Text

Draft IR 05000302-02-005, on 06/24/02 - 07/12/02, for Crystal River, Unit 3, Triennial Baseline Inspection of the Fire Protection Program
	ML033020031
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	10/10/2003
From:	Ogle C; NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB
To:	Young D; Florida Power Corp
References
	FOIA/PA-2003-0358 IR-02-005
	Download: ML033020031 (23)
	v • d • e

_'FA RED&

t;FUNITED

STATES

4

By

7op

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

M,,

A

{

REGION II

SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER

61 FORSYTH STREET SW SUITE 23TBS

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

Mr. Dale E. Young, Vice President

Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA1 B)

ATTN: Supervisor, Licensing &

Regulatory Programs

15760 West Power Line Street

Crystal River, FL 34428-6708

SUBJECT:

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-302/02-05

Dear Mr. Young:

On July 12, 2002, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a triennial fire

protection inspection at your Crystal River Unit 3 Plant. The enclosed report documents the.

results of this inspection which were discussed on July 12, 2002, with you and .other members

of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed elected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel.

,/ he ,4cs

4 ;

g

Based on the resul

of this inspectio

e inspectors identified orreunresolved item, with three

examples,

failure to ensure hat one of the redundant trains of a system necessary to

achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions would be free of fire damage. The issue

remains unresolved pending NRC review of a technical analysis being performed by your staff

of local manual operator actions in response to a fire in these areas and subguont compIetien

ei fie si~cnncdztrminaticn p

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's 'Rules of Practice,' a copy of this letter and Its

enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document

Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's Document

1'

.

FPC

2

system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at http://www.nrc.gov/readinp-

rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

Charles R. Ogle, Chief

Engineering Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket No.: 50-302

License No.: DPR-72

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 50-302/02-05

w/Attachment

cc w/encl:

Daniel L. Roderick

Director Site Operations

Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C)

Electronic Mail Distribution

-Jon A. Franke

Plant General Manager

Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C)

Electronic Mail Distribution

S

.

Richard L. Warden

Manager Nuclear Assessment

Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C)

Electronic Mail Distribution

R. Alexander Glenn

Associate General Counsel (MAC - BT15A)

Florida Power Corporation

Electronic Mail Distribution

Attorney General

Department of Legal Affairs

The Capitol

Tallahassee, FL 32304

(cc w/encl cont'd - See page 3)

-

FPC

.1.

(cc w/encl cont'd)

William A. Passetti

Bureau of Radiation Control

Department of Health

Electronic Mail Distribution

Craig Fugate, Director

Division of Emergency Preparedness

Department of Community Affairs

.Electronic Mail Distribution

Chairman

Board of County Commissioners

_CitrusLCounty .___..

110 N. Apopka'Avenue

Inverness, FL 36250

3

Michael A. Schoppman

Framatome Technologies

Electronic Mail Distribution

Distribution

weenc:

RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB

PUBLIC

...

.

.. ..

.

.2. .t

-.t.;i;s

. r

OFFICE

RII:DRS

RiI:DRS

RII:DRP

RII:DRS

ISIGNATURE

NAME

B1LLINGS

MERRIWEATIH-ER

SMITH

WISEMAN

PAYNE

OGLE

DATE

8 / 02

8/ /02

8/02

8/ /02

/ /02

/ /8/

02

E.MAIL COPY?

YES NO

YES

NO

YES

NO

YES

NO

YES

NO

UNFFICAL htCUMU -U T

LJULUMEN I NAdME:

b:RLJM~ng Branc I Vworm MerwIiirev-.wpa

Report Details

1.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems

1 R05 FIRE PROTECTION

.01

Systems Required To Achieve and Maintain Post-Fire Safe Shutdown (SSD) and Post-

Fire SSD Circuit Analysis

a.

Inspection Scope

The team evaluated the licensee's fire protection program against applicable rules and

requirements, including Operating License Condition 2.(C).9, Fire Protection; Title 10 of

the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50 (10 CFR 50), Appendix R; Appendix A of

Branch Technical Position (BTP) Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch

(APCSB) 9.5-1; 10 CFR 50.48; related NRC Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs); and the

plant Technical Specifications (TS).

The team used the licensee's Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE)

-

;

and in-plant walkdowns tooselecfour risk significant fire areas for inspection. The four

-

fire areas selected were: :

.

.<

-

Fire Area 102: Fire Area 102 is the hallway and remote shutdown room on the

108' 0" elevation of the Control Complex. The area extends from the 108' 0"

elevation to the 124'

elevation and is shown on drawing 213-005, level 28. No

automatic fire suppression system is provided in this area and ionization

detectors have been installed in the area to provide for warning of fire for fire

brigade response.

A fire in this area would involve shutdown of the unit from the Main Control Room

(MCR) using Train B SSD equipment.

Fire Area 106: Fire Area 106 is Battery Charger Room 3A in the Control

Complex. The area extends from the 108' 0" elevation to the 124' 0" elevation

and is shown on drawing 213-005, level 28. The walls, floor, and ceiling are of

concrete construction and are considered to be rated as three-hour fire barriers.

No automatic fire suppression system is provided in this area and ionization

detectors have been installed in the area to provide for early warning of fire for

fire brigade response.

A fire in this area would involve shutdown of the unit from the MCR using Train B

SSD equipment.

