worst case meterological conditions.

L liauid nitroaen and lacewene

-r d

dt concentrations were determined at the control room after a release of the largest vessel. In each case, the concentration at the CCNPP Unit 3 control room land 80l9 craa of the asphxint Icted at CCNPP Unit 1 and 2, (53.0 ppm for hydrogen, and 635 ppm for cetylen liquidnitrogel, would not displace enough oxygen for the CCNPP Unit 3 main control room Additionally. oxygen is analyzed for its potential to create an oxygen-enriched environment (23.5% as defined by OSHA). It was determined that the concentration in the CCNPP Unit 3 control room after an oxygen release (23.4 ppm) from the warehouse would not create an oxygen-enriched atmosphere.

to become an oxygen-deficient environment. Similarly, the asphyxiants associated with the gas cylinder storage at CCNPP Unit 3, are stored farther than the determined safe distance (the distance to where the vapor cloud would travel prior to falling below a concentration which could result in the displacement of a significant fraction of the control room air--defined by the OSHA) under worst case meteorological conditions (42 ft for argon gas and argon-methane gas cylinders, 39 ft for hydrogen gas cylinders, and 36 ft for nitrogen gas cylinders).*

For each toxic chemical evaluated, with the exception of the 3,500 gallon (13,250 I) gasoline delivery truck, the remaining chemical analyses indicate that the control room would remain habitable for the worst case release scenario.

The evaluation of toxic chemical release events was performed for each of the identified chemicals to determine if any of these events would qualify as a design-basis event. That is, an accident that has a probability of occurrence on the order of magnitude of 1 E-7 per year, or greater, with potential consequences serious enough to affect the safety of the plant to the extent that the guidelines in 10 CFR Part 100 could be exceeded.

An expected rate of occurrence for exceeding the guidelines in 10 CFR Part 100 (on the order of magnitude of 1 E-6 per year) is acceptable if, when combined with reasonable qualitative arguments, the realistic probability can be shown to be lower. Further, Regulatory Guide 1.78 (NRC, 2001) provides that releases of toxic chemicals that have the potential to result in a significant concentration in the control room need not be considered for further evaluation if the releases are of low frequencies (1 E-6 per year, or less) because the resultant low levels of radiological risk are considered acceptable. In evaluating the gasoline tanker spill, the following inputs were used in the model (a confirmatory meteorological sensitivity analysis was conducted that demonstrated the inputs represented the worst case):

Pasquill Stability Class F selected to represent the most limiting 5% of meteorological conditions observed.

CCNPP Unit 3 2-82

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FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#13-091.2.4 Page 11 of 29 References

{Airnav, 2006. Airnav.com, Website: http://www.airnav.com/airports/, Date accessed: June 28, 2006 ALOHA, 2007. Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA) Version 5.4.1, NOAA, February 2007, Website: http://www.epa.gov/ceppo/cameo/aloha.htm, Date accessed: June THIS PAGE 24,2007.

PROVIDED ANSI, 1989. American National Standards Safety Requirement for the Storage and Handling FOR Anhydrous Ammonia, ANSI K61.1, American National Standards Institute, 1989.

REFERENCE ONLY Beerens, 2006. The Use of Generic Failure Frequencies in QRA: The Quality and Use of Failur Freauencies and How to Brina Them UD to Date, Journal of Hazardous Materials, Volume 13C of e

Issue 3, March 31,2006, Pages 265-270, H. Beerens, J. Post and P. Uijt de Haag.

BGE, 2006. Application for License Renewal, Appendix B, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Supplement CCNPP, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, April 8, 2006, Website: http://

www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications/calvert-cliffs/ccv3.pdf, Date accessed: May 14, 2007.

Caltex, 2002. Material Safety Data Sheet for Petroleum Jelly, Caltex, Sydney, Australia, Website: http://www.caltex.com.au/products-oil detail.asp?id=140, Date accessed: May 12, 2007.

CALCO, 2004.2004 Comprehensive Plan Calvert County, Maryland Approved and Adopted December 2004, Calvert County, Website: http://www.co.cal.md.us/residents/building/

planning/documents/compplan/default.asp, Date accessed: May 9,2007.

CALCO, 2007. Calvert County Marinas, Calvert County, Website: http://

www.calvertcountymd.us/calvert-county-marinas.html, Date accessed: June 21, 2007.

CCR, 2005. California Code of Regulations, Title 14 CCR, Division 1.5, Chapter 7 Fire Protection, Subchapter 3, Article 3. Fire Hazard Reduction Around Buildings and Structures Defensible Space. Section 1299, Website: http://www.fire.ca.gov/CDFBOFDB/pdfs/

DefensibleSpaceRegulationsfina 12992_17_06.pdf, Date accessed: May 9,2007.

CFR, 2007a. Standards for Protection Against Radiation, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2007.

CFR, 2007b. Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2007.

CFR, 2007c. Contents of Applications; Technical Information, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.34, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2007.

CFR, 2007d. Reactor Site Criteria, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 100, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2007.

CFR, 2007e. Factors to be Considered when Evaluating Sites, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 100.20, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2007.

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F ction 2.2 Continuation of FSAR FSAR:Se tion 12.2.

1_4 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#13-096 Page 12 of 29 CFR, 2007f. Non-seismic Site Criteria, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 100.21, U. S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2007.

CFR, 2007g. Contents of Applications; Technical Information in Final Safety Analysis Report, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 52.79, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2007.

CLUI, 2006. Patuxent River Naval Air Station, The Center for Land Use Interpretation, Website:

http://ludb.clui.org/ex/i/MD3141/, Date accessed: June 21, 2007.

CRS, 2005. Marine Security of Hazardous Chemical Cargo, Congressional Research Service (CRS), August 26, 2005, Website: http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/05aug/

RL33048.pdf, Date accessed: May 9, 2007.

DOE, 2006a. Accident Analysis For Aircraft Crash Into Hazardous Facilities, DOE Standard, DOE-STD-3014-2006, U.S. Department of Energy, May 2006.

DOE, 2006b. AES Sparrows Point LNG, LLC and Mid-Atlantic Express, LLC; Notice of Intent To Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed Sparrows Point Project, Request for Comments on Environmental Issues and Notice of a Joint Public Meeting, Federal Register Volume 71, Number 100, p 29941-29944, U.S. Department of Energy, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, May 24, 2006, Website: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/

getpage.cgi?dbname=2006_register&position=all&page=29941, Date accessed: June 24, 2007.

