ML032471475
| ML032471475 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 08/11/2003 |
| From: | Ernstes M Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch |
| To: | Rosalyn Jones Duke Energy Corp |
| Shared Package | |
| ML032521014 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269/03-301, 50-270/03-301, 50-287/03-301 50-269/03-301, 50-270/03-301, 50-287/03-301 | |
| Download: ML032471475 (49) | |
See also: IR 05000269/2003301
Text
Draft Submittal
OCONEE JUNE 2003 EXAM
50-269/2003-30 1
JUNE 16 - 27,2003
1.
Operating Test Simulator Scenarios
+ o u r L / N S
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Scenario No.: 1, Initial Submittal
Op-Test No.:
1
Facility:-a
-~
perators:
Initial C
Turnob
0
luest (IC-42)
0 . . . .
I
Event
No.
oa- I Pre-lnsert
MSS330
Updater
+I=-
2
I MP1121, 100
MCR021
Override
80%) +
6
MCR022
I MELOSO
I
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity,
C, OATC, SRO
R, OATC, SRO
C, OATC, SRO
M. ALL
M, ALL
(I)nstrument, I
u
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
ak, expected returned this shift
Event
Description
TD EFDW Pump Fails to Start
SASS in manual
AMSACIDSS bypassed
De-Lithiation with the deborating Demineralizer
PZR LVL #I Transmitter Fails HIGH
Drop CR Group 2 Rod 6, (TS)
Diamond blocked from AUTO operation
IA, RCP High Vibration (secure RCP)
Power Reduction
Second dropped control rod, requiring a manual
CT-1 Lockout (Loss of Power)
Keowee Unit 1 Emergency Lockout (blackout,
PRA)
)omponent, (M)ajor
Page 1 of 17
Scenario #I
OVeWiew (Initial Submittal)
Initial Conditions: Unit 1: 75% power - EOL, Unit 2: loo%, Unit 3: 100%
Turnover:
Unit 1 TD EFDW Pump 00s to repair oil leak, expected returned this shift
SASS in manual for I&E testing
AMSAC/DSS bypassed for I&E testing
Keowee Unit 1 generating to the grid
ICs Diamond in MANUAL for I&E test
ii
1) De-Lithiation with the deborating Demineralizer: (N, BOP)
a) Chemistry requests that the RCS be de-lithiated for 5 minutes with the Unit 1
Deborating Demineralizer. The BOP should use Enclosure 4.26 of OP/1103/004,
Soluble Poison Control, to begin de-lithiation.
TIME = 10 minutes, TOTAL 10 min.
2) PZR Level #I
Transmitter Fails HIGH: (I, BOP)
a) Crew will refer to the ARG for high PZR level. Crew should refer to PT/600/001
TIME = 5 minutes, TOTAL 15 min.
(Periodic Instrument Surveillance) and select a good level instrument.
3) Dropped Control Rod: (C, OATC) (TS)
a) The crew should utilize the "Plant Transient Response" to stabilize the plant and
b) Perform actions per APll5, Dropped Control Rods, including reducing reactor
c) SRO should refer to TS.
d) The crew may try to return the ICs to AUTO. However, the Diamond will be
e) Power reduction will be performed in manual however this will not count for the
TIME = 10 minutes, TOTAL 25 min.
recognize that a runback is not in progress.
power to less than 60% within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
blocked from running back in AUTO requiring a manual power reduction. This will
require that the crew diagnose the failure to automatically runback.
reactivity. The reactivity will occur later in the scenario.
i/
4) lA1 RCP High Vibration: (C, BOP)
a) During the power reduction the lA1 RCP will experience High Vibration. This will
require entry into APll6, Abnormal Reactor Coolant Pump Operation. RCP
vibration will increase and the decision will be made to secure the 1A1 RCP.
TIME = 5 minutes, TOTAL 30 min.
Page 1 of 2
Scenario #I
Overview (Initial Submittal)
5) Power Reduction: (R, OATC)
a) After the RCP is secured the unit will be required to reduced to < 45% power
because of the dropped CR and RCP combination. The CRSRO will direct the
OATC with the help of the BOP to commence a power reduction with the ICs in
manual.
u
TIME = 10 minutes, TOTAL 40 min.
6) Second dropped Control Rod (Manual Reactor Trip): (C, OATC)
a) After the plant is stable a second control rod will drop. This will require a manual
TIME = 2 minutes, TOTAL 42 min.
7) CT-1 Lockout and an ATWS: (M, ALL; R, OATC)
a) The reactor will not trip and an ATWS will occur requiring utilization of the
Unanticipated Nuclear Power Production tab and RULE 1 from the EOP.
Manually inserting control rods, deenergizing control rod drives, and initiating
Emergency Boration will be required. When reactor power is less than 5% the
turbine will be tripped. This will cause a loss of power due to CT-1 (startup
transformer) lockout. Main Feeder Bus power will automatically be restored from
Keowee via CT-4 and the Standby Bus. This will require entering APll1
(Recovery From Loss of Power) to restore plant loads and secondary equipment
required for the recovery of condenser vacuum. When Nls indicate less than 1%
UNPP tab directs transfer back to Subsequent Actions tab.
TIME = 10 minutes, TOTAL 52 min.
8) Keowee Unit 2 Emergency Lockout, Unit Blackout: (M, ALL)
a) Keowee Unit 2 Emergency Lockout will result in a Unit Blackout. This will cause
the SRO to transfer to the Blackout tab of the EOP for guidance on manually
restoring power to Unit 1s Main Feeder Busses from Central Switchyard via
CT-5. After power is restored to the 4160 volt switchgear AP/11 will be restarted.
The scenario will be completed after power has been restored to the Main
Feeder Buses and APll1 has been restarted.
TIME = 10 minutes, TOTAL 62 min.
Page 2 of 2
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Facility: Oconee
Scenario No.: 2, Initial Submittal
Op-Test No.:
Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
100% Reactor Power (IC-41)
Turnover:
AMSAClDSS bvoassed for I&E testing
SASS in manual'for I&E testing
" A
Condensate Booster Pump OOS, breaker to be replaced
Keowee Unit 2 00s for unplanned reasons
-
Ob
Pre-Insert
NI-9 00s
MN1082
oc
Pre-Insert
"A
AFlS circuit disabled
" B AFlS circuit disabled
Od
Pre-Insert
Keowee Unit 2 Emergency Lockout
MEL180
Oe
Pre-Insert
l a
Override
Low " A
CFT Pressure (N? makeuo)
ES Channels 7 and 8 fail to automatically actuate
.-
- - ..
-
~-
. I
I b I
I C, BOP, SRO I IN-298 (N2 Fill CFT IA) fails OPEN
I
I
!
2
1
MPSO9O
1 C. OATC. SRO 1 IHP-120 (RC Volume Control) Fails closed
-
3
MCS004
I, OATC, SRO
Controlling Tave fails LOW
4
Override
Seismic event (PRA)
5
MPS020
C,ALL
1 B SG Tube leak 5 gpm (TS)
1A RBCU rupture (TS)
6
R, OATC, SRO
Unit Shutdown
7
MPS020
M,ALL
1B SG Tube leak increases to 200 gpm
8
MSS360,50
M, ALL
1A Main Steam line break in RB
_ _ _ _ ~
(N)ormal,
(R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
NUREG-1021, Drafl Revision 9
.-.Page 1 of 1
Scenario #2 Overview (Initial Submittal)
Initial Conditions: Unit 1: 100% power - EOL, Unit 2: loo%, Unit 3: 100%
Turnover:
AMSAC/DSS bypassed for I&E testing
SASS in manual for I&E testing
A Condensate Booster Pump OOS, breaker to be replaced
Keowee Unit 2 00s for unplanned reasons
Keowee Unit 1 aligned to underground
i/
1) 1A CFT low pressure and IN-298 (N2 Fill CFT IA) fails OPEN: (N, BOP; C, BOP)
a) Crew will refer to ARG for low pressure and when directed by the SRO will use
OP/1104/001 (Core Flooding System) to add Nitrogen to the 1A CFT. 1 N-298
(N2 Fill CFT IA) fails OPEN and the BOP should direct the NE0 to close the
block valve to prevent over pressurizing the CFT.
