ML082381250
| ML082381250 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/08/2008 |
| From: | Lochbaum D Union of Concerned Scientists |
| To: | James Trapp Plant Support Branch 1 |
| References | |
| Download: ML082381250 (6) | |
Text
Union of Concerned Scientists Citizens and Scientists for Environmental Solutions August 8,2008 James M. Trapp, Chief Plant Support Branch 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415 Re:
ALLEGATION OF FAILURE TO EVALUATE TRUSTWORTHINESS AND RELIABILITY FOR PERSON(S) WITH UNESCORTED ACCESS TO INDIAN POINT ENERGY CENTER
Dear Mr. Trapp:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commissions regulations (specifically including, but not limited to, 10 CFR Part 26, and 10 CFR 73.56) require that, among other things, individuals granted unescorted access to protected and vital areas of NRC-licensed nuclear power reactors be trustworthy and reliable. The reason seems obvious.
Because neither trustworthy nor reliable is defined in 10 CFR part 26 or 10 CFR Part 73, the factors determining whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy and reliable are found in licensees implementing procedures and cases where licensees and/or NRC have determined individuals lacking.
Dominion, which operates a large fleet of reactors and therefore must decide the trustworthiness and reliability of the thousands of individuals working at these sites, requires its workers to report arrests and convictions:
Virginia Power Administrative Procedure VPAP-0105, Fitness For Duty Program, Revision 13, requires that all individuals subject to the Virginia Power Nuclear Fitness for Duty Program shall report to supervision any felony or misdemeanor conviction and any arrest which may impact trustworthiness. This includes all arrests, except for trafJic offenses for which the individual is released afer signing a summons.
1 Letter dated October 3 1,2000, fiom Kenneth P. Barr, Chief - Plant Support Branch, Dvision of Reactor Safety, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 11, to David A. Christian, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Virginia Electric and Power Company, NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-280/00-08, 50-28 UOO-08 and Office of Investigations Report No. 2-200-013.
Washington Office: 1825 K Street NW Suite 800 0 Washington DC 20006-1232 0 202-223-6133 FAX: 202-223-6162 Cambridge Headquarters: Two Brattle Square Cambridge MA 02238-9105 617-547-5552 FAX: 617-864-9405 California Office: 2397 Shattuck Avenue Suite 203 Berkeley CA 94704-1567 510-843-1872 FAX: 510-843-3785
I August 8,2008 Page 2 of 6 Exelon, which operates an even larger fleet of reactors employing an even larger population of workers, has a similar requirement:
Individuals are required to report arrests and other issues that may impair their fitness-for-duty.
Turning to case law, there are numerous examples where individuals were sanctioned by licensees and/or the NRC for failing to divulge pertinent information so that formal evaluations of how it affects their trustworthiness and reliability could be made. The examples include:
The NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to an individual in July 2008 for an apparent violation of the deliberate misconduct rule for allegedly failing to provide complete and accurate information on an application for unescorted access to the Hatch nuclear plant in Georgia.
The NRC sanctioned another individual in June 2008 for failing to report an arrest on an application for unescorted access to the Hatch nuclear plant (still in Georgia). The NRC reported:
On January 25, 2006, as part of a Request for Unescorted Access Authorization to SNC s Hatch Nuclear Plant, you deliberately provided inaccurate information regarding your criminal history. Specijkally, in response to a question contained on the Williams Plant Services form entitled Reinstatement Personal History Questionnaire, section entitled Personal History Data, Criminal History, you annotated (i, e., circled NO,) that since your last unescorted access status, you had not been held, detained, taken into custody, charged, arrested, indicted, fined, forfeited bond, cited, or convicted for a violation of any law, regulation or ordinance (e.g., felony, misdemeanor, traffic or military criminal history, etc.) or that you did not have such a case pending. However, as you described in your written response, you were arrested, detained, andor taken into custody (or had such a case pending;) on December 5, 2005, in Savannah, Georgia.
and Your actions caused the SNC to be in violation of Access Authorization program objectives in 10 CFR 73.56@)(1), which is to provide high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute and unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public.
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- Letter dated February 1 1,2008, from Charles G. Pardee, Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Generation Company and/or AmerGen Energy Company, to Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Exelon Generation Company, LLC/AmerGen Energy Company LLC, 60-Day Response to NRC Bulletin 2007-0 1, Security Officer Attentiveness.
