ML070610421
| ML070610421 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades, Wolf Creek, River Bend, Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 12/07/2006 |
| From: | Kane W NRC/EDO |
| To: | Borchardt R, Caldwell J, Collins S, Dyer J, Mary Johnson, Kane W, Mallett B, Reyes L, Silber J, Travers W, Virgilio M, Zimmerman R NRC/EDO, NRC/EDO/AO, Office of New Reactors, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, Region 1 Administrator, Region 2 Administrator, Region 3 Administrator, Region 4 Administrator |
| References | |
| G20061041 | |
| Download: ML070610421 (9) | |
Text
EDO Principal Correspondence Control FROM:
DUE: 06/28/07 William F.
- Kane, DEDR EDO CONTROL: G20061041 DOC DT: 12/07/06 FINAL REPLY:
CRC NO:
TO:
OD/RAs FOR SIGNATURE OF :
GRN Caldwell, RIII DESC:
ROUTING:
DEDR Direct Reports Meeting -Next Meeting of DEDR Reports DATE: 12/21/06 Reyes Virgilio Kane Silber Johnson Cyr/Burns Bloomer, OEDO ASSIGNED TO:
RIII CONTACT:
Caldwell SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:
Prepare memo to W.
J.
Caldwell, RIII.
of DEDR reports.
- Kane, DEDR for the signature of Address plans for next meeting
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UNITED STATES 3
.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
. RWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 December 7, 2006 MEMORANDUM TO: Those on Attached List
/
FROM:
William F. Kane i,
Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs Office of the Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
NOVEMBER 15, 2006, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR REACTOR AND PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS DIRECT REPORTS MEETING
SUMMARY
The Fall Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs (DEDR) Direct Reports Meeting (DRM) was held at the National Conference Center in Lansdowne, Virginia, on Wednesday, November 15, 2006. The meeting participants discussed: Operator/ Plant Performance Issues, Best Practices, and Personnel. A summary of the key discussion points in each area is provided below; the action items identified, as a result of the meeting, are enclosed.
OPERATOR / PLANT PERFORMANCE ISSUES The session on Operator/Plant Performance Issues included discussion of operator performance issues at Ginna, Palisades, and River Bend and plant technical issues such as the pressurizer cracking issue at Wolf Creek.
Ginna On April 18, 2005 at Ginna, while at 100% power, both trains of standby auxiliary feedwater (AFW) flow transmitters were found isolated. Ginna had entered Mode 3 on April 8, 2005, for a routine startup after a refueling outage. The transmitters were restored to their normal operational alignment promptly when the condition was identified. These two standby AFW trains are in addition to the typical safety-related AFW motor driven pump trains and turbine driven pump train, for a total of five safety-related AFW pump trains at the site. The two standby AFW trains are designed to address a high energy line break (HELB) event which would disable the other three AFW pump trains. Both of the flow transmitters perform several functions including control room indication of standby AFW discharge flow and valve control functions for the pump discharge valve and pump recirculation valve. With the flow transmitters isolated in both trains of the standby AFW system, an unanalyzed condition existed due to the following: during a postulated HELB, the inoperable flow transmitters would result in the recirculation valve and the pump discharge valve being both full open. Under a steam generator (SG) low pressure condition, as a result of the HELB, with flow through both the open discharge valve and the open recirculation valve, the pump would be in a high flow rate condition until the SG level was recovered. The operators would have no indication of flow through the discharge valves and would be operating the system based on SG level. During the time assumed for the intact SG level recovery, the breaker for the pump motor could be expected to exceed its time delayed current protection setpoint and trip the motor, preventing delivery of feedwater to the SG. Both trains of the standby AFW system are allowed by Technical Specifications to be concurrently inoperable for a period of up to 7 days. The actual inoperability occurred over 10 days while the flow transmitters were isolated. Ginna did not report the event at the time the isolated transmitters were discovered because the transmitters' control function was not recognized to interact in an unanalyzed manner with the resulting unavailable control room indication, concurrent with the low pressure SG condition associated with the HELB event.
