ML110310796
See also: RIS 2005-31
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001
December 22, 2005
NRC REGULATORY ISSUE SUMMARY 2005-31
CONTROL OF SECURITY-RELATED SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED NON-
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION HANDLED BY INDIVIDUALS, FIRMS,
AND ENTITIES SUBJECT TO NRC REGULATION OF THE USE OF
SOURCE, BYPRODUCT, AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
ADDRESSEES
All licensees, certificate holders, applicants, and other entities (hereafter referred to as
licensees and others) subject to regulation by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
of the use of source, byproduct, and special nuclear material, except for those as covered by
provisions of Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2005-26 for nuclear power reactors.
INTENT
This RIS sets forth procedures that licensees and others are encouraged to follow when
handling documents and/or when submitting documents to the NRC that contain security-
related sensitive information, other than classified or safeguards information, that could be
useful, or could reasonably be expected to be useful, to a terrorist in a potential attack.
Attached to this RIS are screening criteria that licensees and others should use to identify
security-related sensitive information.
No specific action nor written response is required.
BACKGROUND
NRC traditionally has given the public access to a significant amount of information about the
facilities and materials the Agency regulates. Openness has been and remains a cornerstone
of NRCs regulatory philosophy. The Atomic Energy Act, subsequent legislation, and various
NRC regulations have given the public the right to participate in the licensing and oversight
process for NRC licensees. To participate in a meaningful way, the public must have access to
information about the design and operation of regulated facilities and use of nuclear materials.
However, NRC and other Government agencies have always withheld some information from
public disclosure for reasons of security, personal privacy, or commercial or trade secret
protection.
NRC000086
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Exhibit # - NRC000086-MA-BD01
Docket # - 07007015
Identified: 01/25/2011
Admitted: Withdrawn:
Rejected: Stricken:
01/25/2011
Page 2 of 5
In the post-September 11, 2001, environment, NRC, like many other agencies, has found it
necessary to be more judicious in determining what information to voluntarily release, so as not
to inadvertently provide assistance to those who might use certain information for malevolent
acts. NRC has issued orders and advisories and taken specific actions regarding the security
of its licensed facilities and has also assessed and revised its policies and practices for making
information available to the public. One of the actions NRC took was to suspend public access
to documents in its electronic Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS) on October 25, 2004. Subsequently, NRC screened those documents to determine
whether they contained security-related sensitive information. Based on this screening, a large
number of documents were returned to public access in ADAMS. This screening process
continues as requests for specific documents are received and as new documents are created
by NRC and received from licensees and others.
To facilitate this screening process, NRC has developed screening criteria for conducting its
reviews. In November 2005, NRC issued guidance (NRC RIS 2005-26) for assessing whether
documents associated with reactor licensees should be made publicly available. As part of the
continuing efforts in this area, NRC has now developed the attached criteria for screening from
public disclosure security-related sensitive information associated with various NRC-regulated
activities of persons handling source, byproduct, and special nuclear material.
This RIS and its attachments do not apply to classified information or Safeguards Information.
Classified information (Confidential, Secret, Top Secret) is withheld from the public by law.
Safeguards Information is withheld because it provides details of security measures at nuclear
facilities. Handling requirements for classified information and Safeguards Information are set
forth in various NRC orders, regulations, and generic communications (e.g., requirements for
the handling and protection of Safeguards Information are discussed in RIS-2003-08,
Protection of Safeguards Information from Unauthorized Disclosure, dated April 30, 2003).
Sensitive (but unclassified, non-safeguards) information covers a range of information for which
the loss, misuse, modification, or unauthorized access can reasonably be foreseen to harm the
public interest, commercial or financial interests of an entity, the conduct of NRC and Federal
Programs, or the personal privacy of individuals. As noted above, this RIS covers security-
related information which, if released, could cause harm to the public interest as it could be
useful, or could reasonably be expected to be useful, to a terrorist in a potential attack.
Specifically, information that should be protected under this RIS is described in Attachment 2.
In addition, licensees and others should use the procedures set forth below to protect
information designated for protection by other federal, State, or local agencies.
SUMMARY OF ISSUE
This RIS:
1)
Informs licensees and others of the screening criteria that NRC uses to identify and
protect security-related sensitive information in documents generated by the Agency
and in documents received from licensees and others;
2)
Encourages licensees and others to identify security-related sensitive information
contained in documents submitted to NRC, by using the screening criteria in
Attachment 2 and marking procedures; and
Page 3 of 5
3)
Encourages licensees and others that may possess security-related sensitive
information to control the information, to limit the risk that the information might fall into
the hands of those who would use it for malevolent acts.
Specifically, protection of the information should be implemented in the following manner:
1. Screening of Future Documents Submitted to NRC
To assure that future submittals containing security-related sensitive information are not
made publicly available in ADAMS, while still making other appropriate information
available to the public, NRC is encouraging licensees and others to screen submittals in
accordance with the guidance in Attachment 2. If practical, documents submitted to
NRC should avoid including security-related sensitive information to permit releasing the
document to the public in its entirety.
2. Marking and Submitting Documents Containing Security-Related Sensitive Information
If it is necessary to include security-related sensitive information in a submitted
document, the submittal should be marked to indicate the presence of such information
as follows:
a)
The cover letter should clearly state that the attached documents contain
security-related sensitive information. When separated from the attached
documents, if the cover letter itself does not contain security-related sensitive
information, the cover letter itself is uncontrolled.
b)
As shown in Attachment 1 (Section A), the top of every page of a letter or
document that contains security-related sensitive information should include the
marking Security-Related Information Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390 (note
that NRCs procedure for these documents is to mark them as Official Use Only
- Security-Related Information). For the pages having security-related sensitive
information, an additional marking (e.g., an editorial notebox) should be included
adjacent to the material meeting the screening criteria in Attachment 2.
Information on suggested handling and methods of submittal of security-related
sensitive information is also contained in Attachment 1 (Section B).