Dominion, 2007. Dominion Cove Point LNG, Cove Point Expansion, Website: http://

www.dom.com/about/gas-transmission/covepoint/expansion/index.jsp, Date accessed: May 9, 2007.

EPA. 2009. Risk Management Program Guidance for Offsite Conseauence Analysis. U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency.

MarCbUL.

EPA, 2001. Cove Point LNG Limited Partnership; Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Assessment for the Proposed Cove Point LNG Project, Request for Comments on Environmental Issues, and Notice of Public Meeting and Site Visit, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Register Volume 66, Number 37, p 11286-11288, February 23, 2001, Website: http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-IMPACT/2001 /February/Day-23/i451 0.htm, Date accessed: June 26, 2007.

FAA, 2006. Sectional and Terminal Aeronautical Chart East, Federal Aviation Administration, National Aeronautical Charting Office, July 2006.

FAA, 2007. FAA Terminal Area Forecast: National Forecast 2006 (1) - Airport Operations, Federal Aviation Administration, May 15, 2007.

FERC, 2006a. Press Release: June 15, 2006, Commission authorizes three new LNG import terminals, expansions of two other LNG import facilities/ Dominion Cove Point LNG, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Website: http://www.ferc.gov/press-room/press-releases/

2006/2006-2/06-15-06-C-4.asp, Date accessed: May 9,2007.

FERC, 2006b. LNG-Environmental Impact Statements (EISs), FERC staff issues Final FERC, 2006. Environmental Impact Statement on Dominion Cove Point Expansion Project (Docket No. CP05-310-000 et al.), April 28, 2006, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Website:

http://www.ferc.gov/industries/Ing/enviro/eis/2006/04-28-06-eis-cove.asp, Date accessed:

May 9, 2007.

CCNPP Unit 3 2-88

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FSAR: Section:2.2 Cotiuaio2o,4A Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities Enclosure I UN#13-096 NRC, 2001. Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Page 13 of 29 Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release, Regulatory Guide 1.78, Revision 1, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, November, 2001.

NRC, 2004a. Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs) Quantitative Fire Hazard Analysis Methods for the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program, NUREG-1 805, U. S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 2004.

NRC, 2004b. Letter, Guy S. Vissing, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to George Vanderheyden, Baltimore Gas and Electric, Safety Evaluation Regarding the Effect of Modification of Liquefied Natural Gas Facility on Safety of Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 2004.

NRC, 2007a. Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0800, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 2007.

NRC, 2007b. Combined License Applications for Nuclear Power Plants, Regulatory Guide 1.206, Revision 0, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, April, 2007.

OP, 2003. Material Safety Data Sheet for Towerbrom, Occidental Petroleum, 2003, Website:

http://msds.oxy.com/DWFiles/M31041 NAEN%2EPDF, Date accessed: May 9, 2007.

OSHA, 2005. Exposure Limits (STEL value for gasoline), Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards:

Gasoline, NIOSH Publication No. 2005-149, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), September 2005, Website: http://www.osha.gov/dts/chemicalsampling/data/

CH_243100.html, Date accessed: June 22, 2007.

Purple Book. 2005.

POACRE, 2005. Property Owners Association Chesapeake Ranch Estates, Airport Committee Guideline for Quantitative Risk Charter 2004-2005, Website: http://www.poacre.org/Amenities/Airport.html, Date accessed:

Quanitaive isk June 25, 2007.

Assessment 'Purple Book'. P.A.M. Uiit de Haag. B.J.M. Ale.

Raj, 1974. Prediction of Hazards of Spills of Anhydrous Ammonia on Water, P. Raj, J. Hagopian, December. 2005.

and A. Kalelkar, Arthur D. Little Inc, March 1974.

RAND, 2003. Delaware Maryland Highways and Interstates map, Rand McNally, 2003.

Solutia, 1999. MSDS for Polychlorinated Biphenyls, Solutia, St. Louis, Missouri, Website: http://

www2.itap.purdue.edu/MSDS/docs/9943.pdf, Date accessed: May 12, 2007.

Supresta, 2006. Material Safety Data Sheet for Fyrquel EHC, Supresta, Ardsley, 2006, Website:

http://phosphorusus.com/pdfs/FYRQUEL%201l50-MSDS.pdf, Date accessed: May 9, 2007.

USACE, 2004a. Waterborne Commerce of the United States, Calendar Year 2004, Part 1-Waterways and Harbors Atlantic Coast, IWR-WCUS-04-1, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Institute for Water Resources, 2004.

USACE, 2004b. Waterborne Commerce of the United States, Calendar Year 2004, Part 2-Waterways and Harbors Gulf Coast, Mississippi River System and Antilles, IWR-WCUS-04-2, U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers, Institute for Water Resources, 2004.

USACE, 2006. National Waterway Network (line), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Navigation Data Center, 2006.

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FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#1 3-096 Page 14 of 29 Table 2.2 {CCNPP Units 1, 2 and 3 Onsite Chemical Storage)

(Page 1 of 3)

Toxicity Limit Shipping Annual Material (IDLH)

Quantity Largest Container Location Mode Frequency monium Hydroxide Ssolution) f~%Bo.ric Acid Number 2 Diesel Fuel Gasoline Towerbrom microbicide Sodium Hypochlorite Hydrazine (35%

13.000 gal I solution) 300 ppm as Ammonia None established I

None established 300 ppm (TWA)/

500 ppm (STEL)

None established 10 ppm for chlorine 50 ppm CCNP Units Iand 2 0 ba 8500 gal 8,500 ga ank Farm (32,0001)

(32,0001)

"56 lb elm.. -

..W arehouse a l(29 kg) 27 foot Aux. BI 350,000 gal 125,000 gal Transportatic (1.3E6 I)

(4.7E5 I)

Shop, 11, 21 &

FOST 4,000 gal 4,000 gal (15,000 I) /

Transportatic (15,000 I) 3,500 gal (13,0001)

Shop tank truck (see Note 1)

I I

nd dg.

n 1IA

n Ground Ground Ground 1/year 2/year 6/year Ground Monthly 8,000 Ibs (will no longer use)

(3600 kg) 500 gal (1900 8,500 gal (38,600 1) 0)/

8,500 gal (38,600 I) 3,000 gal (11.0001)

I I(,uoIL-ubricating Oil 163.000 gal Liquid Nitrogen 1216.331 gall (I18.900 Mineral Oil 18,000o ga l...............

