ML020150612

Part 1 of 2, Beaver Valley Units 1 & 2, Emergency Preparedness Implementing Procedures

ML020150612
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	01/07/2002
From:	FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML020150612 (190)

Text

EPP/I-la Unit 1 A5.735B RECOGNITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS Revision 1 Bye tiff I

EPP/I-la Unit 1 EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EFFECTIVE INDEX Issue 8 Rev.

Issue 9 Rev.

0 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

0 1

2 3

Rev.

5 6

7 8

Rev.

0 Rev.

1 OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Safety Related OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision 3-12-87 8-13-87 10-8-87 2-9-88 2-9-89 3-15-89 4-18-89 4-12-90 10-9-90 4-4-91 12-29-92 1-27-93 12-9-93 10-7-94 7-22-98 12-31-99 4-17-01 12-12-01 Revision 1 i

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS A.

Purpose B.

References C.

Responsibilities D.

Action Levels/Precautions E.

Procedure F.

Final Condition G.

Attachments Revision 1 ii

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 A.

PURPOSE 1.0 This procedure describes the immediate actions to be taken to recognize and classify an emergency condition.

2.0 This procedure identifies the four emergency classifications and emergency action levels.

3.0 Reporting requirements for non-emergency abnormal events are provided.

B.

REFERENCES 1.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Preparedness Plan and Implementing Procedures.

2.0 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix E.

3.0 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants 4.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Operating Manual 5.0 NUMARC/NESP-007, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels 6.0 ERS-SFL-91-041-REV 1 (U1/U2 Containment Monitor Readings due to LOCA's with various Source Terms).

7.0 Condition Report #992522 8.0 Condition Report #991327-1 9.0 Unit 1 Technical Specification Amendment 205 and Unit 2 Technical Specification Amendment 101.

10.0 EPPOS #2 "Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions".

11.0 NEI 99-02 "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline" 12.0 Condition Report #00-3939 Revision 1 1

EPP/implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 C.

RESPONSIBILITY The Emergency Director (Shift Supervisor, until properly relieved by a designated alternate) has the responsibility and authority for the performance of the actions prescribed in this procedure.

D.

ACTION LEVELS/PRECAUTIONS/GUIDANCE 1.0 ACTION LEVELS 1.1 An off-normal event has occurred.

1.2 An action step in a plant operating or emergency operating procedure refers to this procedure for classification of the indicated plant condition.

2.0 PRECAUTIONS 2.1 The Emergency Director must review all applicable EALs to ensure that the event is properly classified since a given INDICATOR may be associated with more than one CRITERION. A particular INDICATOR omitted from the fission product barrier matrix may be addressed as an event-based EAL in one of the other tabs.

Event-based EALs may escalate to the fission product barrier matrix. The Emergency Director may need to consider related events (e.g., fire and explosion) or the possible consequences of the event (e.g., fire in an MCC resulting in loss of AC) in classifying an event.

2.2 Continued surveillance and assessment of plant conditions are necessary to ensure that the emergency classification is appropriately revised as conditions change, or as more definitive information is obtained.

2.3 If there is any doubt with regard to assessment of a particular EAL, the EAL Basis Document (i.e., Chapter 4 of the EPP) entry for that EAL can be reviewed.

Classifications shall be consistent with the fundamental definitions of the four emergency classifications (tabulated in Tab 4.7).

2.4 The Emergency Director shall take whatever mitigative or restoration actions are necessary to protect public health and safety. The Emergency Director shall not reject courses of action solely on the basis that the action would result in escalation of the emergency classification.

Revision 1 2

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.0 GUIDANCE 3.1 Structure of the EALs 3.1.1 There are two types of Emergency Action Levels included in this procedure:

3.1.1.1 Barrier-Based EALs:

These EALs address conditions that represent potential losses, or losses, of one or more of the Fuel Clad, RCS, or Containment fission product barriers.

INDICATORs of these conditions include CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION status, fundamental indications such as subcooling or reactor vessel water level, or auxiliary indications such as containment radiation monitor readings. Classifications are based on the number of barriers lost or potentially lost.

3.1.1.2 Event-Based EALs:

These EALs address discrete conditions or events that are generally precursors to fission product barrier degradation, or are otherwise degradations in the level of safety of the plant. Events may be external (e.g., severe weather, earthquakes, loss of offsite power) internal (e.g., fires, explosions, instrumentation failure) or may involve radioactivity releases.

3.1.2 The EALs are grouped by recognition category as follows:

Tab 1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix Tab 2 System Degradation Tab 3 Loss of Power Tab 4 Hazards and ED Judgement Tab 5 Destructive Phenomena Tab 6 Shutdown Systems Degradation Tab 7 Radiological 3.1.3 Each of the EAL tabs includes one or more columns that address one initiating condition (e.g., fires). Each column provides EALs for each of the four emergency classifications, as applicable. A notation adjacent to each EAL identifies the plant operating mode(s) for which the EAL is applicable.

Revision 1 3

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.1.4 Each EAL is comprised of a CRITERION, printed in bold type, and one or more INDICATORs.

The purpose of each is as follows:

3.1.4.1 CRITERION: identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration) All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

3.1.4.2 INDICATOR:

is available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.),

operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Upon occurrence of one or more indicators, the Emergency Director performs an assessment against the criterion.

Depending on the particular condition, this assessment may be as simple as a review of the criterion, an instrument channel check, or a detailed calculation as in the case of a radioactivity release.

3.1.4.3 Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

3.1.4.4 The INDICATORs were selected with the objective of providing unambiguous guidance to assist with assessment of the CRITERION.

There may be other INDICATORs not envisioned by the writers of this procedure that, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, correspond to the CRITERION. In these cases, the Emergency Director should base the declaration on engineering judgment, using the supplied INDICATORs as examples of the severity of the condition.

Revision 1 4

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.2 Common Plant Conditions 3.2.1 IF an event occurs such that both reactor units are affected, e.g.,

tornado, toxic gas offsite, etc., THEN the senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor shall make the appropriate classification and assume the role of Emergency Director.

3.2.2 IF the common plant condition results in a higher emergency classification at one reactor unit, THEN the Nuclear Shift Supervisor from that unit shall make the appropriate classification and assume the role of Emergency Director.

3.3 Mode Applicability 3.3.1 The plant operating mode that existed at the time that the event occurred, prior to any protective system or operator action initiated in response to the condition, is compared to the mode applicability of the EALs.

3.3.2 IF an event occurs, and a lower or higher plant operating mode is reached before the classification can be made, THEN the classification shall be based on the mode that existed at the time that the event occurred.

3.3.3 The fission product barrier matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at mode 4 or higher. An event that occurs in modes 5 or 6 shall not be classified using the fission product barrier matrix, even if mode 4 is entered due to subsequent heatup.

In these cases, Tab 6, Shutdown Systems Degradation, shall be used for classification.

3.4 Transient Events 3.4.1 For some EALs the existence of the event, without regard to duration, is sufficient to warrant classification. In these cases, the appropriate emergency classification is declared as soon as the Emergency Director assessment concludes that the CRITERION is met.

3.4.2 Some EALs specify a duration of occurrence. For these EALs the classification is made when Emergency Director assessment concludes that the specified duration is exceeded or will be exceeded (i.e., condition can not be reasonably rectified before the duration elapses), whichever is sooner.

Revision 1 5

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/J-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.4.3 IF a plant condition meeting an EAL CRITERION is rectified before the specified duration time is exceeded, THEN the event is NOT classified by that EAL. Lower severity EALs, if any, shall be reviewed for possible applicability in these cases.

3.4.4 IF a plant condition meeting an EAL CRITERION is NOT classified at the time of occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g., as a result of routine log or record review) AND the condition no longer exists, THEN an emergency shall NOT be declared. However, reporting under 10 CFR 50.72 may be required. Such a condition could occur, for example, if a followup evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the condition was more severe than earlier believed.

3.4.5 IF an emergency classification was warranted, but the plant condition has been rectified (such that the CRITERION is no longer met) prior to declaration and notification, THEN the following guidance applies:

3.4.5.1 For transient events that would have been declared as UNUSUAL

EVENTS, no emergency is declared.

However, the event shall be reported to those local, state, and Federal agencies designated to receive the initial notification form. These agencies shall be told that the UNUSUAL EVENT condition was rectified upon detection and no emergency is being declared.

3.4.5.2 For transient events that would have been declared as an ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, or GENERAL EMERGENCY, the event shall be declared and the emergency response organization activated.

The EAL CRITERIA for these events has been set at a threshold that warrants declaration even if the initiating condition has been rectified.

Termination can occur when the criteria of EPP/IP-6.2, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery can be satisified.

3.5 Declaration Timing and Assessment Emergency conditions shall be classified as soon as the Emergency Director assessment of the INDICATORs shows that the CRITERION is met. IF the EAL specifies a duration, THEN the event shall be declared as soon as it is determined that the condition cannot be corrected within the specified period.

In either case, the assessment time starts from the indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

Revision 1 6

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.5.1 The assessment time is limited to 15 minutes, except as follows:

3.5.1.1 IF the EAL specifies a duration (e.g., release exceeds 2x TIS for one hour), THEN the assessment time runs concurrently with the required duration AND is the same length (e.g., in this example, one hour).

3.5.1.2 The assessment time and any required duration are NOT additive.

3.5.2 IF the assessment cannot be completed within the specified period, THEN the event must be declared on the basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.

3.6 Bases 3.6.1 Chapter 4 of the BVPS EPP provides the bases for these EALs.

The bases can be used for guidance to assist the Emergency Director in classifying events for which the classification is not immediately apparent.

3.7 Defined Terms 3.7.1 In the EALs, words written in bold uppercase letters are defined terms having specific meanings as they relate to this procedure.

Definitions of these terms are provided on the reverse side of most pages in the EAL section of this procedure. Such terms shall be interpreted as provided in the definitions.

E.

PROCEDURE 1.0 DETERMINE OPERATING MODE THAT EXISTED AT THE TIME THAT THE EVENT OCCURRED PRIOR TO ANY PROTECTION SYSTEM OR OPERATOR ACTION INITIATED IN RESPONSE TO THE EVENT.

2.0 DETERMINE IF THE CONDITION AFFECTS FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS AND, IF SO, PROCEED TO TAB 1.

2.1 IF the condition involves any of the following AND the initial mode was 1-4 THEN proceed to Tab 1 and follow instructions provided AND continue with Step 2.2.

2.1.1 CSF status tree ORANGE PATH or RED PATH conditions 2.1.2 Core exit thermocouple readings above 719 F Revision 1 7

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 2.1.3 Reactor vessel full range water level less than 40% (no RCPs) 2.1.4 Elevated RCS activity >300 p.Ci/gm 2.1.5 Elevated Containment High Range Area Radiation Monitor reading 2.1.6 RCS leakrate large enough to require a 2nd charging pump 2.1.7 Loss of RCS subcooling 2.1.8 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 2.1.9 Containment bypass or loss of integrity 2.1.10 Rise in containment pressure or hydrogen concentration 2.2 Consider other related event-based EALs. IF other EALs are applicable, THEN perform Steps 3.0 and 4.0 if necessary. Otherwise, go to Step 5.0 3.0 CATEGORIZE THE EVENT INTO ONE OF THE INITIATING CONDITIONS AND LOCATE THE TAB.

3.1 Locate one of the EAL indices provided at the start of each tab.

3.2 Review the index to identify the tab that addresses the event that has occurred.

3.3 Turn to the appropriate tab.

NOTE:

The assessment of an emergency condition shall be completed as soon as possible and within 15 minutes of the occurance of one or more INDICATORs.

IF the assessment cannot be completed within the specified period, THEN the event must be declared on the basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.

NOTE:

IF the EAL specifies a duration (e.g., release exceeds 2x TIS for one hour),

THEN the assessment time runs concurrently with the required duration AND is the same length.

Revision 1 8

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 4.0 ASSESS THE EVENT AND COMPARE TO THE EALS 4.1 Locate the EAL for the highest severity emergency classification that is applicable for the initiating condition and operating mode 4.2 Review the INDICATORs and CRITERION for that EAL 4.3 IF the specified INDICATORs are not observed, THEN:

4.3.1 Proceed to the next lower severity EAL and re-perform step 4.2

& 4.3.

4.3.2 IF none of the EALs for an initiating condition are met, THEN re perform steps 3.0 and 4.0 for related initiating conditions.

4.3.3 IF the actions above do not identify an applicable EAL, THEN review the observed conditions against Tab 4.7, Hazards and Emergency Director Judgment.

4.3.4 IF, after performing the above, no EAL is identified, THEN proceed to step 6.0.

4.4 IF the specified INDICATORs are observed, THEN:

4.4.1 Perform necessary assessments to validate the instrument readings and/or confirm reported observations.

4.4.2 Initiate any sampling, inspections, or dose assessments specified by the EAL.

NOTE:

IF the CRITERION specifies an event or condition duration, THEN the classification shall be made as soon as the duration is exceeded, OR when it is apparent that the duration will be exceeded, whichever is earlier.

4.4.3 Compare the results of the assessments to the CRITERION.

NOTE A given INDICATOR may apply to more than one CRITERION.

The Emergency Director shall review other related EALs for applicability.

Revision 1 q

9

EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EPP/I-la Unit 1 4.5 IF the assessment concludes that the CRITERION is met, THEN the classification shall be made. Proceed to Step 5.0 4.6 IF the assessment concludes that the CRITERION is not met, THEN re perform steps 3.0 and 4.0 for other related initiating conditions as applicable.

4.7 IF no classification results from the above, THEN proceed to step 6.0.

5.0 DECLARE THE EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND TRANSITION TO RESPONSE PROCEDURES 5.1 IF an UNUSUAL EVENT is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-2 5.2 IF an ALERT is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-3 5.3 IF a SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-4 5.4 IF a GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-5 NOTE:

The step below is implemented only if an emergency classification is NOT made. IF a classification is made, THEN the transition indicated in step 5.0 should have been made.