Licensees and others can submit both a public and a non-public version of a document,
when security-related documents need to be submitted. The public version could have
the security-related sensitive information marked out or removed with a notation that
the information was withheld on the basis that it is Security-Related Information. This
is similar to what is sometimes done to protect proprietary information under 10 CFR 2.390, except that an affidavit is not needed. Alternatively, security-related sensitive
information could be segregated from the main body of the document and included only
in attachments to the submittal. Only the attachments containing security-related
sensitive information would be marked for withholding from public disclosure. Using this
approach, the public version need not be marked as containing security-related sensitive
information.
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3. Protection of Security-Related Sensitive Information
Documents that contain security-related sensitive information should be protected from
public disclosure, using methods similar to that for protecting proprietary information.
To the extent practicable, any existing documents containing security-related sensitive
information that licensees or others have previously made available to the public should
be withdrawn from public access. As with proprietary information, licensees and others
should have sufficient internal controls to prevent release of information. Possible
methods to prevent the inadvertent release of security-related sensitive information
include marking documents Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390, restricting access to electronic recordkeeping systems that contain such
information, and controlling the reproduction, distribution, and destruction of potentially
sensitive records. Licensees and others should ensure that similar controls are in place
when security-related sensitive information is provided to outside parties such as
contractors or other Government agencies, and that the information is made available
only to such parties who have a need to know the information to perform their jobs and
who are made aware of the security-related nature of the information.
This RIS, the attached screening criteria, and additional explanatory material, as appropriate,
are also posted on the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/sensitive-info.html)
(note that the criteria for fuel cycle facilities in this website and in this RIS supercedes
information at http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/review-criteria-fuel-cycle.html).
The NRC staff will interact with licensees and others on a case-by-case basis to resolve
questions regarding the application of the procedures and screening criteria set forth in this RIS
and its attachments.
NRC will continue to make available to the public as much information as possible. Much of
NRCs information is readily available to the public via the NRC Web site (www.nrc.gov) and
NRCs ADAMS system (www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html). In addition, other information
may be released to the public in response to formal and/or informal requests. Although the
security-related sensitive information screening criteria were developed with the principles of
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in mind, a review for security-related sensitive
information does not substitute for a FOIA review. FOIA requests will continue to be reviewed
and processed independently from the security-related sensitive information review process.
BACKFIT DISCUSSION
This RIS requires no action nor written response and is, therefore, not a backfit under 10 CFR
70.76, 72.62, or 76.76. Consequently, the NRC staff did not perform a backfit analysis.
FEDERAL REGISTER NOTIFICATION
A notice of opportunity for public comment on this RIS was not published in the Federal
Register because it is informational and does not represent a departure from current regulatory
requirements and practice.
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SMALL BUSINESS REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT FAIRNESS ACT OF 1996
NRC has determined that this action is not subject to the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996.
PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT
This RIS does not contain information collections and, therefore, is not subject to the
requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.).
Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contacts listed below.
/RA/
Charles L. Miller, Director
Division of Industrial and Medical
Nuclear Safety
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards
Technical Contacts:
Spent Fuel Storage and
Materials IMNS/Regional Transportation
Fuel Cycle
Paul Goldberg, NMSS/IMNS Joe Sebrosky, NMSS/SFPO
Patricia Silva, NMSS/FCSS
301-415-7842
301-415-1132
301-415-8029
E-mail: pfg@nrc.gov
E-mail: jms3@nrc.gov
E-mail: pas6@nrc.gov
Decommissioning
HLWRS
Import/Export
Ted Carter, NMSS/DWMEP Alexander Sapountzis
301-415-6668
301-415-7822
301-415-2342
E-mail: thc1@nrc.gov
E-mail: aps@nrc.gov
E-mail: sxd@nrc.gov
Attachments:
1. Suggested Markings; Withhold From Public Disclosure in Accordance With 10 CFR 2.390
2. NMSS Guidance on Screening Criteria for Security-Related Sensitive Unclassified Non-
Safeguards Information
3. List of Recently Issued NMSS Generic Communications
Attachment 1
Page 1 of 2
Security-Related Information
Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390
Subject
XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX
SUGGESTED MARKINGS AND HANDLING
This attachment provides information on suggested markings for pages of a document that
contains security-related sensitive information (Section A) and suggested handling of such
documents (Section B).
A. Page Markings
Overall page marking on the top of all pages
of a document that contains security-related
sensitive information
Note that a cover letter should clearly state
that attached documents contain security-
related sensitive information - - However,
this marking is also needed on the cover
letter only if it itself contains security-
related sensitive information.
Ensure Subject Line is non-sensitive
Attachment 1
Page 2 of 2
B. Appropriate Controls for Handling Documents
Access:
Need-to-know in order to perform official licensee, applicant or
entity functions.
Storage:
Openly within licensee, applicant, or other entity facilities with
electronic or other access controls, for example, key cards,
guards, alarms.
Mail:
U.S. Postal Service first class mail, registered mail, express mail,
or certified mail in single opaque envelope with no external
markings to indicate 10 CFR 2.390 contents.
Electronic Transmission:
Over phone if the recipient is confirmed as being
authorized to access the information; over facsimile if it is
confirmed that a recipient who is authorized to access the
information will be present to receive the transmission;
over encrypted computer e-mail (using computer software
such as SecureZip).
Note that NRC is using SecureZip when transmitting security-
related sensitive information by e-mail to licensees and others to
encrypt electronic information. Users will be prompted for a
password to access a free download of the reader.
Attachment 2
Page 1 of 19
-1-
NMSS GUIDANCE
SCREENING CRITERIA FOR SECURITY-RELATED
SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED NON-SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION
DECEMBER 2005
Attachment 2
Page 2 of 19
SCREENING CRITERIA FOR SECURITY-RELATED
SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED NON-SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION
DECEMBER 2005
INTRODUCTION:
This guidance provides the criteria which will be used to determine the types of security-related
sensitive information, other than classified or safeguards information, associated with materials
licensees, applicants, certificate holders, and other entities that will not be voluntarily disclosed
to the public so as not to inadvertently provide assistance to those who might wish to use this
information for malevolent acts.