MMI3 1I Polychlorinated 11.000 j Biphenyl (PCB) Oil (41,7 o

dio)

Sodium Hydroxide 5.000gal I(s0%solution)

(19.oo IISuifuric Ac id None established 36,0e0 ga; Asphyxiant 11,300 gal (42,800 I) 2,500 mg/in3 350 gal (1300 1) totes

-(38eelt-11,300 gal (42,8001) t*,O6ý-

o'3'006

.......... r.............. E 5 mg/m3 (NIOSH)

None established (98% solution)

Fyrquel EHC fluid Sodium Thiosulfate Aluminum Sulfate Monoethanolamine Dimethylamine (2% solution)

Hydrogen 15 mg/in 3 1000 mg/M 3 as Triphenyl Phosphate None established None established 30 ppm 1500 ppm None established 4,700 gal 336 gal (1270 I)

(18,0001) 12,000 gal 12,000 gal (45,0001)

(45,0001) 1,700 gal 800 gal (64001)

(30001) 2,000 lbs 1: 50 lb (23 kg) bags i

(900 kg) 2,000 lbs 50 lb (23 kg) bags (900 kg) 350 gal 350 gal (13001)

(13001) 350 gal (1300 I) 350 gal (13001)

Waterfront Ground 2/year Intake Building, Ground 4/year OTF Well water house & 12 foot NSB Warehouse and Ground 4/year 12 foot NSB Tank Farm, Ground 12/year

........ d....

!Em ra nc Tank Farm Ground 2/year e

Main Ground 1/year Transformers Switchgear rooms Ground 1/year

&27ftNSB Mezzanine 12 foot NSB Ground 2/year Tank Farm Ground 2/year Turbine Bldg. &

Ground 1/year Warehouse STP I Ground 2/year STP Ground 2/year 12 foot NSB Ground 3/year 12 foot NSB Ground 2/year Tank Farm Ground 8-10/year 460 cuft (13 cu m) 460 cu ft (13 cu m)

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FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#13-096 Page 15 of 29 Table 2.2

{CCNPP Units 1, 2 and 3 Onsite Chemical Storage)

(Page 2 of 3)

Toxicity Limit Shipping Annual Material (IDLH)

Quantity Largest Container Location Mode Frequency Caroon uioxide

'-u,uuu ppm 0,UUU IDS

,UUU ILIS k.i,DZ Kgy)

(3,629 kg) 50,000 lb (22,680 kg) delivery truck i

(Note 4) 2,000 lbs (907 50 lb (23 kg) bags kg)

IL 0oo1 I uroine Bldg.

Ground i-4/year Insert A Soda Ash (Sodium foert FAR Carbonate) for FSAR Table Hydrochloric Acid 2.2-2.

None established 50 ppm STP 1 Ground 2/year 5,000 gal (19,0001) 3,000 gal (11,0001)

Tank Farm Ground 4/year CCNPP Unit 3 Argon (gas cylinder)

Argon-Methane (gas cylinder)

Asphyxiant Asphyxiant Hydrogen (gas cylinder) i Asphyxiant Nitrogen (gas cylinder)

Oxygen (gas cylinder)

Sodium Hypochlorite Sulfuric Acid Sodium Bisulfite Scale Inhibitor/

Dispersant (2-Phosphono-1,2,4-but ane tricarboxylic acid)

Asphyxiant Asphyxiant 10 ppm as Cl2 1S mg/m3 5 mg/m 3 (TLV-TWA) 270 scf (7.65 Nm 3) (see Note i 2) 282 scf (7.99 Nm 3) (see Note I 2) 278 scf (7.87 Nm 3) (see Note 2) 235 scf (6.65 Nm3) (see Note 2) 282 scf (7.99 Nm 3) (see Note 2) 20,000 gal (75,700 I) Plant Intake / 40,000 gal (151,400 I)

CW / (2) 2,000 gal (7,600 I)

UHS 25,000 gal (94,600 1) CW /

7,500 gal (28,4001)

Desalination Building 5,000 gal (18,900 1) CW/

(2) 350 gal (1,300 1) UHS/

1,000 gal (3,800 I)

Desalination Building 10,000 gal (37,900 I) CW /

(2) 350 gal (1,300 1)

UHS 1.76 cu ft cylinders (see Note 2) 1.76 cu ft cylinders (see Note 2) 1.76 cu ft cylinders (see Note 2) 1.76 cu ft cylinders (see Note 2) 1.76 cu ft cylinders (see Note 2)

Central Gas N/A (see Supply Systems Note 3)

Building Central Gas Supply Systems Building Central Gas Supply Systems Building N/A(see N/A (see Note 3)

Note 3)

N/A (see N/A (see Note 3)

Note 3)

Central Gas Supply Systems Building Central Gas Supply Systems Building N/A (see N/A (see Note 3)

Note 3)

N/A (see N/A (see Note 3)

Note 3)

N/A (see Note 3) 40,000 gal (15,0001) 25,000 gal (94,6001) 5,000 gal (18,9001) 10,000 gal (38,0001)

CW Cooling N/A (see N/A (see Tower Note 3)

Note 3)

CW Cooling N/A (see N/A (see Tower Note 3)

Note 3)

CW Cooling N/A (see N/A (see Tower Note 3)

Note 3)

CW Cooling Tower N/A (see N/A (see Note 3)

Note 3)

CCNPP Unit 3 2-94

COPYRIGHT PROTECTED Rev 9 UN#13-09Wsert A for FSAR Table 2.2-2 Page 16 of 29 Toxicity Limit Largest Shipping Annual Material (IDLH)

Quantity Container Location Mode Frequency 5 Ral (191)

Acetone 2,500 ppm 1 liter Acetylene AquaWorks Cleaning Solution Freon/

Refrigerants Asphyxiant None established 30,740 cu ft (870 cu m) 55 gal (208I) 30,740 cu ft (870 cu m) 30oal (1141) 6,900 Ibs 20 Ibs (3130 kg)

(9kg) 15,000 ppm Warehouse and Lab Warehouse and Plant Locations Warehouse and Maintenance Warehouse, Office area, and plant Switchgear and Cable Spreading Rooms, 27' Deck 12' NSB Deck GE Trailers, Aux Building Warehouse and Plant Locations Ground Ground Ground 4/year Rare Ground Varies L/year 300 Ibs 18,000 Ibs (136 kg)

(8165 kg) interconnected Halon Hydraulic Oil Hydrogen Peroxide 40,000 ppm None established 75 ppm 800 gal (30281) 300 gal (11361) 55 gal (2081I) 300 gal (11361I)

Ground Ground Ground Rare Varies 4/year Oxygen-enriched 4,472 cuft 4,472 cu ft (127 cu mn)

(127 cu mn)

Oxygen Ground 4/year

FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#113-096 Page 17 of 29 Table 2.2 {Onsite Chemicals Disposition)

(Page 2 of 3)

Toxicity Limit Explosion Vapor Material (IDLH)

Flammability Hazard?

