ML033250547

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Notification of Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Safety System Design and Performance Capability Inspection - NRC Inspection Report 05000348/2004006 and 05000364/2004006
ML033250547
Person / Time
Site: Farley  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 11/19/2003
From: Ogle C
NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB
To: Beasley J
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-04-006
Download: ML033250547 (6)


See also: IR 05000348/2004006

Text

November 19, 2003

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

ATTN: Mr. J. B. Beasley, Jr.

Vice President

P. O. Box 1295

Birmingham, AL 35201-1295

SUBJECT:

NOTIFICATION OF JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - SAFETY

SYSTEM DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY INSPECTION - NRC

INSPECTION REPORT 05000348/2004006 AND 05000364/2004006

Dear Mr. Beasley:

The purpose of this letter is to notify you that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Region II staff will conduct a safety system design and performance capability inspection at

your Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant during the weeks of January 26-30, 2004, and February

9-13, 2004. A team of six inspectors will perform this inspection. The inspection team will be

led by Mr. McKenzie Thomas, a Senior Reactor Inspector from the NRC Region II Office. This

biennial inspection will be conducted in accordance with baseline inspection program

Attachment 71111.21, Safety System Design and Performance Capability.

The inspection will evaluate the capability of installed plant equipment to detect and respond to

a steam generator tube rupture event. Procedures which direct the mitigating actions for this

event will also be evaluated.

During a telephone conversation on November 19, 2003, Mr. Thomas of my staff, and

Mr. Phil Crone of your staff, confirmed arrangements for an information gathering site visit and

the two-week onsite inspection. The schedule is as follows:

Information gathering visit: Week of January 5-9, 2004

Onsite inspection weeks: January 26-30, 2004 and February 9-13, 2004

The purpose of the information gathering visit is to obtain information and documentation

outlined in the enclosure needed to support the inspection. Mr. Walter Rogers, a Region II

Senior Reactor Analyst, may accompany Mr. Thomas during the information gathering visit to

review probabilistic risk assessment data and identify risk significant components which will be

examined during the inspection. Please contact Mr. Thomas prior to preparing copies of the

materials listed in the Enclosure. The inspectors will try to minimize your administrative burden

by specifically identifying only those documents required for inspection preparation.

During the information gathering visit, the team leader will also discuss the following inspection

support administrative details: office space; specific documents requested to be made

available to the team in their office space; arrangements for site access; and the availability of

knowledgeable plant engineering and licensing personnel to serve as points of contact during

the inspection.

2

SNC, Inc.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. If you have any questions regarding the

information requested or the inspection, please contact Mr. Thomas at (404) 562-4673 or me at

(404) 562-4605.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its

enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document

Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system

(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-

rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Charles R. Ogle, Chief

Engineering Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos.: 50-348, 50-364

License Nos.: NPF-2, NPF-8

Enclosure:

Information Request for the Safety System Design and

Performance Capability Inspection

cc w/encl.:

M. J. Ajluni, Licensing

Services Manager, B-031

Southern Nuclear Operating

Company, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution

D. E. Grissette

General Manager, Farley Plant

Southern Nuclear Operating

Company, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution

J. D. Woodard

Executive Vice President

Southern Nuclear Operating

Company, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution

(cc w/encl contd - See page 3)

3

SNC, Inc.

(cc w/encl contd)

State Health Officer

Alabama Department of Public Health

RSA Tower - Administration

Suite 1552

P. O. Box 303017

Montgomery, AL 36130-3017

M. Stanford Blanton

Balch and Bingham Law Firm

P. O. Box 306

1710 Sixth Avenue North

Birmingham, AL 35201

William D. Oldfield

Quality Assurance Supervisor

Southern Nuclear Operating Company

Electronic Mail Distribution

Distribution w/encl:

F. Rinaldi, NRR

L. Slack, RII EICS

RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB

PUBLIC

OFFICE

RII:DRS

RII:DRS

RII:DRP

SIGNATURE

RA

RA

RA

NAME

MThomas

JMoorman

BBonser

DATE

11/19/2003

11/19/2003

11/19/2003

11/ /2003

11/ /2003

11/ /2003

11/ /2003

E-MAIL COPY?

YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO

PUBLIC DOCUMENT

YES

NO

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\\ORPCheckout\\FileNET\\ML033250547.wpd

Enclosure

INFORMATION REQUEST FOR THE SAFETY SYSTEM DESIGN AND

PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY INSPECTION

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT

Note: Electronic media is preferred if readily available. (The preferred file format is

searchable .pdf files on CDROM. The CDROM should be indexed and hyperlinked to

facilitate ease of use. Please provide 6 copies of each CDROM submitted. Information

in lists should contain enough information to be easily understood by someone who

has a knowledge of pressurized water reactor technology.)