Palisades On November 1, 2006, Palisades commenced a technical specification (TS) required shutdown due to a service water leak in the cooling coil of a Containment Air Cooler. On November 3, after repairing the leak, while the unit was in mode 2, control room operators were proceeding with plant startup when the NRC resident inspector discovered that all trains of AFW pump automatic actuation controls were in "MANUAL" configuration. Plant TS requires all three AFW pump automatic actuation controls to be placed in "AUTO" when the plant is in mode 1, 2, or 3.
Immediately after discovering this improper system alignment, both trains of AFW pump controls were placed in "AUTO" mode. The licensee believes that the pump controls had been placed in "MANUAL" on November 1 during TS-required shutdown. A Region III senior reactor analyst completed a simplified plant analysis risk (SPAR) model event assessment using a transient initiating event and failure of the AFW to respond in "AUTO". The assessment resulted in a preliminary incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP) value of approximately 1 E-6. In accordance with Management Directive 8.3, "NRC Incident Investigation Procedure", the incident met MD 8.3 criterion h, "involved questions or concerns pertaining to licensee operational performance." Accordingly, based on the deterministic and risk criteria in MD 8.3, and as provided in Regional Procedure 8.31, "Special Inspections at Licensed Facility," a special inspection team (SIT) commenced an inspection on November 6, 2006. The special inspection will determine the sequence of events, and will evaluate the facts, circumstances, and the licensee's actions surrounding the November 1 and 3, 2006, incidents.
The SIT Charter is available in ADAMS with Accession number ML063110635.
River Bend On October 19, 2006, River Bend Station was operating at 100% power with the reactor core isolation cooling system out of service for maintenance. The at-the-controls operator was attempting to correct a paper jam in a chart recorder when the paper drive mechanism fell out of the recorder. The paper drive mechanism bounced several times striking the open pushbutton for one of the long-cycle recirculation valves and the close pushbuttons for both the 7A and 7B feedwater isolation valves. These 24-inch motor-driven gate valves take about 3.5 minutes to close. Therefore, initially there were no alarms, position indication, or plant response to the valve closure. As the valves closed, feedwater was reduced to the reactor resulting in a low reactor vessel water level (Level 3) automatic reactor scram. The shrink in boiling margin following the scram resulted in water level reaching Level 2, wherethe high pressure core spray system actuated and injected to the vessel for approximately 2 minutes until operators closed the system injection valve in accordance with system operating procedures.
The recovery from the scram was complicated by actions of the control room operators. A control room operator failed to place the Mode Switch into the "Shutdown" position in accordance with the immediate actions of the reactor scram off-normal operating procedure, and the control room supervisor failed to verify that this action was complete as required by emergency operating procedures. Failure to immediately place the mode switch in Shutdown resulted in a main steam isolation on low reactor vessel pressure that would normally have been blocked by the mode switch. Closure of the main steam isolation valves requires operators to control reactor pressure with the safety relief valves and results in entry into both the containment pressure and suppression pool level emergency operating procedures.
Following these actions, high reactor vessel water level (Level 8), and the associated system isolations, was reached several times caused by uncoordinated safety relief valve actuation for pressure control.
Region IV personnel performed an MD 8.3 evaluation to determine the need for reactive inspection. The Regional Administrator decided to charter a Special Inspection Team because the event involved questions or concerns pertaining to licensee operational performance, and the conditional core damage probability was initially estimated to be 3 x 10-Q by the senior reactor analyst and 3 x 10-5 by the licensee.