6.0 EVALUATE THE NEED FOR AND MAKE NON-EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 6.1 IF the abnormal condition is reportable to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 and NPDAP 5.1, THEN perform the following:

6.1.1 Complete the NRC Event Notification Form, Attachment 4 to EPP/IP-1.1.

Revision 1 NOTE:

The declaration of the emergency classification shall be made as soon as the Emergency Director has assessed that the EAL has been met OR will be met, AND within 15 minutes of occurance of the INDICATOR.

Once the emergency is classified, notifications to state and local governments shall be completed within 15 minutes of the declaration.

10

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 6.1.2 Notify First Energy Communications of the event per NPDAP 5.3 and provide the information on the NRC Event Notification Form.

6.2 IF directed by station management, THEN make courtesy calls to the following state and local agencies on a timely basis consistent with normal working hours.

6.2.1 BCEMA 6.2.2 PEMA 6.2.3 CCEMA 6.2.4 HCOES F.

FINAL CONDITIONS 1.0 For emergency events, the transition to the appropriate response procedure has been made and actions pursuant to that procedure are in progress.

2.0 For non-emergency events, required notifications have been completed.

G.

ATTACHMENTS 1.0 Tabs for Classification of Emergency Conditions H.

FIGURES 1.0 Figures are identified on the EAL indices Revision 1 11

1.3 C arrerModes:

1,2,3,4 1.1 Fue Clad arrier

.2aRCSBarrie F~cii t a INSTRUCTIONS Potential LOSS Potential LOSS Potential LOSS NOTE: An INDICATOR is considered to be MET1.f the stated Core Cooling CSF RED Core Cooling CSF ~

RCS Integrity CSF RED Not Applicable CNMT CSF RED PATH threshold has been, or is, reached or exceeded, on the PATH ORANGE PATH OR Heat Not applicable PATH OR Heat Sink CSF OR basis of confirmed observation or VALID instrument PATH Sink CSF RED PATR PActions of FR-C. I (RED readings. The Emergency Director must use judgement ORnk CS RE-AT EDPT PATH) are INEFFECTIVE when classifying parameters that may be transitory (e.g..

.. LL2.316e HoihtesCETCs 12.2

,,RioatokV.essel:Water,Level

-L~.R containment pressure).

i

,Potential LS oenilLS lLOSS Potential LOSS ContC c.N7TE:

The INDICATOR should be considered MET if the RVGretertan100Freatetha7S FSullRge<40%

parameter is indeterminate due to instruments that are no (no RCPs running)

Not Applicable CNMT pressure

>45 available or out of range and the eiste t

S

'***O**!"*

i~

i*~

!.'I!:*Rapid unexplained drop NT pesr

>4 i"

NMTresur0can not be reasonably discounted.

~0 113 inRS.e CNMT pressure PSIG e

V e

r following initial rise OR Potential LOSS Potential LOSS OR CNMT H2 rises >4%

RVLIS Full Range <40%

RCS leak results in loss of Unisolable RCS leak that CNMT pressure or sump OR NOTE:

An INDICATOR is considered to be MET 4f i

th Not Applicable (no RCPs running) ~

RCS subcooling requires an additional level response NOT CNMT pressure >8 PSIG8Judgement of the Emergency Director, the INDICATOR wil charging pump be started consistent with LOCA with less than one full be MET imminently (i.e., within I to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in the absence with letdown isolated.t conditions train of CNMT spray of a viable success path). The classification shall be madeft OR"k.s

_fety as soon as this determination is made.

injection actuation indicated a

Potential LOSS In the matrix to the left, review the LOSS INDICATORS in by direct entry into EOP E-1?amorewIt DCATOSSar required by EOP E-0 CNMT isolation is each barrier column. If one or more INDIC incomplete creating a

Not Applicable met, check the LOSS block at the bottom of the column.

"direct releaseipatheto then

2.

If no LOSS is identified for a particular barrier, review the

-41

~environment whenba

. eco

~~~~~~~~~~

~~~required ptnilLS NIAOSfrta air foeo Potential LOSS AmPotential LOSSrpotentialeLOSS INDICATORSefor thatt RCS activity >300 SGTR that results in a safety more INDICATORS are met, check thtluena V.Ci/gm dose equivalent Not Applicable block at the bottom of the barrier column.

la~igm oseequialet Nt Aplicbleinjection actuation Not Applicable oE-OE e

3.

Compare the blocks checked to the CRITERIA below and SEntry into E-3 required by

-ti sPz

~maEOPs

.kethe appropriate declaration.

'~o-'~Potential LOSS RUPTURED S/G is also Unexplained VALID rise f-

• 4 PotentAIDrLOSSeadingnexFAULTED Outside of in reading on area or RM-CH101 A or B VALID VALID reading exceeds:

CNMT ventilation monitors in reading greater than 3.5E5 Not Applicable Not Applicable OR contiguous areas with GENERAL EMERGENCY cpm with letdown unisolated TieAer RM-202 RM-20*

P-to-S leakrate > T/S known LOCA LOSS of any Two (2) barriers and Potential LOSS of thin(

0-0.5 i20 1.5 with approx.

4-8 hr.

OR barrier.

0.5-4 70 1.0 steam release from Hi-Hi Alarm on RM-OR 2-12 40 0.5 affected SIG via RW-IOOA,BC, or D

LOSS of all three (3) barriers.

-o,nonisolable MSSV.

AND affected HX is SGADV, or from MSLB NOT isolated 7121..-

ot'-wrl-"outside of CNMT SITE AREA EMERGENCY "Potential LOSS LOSS or Potential LOSS of any Two (2) barriers.

Potential LOSS LOSS of one (1) barrier and a Potential LOSS of a second No plcbeVALID reading exceeds:

nanet'O Time After RM-2i9AIB M-20i Not applicable Not applicable VALID reading exceeds:

barrier.

/DhrTime After RM-219A RM-201

-0.5-714 3800o a

irac SID. Jhrs RAhr ALERT 12-24 42 200 Due to streaming thru Rr

-o*D osramirk t

0.5-3-0.5 1.5E4

.IED Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier.

airlock 0.5-4 5.2H3 3.464 O

e 4-12u2 201.3 E.43 Any LOSS pr Potential LOSS of RCS barrier.

Any conditi'o

.UNUSUAL EVENT Any condition that, in the judgement of the NSS/ED, Aycnion that, in the judgement of 6he NSS/ED,*

i~ ~~T*R*""

NSA VN indicates loss or potential loss of the Fuel Clad barrier indicates loss or potential loss of the RCS D

barrier_-

A indiate los o poental lss f te RS brrir ~Any condition that, in the judgement of the NSS/ED, cornarable to the indicators listed above.

coinarable to the indicators listed above.A he S

D LOSS or Potential LOSS of CNMT barrier.

-copal indicates loss or potential loss of the Containment barrier See also EAL's:

comparable to the indicators listed above.2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation (RCS Specifi F*1