TIME = 10 minutes
2) IHP-120 (RC Volume Control) Fails CLOSED: (C, OATC)
a) 1 HP-120 (RC Volume Control) Fails CLOSED due to a ruptured diaphragm. This
should be diagnosed and AP114, Loss of Normal HPI Makeup and/or RCP Seal
Injection, should be followed. The AP will give guidance on maintaining PZR
level and instruct the crew to call SPOC to repair the valve. 1 HP-120 (RC
Volume Control) will remain broken for the remainder of the scenario.
TIME = 10 minutes, TOTAL 20 min.
\\ W
NOTE: Events 1 and 2 will occur at about the same time.
3) Controlling Tave fails LOW: (I, OATC)
a) The controlling Tave input to the ICs system will fail low. The crew should
respond using Plant Transient Response process. ICs will be place in manual
to stabilize the plant and will remain in manual for the remainder of the scenario.
TIME = 5 minutes, TOTAL 25 min.
4) Seismic event (PRA) and 1A RBCU rupture (TS): (C, BOP)
a) A seismic event will occur which will cause the 1A RBCU to rupture. AP/005,
Earthquake, will be entered. RBCU rupture should be diagnosed and
subsequently isolated to prevent diluting the RB sump.
TIME = 5 minutes, TOTAL 30 min.
Page 1 of 2
Scenario #2 Overview (Initial Submittal)
5) 1 6 SG Tube leak (5 gpm): (C, ALL) (TS)
a) The seismic event will also cause a tube leak in the 1 B Steam Generator. This
leak will initially be - 5 gpm. This leakage will require entry into AP131, Primary to
Secondary Leakage. After determining the leak is greater than TS limits, the
SRO should initiate a unit shutdown.
i/
TIME = 20 minutes, TOTAL 50 min.
6) Unit Shutdown: (R, OATC)
a) As a result of the previous instrument failure a unit shutdown will be conducted
with the ICs in manual. Primary inventory will require manual control during the
shutdown due to IHP-120 (RC Volume Control) remaining in manual.
TIME = 5 minutes, TOTAL 55 min.
7) 16 SG Tube leak increases to 200 gpm (M, ALL)
During the shut down the SG tube leak will increase to 200 gpm requiring the SRO
to transfer to the Steam Generator Tube Rupture tab of the EOP. The leak will be
beyond the capacity of normal HPI makeup requiring the use of additional makeup
and suction from the BWST.
TIME = 10 minutes, TOTAL 65 min.
8) 1A Main Steam line break in RB: (M, ALL)
c
a) A main steam line break will occur in the 1A main steam line. This will require
the use of RULE 5 (Main Steam Line Break) to isolate the leak and may require
using RULE 2 (Loss of SCM). The CRSRO will transfer to the Excessive Heat
Transfer tab of the EOP to ensure excessive heat transfer has been stopped and
the plant stabilized. Transfer will then be made back to the Steam Generator
Tube Rupture tab of the EOP. ES channels 7 and 8 will not automatically actuate
on high RB pressure. It should be manually actuated while performing EOP
Enclosure 5.1 (Es Actuation). Manual initiation of ES channels 7 and 8 will not
completely actuate all required equipment. Additional action by the crew will be
required. The scenario will be completed when the 1A main steam line has been
isolated and a transfer to the Steam Generator Tube Rupture tab of the EOP has
been made.
TIME = 15 minutes, TOTAL 80 min.
Page 2 of 2
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Facility: Oconee
Scenario No.: 3, Initial Submittal
Op-Test No.:
1
Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
25% Reactor Power, startup in progress
Turnover:
Unit 1 TD EFDW Pump 00s to repair oil leak
NI-9 OOS, to be replaced next outage
Keowee Unit 2 00s for unplanned reasons
Keowee Unit 1 aligned to underground
Operability test of Keowee Unit 1 is to be performe- ?er PT/62O/C
Operation) after turnover and before startup continues. ONS to pt
Keowee start
(Keowee Hydro
rm remote
Event
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event
No.
Description
Oa
Pre-Insert
TD EFDW Pump Fails to Start
Ob
Pre-Insert
SASS in manual
MSS330
Updater
Pre-Insert
Uodater
Pre-Insert
MEL180
1
Keowee Unit 2 Emergency Lockout
.
.
1
MEL020
Operability test Unit 1
Override
Keowee Unit 1 Gen Field Flashing Breaker fails
to OPEN automaticallv
MPS460
Override
C, OATC, SRO
" A
HPI Pump sheared shaft and standby HPI
1 pump fails to start
3
~
MNkl32
I, OATC, SRO
Controlling NI fails LOW
4
MSS310
Loss of Instrument Air
5
MP1290
Main FDW Pump Trips
C, OATC, SRO
6
MSS280,lOO
M, ALL
" A
TBVs fail open
Main Turbine Fails to trip (Lockout EHC Pumps)
1 MS-17 r A TBV Block) fails to close
Override
7
I MPSOIO
I "A
SG Tube Rupture
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 1 of 3
Scenario #3 Overview (Initial Submittal)
Initial Conditions: Unit 1: 25% power - EOL, Unit 2: loo%, Unit 3: 100%
Turnover:
Unit 1 TD EFDW Pump 00s to repair oil leak, expected returned this shift
NI-9 00s. to be replaced next outage
Keowee Unit 2 00s for unplanned reasons
Keowee Unit 1 aligned to underground
Operability test of Keowee Unit 1 is to be performed per PT/620/009 (Keowee
Hydro Operation) after turnover and before startup continues, ONS to perform
remote Keowee start
W
1) Operability test Keowee Unit 1 with failure of Gen Field Flashing Breaker:
a) Keowee Unit 1 will be started from the control room as part of the operability test.
During startup the Gen Field Flashing Breaker fails to open automatically. This
should be recognized and the breaker should be opened manually. This does not
make the Keowee unit inoperable.
TIME = 15 minutes
2) A HPI Pump sheared shaft and the standby HPI pump fails to auto start:
(C, OATC; C, OATC TS)
a) The 1A HPI Pump shaft will shear. This will cause low RCP seal injection flow
and the standby HPI pump will not auto start. This will require entry into AP/014
(Loss of Normal MIU andlor RCP SI). The standby HPI will be started and RCP
u
seal injection re-established.
TIME = 15 minutes, TOTAL 30 min.
NOTE: Events 1 and 2 will occur at about the same time.
3) Controlling NI fails LOW: (I, OATC)
a) The crew should utilize the Plant Transient Response to stabilize the plant and
recognize that the controlling NI has failed. The ICs will be placed in manual to
stabilize the unit. The ICs will remain in manual for the remainder of the
scenario.
TIME = 5 minutes, TOTAL 35 min.
4) Loss of Instrument Air (C, BOP)
a) Instrument Air (IA) pressure will begin to decrease. The crew should implement
AP1022 (Loss of IA). The Diesel Air Compressor will be started and an attempt
will be made to locate and stop the loss of IA. After a leak is found and isolated
IA pressure will return to normal.
TIME = 13 minutes, TOTAL 48 min.
u
Page 1 of 2
Scenario #3 Overview (Initial Submittal)
5) Main FDW Pump trips and the turbine Fails to trip (C, BOP)
a) The operating Main FDW pump will trip resulting in a reactor trip and entry into
the EOP. The Main Turbine will not trip requiring the OATC to secure the EHC
pumps during performance of the EOP Immediate Manual actions.
i_/
TIME = 2 minutes, TOTAL 50 min.
6) A TBVs fails open and IMS-17 (A TBV Block) fails to close: (C, OATC)
a) Affer the reactor trip the A
TBVs will fail open resulting in excessive heat
transfer. 1 MS-17 will not close from the control room to isolate the TBVs. RULE
5 (Main Steam Line Break) will be used to isolate the A SG and the SRO will
transfer to the Excessive Heat Transfer tab of the EOP.