Fire Area 107: Fire Area 107 is the 3B 4160 Volt Engineered Safeguard (ES)

switchgear room in the Control Complex. The area extends from the 108' 0'

elevation to the 124' 0" elevation and is shown on drawing 213-005, level 28. No

automatic fire suppression system is provided in this area and ionization

I F.1i

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket No:

License No:

50-302

DPR-72

Report No:

Licensee:

Facility:

Location:

50-3/2/02-05-

Florida Power Corporation (FPC)

Crystal River Unit 3

15760 West Power Line Street

Crystal River, FL 34428-6708

L . .

.

-

i:

'

Dates:

Inspectors:

June 24 - July 12, 2002

... . .

. ...

Accompanying

Personnel:

Approved by:

D. Billings, Resident Inspector, Oconee Nuclear Power Plant

N. Merger, Senior Reactor Inspector, Region II

G.

edanire Protection Inspector, Region II

C. Sfnith'P. E.J Senior Reactor Inspector, Region II (Lead Inspector)

M. K

dR

nt Inspector, V.C. Summer

N. Staples, Nuclear Safety Intern, Region II

C. Payne, Fire Protection Team Leader, Region II

Charles R. Ogle, Chief

Engineering Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

I

7W

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000302-02-05, Florida Power Corporation, on 06/24/2002 - 7/12/2002, Crystal River Unit

3, triennial baseline inspection of the fire protection program.

The inspection was conducted by three regional inspectors and the Oconee resident inspector.

The inspection identified one unresolved item. The significance of issues is indicated by their

color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609 "Significance Determination Process" (SDP).

Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be "Green" or be assigned a severity level after

NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of

commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process,"

- ------ Revision-3,-dated July 2000.

Inspector Identified Findings

-Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

TBD. An unresolved item was identified for failure to ensure in three fire areas that one

of the redundant trains of a system necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown

4'

conditions would be free of fire damage. Redundant electrical cables for redundant

O

U

makeup system valves MUV-23, 24, 25, and 26 were located in fire areas CC-108-102

and CC-108-107 without adequate spatial separation or fire barriers in accordan

withl0 CFR 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2. In the event of a severe fire intharea

fire damage to the unprotected cables could prevent opening of the valves from the

main control room which would require local manual operators actions to establish

adequate injection flow to the reactor coolant system and reactor coolant pump seals.

Also, redundant electrical cables for redundant emergency diesel generators (EDG).1A

and 1 B and makeup pumps 1 A,1 B, and 1 C were located in fire area CC-108-106

without adequate spatial separation or fire barriers. In the event of a severe fire in this

area, fire damage to these unprotected cables could prevent starting a makeup pump

from the main control room which would require local manual operator action to

establish adequate injection flow to the reactor coolant system and reactor coolant

pump seals. In addition, a fire in this area could result in a loss of both EDGs. This

finding is unresolved pending NRC review of a technical analysis being performed by

the licensee of local manual operator actions p response to a fire in these areas.

oubsequet comnplotion of the oig,ificnco 'termnatkn prees. The finding affects

the mitigating systems cornerstone only. (Section 1R05.01)

1-.

2

detectors have been installed in the area to provide for warning of fire for fire

brigade response.

A fire in this area would involve shutdown of the unit from the MCR using Train A

SSD equipment.

Fire Area 121: Fire Area 121 is the Control Complex heating, ventilation and air

conditioning (HVAC) area and is divided into four fire zones: 121A, 121 B, 121C

and 121D. The area extends from the 163' 0 elevation to the 186' 0' elevation

and is shown on drawing 213-005, level 28.

Ionization detectors are installed in

zones 121A, 121B, and 121C to provide for warning of fire for fire brigade

response. No detection is provided in zone 121D.

-

-Afire in this-area would involve alternate safe shutdown (ASD) of the unit from

the Remote Shutdown Panel Room and the redundant switchgear rooms using

Train B SSD equipment.

For a selected sample of SSD systems, components, and plant monitoring instruments,

the team reviewed the CR3 Appendix R Fire Study, applicable fire protection related

SERs, and system flow diagrams to evaluate the completeness and adequacy of the

CR3 Appendix R Fire Study and.the systems relied upon to mitigate fires in the selected'- -

fire areas. The inspection included review of the post-fire SSD capability and of the fire

protection features to-ensure that at least one post-fire SSD success path was

maintained free of fire damage.

'

?

-

~~.7,

^

..

.

.

..

The team examined cable routing, raceway drawings, the actual configuration of the

circuits, fire detection and alarm systems, manual fire suppression equipment, and the

electrical raceway fire barrier system (ERFBS) for conformance to applicable NRC

requirements and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards. In addition,

the team walked down these fire areas to verify that the licensee's documentation

reflected the as-built configuration.

On a sample basis, the team reviewed the licensee's CR3 Appendix R Fire Study to

determine whether redundant trains of components or circuits required for SSD were

located in the same fire area. From this review, the team selected makeup system

valves MUV-23, MUV-24, MUV-25, and MUV-26; makeup pumps MUP-lA, 1B, and C;

and emergency diesel generators EDG-1 A and 1 B to review the routing and installation

of the associated power and control cables. The team reviewed the cables to verify that

adequate spatial separation or proper fire barrier protection features were installed in

accordance with the design requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. Specifically, the

inspectors assessed whether fire-induced faults (e.g., hot shorts, open circuits, and

shorts to ground) could prevent safe shutdown.

