ML050620498
| ML050620498 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 03/03/2005 |
| From: | Morgan M NRC/NRR/DRIP/RLEP |
| To: | Nuclear Management Co |
| Morgan M, NRR/NRC/DRIP/RLEP, 415-2232 | |
| References | |
| Download: ML050620498 (10) | |
Text
March 3, 2005 LICENSEE:
Nuclear Management Company, LLC FACILITY:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING HELD ON FEBRUARY 15, 2005, BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC) STAFF AND NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS THE POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION On February 15, 2005, the NRC staff met with members of Nuclear Management Company, LLC (the applicant) in a public meeting to discuss the license renewal application (LRA) for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The application was submitted by letter dated February 25, 2004. A listing of attendees is provided in Enclosure 1, and the meeting agenda is provided in Enclosure 2. A summary of the RAIs discussed with the applicant, including a brief description on the status of the items, are provided as Enclosure 3.
The applicant had an opportunity to comment on this summary.
/RA/
Michael J. Morgan, Project Manager License Renewal Section A License Renewal and Environmental Impacts Program Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/encls: See next page
March 3, 2005 LICENSEE:
Nuclear Management Company, LLC FACILITY:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING HELD ON FEBRUARY 15, 2005, BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC) STAFF AND NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSS THE POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION On February 15, 2005, the NRC staff met with members of Nuclear Management Company, LLC (the applicant) in a public meeting to discuss the license renewal application (LRA) for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The application was submitted by letter dated February 25, 2004. The list of attendees is provided in Enclosure 1, and the meeting agenda is provided in Enclosure 2. A summary of the RAIs discussed with the applicant, including a brief description on the status of the items, are provided as Enclosure 3.
The applicant had an opportunity to comment on this summary.
/RA/
Michael J. Morgan, Project Manager License Renewal Section A License Renewal and Environmental Impacts Program Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/encls: See next page DISTRIBUTION: See next page Adams Accession No.: ML050620498 DOCUMENT NAME:E:\\Filenet\\ML050620498.wpd OFFICE:
LA:RLEP PM:RLEP PM:RLEP PM:RLEP SC:RLEP NAME:
MJenkins VRodriguez GSuber (VMR for)
MMorgan SLee DATE:
03/01/05 03/03/05 03/03/05 03/01/05 03/03/05 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 cc:
Jonathan Rogoff, Esq.
Vice President, Counsel & Secretary Nuclear Management Company, LLC 700 First Street Hudson, WI 54016 Mr. Frederick D. Kuester President and Chief Executive Officer We Generation 231 West Michigan Street Milwaukee, WI 53201 James Connolly Manager, Regulatory Affairs Point Beach Nuclear Plant Nuclear Management Company, LLC 6610 Nuclear Road Two Rivers, WI 54241 Mr. Ken Duveneck Town Chairman Town of Two Creeks 13017 State Highway 42 Mishicot, WI 54228 Chairman Public Service Commission of Wisconsin P.O. Box 7854 Madison, WI 53707-7854 Regional Administrator, Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 801 Warrenville Road Lisle, IL 60532-4351 Resident Inspector's Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 6612 Nuclear Road Two Rivers, WI 54241 Mr. Jeffrey Kitsembel Electric Division Public Service Commission of Wisconsin P.O. Box 7854 Madison, WI 53707-7854 David Weaver Nuclear Asset Manager Wisconsin Electric Power Company 231 West Michigan Street Milwaukee, WI 53201 John Paul Cowan Executive Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer Nuclear Management Company, LLC 700 First Street Hudson, WI 54016 Douglas E. Cooper Senior Vice President - Group Operations Palisades Nuclear Plant Nuclear Management Company, LLC 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043 Fred Emerson Nuclear Energy Institute 1776 I Street, NW., Suite 400 Washington, DC 20006-3708 Roger A. Newton 3623 Nagawicka Shores Drive Hartland, WI 53029 James E. Knorr License Renewal Project Nuclear Management Company, LLC 6610 Nuclear Road Point Beach Nuclear Plant Two Rivers, WI 54241