BACKGROUND:
Historically, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has made routinely available to the
public large amounts of information, more than required by law. In the post-September 11,
2001 environment, however, like many other agencies, the NRC has found it necessary to be
more judicious in what it voluntarily releases, so as not to inadvertently provide assistance to
those who might use this information for malevolent acts.
The NRC developed guidance several months ago for conducting a broad security/sensitivity
review to assess whether documents associated with reactor licensees should be made publicly
available in the first instance as a matter of administrative discretion (SECY-04-0191). In
November 2005, the NRC issued guidance (NRC RIS 2005-26) in this area. As part of the
continuing efforts in this area, the NRC has now developed this guidance which addresses the
criteria for screening from public disclosure certain types of information associated with various
classes of materials licensees, applicants, certificate holders and other entities.
Consistent with the Task Force Report on Public Disclosure of Security-Related Information,
(SECY 05-0091) and the Commission guidance on that Task Force Report, the screening
criteria in these guidelines ...should follow the principles for withholding security-related
information under FOIA. Although the security-related sensitive screening criteria were
developed with the principles of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in mind, a review for
security-related sensitive information does not substitute for a FOIA review. FOIA requests will
continue to be reviewed and processed independently from the security-related sensitive
information review process.
ORGANIZATION OF THIS GUIDANCE:
This guidance is organized as follows (see Table 1 for an outline on navigating the guidance):
-
Section 1 indicates the thresholds under which documents may be released to the public
without any further screening. However, Section 1 also notes specific requirements for
withholding documents in certain cases even if the documents fall under the threshold.
-
Section 2 contains general criteria for screening documents above the threshold.
Attachment 2
Page 3 of 19
1 With regards to High-Level Waste, requirements for making information publicly
available via the Licensing Support Network (LSN) is contained in 1O CFR Part 2 Subpart J for
an applicant of the proposed geological repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. Furthermore,
the "Joint DOE and NRC Sensitive Unclassified Information and Classification Guide for the
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program" (CG-OCRWM-1) provides
guidance for determining sensitive information.
-
Appendices 1 - 5 contain guidance, in addition to that in Section 2, for screening
documents specific to fuel cycle facilities; decommissioning and low-level waste sites;
medical, industrial, and academic uses of nuclear materials; spent fuel/transportation;
and export/import, respectively.
Table 1 Stakeholders Using This Guidance and Applicable Sections of the Guidance1
Stakeholder
Applicable guidance
Fuel cycle facilities including milling,
conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication
facilities
Sections 1 and 2 for general information and
Appendix 1.
Decommissioning and low-level waste sites
Sections 1 and 2 for general information and
Appendix 2.
Medical, Industrial, and Academic Uses of
Nuclear Materials
Sections 1 and 2 for general information and
Appendix 3.
10 CFR Part 71: certificate holders, and
registered users
Sections 1 and 2 for general information and
Appendix 4, parts A, B, and E. Special
attention should be given to the guidance
relative to detailed design drawings, and
control of registered users list for
transportation packages.
10 CFR Part 71: Quality Assurance Program
holders
Sections 1 and 2 for general information and
Appendix 4, parts A, B, and E. Based on
NRC staff experience, most QA program
holder submittals do not contain sensitive
information as defined in this RIS. However,
attention should be given to the guidance
relative to detailed design drawings, and
control of registered users list for
transportation packages.
10 CFR Part 72: certificate holders, general
licensees, and site specific licensees
Sections 1 and 2 for general information and
Appendix 4, parts A, B, C, D and E.
Export and Import
Sections 1 and 2 for general information and
Appendix 5.
Attachment 2
Page 4 of 19
1. NMSS THRESHOLD CRITERIA:
Documents containing information falling under these thresholds may be released without any
further screening, except as specifically noted.
A. Low Hazard: The following types of licensee files need NOT be screened due to the low
hazard of the radioactive material at the sites:
- Licensees authorized to possess quantities of radionuclides in any single location that
are below the International Atomic Energy Agencys (IAEA) Category 3 quantities (as
listed in Table 1 of these guidelines). However, documents which give the exact
location of the material should be withheld, even if they refer to material levels below
the Category 3 threshold. Thus, a document may be released if it indicates a general
location (i.e., in a certain building), but documents giving the exact location should be
withheld unless the location is intuitively obvious.
-
Licensees (other than fuel cycle) authorized to possess radionuclides which are not
listed in Table 1. However, information on the exact location of this radioactive material
should be withheld.
- Uranium recovery (yellow cake and tailings only)
- Current information on decommissioning materials sites with diffuse contamination only.
(Check for other active licenses or radioactive material at the site; e. g., high activity
reactor components, and high activity waste. Screen any such documents separately.)
- Terminated licenses where all radioactivity except diffuse contamination has been
removed. (Screen old files for operational information which may contain sensitive
information.)
B. Information Readily Available to the Public Elsewhere:
Based on Reactor Criteria Approved by Commission (see SECY-04-0191):
- If the information is available from open source literature such as text books, Web sites,
or other sources, an NRC decision to withhold the information may decrease the
openness of our regulatory programs without obstructing an adversary.
- Information clearly visible from locations accessible to the public is generally released.
This includes general (low resolution) drawings of the site and adjacent areas.
Attachment 2
Page 5 of 19
2. GENERAL CRITERIA FOR SCREENING DOCUMENTS ABOVE THE THRESHOLD
A. Descriptions of Facilities Where Licensed Material May Be Located
Criteria:
(1) Locations and quantities of radioactive material (above the thresholds listed in Table 1)
- Withhold information identifying the exact locations of radioactive material
- Withhold information on possession limits or actual inventories of radionuclides.