Pressure Disposition Dimethylamine 500 ppm 2.8-14.4%

May explode 37.21 psi @

Toxicity Analysis (2% solution)

Hydrogen None estab.

850F/

257 kPa @

29.4oC 4.0-75%

Vapor may 29.030 @

explode

-418 0F/

200 kPa @

-250oF Flammability Analysis Explosion Analysis Toxicity-consider as asphyxiant Flammability Analysis Explosion Analysis Toxicity Analysis Carbon Dioxide 40,000 ppm Not flammable None listed 833 psi @ 680F 5,743 kPa @

200C Soda Ash (Sodium Insert B Carbonate) for FSAR Table Hydrochloric Acid 2.2-5.

None estab.

Not flammable None listed N/A-solid No further analysis required 50 ppm Not flammable None listed 7.929 psi @

1 00oF/

54.7 kPa @

37.80C Toxicity Analysis CCNPP Unit 3 None estab.

Not flammable None listed Argon Not available Toxicity-consider as asphyxiant Argon-Methane (considered as methane)

Hydrogen Nitrogen gas None estab.

None estab.

5-15%

May explode 31.580 psi @

240oF/

217 kPa @

115.50C 4.0-75%

Vapor may 29.030 @

explode 418oF/

200 kPa @

214 0C t flammable None listed 65.820 psi @

294oF/

453.8 kPa @

145.50C Toxicity-consider as asphyxiant Flammability Analysis Explosion Analysis Toxicity-consider as asphyxiant Flammability Analysis Explosion Analysis Toxicity-consider as asphyxiant None estab.

No Oxygen Sodium Hypochlorite Sulfuric Acid Sodium Bisulfite None estab.

Not flammable May explode 10 ppm as C12 Not flammable None listed 36.260 psi @

280oF/

250 kPa @

137.80C 17.5 mmHg @

68F Explosion Analysis The 20,000 gallon tank located at the plant intake is bounded by the 40,000 gallon tank located at the CW Tower (The 20,000 gallon tank is further away from the control room HVAC intakes.)

No further analysis required-low vapor pressure (Note 1) 15 mg/m 3 Not flammable None listed 0.001 mmHg @

68F 5 mg/mi3 (TLV-TWA)

Not flammable None listed N/A-solid in a No further analysis required.

solution CCNPP Unit 3 2-99

COPYRIGHT PROTECTED Rev 9 HKI*_Inoansert R for FSAR Table 2.2-5 Page 18 of 29 Toxicity Limit Explosion Vapor Material (IDLH)

Flammability Hazard?

Pressure Disposition Acetone Acetylene AquaWorks Cleaning Solution Freon/

Refrigerants 2500 ppm Asphyxiant None established 15,000 ppm 40,000 ppm None established 75 ppm Oxygen-enriched 2.5 % - 12.8%

2.5%- 100%

Not flammable Not flammable Not flammable Not flammable Not flammable Vapor may 180 mm Hg@

explode 68 OF Vapor may 33,592 mm Hg explode

@ 68 OF None listed Not available 4,332 mm Hg None listed

@ 68 0 F

> 760 mm Hg None listed

@68 OF 7 mm Hg @ 20 None listed 0C 5 mm Hg @ 86 None listed

°F 1,875 mm Hg None listed

@ -280 OF Flammability Analysis Explosion analysis (Note 2)

Toxicity - Considered as asphyxiant Flammability Analysis Explosion Analysis No further analysis required No further analysis required (Note 2)

No further analysis required (Note 3)

No further analysis required (Note 1)

Toxicity Analysis (oxygen-enriched atmosphere)

Explosion Analysis Halon Hydraulic Oil Hydrogen Peroxide Oxygen Not flammable

FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#1 3-096 Page 19 of 29 Table 2.2

{Onsite Chemicals Disposition)

(Page 3 of 3)

Toxicity Limit Explosion Vapor Material (IDLH)

Flammability Hazard?

Pressure Disposition Scale Inhibitor /Dispersant None estab.

Not flammable None listed N/A-solid in a No further analysis required.

(2-Phosphono-1,2,4-butan solution e tricarboxylic acid)

Non-Oxidizing Biocide 3,300 ppm as 3.3-19%

Vapor may 44 mmHg @

Toxicity Analysis (ethanol) ethanol explode 68F Flammability Analysis Explosion Analysis Antiscalant (Sodium None estab.

Not flammable None listed N/A-solid in a No further analysis required.

Hexametaphosphate) solution TLV-TWA: Threshold Limit Value-Time-Weighted Average STEL: Short term exposure limit IDLH: Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health threshold value Chemical information was obtained from the CHRIS on-line manual (USCG, 2006), except for Fyrquel EHC (Supresta, 2006), Towerbrom (Occidental, 2003), Polychlorinated Biphenyls (Solutia, 1999), Sodium Carbonate (Mallinckrodt, 2006) Petroleum Jelly (Caltex, 2002), Sodium Thiosulfate (Mallinckrodt, 2004), Argon (NIOSH, 2003) and the STEL value for gasoline (OSHA, 2005).

Note 1: Chemicals with vapor pressures less than 10 torr (0.193 psi, or 0.13 kPa) were not considered. Chemicals with vapor pressures this low are not very volatile. That is, under normal conditions, chemicals cannot enter the atmosphere fast enough to reach concentrations hazardous to people and, therefore, are not considered to be an air dispersion hazard (NOAA, 2007).

Note 2: Chemicals stored in containers less than 20 lbs do not require toxicitv analysis. per Regulatory Guide 1.78.

Note 3: A toxicity analysis is not required based on the screenino methodology provided in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.78.