DISTRIBUTION: Note to Licensee: Nuclear Management Company, Re: Summary of meeting held on February 15, 2005 to discuss Point Beach, Dated: March 3, 2005 Adams Accession No.: ML050620498 HARD COPY RLEP RF E-MAIL:
RidsNrrDrip RidsNrrDe G. Bagchi K. Manoly W. Bateman J. Calvo R. Jenkins P. Shemanski J. Fair RidsNrrDssa RidsNrrDipm D. Thatcher R. Pettis G. Galletti C. Li K. Winsberg (RidsOgcMailCenter)
R. Weisman M. Mayfield A. Murphy S. Smith (srs3)
S. Duraiswamy Y. L. (Renee) Li RLEP Staff P. Lougheed, RIII J. Strasma, RIII A. Stone, RIII H. Chernoff W. Ruland C. Marco L. Raghavan T. Mensah OPA MEETING ATTENDANCE LIST - FEBRUARY 15, 2005 Name Organization Jim Knorr Doug Johnson Mark Ortmayer John Thorgersen Steven Schellin Brad Fromm Todd Mielke Vijay Goel Duc Nguyen Kurt Cozens Paul Shemanski James Strnisha Hansraj Ashar Martin Murphy Frank Talbot Richard McIntyre Greg Galletti Devender Reddy Chang Li Naeem Iqbal Daniel Merzke Michael Morgan Gregory Suber Veronica Rodriguez Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC)
NMC NMC NMC NMC NMC NMC Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC MEETING BETWEEN THE NRC STAFF AND NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION FOR POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND ROOM 04-B4 PROPOSED AGENDA FEBRUARY 15, 2005 Time - 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
I.
Introduction/Opening remarks 9:00 am. - 9:10 a.m.
II.
Discussion of unresolved issues associated 9:10 a.m. - 10:30 a.m.
with the Division of Inspection Program Management (DIPM) methodology review III.
Discussion of unresolved issues associated with 10:30 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.
the Division of Systems Safety and Analysis (DSSA) scoping and screening results review IV.
Break 12:00 p.m. - 1:00 p.m.
V.
Discussion of unresolved issues associated with 1:00 p.m - 2:30 p.m.
the aging management reviews VI.
Discussion of unresolved issues associated with 2:30 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.
the time-limited aging analyses REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION Aging Management of Electrical and Instrumentation and Controls RAI 3.6.2.1.3 Phase bus (480 VAC, 4160 VAC, and 13.8 KVAC Power Systems): Information Notices 89-64, 98-36, and 2000-14 provide examples that underscore the safety significance of bus ducts and the potential problems that can arise from age-related bus component failures. Please explain why the aging management program (AMP) for bus ducts is not necessary. If needed, the AMP must address the following aging effects: oxidation, loosening of bolted connections due to thermal cycling, corrosion due to moisture, embrittlement, cracking, melting, discoloration, swelling or loss of dielectric strength of bus duct insulating materials (if applicable) leading to reduced insulation resistance and dielectric strength. The AMP should check bolted connections for proper torque. A periodic visual inspection of the bus duct is needed to inspect for signs of insulation cracking, corrosion, debris, excessive dust buildup, evidence of moisture and water intrusion, or discoloration of insulation which may indicate overheating. The internal bus supports should also be inspected for structural integrity and signs of cracks. If visual inspection of the whole bus assembly can not be performed, appropriate electrical tests should be conducted on a periodic basis to assess its condition for aging degradation.
Discussion: Based on the discussion, the applicant will provide their formal response in writing.
Aging Management Programs - Cable Condition Monitoring RAI B2.1.8-1 Question 2: On Page B-84 of the PBNP LRA, purposes and an exception to the definition of
?significant moisture. The GALL Report defines ?significant moisture as ?periodic exposure to moisture that lasts more than a few days (e.g., cable in standing water). The PBNP LRA (page B-84) states that, ?Prolonged exposure to significant moisture is defined as exposures to significant moisture that last more than a few years (e.g., cable in standing water).