TIME = 1 Ominutes. TOTAL 60 min.
7) A SG Tube Rupture: (M, ALL)
a) Affer the SG has been isolated a tube in the A SG will rupture requiring the
SRO to transfer to the Steam Generator Tube Rupture tab of the EOP. After
transfer is made to the Generator Tube Rupture tab of the EOP the scenario may
be stopped.
TIME = 15 minutes, TOTAL 75 min.
Page 2 of 2
ADoendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
I , OATC, SRO
~~
~
Facility: Oconee
Th Fails HIGH (repair return to auto)
~~~~~~
~
~
~
Scenario No.: SPARE, Initial Submittal
Op-Test No.:
c3 OAT',
SRo
Examiners:
Operators:
1A CC Pump trips (1 B CC Pump fails to auto
start)
1 HP-5 Fails closed
Unidentified RCS leak in RB (20 gpm) (TS)
Inability for CRD insertion in automatic during
shiitrlnwn~
nitial Conditions:
50% Reactor Power, startup in progress (IC-45)
Turnover:
AMSAC/DSS bypassed for I&E testing
NI-9 00s. to be replaced next outage
Event
No.
Oa -
Ob
oc
~
Od
1 -
-
2
3
4
5
6
7
Malf. No.
Pre-Insert
Pre-Insert
MN1082
&e-Insert
Pre-insert
MP1171, 100
MP1500, 100
MPS290
Override
MPSl10
MPS405
MCR040
MPS400.5
31,
(R)eactivi
Event
I N1-9 OoS
R. OATC. SRO 1 Manual CRD Dower decrease
M. ALL
I SBLOCA
(I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
\\ /
NUREG- 102 1, Draft Revision 9
Page 1 of 2
Scenario Spare Overview (Initial Submittal)
Initial Conditions: Unit 1: 50% power - EOL, Unit 2: loo%, Unit 3: 100%
Turnover:
AMSAC/DSS bypassed for I&E testing
NI-9 OOS, to be replaced next outage
-
1) Thot fails HIGH: (I, OATC)
a) The crew should diagnose the failure and stabilize the plant by using the Plant
Transient Response process.
b) The Crew should take BOTH FDW Masters and the Diamond to Manual to
mitigate the transient and attempt to stabilize the plant by removing header
pressure error from feeding forward to the FDW and Rx Subsystems.
c) The failure will be repaired and the ICs returned to auto.
TIME = 20 minutes
a) The crew should refer to ARG and to AP/020 (Loss of Component Cooling). The
b) The crew should initiate investigation and repair of 1A CC pump and why 18 CC
TIME = 10 minutes, TOTAL 30 min.
BOP should manually start the standby CC pump.
pump failed to auto start.
3) IHP-5 Fails closed: (C, BOP)
i
a) Recognize that 1 HP-5 closed due to high letdown temperature, and refer to the
b) When the crew recognizes that IHP-5 has failed closed, the CRSRO should refer
c) An operator should be dispatched to manually open 1 HP-5.
TIME = 10 minutes, TOTAL 40 min.
ARG for stat alarm 1 SA-2E-1, Letdown Temperature High.
to AP/032, Loss of Letdown.
4) Unidentified RCS leak in RB (20 gpm): (C, BOP) (TS)
a) Diagnose a leak in the RB by using RlAs and monitoring RCS inventory. Refer to
AP1002 (Excessive RCS Leakage). Determine leak rate and location. SRO
should refer to TS and determine that a unit shutdown is required.
TIME = 10 minutes, TOTAL 50 min.
Page 1 of 2
Scenario Spare Overview (Initial Submittal)
5) Inability for CRD insertion in automatic during shutdown: (C, OATC)
, --
b
a) When the unit shutdown is commenced the OATC should determine that the
control rods are not inserting. The SRO should direct the OATC to place the
control rods in manual and reduce reactor power.
TIME = 3 minutes, TOTAL 53 min.
6) Manual CRD power decrease (R, OATC)
a) The OATC should reduce power with the control rods in manual.
TIME = 12 minutes, TOTAL 65 min.
7) Small Break LOCA : (M, ALL)
a) Leak will develop into a SBLOCA requiring entry in to the EOP. This event is
complicated by the failure of 1 HP-26 and 1 FDW-316. RULE 2 (Loss of SCM) will be
implemented and the SRO will transfer to the Loss of Subcooling Margin tab of the EOP.
After transfer is made to the LOCA CD tab of the EOP this scenario may be stopped.
TIME = 10 minutes, TOTAL 75 min.
Page 2 of 2
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Appendix D
Ob
Oc
W
L
. . . - - . . .
Pre-Insert
SASS in manual
Updater
Pre-Insert
AMSAC/DSS bypassed
UDdater
Facility: Oconee
Scenario No.: 1, IS R1
Op-Test No.:
Examiners:
Operators:
2
Initial Conditions:
Turnover:
75% Reactor Power EOL, per dispatcher request (IC-42)
Unit 1 TD EFDW Pump 00s to repair oil leak, expected returned this shift
SASS in MANUAL for I&E testing
AMSAC/DSS bypassed for I&E testing
Keowee Unit 1 generating to the grid
Diamond in MANUAL for I&E test
Chemistry has requested that the RCS be De-Lithiation with the Normal deborating
Demineralizer for 5 minutes. OP/1103/004 Encl. 4.26 completed up to step 2.7.
PZR LVL # I Transmitter Fails HIGH
Descriotion
3
4
Pre-Insert
Oa I MSS330
I
MCR021
Override
MPS440 (40-
C, OATC, SRO
Drop CR Group 2 Rod 6, (TS)
Diamond blocked from AUTO operation
IA, RCP High Vibration (secure RCP)
I TD EFDW Pump Fails to Start
7
CT-I Lockout (Loss of Power)
MELO90
M, ALL
71
I De-Lithiation with the Normal deboratins Demin.
~
a
MEL180
M, ALL
Keowee Unit 1 Emergency Lockout (blackout,
p w
I I, OATC, SRO I AT,fails HIGH when RCP secured
I MP1281
I
I
I
6
I MCR022
I C, OATC, SRO I Second dropped control rod, requiring a manual
L,
NUREG-I 021, Draft Revision 9
Page 1 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 1
Page 1 of 1
Op-Test No.: __
Event Description: De-Lithiation with the deborating Demineralizer (N, BOP)
Time
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Refer to OP/I/AIl 103/004 (Soluble Poison Control) Enclosure 4.26
(Step 2.7) to begin de-lithiation.
Perform OP/1/AI1103/004, Soluble Poison Control, Enclosure 4.26
Place Deborating IX in service:
Review Limits and Precautions
Verifv closed ICs-32 & 37 (SPARE DEBOR IX INLET &
OU~LET)
0 Close 1 CS-26 (Letdown to RC Bleed)
Open ICs-27 (Debor IX Inlet)
Open IHP-16 (LDST Makeup Isolation)
Verify IHP-15 (LDST Makeup Control) in
open
Position IHP-14 (LDST Bypass) to BLEED
NI
and
Record letdown pressure (contact NEO, Cue: 115 psig)
Wait 5 minutes
Restore system per OP/1/A/1103/004, Soluble Poison Control,
Enclosure 4.26:
Place IHP-14 (LDST Bypass) in NORMAL
Close 1 HP-16 (LDST Makeup Isolation)
Reset 1 HP-15 Moore Controller for Normal Operation(LDST
Makeup Control)
Close ICs-27 (Debor IX Inlet)
Open 1 CS-26 (Letdown to RC Bleed)
Complete OP/1/A/1103/004, Soluble Poison Control,
Enclosure 4.26
When de-lithiation is complete or when directed by the lead
evaluator this event is completed.
ii
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 2 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 2
Page 1 of 1
Event Description: PZR Level #I
Transmitter Fails HIGH: (I, BOP)
Position
SRO/BOP
SRO/BOP
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
Statalarms
Front board (IUBI) indications:
PZR Level 1 indicates 4 0 0
1 HP-120 (RC Volume Control) throttles closed
Makeup flow decreases to = 0 gpm.