Additionally, the team reviewed electrical coordination and protection data (e.g., circuit

breaker trip characteristics, fuse melt characteristics, and relay trip characteristics) for a

sample of SSD components to assess the adequacy of electrical protection provided

from non-essential cables or loads which share a common power source or enclosure

with cables of equipment required to achieve and maintain SSD conditions. Specific

.1;

3

components examined included: emergency feedwater valves EFV-1 1 and EFV-32;

pressurizer power actuated relief valve RCV-10; makeup system valves MUV-9 and

MUV-49; makeup pump MUP-C; air handling fans AHF-22C and AHF-22D; service

water pump SWP-1 C; and emergency diesel generator EDG-1 B.

b.

Findings

An unresolved item (URI) with three examples was identified, in that, some control

cables for components associated with the makeup pumps, EDGs, and selected valves

in the makeup flow path in three fire areas had not been protected from fire damage as

required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. This finding is unresolved pending NRC review of

a technical analysis being performed by the licensee of lgc6al manual operator actions in

response to a fire in these areas and zubsoquent corme!tin of tho cignificano

dotorminotizn procoss.

10 CFR 50.48, "Fire Protection," and Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, Fire Protection

Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979,' establish

specific fire protection features required to satisfy General Design Criterion 3,

Fire

Protections (GDC 3, Appendix Ato 10 CFR 50).Section III.G of Appendix R requires

fire protection features be provided for equipment important to safe shutdown. An

acceptable level of fire protection may be achieved by various combinations of fire

protection features (barriers; fire suppression systems, fire detectors, and spatial

.

separation of safety trains) delineated in Section III.G.2. For areas of the plant where

compliance with the technical requirements of Section III.G.2 can not be achieved, the.

licensee must either seek an exemption or deviation from the specific requirement(s) or.-

provide an ASD capability in.accordance with Sections lIl.G.3 and Ill.L of the regulation.

The use of local manual operator actions is not specifically addressed in Section II.G.2

as being an acceptable alternative method for meeting the requirements of this section.

The team found that the 108' 0" level of the Control Complex area contained cables for

redundant trains of SSD equipment. Because these redundant cables were located in

close proximity o each other, compliance with the fire protection requirements of

Appendix R, S/ction III.G.2 was required. The licensee had originally used Thermo-Lag

wraps

Wa pt to meet these requirements. But later when that material could not be

qualified for the appropriate fire rating, the licensee chose not to protect certain cables

in this area. Instead, the licensee developed an alternate fire response strategy which

procedurally directed local manual operator actions should control of the equipment be

lost from the MCR. The licensee did not develop an A

ethodology for this area.

Based on a review of cable routing informat provided by the licensee, the inspection

team determined that redundant electric

ables for redundant makeup system valves

MUV-23, 24, 25, and 26 were locatedj fire areas CC-108-102 [Example 1] and

CC-1 08-107 [Example 2]. While th

icensee considered the cables associated with this

equipment to be necessary for ac ieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions, the

team identified that the licensee did not provide adequate spatial separation or fire

barriers in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, III.G.2. Hence, in the event of a

severe fire in these areas, fire damage to the unprotected cables could prevent opening

of the valves from the MCR and challenge the operators' ability to establish adequate

injection flow to the reactor coolant system and reactor coolant pump seals.

im

1*

4

licensee creditedlocal mralat6-nsof theakeup~ systemvalvesp-ted in the

-Auxiliary.Building to throttle valves-MUV-23;-24':25-and 26to pr

man;p

TX

H

h,

es

The team also found that redundant electrical cables for redundant EDG-1A and 1 B and

makeup pumps MUP-lA, B, and 1C were located in fire area CC-108-106 [Example 3]

without adequate spatial separation or fire barriers installed in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, III.G.2. In the event of a severe fire in this area, fire damage to these

unprotected cables could prevent starting a makeup pump from the MCR and

subsequently challenge the operators' ability to establish adequate injection flow to the

reactor coolant system and reactor coolant pump seals. The licensee credited local

manual actions to restore makeup pump 1 C by operating the pump rpotor circuit breaker

at the switchgear (4KV ES Bus 31). In addition, a fire in this ar a c uld result in a loss

on both EDGs.a-ed , 4

X

This finding had a credible impact on safety, in that, during a fire that required shutdown

from the MCR, local manual operator actions would have to be performed in the plant in

order to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. These actions have not been

reviewed or approved by the NRC as being acceptable for meeting the III.G.2 criteria of

10 CFR 50, Appendix R. Nor have these actions been fully analyzed by the licensee for

timeliness, complexity, quantity, availability of manpower, human performance under

. .^. i.

high stress or risk. This finding only affects the mitigating system cornerstone.

A

.

Prior to the NRC's triennial fire protection inspection, the licensee conducted the

triennial assessment of its fire protection program in May 2002 (NAS Assessment C-FP-

02-01.) This evaluation identified that "some manual actions contained in OP-880A,

Appendix R Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Information, may not be in conformance with the

current NRC position regarding the use of manual actions to satisfy the requirements of

10 CFR 50, Appendix R." The licensee stated its position that changes to the approved

fire protection program could be made under 10 CFR 50.59 per CR-3 Operating Licence

Condition 2.(C).9 and that this was an industry-wide concern. The NRC and Nuclear

Energy Institute (NEI) have corresponded and met on several occasions to define this

issue and attempt to resolve it in a mutually agreeable manner. The licensee is tracking

the issue until the need for corrective action is furthei clarified.