- 2.5 RCS Unidentified or Pressure Bouniy Leakage S*,

2.6 RCS Identified Leakage

~~~~~9------

9 il Revisicu I

ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SIT AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violent protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numer values which define that condition (Le., the basis of the declaration). A classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that ti condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION ha been met or exceeded.

Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for thes assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) c indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergenc Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety functior required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to tht environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Hea

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100.

Refer tc Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION. A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION:

An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

E ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE:

An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pote for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of.

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment

" contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:

An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION:

A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors.

The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS:

A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not t, expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e.. within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Exnple damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure.

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger tht public health and safety by exposure to radiation

)

DEFINITIONS/A CRONYMS

2.Ios fInsru enato Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" and Tab 7 "Radiological Effluents" Inability to monitor TRANSIENT in progress

[I and 2 and 3 and 41 a

SIGNIFICANT

1. Loss of most (>75%)

annunciators pr indications

2.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress

3.

Loss of SER and SPDS

4.

Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs:

Subcriticality Core Cooling Heat Sink Vessel Integrity Containment UNPLANNED loss of most annunciators oIr indications for >15 minutes with either a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or a loss of non-alarming compensatory indications

[I and 2 and 3]

1.

UNPLANNED loss of most

(>75%)

annunciators or indications for >15 minutes

2.

NSS judgement that additional personnel (beyond normal shift complement) are required to monitor the safe operation of the unit

3.

[a or b]

a.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT progress

b.

Loss of SER

.dd SPDS in UNPLANNED loss of most annunciators or indications for >15 minutes

[I and 2)

1.

UNPLANNED loss of most

(>75%)

annunciators or indications for >15 minutes

2.

NSS judgement that additional personnel (beyond normal shift complement) are required to monitor the safe operation of the unit Mode 1

2 3

4 I 2 3

4 I

1 2

3 4

ALL I

S S

2.2 Leossnof Fuactioo Inability to cool the core

[1 or 2)

1.

Actions of FR-C.I (RED PATH) are INEFFECTIVE

2.

[a and b]

a.

Five hottest core exit thermocouples

>1200 F; or five hottest core exit thermocouples >719 F with NO RCPs running and RVLIS full range level

<40%

b.

Actions taken have NOT resulted in a rising trend in RVLIS full range level or a

dropping trend in core exit thermocouple temperatures within 15 minutes of initiation of restoration actions Loss of function needed to achieve or maintain hot shutdown

[1 or 21

1.

Ops personnel report a CSF status tree RED PATH terminus for core cooling or heat sink exists

2.

Five hottest core exit thermocouples >1200 F; or five hottest core exit thermocouples

>719 F with NO RCPs running and RVLIS full range level <40%

Also Refer to Tab 2.3 "Failure of Reactor Protection" and Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Inability to achieve cold shutdown when required by Technical Specifications 11 and 2 and 31

1.

Loss of decay heat removal capability (RHR, CCR, or RPRW)

2.

Inability to remove heat via the condenser

3.

Shutdown to mode 5 required by T/S UNPLANNED Loss of communications

[1 or 21 I.

In-plant [a and b and cl

a.

UNPLANNED Loss of All Pax Phones

b.

UNPLANNED Loss of All Gaitronics (Page/Party)

c.

UNPLANNED Loss of All Radios (Handie-Talkies)

2.

Offsite [a and b and c]

a.

UNPLANNED Loss of ENS

b.

UNPLANNED Loss of Bell Lines

c.

UNPLANNED Loss of Radios to Offsite 2.3 ailue o

Rx rotetio 1

2 1

2 1

2 i

I Mode Reactor trip failure after VALID Trip signal(s) with reactor power >5% and attempts to cause a manual trip from the control room are unsuccessful.

Ops personnel report FR-S.I has been entered and manual reactor trip from control room did NOT result in reduction of power to

<5% and decreasing Automatic reactor trip did not occur after Automatic reactor trip did not occur after VALID trip signal and manual trip from control room was successful

[1 and 2)

l.

VALID reactor trip signal received or required.

2.

Manual reactor trip from control room was successful and power is <5% and decreasing Not Applicable Mod*I Criterion / Indicator I

Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" t ____________

Reactor coolant system specific activity esceeds 1

2 4

5 Ji Reactor coolant system specific activity elceeds LCO (refer to BVPS technical specification 3.4.8)

[1 or 2)

1. VALID high alarm on RM-CH-IOA sr B reactor coolant letdown monitor

2.

Radiochemistry analysis exceeds Tedmical Specification 3.4.8.

ILKisiou I EPPI-lA Att I AVAv-i

(

I 1

2 3

4

(

1 2

3 4

1 2

3 4

A-W-I

---

I I

Reactor power >5 % after VALID trip signal(s) and loss of core cooling capability

[1 and 2]

I.

Ops personnel report FR-S.1 has been entered and subsequent actions do NOT result in reduction of power to <5% and decreasing

2.

[a or b]

a Ops personnel report CSF status tree RED PATH terminus exists for core cooling or heat sink

b. Five hottest core exit thermocouples

>1200 F;

or five hottest core exit thermocouples >719 F with NO RCPs running and RVLIS full range level <40%

I I

I i

I i

i I

i l Criterion / Indicator Monde Crtterion / Indicator I Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix'"

Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I " Fission Product Barrier Malfix

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL

EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SIT AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE:

A group of ten (10) or more persons violenti protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numen values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). A classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that th condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION ha been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for thes assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) c indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Hea

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION:

An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.

Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

E ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards, -Pant

]y structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. F

)a for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity or the affected stawure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment ic contained therein.

Ae The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas as within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

e RED PATH

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which

)f indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

ýY RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and n safety injection.

e SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Y plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% fiuI electrical load: (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION:

A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors.

The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS:

A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is mao-&

expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times. maximum release rates.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.-.., within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fail,"

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger

)

public health and safety by exposure to radiation

Criterion I/rInicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Unidentified or pressure boundary RCS leakage >10 GPM

1.

Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined by Technical Specifications) >10 GPM as indicated below [a or b]

a.

OST 1.6.2 results

b.

With RCS temp. and PZR level stable, VCT level dropping at a rate >10 GPM

(>I%/inn indicated on LI-CH-I15 with no VCT makeup in progress)

• Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized

__________ 4-1 2

3 4

5*

Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Identified RCS leakage >25 GPM

1.

Identified RCS leakage (as defined Technical Specifications)

>25 GPM indicated below [a or b]

by as

a.

OST 1.6.2 or 1.6.2A Results

b.

UNPLANNED level rise in excess of 25 GPM total into PRT, DG-TK-l, and DG-TK-2

• Applies to Mode 5if RCS Pressurized I Mode Criterion / Indicator 1

2 3

4 I

Not Applicable Not Applicable Refer to Tab 2.2, "Loss of Function" Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Mode Within Technical Specification Time Limits 11 and 21

1.

A Technical Specification action statement, requiring a mode reduction, has been entered

2.

The unit has NOT been placed in the required mode within the time prescribed by the action statement Mode Criterion / Indicator

1.

4

.4 3

4 5

.4 Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Safety Limit Has Been Exceeded

[I or 21

1.

The combination of thermal power. RCS temperature, and RCS pressure is greater than the safety limit as determined from BVPS Technical Specifications Figure 2.1-1 "Reactor Core Safety Limit"

2.

RCS/pressurizer pressure exceeds safety limit

(>2735 psig)

EPPJI-lz Art I I M.oe I

1 2

3 4

5*

-I Retiim 12.6 RCS Identiried Leakage I Mode Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" i

i i

i I

I i

I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL

EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100.

Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION:

An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.

Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potent for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of ti.

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:

An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following:

(1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full elecurical load; (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors.

The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS:

A gas that is dangerous to life or healnh by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g.. chlorine).

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not fl.

expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structme that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Exbmple damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure.

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger iih public health and safety by exposure to radiation

)

Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Turbine failure generated missiles cause penetration of a missile shield wall of any area containing safety related equipment

1.

Plant personnel report missiles generated by turbine failure with casing penetration also results in a through-wall penetration of a missile shield wall listed in Table 2-1 Turbine failure results in casing penetration

1. Plant personnel report a turbine failure which results in penetration of the turbine casing or damage to main generator seals with evidence of significant hydrogen or seal oil leakage Mode 1

2 3

4 JI 1

210 StamFed in Bea Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown and Safety Injection actuation

[I and 2]

1.

Ops personnel report rapid depressurization of Main Steam System that causes SLI (<500 psig)

2.

Ops personnel report Safety Injection has actuated EPP/I-la 0

C Table 2-1 Plant Areas Associated With Shield Wall Penetra'tion EAL Control Room Electrical Switchgear Safeguards Diesel Generator Bldg Cable Tray Mezz Containment Primary Aux. Building 1WT-TK-10

.i~i*~~rhi Fi

~in-

-Mode 1

2 3

1 2

3

-'I.

,4w 0

C4 R-vision I I - -

nr I---

I

..V IUF II alu-7--

I I

i i

i v

m I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE:

A group of ten (10) or more persons violentl protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeri values which define that condition (i.e.. the basis of the declaration). A]

classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that th condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION ha been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) o indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety functior required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Hea

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.),

operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant ly structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Po.

)l for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity oi,le affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment ic contained therein.

11 The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas ts within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

e RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which

)f indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

y RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and n safety injection.

e SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mnis-alignment, or mis-operation of Y plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal t reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% fufl electrica] load; (3)

) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors.

The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS:

A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g.. chlorine).

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates&

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Ekample damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger I1 public health and safety by exposure to radiation

ILs IoA (Pw Criterion / Indicator Prolonged loss of offsite and onsite AC power

[( and 2]

1.

AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT energized from Unit I sources for >15 minutes

2.

[a or b or c]

a.

Ops personnel report CSF status tree RED PATH or, ORANGE PATH terminus exists for core cooling

b.

Restoration of either AE or DF 4KV emergency bus is NOT likely from any source within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of loss

c.

Five hottest core exit thermocouples

>1200 F 2r five hottest core exit thermocouples >719 F with no RCPs running and RVLIS full range <40%

Loss of offsite and onsite AC power for >15 minutes

1.

AE and DF 4KV emergency, buses NOT energized from Unit 1 sources for >15 minutes AC power to emergency buses reduced to a single source of power such that any additional failure will result in the de-energization of both buses

[I and 2)

1. Either AE or DF 4KV emergency bus is de energized for >15 minutes

2.

The energized AE or DF 4KV emergency bus has only one source of power

[a or b]

a.

Emergency diesel generator

b.

lAor 1D 4KV normal bus Loss of offsite power for >15 minutes

[I and 2)

1.

IA ad ID 4KV normal buses de-energized for >15 minutes

2.

Each diesel generator is supplying power to its respective emergency bus Mode 132 Lo o

AC

.5.

I 5

6 De fuel 5

6 De fuel Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown System Degradation" Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown System Degradation" UNPLANNED loss of power for >15 minutes offsite and onsite AC

1. AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT energized from Unit 1 sources for >15 minutes Also Refer to Tab Degradation" 6

"Shutdown System UNPLANNED loss of offsite power for >15 minutes (1 and 2)

1. IA and ID 4KV normal buses de-energized for >15 minutes

2.

Either diesel generator is supplying power to its respective emergency bus 1

2 3

4 1

2 3

4

+

R'efer to Tao i rission rroauct Harner Matrix and Tab 2.2 "Loss of Function", and Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" Loss of all vital DC power for >15 minutes

1.

Voltage <110A VDC on DC buses 1-1 and 1 2 and 1-3 and 1-4 for >15 minutes Also Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix", Tab 2.2 "Loss of Function", and Tab 2.1 "Loss of Instrumentation" and Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" I Mode Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix",

Tab 2.2 "Loss of Function". and Tab 2.1 "Loss of Instrumentation" and Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" UNPLANNED loss of one train of DC power for >15 minutes

[1 or 21

1.

Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC Buses 1-1 and 1-3 for >15 minutes

2.

Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC Buses 1-2 and 1-4 for >15 minutes Refer to Tab 6.4 "Loss of DC (Shutdown)" for modes.5 6. and defiteled

-'a.

ReviionI 1

2 3

4 3.3 Losef CriProwerIdcao C_

r ite..

• ,rio_.__n

/_I-ndicator.*

1 2

3 4

(

1 2

3 4

1 2

3 4

4 EPP/I-la I

"0

0.

0 i

R r

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded.

Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

PROJECTILE:

An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. PoteW for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity ot affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner contronled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors.

The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS:

A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not

)

expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events tha result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

,-L With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.. alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE:

Damage to equipment or structure hat is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (eg.. pint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger th public health and safety by exposure to radiation

EPP/I-la 4

s Mode

__Criterion I Indicator FIRE in the control

room, cable tray mezzanine, or process control room resulting in an evacuation of the control room per 1.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" and loss of any required equipment results in an uncontrolled RCS Heatup

[I and 2 and 31

1.

1.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" entered

2. Ops personnel report inability to operate at least one of each of the following components of the available train:

Charging pump AFW pump Diesel generator RPRW pump BIP Steam relief path

3.

Uncontrolled RCS heatup lasting longer than 15 minutes FIRE in the control

room, cable tray mezzanine, or process control room resulting in an evacuation of the control room per 1.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown"

1.

1.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" entered FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting safety related equipment

[1 and 2)

1. FIRE in any of the listed areas in Table 4-1

2.

[a orb]

a.

Ops personnel report VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or equipment in listed area due to FIRE

b.

Control room indication of degraded system or component (within listed areas) response due to FIRE Monde All All Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" or Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" or Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting safety related equipment

[1 and 2]

1.

EXPLOSION in any of the listed areas in Table 4-1

2.

[a or b]

a.

Ops personnel report VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or equipment in listed area

b.

Control room indication of degraded system or component (within listed areas) response due to EXPLOSION Refer to Tab 4.6 "Security" UNPLANNED EXPLOSION in or adjacent to those areas listed in Table 4-1

1.

UNPLANNED EXPLOSION in or adjacent to any of the listed areas in Table 4-1 Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" or Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab 4.6 "Security" TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS Control Room Cable Tray Mezz.