- Withhold manufacturers and model numbers of sealed sources and devices.
- For fuel cycle facilities, withhold information on possession limits and inventories of
enriched uranium above 6% U-235, and mixed oxide materials.
- Withhold lists of licensees registered to use NRC-approved 10 CFR Part 71
transportation packages.
- Release identification of radionuclides and form.
- Release 10 CFR Part 71 certificates and 10 CFR Part 72 information related to
radionuclide form, content, quantities, model numbers, and locations of independent
spent fuel storage installations, regardless of the quantities.
- Release event reports involving lost/stolen/abandoned/found radioactive material.
(2) Design of structures/equipment (site specific)
- Withhold information related to security requirements, information from analyses which
could reveal vulnerabilities, reports of specific or predicted failures, and any other
information which could reasonably be expected to be useful to potential adversaries.
- Release information regarding the design of structures provided to the NRC which
typically consists of analyses to show that the design feature will withstand the
combinations of forces associated with design basis events and natural hazards. The
analyses do not typically provide realistic information on the failure of structural features,
and, except for fuel cycle facilities, are not considered sensitive. However, withhold
information related to predicted structural failures that could be useful to terrorists. (See
Appendix 1 for specific guidance on fuel cycle facilities.)
(3) Nearby Facilities
- Withhold information related to nearby facilities if the information might reasonably be
helpful to those planning an attack.
B. Design Information (non-site-specific): Spent Fuel Casks, Transportation Packages,
Sealed Source and Device Catalog and Files, etc.
- Withhold drawings showing detailed design information.
- Withhold design/performance information which indicates vulnerabilities that could
reasonably be expected to be useful to potential adversaries.
- Release text information containing descriptions of how packages/devices/sources are
constructed.
Attachment 2
Page 6 of 19
C. Emergency Planning/Fire Protection Information
- Withhold information related to emergency planning, emergency response, and fire
protection. Review any considerations and/or requests for release on a case-by-case
basis. As part of the review, check to see whether the State or local governments are
withholding related information as sensitive.
- Withhold information describing licensee or government responses to malevolent
attacks.
- Withhold information and drawings identifying locations of radioactive material, and
onsite routes and pathways to or from the locations of radioactive material.
- Withhold information which State or local government agencies have designated as
sensitive.
D. Security Program Information
- Much information related to security programs at fuel cycle facilities and other materials
facilities with high risk sources has already been designated to be withheld as
Classified, Safeguards, or Proprietary Information.
- In addition to withholding Classified, Safeguards, or Proprietary Information, withhold
any security information which could reasonably be expected to be useful to potential
adversaries.
E. Vulnerability/Security Assessments/Accident Analyses/Safety Analyses/Risk Assessments
- Release typical accident analyses which involve conservative models to demonstrate a
facilitys ability to respond to design basis events (i.e., non-security related events),
unless the analysis could reasonably be expected to be useful to an adversary.
- Withhold assessments which use a malevolent event as an initial condition
(e.g.,vulnerability/security analysis).
- Withhold descriptions of structural features related to potential malevolent attacks.
- Withhold detailed information and drawings describing the specific locations of
equipment relied upon for safety or security.
- Withhold discussions of safety features or mitigation strategies within
vulnerability/security assessments.
- Withhold any analysis that identifies which events have significant consequences and
which events don't.
- Withhold information related to security events and any information which could be
useful to an adversary due to identification of vulnerabilities.
Attachment 2
Page 7 of 19
APPENDICES 1-5: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR SECURITY-RELATED SENSITIVE
INFORMATION SCREENING REVIEWS
These appendices contain additional guidance for screening documents for security-related
sensitive information specific to fuel cycle facilities; decommissioning and low-level waste sites;
medical, industrial, and academic uses of nuclear materials; spent fuel/transportation; and
export/import licensing. These appendices are organized as follows:
1. Fuel cycle facilities including milling, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication
facilities;
2. Decommissioning and low-level waste sites;
3. Medical, industrial, and academic uses of nuclear materials;
4. Spent Fuel/Transportation (10 CFR Part 71: certificate holders, and registered users;
10 CFR Part 71: Quality Assurance Program holders; 10 CFR Part 72: certificate
holders, general licensees, and site specific licensees);
5. Export/Import licensing.
Attachment 2
Page 8 of 19
APPENDIX 1 - - FUEL CYCLE FACILITY REVIEWS (NRC CONTACT: DIVISION OF FUEL
CYCLE SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS (FCSS), NMSS)
A. Descriptions of Facilities Where Licensed Material May Be Located
- Withhold information on possession limits or actual inventories of radionuclides, and
quantities, including such information on the license itself, for mixed oxide material and
uranium enriched to greater than 6 % U-235. (Release identification of radionuclides
and their forms.)
- Withhold information related to military contract operations, even if it is publicly available
elsewhere.
- Withhold information identifying the exact locations (e.g., detailed floor plans) of
radioactive and hazardous material whose release or theft could allow adversaries to
create a diversion for theft of material or result in a significant consequence.
Information for planning a sabotage activity (e.g., bombing a building) would likely
require less detailed information than theft where exact locations would likely be
needed.
- Withhold information about the design of structures that consists of analyses to show
that design features will withstand the forces associated with both security-related
scenarios and non-security-related scenarios, such as tornadoes, high winds, snow
loads, etc. Analyses indicating forces associated with non-security regulatory
requirements could be useful in planning terrorist activities. For instance, information
related to seismic loadings could be used to determine blast loads for bombs.
- Withhold detailed design information, including diagrams showing dimensions, material
properties, and descriptions of how the facilities/equipment is constructed. Additionally,
withhold process information that could potentially allow an adversary to access
radioactive or hazardous materials or gain knowledge of detailed information or potential
weaknesses of systems designed to ensure safe operations (necessary to prevent or
mitigate accidents) at fuel cycle facilities.
B. Design Information (non-site specific)
No additional fuel cycle facility guidance for this category.