1 SA-ZC-3, RC Pressurizer Level High/Low
ISA-ZC-4, RC Pressurizer Level Emerg. High/Low
Crew response:
Refer to ARG:
Check alternate PZR level indications (1 UB . mi
determine that PZR level 1 has failed high.
C. 2) and
Check for proper MakeuplLetdown flows and adjust to restore
proper level.
SRO should direct the BOP to take actions to restore normal
PZR level.
SRO should refer to PT/600/001 (Periodic Instrument
Surveillance) SASS Manual Operation and have the BOP
select an alternate PZR level channel on 1 UBI.
~~
When an alternate PZR level channel has been selected or
when directed by the lead evaluator this event is completed.
'V
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 3 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 3
Page 1 of 2
Event Description: Dropped Control Rod: (C, OATCISRO) (TS)
When directed by the Lead Examiner Group 2, rod #6 drops into the
cor6
Position
OATC
Awlicants Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
Statalarms
1 SA-2/B-l0, CRD Position Error
Position Indicating Panel
API indication of dropped rod on individual meter
In limit (zero %) green light on respective dropped rod.
Loss of respective dropped rod out limit (100%) red light.
Amber 7 asymmetric lights on the dropped rod and the entire
group.
Diamond Panel indications
9 asymmetric lamp.
Group In Limit (green) lamp on respective group.
Crew will use Plant Transient Response process to stabilize the
plant.
Acknowledge and verbalize to the SRO the most important Statalarm
received for the failure.
Verbalize to the SRO reactor power level and direction of movement.
Recognize that a valid runback should be occurring but is not
because the ICs is in manual.
Refer to ARG for 1 SA-2/B-10, CRD Position Error
Inform SRO entry into APlOl5, Dropped Control Rods is
rewired.
The SRO should use the OAC to monitor unit status.
Enter AP/I/A/1700/15, Dropped Control Rods
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 4 of 14
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Appendix D
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 3
Page 2 of 2
- vent Description: Dropped Control Rod: (C, OATCISRO) (TS)
Position
OATC
OATC
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Direct actions per AP/015, Dropped Control Rods.
1. Verify s one dropped control rod or misaligned > 9 (6%) from
group average.
2. Verify Reactor is critical
3. Verify runback to 55% FP in progress.
OATC should determine that a runback is not in progress due
to ICs in manual and initiate a manual runback as directed by
the SRO.
4. Initiate Enclosure 5.1 (Control of Plant Equipment During
Shutdown)
Notify WCC SRO to make notifications
Ensure 1A and 1B MSRH DRN PUMP stopped
Place IFDW-53 and 1FDW-65 (MFDWP Recircs) in
MANUAL and closed
Place 1 HD-37 and 1 HD-52 in DUMP.
Start the 1A and 1 B MFDW Pump's Seal Injection and Aux oil
pumps.
5. Notify I&E (SPOC) to perform the following:
Investigate cause of dropped rod
Prepare to reduce RPS FluxlFlow-Imbalance and RPS High
Flux setpoints.
6. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> verify > 1% SDM with the allowance for inoperable
control rod(s) by performing PT/l/A/I 103/15, Reactivity Balance
Calculations.
7. Refer to TS 3.2.3 Quadrant Power Tilt (QPT)
8. Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, ensure reactor power is less than 60% of the
allowable power per the RCP combination.
Note: The crew may elect to place the Diamond in Auto to let
the unit runback. However going to Auto is blocked by a
malfunction of the auto/manual pushbutton.
9. Begin reducing reactor power to less than 60% with the ICs in
manual.
Verify QPT within COLR limit
When power is being reduced with the ICs in manual this
event is comoleted.
NUREG-I 021, Draft Revision 9
Page 5 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 4
Event Description: IA, RCP High Vibration: (C, BOPISRO)
Position
Page 1 of 1
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Statalarm ISA-9/D-2 (RC PUMP VIBRATION HIGH) will alarm.
1. The BOP should refer to the ARG
2. Verify RCP vibration conditions by using RCP OAC Display
Group RCP
3. Refer to AP/016, Abnormal Reactor Coolant Pump Operation.
Determine RCP immediate trip criteria are not met by
referring to Enclosure 5.1 (RCP Immediate Trip Criteria).
Since immediate trip criteria is not met then notify the OSM
and request an evaluation of the RCP vibration condition by
the RCP Component Engineer.
Statalarm 1 SA-9/E2 (RCP VIBRATION EMERG HIGH) will actuate.
1. The BOP should determine that the immediate trip criteria are
now met based on Enclosure 5.1 (RCP Immediate Trip Criteria)
and inform the SRO.
2. The SRO should direct the BOP to:
Verify Reactor power 5 70%
Verify four RCPs operating
Trip the 1Al RCP.
3. Trip the 1Al RCP.
When crew has tripped the RCP this event is completed.
'U
NUREG-I 021, Draft Revision 9
Page 6 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 5
Page 1 of 1
Op-Test No.: -
Event Description: AT,fails HIGH: (I, OATC)
Statalarm ISA-02/B-5 (RC Cold Leg Diff. Temperature High)
will actuate.
FDW flow will ratio based on the failure
" A
FDW flow will increase causing " A loop Tc to decrease.
" B FDW flow will decrease causing " B loop Tc to increase.
This will cause actual ATcto increase
OATC
Diagnose the ATcfailure by observing the ATc meter on 1 UBI. It
should return to zero but is staying a + 3.5 degrees.
Take the Feedwater Masters to MANUAL and re-ratio feedwater
using the loop Tc meters to return actual ATc to near zero.
May refer to AP/28 (ICs Instrument Failures)
When the OATC has re-ratioed FDW and returned Tc to near
zero or when directed by the lead examiner this event is
completed.
i/
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 7 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
3p-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 6
Page 1 of 1
Event Description: Second dropped Control Rod (Manual Reactor Trip): (M, OATCISRO)
Time -
Position
OATC
Applicants Actions or Behavior
After reactor power has been reduced and when directed by the
lead examiner a second control rod will drop.
Plant response:
Statalarm
API indication of dropped rod on individual meter
In limit (zero %) green light on respective dropped rod.
Amber 7 asymmetric lights on the dropped rod and the entire
group.
Crew response:
1SA-2/D-10 (CRD Continuous Boron Dilute Permit) actuates
The OATC should determine that a second control rod has
dropped into the core by observing the CRD PI Panel and
MANUALLY TRIP THE REACTOR. OATC will attempt to trip
the reactor by depressing the reactor trip pushbutton.
Note: The reactor will NOT trip when the button is depressed.
SRO should ENSURE that a manual reactor trip is performed.
u
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
After the reactor pushbutton has been depressed this event is
completed.
Page 8 of 14
'ii
ii
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
-
3p-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 7
Page 1 of 4
Event Description: CT-1 Lockout and an ATWS: (C, ALL)
When the manual reactor trip push button is depressed, the reactor will not trip and an
ATWS will occur. When reactor power is less than 5% the turbine will be tripped and
CT-1 (startup transformer) will lockout, which will result in a loss of power. Power will
be restored from Keowee Unit 1 in approximately 35 seconds via the underground
Dath and CT-4.
, =
Time
Position
OATC
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Recognize that the Reactor should have tripped and begin
performing Immediate Manual Actions.
Depress REACTOR TRIP pushbutton
The OATC should recognize that Power Range Nls are not C 5%
FP and perform Rule 1. (CT-24)
Verify that at least one Power Range NI is 25% FP.
Initiate manual control rod insertion to the IN LIMIT.
Open IHP-24 & IHP-25 (IA and 1B BWSTSuction)
Ensure 1A or 1B HPIP is operating.
Start I C HPIP.
Verify reactor power < 5% FP and decreasing
Open IHP-26 & IHP-27 (1Aand 1B HP Injection)
Dispatch operators to the Cable Room and to the 600V Load
Centers 1x9 and 2x1 to de-energize the CRD System.
Notify the Procedure Director to GO TO UNPP tab.
Adjust FDW to match reactor power and maintain Tave near
setpoint.