Wolf Creek Ultrasonic Testing (UT) inspection in mid-October of dissimilar metal welds at Wolf Creek Generating Station identified five circumferential flaws on pressurizer nozzle-to-piping dissimilar metal welds. The UT results indicated that all the flaws originate at or near the weld inside surface. The largest flaw was located on an 8" diameter nozzle-to-safe-end weld in a Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) line. It measured 7.7" in length on the inside surface and was characterized as about 30% through wall. The surge nozzle weld contained three flaws and one of the safety nozzle welds contained a flaw. The licensee concluded that the flaws are most probably due to primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC). The flaws found at Wolf Creek are significantly larger and more extensive than previously seen in the industry. The staff is currently assessing whether a more aggressive inspection schedule is needed throughout the fleet rather than the current schedule being implemented under an industry program for managing degradation referred to as the "Materials Reliability Program: Primary System Piping Butt Weld Inspection and Evaluation Guidelines (MRP-139)". Wolf Creek is one of the few licensees that has performed examinations of the pressurizer dissimilar-metal welds before applying corrective weld overlays. A qualified inspection cannot be performed on most of these welds without first applying a weld overlay. MRP-1 39 guidelines require that the welds either be inspected or made inspectable through mitigation, such as weld overlays. The significant flaws found at Wolf Creek could have an impact on other licensees who have not yet completed inspections or who have delayed their mitigative weld overlays. The NRR Technical Staff (DCI) will be discussing the need for more urgent generic action than currently recommended under MRP-1 39. Wolf Creek completed its baseline inspections and weld overlay repairs per industry guidance (MRP-139) during the Fall 2006 refueling outage Wolf Creek had previously inspected the other dissimilar metal welds, such as in the hot leg and cold leg reactor vessel nozzle welds.
BEST PRACTICES This session included discussion of best practices related to communication, incident response, operational, Regional State Liaison Officers, Significant Determination Process (SDP), and training. Best practices identified in each area are provided below.
Communication Goal is to develop processes and forums to foster an open communication among all regional divisions regarding plant status, lesson-learned, operational experience, management decisions and priority items and items of interest for the licensee and public.
Incident Response Goal is to ensure the agency is prepared to respond to reactor or material events by utilizing consistent and effective best practices in program oversight, training, maintaining a response roster of qualified individuals, maintaining a full time regional duty -officer and exercise coordinator.
Operational Develop guides, documents and procedures for residents and supervisors for containment tours, conducting PI & R inspections and referencing generic communications in inspection procedures, emphasize operating experience and generic technical issues (e.g. DB head event), resources (reorganize DRP branches having similar reactor types, fill gaps during resident turnover), and site visits where managers conduct walk down areas and reinforce inspection techniques to inspectors during these visits.
Regional State Liaison Officer Maintain the primary Regional State Liaison Officer (RSLO) function as a direct report to the Regional Administrator. Designate the RSLO as the Regional Assistance Committee representative. Attend the National Radiological Emergency Preparedness (NREP) conference on an annual basis to promote communication between the RSLOs and NREP attendees.
RSLOs conduct Congressional District outreach activities in their respective regional office.
Staff the position with individuals who are highly experienced in the NRC and/or the industry.
Sicgnificance Determination Process This was a follow-up on the next steps after completion and issuance of the Best Practice memorandum from Region IV. Best Practices include managing SDP timeliness and metrics and tying SDP results properly to enforcement; using a modified Phase 2 estimation for the risk assessment in lieu of a full-scale Phase 3 analysis; and implementing early engagement of the SRA, NRR risk personnel and regional management to develop defendable risk-based decisions and inspection findings.
Traininq This was a follow-up on the next steps after completion and issuance of the Best Practice memorandum from Region II. Implementing processes and procedures for new employee orientation and training; providing a reference or training syllabus for new supervisors/team leaders for successful transition into supervision and utilizing a "continuous learning process" by developing a core curriculum which progressively builds on the mandatory Supervisory Core Courses; maintaining knowledge transfer; establishing and maintaining a training coordination/council; developing a Reassignment Training Plan and Checklist to identify training and qualification activities; developing construction inspection program training; and developing a method to monitor and report regional and divisional performance against average hours and percentage of employees meeting the goal.