The licensee also identified an issue involving the rigor/adequacy of the safety analyses

used to justify the addition of manual actions for certain Thermo-Lag protected circuits in

lieu of the circuit protection or separation as specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, III.G.2.

In general, the analyses lack sufficient information to determine if factors other than

emergency lighting and accessibility were considered in determining the acceptability of

the additional manual actions and that the changes would not adversely effect the

ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire" as required by the

CR-3 Operating License Condition 2.(C).9. These issues were entered into the

--- licensee's corrective action program in Non-Conformance Report (NCR) No. 61781.

(See section 1R05.11)

The examples in the finding described above represent situations where the licensee's

alternate fire response strategy could adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain

safe shutdown of CR-3 in the event of a fire. While the licensee had identified which

circuits were not adequately protected and had specified c

pensatory manual operator

actions, there was no comprehensive safety or risk anal is confirming the adequacy

these changes. Additionally, no new enhanced or exp

ded safety analyses of manual

operator actions were provided or available to the ins ectors during this inspection. The

safety characterization of this finding has not yet be n finalized. Therefore7 this finding

is unresolved pending licensee completion and N

review of a technic ~l analysis of

local manual operator actions (in response to firee

SBP-review. This finding will be tracked as URI 50-302/02-05-01, Failure to Protect One

Train of Safe Shutdown Equipment From Fire Damage in Accordance with Appendix R,

-- Section-III.G.2((Three Examples).-

The team also identified a condition that could result in possible delay in fire brigade

response to a fire event and hence, increase the risk associated with a fire in Fire Areas

102, 106 and 107. Fire service valve FSV-257 must be opened to supply water to the

fire hose stations in the Control Complex. This may be accomplished either by operator

action from the MCR or local manual action at a pull station within the Control Complex. 3i

The team identified that a fire in the Control Complex could potentially damage the

control and power cables for FSV-257. If the actuation cables for FSV-257 were

damaged by fire, then manual action outside the MCR would be required to open

V.

e

257 to align fire fighting water to the Control Complex fire brigade hose stations.

he

delay in opening this valve could result in an overall delay of over three minutes in fire

brigade response to a fire event. .The licensee documented this finding in their

..

corrective action program as NCR No. 065526.

2

.

t

..-

..:02

. Fire Protection of SSD Capability

a.

Inspection Scope

The team reviewed selected portions of the sife Fire Protection Plan (FPP), the Fire

Hazards Analysis (FHA) and fire prevention/combustible hazards control procedures to

determine if the objectives established by the licensee's commitments, as established in

the fire protection licensing basis documents, were satisfied. Using procedure SP-809

the team, accompanied by the site fire protection specialist, toured the selected fire

areas to observe whether the licensee limited fire hazards in a manner consistent with

the fire prevention/combustible hazards control procedures. Fire brigade response and

emergency/incident reports from 1999 through 2002, as well as corrective action

program Action Requests (ARs) resulting from fire, smoke, sparks, arcing, and

equipment overheating incidents were reviewed. This review was conducted to assess

the effectiveness of .the fire prevention program and to identify any maintenance or

material condition problems related to fire incidents. Additionally, design control

procedures were reviewed to verify that plant changes were adequately reviewed for the

potential impact on the fire protection program, SSD equipment, and procedures as

required by fire protection program.

Team members also walked down the selected fire areas to compare the associated fire

fighting pre-fire plans and drawings with as-built plant conditions. This was done to

verify that fire fighting pre-fire plans and drawings were consistent with the fire

protection features and potential fire conditions described in the FHA. Additionally, the

team reviewed drawings and engineering flood analysis associated with the 164'

.9

6

elevation control building floor and equipment drain system to verify that those actions

required for ASD would not be inhibited by fire suppression activities or leakage from fire

suppression systems.

The team reviewed fire brigade response, training, and drill program procedures, drill

critiques, and drill records for the operating shifts from June 2001 through May 2002.

The reviews were performed to determine whether fire brigade drills had been

conducted in high fire risk plant areas and whether fire brigade personnel qualifications,

drill response, and performance met the requirements of the licensee's approved fire

protection program. -The team walked down the primary fire brigade staging and locker

area in the maintenance shop adjacent to the turbine building to assess the condition of

fire fighting and smoke control equipment. Fire brigade personal protective equipment

located in the fire brigade dress-out area and fire fighting equipment in the turbine

building fire brigade staging area were reviewed to evaluate equipment accessibility and

functionality.

The team toured the plant to determine if emergency exit lighting was provided for

personnel evacuation pathways to the outside exits as identified in the NFPA 101, Lfe

Safety Code. The team also checked if backup emergency lighting was provided for

access pathways to and within the fire brigade staging and dress-out areas in support of

fire brigade operations should power fail during a fire emergency. The firelbrigade self-

contained breathing apparatuses (SCBAs) were examined for adequacy as-well as the

availability of supplemental breathing air tanks.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.03

ASD Capability

a.