C. Emergency Planning/Fire Protection Information
- Withhold information contained in Emergency Planning and Fire Protection Plans that
could potentially allow an adversary to gain knowledge of detailed information or
potential weaknesses of systems designed to ensure safe operations (necessary to
prevent or mitigate accidents) at fuel cycle facilities.
Attachment 2
Page 9 of 19
- Withhold information and drawings identifying routes to or from the locations of
radioactive and hazardous material whose release or theft could allow adversaries to
achieve their goals.
- Withhold information that State or local government agencies have designated as
sensitive.
- Withhold any detailed accident analysis that identifies which accidents have significant
consequences and which accidents don't. Accident analysis information can appear in
many documents (i.e., emergency plan, fire protection plan, Integrated Safety Analysis
Summary, environmental assessment, etc.). General information may be releasable,
but details should be withheld.
D. Security Program Information
- Much information related to security programs at fuel cycle facilities and other materials
facilities with high risk sources has already been designated to be withheld as
Proprietary, Classified or Safeguards Information.
- Withhold information about security equipment and programs, descriptions of equipment
and radioactive or hazardous materials, and accident studies that bear a close
resemblance to programs, equipment, radioactive or hazardous materials, and studies
at other active licensee sites if that information would reveal vulnerabilities or be
expected to be useful to adversaries at active licensee sites.
E. Vulnerability/Security Assessments/Accident Analyses
- Withhold detailed information and drawings describing the exact locations of radioactive
or hazardous materials or gain knowledge of detailed information or potential
weaknesses of system designed to ensure safe operations (necessary to prevent or
mitigate accidents) at fuel cycle facilities.
- Withhold any detailed accident analysis which contains accident sequences, identifies
accident consequences, identifies systems and components relied upon for safety, or
identifies which accidents have significant consequences and which accidents don't.
Accident analysis information can appear in many documents (i.e., emergency plan, fire
protection plan, Integrated Safety Analysis Summary, environmental assessment, etc.).
General information may be acceptable, but details should be withheld.
- Withhold information identifying the exact locations (e.g., detailed floor plans) of
radioactive and hazardous material whose release or theft could allow adversaries
create a diversion for theft of material or result in a significant consequence.
Information for planning a sabotage activity (e.g., bombing a building) would likely
require less detailed information than theft where exact locations would likely be
needed.
Attachment 2
Page 10 of 19
APPENDIX 2 - - DECOMMISSIONING AND LOW-LEVEL WASTE SITE REVIEWS (NRC
CONTACT: DIVISION OF DECOMMISSIONING, WASTE MANAGEMENT, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (DWMEP), NMSS)
DECOMMISSIONING AND LOW-LEVEL WASTE SITE THRESHOLD CRITERIA
1. Diffuse contamination consists of soil, groundwater, surface contamination on and in
buildings, including that which is on equipment, floors, walls, etc. It also could include
volumetrically contaminated materials whose concentrations are sufficiently low.
For determining whether only diffuse contamination is present at a decommissioning
site, apply the following information derived from the IAEA Code of Conduct on the
Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (see Table 1). Category 3 sources in the
Code of Conduct, for which NRC is developing a rulemaking to control their import and
export, are typically about 1 curie. At a concentration of 2000 pCi/gram, which is well
above the concentrations of plutonium typically found in soil at sites undergoing
decommissioning, this equates to approximately 15,000 cubic feet of material, well in
excess of what a terrorist could reasonably use for malevolent purposes. For materials
at the 10 CFR Part 61 Class A limit for plutonium (10 nCi/gram), the volume of waste
that would contain the Category 3 activity limit for plutonium would be 3000 cubic feet,
also in excess of what could reasonably be used by a terrorist. However, for Co-60, the
amount of loose material or rubble at the Class A limit (700 Ci/cubic meter) containing
the Category 3 quantity (about 1 curie) would be less than 0.1 cubic foot, an amount that
could easily be used for malevolent purposes because of its small volume.
Reviewers should apply values taking into consideration the examples given above in
making a determination on whether a decommissioning site is within the threshold limits.
2. DWMEP has little licensing work in low-level waste. However, that which is performed
may not be below the threshold. For example, import and export licensing could involve
quantities of materials that would be useful to terrorists.
GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR DECOMMISSIONING AND LOW-LEVEL WASTE SITES
Most sites undergoing decommissioning are expected to be below the threshold, so that
most licensing documents can be released. Sensitivity reviews must be conducted on
documents related to LLW storage, safety, and security systems and procedures. Reviews
should focus on determining if the information contained in these documents could be
useful to an adversary in planning a terrorist act. Examples include the location and
security arrangements for high-activity waste, the location of highly activated components,
or the transportation security arrangements for high-activity waste or activated
components.
Attachment 2
Page 11 of 19
For fuel cycle, materials, and spent fuel pool and independent spent fuel storage
installation (ISFSI) licensees that are undergoing decommissioning, issues that are not
unique to decommissioning (such as descriptions of plant processes, vulnerability/security
assessments, etc.) should be reviewed with regard to Appendices 1, 3, and 4, respectively.
A. Descriptions of Facilities Where Licensed Material May Be Located
- Withhold information identifying the exact locations of radioactive material. For
example, detail drawings or maps of facilities, room numbers and locations, and specific
locations of waste storage/processing operations.
- Withhold design information that could reasonably be expected to be useful to potential
adversaries. Examples include detailed drawings or maps showing the locations of
security measures/operations and infrastructure, locations of critical site infrastructure
(electrical or power systems), and the design of facilities that could be useful in
developing approaches to breech the facility.
- For transportation package information provided in connection with decommissioning or
LLW disposal licensing, consider Appendix 4 for sensitivity of the information.
No additional guidance for decommissioning and low-level waste sites for other categories.