1.

Design basis documents for the engineered safety features and other systems used to

mitigate the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event. Design basis documents for

the high, intermediate, and low voltage electrical systems that power these components.

Design basis documents for pressurizer relief valves, secondary system relief valves,

atmospheric dump valves and turbine bypass valves. Include performance history of

these valves for the past 10 years.

2.

Piping and instrumentation drawings (P&IDs) for the reactor coolant system (RCS), high

pressure injection (HPI), safety injection (SI), auxiliary feedwater (AFW), chemical and

volume control system, main steam and other systems used to mitigate the SGTR

event. (Two paper copies are preferred for these)

3.

All procedures used to implement the mitigation strategy for the SGTR event. Include

alarm response procedures as well as normal, abnormal, and emergency operating

procedures (EOP) as appropriate. Also include the EOP users guide and EOP setpoint

document.

4.

Procedures used for the operational testing of check valves in the AFW system and

portions of the emergency core cooling systems used during mitigation of the SGTR

event.

5.

Surveillance procedures used to ensure the operability of equipment required by your

Technical Specifications that is used during the mitigation of the SGTR event.

6.

Summary results of the steam generator (SG) in-service inspection program.

7.

List of all temporary modifications and operator work-arounds (for the past 3 years)

involving any components required for detection or mitigation of a SGTR event.

8.

A list of major modifications completed in the past 5 years to components or systems

required for detection or mitigation of a SGTR event.

9.

A list of deferred modifications for any components required for detection or mitigation

of a SGTR event.

10.

System descriptions and operator training modules for the SGTR event and the systems

used to mitigate the event.

2

11.

List of operating experience program evaluations of industry, vendor, or NRC generic

issues related to a SGTR event.

12.

Procedures used to sample the RCS and SGs during a SGTR event.

13.

Calibration and functional testing procedures for radiation monitoring instrumentation

used to detect a SGTR event (e.g. main steam line, condenser air ejector, steam

generator blowdown, etc.).

14.

Calculations used to support the set points in EOPs for a SGTR event.

15.

Performance history of valves or support equipment used to isolate SGs in the event of

a tube rupture.

16.

Calibration and functional test procedures for instruments used to monitor RCS

pressure, pressurizer level and pressure, SG level and pressure, RCS hot leg and cold

leg temperatures, RCS subcooling, feedwater flow, steam flow, core exit temperature,

HPI flow, low pressure injection flow, refueling water storage tank level, pressurizer

heater status, safety relief valve position indicator, AFW flow, condensate storage tank

(CST) level, makeup flow, and letdown flow.

17.

Key electrical one-line drawings depicting the high, intermediate, and low voltage

alternating current systems and of the direct current power systems that provide power

for the pumps, valves, and instrumentation and control circuits associated with the

systems that accomplish the SGTR mitigation strategy. (Two paper copies are

preferred)

18.

Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) event tree for the SGTR event. A list of PRA

identified system dependencies and success criteria for systems used to mitigate a

steam generator tube rupture. Provide SGTR cutsets and risk achievement worths for

those basic events (only assuming a SGTR initiating event).

19.

A brief description of the mitigation strategy for handling the SGTR event, including

operator actions and equipment used.

20.

System health reports and/or other performance monitoring information for systems

used to detect and mitigate the SGTR event and their power supply systems.

21.

A list of condition reports and non-routine work requests initiated since 1998 related to:

1) the systems used to detect and mitigate the SGTR event and 2) inservice inspection

activities of steam generator tubes.

22.

Quality Assurance audits, self-assessments, and third party assessments performed on

the systems used to detect and mitigate a SGTR event.

23.

Maintenance Rule performance criteria for systems used to detect and mitigate the

SGTR event and their electrical power systems. A list of maintenance rule failures of

equipment and their power supplies that are used to detect or mitigate the SGTR event.

3

24.

Provide a list of equipment used to mitigate a SGTR that changes state or is manually

manipulated during implementation of the SGTR mitigation strategy and the indications

used by plant operators to make decisions during the event.

25.

Plant Technical Specifications, Bases, and Technical Requirements Manual

26.

A current copy of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

27.

Procedures that provide implementation guidance for the following programs: Corrective

Action Program, Maintenance Rule Program, and Operating Experience Program.