Inspection Scone

The team reviewed the licensee's ASD methodology to determine the adequacy

identified components and systems required to achieve and maintain SSD con itions for

a severe fire in fire area 121. A fire in this area would involve shutdown of ths ua+/-fror

the Remote Shutdown Panel Room and the redundant switchgear rooms us

GUrain B

SSD equipment.

_

l

The team focused its review on the adequacy of the systems and component

reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring,

and support system functions. The team reviewed electrical control schematics of

remote shutdown relays located in Remote Shutdown Relay Cabinets

B" and B-1 to

ensure that the control circuits of SSD equipment required to mitigate a fire in fire area

-

- -- CC-164-121 were provided a permissive by logic inputs from these relays upon

operation of control switch CS/ISB to the remote shutdown panel (RSP) position. The

team reviewed electrical control schematics of selected SSD equipment to determine if.

operation from Remote Shutdown Panel B was enabled by manipulation of selector

switches mounted on this cabinet. The 120 VAC and 125 VDC control circuits of safe

shutdown equipment were also examined to ascertain whether separate control fuses

- ..

S

7

were installed in the control circuit to ensure that a fire induced failure from a firethe

MCR would not defeat the capability of controlling SSD equipment from RSP B a er

placing control switch CS/ISB to the RSP position.prior to tho operation ataff'

iig the

MeR. The electrical control schematics of SSD equipment fed from the 4160 VAC ES

bus were also reviewed by the team to identify if logic inputs from the Remote Shutdown

Relay Cabinets defeated equipment operation fr

the MCR upon placing control switch

CS/ISB in the RSP position.

7

Th tnm" r'Aew alz SC~~ tldLupi paiYnroiw switchi CStIS1 i the RISP

Sia, oeraionof416

VA ss eq i~netlwc rqM itd to be peformd l

alt

thu' c~witchpenir hy rn~ni 'al operath.

The team reviewed the electrical

control schematic of emergency diesel generator EDG-1 B to determine if logic inputs,

which ensure that electrical power required for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown

from outside the MCR, with or without offsite power, had been provided to the

emergency diesel generator EDG-1 B control circuit from Remote Shutdown Relay

Cabinet B. The team reviewed coordination curves of selected power supplies in order

to ensure that selective circuit breaker coordination had been established for power

supplies feeding SSD equipment.

The team also reviewed records of the latest surveillance and performance tests

performed on the remote shutdown panel instruments to ensure that instrumentation

.-

channels were operating within normal operating limits in accordance with the program

acceptance criteria delineated in the procedures.

b.

Findings.

No findings of significance were identified.

.04

Operational Implementation of ASD Capability

a.

Inspection Scone

The team reviewed the operational implementation of the ASD capability for a fire in the

selected fire areas to verify that (1) the procedures used for ASD were consistent with

the SSA methodology and assumptions; (2) the procedures were written so that the

operator actions could be correctly performed within the times assumed in the SSA; (3)

the training program for operators included alternative or dedicated SSD capability; (4)

the personnel required to achieve and maintain the plant in hot standby from outside the

control room could be provided from normal onsite staff, exclusive of the fire brigade;

and (5) the licensee periodically performed operability testing of the SSD

instrumentation and the transfer and control functions. The team walked down selected*

portions of AP-990 and EOP-02 to verify that the procedures could be performed within

the required times, given the minimum required staffing level of operators, with or

without offsite power. Operator and fire brigade staffing was reviewed to verify

compliance with the TS and conformance with the Fire Protection Program. The team

reviewed operator training lesson plans and job performance measures (JPMs), and

discussed the training with operators to determine if ASD activities were included in the

training program.

S

8

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.05

Communications During Performance of ASD Functions

a.

Inspection ScoDe

The team reviewed the adequacy of the communication system to support plant

.- -.. ..

personnel in the performance of-ASD-functions and-fire brigade duties.--The licensee

credited the radio repeater systems for prompt fire brigade personnel response and

post-fire SSD MCR operator response. The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the

radio communication system utilized by the fire brigade and to assess whether the

licensee's portable radio channel features would operate should the radio repeaters be

unavailable. The team walked down sections of the ASD procedures and inspected

selected shutdown equipment required for remote manual operator actions to evaluate if

adequate communications equipment would be available for the personnel performing

the procedures. The team also reviewed the periodic testing of the SSD radio repeater

systems and inventory surveillance of post-fire SSD operator equipment to assess

whether the surveillance test program for the radios was sufficient to verify proper

.

-

'.' 9

operation of the system.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.06

Emergency Lighting During Performance of ASD Functions

a.

Inspection Scope

The team walked down the selected fire areas to observe whether battery pack

emergency lighting units (ELUs) were installed to allow operation of ASD equipment if

normal lighting was lost. In some cases, the installed ELUs were tested to demonstrate

functionality. The locations and identification numbers on the ELUs were compared to

design documents to confirm the as-built configuration. The team reviewed vendor

documentation to verify that the battery power supplies were rated for at least eight-hour

capacity. The team also reviewed licensee periodic tests to verify that the ELUs were

being maintained in an operable manner.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.07 - -- .Cold Shutdown ReDairs----..

a.