CCNPP Unit 3 2-100

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FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#1 3-096 Page 20 of 29 Table 2.2

{Explosion Event Analysis)

Heat of Distance to Combustion Nearest CCNPP Distance at I psi (Btu/Ib)/

Unit 3 Safety (6.9 kPa) Peak Source Pollutant Evaluated Quantity (kJ/kg)

Related Structure I Incident Pressure Maryland Gasoline (Note 1)

Route 2/4 Gasoline (aviation) (Note 1)

Propane (Note 2)

Pipeline-DCPLNG Navigable Gasoline (Notes 1 and 4)

Waterway Benzene (Notes 1 and 4)

Toluene (Notes 1 and 4)

On-Site Gasoline (Notes 1 and 5)

(CCNPP Units (3,500 gal (15,9001) tank truck) 1 &2)

(Notes 1 and 3)

Hydrazine (35% solution) (Note 1)

Dimethylamine Insert C for FSAR /

(2% solution) (Note 1)

Table 2.2-8.

ydrogen (Note 2)

On-Site Argon-Methane (considered (CCNPP Unit as methane (Note 2)

3)

Hydrogen (Note 2)

Oxygen (Note 2)

Non-Oxidizing Biocide (ethanol) (Note 7)

Non-Oxidizing Biocide (ethanol) (Note 8)

Nearby Facilities 8,500 gal/

18,720/

32,0001 43,514 8,500 gal/

18,720/

32,0001 43,514 50,000 lbs/

19,782/

22,679 kg 45,982 Liquefied Natural Gas (Note 3) 5,200,000 lbs/

18,720/

1 2,400,000 kg 43,514 5,200,000 lbs/

17,460/

2,400,000 kg 40,585 5,200,000 Ibs/

17,430/

2,400,000 kg 40,572 3,500 gal/

18,720/

13,2501 43,514 350 gal/

8,345/

1,3251 19,397 350 gal/

16,800/

1,3251 39,051 460 cu ft/

50,080/

13 cu m 116,411 282 scf/

21,517/

7.99 Nm 3 50,029 278 scf/

50,080/

7.87 Nm 3 120,000 282 scf/

N/A (Note 6) 7.99 Nm 3 1,000 gal/

11,570/

3,8001 26,880 kJ/kg 350 gal/

11,570/

1,3001 26,880 kJ/kg DCPLNG (associated hazards) (Note 3)

S,119 ft/

1.9 km 263 ft/

50.2 m 260 ft/

79.2m 3,559 ft/

1.1 km 1,678 ft/

3.6 km 310 ft/

94.5 m 891 ft/

271.6 m 462 ft/

140.8 m 745 ft/

271.6 m Note 9)

Note 9)

(Note 9)

Note 9) 1,222 ft/

372.5 m 1,076 ft/

328 m 1,072 ft/

326.7 m 196 ft/

59.7 m 114 ft/

34.7 m 85ft/

25.9 m 119ft/

36.2 m 133 ft/

40.5 m 41 ft/

13 m 58ft/

17.7 m 41 ft/

12.5 m scf: Standard cubic feet Nm3: Normal cubic meter Note 1: For atmospheric liquids, the storage vessel was assumed to contain the quantity of fuel vapors in air at the upper explosive limit.

Note 2: For compressed or liquefied gases, the entire content of the storage vessel was conservatively assumed as the flammable mass.

CCNPP Unit 3 2-105

COPYRIGHT PROTECTED Rev 9 UN#13-09,tIsert C for FSAR Table 2.2-8 Page 21 of 29 Distance to Heat of Nearest CCNPP Distance at 1 Pollutant Combustion Unit 3 Safety psi (6.9 kPa)

Evaluated Quantity (BtuIlb)l(kJlkg) Related Structure Peak Pressure 191 Acetone (Note 1) 28,494 20.747/

48,258 Acetylene (Note 2)

Oxygen (Note 2) 30,470 cu ft/

870 cu m 4,472 cu ft/

127 cu m 1,052 ft/

321 m 1,052 ft/

321 m 1,052 ftl 321 m 206ft 6m 1,246 ft/

380 m (Note 10) 103 ft/

32 m N/A (Note 6)

FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#13-096 Page 22 of 29 Note 3: The DCPLNG pipeline explosion and all explosive hazards from the DCPLNG facility are bounded by the DCPLNG pipeline vapor cloud explosion.

Note 4: The maximum quantity shipped per shipment for gasoline, benzene, and toluene was not available. Therefore, it was assumed that the maximum quantity was 5.2 million lbs. (2.4 million kg) (CRS)

Note 5: The 4,000 gallon gasoline tank is an underground storage tank. The toxicity event is bounded by the 3,500 gallon gasoline delivery tank truck.

Note 6: Oxygen is not explosive by ignition and has no reported heat of combustion; therefore it was analyzed for explosion by overpressure (USCG, 2007).

Note 7: The actual quantity of ethanol analyzed (10 percent by weight of non-oxidizing biocide) was 122 gal/ 462 I.

Note 8: The actual quantity of ethanol analyzed (10 percent by weight of non-oxidizing biocide) was 42.66 gal/ 161.3 I.

Note 9: The evaluated pollutant is stored at a distance greater than the reported safe distance (the minimum distance required for an explosion to have less than 1 psi peak incident pressure).

<I Note 10: The acetylene explosion event was determined not to be a credible event based on gas cylinder catastrophic failure frequency. Refer to Subsection 2.2.3.1.1 for the analysis of this event.

