ML031500775
| ML031500775 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 05/30/2003 |
| From: | Howell A NRC/RGN-IV/DRP |
| To: | NRC/RGN-IV/DRP |
| References | |
| Download: ML031500775 (22) | |
Text
May 30, 2003 MEMORANDUM TO:
File FROM:
Arthur T. Howell III, Director /RA/
Division of Reactor Projects
SUBJECT:
BRIEFING SLIDES FOR JUNE 5-6, 2003 IAEA/OECD-NEA WORKSHOP The attached briefing material will be provided as a handout during a June 5-6, 2003 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sponsored workshop, which will be held in the IAEAs headquarters office in Vienna, Austria. The focus of the workshop will be on the nuclear safety management and safety culture implications of a number of recent events involving both domestic and foreign facilities. I will use the attachment to provide a presentation on the NRCs Davis-Besse Reactor Vessel Head Degradation Lessons-Learned Task Force Final Report, dated September 30, 2003.
Attachment:
As stated
Memo to File ADAMS: Yes G No Initials: __ATH__
G Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive G Non-Sensitive S:\\DRP\\DRPDIR\\Memo LLTRVIENNASLIDESADAMS.wpd RIV:D:DRP ATHowell III:lao
/RA/
5/30/2003 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
Nuclear Safety Management and Safety Culture Lessons-Learned from Recent Events IAEA /OECD-NEA Workshop June 5-6, 2003 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS)
Reactor Vessel Head Degradation Lessons-Learned United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Presentation at the
- NRC has taken the initiative to conduct lessons-learned reviews for significant issues
Self-critical
Improvements made
Examples
- Indian Point 2 steam generator tube failure (2000)
- NRC insepctions at the South Texas Project (1995)
Overview NRC Lessons-Learned Task Force Background
- Perform independent evaluation
- Review
Reactor oversight process
Regulatory processes
Research activities
International practices
- Identify and recommend improvements Overview Task Force Objectives and Scope
- NRC and U.S. industry recognized potential for this type of condition more than 10 years ago
- Initial conclusion, in the early 1990s, was that vessel head penetration nozzle cracking was not an immediate safety concern
- NRC and DBNPS failed to learn key lessons from past boric acid-induced corrosion events Results Overall Conclusions
- Contributing causes for the lack of prevention
DBNPS failed to assure that plant safety issues would receive appropriate attention
The NRC, DBNPS, and the U.S. nuclear industry failed to adequately review, assess, and follow up on relevant operating experience
The NRC failed to integrate known or available information into its assessments of DBNPSs safety performance Results Overall Conclusions (continued)
- Nuclear safety management and safety culture implications
Staffing levels
Production emphasis
Symptom-based problem solving
Long-standing equipment problems
Management involvement
Questioning attitude
Engineering rigor Results NRC Task Force Assessment of DBNPS
- Nuclear safety management and safety culture implications (continued)
Operating experience awareness
Corrective action program
Employee concerns program (Ombudsman program)
Self-assessments
Procedural compliance
Internal and external communications Results NRC Task Force Assessment of DBNPS
- Technical and programmatic issues
Significant operating experience involving boric acid leakage and corrosion
Generic communication program implementation
Generic issues program implementation
International operating experience involving pressurized water reactor plants Results NRC Lessons
- Technical and programmatic issues (continued)
Assessment and verification of industry technical information
NRC operating experience review and assessment capability
Reactor coolant system leakage assessment
Inspection program implementation Results NRC Lessons
- Technical and programmatic issues (continued)
Integration and assessment of performance data
Guidance and requirements
Staffing and resources
Licensing process guidance and implementation Results NRC Lessons
- NRC inspection, assessment and monitoring
Pre-event/condition
- Problem identification and resolution inspections
- Safety conscience work environment and employee concerns program inspections
- Human performance inspections
- Industry evaluation monitoring
- Allegation follow up inspections and investigations Inspection and Assessment Indirect Methods
Post-event/condition
- Reactive inspections of events and abnormal conditions
- Supplemental inspections
- Accident and incident investigations
- Lessons-learned reviews
- Oversight of plants in extended shutdowns (Manual Chapter 0350 panel)
- Enforcement process Inspection and Assessment Indirect Methods
- Actions stemming from DBNPS experience
Assess Davis-Besse corrective actions by means of an oversight panel (Manual Chapter 0350), including DBNPSs actions to improve and assess its safety culture
- Internal review process
- External review process
- Long-term review process Actions Current and Ongoing Activities
- Actions stemming from DBNPS experience (continued)
Assess current condition of DBNPSs
- Employee concerns program
- Safety conscious work environment
- Safety conscious work environment review team Actions Current and Ongoing Activities
- Actions stemming from DBNPS experience (continued)
Enhance inspection guidance, including providing additional focus on potential influences and indicators
Monitor industry assessment initiatives implemented in response to the DBNPS condition
Monitor international efforts to measure and regulate safety culture, particularly the development of objective measures ACTIONS Current and Ongoing Activities
- Approximately 50 recommendations are being addressed by four action plans
Operating experience
Inspection, assessment, and project management guidance
Barrier integrity requirements Other Actions Technical and Programmatic Actions to Address Lessons-Learned Task Force Recommendations
- Short-term actions
Conduct enhanced inspections of reactor vessel head penetrations, including increased NRC inspection oversight
Conduct an assessment of operating experience programs
Assess a sample of licensee actions in response to other operating experience
- Short-term actions (continued)
Conduct a survey of reactor coolant system leakage detection methods and leakage rates
Enhance inspection and project management guidance
Revise currently planned actions, as appropriate, on the basis of the implications of the South Texas Project bottom mounted instrumentation nozzle cracking Other Actions Technical and Programmatic Actions to Address Lessons-Learned Task Force Recommendations
Revise requirements for inspection of pressure boundary components
Conduct research activities
Evaluate state-of-the-art systems capable of detecting leaks and cracks
Assess leakage rate requirements
Review and improve barrier integrity performance indicators Other Actions
assessment of its regulatory processes as a result of the DBNPS degraded reactor vessel head
- Nuclear safety management and safety culture implications stemming from DBNPS condition are being addressed
NRC Manual Chapter 0350 oversight panel assessments
U.S. industry assessment initiatives
NRC inspection guidance enhancements (indirect)
Closing Remarks Summary