InsDection Scope

The team inspected plant procedures and equipment to ascertain if the licensee had

dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and materials to accomplish repairs of

9

damaged components required for cold shutdown, that these components could be

made operable, and that cold shutdown could be achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The team

observed cold shutdown repair equipment and cables stored in nearby warehouses for

providing electrical power to pumps and valves if needed after a large fire. The team

checked to determine if the equipment was appropriately labeled and was maintained in

good condition. Also, the team walked down procedural actions and the projected route

for installing temporary cabling to power Decay Heat Pump B, Decay Heat Service

Water Seawater Pump, and a Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Pump after a large fire.

The team evaluated whether the estimated manpower and installation time was

reasonable.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.08

Fire Barriers and Fire Area/Zone/Room Penetration Seals

a.

Ins ection Scope

The team walked down the selected fire areas to evaluate the fire resistance of barrier

enclosure walls, ceilings, floors, and structural steel support protection. This evaluation

also included fire barrier penetration seals, fire doors, fire dampers, and the MECATISS

ERFBS to ensure that at least one train of SSD equipment would be maintained free of

fire damage. The team observed the material condition and configuration of the

installed fire barrier features, as well as, reviewed construction details and supporting

fire endurance tests for the installed ERFBS. The team compared the observed fire

barrier penetration seal configurations to the design drawings and tested configurations.

The team also compared the penetration seal ratings with the ratings of the barriers in

which they were installed.

The team reviewed ASD procedures, selected fire fighting pre-plan procedures, and

HVAC systems to verify that access to remote shutdown equipment and operator

manual actions would not be inhibited by smoke migration from one area to adjacent

plant areas used to accomplish SSD. In addition, the team reviewed licensing

documentation, engineering evaluations of Generic Letter 86-10 fire barrier features,

and NFPA code deviations to verify that the fire barrier installations met design

requirements and license commitments.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.09

Fire Protection Systems. Features, and Equipment

a.

Inspection Scope

The team reviewed flow diagrams, cable routing information, periodic test procedures,

engineering evaluations for NFPA code deviations, and operational valve lineup

procedures associated with the fire pumps and fire protection water supply system. The

I.

10

review evaluated whether the common fire protection water delivery and supply

components could be damaged or inhibited by fire-induced failures of electrical power

supplies or control circuits. Additionally, team members walked down the fire protection

water supply system in selected areas to assess the adequacy of the system material

condition, consistency of as-built configuration with engineering drawings, and

operability of the system in accordance with applicable administrative procedures and

NFPA standards.

The team examined the adequacy of installed fire protection features in accordance with

the separation and design requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, III.G.2. The team

walked down accessible portions of the fire detection and alarm systems in the four

selected fire areas to evaluate the engineering design and operation of the installed

configurations. The team also reviewed engineering drawings for fire detector spacing

and locations in the four selected fire areas for consistency with the licensee's fire

protection plan and the requirements in NFPA 72D.

The team reviewed the adequacy of the design, installation and operation of the manual

suppression standpipe and fire hose system for the Control Complex. The team

examined design calculations to verify that the required fire hose water flow and

sprinkler system density for each protected area were available. The team checked a

sample of manual fire hose lengths to determine whether they would reach the SSD

equipment. Additionally, the team observed placement of the fire hoses and

extinguishers to assess consistency with the fire-fighting pre-plans.

.

..

~.

.s

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.10

Comgensatorv Measures

a.

InsDection Scope

The team reviewed the licensee's Form 01 07-03, DCegraded Equipment Log, which

identified compensatory measures for all degraded structures, systems, and

components. The review was performed to verify that the risk associated with removing

fire protection and/or post-fire systems or components was properly assessed and

adequate compensatory measures were implemented in accordance with the approved

fire prot6ction program. The team also reviewed non-conformance reports generated

over the last 18 months as a result of any fire protection features that were not returned

to service within the time frames required.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