CCNPP Unit 3 2-106

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FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#13-096 Table 2.2 (Flammable Vapor Cloud Events (Delayed Ignition) and Vapor Cloud Explosion Page 23 of 29 Analysis)

(Page 1 of 2) p p

p p

p Source Pollutant Evaluated &

Quantity Maryland Gasoline (8,500 gal)/

Route 2/4 132,1761 (Note 7)

Gasoline (aviation)

(8, 500 gal)/

32,1761 (Note 7)

Propane (50,000 lbs)/

22,680 kg (Note 8)

Waterway Gasoline (5,200,000 lbs)/

(Chesapeak 2,360,000 kg (Note 6) e Bay)

Benzene (5,200,000 lbs)/

2,360,000 kg (Note 6)

[Toluene (5,200,000 lbs)/

i 2,360,000 kg (Note 6)

Ammonia (1,200,000 lbs)/

544,311 kg (Note 3)

Distance to Distance to Distance to Nearest Safety Related CCNPP Unit 3 Structure 6,119 ft/

1,865 m to Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)

UFL 234 ft/

71.3 m 237 ft/

72.2 m LFL 393 ft/

119.8 m 414 ft/

126.2m Safe Distance for Vapor Cloud Explosions 999 ft/

304.5 m 1,002 ftl/

305.4 m 4,185 ft/ 1,276 m Peak Over pressure at Nearest Safety Related CCNPP Unit 3 Structure Not Significant (Note 5)

Not Significant (Note 5) 0.526 psi/ 3.63 kPa 1,167 ft/

2,361 ft/

356 m 720 m 11,678 ft/

3,560 m to UHS makeup intake water structure 783 ft/

239 m 951 ft/

290m 696 ft/

212 m 1,464 ft/

446 m 2,172 ft/

662 m 1,302 ft/

397 m 3,312ft/

1,009 m 0.159 psi/

1.10 kPa 4,095 ft (1,284 m) 0.209 psi (1.44 kPa) 4,746 ft/

6,864 ft/

1,447 m 2,092 m 144 2347 44 m 71 m 2,604 ft (794 m) 10,032 ft/

3,058 m 648 ft/

198 m No explosion 0.115 psi (0.793 kPa) 0.684 psi/

4.72 kPa 5.62 psi/

38.7 kPa (Note 1)

No explosion On-site (CCNPP Units 1 & 2)

Gasoline (3,500 gal)/

13,2491 (Note 4)

Hydrazine (35% solution)

(350 gal)/1,3251 310 ft/

94.5 m 891 ft/

<33 ft/

272 m

= <10.1 m

<10.1 m Dimethylamine (Note 9)

(2% solution)

(350 gal)/1,325 I Hydrogen (460 cu ft)/

Table 2.2-9.

1...

Argon-Methane (Note 10C (CCNPP (282 scf)/

Unit 3) 7.99 Nm 3 462 ft/

<33 ft/

141 m

<10.1 m 45ft(14m) 180 ft/55 m 0.282 psi/1.94 kPa 745ft/

227.1 m (Note 15) 108ft/33 m 492ft/

150 m 738 ft/225 m 0.984 psi/ 6.78 kPa I) 39ft/

11.9 m 69ft/21 m 126ft/38 m (considered as Methane)

Hydrogen (Note 11) (278 7.87 Nm3 Non-Oxidizing Biocide (ethanol) 1,000 gal/ 3,8001 (Note 12)

Non-Oxidizing Biocide (ethanol) / 350 gal/

1,3001 (Note 14)

(Note15)

< 33ft/

<10.1 m 75 ft/23 m (Note 15) I (Note 13)

< 33 ft/

<10m 138 ft/42 m 36ft/

11 m

< 33 ft/

<lOm (Note 15)

(Note 15)

(Note 13)

< 33 ft/

<10m I

DCPLNG Nearby Facility and Pipeline Scenario for Flammable Vapor Clouds (Note 2)

COPYRIGHT PROTECTED Rev 9 UN#13-091lsert D for FSAR Table 2.2-9 Page 24 of 29 Safe Peak Distance to Distance Overpressure at Pollutant Nearest Safety for Vapor Nearest Safety Evaluated &

Related CCNPP Distance to Distance Cloud Related CCNPP Quantity Unit 3 Structure UFL to LFL Explosions Unit 3 Structure Acetone (5 gal)/

19_1 Acetylene (30,470 cu ft)/ 870 cu m 33 ft/

i0 m 1,052 feet

< 33 ft/ lOm 114 ft/35 m Not significant 411 ft/ 125 828 ft / 252 0.692 psi 63 ft/20 m m

m (Note 16) 1,052 feet

FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#13-096 Table 2.2 (Flammable Vapor Cloud Events (Delayed Ignition) and Vapor Cloud Explosion Page 25 of 29 Analysis)

(Page 2 of 2)

Scenario Frequency per year (Existing)

Frequency per year (Expansion Distance to Nearest Safety Related Structure Maximum Consequence Range Total loss of ship's tank en route (off CCNPP)

DCPLNG Gas Pipelines 2.18x 10-7 2.84x 10-7 3.60 x 10-3 7.48 x 10-3 3.4 mi/

1,558 ft-Pool Fire / 13,943 ft-Flash Fire 17,925 ft 475 rn-Pool Fire/ 4,250 rn-Flash Fire 1.54 mi 5,808 ft-overpressure/2,362 ft-Jet Fire /

8,131 ft 722 ft-Flash Fire 1,770 m-overpressure/720 rn-Pool Fire/

220 mr-Flash Fire 3.2 mi/

1,188 ft-Pool Fire / 5,413 ft-Flash Fire 16,896ft i 362 rn-Pool Fire/I,295 mr-Flash Fire Escalation Event-Total loss of all storage 4.00 x 10-6 4.00 x 10-6 tanks scf: Standard cubic feet THIS PAGE PROVIDED FOR REFERENCE ONLY Nm3: Normal cubic meter Note 1: This event was determined not to be a credible event based on an event probability of less than 1 E-7. Refer to Section 2.2.3.2.4 for the analysis of this event.

Note 2: Overall risk of fatality from DCPLNG facility and associated pipeline to CCNPP Site was evaluated to be 2.3E-9 per year (present operations) and 6.6E-9 per year (planned expansion).

(The risk of physical damage to CCNPP Unit 3 is lower) The impact from blast overpressures was taken into account in developing this risk.

Note 3: The annual quantity of ammonia transported in proximity to the CCNPP Unit 3 site is 2.0 million pounds (0.9 million kg). The frequency of transport was not available; consequently, it was conservatively assumed that the entire 2.0 million pounds (0.9 million kg) was transported in one shipment and released. A 0.6 reduction factor was applied to the 2.0 million pounds (0.9 million kg) in the analysis to account for the high rate at which ammonia dissolves in water as ALOHA does not account for this phenomena.

Note 4: The 4,000 gallon gasoline tank is an underground storage tank. Therefore, the toxicity event is bounded by the 3,500 gallon gasoline delivery tank truck.

Note 5: ALOHA output results indicate "not significant" when the peak overpressure is <0.1 psi.

Note 6: The maximum quantity shipped for gasoline, benzene, and toluene was not available.