PERSONNEL The session on Personnel included sharing appraisal results, SES certification plans and schedule, regional SES succession planning, and developmental assignments/rotations for SES leaders.
ACTION ITEMS We discussed the next areas for Best Practices review. Enclosed are the actions items, primary owners of the actions, and tentative due dates as a result of the meeting.
Enclosure:
Action Items from DEDR Direct Report November 15, 2006 Meeting
ACTION ITEMS FROM DEDR DIRECT REPORTS NOVEMBER 15, 2006 MEETING T1itle Deqip-tin b
werD~t (tent.)
Primary Water NRR provide a RAs/NRR December 2006 Stress Corrosion regulatory approach Cracks (Dissimilar with schedules.
metal welds, Regions be prepared MRP139) to provide NRR with site information on pressurizer inspections.
Operator issues, Issuing Information NRR with support March 2007 including mode sw.,
Notice to share from other Regions fuel moves, etc regional examples with the industry.
Materials Inspection Develop a materials Region I, with June 2007 and Licensing Best best practices for support from other Practices inspector Regions,FSME, observations using NMSS Reactor Oversight best practices as a model. Coordinate with Agreement States TIA Best Practices Streamline Reactor NRR with support November 2007 TIA Process and from Regions, NSIR, include NMSS TAR NMSS, and FSME process.
PI&R inspections Gather and publish Rill June 2007 info on best practices for PI&R Security inspections Identify best ways for NSIR June 2007 by Resident Residents to be more Inspectors sensitive to security issues and more involved in security inspection at sites.
ISI activities Best Practices for ISI RII June 2007 inspection, training, tools, procedures Enclosure
TiOE
_ DescrlipoPn Owner Due by (tent.)
Communication Focus on how to get NSIR June 2007 w/allegers on better (more security issue, and complete) feedback openness to allegers on security issues. Also look at how openness can be improved for the security area.
Retention and Continue on with BP RIV June 2007 Recruitment Best project with insight Practices from SLM workshops Guidance from OCA Get guidance from DEDR/DEDMRT June 2007 on working with OCA on areas for Congressional focus.and extent of Offices in District interaction with Offices Congressional Offices CDMP goals in Discuss and clarify DEDR June 2007 operation plans CDMP goals in operating plans and how to link measurement data to the target (i.e. 40%
on agency recruitment teams are minorities)
Exit interviews for Review process for HR June 2007 staff leaving the exit interviews, how agency to get the information needed to know why they are leaving, discuss in the context of retention Next meeting of Plan next meeting of RIII w/OEDO support June 2007 DEDR reports DEDR reports
MEMORANDUM TO THOSE ON THE ATTACHED LIST DATED: December 7, 2006
SUBJECT:
NOVEMBER 15, 2006 DEDR DIRECT REPORTS MEETING
SUMMARY
E-Mail Mail Stops Luis A, Reyes, Executive Director for Operations RidsEdoMailCenter William F. Kane, Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs, OEDO RidsEdoMailCenter Martin J. Virgilio, Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Research, State and Compliance Programs, OEDO RidsEdoMailCenter Jacqueline E. Silber, Deputy Executive Director for Information Services and Administration and Chief Information Officer, OEDO RidsEdoMailCenter Michael R. Johnson, Assistant for Operations, OEDO RidsEdoMailCenter R. William Borchardt, Director, Office of New Reactors RidsNroOd James E. Dyer, Director,- Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation RidsNrrWpcMail Roy P. Zimmerman, Director, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response RidsNsirMailCenter Samuel J. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region I RidsRgnl MailCenter William D. Travers, Regional Administrator, Region II RidsRgn2MailCenter James L. Caldwell, Regional Administrator, Region III RidsRgn3MailCenter Bruce S. Mallett, Regional Administrator, Region IV RidsRgn4MailCenter