L/
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 9 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario OLt ine
Form ES-D-1
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 7
Page 2 of 4
Dp-Test No.: -
Event Description: CT-1 Lockout and an ATWS: (C, ALL)
When the manual reactor trip push button is depressed, the reactor will not trip and an
ATWS will occur. When reactor power is less than 5% the turbine will be tripped and
CT-1 (startup transformer) will lockout, which will result in a loss of power. Power will
be restored from Keowee Unit 1 in approximately 35 seconds via the underground
Dath and CT-4.
Position
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Transfer to the UNPP tab from IMAs and direct the following
actions:
Announce plant conditions
Verify Main FDW available.
IAAT &I power range Nls are 4%
FP, THEN ensure the
turbine-generator is tripped.
Note: This action will result in a unit loss of power for S= 35
seconds due to CT-1 lockout.
Ensure Rule 1 is in progress or complete.
Verify 4 wide range Nls 21 % FP.
Maximize letdown.
Verify Main FDW available.
Adjust Main FDW flow as necessary to control RCS
temperature.
Verify overcooling NOT in progress.
Ensure makeup to the LDST is secured.
WHEN &I Nls are 4 % FP, AND decreasing, THEN continue in
this tab.
Note: Due to sequence of events all steps may not be
completed.
ii
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 10 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
ATWS '
(startul
restore
and Cl
Time -
-
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 7
Page 3 of 4
Event Description: CT-1 Lockout and an ATWS: (C, ALL)
When the manual reactor trip push button is depressed, the reactor will not trip and an
II occur. When reactor power is less than 5% the turbine will trip and CT-1
ransformer) will lockout, which will result in a loss of power. Power will be
from Keowee Unit 1 in approximately 35 seconds via the underground path
Position
OATC
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Perform symptoms check and when asked report no other
symptoms.
When power is regained on the Main Feeder Buses perform AP/11,
Recovery from Loss of Power.
9
IAAT Pzr level > 8 0 [ I 8 0 acc],
THEN ensure Pzr heaters in AUTO
Verify load shed is complete as indicated by LOAD SHED
COMPLETE on
Dispatch an operator to perform Encl 5.2 (Restoring Loads
Outside the Control Room).
1 Dispatch an operator to perform Encl 5.4 (Actions to Restore
ESV System to Normal Operation).
1 Verify condenser vacuum maintained.
. Verify IA header pressures 2 90 psig:
.
ES Module (Channel 1 or 2).
Determine the Main Feedwater Pumps have tripped as a result of
the loss of power and perform RULE 3 (Loss of Main or Emergency
FDW).
9
Ensure any EFDWP operating
1 .
Initiate Enclosure 5.9 (Extended EFDW Operation)
Throttle Motor Driven EFDW as necessary to prevent
overcooling.
ii
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 11 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 7
Page 4 of 4
Event Description: CT-1 Lockout and an ATWS: (C, ALL)
When the manual reactor trip push button is depressed, the reactor will not trip and an
ATWS will occur. When reactor power is less than 5% the turbine will trip and CT-1
[startup transformer) will lockout, which will result in a loss of power. Power will be
restored from Keowee Unit 1 in approximately 35 seconds via the underground path
and CT-4.
Time I
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
When the turbine is tripped and power is lost:
Two possible paths
1.
GO TO the Blackout tab per parallel actions page
In the blackout tab, the crew will: verify power restored,
initiate AP/11 (Recovery from Loss of Power) and transfer to
Subsequent Actions.
2.
If power is restored prior to transferring to blackout tab, SRO
will complete UNPP tab.
When power is regained to the 4160-switchgear use a
Parallel Actions transfer from the yellow page to initiate
AP/11 (Recovery from Loss of Power).
Determine that reactor power is s 1%.
Direct an RO to throttle HPI per Rule 6 and adjust Letdown
if needed.
3. Transfer to Subsequent Actions
Verify all control rods are inserted
Verify Main FDW is not operating and ensure SG level are
approaching 240 XSUR.
Verify all 4160V switchgear (ITC, ITD, ITE) energized.
This event is completed when power is regained to 4160V
switchgear, reactor is shutdown, EOP Subsequent Actions are
in progress, and when directed by the lead examiner.
u
NUREG-I 021, Draft Revision 9
Page 12 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
3p-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 1
Event No.: 8
Page 1 of 2
- vent Description: Keowee Unit 1 Emergency Lockout, Unit Blackout: (M, ALL)
Note: When directed by the lead examiner Keowee Unit 1 Emergency Lockout will
Position
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Keowee Unit 1 Emergency Lockout will result in a Unit Blackout.
1. Determine that CC and HPI are lost and initiate AP/25 (SSF
Emergency Operating Procedure)
The SRO will make a "Parallel Actions" transfer to the
Blackout tab.
Close 1 HP-31 (RCP Seal Flow Control) and 1 HP-21 (RCP
Seal Return).
Determine SGs are not being feed and dispatch operators
to the Atmospheric Dump Valves.
Note: Since the TD EFDW Pump is 00s no source of FDW is
available to the SGs until power is restored from CT- 5.
Notify SSF operators that feeding with SSF ASW is
required.
Initiate Enclosure 5.38 (Restoration of Power)
Perform Enclosure 5.38 (Restoration of Power) (CT-8)
1. Verify MFBI and MFB2 de-energized
2. Determine CT-1 has no voltage
3. Verify both Standby Buses de-energized
4. Verify all Keowee Units operating
Note: Keowee 1 emergency locked out, Keowee 2 operating.
5. Notify Keowee operator to give Oconee Control for Keowee 2
6. Close ACB-4 (Unit 2 EMER FDR)
7. Verify CT-4 voltage 4160
8. Place CT-4 Bus 1 and 2 AUTO/MAN switches in MANUAL
9. Place STBY BUS 1 and 2 SYNCHRONIZING switch in ON.
i/
NUREG-I 021, Draft Revision 9
Page 13 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Event No.: 8
Page 2 of 2
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 1
ivent Description: Keowee Unit 1 Emergency Lockout, Unit Blackout: (M, ALL)
Position
___
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
I O . Close SKI and SK2
11. Place STBY BUS 1 and 2 SYNCHRONIZING switch in OFF.
12. Verify Standby Bus #I
energized.
13. Notify SRO Standby Bus # I is energized.
14. Place the following switches in MANUAL:
MFBI AUTOIMAN
MFB2 AUTOIMAN
STANDBY 1 AUTOlMAN
STANDBY 2 AUTOIMAN
15. Ensure the following breakers open:
N1 andN2
E l and E2
16. Close S I and S2
Note: This will power the Main Feeder Buses.
17. Verify any of the following energized:
18. Notify SRO of status of 4160V SWGR
19. Use RULE 3 to establish EFDW flow to SGs.
ITC, ITD, ITE
i/
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
This event and the exam are complete when plant is in a safe
configuration i.e. EFW is restored.
Page 14 of 14
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Facility: Oconee
Scenario No.: 2, Initial Submittal R1 Op-Test No.:
Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
Turnover:
100% Reactor Power (IC-41)
AMSACDSS bypassed for I&E testing
SASS in manual for I&E testing
A Condensate Booster Pump OOS, breaker to be replaced
Keowee Unit 2 00s for unplanned reasons
Oa
Pre-Insert
AMSACIDSS bypassed
Ob
Pre-Insert
NI-9 00s
MN1082
Oc
Pre-Insert
A AFlS circuit disabled
B AFlS circuit disabled
Od
Pre-Insert
Keowee Unit 2 Emergency Lockout
MEL180
Oe
Pre-Insert
l a
Override
Low A CFT Pressure (N2 makeup)
I b
Override
IN-298 (N2 Fill CFT 1A) fails OPEN
2
MPSO9O
C, OATC, SRO
IHP-120 (RC Volume Control) Fails closed
ES Channels 7 and 8 fail to automatically actuate
3
I MCS004
I I, OATC, SRO I Controlling Tave fails HIGH
4
1 Override
1 Seismic event (PRA)
1A RBCU rupture (TS)
5
MPS020
C, ALL
1 B SG Tube leak 5 gpm (TS)
6
MPS020
C. ALL
16 SG Tube leak increases to 100 aDm
I
I
I
.