The LRA supports this alternative definition based on a logic that includes consideration of:
- Use of moisture resistant cables Reduced likelihood for water treeing in lower voltage cables Installation of cables not using less susceptible installation material Minimize expose to moisture While the NRC staff understands that these antidotal attributes suggest that water treeing would be minimized in these cables, the LRA does not provide any quantified test data supporting this alternate definition. Furthermore, the NRC staff understands that cables managed by this AMP are made by two manufactures and that one cable type is expected to perform better than the other because it has used a later technology. Please provide to the NRC staff manufacturer or laboratory test results for both types of cables that support a conclusion that water treeing would not occur if the cables were immersed in water for five or more years.
The LRA states that:
?Manhole flooding and groundwater intrusion has been a long standing issue at PBNP and efforts were periodically taken to reduce the exposure of medium-voltage cables to water. In order to better understand the magnitude of the groundwater intrusion problem into the electrical manholes, a new call-up to inspect and pump the flooded manholes was initiated. The new call-up periodically inspects and pumps down the electrical manholes, as necessary. As part of the new call-up, the approximate water level in each manhole is recorded. The recording of the water level will provide the basis for any future changes in frequency to the call-up and any deletion of manhole inspections.
The PBNP activities to better manage the manhole flooding and groundwater intrusion is a positive step in managing the potential for treeing. However, it has been the NRC staffs experience that just eliminating water in the manholes does not provide reliable information about the presence of water or moisture in the inaccessible regions in conduits or where cables are buried. Therefore, based on the information contained in the LRA, it is not possible to determine if water or moisture is present in the inaccessible areas, even if the manholes are regularly drained. Please provide information that supports a lack of water in the inaccessible areas once the manholes have been drained. Alternatively, provide information documenting how PBNP will assure that the cables can not be immersed in water for more than a few days.
If this data is not available, please consider the use of the GALL Report definition for
?significant moisture?
Discussion: Based on the discussion, the applicant will provide their formal response in writing.
Aging Management of Containments, Structures, and Components Supports RAI 3.5-4 In discussion of Item 3.5.1-12 in Section 3.5.2.2.1.4, the applicant notes that the liner corrosion has been found in both the PBNP Units due to borated water leakage, and that the applicant is performing Subsection IWE augmented inspections in this areas. The applicant is requested to provide a quantitative summary of extent of liner corrosion found in each unit, and the corrective actions taken. The applicant is requested to include a discussion of acceptable liner plate corrosion before it is reinstated to its nominal thickness.
Discussion: Based on the discussion, the applicant will provide their formal response in writing.
RAI 3.5-5 The further evaluation in Section 3.5.2.2.1.3 associated with line Item 3.5.1-27 (Table 3.5.1) of the LRA indicates that the reactor cavity cooling sub-system maintains acceptable ambient temperature at the primary shield and reactor vessel support structure. The applicant is requested to provide the following information related to the concrete temperatures and monitoring activities in the primary shield and reactor vessel support areas for PBNP Units 1 and 2:
- a. The operating experience related to the functioning of the reactor cavity cooling sub-system including a range of temperatures maintained between the reactor vessel and the primary shield wall, and at the reactor vessel support, and means of monitoring these temperatures;
- b. If a separate cooling system is installed to cool the primary shield wall concrete, provide the operating experience related to the functioning of this system, and means used to monitor the primary shield concrete temperatures; and
- c. A summary of the results of the last inspection performed in these areas, such as concrete cracking, spalling, pop-outs, etc.
Discussion: Based on the discussion, the applicant will provide their formal response in writing.
TLLA Support Activities - Pre-stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program RAI B3.3-1 Scope of Program: The title of the program is Prestressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program, that includes inspection of tendon wires, tendon corrosion protection medium, tendon anchorages, and monitoring of tendon prestressing forces. The scope element only includes monitoring of tendon prestressing forces part of the tendon surveillance.
For the sake of consistency with the scope, the title of the program should be Prestressed Concrete Containment Tendon Force Monitoring Program. The applicant is requested to discuss this inconsistency.
