ML11308B345
| ML11308B345 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 10/25/2011 |
| From: | Ernstes M NRC/RGN-II/DRS/PSB2 |
| To: | Lynch T Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| I. Hall | |
| References | |
| 2-2011-017 | |
| Download: ML11308B345 (4) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 October 25, 2011 Mr. Thomas A. Lynch Vice President - Farley Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Farley Nuclear Plant P.O. Drawer 470, BIN B500 Ashford, AL 36312
SUBJECT:
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT NO. 2-2011-017
Dear Mr. Lynch:
Enclosed for your information is the synopsis of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Office of Investigations= (OI) completed report regarding whether a security manager assigned to Farley Nuclear Plant (Farley), Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Birmingham, Alabama was aware that security officers were circumventing search equipment at the entrance to the protected area, and willfully failed to communicate such behavior of the security officers to the licensee as required.
Based on the evidence developed during this investigation, OI did not substantiate the allegations that the Farley security manager was aware that security officers were circumventing search equipment at the entrance to the protected area, and willfully failed to communicate such behavior of the security officers to the licensee as required. We plan no further action with regard to this matter. Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Michael E. Ernstes, Chief Plant Support Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Certified Mail No. 7010 0780 0001 4601 8346 Return Receipt Requested Docket No.: 50-348, 50-364 License No.: NPF-2, NPF-8
Enclosure:
Investigative Synopsis, OI Case No. 2-2011-017
ML11308B345 X SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE X FORM 665 ATTACHED OFFICE RII: DRS/PSB2 RII: DRS/PSB2 RII: DRP/BR2 RII: EICS SIGNATURE RA/IH RA/ME RA/JH RA/OD NAME I. HALL M. ERNSTES G. HICKEY O. DEMIRANDA DATE 10/11/2011 10/12/2011 10/17/2011 10/17/2011 E-MAIL COPY?
YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
SNC 2
cc w/Encl.:
Keith Wooten Project Manager Nuclear Fleet Security Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
40 Inverness Center Parkway Birmingham, AL 35242 David Burford Manager Nuclear Fleet Security Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
40 Inverness Center Parkway Birmingham, AL 35242 L. B. Hogg Nuclear Licensing Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
40 Inverness Center Parkway Birmingham, AL 35242 S. P. McGavin Security Manager Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant 7388 North State Highway 95 Columbia, AL 36319
Official Use Only - OI Investigation Information NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WITHOUT APPROVAL OF FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, REGION II Official Use Only - OI Investigation Information OI Case No. 2-2011-017 Enclosure SYNOPSIS This investigation was initiated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Investigations, Region II Field Office, on December 15, 2011, to determine whether a security manager assigned to Farley Nuclear Plant (Farley), Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Birmingham, Alabama was aware that security officers were circumventing search equipment at the entrance to the protected area, and willfully failed to communicate such behavior of the security officers to the licensee as required.
Based on the evidence developed during this investigation, this investigation did not substantiate the allegations that the Farley security manager was aware that security officers were circumventing search equipment at the entrance to the protected area, and willfully failed to communicate such behavior of the security officers to the licensee as required.