Therefore, it was assumed that the maximum quantity was 5,200,000 lbs. (CRS, 2005)

Note 7: Gasoline and aviation gasoline were modeled in ALOHA as n-heptane. N-heptane is used as a substitute for gasoline because the molecular weight and physical properties are similar.

Note 8: The worst case combination of stability class and wind speed is F stability and a wind speed of 3 m/sec for propane.

CCNPP Unit 3 2-108

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FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#13-096 Page 26 of 29 Note 9: The worst case combination of stability class and wind speed is E stability and a wind speed of 1 m/sec for dimethylamine.

Note 10: The worst case combination of stability class and wind speed is E stability and a wind speed of 1 m/sec for argon-methane.

Note 11: The worst case combination of stability class and wind speed is E stability and a wind speed of 1 m/sec for the CCNPP Unit 3 hydrogen.

Note 12: The actual quantity of ethanol analyzed (10 percent by weight of non-oxidizing biocide) was 122 gal/ 4621.

Note 13: The concentration is never reached in the vapor cloud.

Note 14: The actual quantity of ethanol analyzed (10 percent by weight of non-oxidizing biocide) was 42.66 gal/ 161.3 I.

Note 15: The evaluated pollutant is stored at a distance greater than the reported safe distance for either the flammable vapor cloud accident category (the distance to the outer edge of the LFL section of the vapor cloud) or the reported safe distance for the vapor cloud explosion accident category (the minimum distance required for an explosion to have less than 1 psi peak incident pressure should a vapor cloud detonate).

Note 16: Acetylene is stored indoors. To account for this. a release from the building of 55% of the release into the building was applied (EPA 2009).

COPYRIGHT PROTECTED Rev 9

FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#1 3-096 Page 27 of 29 Table 2.2 [Toxic Vapor Cloud Analysis)

(Page 1 of 3)

Distance to Maximum Control CCNPP Unit 3 Distance to Room Control Room IDLH Concentration Source Chemical Quantity IDLH Intake (Note 1)

(Note 2)

Maryland 2/4 Gasoline Gasoline (aviation)

Propane Ammonium Hydroxide (19% solution)

Gasoline Waterway (Chesapeake Bay)

Benzene (Note 6)

Toluene (Note 6)

Ammonia On-site Ammonium (CCNPP Units Hydroxide 1 & 2)

(28% solution)

Gasoline (Note 10)

Sodium Hypochlorite Hydrazine (35% solution)

Monoethanolamine Dimethylamine (2% solution)

Hydrochloric Acid (30% Solution)

Hydrogen Carbon Dioxide Insert E for FSAR Liquid Nitrogen Table 22-10.

8,500 gal/

32,200 I 8,500 gal/

32,2001 50,000 Ibs/

22,700 kg 50,000 Ibs/

22,700 kg 5,200,000 Ibs/

24,000,000 kg 560,000 Ibs/

254,000 kg 560,000 Ibs/

254,000 kg 16,000 Ibs/

7,257 kg (Note 7) 8,500 gal/

32,1761 3,500 gal/

13,2501 8,500 gal/

32,1761 350 gal/

1,3251 350 gal/

1,3251 3,000 gal/

11,3601 460 cu ft/

13cu m 50, 000 lb 22,680 kg 11,300 gal/

42,775 1 300 ppm TWA /

500 ppm STEL (Note 3) 300 ppm TWA/

500 ppm STEL (Note 3) 2,100 ppm 300 ppm for ammonia 300 ppm TWA/

500 ppm STEL (Note 7) 500 ppm 500 ppm 300 ppm 300 ppm as ammonia 300 ppm TWA/

500 ppm STEL 10 ppm as chlorine 50 ppm 30 ppm 500 ppm 50 ppm Asphyxiant 40,000 ppm Asphyxiant 6,531 ft/

1,752 ft/

1,991 m 534 m 1,752 ft/

534 m 5,022 ft/

1,531 m 8,448 ft/

2,575 m 11,701 ft/

6,336 ft/

3,566 m 1,931 m 9.44 ppm (Note 4) 9.45 ppm (Note 4) 114 ppm 70.9 ppm (Note 5) 18.5 ppm (Note 4) 2,994 fW/

913 m 617 ft/

188 m 2,472 Wt/

753 m 1,489 ft/

454 m 2,889 ft/

881 m 2,889 ft/

881 m 2,994 ft/

913 m 2,994 ft/

913 m 900Wft 274 m 2,994 913 m 5,808 ft/

1,770 m 4,551 ft/

1,387 m 18,480 ft/

5,633 m 6,864 ft/

2,092 m 1,230 fW/

375 m 174 ft/

53m 1,197Wft 365 m 135 ft/

41 m 288 ft/

88 m 3,102 ft/

945 m Asphyxiant 1,749 W 533 m Asphyxiant 33.0 ppm (Note 4) 19.7 ppm (Note 4) 83.5 ppm (Notes 5 and 8) 194 ppm (Note 15) 343 ppm (Note 9) 0.049 ppm (Note 4) 10.1 ppm (Note 5) 0.0784 ppm (Note 5) 0.743 ppm 14.1 ppm (Note S) 53.0 ppm 25,300 ppm (Note 16) 635 ppm (Note 5)

CCNPP Unit 3 2-110

COPYRIGHT PROTECTED Rev 9 i '*-*nalksrt F fnr FSAR Thhle 2.2-ifl "Kigii-noinsert E for FSAR Table 2 2-10 Page 28 of 29 Distance to Maximum CCNPP Unit 3 Control Room Pollutant Control Room Distance to Concentration Evaluated Quantity IDLH Intake IDLH (Note 1)

(Note 2)

Acetylene 30,470 cu ft/

871 cu m 4,472 cu ft/

127 cu m Asphyxiant Oxygen-enriched 1,489 ft/

454 m 1,489 ftl 454 m 168 ft/

52 m

<33 ft/

10iM 80.9 ppm (Note 11) 23.4 ppm (Note 17)

Oxygen

FSAR: Section 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation And Military Facilities UN#1 3-096 Table 2.2 (Toxic Vapor Cloud Analysis)

Page 29 of 29 (Page 3 of 3)

!I Distance to Maximum Control CCNPP Unit 3 Distance to Room Control Room IDLH Concentration Source Chemical Quantity IDLH Intake (Note 1)

(Note 2)

TLV-TWA: Threshold Limit Value-Time-Weighted Average STEL: Short term exposure limit IDLH: Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health threshold value scf: Standard cubic feet Nm3: Normal cubic meter Note 1: The reported value for the distance to the IDLH (or other determined toxicity limit) is the resultant distance to the IDLH for the determined worst case meteorological conditions for each postulated event. The worst case meteorological conditions were based upon those meteorological conditions yielding the highest concentration in the control room during a postulated event.