7
I R, OATC, SRO I Unit Shutdown
a
MSS360,50 I M,ALL
I 1A Main Steam line break in RB
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 1 of 11
ii
L
.-
.
. ~.
.
__
Scenario dJtline
Form ES-D-1
.
. .
Appendix D . ..
Scenario No.: 2
Event No.:
Page 1 of 1
3p-Test No.: -
Event Description: Low "A" CFT pressure (N2 makeup) (N, BOPERO)
Position
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
1 SA-08/A-I 1, CF TANK " A
PRESS HIGH/LOW will actuate.
Crew response:
1, The crew should refer to the ARG.
2. Refer to OP/l104/001, Enclosure 4.7 (Pressure Makeup To CFTs
Using Nitrogen) to adjust CFT pressure.
Direct an NE0 to open IN-I37 (CFTs Supply)
> Cue: Time compression used to open 1 N-137
- J!
@@,
Monitor 1A CFT pressure
I/@"
WHEN pressurization of 1A CFT is complete, close 1 N-298.
When IN-298 (N2 Fill CFT IA) is taken to CLOSE or when
directed bv the lead examiner this event is completed.
LJ
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 2 of 11
~
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
.-
~
Appendix D
Scenario No.: 2
Event No.: 2
Page 1 of 1
Dp-Test No.: __
Event Description: IN-298 (N2 Fill CFT 1A) fails OPEN (C, BOPISRO)
Time -
-
Position
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
1, Determine 1 N-298 has failed to close:
Red "open" light lit
CFT pressure continues to increase
2. Inform the SRO.
3. Direct the NE0 to close IN-I37 (CFTs Suppl!
Note: I f IN-137 is not closed the CFT pressure will continue to
increase, possibly outside of TS limits.
4. Verify 1A CFT pressure is stable.
When CFT pressurization is stopped or when directed by the
lead examiner this event is completed.
L-.,
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 3 of 11
otls
otls
31vo
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 2
Event No.: 3
Page 1 of 1
Event Description: Controlling Tave fails HIGH (I, OATC/SRO)
When directed by the lead examiner controlling Tave will fail high.
Position
OATC
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
1, 1SA-O2/A-12, ICs Tracking, will actuate due to neutron and
feedwater cross-limits.
2. Controlling Tave will indicate = 596.4" F.
3. Actual loop A & B Tave will decrease until operator stops
4. RCS pressure and temperature will decrease.
Crew response:
1. When the ICs TRACKING alarm is received, the candidates
should utilize the "Plant Transient Response" process to stabilize
the plant and recognize that the controlling Tave has failed. RX
will trip on variable low pressure with no operator action.
2. Verbalize to the SRO reactor power level and direction of
movement.
3. Place the FDW Masters in manual and stabilize the plant. Use
control rods and FDW to stabilize the plant
4. The SRO should:
Note: The ICs will remain in manual for the remainder of the
scenario.
Refer to AP/28, ICs Instrument Failures
Contact SPOC to repair controlling Tave.
When the plant is stable or when directed by the lead
examiner this event is completed.
L/
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 5 of 11
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Scenario No.: 2
Event No.: 4
Page 1 of 1
3p-Test No.: -
Event Description:
Seismic event (PRA)
1A RBCU rupture (C, BOPISRO) (TS)
Position
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
1, 1 SA-9/B-9, LPSW RBCU A Cooler Rupture will actuate and RB
normal sump level will increase.
The BOP should refer to ARG for 1 SA-9/B-9
Verify alarm is valid by checking RBCU 1A Inlet Flow and
RBCU 1A delta flow.
Verify ILPSW-18 (RBCU 1A Oultlet) open
Verify adequate LPSW flow is available; check LPSW pump
operation
Monitor RBNS Level for any unexplained increase (Notify
Chemistry to sample RBNS for boron to determine if a
cooler rupture has occurred).
Diagnose a Cooler Rupture is indicated and Isolate the 1A
RBCU Cooler.
2. The SRO should determine that isolation of LPSW to a RBCU
places the Unit in Tech Spec 3.6.5 Condition B (7 day
completion Time).
Note: The control room will receive a phone call from security
that indicates that a tremor has been felt but no damage has
been noted.
3. The SRO may refer to AP/05, Earthquake.
Dispatch operators to perform plant inspections
Note: No damage will be reported.
- Notify SPOC to develop the Strong Motion Accelerometer
tape.
- Verify NO fuel handling activities in progress.
- These items may not be completed depending on how soon
the next event is started.
Note: Team may decide at this time to begin a unit shutdown.
Refer to event 6.
When the RBCU has been isolated, or at the direction of the
Lead Examiner this event is completed.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page6of 11
W
'v
Form ES-D-1
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Page 1 of 2
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 2
Event No.: 5
- vent Description: 1B SG Tube leak (5 gpm) (C, ALL) (TS)
I B SG tube leak occurs following RBCU isolation or when directed
bfl
Position
ALL
~
lead evaluator.
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
1. The following alarms actuate:
1SA-8/B-9, RM PROCESS MONITOR RADIATION HIGH
1SA-8/D-10, RM CSAE EXHAUST RADIATION HIGH
2. PZR level will decrease.
Crew response:
1. Diagnose and take actions for a Tube leak in the 1 B SG:
2. Refer to the ARG for the following alarms:
ISA-8/B-9, RM PROCESS MONITOR RADIATION HIGH
1SA-8/D-10, RM CSAE EXHAUST RADIATION HIGH
3. Refer to AP/31 (Primary to Secondary Leakage)
Monitor primary parameters; PZR Level and LDST level to
determine that gross leakage exist and transfer to step
4.71.
Determine OTSG tube leak size is initially less than 25 gpm.
Greater than 25 will require entering the EOP.
Log RIA readings (a rough log is adequate)
Initiate a Unit shutdown to met requirements of Encl. 5.1
(Unit Shutdown Requirements). (Per Enclosure 5.1 reduce
power < 50% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />).
P Initiate a unit shutdown using OP/1/AJ1102/004
(Operation At Power)
Note: A shutdown with the ICs in manual is required.
When the SRO has directed a manual Unit shutdown or when
directed by the Lead Examiner the event is completed.
u
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page7of 11
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 2
Event No.: 6
Page 1 of 1
Event Description: 1B SG Tube leak ( 100 gpm) (C, ALL) (TS)
Position
Aoolicants Actions or Behavior
1. Primary inventory should be monitored and when the leak rate is
determined to be > 25 gpm transfer to the SGTR tab of the EOP.
2. EOP SGTR tab will perform the following:
Determine that the Reactor is not tripped.
Maintain PZR level 220 inches using Enclosure 5.5 (Pzr
and LDST Level Control).
k Open HP-24 and 25 (IA and 1 B BWST Suction)
k Close IHP-5
Monitor RIA-I6 (A
MS Header) and 17 (B MS Header) to
identify all SGs with tube ruptures.
Start the Outside Air Booster Fans on both Units 1 and 3.
>
w:pz?nd
white Tag TB Sump pump breakers.
3. The SRO should direct the OATC to begin a unit shutdown at a
rate between 9.9% per hour and 20% per minute (MAXIMUM
RUNBACK).
When the SRO has entered the EOP SGTR tab or when directed
by the Lead Examiner the event and scenario is completed.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 8 of 11
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 2
Event No.: 7
Page 1 of 1
Event Description: Unit Shutdown (R, OATC)
Position
OATCISRO
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
The OATC will use the FDW Masters and the Diamond to reduce
power while monitoring Reactor Power, Tave, and other plant
parameters.
If the reactor trips automatically the team must return to IMAs.
The BOP will utilize Enclosure 5.19 (Control of Plant Equipment
During Shutdown for SGTR).