Attachment 2
Page 12 of 19
APPENDIX 3 - - REVIEWS OF MEDICAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND ACADEMIC USERS OF
NUCLEAR MATERIALS (NRC CONTACT: DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL AND MEDICAL
NUCLEAR SAFETY (IMNS), NMSS)
A. Descriptions of Facilities Where Licensed Material May Be Located (above the thresholds in
Table 1)
(1) Copies of Licenses and Mailing Lists
- Copies of licenses: Release authorized radionuclides and form. Withhold authorized
quantities. Withhold manufacturers and model numbers of sealed sources and devices.
Withhold information which identifies buildings or rooms where radioactive material is
located (this may be in the license condition specifying authorized location).
- Withhold mailings lists which are compiled for security purposes or identify high risk
facilities or vulnerable facilities.
- Release individual mailing addresses, and street address where material is located
(normally included on licenses).
(2) Locations of radioactive material
- Withhold lists of authorized or actual inventories of radionuclides.
- Withhold building numbers and room numbers (other than mailing addresses) or similar
information which identify locations of material.
- Withhold site drawings which identify individual buildings on the licensee site.
- Withhold building drawings which identify the location of radioactive material, or onsite
pathways or routes to and from locations of radioactive material.
- Release individual mailing addresses and street addresses.
(3) Design/description of structures/equipment/operating procedures (site specific)
- Most descriptions of structures/equipment/procedures may be released if they are not
security-related.
- Withhold drawings of buildings/rooms/devices where radioactive material is located.
- Withhold manufacturers and model numbers of sealed sources and devices.
- Withhold information on security programs, guards, access controls, key cards, alarms,
barriers, chains, locks, etc.
B. Design Information (non-site specific) - Sealed Source and Device Catalog
- Release information on addresses of manufacturers/distributors.
- Establish a password system for users with a valid need-to-know, and who have agreed
to protect the information from unauthorized disclosure.
Attachment 2
Page 13 of 19
C. Emergency Planning/Fire Protection Information
- Release general descriptions of emergency procedures for safety related events, such
as radioactive material spills, releases, contamination, and fires.
- Withhold information on routes to and from locations of radioactive material.
- Withhold information related to responses to security events and malevolent events.
- Withhold information on responses of offsite law enforcement officials.
- Withhold information designated by State or local governments as sensitive.
D. Security Program Information
- Certain security information at specified facilities is already designated as Safeguards
Information and should continue to be withheld and protected accordingly.
- In addition to withholding Safeguards Information, withhold any security information
related to malevolent events or which could be useful to potential adversaries.
Examples as given in Section A above: information on guards, access controls, key
cards, alarms, barriers, chains, locks, etc.
E. Vulnerability/Security Assessments/Accident Analyses
- No additional guidance for medical, industrial, and academic users of nuclear material
for this category.
Attachment 2
Page 14 of 19
APPENDIX 4 - - SPENT FUEL/TRANSPORTATION REVIEWS (NRC CONTACT: SPENT
FUEL PROJECT OFFICE (SFPO), NMSS)
A. Descriptions of Facilities Where Licensed Material Be Located
Subject
Discussion and/or typical controls
10 CFR Part 72 Specific ISFSI
Licenses and General Licenses
- Text descriptions of the
following: general description,
site characteristics, principal
design criteria, storage cask
design, operations, waste
management, radiation
protection, accident analyses,
conduct of operations, operating
controls and limits, and quality
assurance
Uncontrolled - Information provided to the NRC for
specific ISFSI licenses and general licenses typically
consists of analyses to show that the design feature will
withstand the combinations of forces associated with
design basis events and natural hazards. The analyses
do not typically provide realistic information on the failure
of structural features and are not considered sensitive.
10 CFR Part 72 Specific ISFSI
Licenses and General Licenses
- Drawings and locations of
related hazards
Potentially Controlled - Decisions regarding the control of
information that show the plant site and buildings are
dependent on the level of detail. Information clearly
visible from locations accessible to the public near the site
is generally released. This includes general (low-
resolution) layout drawings of the site and adjacent areas.
Drawings showing details such as the specific locations of
equipment within buildings, doorways, stairways, storage
areas, etc. are to be withheld under 10 CFR 2.390(d).
Drawings showing locations of hazards in relation to the
ISFSI are also withheld. A text description of the hazards
in relation to the ISFSI is uncontrolled and will not be
reviewed.
10 CFR Part 72 Specific ISFSI
Licenses and General Licenses
- Nearby industrial,
transportation, and military
facilities
Controlled - Information related to non-nuclear facilities
located near the ISFSI such as pipeline data (usually
withheld per DOT) and chemical facilities (some data
withheld per EPA) is controlled. Other information may
be protected by other federal agencies (e.g., DHS, FERC,
10 CFR Part 72 Specific ISFSI
Licenses and General Licenses
Uncontrolled - Information related to radionuclides, form,
and quantities
Lists of licensees registered to
use NRC-approved 10 CFR Part 71 transportation packages.
Withhold lists and associated letters required by 10 CFR 71.17(c)(3).
Attachment 2
Page 15 of 19
B. Design Information (non-site specific): Transportation Packages, and Spent Fuel Casks
Subject
Discussion and/or typical controls
10 CFR Part 71 Transportation
Package Descriptions Text
Descriptions Including
Radionuclide Form, Content and
Quantity
Uncontrolled - Information provided to the NRC typically
consists of analyses to show that the design feature will
withstand the combinations of forces associated with
design basis events and natural hazards. The analyses
do not typically provide realistic information on the failure
of structural features and are not considered sensitive.
Text descriptions regarding the design of transportation
packages do not need to be controlled for 3 basic
reasons: 1) Part 71 does not authorize possession of
byproduct, source or special nuclear material, 2) package
design information is required for commerce both
domestically and internationally, and 3) the information
that could reasonably be expected to be useful to
terrorists in planning or executing an attack for
transportation packages containing large quantities of
byproduct, source or special nuclear material is controlled
by other means (e.g., route controls, escort requirements,
etc., in accordance with Commission Orders, interim
compensatory measures or other applicable
requirements).