Process Cntrol Rm Relay Room Rod Drive/MG Rm RWST (1QS-TK-I)

Diesel Gen. Room Intake Str Cubicles U I/U2 CV3 Cable Tunnel AE/DF Switchgear Fuel Building RW Valve Pit Containment Building Prim. Auxiliary Building Safeguards Building Demin Water (IWT-TK-l1)

C02 Storage/PG Pump Rm DIG Fuel Oil Figure 4-A PROTECTED AREA / SITE PERIMETER

~OH-IO "Protected r

Area PERIETER S.......il i!:*i!

ii*ii l ili iER~fETERI~iiii~iii~l

• E, i!.

l***

'-U 1

2 3

4 I.

2 3

4

(

All All FIRE in or adjacent to those areas listed in Table 4-1 not extinguished within 15 minutes from the time of control room notification oqr verification of control room alarm Revision I

-1 i

I i

Criterion / Indicator i

iz 0%

r-14 1.q

,4 12 qm 0,

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION:

An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

PROJECTILE:

An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pot,")

for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity ot...e affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:

An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following:

(1) Automatic turbine nmback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full ele cal load; (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION:

A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS:

A gas that is dangerous to life or health byr=asonof inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not

)

expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e. within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.

Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.,paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger:

public health and safety by exposure to radiation

144 Toxic a

I Criterion/Indicator -r Refer to Tab 4.1 "tire",T ao b4.2 rxplosion, Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire", Tab 4.2 "Explosion", or Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" I 

Release of flammable gas within, or contiguous to, a

VITAL AREA which jeopardizes operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown (Mode 5).

1.

Report or detection of a flammable gas within, or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA in concentrations greater than explosive concentrations.

Release of flammable gas PROTECTED AREA deemed the safe operation of the plant.

(1 or 2) affecting the detrimental to

1.

(a and b)

a.

Report or detection of flammable gas that could enter the SITE PERIMETER in amounts that can affect normal operation of the plant (Refer to Figure 4-A).

b.

Normal operation of the plant is impeded due to access restrictions implemented by the Control Room within the PROTECTED AREA (Refer to Figure 4-A).

2.

Report by local, county or State officials for a

potential evacuation of site personnel based on an offsite event.

Mode All All Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Release of TOXIC GAS within, or contiguous to, a

VITAL AREA which jeopardizes operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown (Mode 5). (1 and 2)

1.

Report or detection of a TOXIC GAS within, or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA or an area required for continued safe operation in concentrations that will be life threatening to plant personnel.

2.

Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessary for continued safe operation or to establish and maintain cold shutdown (Mode

5) while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment.

Release of TOXIC GAS affecting the PROTECTED AREA deemed detrimental to the safe operation of the plant.

(1 or 2)

1.

(a and b)

a.

Report or detection of TOXIC GAS that could enter the SITE PERIMETER in amounts that can affect normal operation of the plant (Refer to Figure 4-A).

b.

Normal operation of the plant is impeded due to access restrictions implemented by the Control Room within the PROTECTED AREA (Refer to Figure 4-A).

2.

Report by local, county or State officials for a potential evacuation of site personnel based on an offsite event.

Refer to AOP 1/2 44A.]

."Chlorinetoxic Gas Release", Attachment 3 for a list of chemicals stored, produced, or transported near BVPS and their toxicity limits.

TABLE 4-2 HAS BEEN DELETED FIGURE 4-B HAS BEEN DELETED E

,U Revisku I I1 All All i

Criterion / Indicator I

II i

T iI i

I I

EPP/I-la I

or I

Figure 4-C

)

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY

• EXCLUSION AREA

• / BOUNDARY

Mode Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 4.1 "FIRE" Evacuation of the control room has been initiated and control of all necessary equipment has not been established within 15 minutes of manning the Shutdown Panel [I and 2]

1.

AOP 1.33.1 "Control Room Inaccessibility" has been entered

2.

Inability to transfer and operate any single component listed in Table 4-3 within 15 All minutes of manning the shutdown panel Also refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" Evacuation of the control room is required

1.

AOP 1.33.1 "Control Room Inaccessibility" has been entered All Not Applicable 4.7 EergecyDrierinIdcatorJugmn All 4.

All All 4.

All Criterion I indicator Security event resulting in loss of control of the systems necessary to establish or maintain cold shutdown

[1 or 2]

1.

Hostile armed force has taken control of the control room or the remote shutdown panel

2.

Hostile armed force has taken control of plant equipment such that Ops personnel report the inability to operate equipment necessary to maintain the following functions [a or b or c]

a

b.

C.

Subcriticality Core cooling Heat Sink Security event has or is occurring which results in actual or likely failures of plant functions needed to protect the public [fI or 2)

1.

VITAL AREA, other than the control room.

has been penetrated by a hostile armed force

2.

Suspected BOMB detonates within a VITAL AREA Confirmed Security event which indicates an actual or potential substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant [1 or 2 or 31

1.

BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA

2.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the PROTECTED AREA

3.

PROTECTED AREA has been penetrated by a hostile armed force Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of the PROTECTED AREA Confirmed Security event which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant [I or 2]

1.

BOMB discovered within the PROTECTED AREA

2.

Security Shift Supervisor reports one or more of the events listed in Table 4-4 Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of the PROTECTED AREA Mode All

.1.

All All 1.

All Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA protective action guidelines exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.

(Refer to Figure 4-C on preceding page.)

Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public.

Any releases are NOT expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA protective action guideline exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.

(Refer to Figure 4-C on preceding page.)

Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA protective action guideline exposure levels.

Unusual events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

Table 4-3 EQUIPMENT REQUIRED AT SHUTDOWN PANEL One Auxiliary Feedwater Pump One Atmospheric Steam Dump One Charging Pump One Boric Acid Pump 1FCV-CH-122 Table 4-4 SECURITY EVENTS

a.

SABOTAGE/INTRUSION has M is Occurring Within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A)

b.

HOSTAGE/EXTORTION Situation That Threatens W Interrupt Plant Operations

c.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE Ongoing Between the SITE PERIMETER and PROTECTED AREA (Fwmu 4-A)

d.

Hostile STRIKE ACTION Within the PROTECTED AREA Which Threatens to Interrupt Normal Plant Operations (Judgement Based on Behavior of Strikers an&r nt enc Received) (Figure 4-A) cvim I S......

i L-1 i

I i

I I

Criterion / Indicator EPPII-Ia Nv,

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded.

Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION. (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.

Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launmced towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Poterival for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity (

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equiph..zat contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operafion of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:

An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following:

(1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load. (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors.

The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS:

A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is no' expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.. alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rames.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (72) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or stnrctur that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. fixample damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger "'e public health and safety by exposure to radiation

Iath k.e.

Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab) "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" I- _______________

Earthquake greater than 0.06g acceleration occurs

1.

Analysis of Accelerograph Recording System data indicate ground acceleration >0.06g in accordance with AOP 1/2.75.3 "Acts of Nature - Earthquake" Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation, >0.01g acceleration)[I and 2)

1. Ann.

A11-59 "Seismic Accelerograph Operation" indicates initiation of the Accelerograph Recording System

2.

[a or b]

a.

Ground motion sensed by plant personnel

b.

Unit 2 reports seismic event detected on unit instrumentation I Mode Figure 5-A Site Perimeter 9

-I Revision I I

All I

All Mode Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Tornado.r high wind strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1 and results in structural damage [I and 2]

1. Tornado or high wind strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1

2.

[a or b]

All

a.

Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE to specified structures

b.

Control room indications of degraded safety system or component response within listed structures due to event Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER I.

Plant personnel report a tornado has been sighted within the SITE PERIMETER (refer to Figure 5-A)

All EPP/1-la I

z V.

v-Table 5-1 I

i Plant Structures Associated With Tornado/Hi Wind and Aircraft EALs Containmenit Building Safeguards Building Primary Auk. Building Fuel Handling Building RWST (1Q3-TK-1)

C02 Storage/PG Pp Rm Service Building (incl. FW Reg Vlv Rm)

Diesel Generator Building Main Intake Structure Demin. Water Sto. (IWT-TK-10)

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SIT AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE:

A group of ten (10) or more persons violenl protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any nume:

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). A classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that th condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION h; been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for the:

assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) o indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergenc Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety functio required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to th environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, He:

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrit (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not resul in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force tc potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat ol force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.

Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a pl-'

structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pot

)

for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of we affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to seconday leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:

An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following:

(1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner cormrofled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION:

A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors.

The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS:

A gas that is dangerous to life or health by mason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not tI expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.L With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.. alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e.. within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Eiample damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material. the failure destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger th public health and safety by exposure to radiation

I River*eve LO Mod Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix'"

Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (strikes) any plant structure listed in Table 5-1 resulting in structural damage 1 and 21

1.

Plant personnel report aircraft or PROJECTILE 'has impacted any structure listed in Table 5-1 on previous page

2.

[a orb]

a.

Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE to specified structures

b.

Control Room indications of degraded safety system or component response (within listed structures) due to event Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER

1. Plant personnel report aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER (refer to Figure 5-A on previous page)

Mode ALL I

ALL

-i 4

Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" River water level > 705 Ft mean sea level

[1 or 2]

1.

1LR-CW-101, if accessible, indicates >705 mean sea level 2.

National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) reports Montgomery Lower Pool stage height >52.48 Ft Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652.52 Ft River water level >700 Ft Mean Sea Level

[1 or 21

1.

1LR-CW-101 indicates > 700 Ft Mean Sea Level

2.

National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) reports Montgomery Lower Pool stage height

>47.48 Ft Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652.52 Ft Mode 4-i

__________ 4 ALL 4

Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" River water level <648.6 Ft Mean Sea Level

[I or 2)

1. ILR-CW-101 indicates < 648.6 Ft Mean Sea Level

2.

National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) Reports Montgomery Lower Pool stage height <-3.92 Ft Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652.52 Ft Not Applicable ALL

-I Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Watercraft strikes primary intake structure and results in a reduction of Reactor Plant or Turbine Plant River Water Flow

[1 and 2)

1.

Plant personnel report a watercraft has struck the primary intake structure

2.

[aorb]

a.

RPRW flow reduction indicated by sustained pressure reduction to <20 psig on IPI-RW-113A and/or 113B

b.

TPRW flow reduction indicated by sustained pressure reduction (Ann A6 118 "RAW Water Pump Disch Press Low" <15 psig) 5.4 R~~ivrLvlHG EPP)l-la Att I ALL ALL Revision I

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DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL

EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 1 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE:

A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded.

Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100.

Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.

Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL)." Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in d

the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance I

level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Po0,.,ala for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primay to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipmen unavailable..

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full ekctrical land. (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to lifeor health by reasor,,

inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

)

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i,.. within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structme that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.

Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA wbiwh contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fail destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger LU, public health and safety by exposure to radiation

61 Lss f6 htdwnSstm Criterion I Indicator Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Inability to maintain unit In cold shutdown

[I and 2)

1. UNPLANNED Loss of RHR or CCR or RPRW

2.

[a orb or c)

a.

Core exit thermocouples (CETC) (if available) indicate the temperature has increased >10 F and has exceeded 200F.

b.

(w/

RHR in service)

RHR inlet temperature has increased >10 F and has exceeded 200 F.

c.

(w/o CETCs or RHR), loss has exceeded 30 minutes or there is evidence of boiling in the Rx vessel.

UNPLANNED loss of any function needed for cold shutdown that results in a core exit temperature increase of more than 10 F

[I and 21

1.

UNPLANNED Loss of RHR or CCR or RPRW

2.

[a orb or c]

a.

Core exit thermocouples (CETC) (if available) indicate the temperature has increased >IOF

b.

(WI RHR in service)

RHR inlet temperature has increased >10 F

c.

(w/o CETCs or RHR), loss has exceeded 15 minutes Modej

-Criterion

/ Indicator

.1 5

6 I.

5 6

Refer to Tab 7Z1 C"Gaseous Effluents" Loss of water level in the reactor vessel that has or will uncover fuel in the reactor vessel.

71 and 21

1.

[a or b]

a.

Loss of RHR or CCR or RPRW

b.

Loss of RCS Inventory with inadequate makeup

2.

[a and b]

a Ops personnel report LI-1RC-480, or LI-I RC-482C RCS level instrumentation (if available) in the Control Room indicates a level drop to 0 inches

b.

Other confirmed indications of fuel uncoverv Not Applicable Loss of Reactor Coolant System Inventory with inadequate make-up

[I and 2)

1.

Ops personnel report LI-IRC-480, or LI-IRC-482C RCS level instrumentation in the Control Room indicates a level drop to less than 14.5 inches

2.

Ops personnel report inability to make-up RCS inventory 1 63 LssfA (S hutown Mode 4

.1 5

6 De Fuel i

5 6 De Fuel Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab Z71 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" UNPLANNED loss of offsite and onsite AC power for >15 minutes]

1.

AE and DF 4KV emergency buses not energized from Unit I sources for >15 minutes Also refer to Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" UNPLANNED loss of all offsite power for >15 minutes

[I and 2]

1.

IA and ID 4KV normal buses de-energized for >15 minutes

2.

Either diesel generator is supplying power to its respective emergency bus ss(I Soo Mode Criterion / Indicator

£ 5 6 De Fuel EPPII-li AttI Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab Z71 "Gaseous Effluents""

Refrr to Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Sysums" UNPLANNED loss of the required train of DC power for >15 minutes

[1 or 2)

1.

Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 1-1 and I 3 for >15 minutes if train A is the priority train Z

Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 1-2 an 1 4 for >15 minutes if train B is the priority train Revision I r Mode 5

6 5

6 I--

i I

I L-I Refer to Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Syste=m"

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermna Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION:

An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE:

Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a r protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

C LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in d

the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance t

level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. '

tial for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integritLthe affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is i

expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition anm unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.- Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure.

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endang public health and safety by exposure to radiation

J Mode Criterion / Indicator Iefer 0 tao Ta.

I ZIaseous rEJJluens "

Refer to Tab 7.1 Gaseous Effluents" Major damage to irradiated fuel; or loss of water level that has or will uncover irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel

[1 and 2)

1. VALID Hi-Hi alarm on RM-RM-203 or RM RM-207 or RM-VS-103 A/B or RM-VS-104 A/B

2.

[a or b]

a.

Plant personnel report damage of irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods

b.

Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed available makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered Refer to Tab 6.2 for In-vessel Uncovery UNPLANNED loss of water level in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity or transfer canal with fuel remaining covered

[1 and 2 and 3]

1.

Plant personnel report water level drop in spent fuel pool pr reactor cavity, or transfer canal

2.

VALID Hi-Hi alarm on RM-RM-203 or RM RM-207

3.

Fuel remains covered with water Criterion 7 Indicator 3

4 5

6 iejer toT a b7. 1.Gaseous Effluents" I.

Refer to Tab 7.1 Gaseous Effluents" Inadvertent reactor criticality

1.

Nuclear instrumentation indicate unanticipated sustained positive startup rate Not Applicable EPPII-la INTENTIONALLY BLANK

- I Re'isza. I

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DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded.

Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION:

An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.

Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via initrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. F pial for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity

-. the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by She EOPs wIich indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, nis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% fail elecrical load; (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS:

A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if itis m, expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance, Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being takea in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in ihis definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.. alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e.. within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or stucture that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. "Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g, paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure.

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endange:

public health and safety by exposure to radiation

7.1 Gseou Effuent Criterion / Indicator EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent Release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 1000 mR TEDE or 5000 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release

[1 or2 or3j

1.

A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 4 of Table 7-1 for

>15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOQ exceeded

2.

Field survey results indicate EAB dose >1000 mR 0-y for the actual or projected duration of the release

3.

EPP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>1000 mR TEDE or >5000 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release EAB dose resulting from an actual Mr imminent release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 100 mR TEDE or 500 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release

[I or 2 or 31

1.

A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 3 of Table 7-1 for

>15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded

2.

Field survey results indicate EAB dose >100 mR 13-y for the actual or projected duration of the release

3.

EPP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>100 mR TEDE or >500 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the radiological effluent Technical Specilflcations/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for 15 minutes

[I or2 or3)

1.

A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 2 of Table 7-1 for

>15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded

2.

Field survey results indicate >10 mR/hr 13-y at the EAB for >15 minutes

3.

EPP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>10 mR TEDE for the duration of the release Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 2 times the radiological effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for 60 minutes fi or 2 or 3)

1.

A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column I of Table 7-1 for

>60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NMT exceeded

2.

Field survey results indicate >0.1 mR/hr j3-y at the EAB for >60 minutes

3.

EPP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>0.1 mR TEDE for the duration of the release Mode All All

-d

-I.

1E Criterion / Indicator Not Applicable Not Applicable Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the radiological effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for 15 minutes

[I or 2)

1.

A VALID liquid effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 2 of Table 7-1 for

>15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded

2.

Sample results exceed 200 times the radiological effluent Technical Specification/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in duration Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds 2 times the radiological effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for 60 minutes 11 or 21

1.

A VALID liquid effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column I of Table 7-1 for

>60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded

2.

Sample results exceed 2 times the radiological effluent technical specification value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >60 minutes in duration I Mode Figure 7-A EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY Revision)I All TABLE 7-1 EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS NOTE: The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perform the specified assessment. If the assessment can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the declaration shall be made based on the VALID reading.

Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 UE ALERT SITE GENERAL IF A RWDA IS APPLICABLE 2x HHSP set 200x HHSP set by RWDA by RWDA n/a n/a IF A RWDA IS NOT AVAILABLE Vent Vent VSi01B 6.00E+3 6.OOE+5 VS 109 Ch 5 2.94E+3 2.94E+5 6.01E+5 VS109 Ch 7 6.69E+1 6.69E+2 VS109 Ch 9 1.32E+1 VS11I LR 7.32E+3 7.32E+4 SLCRS VS 107 B 1.28E+4 VS 110 Ch 5 6.76E+3 6.76E+5 9.08E+5 VS110 Ch 7 7.98E+I 7.98E+2 VS110 Ch 9 2.28E+1 VS112HR 1.53E+1 VS112LR 1.19E+4 1.19E+5 Gas Waste GW109 Ch 7 4.80E+3 4.80E+5 7.90E+5 GW109 Ch 9 1.83E+4 1.83E+5 GWI10HR 1.59E+4 1.59E+5 GW110LR Liquid Monitors LW-104 6.78E+5 LW-116 RW-100 3.60E+4 RELEASE DURATION, Minutes 60 15 15 15 ASSESSMENT METHOD HPM-RP6.12 EFP/IP-2.7 EPP/IP-2.6.x EPP/IP-2.6.x EPP/IP-2.7 EPP/IP-2.6.x All All All i

i I

i

=

EPP/I-la Attachment I I

z O

0 0'

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL

EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded.

Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A bounTdary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION:

An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards

"*'t structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. PL.Fia for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS:

A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

)

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is notthe expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.. alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicators operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e. within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or stractwe that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fa destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endangm.,.

public health and safety by exposure to radiation

7.3 RaiationLevel Criterion! /Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" or Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" or Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" UNPLANNED increases in radiation levels within the facility that impedes safe operations or establishment 91 maintenance of cold shutdown

[1 or 21

1.

VALID area radiation monitor readings 9r survey results exceed 15 mR/hr in the Control Room or PAF (on U2 DRMS) for >15 minutes

2.

[a and b]

a.

VALID area radiation monitor readings or survey results exceed values listed in Table 7-2

b.

Access restrictions impede operation of systems necessary for safe operation or the ability to establish or maintain cold shutdown See Note Below UNPLANNED increase In radiation levels within the facility I.

VALID area radiation monitor readings increase by a factor of 1000 over normal levels for >15 minutes Note: In either the BUE or ALERT EA1.l the ED nmst determine the cause of increase in radiation levels and review other CRITERIAIINDICATORS for applicability (e.g., a dose rate of 15 mR/hr in the Control Room could be caused by a release associated with a more significant event).

Mode Criterion / Indicator 0

All ALL Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Major damage to irradiated fuel; or loss of water level that has 9X will uncover Irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel 11 and 21

1.

VALID Hi-Hi alarm on RM-RM-203 or RM-RM 207 gr RM-VS-103 A/B or RM-VS-104 A/B

2.

[a orb1

a.

Plant personnel report damage of irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods

b.

Plant personnel report water level drop has gr will exceed available makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown Systems" for In-vessel Uncovery UNPLANNED loss of water level in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity or transfer canal with fuel remaining covered

[( and 2 and 3]

1.

Plant personnel report water level drop in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity, or transfer canal

2.

VALID Hi-Hi alarm on RM-RM-203 or RM-RM 207 Qr Fuel remains covered with water 3.

EPPII-la Attachment I Table 7-2 Areas Associated With EAL 7.3 LOCATION C

INDICATOR READING Chem Sample Panel (735' PAB)

RM-RM-212

>100 nmR/hr general area PASS Sample Pnl (735' PAB)

Survey Results

>100 mR/hr general area Manual Valve Chg. Pump Survey Resulta

>100 mR/hr general area Discharge_(722'_PAB)

Safeguards 752' Valves IHY-110, Survey Result$

>100 mR/hr general area IHY-Il11,_1HY-196,_IHY-197 767' PAB SA9/SAI0 Gas Monitors Survey Results

>100 mR/hr general area 752' PAB SPING Monitor RM-RM-210

>100 mR/hr general area 752' Safeguards Valves IRS-157, Survey Results

>100 mR/hr general area IRS-159 735' West Cable Vault Valves, Survey Results

>100 mR/hr general area IIA-90, IHY-101, IHY-102, IHY-103,_IHY-104 735' Safeguards.(IQSS, AEW)

Survey Results

>100 mR/hr general area Main Steam Valve Room (752' Survey Results

>100 mR/hr general area Safeguards)

A Penetrations (722' Safeguards)

Survey Result';

>5 R/hr general area East Cable Vault (735' Safeguards)

Survey Results

>100 mR/hr general area Normal 4kV Switchgear Survey Results

>100 mR/hr general area Process Instrm. Room Survey Results-

>100 mR/hr general area AE/DF Switchgear Survey Results

>100 mR/hr general area EDG 1-1, 1-2 Survey Results

>100 mR/hr general area

-I Ecvism I I Mode I

All All 1

0 I

4 U'

7 4

l iia 4A r a n

v i

i I

DEFINITIONSIACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values.which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION:

An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steami or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards - "r structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pk '.

a, for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors.

The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).I)

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is no. cth expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.

Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the f-'

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly rndang, Z

public health and safety by exposure to radiation

EPP/I-lb Unit 2 A5.735B RECOGNITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

'C©§UTOLLED BYm UHMT 2 Revision 1

EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EFFECTIVE INDEX Issue 8 Rev.

Issue 9 Rev.

0 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

0 1

2 3

Rev.

5 6

7 8

Rev.

0 Rev.

1 OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Safety Related OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision Revision 1 i

EPP/I-lb Unit 2 3-12-87 8-13-87 10-8-87 2-9-88 2-9-89 3-15-89 4-18-89 4-12-90 10-9-90 4-4-91 12-29-92 1-27-93 12-9-93 10-7-94 7-22-98 12-31-99 4-17-01 12-12-01

EPP/I-lb Unit 2 EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions TABLE OF CONTENTS A.

Purpose B.

References C.

Responsibilities D.

Action Levels/Precautions E.

Procedure F.

Final Condition G.

Attachments Revision 1 ii

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 A.

PURPOSE 1.0 This procedure describes the immediate actions to be taken to recognize and classify an emergency condition.

2.0 This procedure identifies the four emergency classifications and emergency action levels.

3.0 Reporting requirements for non-emergency abnormal events are provided.

B.

REFERENCES 1.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Preparedness Plan and Implementing Procedures.

2.0 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix E.

3.0 NUREG-0654JFEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants 4.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Operating Manual 5.0 NUMARC/NESP-007, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels 6.0 ERS-SFL-91-041-REV 1 (U1/U2 Containment Monitor Readings due to LOCA's with various Source Terms).

7.0 Condition Report #992522 8.0 Condition Report #991327-1 9.0 Unit 1 Technical Specification Amendment 205 and Unit 2 Technical Specification Amendment 101.

10.0 EPPOS #2 "Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions".

11.0 NEI 99-02 "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline" 12.0 Condition Report #00-3939 Revision 1 1

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 C.

RESPONSIBILITY The Emergency Director (Shift Supervisor, until properly relieved by a designated alternate) has the responsibility and authority for the performance of the actions prescribed in this procedure.

D.

ACTION LEVELSIPRECAUTIONS/GUIDANCE 1.0 ACTION LEVELS 1.1 An off-normal event has occurred.

1.2 An action step in a plant operating or emergency operating procedure refers to this procedure for classification of the indicated plant condition.

2.0 PRECAUTIONS 2.1 The Emergency Director must review all applicable EALs to ensure that the event is properly classified since a given INDICATOR may be associated with more than one CRITERION. A particular INDICATOR omitted from the fission product barrier matrix may be addressed as an event-based EAL in one of the other tabs. Event-based EALs may escalate to the fission product barrier matrix. The Emergency Director may need to consider related events (e.g., fire and explosion) or the possible consequences of the event (e.g., fire in an MCC resulting in loss of AC) in classifying an event.

2.2 Continued surveillance and assessment of plant conditions are necessary to ensure that the emergency classification is appropriately revised as conditions change, or as more definitive information is obtained.

2.3 If there is any doubt with regard to assessment of a particular EAL, the EAL Basis Document (i.e., Chapter 4 of the EPP) entry for that EAL can be reviewed.

Classifications shall be consistent with the fundamental definitions of the four emergency classifications (tabulated in Tab 4.7).

2.4 The Emergency Director shall take whatever mitigative or restoration actions are necessary to protect public health and safety. The Emergency Director shall not reject courses of action solely on the basis that the action would result in escalation of the emergency classification.

Revision 1 2

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 3.0 GUIDANCE 3.1 Structure of the EALs 3.1.1 There are two types of Emergency Action Levels included in this procedure:

3.1.1.1 Barrier-Based EALs:

These EALs address conditions that represent potential losses, or losses, of one or more of the Fuel Clad, RCS, or Containment fission product barriers.

INDICATORs of these conditions include CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION status, fundamental indications such as subcooling or reactor vessel water level, or auxiliary indications such as containment radiation monitor readings. Classifications are based on the number of barriers lost or potentially lost.

3.1.1.2 Event-Based EALs:

These EALs address discrete conditions or events that are generally precursors to fission product barrier degradation, or are otherwise degradations in the level of safety of the plant. Events may be external (e.g., severe weather, earthquakes, loss of offsite power) internal (e.g., fires, explosions, instrumentation failure) or may involve radioactivity releases.

3.1.2 The EALs are grouped by recognition category as follows:

Tab 1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix Tab 2 System Degradation Tab 3 Loss of Power Tab 4 Hazards and ED Judgement Tab 5 Destructive Phenomena Tab 6 Shutdown Systems Degradation Tab 7 Radiological 3.1.3 Each of the EAL tabs includes one or more columns that address one initiating condition (e.g., fires). Each column provides EALs for each of the four emergency classifications, as applicable. A notation adjacent to each EAL identifies the plant operating mode(s) for which the EAL is applicable.

Revision 1 3

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 3.1.4 Each EAL is comprised of a CRITERION, printed in bold type, and one or more INDICATORs. The purpose of each is as follows:

3.1.4.1 CRITERION: identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration) All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

3.1.4.2 INDICATOR:

is available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.),

operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Upon occurrence of one or more indicators, the Emergency Director performs an assessment against the criterion.

Depending on the particular condition, this assessment may be as simple as a review of the criterion, an instrument channel check, or a detailed calculation as in the case of a radioactivity release.

3.1.4.3 Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

3.1.4.4 The INDICATORs were selected with the objective of providing unambiguous guidance to assist with assessment of the CRITERION.

There may be other INDICATORs not envisioned by the writers of this procedure that, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, correspond to the CRITERION. In these cases, the Emergency Director should base the declaration on engineering judgment, using the supplied INDICATORs as examples of the severity of the condition.

Revision 1 4

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 3.2 Common Plant Conditions 3.2.1 IF an event occurs such that both reactor units are affected, e.g.,

tornado, toxic gas offsite, etc., THEN the senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor shall make the appropriate classification and assume the role of Emergency Director.

3.2.2 IF the common plant condition results in a higher emergency classification at one reactor unit, THEN the Nuclear Shift Supervisor from that unit shall make the appropriate classification and assume the role of Emergency Director.

3.3 Mode Applicability 3.3.1 The plant operating mode that existed at the time that the event occurred, prior to any protective system or operator action initiated in response to the condition, is compared to the mode applicability of the EALs.

3.3.2 IF an event occurs, and a lower or higher plant operating mode is reached before the classification can be made, THEN the classification shall be based on the mode that existed at the time that the event occurred.

3.3.3 The fission product barrier matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at mode 4 or higher. An event that occurs in modes 5 or 6 shall not be classified using the fission product barrier matrix, even if mode 4 is entered due to subsequent heatup. In these cases, Tab 6, Shutdown Systems Degradation, shall be used for classification.

3.4 Transient Events 3.4.1 For some EALs the existence of the event, without regard to duration, is sufficient to warrant classification. In these cases, the appropriate emergency classification is declared as soon as the Emergency Director assessment concludes that the CRITERION is met.

3.4.2 Some EALs specify a duration of occurrence. For these EALs the classification is made when Emergency Director assessment concludes that the specified duration is exceeded or will be exceeded (i.e., condition can not be reasonably rectified before the duration elapses), whichever is sooner.

Revision 1 5