Letter dated July 3,2008, from Luis A. Reyes, Regional Administrator, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to Anthony R. Fortuna, IA-07-069, Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) NRC Office of Investigations Report No. 2-2006-035 (Hatch Nuclear Plant).
Letter dated June 6, 2008, from Luis A. Reyes, Regional Administrator, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 11, to Stanley Swans, Notice of Violation (NRC Office of Investigations Report No. 2-2007-05).
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August 8,2008 Page 3 of 6 Last December, Duke informed the NRC that:
A vendor contract employee (Subject) was reinstated (31 to 365 Days) by Duke for the CNS [Catawba Nuclear Station] Unit 2 Outage on 09/13/07.... Subject did not self-disclose any arrests to the vendor contractor company, so no potentially disqualifiing information (PDO was identiyed that required adjudication by Duke.... When the Subjects reinvestigation results were obtained by Duke on 10/24/07, it was recognized that Subject had an outstanding warrant and an arrest record that had not been reviewed.
0 Last November, the NRC reported that:
The Confirmatory Order will be issued to Mr. Keith Davis, former Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES). This action relates to an incident that occurred on June 27, 2007, when Mr, Davis reported to work and failed to report an arrest which occurred on June 19, 2007, for driving under the influence of alcohol, coincident with a single motor vehicle accident. Mr. Davis SRO license and site access was immediately terminated and he was assigned other duties.
Subsequently, his employment at SSES.was terminated.
Last September, the NRC reported that:
01 substantiated that a former contractor at FP&L willfully failed to report an arrest to FP&L, in violation of licensee procedures. Because it was concluded that FP&L did not violate procedures and had no knowledge of the arrest before it was reported, no enforcement action is being taken against FP&L. However, it was noted during 01 interviews that a number of employees with unescorted access at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, indicated that they too were unaware of a requirement to report an arrest to FP&L. It is a fundamental tenet of the Access Authorization program that badged employees understand and adhere to these requirements. I The common thread among these, and related, cases is the failure of individuals to report incidents that raised potential doubts about their trustworthiness and reliability so that proper evaluations could be performed regarding the issuance or revocation of their unescorted access privileges.
Letter dated December 20,2007, from James R. Morris, Vice President, Duke Energy, to Nuclear Regulatory Memo dated November 26,2007, from the Staff, Nuclear Regulatory Commission to the Chairman and Commission, Special Security Report 4 13/2007-S02, Rev. 0.
Commissioners, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, EN-07-064.
Letter dated September 28,2007, from Steven J. Vias, Chief - Reactor Projects Branch 3, Division of Reactor Projects, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 11, to J. A. Stall, Senior Vice President Nuclear and Chief Nuclear Officer, Florida Power and Light, St. Lucie Nuclear Plant: Alleged Failure to Report an Arrest by a Florida Power and Light (FP&L) Contractor at St. Lucie Nuclear Plant (Office of Investigations Case Number 2-2007-006).
August 8,2008 Page 4 of 6 In January 2006, the NRC issued an Order requiring that backup power for emergency sirens be provided by January 30,2007. The NRC subsequently relaxed the deadline to April 15, 2007.9 When the licensee failed to comply with the Order, the NRC proposed first a $130,000 civil penalty and later a $650,000 civil penalty. l1 Along the way to these civil penalties, the NRC assembled ample evidence to question the trustworthiness and reliability of individuals. When NRC denied the licensees second request for an extension to the orders deadline,12 the staff stated:
As part of the request, Entergy discussed the difJulties encountered in achieving reliable operation in the radio-only activation mode. The NRC staff evaluated the factors presented in the request, as well as Entergys ability to have reasonably foreseen dificulties which impacted the completion date of April 15, 2007. Additionally, the NRC staf evaluated the extent to which the factors described by Entergy were within its control. The NRC concludes that these factors were known or should have been known bv Enterpv at the time the first extension was reauested. Therefore, inasmuch as Entergy has not demonstrated good cause, the NRC denies Entergys request for a relaxation of the Order. [emphasis added]
Factors that individuals knew or should have known that caused this licensee to not demonstrate good cause and, as a direct consequence, violate an NRC Order. That would certainly seem to raise doubt about the trustworthiness and reliability of these individuals.