,

~~~~~~~~~~~~~11

.11

Identification and Resolution of Problems

a.

Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a sample of action requests for fire protection equipment to

determine whether the licensee was identifying fire-related issues at an appropriate

threshold and entering those issues into the corrective action program. The team also

reviewed self-assessments and audits related to the fire protection and SSD programs

to assess whether the licensee was performing comprehensive audits of these

programs in accordance with the requirements set forth in Appendix A of BTP APCSB

9.5-1.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

40A6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary..*

.

..

.

The team presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Young, Site Vice President arid

other members of licensee management and staff at the conclusion of the inspection on

July 12, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary

information is included in this report.

12

Partial List of Persons Contacted

Licensee

S. Barlofski, Supervisor, ElecJI&C Design

D. Brass, Superintendent, Prog., Proj. & Facility Svs.

J. Franke, Plant General Manager-CR3

C. Miller, Supervisor, ECCS Systems

H. Oates, Superintendent, Design Engineering

D. Porter, Superintendent, Operations Support

-- S. Powell,-Supervisor,-Licensing & Reg. Programs-=

P. Rubio, Lead Engineer, Design Engineering

D. Taylor, Manager, Site Support Services

R. Warden, Manager, Nuclear Assessment

R. Wiemann, Supervisor, Elec./l&C Systems...

D. Young, Vice President, Crystal River Nuclear Plant

NRC

D. D IIg-s,

Iesident

Inspector, Oconee Nuclear Poxyer Plant

7

ne

la

, FlPrtconlearn Leader,

egion II

\\

N. taples, lcorSft

ncn ci 1'a

S. Stewart, Senior Resident Inspector,.Crystal River

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

'

Opened

URI 50-302/02-05-01

Failure)

rot

t

n

Safe Shutdown Equipr

Fire Damage n Accordanc with Appendix R, Section

(Three Exa pe

/

Closed

ient From

IIl.G.2

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

PROCEDURES

AP-880, Fire Protection, Rev 15

AP-990, Shutdown From Outside the Control Room, Rev 18

OP-880A, Appendix ORI Post Fire Safe Shutdown Information, Rev 00

EOP-02, Vital System Status Verification, Rev 07

MP-192, Post Fire Repair of decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Pump Motors, Decay Heat

Pump 1 B, Decay Heat Service Seawater Pump and Power Cables, Rev 07

MP-193, Temporary Cooling to Control Complex, Rev 04

_ ___A-I- 000,-Housekeeping/Material-Condition Program, Rev.-37------

Al-2001, Control of Combustible Chemicals, Rev. 9

Al-2100, Chemical Hygiene Plan and Safety Guidelines for Environmental and Chemistry Work

Areas and Activities, Rev. 8

Al-2200, Guidelines for Handling Use and Control of Transient Combustibles, Rev. 8

Al-2205, Administration of CR-3 Fire Brigade Organization and Duties of the Fire Brigade,

Rev. 17

Al-2210, Fire Watch Program, Rev. 8

Al-2215, Management of the CR-3 Fire Protection Program, Rev. 2

AR-801, Fire Service Annunciator Response, Rev. 17

CP-113B, Work Request Evaluation/Planning, Rev. 32

CP-1 18, Fire Prevention Work Request, Rev. 32

CP-1 37, Fire Barrier Breaches, Rev.16

MP-805, Sealing of Penetrations, Rev. 12

PM-175, Fire Door Maintenance, Rev., 3

PM-185, Diesel Fire Pump Engine Inspection and Maintenance, Rev. 5

SP-190D, Functional Test of Fire Detection Systems-Control Complex, Rev. 14

SP-802, Fire Hose Hydro Test and Hose Reel Inspections, Rev. 26

SP-804, Surveillance of Plant Fire Brigade Equipment, Rev. 32

SP-807, Surveillance of Mounted Emergency Battery-Powered Light Units, Rev. 16

SP-809, Weekly Inspection Fire Protection, Rev. 9

TPP-219, Nuclear Emergency Team Training Program, Rev. 2

95 MC 0011, MECATISS Operating Procedure for the Installation of MTS. 3 Three Hours Fire

Barrier System, Rev. B

95 MC 0020, MECATISS Detailed Sketches on MPF/MTS Installations, Rev. B

95 MC 0057, MECATISS Operating Procedure for the Installation of MPF-180 Three Hours Fire

Barrier System Over Thermo-Lag 330.1 Material, Rev. E

ob Performance Measures JPMs) and Lesson Plans

JPM 9818, Actuate Main Steam and Main Feed Line Isolation from Outside the Control Room

C<

JPM 017, Initiate EFW in Accordance with Ap-990

JPM 085, Manually Trip the Reactor in Accordance with AP-990

Lesson Plan OPS-4-16-LP, Remote Shutdown System

Lesson Plan OPS-5-31 LP, AP-990 Shutdown Outside Control room, Rev 00

Lesson Plan OPS-8-38, Shutdown From Outside Control room, Rev 02

Lesson Plan AP-880 Fire Protection, Rev 01

ATTACHMENT

2

Lesson Plan OPS-5-91LP, NLO Emergency and Abnormal Tasks, Rev 00

Simulator Exercise Guide LOR-1-08, Shutdown Outside the Control Room, Rev 00

Completed Surveillance Test Records

PT-315, Remote Shutdown Relay Operability, Rev 09

SP-338, Remote shutdown and Post Accident Monitoring Channel Check, Rev 41

DESIGN CRITERIA AND CALCULATIONS

Topical Design Basis Document for Appendix R, Rev 05

Enhanced Design Basis Document for the Fire Service System, Rev. 8