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPPII-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 3.4.3 IF a plant condition meeting an EAL CRITERION is rectified before the specified duration time is exceeded, THEN the event is NOT classified by that EAL. Lower severity EALs, if any, shall be reviewed for possible applicability in these cases.

3.4.4 IF a plant condition meeting an EAL CRITERION is NOT classified at the time of occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g., as a result of routine log or record review) AND the condition no longer exists, THEN an emergency shall NOT be declared. However, reporting under 10 CFR 50.72 may be required. Such a condition could occur, for example, if a followup evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the condition was more severe than earlier believed.

3.4.5 IF an emergency classification was warranted, but the plant condition has been rectified (such that the CRITERION is no longer met) prior to declaration and notification, THEN the following guidance applies:

3.4.5.1 For transient events that would have been declared as UNUSUAL EVENTS, no emergency is declared.

However, the event shall be reported to those local, state, and Federal agencies designated to receive the initial notification form. These agencies shall be told that the UNUSUAL EVENT condition was rectified upon detection and no emergency is being declared.

3.4.5.2 For transient events that would have been declared as an ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, or GENERAL EMERGENCY, the event shall be declared and the emergency response organization activated.

The EAL CRITERIA for these events has been set at a threshold that warrants declaration even if the initiating condition has been rectified.

Termination can occur when the criteria of EPP/IP-6.2, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery can be satisified.

Revision 1 6

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 3.5 Declaration Timing and Assessment Emergency conditions shall be classified as soon as the Emergency Director assessment of the INDICATORs shows that the CRITERION is met. IF the EAL specifies a duration, THEN the event shall be declared as soon as it is determined that the condition cannot be corrected within the specified period.

In either case, the assessment time starts from the indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

3.5.1 The assessment time is limited to 15 minutes, except as follows:

3.5.1.1 IF the EAL specifies a duration (e.g., release exceeds 2x TIS for one hour), THEN the assessment time runs concurrently with the required duration AND is the same length (e.g., in this example, one hour).

3.5.1.2 The assessment time and any required duration are NOT additive.

3.5.2 IF the assessment cannot be completed within the specified period, THEN the event must be declared on the basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.

3.6 Bases 3.6.1 Chapter 4 of the BVPS EPP provides the bases for these EALs.

The bases can be used for guidance to assist the Emergency Director in classifying events for which the classification is not immediately apparent.

3.7 Defined Terms 3.7.1 In the EALs, words written in bold uppercase letters are defined terms having specific meanings as they relate to this procedure.

Definitions of these terms are provided on the reverse side of most pages in the EAL section of this procedure. Such terms shall be interpreted as provided in the definitions.

Revision 1 7

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 E.

PROCEDURE 1.0 DETERMINE OPERATING MODE THAT EXISTED AT THE TIME THAT THE EVENT OCCURRED PRIOR TO ANY PROTECTION SYSTEM OR OPERATOR ACTION INITIATED IN RESPONSE TO THE EVENT.

2.0 DETERMINE IF THE CONDITION AFFECTS FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS AND, IF SO, PROCEED TO TAB 1.

2.1 IF the condition involves any of the following AND the initial mode was 1-4 THEN proceed to Tab 1 and follow instructions provided AND continue with Step 2.2.

2.1.1 CSF status tree ORANGE PATH or RED PATH conditions 2.1.2 Core exit thermocouple readings above 729 F 2.1.3 Reactor vessel full range water level less than 40% (no RCPs) 2.1.4 Elevated RCS activity >300 gCi/gm 2.1.5 Elevated Containment High Range Area Radiation Monitor reading 2.1.6 RCS leakrate large enough to require a 2nd charging pump 2.1.7 Loss of RCS subcooling 2.1.8 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 2.1.9 Containment bypass or loss of integrity 2.1.10 Rise in containment pressure or hydrogen concentration 2.2 Consider other related event-based EALs. IF other EALs are applicable, THEN perform Steps 3.0 and 4.0 if necessary. Otherwise, go to Step 5.0 3.0 CATEGORIZE THE EVENT INTO ONE OF THE INITIATING CONDITIONS AND LOCATE THE TAB.

3.1 Locate one of the EAL indices provided at the start of each tab.

3.2 Review the index to identify the tab that addresses the event that has occurred.

3.3 Turn to the appropriate tab.

NOTE:

The assessment of an emergency condition shall be completed as soon as possible and within 15 minutes of the occurance of one or more INDICATORs.

IF the assessment cannot be completed within the specified period, THEN the event must be declared on the basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.

Revision 1 8

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 NOTE:

IF the EAL specifies a duration (e.g., release exceeds 2x TIS for one hour),

THEN the assessment time runs concurrently with the required duration AN] is the same length.

4.0 ASSESS THE EVENT AND COMPARE TO THE EALS 4.1 Locate the EAL for the highest severity emergency classification that is applicable for the initiating condition and operating mode 4.2 Review the INDICATORs and CRITERION for that EAL 4.3 IF the specified INDICATORs are not observed, THEN:

4.3.1 Proceed to the next lower severity EAL and re-perform step 4.2

& 4.3.

4.3.2 IF none of the EALs for an initiating condition are met, THEN re perform steps 3.0 and 4.0 for related initiating conditions.

4.3.3 IF the actions above do not identify an applicable EAL, THEN review the observed conditions against Tab 4.7, Hazards and Emergency Director Judgment.

4.3.4 IF, after performing the above, no EAL is identified, THEN proceed to step 6.0.

4.4 IF the specified INDICATORs are observed, THEN:

4.4.1 Perform necessary assessments to validate the instrument readings and/or confirm reported observations.

4.4.2 Initiate any sampling, inspections, or dose assessments specified by the EAL.

NOTE:

IF the CRITERION specifies an event or condition duration, THEN the classification shall be made as soon as the duration is exceeded, OR when it is apparent that the duration will be exceeded, whichever is earlier.

Revision 1 9

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 4.4.3 Compare the results of the assessments to the CRITERION.

4.5 IF the assessment concludes that the CRITERION is met, THEN the classification shall be made. Proceed to Step 5.0 4.6 IF the assessment concludes that the CRITERION is not met, THEN re perform steps 3.0 and 4.0 for other related initiating conditions as applicable.

4.7 IF no classification results from the above; THEN proceed to step 6.0.

5.0 DECLARE THE EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND TRANSITION TO RESPONSE PROCEDURES 5.1 IF an UNUSUAL EVENT is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-2 5.2 IF an ALERT is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-3 5.3 IF a SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-4 5.4 IF a GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-5 Revision 1 10 NOTE:

A given INDICATOR may apply to more than one CRITERION.

The Emergency Director shall review other related EALs for applicability.

NOTE The declaration of the emergency classification shall be made as soon as the Emergency Director has assessed that the EAL has been met OR will be met, AND within 15 minutes of occurance of the INDICATOR. Once the emergency is classified, notifications to state and local governments shall be completed within 15 minutes of the declaration.

NOTE The step below is implemented only if an emergency classification is NOT made. IF a classification is made, THEN the transition indicated in step 5.0 should have been made.

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-Ib Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 6.0 EVALUATE THE NEED FOR AND MAKE NON-EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 6.1 IF the abnormal condition is reportable to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 and NPDAP 5.1, THEN perform the following:

6.1.1 Complete the NRC Event Notification Form, Attachment 4 to EPP/IP-1.1.

6.1.2 Notify First Energy Communications of the event per NPDAP 5.3 and provide the information on the NRC Event Notification Form.

6.2 IF directed by station management, THEN make courtesy calls to the following state and local agencies on a timely basis consistent with normal working hours.

6.2.1 6.2.2 6.2.3 6.2.4 BCEMA PEMA CCEMA HCOES F.

FINAL CONDITIONS 1.0 For emergency events, the transition to the appropriate response procedure has been made and actions pursuant to that procedure are in progress.

2.0 For non-emergency events, required notifications have been completed.

G.

ATTACHMENTS 1.0 Tabs for Classification of Emergency Conditions H.

FIGURES 1.0 Figures are identified on the EAL indices Revision 1 11

P Core Cooling PATH

(

EPP/I-lb Attachment I Modes: 1,2,3,4 INSTRUCTIONS

ýTE:

The INDICATOR should be considered MET if the parameter is indeterminate due to instruments that are non available or out of range and the existence of the conditionl can not be reasonably discounted.

N* TE:

An INDICATOR is considered to be MET if, in the judgement of the Emergency Director, the INDICATOR wili be MET imminently (i.e.. within I to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in the absence of a viable success path). The classification shall be madWe as soon as this determination is made.

In the matrix to the left, review the LOSS INDICATORS in each barrier column. If one or more INDICATORS are met.

check the LOSS block at the bottom of the column.

If no LOSS is identified for a particular barrier, review the potential LOSS INDICATORS for that barrier. If one or more INDICATORS are met, check the potential LOSS block at the bottom of the barrier column.

Compare the blocks checked to the CRITERIA below and make the appropriate declaration.

(

Revision I N )TE:

An INDICATOR is considered to be MET if the stated threshold has been, or is, reached or exceeded, on 'he basis of confirmed observation or VALID instrument readings. The Emergency Director must use judgement when classifying parameters that may be transitory (e.g.,

containment pressure).

I I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs'by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing 'trendon core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pote' for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of,. /

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner coitxolled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which F indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (I) Automatic turbine naback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.. alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or(2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing. or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA whi&

contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failur, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

)

122 Ls s o unto Criterion? /Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" and Tab 7 "Radiological Effluents" Inability to monitor a

TRANSIENT in progress

[( and 2 and 3)

SIGNIFICANT

1.

Loss of most (>75%) annunciators or indications

2.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress

3.

Inability to directly following CSFs:

Subcriticality Core Cooling Heat Sink monitor any of the Vessel Integrity Containment UNPLANNED loss of most annunciators or indications for >15 minutes with either a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress m a

loss of non-alarming compensatory Indications

[1 and 2 and 3]

I.

UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%)

annunciators or indications for

>15 minutes

2.

NSS judgement that additional personnel (beyond normal shift complement) are required to monitor the safe operation of the unit

3. [a orb]

a.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress

b.

Loss of SPDS UNPLANNED loss of most annunciators or indications for >15 minutes (l and 2)

1.

UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%)

annunciators or indications for >15 minutes

2.

NSS judgement that additional personnel (beyond normal shift complement) are required to monitor the safe operation of the unit Mode 1

2 3

.4 1

2 3

.4 4

1 2

3 4

.1.

ALL Criterion / Indicator Inability to cool the core 11 or 2]

1.

Actions of FR-C. 1 (RED PATH) are INEFFECTIVE

2.

[a and b]

a, Three max core exit thermocouples

>1200 F: or three max core exit thermocouples >729 F with NO RCPs running and RVLIS full range level

<40%

b.

Actions taken have NOT resulted in a rising trend in RVLIS full range level or a dropping trend in core exit thermocouple temperatures within 15 minutes of initiation of restoration actions Loss of function needed to achieve or maintain hot shutdown

[( or 21

1.

Ops personnel report a CSF status tree RED PATH terminus for core cooling or heat sink exists

2.

Three max core exit thermocouples >1200 F; or three max core exit thermocouples

>729 F with NO RCPs running and RVLIS full range level <40%

Also Refer to Tab 2.3 "Failure of Reactor Protection" and Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Inability to achieve cold shutdown when required by Technical Specifications

[I and 2 and 3].

1.

Loss of decay heat removal capability (RHS, CCP or SWS)

2.

Inability to remove heat via the condenser

3.

Shutdown to mode 5 required by T/S UNPLANNED Loss of communications

[I or 21

1.

In-plant [a and b and c]

a.

UNPLANNED Loss of All Pax Phones

b.

UNPLANNED Loss of All Gaitronics (Page/Party)

c. UNPLANNED Loss of All Radios (Handie-Talkies)

.2.

Offsite [a and b and c]

a.

UNPLANNED Loss of ENS

b.

UNPLANNED Loss of Bell Lines

c.

UNPLANNED Loss of Radios to Offsite 2.3 Falur o

RxPrtecio Mode i

2 1

2 1

2 4.

a Criterion I Indicator Reactor trip failure after VALID Trip signal(s) with reactor power >5% and attempts to cause a manual trip from the control room are unsuccessful.

1. Ops personnel report FR-S.I has been entered and manual reactor trip from control room did NOT result in reduction of power to <5% and decreasing Automatic reactor trip did not occur after VALID trip signal and manual trip from control room was successful

[I and 2)

1. VALID reactor trip signal received or required.

2.

Manual reactor trip from control room was successful and power is <5% and decreasing Not Applicable 1-i--

1 2

3 4

5

-'I-I Criterion! /Indicator Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Reactor coolant system exceeds LCO (refer to specification 3.4.8)

[1 or2]

specific activity BVPS technical

1. VALID high alarm on 2CHS-RQIOIA/B (30511 reactor coolant letdown monitor

2. Radiochemistry analysis exceeds Technical Specification 3.4.8

~.1 -

.1

~ReviionI 4.

EPP/1-lb AUtI

(

.1 2 3 4*

I 1

2 3

4 1

.2 3

4 Reactor power >5% after VALID trip signal(s) and loss of core cooling capability

[1 and 2)

I.

Ops personnel report FR-S. I has been entered and subsequent -actions do NOT result in reduction of power to <5% and decreasing

2.

[a or b]

a Ops personnel report CSF status tree RED PATH terminus exists for core cooling or heat sink

b. Three max core exit thermocouples

>1200 F; or three max core exit thermocouples >729 F with NO RCPs running and RVLIS full range level

<40%

RevhW= I i

I i

1:

I z

0

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the BOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE:

A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality. Core Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized.Thernial Shock),

Integrity (Contaimnent) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

PROJECTILE:

An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a pI aIt structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pot!

for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity o6.a affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment c contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner contrloed areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

I RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the ZQ, s which f indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or inrs-operation or plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical loadc (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g.. chlorine).

)

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED iffit is not'the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rate and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or smrcture that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or componem. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA whicl contains equipment, systems, components, or material the failut destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

)

Mode

__________ 1' 1

2 3

4 25d R

CS iiriter

/Indicrkag C teion/Indicato Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Unidentified 2r pressure boundary-RCS leakage >10 GPM I.

Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined by Technical Specifications)

>10 GPM as indicated below [a or b]

a. OST 2.6.2A results

b. With RCS temp. and PZR level stable, VCT level dropping at a rate >10 GPM (>1%/min indicated on 2CHS LI-I15 with no VCT makeup in progress)

• Applies to Mode5 if RC'S Pressurized IRS IdntiiedLeaag Mode 4

4.

I 2

3 4

5*

4

-Criterion I/Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Matrix" Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Identified RCS leakage >25 GPM

1.

Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Technical Specifications) >25 GPM as indicated below [a or b]

a.

b.

OST 2.6.2 or 2.6.2A Results UNPLANNED level rise in excess of 25 GPM total into PRT, 2DGS-TK-2 1, and 2DGS-TK-22

• Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized EPPIJ-lb AtII 2.7 TehnialSpcifcaio Criterion! /Indicator Not Applicable Not Applicable Refer to Tab 2.2. "Loss of Function" Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Mode Within Technical Specification Time Limits

[I and 21

1.

A Technical Specification action statement, requiring a mode reduction, has been entered

2.

The unit has NOT been placed in the required mode within the time prescribed by the action statement

l.

i,-,,

, 4...

5 Not Applicable Not Applicable A

Safety Limit Has Been Exceeded

[I or 21

1. The combination of thermal power, RCS temperature, and RCS pressure is greater than the safety limit as determined from BVPS Technical Specifications Figure 2.1 1 "Reactor Core Safety Limit"

2. RCS/pressurizer pressure exceeds safety limit (>2735 psig)

Revision I F-(

(

I

.4 21 2

3 4

5*

=

i

=

i i

I i

--4 1

I i

[

l Not Applicable

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENF.RAL EMERGENCY, SITE AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity fer these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) In the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE:

The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

Z ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a p1a*u structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pot for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity oi..e affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or nis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g.. chlorine)..

)

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e.. within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA whir-'

contains equipment, systems, components. or material, the failu )

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation j

Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Turbine failure generated missiles cause penetration of a missile shield wall. of any area containing safety related.equipment

1.

Plant personnel report missiles generated by turbine failure with casing penetration also results in a through-wall penetration of a missile shield wall listed in Table 2-I Turbine failure results In casing penetration

1.

Plant personnel report a 'turbine failure which results inpenetration of the turbine casing or damage to main generator seals with evidence of significant hydrogen or seal oil leakage I--

2.0 SeniFe in6ra 1

-Mode 1

2 3

4 i

Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown and Safety Injection actuation

[I and 2)