Discussion: Based on the discussion, the applicant will provide their formal response in writing.
RAI B3.3-2 Preventive Actions: In order to ensure that the tendon prestressing forces are not affected by age related degradation, it is essential that the tendons and their anchorages are not prone to corrosion. Ensuring the coverage of the tendons by qualified corrosion protection medium, and preventing ingress of water from the anchorage areas are the preventive measures. The staff recognizes that these aspects are covered under IWL inspections, the preventive measures need be identified in this program, may be through referencing Sections of B2.1.2 Program.
The applicant is requested to justify the lack of this discussion in this program element.
Discussion: Based on the discussion, the applicant will provide their formal response in writing.
RAI B3.3-3 The staff finds a reference to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and Section 1.4 of the PBNP FSAR acceptable as corrective action process and documentation requirements for Corrective Actions program element. However,Section X.S1 of NUREG-1801, which has been quoted as reference for this program, recommends the corrective actions to be taken as follows: If acceptance criteria are not met, then either systematic retensioning of tendons, or a reanalysis of the containment is warranted to ensure the design adequacy of the containment. The applicant is requested to provide information to justify why the program specific corrective actions should not be added to this element description.
Discussion: Based on the discussion, the applicant will provide their formal response in writing.
RAI B3.3-4 In Section 15.3.1 of Appendix A of the LRA, the applicant summarizes the program, together with the relevant time limited aging analysis (Section 4.5 of the LRA). The applicants description is qualitative. For the summary to be meaningful, as a minimum, the applicant should provide a Table showing the minimum required prestressing forces and the projected (to 60 years) prestressing forces for each group of tendons which would demonstrate the validity of the program and the corresponding TLAA results. The applicant is requested to supplement this information in Section 15.3.1 of the UFSAR Supplement.
Discussion: Based on the discussion, the applicant will provide their formal response in writing.
TLAA - Loss of Preload RAI 4.5-1 The use of 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii) and (iii) is appropriate for concrete containment tendon prestress TLAA. However, the staff need to assess the plant specific operating experience regarding the residual prestressing forces in the containments and the methods used to arrive at the projected prestresses forces. Based on the analysis performed as per 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii), the applicant is requested to provide the following information:
- a. The estimated upper and lower bound lines, and the minimum required prestressing forces for each group of tendons for each containment.
- b. Trend lines of the projected prestressing forces for each group of tendons based on the regression analysis of the measured prestressing forces (see NRC Information Notice 99-10 for more information). Also, show the actual measured prestressing forces that were used to obtain the trend lines.
- c. Plots showing comparisons of prestressing forces projected to 40 years and 60 years with the minimum required prestress (or MRV) for each group of tendons for each containment.
Discussion: Based on the discussion, the applicant will provide their formal response in writing.
RAI 4.5-2 In Section 15.3.1 of Appendix A of the LRA, the applicant notes the Prestressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program, as an activity related to this TLAA. The applicants description is qualitative. For the summary to be meaningful, as a minimum, the applicant should provide a Table showing the minimum required prestressing forces and the projected (to 60 years) prestressing forces for each group of tendons which would demonstrate the validity of the program and the corresponding TLAA results. The applicant is requested to supplement this information in Section 15.3.1 of Appendix A of the UFSAR Supplement.
Discussion: Based on the discussion, the applicant will provide their formal response in writing.
Aging Management Program B2.1.7 - Buried Services Monitoring Program RAI B2.1.7-1 The program indicates that buried components within the program scope are coated per industry practice prior to installation. Although the AMP references industry practice what bases were used by the plant to confirm that all buried services within the program scope were required to be coated at the plant? If such documentation does not exist, how is reasonable assurance established that program components are all coated in light of the limited related operating experience.
Discussion: Based on the discussion, the applicant will provide their formal response in writing.
Scoping and Screening Methodology RAI 2.1.1 The PBNP LRA and page 13 of LR-TR-514 did not adequately define short term exposure duration for low and moderate energy piping failures covered under10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) that could affect safety related electrical equipment under the scope of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1).