1. Notify WCC SRO to make notifications
2. Stop 1A and 1B MSRH Drain Pump
3. Place 1 FDW-53 and 1 FDW-65 in manual and closed. (Located
on 1VB3)
4. Place 1 HD-37 and 1 HD-52 in DUMP.
5. Start the both FDWPs Seal Injection and Auxiliary Oil Pumps.
6. When Reactor power is 5 80%, stop 1 E l and 1 E2 Heater Drain
Pumps.
7. Transfer electrical auxiliaries
Place ITA AUTOlMAN transfer switch in MAN
Place ITB AUTOlMAN transfer switch in MAN
Close ITA SU 6.9 KV FDR
Close ITB SU 6.9 KV FDR
Place MFBI AUTO/MAN transfer switches in MAN
Place MFB2 AUTO/MAN transfer switches in MAN
Close El, MFBI STARTUP FDR
4. Close E2, MFB2 STARTUP FDR
Note: the team may manually trip the reactor if PZR level cannot
be maintained with full HPI. This may occur because of the tube
leak and RCS cooldown.
Note: If the reactor is manually tripped activate event 8.
When a unit shutdown of > 5% has occurred or when directed
by the lead examiner this event is concluded.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page9of 11
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Scenario No.: 2
Event No.: 8
Page 1 of 2
lp-Test No.: __
- vent Description: 1A Main Steam line break in RB (M, ALL)
1A main steam line break will occur following event 7 as directed by
Time -
the
Position
ALL
OATC
OATC
rd examiner.
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
1. Statalarm 1 SA-OZA-9, MS Press HighlLow, actuates
2. A and B main steam (MS) pressure decreases
3. Reactor trips.
RCS may saturate
B MS line pressure stops decreasing
A MS line pressure continues to decrease
Crew response:
1. The OATC will perform and verify IMAs.
Depress REACTOR TRIP pushbutton
Verify reactor power < 5% FP and decreasing
Depress TURBINE TRIP pushbutton
Verify all turbine stop valves closed
Verify RCP seal injection available
2. The BOP will perform a symptoms check.
3. The Crew should respond to the MSLB in the IA SG
4. The BOP will perform Rule #5 (Main Steam Line Break) after
receiving concurrence from the SRO. (CT-17)
Stop 1A MDEFDW Pump
5. If SCM = O°F then the OATC will perform Rule #2 (Loss of SCM)
after receiving concurrence from the SRO. (CT-1, CT-2)
0
Initiate both trains of MSLB isolation
Ensure both Main FDW pumps tripped
Steam 1B SG to maintain CETCs constant
Trip ALL RCPs within 2 minutes
Ensure open 1 HP-24 and 1 HP-25
Ensure ALL HPI pumps operating
Ensure open 1 HP-26 and 1 HP-27
Verify required HPI flow per header
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 10 of 11
-
~
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 2
Event No.: 8
Page 2 of 2
Event Description: 1A Main Steam line break in RB (M, ALL)
Time
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Verify TBVs available
Feed all intact SGs
Control EFDW as required to raise level to intact SGs to
proper setpoint per RULE 7 (SG Feed Control)
Trip both Main FDWPs
Place FDW block valve switches (1 FDW-33, 31,42,40) in
CLOSE:
Maintain SG pressure < RCS pressure
6. The SRO will Parallel Action to transfer to the Excessive Heat
Transfer (EHT) tab and direct the Crews actions as follows:
7. Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation) will be performed.
8. Excessive Heat Transfer (EHT) tab will:
Diagnose that ES Channels 7 and 8 have not actuated.
Depress the ES Channels 7 and 8 trip pushbutton on 1UB1.
Verify excessive heat transfer stopped
Throttle HPI to stabilize RCS pressure and maintain PZR
level > 8 0 (1 8 0 acc)
Feed and steam all intact SGs to stabilize RCS P/T. (CT-11)
Minimize SCM using the following methods as necessary:
9 De-energizing all PZR heaters
9 Using PZR spray
9 Throttling HPI
Initiate Enclose 5.16 (SG Tube-to-Shell A T Control)
GO TO Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) tab
(CT-7)
When the SRO has transferred to the SGTR tab or when
directed by the Lead Examiner the event and scenario is
completed.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 11 of 11
Appendix D
Scenario Outline
Form ES-D-1
Facility: Oconee
Scenario No.: 3, initial Submittal
Op-Test NO.:
Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
e
25% Reactor Power (IC-45), startup in progress
Turnover:
e
e
e
Unit 1 TD EFDW Pump 00s to repair oil leak
NI-9 00s. to be replaced next outage
Keowee Unit 2 00s for unplanned reasons
Keowee Unit 1 aligned to underground
Operability test of Keowee Unit 1 is to be performed per PT/620/009 (Keowee Hydro
Operation) after turnover and before startup continues. ONS to perform remote
Keowee start.
Event I
Malf. No. I Event Type*
No.
I
Event
Description
shaft and standby HPI
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Page 1 of 11
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Appendix D
Operator Actions
Form ES-D-2
3p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1
Page 1 of 1
Event Description:
Operability test Keowee Unit 1 (N, BOPISRO)
Keowee Unit 1 Gen Field Flashina Breaker fails to OPEN
Time
-
-
a
Position
-
omatically (C, BOPISRO)
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Direct BOP to perform PT/620/009 (Keowee Hydro Operation) to
operability test unit 1 Keowee underground.
Use OP/1106/019 (Keowee Hydro At Oconee) to perform an
Automatic Startup of Keowee Unit 1
Initial Conditions
1. Verify applicable Statalarms and breaker positions
2. Notify Keowee operator to give Oconee control of Keowee # 1.
3. Review Limits and Precautions
Procedure
1. Place UNIT 1 LOCAL MASTER switch to START AND hold until
Keowee Unit starts.
2. Verify the following:
GEN 1 FIELD BREAKER closes
GEN 1 SUPPLY BREAKER closes
GEN 1 FIELD FLASHING BREAKER closes
3. Ensure GEN 1 FIELD FLASHING BREAKER trips.
Candidate should diagnose that the breaker did not open
automatically and should open the breaker manually and
initiate a work request or contact SPOC.
SRO should direct the BOP to continue with the startup.
Note: GEN FIELD FLASHING BREAKER automatically trips
s
45 seconds after receiving close signal. Failure of breaker to
trip automatically does NOT make the KHU inoperable. Startup
procedure may continue.
4. Determines KHU #I is operable when test complete
5. Verify ACB-1, Keowee 1 Generator Breaker, closed.
5. Verify Unit 1 EMER FDR ACB 3 closed
7. Verify - 4.16 KV on CT4 Volts (2AB3)
3. Close SKI and SK2 (CT4 STBY BUS 1/2 FEEDER)
3. Shutdown Keowee #I.
Event is complete when operability test is complete or when
directed by the lead examiner.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 2 of 11
Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2
Page 1 of 2
Ip-Test No.: -
ivent Description:
A HPI Pump sheared shaft and the standby HPI pump fails to
auto start: (C, OATC)
Time -
-
Position
OATC
OATC
Applicants Actions or Behavior
lant response:
Statalarms:
ISA-2/B-2 (HP RCP Seal Injection Flow HighlLow)
ISA-2/C-2 (HP Injection Pump Disch. Header Pressure
HighlLow)
3oard indications:
RC Makeup Flow = 0 gpm
1A HPI Pump = 0 amps
PZR level will begin to decrease and LDST level will begin to
increase.
Crew response:
1. Refer to ARG for above Statalarms
2. SRO should refer to AP/014 (Loss of Normal Makeup andlor
RCP Seal Injection)
Verify no HPI pump operating
Close 1 HP-5 (Letdown Isolation)
Ensure IHP-120 (RC Volume Control) in HAND and closed
Place 1 HP-31 (RCP Seal Flow Control) in HAND and closed
Start standby HPI pump (1 B HPI pump)
Slowly open IHP-31 in small increments until = 8 gprnlRCP is
achieved.
Re-establish normal makeup through 1 HP120.
Reduce IHP-7 demand to 0%.
Close 1 HP-6
Ensure the following open:
F IHP-1
9 IHP-2
9 IHP-3
9 IHP-4
Open 1 HP-5
Throttle open 1 HP-7 for = 20 gpm letdown flow.
