ML071350409

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Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01, Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures That Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients
ML071350409
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 05/07/2007
From: Joyce T
Public Service Enterprise Group, Public Service Electric & Gas Co
To:
Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR/ADRO
References
GL-07-001, LR-N07-0095
Download: ML071350409 (4)


Text

PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 0 PSEG Nuclear LLC 10 CFR 50.54(f)

WFAyu 0 7 2O0l LR-N07-0 095 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-001 Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75 NRC Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311

Subject:

Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01, "Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients"

Reference:

Letter from Michael J. Case (NRC) to Addressees, "NRC Generic Letter 2007-01: Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients," dated February 7, 2007 On February 7, 2007, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 2007-01, "Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients" (i.e., Reference). The GL requested that all holders of operating licenses submit a written response within 90 days in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54, "Conditions of licenses," paragraph (f). The GL requested the following information.

(1)

Provide a history of inaccessible or underground power cable failures for all cables that are within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and for all voltage levels. Indicate the type, manufacturer, date of failure, type of service, voltage class, years of service, and the root causes for the failure.

(2)

Describe inspection, testing and monitoring programs to detect the degradation of inaccessible or underground power cables that support EDGs, offsite power, ESW, service water, component cooling water and other systems that are within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule).

412ý 95-2168 REV. 7/99

MAY 0 7 2M 7 Document Control Desk Page 2 LR-N07-0095 provides the PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) 90-day response to the requested information for Salem Nuclear Generating Station.

There are no regulatory commitments made in this letter. Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Jamie Mallon at (610) 765-5507.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on 517 01 bae Sincerely, Thomas P. Joyce Site Vice President Salem Generating Station Attachment (1)

C Mr. S. Collins, Administrator - Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. R. Ennis, Project Manager - Salem and Hope Creek Mail Stop 08B1 Washington, DC 20555-0001 USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - Salem X24 Mr. K. Tosch, Manager IV Bureau of Nuclear Engineering P. O. Box 415 Trenton, NJ 08625

ir ATTACHMENT 1 90-Day Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Salem Nuclear Generating Station On February 7, 2007, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 2007-01, "Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients." The GL requested that all holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors submit a written response within 90 days in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54, "Conditions of licenses," paragraph (f). The 90-day response to the information requested by the NRC in GL 2007-01 is provided below for Salem Nuclear Generating Station (SNGS).

NRC Request 1 Provide a history of inaccessible or underground power cable failures for all cables that are within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and for all voltage levels.

Indicate the type, manufacturer, date of failure, type of service, voltage class, years of service, and the root causes for the failure.

Response

A records review has been completed for cable failures at Salem Nuclear Generating Station. This review examined the plant corrective action program (both current and previous), Maintenance Rule (MR) database, maintenance records, interviews with cognizant personnel, and a review of the circuit and raceway schedules to identify power cable failures. None of the cable issues identified during the review were within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65. The scope of the review included alternating current power distribution cables with voltages from 230 VAC to 15,000 VAC. This represents our best effort in that data of this nature was not necessarily recorded in a means that was conducive to identifying cable failures.

SNGS has had no history of failures of inaccessible or underground power cables that are within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65.

NRC Request 2 Describe inspection, testing and monitoring programs to detect the degradation of inaccessible or underground power cables that support EDGs, offsite power, ESW, service water, component cooling water and other systems that are within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule).

Response

SNGS has had no history of failures of inaccessible or underground power cables that are within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65. As such, SNGS has not implemented a specific cable-monitoring program to assess the condition of its medium voltage cables.

1

iC ATTACHMENT 1 90-Day Response to NRC Generic Letter 2007-01 Salem Nuclear Generating Station A representative sample of cables are routinely monitored as part of Maintenance Procedure SH.MD-GP.ZZ-0011(Q), Meggering of Rotating Electrical Equipment. This tests power cables from the equipment motor windings to electrical switchgear for cable degradation based upon megger readings. Polarization Index (PI) testing for rotating equipment, greater than or equal to 4,160 VAC, is performed with the power feeder cable connected. If testing results are not within acceptance criteria, engineering would be notified and the corrective action process initiated. These tests are generally performed from the switchgear to the motor.

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