ML13066A324
| ML13066A324 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/2010 |
| From: | Meena Khanna Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Jeffrey Mitman, George Wilson Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2012-0325 | |
| Download: ML13066A324 (1) | |
Text
L/
Mitman, Jeffrey From:
Khanna, Meena Sent:
Wednesday, March 24, 2010 3:29 PM To:
Mitman, Jeffrey; Wilson, George Cc:
James, Lois; Uribe, Juan
Subject:
RE: Resolution of the Oconee Backfit Document Evaluation Question on HEP Value thanks Jeff From: Mitman, Jeffrey Sent: Wednesday, Marcb24, 2%10 2:30 PM To: Wilson, George Cc: Khanna, Meena; James, Lois
Subject:
Resolution of the Oconee Backfit Document Evaluation Question on HEP Value George, attached is the analysis that DRA performed on the Duke mitigation strategy EM 5.3. The language below is lifted (with slight modification for context) from that analysis. It is the language that I would suggest that you insert into the Oconee Backfit Document Evaluation to address G. Mizuno's concern. If you have questions please let me know.
Jeff Mitman "The staff evaluated EM 5.3 using the SPAR-H HRA ('The SPAR-H Human Reliability Analysis Method,' NUREG/CR-6883, August 2005) methodology to obtain a rough estimate of the human error probability (HEP) for this procedure. A rigorous analysis was not performed. SPAR-H was used to get a sense of the probability of failure. The human failure event was defined, success criteria stipulated, cues identified and performance shaping factors evaluated. The overall human error probability from this process was high, giving a result close to one. Due to the complexity of the mitigation strategy, the lack of rigor in the evaluation and the conservative nature of the SPAR-H methodology, no greater accuracy should be construed from this analysis. A more rigorous analysis may lower the failure probability someWhat, but the final result is anticipated to be between 0.1 and 1.0."
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