Design Basis Document for the Remote Shutdown System, Rev 06

DRAWINGS

FD-302-082, Emergency Feedwater

FD-302-601, Nuclear services Closed Cycle Cooling Water

FD-302-61 1, Nuclear Services and Decay Heat Seawater

FD-302-631, Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water

FD-302-641, Decay Heat Removal

.

X -.;

,

FD-302-661, Makeup and Purification

.

-;

FD-302-753, Control Complex

.

-

FD-302-769, Appendix R

-

A-107-013, Fire Barrier Penetrations, Rev. 10

B-208-031, Elementary Diagram, Fire Service System, Rev. 7

E-213-005, Appendix R Protected Raceways, Control Complex, Rev.7

E-213-012, Appendix R Protected Raceways, Control Complex El. 108', Rev. 12

E-215-204, Conduit Layout Fire Service, Control Complex, Rev. 29

EC-209-014, Electrical Interconnection Wiring Diagram, Communications System, Rev. 15

BS-311-653, Sewage Pump Discharge Thru Turbine Bldg., Control Complex Plan, Rev. 17

BS-311-714, Ventilation Systems, Control Complex Plan, Rev. 28

FD-302-753, sheets. 1-4, Flow Diagram Air Handling, Control Complex, Rev. 41

B-208-082, Elementary Diagram, Remote Shutdown Panel MB" Relay Actuation,

Sheet RS-05, Revision 3

Sheet RS-06, Revision 8

Sheet RS-07, Revision 11

-

--- Sheet RS-08, Revision-6

Sheet RS-12, Revision 7

Sheet RS-14, Revision 11

Sheet RS-16, Revision 13

Sheet RS-18, Revision 8

B-208-021, Elementary Diagram,

-

Sheet No. DH-10, Revision 21"B" LPI Flow Control Valve DHV-1 11,

Sheet No. DH-02, Revision 21, D.H. Removal Pump 3B, (DHP-1 B), 4160 V ES Bus 3B

MTSW-2E-3B 1

ATTACHMENT

.

2

Sheet No. DH-06, Revision 24, L.P. Injection Cont. sol. from DHP-1 B, DHV-6, ES MCC

381, MTMC-5.-

B-208-026, Elementary Diagram, Sheet No. EF-08, Revision 21, T.D. Emerg. Feed Pump 3B

EFP-2 and Aux. Feed Water Disch. so. To Steam Generator EFV-1 1

B-208-039 Elementary Diagram,

Sheet No. MS-09, Revision 23, Main Steam Supply so. to EFP-2 Turbine Drive MSV-56

Sheet No. MS-10, Revision 24, Main Steam Supply Iso. to EFP-2 Turbine Drive MSV-55

Drawing No. B-208-041, Elementary Diagram,

Sheet No. MU-03, Revision 19, Makeup and Purification Pump 3B (MUP-1B)

Sheet No. MU-17, Revision 18, HP Pp. Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank,

(MUV-58)

Electrical Block Diagrams Drawing No. SS-211 -008,

Sheet No. AS-01, Revision 16, Emergency Feed Pump Stop Valve ASV-5

Electrical Block Diagrams Drawing No. SS-211-026,

Sheet No. EF-08, Revision 10,T.D. Emerg. Feed Pump 3B & Aux. F. W. Disch. Isol. to

Steam Gen. EFV-1 1

Sheet No. EF-10, Revision 9, T.D. Emerg. Feed Pump 3B & Aux. F. W. Disch. Isol. to

Steam Gen. EFV-32

Sheet No. EF-1 1, Revision 10, Motor Driven Emerg. Feed pump 3A & Aux. F. W. Disch.

Isol. to Stm. Gen. EFV-33

Sheet No. EF-14, Revision 5, MOVs EFV-11,14, 32, 33" C' and "D" Power Supplies

Sheet No. EF-17, Revision 7, Emergency Feed water Valve EFV-55

.:.

.

Sheet No. EF-18, Revision 7, Emergency Feed water Valve EFV-56

Sheet No. EF-1 9, Revision 7, Emergency Feed water Valve EFV-57

Sheet No. EF-20, Revision 7, Emergency Feed water Valve EFV-58

.

Electrical Block Diagrams Drawing No. SS-211-039,

Sheet No. MS-09, Revision 12, Stm. Gen. 3B to Emerg. Feed Pp. Isol. Vlv. (MSV-56)

Sheet No. MS-10, Revision 13 Stm. Gen. 3B to Emerg.. Feed Pp. Isol. Vlv. (MSV-55)

Electrical Block Diagrams Drawing No. SS-211-041,

Sheet No. MU-01, Revision 5, Makeup and Purification Pump 3A, MUP-1A

Sheet No. MU-04, Revision 3, Makeup and Purification Pump 3C, MUP-1 C

Sheet No. MU-05, Revision 2, M.U. & P. Pump 3A Main Oil Pump MUP-2A

Sheet No. 17, Revision 7, H. P. Pp. Suct. From Bor. Water Storage Tank MUV-58

Sheet No. MU-19, Revision 14, H. P. Inj. Cont. Viv. To React. Inlet Line Loop A,

(MUV-23).

Sheet No. MU-20, Revision 10, H. P. Inj. Cont. Vlv. To React. Inlet Line Loop A,

(MUV-24).

Sheet No. MU-22, Revision 10, H. P. Inj. Cont. Vlv. To React. Inlet Line Loop B,

(MUV-26).

Sheet No. MU-24, Revision 5, Makeup Pump Recirc. Viv. 3B (MUV-257)

Sheet No. MU-25, Revision 5, Makeup Pump Recirc. VIv. 3A (MUV-53)

APPLICABLE CODES AND STANDARDS

NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, 1983 Edition.

NFPA 14, Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems, 1970 Edition.

NFPA 15, Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection, 1969 Edition.

ATTACHMENT

3

NFPA 20, Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps, 1970 Edition.

NFPA 72D, Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Proprietary Protection

Signaling Systems, 1967 Edition.

NFPA 80, Standard on Fire Doors and Windows, 1970 Edition.

NFPA 90A, Standard on Air Conditioning and Ventilating Systems, 1981 Edition.

NUREG-1552, Supplement 1, Fire Barrier Penetration Seals in Nuclear Power Plants, dated

January 1999

Underwriters Laboratory, Fire Resistance Directory, January 1998

AR REPORTS, AUDITS, AND SELF ASSESSMENTS

AR 00063067:Transient Fire Loading Concerns on 163' Control Complex

NAS Assessment C-FP-02-01; Action Request 00061781, OP-880A Manual Actions

ML033020031

Text

Navigation menu

Search