10 CFR Part 71 Drawings
Potentially Controlled - Withhold diagrams showing
detailed design information. Do not withhold drawings
which have already been made public through FOIA
requests, hearings, rulemakings, or other public forums.
10 CFR Part 71 Transportation
Quality Assurance Program
Plan Descriptions
Uncontrolled - An entity wishing to use or fabricate an
approved transportation package must submit a
description of its quality assurance program to the NRC.
This submittal is assigned a 10 CFR Part 71 docket and
reviewed and approved by the staff. The QA program
description typically does not contain the type of
information found in the generic criteria that would cause
it to be controlled. In addition, filing and approving a QA
program description does not authorize possession of
byproduct, source, or special nuclear material.
10 CFR Part 71 Package
Information related to
radionuclides, form and
quantities
Uncontrolled
Attachment 2
Page 16 of 19
Subject
Discussion and/or typical controls
10 CFR Part 71 Advance
Notification of Shipments of
Irradiated Reactor Fuel and
Nuclear Waste
NSIR has programmatic responsibility for reviewing and
controlling this information. 10 CFR 71.97 requires
advance notifications to the governor of a State, or the
governors designee, of certain shipments of high-risk
radioactive material.
10 CFR Part 72 Dry Cask
Storage Systems -Certificates of
Compliance (COC) safety
analysis report information
Uncontrolled - Information provided to the NRC typically
consists of analyses to show that the design feature will
withstand the combinations of forces associated with
design basis events and natural hazards. The analyses
do not typically provide realistic information on the failure
of structural features and are not considered sensitive.
Text information in the safety analysis report including
design information is not controlled for the following
reasons: 1) the design of the casks are simple by nature
and the criteria for which they are designed are widely
known; 2) most casks designs involve storage of the
casks in open areas on concrete pads that are often
readily seen from offsite locations; and 3) this information
has been historically released to the public to support
rulemaking for approved cask designs, and other public
outreach efforts.
10 CFR Part 72 Dry Cask
Storage Systems -Drawings
Potentially Controlled - Withhold diagrams showing
detailed design information. Do not withhold drawings
which have already been made public through FOIA
requests, hearings, rulemakings, or other public forums.
10 CFR Part 72 Package
Information related to
radionuclides, form and
quantities
Uncontrolled
Attachment 2
Page 17 of 19
C. Emergency Planning Information
Subject
Discussion and/or typical controls
10 CFR Part 72 Specific ISFSI
Licenses and General Licenses
- Emergency Planning
Potentially Controlled - Incoming documents are initially
profiled as nonpublic - staff will review for release upon
request. Most information related to emergency planning
will not need to be designated as sensitive. Special
attention is needed to determine if information relates to
the response by a licensee or government agency to a
terrorist attack. Note that some State and local
governments consider parts of their emergency plans to
be sensitive.
D. Security Program Information
Subject
Discussion and/or typical controls
10 CFR Part 72 Specific ISFSI
Licenses and General Licenses
- Security
Potentially Controlled - Information related to security
programs is generally designated as SGI or SGI-M and is
protected in a manner similar to classified confidential
information. Security-related information within the
inspection and oversight program is withheld from public
disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(d).
E. Vulnerability/Security Assessments/Accident Analyses/Risk Assessments
Subject
Discussion and/or typical controls
Vulnerability/Security
Assessments for:
-
transportation package
designs
-
10 CFR Part 72 dry cask
storage systems
-
independent spent fuel
storage installations (ISFSI)
Controlled - Vulnerability/security assessments to
determine the ability of transportation packages, dry cask
storage systems, or ISFSIs to withstand events from
malevolent acts have been and will continue to be
withheld from public disclosure.
Attachment 2
Page 18 of 19
APPENDIX 5 - - EXPORT/IMPORT LICENSING (NRC CONTACT: OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP)
- Withhold information on authorized quantities or actual inventories of radionuclides,
above the thresholds in Table 1, mixed oxide materials, and enriched uranium above 6%
U-235. Release information identifying radionuclides and form.
- For quantities above the thresholds in Table 1, mixed oxide materials, and enriched
uranium above 6% U-235, withhold information on projected or actual shipment
schedules, delivery dates, date required, mode of transport, storage arrangements, or
any other related logistical information provided by the licensee in the application or
added by the NRC.
Attachment 2
Page 19 of 19
Table 1: Radionuclide Screening Threshold Values
Radionuclide
Quantity of
Concern1 (TBq)
Quantity of
Concern2 (Ci )
0.06
1.6
0.06
1.6
0.02
0.54
Cm-244
0.05
1.4
0.03
0.81
0.1
2.7
1
27
0.08
2.2
Pm-147
40
1100
0.06
1.6
Pu-239/Be
0.06
1.6
Se-75
0.2
5.4
1
27
Tm-170
20
540
Yb-169
0.3
8.1
Combinations of
radioactive materials listed
above3
See Footnote
Below4
1 The aggregate activity of multiple, collocated sources should be included when the total
activity exceeds the quantity of concern.
2 TBq values are the regulatory standard and the Curie values are rounded to two significant
figures.
3 Radioactive materials are to be considered collocated if breaching a common physical security
barrier (e.g., a locked door at the entrance to a storage room) would allow access to the
radioactive material or devices containing the radioactive material. For sources installed in
devices, each device should be considered a separate location.
4 If several radionuclides are aggregated, the sum of the ratios of the activity of each source, I
of radionuclide, n, A(i,n), to the quantity of concern for radionuclide n, Q(n), listed for that
radionuclide exceeds one. [(aggregated source activity for radionuclide A) ÷ (quantity of
concern for radionuclide A)] + [(aggregated source activity for radionuclide B) ÷ (quantity of
concern for radionuclide B)] + etc........ >1
Attachment 3
Page 1 of 3
Recently Issued NMSS Generic Communications
Date
GC No.