Open 1 HP-6
Adjust 1 HP-7 for desired letdown flow.
Place IHP-31 in auto.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page3of 11
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2
Page 2 of 2
Event Description:
A HPI Pump sheared shaft and the standby HPI pump fails to
auto start: IC. OATC)
. ,
Applicants Actions or Behavior
3. Refer to Tech Spec 3.5.2 High Pressure Injection
Condition A
Completion Time: 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />
Required Action: Restore HPI pump to OPERABLE status
Note: Due to sequence of events, SRO may not review the TS
during the scenario. Follow-up questions may be required to
ensure knowledge of this competency.
Event is complete when normal makeup and letdown is
established or when directed by the lead examiner.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 4 of 11
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3
Page 1 of 1
Event Description:
Controllina NI fails LOW: [I, OATC) (TS)
Time
-
-
Position
OATC
-
._
I . ,
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
Statalarm 1SA9/A-12 (ICs Tracking)
Diamond will transfer to MANUAL, because indicated reactor
power is < 1.5%.
Tave will increase and actual reactor power will decrease.
Crew response:
1. Crew should use Plant Transient Response to stabilize the plant
by placing both FDW Masters in MANUAL.
2. Adjust CR and FDW as required to stabilize the plant.
Note: ICs will remain in MANUAL for the reminder of the
scenario.
ii
NUREG-I 021, Draft Revision 9
Event is complete when plant is stable or when directed by the
lead examiner.
Page 5 of 11
lp-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4
Page 1 of 1
- vent Description:
Loss of Instrument Air (C, BOP)
Time
= Position
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
D
Statalarm ISA-4/C-5 (Aux Bldg Air HDR PR Low) activates
D
IA pressure decreasing on Aux and Turb Building gauges located
on 1UB2.
Crew response:
1. Refer to ARG for 1SA-4/C-5.
0
Start Primary IA Compressor
e
2. AP/22 (Loss of Instrument Air)
Send NE0 to start all backup IA compressors.
Send operators to check fro IA line ruptures or open valves.
Refer to AP/22 (Loss of Instrument Air)
Using paging system, request that plant personnel stop using
service and IA.
Direct Unit 2 to dispatch an operator to start the Diesel Air
Compressor.
IAAT Feedwater flow cannot be controlled, trip Reactor and
all Main FDW pumps.
IAAT two or more CRD temperatures are > 180°F, trip
Reactor.
Using paging system, request that plant personnel stop using
service and IA.
IAAT Aux IA press 5 88 psig dispatch operator to verify Unit 1
Aux IA Compressor is operating.
IAAT IA header pressure is < 80 psig and letdown is desired:
Place IHP-14 (LDST Bypass) to NORMAL
Open IHP-13 (Purification IX Bypass)
Verify Letdown Filter available
Open IHP-17 (IA Letdown Filter Inlet)
Open IHP-6 (Letdown Orifice Stop)
Adjust IHP-7 to obtain desired letdown flow.
Note: If reactor trips, continue to next event.
Note: IA leak will be reDaired after letdown is aligned.
Event is complete when AP/22 actions are being performed or
when directed by the lead examiner.
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 6 of 11
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5
Page 1 of 1
Event Description:
Main FDW Pump trips and the turbine Fails to trip (C, OATC)
Position
OATC
u
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
1A Main FDW pump trips resulting in a reactor trip.
The Main Turbine should trip but does not. This will result in a
reduction steam pressure in both SG until actions are taken to
trip the turbine. The will result in RCS overcooling until tripped.
Crew response:
2. OATC will perform Immediate Manual Actions and when
determine that the turbine did not trip he should stop both EHC
pumps, which will cause the turbine to trip.
3. BOP will perform a symptom check.
Event is complete when EHC pumps have been tripped or when
directed by the lead examiner.
Page 7 of 11
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6
Page 1 of 2
Event Description:
A
TBVs fails open and IMS-17 (A TBV Block) fails to close:
(M, OATC)
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Note: The A TBVs will fail open at the same time as the turbine
trip.
Plant response:
The A
TBVs will indicate full open. The B TBVs will be
throttled.
The RCS will begin to slowly cool off
A
Main Steam line will begin to depressurize
Crew response:
1. The crew may diagnose the TBVs failed open and with SRO
guidance try to control SG pressure by taking the TBVs to
manual. (This will not work)
2. After trying to control pressure with the TBVs in manual, the SRO
may direct them to close IMS-17 (A
TBV Block) but it will not
close.
3. An RO should initiate Rule 5 (Main Steam Line Break). (CT-17)
Select OFF on the A MDEFDWP.
Ensure both Min FDWPTs are tripped
Close 1 FDW-315
Close 1 FDW-33 and 1 FDW-31.
Adjust 1 B SG to maintain CETCs constant.
Ensure Rule 3 (Loss Of Main or Emergency FDW) in
progress.
Ensure Rule 8 (Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS)) is in
progress or complete.
When notified by the SRO, exit rule.
u
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page 8 of 11
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6
Page 2 of 2
Event Description:
A TBVs fails open and IMS-I7 (A TBV Block) fails to close:
IM. OATC)
Time -
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
4. The SRO should make a Parallel Actions transfer to the
Excessive Heat Transfer tab.
5. Excessive Heat Transfer tab will:
If any SG pressure < 550 psig ensure Rule 5 (Main Steam
Line Break) in progress or complete.
Verify excessive heat transfer stopped.
Verify level in both SGs < 96% O.R.
Throttle HPI to stabilize RCS pressure and maintain Pzr level
> 100.
Verify letdown in service.
Ensure 1B MDEFDWP operating.
Verify B SG has an intact secondary boundary (intact SG).
Ensure open 1 FDW-382 and 1 FDW369.
Feed and Steam B SG to stabilize RCS P/T. (CT-1 I)
Event is complete when Rule 5 is complete and Excessive Heat
Transfer tab is in progress or when directed by the lead
examiner.
ii
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
Page9of 11
Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7
Page 1 of 2
Dp-Test No.: __
Event Description:
A SG Tube Rupture: (M, ALL)
Time -
-
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Plant response:
Statalarms:
1SA-8/A-9 (RM Area Monitor Radiation High)
1SA-8/B-9 (RM Process Monitor Radiation High)
1SA-8/D-10 (RM CSAE Exhuast Radiation High)
Board indications:
PRZ level and RCS pressure will decrease.
Crew response:
SRO should remain in Excessive Heat Transfer Tab and perform the
following:
1. Verify initiating Rule 8 (Pressurized Thermal Shock PTS)) is not
required.
2. Verify aux steam header being supplied from another unit.
3. Open AS-8
4. Close 1 SSH-1, 1 SSH-3, and 1 SSH-9.
5. Notify Chemistry to determine RCS Boron concentration.
6. Notify RP and Secondary Chemistry to check for indications of a
SGTR.
7. IAAT the following conditions exist:
0
ES Bypass Permit satisfied
All SCMs > 0°F
RCS pressure controllable
THEN Bypass ES as required
8. While maintaining RCP NPSH and Pzr level minimize SCM using
the following methods as necessary:
De-energizing all Pzr heaters
Using Pzr spray
Throttling HPI
Using PORV
NUREG-1021, Draft Revision 9
PageIOof11
3p-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7
Page 2 of 2
Event Description:
A SG Tube Rupture: (M, ALL)
Position
u
NUREG-1021. Draft Revision 9
Applicants Actions or Behavior
9. Initiate Encl. 5.16 (SG Tube-to-Shell AT Control)
IAAT any SG tube-to-Shell AT approaches either limit THEN
take appropriate action.
SGTR tab will:
1. Verify Reactor is tripped and Initiate Encl. 5.5 (Pzr and LDST
Level Control)
2. Start A and B Outside Air Booster Fans on Unit 1&2 and Unit 3.
3. Dispatch operator to open TBS pump breakers.
(CT-27)
Event is complete when TBS pump breakers have been opened
or when directed by the lead examiner.
Page 11 of 11