The doubt does not stem from a single bad event, but rather from a recurring series of bad events. After the NRC imposed the initial $130,000 fine in April 2007:
On May 23,2007, Enterpv resuonded to the NOV and committed to Aupust 24,2007, as the latest date to declare the new ENS svstem and its associated backuu Dower suuulv as operable. The NRC evaluated Entergys response to the NOVand the additional information it gathered at the July 9, 2007, public meeting and issued the Order to formalize the commitments in Entergy s NO V response by making them regulatory requirements. [emphasis added]
- Confirmatory Order Modifying License dated January 3 1,2006, by J. E. Dyer, Director - Ofice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, EA-05-1 90.
Letter dated January 23,2007, from J. E. Dyer, Director - Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to Michael R. Kansler, President - Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., EA-05-1 90, Relaxation of Implementation Date for NRC Confirmatory Order (EA 190) - Emergency Notification System Backup Power for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3.
lo Letter dated April 23,2007, from Samuel J. Collins, Regional Administrator, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to Michael R. Kansler, President - Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., EA-07-092 and EA 190, Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty - $130,000 and Additional Requirement to Provide Information - (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 3 and 3) (Failure to meet NRC Confirmatory Order (EA 190) - Emergency Notification System Backup Power).
l 1 Letter dated January 24,2008, from Martin J. Virgilio, Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Waste, Research, State, Tribal, and Compliance Programs, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to Michel A. Balduzzi, Senior Vice President & COO, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., EA-08-006, Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty - $650,000, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3.
l2 Letter dated April 13, 2007, from J. E. Dyer, Director - Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to Michael R. Kansler, President - Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., EA 190, Response to Entergy Letter Regarding NRC Confirmatory Order (EA 190) - Emergency Notification System Backup Power for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3.
August 8,2008 Page 5 of 6 The repeated failure to honor commitments (recall that the January 2006 Order by the NRC was confirmatory in nature because the licensee formally agreed to meet the January 2007, deadline and the NRCs January 2007 relaxation was confirmatory in nature because the licensee formally agreed to meet the April 15,2007, deadline) raises doubt after doubt about the trustworthiness and reliability of the individuals involved in the wrong-doing.
I allege that the individuals responsible for the ongoing violation of NRCs requirement regarding emergency sirens around the Indian Point Energy Center that resulted in over three-quarters of a million dollars in fines paid failed to report same to their managershupervisors and, as a result, formal determinations of whether their actions dropped their trustworthiness and reliability rankings below the level needed for unescorted access were not performed. Chopping up this long, run-on sentence into bit-sized elements:
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Individuals at Indian Point are responsible for recurring violations of NRC requirements.
The NRC has fined this licensee $780,000, so far, for those violations.
The NRCs fines are comparable to the arrests, convictions, and other issues warranting evaluation for trustworthiness and reliability.
The individuals did not report the incidents to their management.I3 The licensee failed to formally determine whether the trustworthiness and reliability issues warranted revocation of these individuals unescorted access.
The individuals are as culpable as the individuals at Hatch, Susquehanna, Catawba, and St. Lucie for not reporting incidents to management for access authorization determinations.
Apparently, an arrest for driving under the influence or trespassing constitutes potential grounds for revoking unescorted access to a nuclear power reactor. Consequently, persons are required to report arrests, convictions, and other issues to management so formal determinations on the need to revoke unescorted access privileges can be made.
Behavior leading to $780,000 in fines by the NRC clearly involves the same potential, and thus should invoke the same deliberative processes. But in this case at Indian Point, it did not.
l3 One might argue that management was already aware of the matter, since they paid the monies. But just as individuals arrested for DUI or jay-walking could not successfully argue that their management knew of their arrests since it was reported in the Police Blotter sections of the local newspapers, awareness from other channels does not eliminate the obligation on these individuals to report their incidents.
August 8,2008 Page 6 of 6 Having more than passing familiarity with NRCs allegation program: (a) I waive confidentiality, and (b) I insist that NRC not simply refer this matter back to the licensee. If the NRC lacks the wherewithal to investigate these serious charges itself, I request that the NRC refer the matter to the NRCs Office of the Inspector General (OIG). Experience has shown that OIG does not shirk its responsibilities and will take these issues seriously.
Sincerely, David Lo.chbaum Director, Nuclear Safety Project Union of Concerned Scientists 1825 K Street, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20006-1232