Note 2: The concentrations reported represent indoor concentrations. The air exchange rate of 0.45 air exchanges per hour that was used in the ALOHA model was calculated from the control room volume and the rate of fresh air intake. Unless noted, the worst case combination of stability class and wind speed is F stability and a wind speed of 1 m/sec.

Note 3: For gasoline and gasoline (aviation) the time weighted average (TWA) and short term exposure limit (STEL) were conservatively used as no IDLH is available for either of these hazardous materials.

Note 4: The worst case combination of stability class and wind speed is F stability and a wind speed of 3 m/sec.

Note 5: The worst case combination of stability class and wind speed is F stability and a wind speed of 2 m/sec.

Note 6: For benzene, and toluene a combined total of 28,000 short tons/year are shipped by barge. It is conservatively assumed that they are shipped in equal quantities (14,000 short tons per year each) and that they each have the minimum 50 shipments (Regulatory Guide 1.78) and each shipment contains the same quantity, 560,000 lbs each.

Note 7: The amount of ammonia transported by barge near the plant is 1,000 short tons. It is conservatively assumed that there are 50 shipments per year (Regulatory Guide 1.78), with each shipment, therefore, containing 40,000 lbs. This quantity was reduced further because of the high rate at which ammonia dissolves in water. A 0.60 partition coefficient was assigned, reducing the volume tol 6,000 lbs.

Note 8: This event was evaluated to not be a credible event based on screening criteria for event frequency in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.78. Refer to Section 2.2.3.1.3 for the analysis of this event.

Note 9: An additional probabilistic evaluation was conducted for this postulated event and this spill event was determined not to be a credible event, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.78 risk frequency evaluation requirements. Refer to Section 2.2.3.1.3 for the analysis of this event.

Note 10: The 4,000 gallon gasoline tank reported in Table 2.2-2 is an underground storage tank. Therefore, the toxicity event is bounded by the 3,500 gallon gasoline delivery tank truck.

Note 11: The reported distance to the IDLH for this asphyxiant is the distance at which the concentration outside the control room is such that enough oxygen may become displaced to create an oxygen deficient atmosphere.

Note 12: The actual quantity of ethanol analyzed (10 percent by weight of non-oxidizing biocide) was 122 gal/ 462 I.

Note 13: The actual quantity of ethanol analyzed (10 percent by weight of non-oxidizing biocide) was 42.66 gal/ 161.3 I.

Note 14: The evaluated chemical is stored at a distance greater than the reported safe distance (the distance the chemical cloud could travel before it disperses enough such that the concentration in the vapor cloud falls below the IDLH limit, other determined toxicity limit concentration, or at a level where an oxygen deficient atmosphere is plausible). For these evaluated chemicals the control room air exchange rate was not accounted for in the analyses.

Note 15: Because the ammonium hydroxide (28%) is stored at the tank farm and must travel directly over/around structures to reach the control room air intake, a ground roughness value of 50 cm was entered.

KNote 16: The toxicity event for the 8,000 lb storage tank Bldg. is bounded by the 50,000 lb delivery truck.

Note 17: The reoorted distance to the IDLH for oxyven is the distance at which the concentration outside the control room Is enough that the atmosphere will become oxygen-enriched.I CCNPP Unit 3 2-112 Rev 9

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UN#13-096 Table of Changes to CCNPP Unit 3 COLA Associated with the Impact of the Toxic-Flammable Explosive Transport Hazards in Calvert Cliffs Units I & 2 on Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3 UN#13-096 Page 2 of 3 Table of Changes to CCNPP Unit 3 COLA Associated with the Impact of the Toxic-Flammable Explosive Transport Hazards in Calvert Cliffs Units I & 2 on Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3 Change Subsection Type of Change Description of Change ID#

Part 2 - FSAR CC3 2.2.3 Incorporate COLA The response to RAI 146, 0256 markups associated with Question 02.02.03-8 (original the response to RAI 146, involves additional CC3 -

Question 02.02.03-8, information on toxic or 10-0054)

Evaluation of Potential asphyxiating chemicals.

Accidents1.

CC3 2.2.3 Incorporate COLA The response to RAI 171, 0256 markups associated with Question 09.05.05-2, Raw (original the response to RAI 171, Water Supply System, CC3 -

Question 09.02.05-22.

involves deletion of 10-0011) reference to CCNPP 1&2 chemical storage locations and additional information on chemicals.

CC3 2.2.3 Incorporate COLA The response to RAI 198, 0256 markups associated with Question 19-22, (original the response to RAI 198, Probabilistic Risk CC3 -

Question 19-223.

Assessment, involves 09-0338) deletion of references to Ammonia Hydroxide.

1UniStar Nuclear Energy Letter UN#09-421, from Greg Gibson to Document Control Desk, U.S. NRC, Response to Request for Additional Information for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3, RAI 146, Evaluation of Potential Accidents, dated October 15, 2009.

2UniStar Nuclear Energy Letter UN#10-022, from Greg Gibson to Document Control Desk, U.S. NRC, Response to Request for Additional Information for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3, RAI 171, Raw Water Supply System, dated February 5, 2010.

3UniStar Nuclear Energy Letter UN#10-230, from Greg Gibson to Document Control Desk, U.S. NRC, Response to Request for Additional Information for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3, RAI 198, Probabilistic Risk Assessment, dated August 24, 2010.

UN#13-096 Page 3 of 3 Change Subsection Type of Change Description of Change ID#

CC3 2.2.3, Incorporate COLA Markups associated with 0099 2.2.4, markups associated with Toxic-Flammable Tables 2.2-2, 2.2-5, Toxic-Flammable Explosive Transport 2.2-8, 2.2-9, 2.2-10, Explosive Transport Hazards in Calvert Cliffs Hazards in Calvert Cliffs Units 1 & 2 on Calvert Units 1 & 2 on Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Cliffs Nuclear Power Unit 3 Part 2, FSAR Plant, Unit 3 (this sections.

submittal).

ML13204A401

Text

Subject:

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