Subject
Addressees
2/11/05
BL-05-01
Material Control and Accounting at
Reactors and Wet Spent Fuel
Storage Facilities
All holders of operating licenses for
nuclear power reactors, decommissioning
nuclear power
reactor sites storing spent fuel in a pool,
and wet spent fuel storage sites.
11/23/05
Control of Radiation Dose to
Visitors of Hospital Patients
All medical licensees.
11/14/05
Clarification of the Reporting
Requirements in
All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
licensees and Part 76 certificate holders
authorized to possess licensed material.
11/08/05
NRC Timeliness Goals,
Prioritization of Incoming License
Applications and Voluntary
Submittal of Schedule for Future
Actions for NRC Review
All 10 CFR Parts 71 and 72 licensees
and certificate holders.
10/28/05
Requirements for the Physical
Protection During Transportation of
Moderate and Low Strategic
Significance: 10 CFR Part 72 vs.
Regulatory Guide 5.59 (1983)
All holders of licenses for the possession
of special nuclear material (SNM) that
ship Category II and III quantities of this
material.
10/07/05
Clarification of the Physical
Presence Requirement During
Gamma Stereotactic Radiosurgery
Treatments
All gamma stereotactic radiosurgery
(GSR) licensees.
09/27/05
Rev. 1
Revised Decay-in-Storage
Provisions for the Storage of
Radioactive Waste Containing
Byproduct Material
All licensees regulated under 10 CFR Parts 30, 32, 33, 35, 39, and 50.
08/25/05
Guidance for Establishing and
Maintaining a Safety Conscious
Work Environment
All licensees, applicants for licenses,
holders of certificates of compliance, and
their contractors subject to NRC authority
08/10/05
Issuance of NRC Management
Directive 8.17, Licensee
Complaints Against NRC
Employees
All licensees and certificate holders.
08/03/05
Reporting Requirements for
Damaged Industrial Radiographic
Equipment
All material licensees possessing
industrial radiographic equipment,
regulated under 10 CFR Part 34.
Attachment 3
Page 2 of 3
Date
GC No.
Subject
Addressees
07/13/05
NRC Incident Response and the
National Response Plan
All licensees and certificate holders.
07/11/05
Transportation of Radioactive
Material Quantities of Concern
NRC Threat Advisory and
Protective Measures System
Licensees authorized to possess
radioactive material that equals or
exceeds the threshold values in the
Additional Security Measures (ASM) for
transportation of Radioactive Material
Quantities of Concern (RAMQC) under
their 10 CFR Part 30, 32, 50, 70, and 71
licenses and Agreement State licensees
similarly authorized to possess such
material in such quantities under their
Agreement State licenses.
07/11/05
Requirements for Power Reactor
Licensees in Possession of
Devices Subject to the General
License Requirements of 10 CFR 31.5
All holders of operating licenses for
nuclear power reactors and generally
licensed device
vendors.
06/10/05
Performance-Based Approach for
Associated Equipment in 10 CFR 34.20
All industrial radiography licensees and
manufacturers and distributors of
industrial radiography equipment.
04/18/05
Reporting Requirements for
Gauges Damaged at Temporary
Job Sites
All material licensees possessing
portable gauges, regulated under 10 CFR Part 30.
04/14/05
Guidance on the Protection of
Unattended Openings that
Intersect a Security Boundary or
Area
All holders of operating licenses or
construction permits for nuclear power
reactors,
research and test reactors,
decommissioning reactors with fuel on
site, Category 1 fuel cycle
facilities, critical mass facilities, uranium
conversion facility, independent spent
fuel storage
installations, gaseous diffusion plants,
and certain other material licensees.
02/28/05
10 CFR Part 40 Exemptions for
Uranium Contained in Aircraft
Counterweights - Storage and
Repair
All persons possessing aircraft
counterweights containing uranium under
the exemption in
11/17/05
Potential Non-conservative Error in
Preparing Problem-dependent
Cross Sections for use with the
KENO V.a or KENO-VI Criticality
Code
All licensees using the KENO V.a or
KENO-VI criticality code module in
Version 5 of the Standardized Computer
Analyses for Licensing Evaluation
(SCALE) software developed by Oak
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL).
10/31/05
Inadequate Test Procedure Fails
to Detect Inoperable Criticality
Accident Alarm Horns
All licensees authorized to possess a
critical mass of special nuclear material.
10/07/05
Low Dose-Rate Manual
Brachytheraphy Equipment
Related Medical Events
All medical licensees.
Attachment 3
Page 3 of 3
Date
GC No.
Subject
Addressees
07/29/05
Inadequate Criticality Safety
Analysis of Ventilation Systems at
Fuel Cycle Facilities
All licensees authorized to possess a
critical mass of special nuclear material.
06/23/05
Manual Brachytherapy Source
Jamming
All medical licensees authorized to
possess a Mick applicator.
05/17/05
Potential Non-conservative Error in
Modeling Geometric Regions in
the
Keno-v.a Criticality Code
All licensees using the Keno-V.a criticality
code module in Standardized Computer
Analyses for Licensing Evaluation
(SCALE) software developed by Oak
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)
05/17/05
Excessively Large Criticality Safety
Limits Fail to Provide Double
Contingency at Fuel Cycle Facility
All licensees authorized to possess a
critical mass of special nuclear material.
04/07/05
Changes to 10 CFR Part 71
Packages
All 10 CFR Part 71 licensees and
certificate holders.
040/01/05
Results of HEMYC Electrical
Raceway Fire Barrier System Full
Scale Fire Testing
All holders of operating licenses for
nuclear power reactors, except those who
have
permanently ceased operations and have
certified that fuel has been permanently
removed
from the reactor vessel, and fuel facilities
licensees.
03/10/05
Improving Material Control and
Accountability Interface with
Criticality Safety Activities at Fuel
Cycle Facilities
All licensees authorized to possess a
critical mass of special nuclear material.
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public website at
http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.