Specifically, the staff found that some safety-related electrical equipment may exist in the turbine building or other parts of the plant and may be subject to harsh environments from low or moderate energy pipe breaks but are not environmentally qualified (EQ). Since this equipment may not be EQ, they could fail due to 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) piping failures.
The staff requests additional information to adequately define short term exposure duration for low and moderate energy piping failures and how it relates to scoping and screening of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) piping that could cause these types of failures.
Discussion: Based on the discussion, the applicant will provide their formal response in writing.
RAI 2.1.3 The PBNP LRA Section 2.1.2.1.2, pages 2-20&21, states, under Piping Supports, ?All NSR supports for non-seismic or Seismic II/I piping systems with a potential for spatial interaction with safety related SSC, will be included within the scope of license renewal per 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2). These supports will be addressed in a commodity fashion, within the civil/structural area review. As long as the effects of aging on the supports for these piping systems are managed, falling of piping sections, except for flow accelerated corrosion (FAC) failures, is not considered credible, and the piping section itself would not be in-scope for 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) due to physical impact hazard (although the leakage or spray may still apply).
The staff requests additional information to adequately describe why the falling of piping sections is not considered credible, and why the piping section itself would not be in-scope for 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) due to physical impact hazard. Please describe how the management of FAC relates to the scoping and screening of 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) Seismic II/I piping systems that could cause these types of failures.
Discussion: Based on the discussion, the applicant will provide their formal response in writing.
Steam and Power Conversion System - Feedwater and Condensate System RAI 2.3.4.2-4 In a letter dated November 16, 2004, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission'(NRC) requested additional information regarding the Auxiliary Systems (LRA Section 2.3.3) and Steam and other Balance of Plant (BOP) Systems in LRA Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 respectively. PBNP response to this request was submitted to the NRC in Nuclear Management Company, LLC letter dated December 22, 2004. The NRC review of the PBNP response to RAI 2.3.4.2-1 identified two follow-up questions regarding the scoping for the small bore branch piping from the NSR portion of the 16" main feed water header (FW) between the feed regulating valve and the downstream steam generator FW inlet check valve:
1.
Recognizing the NRC would not require a formal HELB evaluation be preformed on piping 1-inch and less, did PBNP perform any evaluation (i.e., walkdown, etc.) to confirm that a break in the branch piping would not impact any safety related equipment in the immediate vicinity of the possible break location?
2.
Please discuss flooding associated with a failure in the branch piping and its impact on safety related equipment.
Discussion: Based on the discussion, the applicant will provide their formal response in writing.
Aging Management of Auxiliary Systems RAI 3.3.2.1.6-1 LRA Table 3.3.2-6 refers to Notes J and 5 which describe the AMPs for certain fire protection component types as listed in the table. Provide justification for the conclusion specified in Note 5 that the aging management program(s) referenced are appropriate for the aging effects identified and provides assurance that the aging effects are effectively managed through the period of extended operation.
Discussion: Based on the discussion, this question will be deferred for clarification in a future conference call or a meeting.
RAI 3.3-6 Loss of preload is an aging effect for closure bolting in high temperature or high pressure systems. NUREG-1801, XI.M18, Bolting Integrity program provides aging management inspections for this aging effect. LRA section 3.3 for the auxiliary systems does not identify loss of preload as an aging effect for closure bolting. The applicant is requested to discuss why the loss of preload was not identified as an aging effects for auxiliary systems closure bolting and the inspections in NUREG-1801, XI.M18 were not credited for managing this aging effect. This RAI is also applicable for closure bolting in the ESF and SPCS.
Discussion: Based on the discussion, the applicant will provide their formal response in writing.
Pre-stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program The staff indicated that if the TLAA in Section 4.5.1 is performed using 10 CFR 54.21(c)(1)(ii),
the GALL AMP X.S1 is not required. Based on the discussion, the applicant decided to withdraw LRA Section B3.3. The applicant will provide their formal response in writing.