1. Ops personnel report rapid depressurization of Main Steam System that causes SLI (<500 psig)

2.

Ops personnel report Safety Injection has actuated

(

Tab]e 2-1 Plant Areas Associafed With Shield Wall Penetration EAL Diesel Generator Bldg.

Electrical Switchgear 730' Main Steam Valve Room 2FWE-TK210 Service Bldg 745' and 760' Containment Primary Aux. Building A

1 Cu 1I Revision I

-4 I

2 3

I 2 3

C' i

I Mode Criterion / Indicator EPP/I-lb Attachment I CA

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or mnore CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded.

Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core.Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA whie contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failu, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

)

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a pla`1 structure. The source of the projectile htay be onsite or offsite. Pot' for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity oi.,

affected structure-or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATTI:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor nip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:

An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS:

A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

)

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structur eiat is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operabiity or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

32 Lss f6 C(Sudon Criterion 1 Indicator Prolonged loss of offsite antd onsite AC power

[I and 2)

1.

AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT energized, from Unit 2 sources for >15 minutes

2.

[aorborc!

a.

Ops personnel report CSF status tree RED PATH or ORANGE PATH

.terminus exists for core cooling

b.

Restoration of either AE or DF 4KV emergency bus is NOT likely from any source within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of loss

c.

Three max core exit thermocouples

>1200 F or three max core exit thermocouples >729 F with no RCPs running and RVLIS full range;<40%

Loss of offsite LWd onsite AC power for >15 minutes

1.

AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT energized from-Unit 2 sources for >15 minutes AC power to emergency buses reduced to a single source of power such that any additional failure will result In the de energization of both buses (1 and 21

1. Either AE or DF 4KV emergency bus is de-energized for >15 minutes

2.

The energized AE gr DF 4KV emergency bus has only one source of power.,

[a or b)

a.

Emergency diesel generator

b.

2A or 2D04KV normal bus Loss of offsite power for >15 minutes if and 21

1.

2A and 2D 4KV normal buses energized for >15 minutes de-

2.

Each diesel generator is supplying power to its respective emergency bus Refer to Tab Degradation" Refer to*

Tab 6

Degradation" I-I 5 6 De fuel I

-

5 6

De fuel 6

"Shutdown System "Shutdown System UNPLANNED loss of offsite and onsite AC power for >15 minutes

1. AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT energized from -Unit 2 sources for >15 minutes

-Also Refer to Tab 6 Degradation" "Shutdown System UNPLANNED loss of offsite power for >15 minutes 11 and 21 1."

2A and 2D 4KV normal buses de energized for >15 minutes

2.

Either diesel generator is supplying power to its respective emergency bus 33 Lss of D

Po've 1

2 3

4 1-

1 2

3 4

iI V.

EPP/I-lb Attachment I Refer to Tab 1 "FIssIon Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" and Tab 2.2 "Loss of Function", and Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" Loss of all vital DC power for >15 minutes

1.

Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 2-1 and2-2and2-3and2-4for>15 minutes Also Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix". Tab 2.2 "Loss of Function", and Tab 2.1 "Loss of Instrnmentation" and Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix". Tab 2.2 "Loss of Function", and Tab 2.1 "Loss of Instrumentation" and Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" UNPLANNED loss of one train of DC power UNPLANNED loss ofone train of Dc power;:

for >15 minutes

[1 or 2]

1. Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC Buses 2-1 and 2-3 for >15 minutes

2. Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 2-2 and 2-4 for >15 minutes Refer to Tab 6.4 "Loss of DC (Shutdown)" for modes.5, 6, and defieled

-I 1

I Mode 2

3

-I.-

1 2 4

U

.1

-

1 2

3 4

1 2

3 4

"Shutdown System p.tevsim I

• A v.....

i i

I I

I v

i I

I t--

i Criterion / Indicator Criterion / Indicator Mode

Modew, I-Lms of all vital DC power for >IS minutes

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL

EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core' thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

PROJECTILE:

An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potr) for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity ot..,e affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment c contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which f indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or nis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% fulle lecutical ioad- (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner contlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS:

A gas that is dangerous to life or heaft by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

)

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is*not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.. alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times. maximum release rates.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.

Example daiiage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA whic&

contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failu, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

)

Criterion I Indicator FIRE in the Instrument and Relay Room (CB 1), Cable Spreading Room (CB-2), Control Room (CB-3), West Communications Room (CB-6), or Cable Tunnel (CB-1) resulting in an evacuation of the control room per 2.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" and loss of any required equipment results in an uncontrolled RCS Heatup [1 and 2 and 3]

I.

2.

2.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" entered Ops personnel report inability to operate any of the following equipment required by 2.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" 2CHS-P21A 2SWS-P21A 2FWE-P23A & 2FWE-P22 EGS-EG2-1 Black DG Alternate S/D Panel 2SAS-C21A 2CCP.P21A 2RHS.P2IA

3.

Uncontrolled RCS heatup lasting longer than 15 minutes FIRE in the Instrument and Relay Room (CB 1), Cable Spreading Room (CB*2), Control Room (CB-3), West Communications-Room (CB-6), or Cable Tunnel (CB-1) resulting in an evacuation of the control room per 2.56CA "Alternate Safe Shutdown"

1. 2.56C.4 "Alteniate Safe Shutdown" entered FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that Is affecting safety related equipment

[I and 21

1. FIRE in any of the listed areas in Table 4-1

2. [a orb]

a.

Ops personnel report VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or equipment in listed area due to FIRE

b.

Control room indication of degraded system go component (within listed areas) response due to FIRE IMode7 Criterion!/ Indicator All All Refer to Tab 4t1 "Firex " or TabI "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"I Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" or Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4.1 that is affecting safety related equipment

[I and 2)

1.

EXPLOSION in any of the listed areas in Table 4-1

2.

[a or b]

a.

Ops personnel report VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or equipment in listed area

b.

Control room indication of degraded system or component (within listed areas) response due to EXPLOSION Refer to Tab 4.6 "Security" UNPLANNED EXPLOSION in or adjacent to those areas listed in Table 4-1

1. UNPLANNED EXPLOSION in or adjacent to any of the listed areas in Table 4-1 Refer to Tab 4.1, "Fire" or Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab 4.6"Security" Monde Penetrations Area Service Building Cable Tunnel 712 Cable Tunnel 735 ND EXPLOSION EALS TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE A Control Room Diesel Gen. Bldgs Inst & Relay Rm 707 Intake Str Cubicles Emerg. Switchgear UI/U2 Cable Tunnel (C' Relay Room Safeguards Building Main Steam Vlv Rm Fuel Building Containment Building Prim. Auxiliary Building Rod Control Cable Vault Bldg.

Cable Spreading Room 725 West Communications Room 707 ERF Substa & ERF DG Bldg RWST 2QSS-TK21

-....... I.

-t lievisim I

-I 4.1 Fr I

2 3

4 T

1 2

3 4

(.

All I-FIRE in or adjacent to those areas listed in Table 4-1 not extinguished within 15 minutes from the time of control room notification 9X verification of control room alarm All Revision I i

i I

i-I V-3) i EPP/I-lb eT z

00 E4 S,0

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by The EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., detennination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded.

Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that ant Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be orwite or offsite. Pote for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity oi affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary 'to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mirs-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic' turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load- (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled aeas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if itis not t,..

expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e.. within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failu

)

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger th&./,

public health and safety by exposure to radiation

Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire", Tab 4.2 "Explosion, or Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire". Tab 4.2 "Explosion", or Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Release of flammable gas within, or contiguous to, a

VITAL AREA which jeopardizes operation of systems required to maintain safe operations gr to establish or maintain cold shutdown (Mode 5).

1. Report or detection of a flammable gas within, or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA in concentrations greater than explosive concentrations.

Release of flammable gas PROTECTED AREA deemed the safe operation of the plant.

(1 or2) affecting the detrimental to

-1. (a and b)

a.

Report or detection of flammable gas that could enter the SITE PERIMETER in amounts that can affect normal operation of the plant (Refer to Figure 4-A).

b.

Normal operation of the plant is impeded due to access restrictions implemented by the Control Room within the PROTECTED AREA (Refer to Figure 4 A).

2.

Report by local, county or State officials for a potential evacuation of site personnel based on an offsite event.

Mode Criterion / Indicator lee 10r_,

i i r:iss__io n rr

.auc t

oc

~rrwr All Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Release of TOXIC GAS within, or contiguous to, a

VITAL AREA which jeopardizes operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown (Mode 5). (1 and 2)

1.

Report or detection of a TOXIC GAS within, or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA or an area required for continued safe operation in concentrations that will be life threatening to plant personnel.

2.

Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessary for continued safe operation or to establish and maintain cold shutdown (Mode

5) while utilizing annropriate nersonnel protection equipment.

All

1.

I Release of TOXIC GAS affecting the PROTECTED AREA deemed detrimental to the safe operation of the plant.

0 or 2)

1.

(awand b)

a.

Report or detection of TOXIC GAS that could enter the SITE PERIMETER in amounts that can affect normal operation of the plant (Refer to Figure 4-A).

b.

Normal operation of the plant is impeded due to access restrictions implemented by the Control Room within the PROTECTED

'AREA (Refer to Figure 4-A).

2.

Report.by local, county or State officials for a potential evacuation of site personnel based on an offsite event.

Refer to AOP 112 44A.1 "Chlorine/toxic Gas Release". Attachment 3 for a list of chemicals stored, produced, or transported near BVPS and their toxicity limits.

EPP/I-lb TABLE 4.2 HAS I)EEN DELETED r

Refer to lTab I "Frission Plroduct BDarrter Mlv ri.*

RewiMon I BEEN DELETED All

__________ J.

All

=

i I

i i

FIGURE 4-B HAS I

z I

N

Figure 4-C EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY

\\N 7'\\N EXCLUSION AREA

• '/

BOUNDARY

/

)

Owner Controlled Property

Criterion / indlcator Refer to Tab 4.1 "FIRE" Evacuation of the control room has been Initiated and control of all necessary equipment has not been established within 15 minutes of manning the Shutdown Panel [1 and 21

1. AOP 2.33. IA "Control Room Inaccessibility" has been entered

2.

Inability to transfer and operate any single component listed in Table. 4-3 within 15 minutes of manning the shutdown panel Also refer to)Tab 4.1 "Fire" Evacuation of the control room Is required

1.

AOP 2.33.1A "Control Room Inaccessibility" has been entered Mode Criterion / Indicator Security event resulting in loss of control of the systems necessary to establish or maintain cold shutdown

[1 or 2]

1. Hostile armed force has taken control of the control room or the remote shutdown panel All

2.

Hostile armed force has taken control of plant equipment such that Ops personnel report the inability to operate equipment necessary to maintain the following functions [a or b or c]:

a Subcriticality

b.

Core cooling

c.

Heat Sink Security event has or is occurring which results in actual or likely failures of plant functions needed to protect the public

[I or 2]

1. VITAL AREA, other than 'the control room, Ahas been penetrated by a hostile armed force All

2.

Suspected BOMB detonates within a VITAL AREA Confirmed Security event which Indicates an actual gr potential substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant

[1 or 2 or 31

1.

BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA

2.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the All PROTECTED AREA

3.

PROTECTED AREA has been penetrated by a hostile armed force Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of the PROTECTED AREA Confirmed Security event which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant 11 or 2]

1.

BOMB discovered within the PROTECTED AREA All

2.

Security Shift Supervisor reports one or more of the events listed in Table 4-4 Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of the PROTECTED AREA 4Cr iterion/IicatorJ Mode All All All

.5 All EPPI-lb Attachment I Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA protective action guidelines exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.

(Refer to Figure 4-C on preceding page.)

Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public.

Any releases are NOT expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA protective action guideline exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.

(Refer to Figure 4-C on preceding page.)

Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be lmited to small fractions of the EPA protective action guideline exposure levels.

Unusual events are in process

_r' have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response M monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

Table 4.3 EQUIPMENT REQUIRED AT SHUTDOWN PANEL One Auxiliary Feedwater Pump One Atmospheric Steam Dump One Charging Pump One Boric Acid Pump and Boration Valve 2CHS*FCV122 Table 4.4 SECURITY EVENTS

a.

SABOTAGE/INTRUSION has 2r is Occurring Within the I

PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) qV

b.

HOSTAGE/EXTORTION Situation That Threatens to Interrupt Plant Operations

c.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE Ongoing Between the SIT V

PERIMETER and PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) "

1

d.

Hostile STRIKE ACTION Within the PROTECTED AREA Which Threatens to Interrupt Normal Plant Operations (Judgement Based on Behavior of Strikers and/or Intelligence Received) (Figure 4-A)

Raviwm 1 I

z 0

U, I

All C

All II Not Applicable I

S.J.

Criterion / Indicator

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violentl protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e.. the basis of the declaration). Al classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) o:

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heal

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containmeni) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure-that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

E ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant Y strAure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pot' for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity 0 -.e affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment c contained therein.

11 The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled aireas e within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

e RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which f indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

Y RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondmy leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and a safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% fullrelectIical load. (3)

-Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands-made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten 1o interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS:

A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

)

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Aitthorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e.. within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or stucture that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA Iwic contains equipment, systems, components, or materiaL the failurt destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

)

Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Earthquake greater than 0.06g acceleration occursf11 and 2)

1.

A seismic event has occurred as indicated by Ann AI0-5H "Init of Seismic Exceed Preset and/or Spectral Accelerations"

2.

Ia and b]

a.

One or more alarm lamps and horn energized on the Seismic Warning panel

[2ERS-ANN-.]

b.

Review of the printout on 2ERS-RSA-1 Response Spectrum Analyzer reveals an acceleration >0.06g has occurred (see 20M-45.4F "Seismic Instrumentation Central Control Cabinet [2ERS-CCC-1]

Running")

Also refer to AOP 1/2.75.3 "Acs of Nature Earthauake" Earthquake detected by site seismic Instrumentation >O.Olg acceleration [I and 2)

1. Ann AIO-5H "Init of Seismic Exceed Preset and/or Spectral Accelerations" indicates initiation of the Accelerograph Recording System

2.

[a orb])

a.

Ground motion sensed by plant personnel

b.

Unit I reports seismic event detected on unit instrumentation All All t Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Tornado or high wind strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1 and results in structural damage 11 and 2)

1. Tornado pr high wind strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1

2.

[a or b]

a.

Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE to specified structures

b.

Control room indications of degraded safety system ar component response within listed structures due to event Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER.

1. Plant personnel report a tornado has been sighted within the SITE PERIMETER (refer to Figure 5-A)

"It

-IErhuk

• 1

1.

I

(

I Mode "z

0 z

v-4 I

a,)

I All

-I All Reviion aI i

i i

I I

I i

EPPII-lb Attachment I I

DEFINITIONS/A(RONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by dhe EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE:

The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pote'-4, for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity oa )

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equiprnien contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EDPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or minsoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% fMll electrical load; (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled arms in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not

)

expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.

alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g..paint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material the failu.

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirecy endanger 1.

public health and safety by exposure to radiation

)

Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (strikes) any plant structure listed in Table 5-1 resulting in structural damage

[I and 2)

I.

Plant personnel report aircraft or PROJECTILE has impacted any structure listed in Table 5-I on previous page

2. [a orb]

a.

Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE to specified structures

b.

Control Room indications of degraded safety system or component response (within listed structures) due to event Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER I.

Plant personnel report aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER (refer to Figure 5-A on previous page)

Mode I

ALL ALL

-L Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"

.Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" River water level > 705 Ft mean sea level fV or 2]

1.

ILR-CW-101, if accessible, indicates >705 mean sea level

2.

National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) reports Montgomery Lower Pool stage height

>52.48 Ft Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652.52Ft River water level >700 Ft Mean Sea Level

[I or 21

1.

ILR-CW-101 indicates > 700 Ft Mean Sea Level

2.

National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) reports Montgomery Lower Pool stage height >47.48 Ft Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652.52 Ft Mode ALL Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" River water level <648.6 Ft Mean Sea Level

[I or 2]

I.

ILR-CW-101 indicates <648.6 Ft Mean Sea Level

2.

National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400)

Reports Montgomery Lower Pool stage height < -3.92 Ft Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652.52 Ft Not Applicable MeCriterion

/ Indicator T

ejer A 111Pii L

P(J -

TCU4LL t Mnrirg,

ALL Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Watercraft strikes primary Intake structure and results in a reduction of Service Water flow

[1 and 21 I.

Plant personnel report a watercraft has struck the primary intake structure

2.

SWS flow reduction indicated by sustained pressure reduction to <30 psig on 2SWS-PI ll3A and/or 113B Refer to AOP 2.30.1 "Loss of Service Water"

(-

Mode APPfl-lb Alit C

I Refer to T ab I r Nsson ProductiBarrier *a~rk*

ALL ALL I

Reiio1 I

i I

i II

-t i

1 k

P i

m 1.

Iq 16 5.5 River Level LOW 1 5.4 River Level HIGH

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by The EOPs wrich AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protestigig station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION:

An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

PROJECTILE:

An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projeQtile may b: onsite or offsia. P,I*ial for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integritq he affected structure or the operability or,eliability of safety equipment c contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which f indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and i safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:

An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following:

(1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full rlectrical load: (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to intemipt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS:

A gas that is dangerous to life or health byreason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is nouma expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.. alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release raes.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e.. within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structre that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or rýliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.

Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact. denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA wbirs contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fai

)

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger a, public health and safety by exposure to radiation

S..

n-

_- n,--

S,

• s!L F_

Criterion I Indicator Mnde Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" InalllIty to maintain unit in cold shutdown inabi (1an

2.

2.

biltty to maintain unit in cold shutdown Md 2)

UNPLANNED Loss of RHS or CCP or SWS

[a orb or c]

a.

Core exit thermocouples (CETC) (if available) indicate the temperature has increased >10 F and has exceeded 200F.

b.

(w/RHS in service)

RHS inlet temperature has increased >10 F and has exceeded 200 F.

c.

(w/o CETCs or RHS), loss has exceeded 30 minutes or there is evidence of boiling in the Rx vessel.

UNPLANNED loss of any function needed for cold shutdown that results in a core exit temperature Increase of more than 10 F

[I and 2)

1. UNPLANNED Loss of RHS or CCP or SWS

2. [a or b or c)

a.

Core exit thermocouples (CETC) (if available) indicate the temperature has increased >10 F

b.

(WIRHS in service)

RHS inlet temperature has increased >I0 F

c.

(w/o CETCs or RHS), loss has exceeded 15 minutes F -Mo-de I Lo s

---'-AC Sh-t

--wn S-'"

IYIVU-,

Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" II I

6.

CSIvetry-Sh tow Mode Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Loss of water level in the reactor vessel that has or will uncover fuel in the reactor vessel

[I and 21

1.

faiorb]

a.

Loss of RHS or CCP or SWS 5

b.

Loss of RCS Inventory with inadequate 6

makeup

2.

[a and b]

a.

Ops personnel report 2RCS-LI-102, LR-102 RCS level instrumentation (if available) in the Control Room indicates a level drop to 0 inches

b.

Other confirmed indications of fuel uncovery Not Applicable Loss of Reactor Coolant System Inventory with inadequate make-up

[1 and 2]

1.

Ops personnel report 2RCS-LI-102, LR-102 RCS level instrumentation in the Control 5

Room indicates a level drop to less than 14.5 6

inches

2.

Ops personnel report inability to make-up RCS inventory Also refer to Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" UNPLANNED loss of all offsite power for >15 minutes

[1 and 2)

I.

2A an 2D 4KV normal buses de-energized for >15 minutes

2.

Either diesel generator is supplying power to its respective emergency bus EPPII-Ib I A nt I i,

i L-Si 12el Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Ree oTb6.

Ls fSutonSses UNPLANNED loss of the required train of DC power for >15 minutes

[1 or 21

1.

Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 2-1 and 2-3 for >15 minutes if train A is the priority train

2.

Voltage <1I10.4 VDC on DC buses 2-2 and 2-4 for >15 minutes if train B is the priority train Rcv-isia I 4.

(.

Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" 5

6 5

6

.4' UNPLANNED loss of offeite and onsite AC 5 6 De Fuel 5 6 De Fuel Refer to

--Tab 7.1

-"Gaseo-us Effluents-"

I I

--f--

I.

I I

4 I

Mode Criterion / Indicator UNPLANNED loss of o>tsite and onsite AC power for >15 minutesI

1.

AE and DF 4KV emergency buses energized from Unit 2 sources for minutes not

>15 ID

'0, 0

I Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents "

SRefer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems"

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one-or more CSFs by the EOPs wbicb AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic

-failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc,) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be Wsite or offsite. Potential for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity

)e affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equ:i.,enx contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following:

(1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load- (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in thie immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work'stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS:

A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is n, expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyse&

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued opermbility or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fa;'

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endangi )

public health and safety by exposure to radiation

i Criterion / Indicator 4- -

Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Major damage to irradiated fuel;, oor loss of water level that has or will uncover Irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel

[I and 21

1. VALID HIGH alarm on 2RMF-RQ202

[1031], 2HVR-RQI04A/B

[1024, 1028],

2RMF-RQ301AIB [1032, 2032], pr.2RMR RQ203 [1025]

2. [a orb]

a.

Plant personnel report damage of irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods

b.

Plant personnel report water level drop has go will exceed available makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered Refer to Tab 6.2 for In-vessel Uncovery UNPLANNED loss of water level In spent fuel pool or reactor cavity or transfer canal with fuel remaining covered 11 and 2 and 31

1. Plant personnel report water level drop in spent fuel pool 2r reactor cavity, pr transfer canal

2.

VALID HIGH alarm on 2RMR-RQ203

.[1025]

2r 2RMF-RQ-202 [103 1]

3.

Fuel remains covered with water Mode 4-3 4

5 6

4.

Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7 1 "Gaseous Effluents" Inadvertent reactor criticality

1. Nuclear instrumentation indicate Iunanticipated sustained positive startup rate Not Applicable INTENTIONALL EPPAI-lb Attachment I

(

I' BLANK

- I

~

I.

evisonI I Mode 1 z 0<

3, ALL ALL Revision I I

M i

i I

I 6.6 Inadvertent Criticality

1 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE:

A group of ten (10) or more persons violentl) protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded.

Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to-be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.). in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may'be exceeded.

Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown. or bunched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may bo onsite or offsita Pot-,*Iai for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity

)e affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

t RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which r indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or caus a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED even? involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full elecuical load- (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if It is not I

expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure. system, or component.

Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint rhipping.

scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA wbich contains equipment, systems, components, or material the faili destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger public health and safety by exposure to radiation

/

(.

4-rM-o~d-e Criterion / Indicator EAB dose resulting from an actual _ U imminent Release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 1000 mR TEDE or 5000 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual 9r projected duration of the release

[f or 2 or 31

1. A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 4 of Table 7-1 for All

>15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded

2.

Field survey results indicate EAB dose >'1000 mR 03-y for the actual or projected duration of the release

3.

EPP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>1000 mR TEDE or >5000 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release EAB dose resulting from an actual 9r imminent release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 100 mR TEDE ar 500 mR. child thyroid CDE for the actual pr projected duration of the release f11or 2 or 31

1.

A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 3 of Table 7-1 for

>15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT All exceeded

2.

Field survey results indicate EAB dose >100 mR 0-y for the actual or projected duration of the release

3.

EPP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>100 mR TEDE or >500 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the radiological effluent Technical Specfleations/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for 15 minutes 11 or 2 or 31 I1. A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 2 of Table 7-I for SAll

>15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the CRITERION Iis NOT exceeded

2.

Field survey results indicate >10 mR/hr 0-y at the EAB for >15 minutes

3.

EPP dose assessment results indicate EBB dose

>10 mR TEDE for the duration of the release Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 2 times the radiological,effluent Technical SpecificationslOffsite Dose Calculation Manual for 60 minutes

[I or 2 or 3]

1.

A VALID gas effluent rad monitor: reading exceeds the values in Column I of Table 7-1 for

>60 minutes, unless assessment within this time All period confirms that the CRITERION-, is NOT exceeded

2.

Field survey results indicate >0.1 mR/hr 0-y at the BAB for >60 minutes

3.

EPP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>0.I mit TEDE for the duration of the release J.

All Not Applicable Not Applicable Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the radiological effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for 15 minutes

/I or 21

1.

A VALID liquid effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 2 of Table 7-1 for

>15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NIOT exceeded

2.

Sample results exceed 200 times the radiological effluent Technical Specification/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in duration Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds 2 times the radiological effluent Technical SpecificationslOffsite Dose Calculation Manual for 60 minutes 11 or 21

1.

A VALID liquid effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 1 of Table 7-i for

>60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded

2.

Sample results exceed 2 times the radiological effluent technical specification value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >60 minutes in duration TABLE 7.1 EFFLUENT RADIATION MON]

NOTE: The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perfori can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for I the VALID reading.

TOR EALS t the specified assessment. If the assessment

ýE), the declaration shall be made based on Figure 7-A EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY Revision I

-4.

Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 UE ALERT SITE GENERAL IF A RWDA IS APPLICABLE 2x HHSP set 20(x HHSP set by RWDA t yRWDA n/a n/a IF A RWDA IS NOT APPLICABLE (pCi/cc unless otherwi. e noted)

Vent Vent/Cond Polishing 2HVS-RQ-101B [2039]

6.02E-4 6.02E-2 1.72E-1 2HVL-RQ-1 12B [20131 3.22E-3 3.22E-1 SLCRS 2HVS*RQ-109 LR [2040]

2.12E-42.12-2 2HVS*RQ-109 MR [3040]

J.

3.88E-2 3.88E 2HVS*RQ-109 HR [4040]

3.94E-1 2HVS*RQ-I09 Eff [5040] pCi/sec 5.90E+3 5.90E+5 1.04E+6 1.04E+7 Decon/WG Vaults 2RMQ-RQ-301B [2033]

4.48E-2 2RMQ-RQ-303B [2037]

6.30E-3 Main Steam Reliefs 2MSS*RQ101ABC [1005/3005/5005]

1.77E-I1 1.77E+0 2MSS*RQ101 Effluent pCi/sec-5.10E+5 5.l0E+6

[2005/4005/6005]

Liquid Monitors 2SGC-RQ-100 [1065]

1.38E-3 2SWS-RQ-101 [1068]

5.98E-5 8.56E-3 2SWS-RQ-102 [1067]

5.98E-5

• 8.56E-3 RELEASE DURATION, Minutes 60 15 15 15 ASSESSMENT METHOD HPM-RP6.12 ElPP/IP-2.7 EPP/IP-2.6.x EPP/IP-2.6.x EPP/IP-2.7 lJ!P/IP-2.6.x i

EPPII-lb Attacmment I z

'4 eq U*

Cu 4

'4l

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or mote CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL IASTURBANCE:

A group of ten (10) or more persons violentl protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeri values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). Al classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that th condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION ha been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for thes assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) o indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergenct Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Hea

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION:

An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.

Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a piant

,y structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. P y for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrit TM affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment ic :contained therein.

1Ie The.PROTECTED AREA encompasses al owner controlled areas le within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

e RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs whteb

)f.indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

"Y.

'RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause areactor trip and n -safety injection.

e SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or m is-operation of it plant equipment with the intent to renderthe equipment unavailable.

y SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:

An UNPLANNED event involvng one e or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal t reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, 0)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is no..

expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition am unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (iae., within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or componemt.

Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blenmises (e.g., paint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fai' destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly eadaniger public health and safety by exposure to radiation

I e

Hnln C.riterlon/ Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" or Tab Z71 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab I "'Fission Product Barrier MatrL" or Tab Z7. "Gaseous Effluents" UNPLANNED increases in radiation levels within the facility that Impedes safe operations &r establishment or maintenance of cold shutdown

[1 or 21 L.

VALID area radiation monitor readings 2r survey results exceed 15 mR/hr in the Control Room 2RMC-RQ201/202 [1069/1072] or PAF 2RMS RQ223 [1071] for >15 minutes

2.

[a and b]

a.

VALID area radiation monitor readings or survey results exceed values listed in Table 7-2

b.

Access restrictions impede operation of systems necessary for safe operation or the ability to establish or maintain cold shutdown See Note Below UNPLANNED increase In radiation levels within the facility I.

VALID area radiation monitor readings increase by a factor of 1000 over normal levels for >15 minutes Note: In either the LiE or ALERT E41, the ED must detenrine the cause of increase In radiation levels and review other CRITERIA/INDICATORS for applicability (e.g., a dose rate of 15 niR/hr in the Control Room could be caused by a release associated with a more significant event).

Mode All All I

Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab Z7. "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Major damage to irradiated fuel; _r loss of water level that has or will uncover Irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel

[I and 21

1.

VALID HIGH alarm on 2RMR-RQ203 (1025] or 2RMF-RQ202

[1031]

or 2RMF-RQ301 A/B (1032/20321 or 2HVR-RQI04A/B [1024/1028]

2.

[a or b]

a.

Plant personnel report damage of irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods

b.

Plant personnel report water level drop has gr will exceed available makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown Systems" for In-vessel Uncovery UNPLANNED loss of water level in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity or transfer canal with fuel remaining covered

[1 and 2 and 31

1.

Plant personnel report water level drop in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity, oZ transfer canal

2.

VALID HIGH alarm on 2RMR-RQ203 (1025] or 2RMF-RQ202 (10311

3.

Fuel remains covered with water EPP/I-lb Attachment I Tabl 7-2 Areas Associatei.With EAL 7.3 LOCATION INDICATOR READING 730' Service Bldg (H2 Analyzers)

Survey Results

>100 mR/hr general area PASS Cubicle (735' PAB)

RMP-.Q-204 [1050]

>100 mR/hr general area Chem Sample Panel (718' PAB)

RMP-I Q-210 [1059]

>100 mR/hr general area 737' Safeguards (H2 Control System RMP-1Q-205AB

>100 mR/hr general area Operations)

[1049],1 741' Safeguards (Safe Shutdown Valves)

Survey Results

>I100 mR/hr general area 738'Cable Vault (RHR Suction Valves)

Survey Results

>100 mR/hr general area 773' PAB (WRGM Sampling)

Survey Results

>I00 mR/hr general area 788' Main Steam & Cable Vault Survey Results

>100 mR/hr general area Alternate Shutdown Panel Room Survey Results

>100 mR/hr general area West Cable Vault (730')

Survey Results

>100 mR/hr general area A Penetrations (713')

Survey Results

>5 R/hr general area C&D Penetrations (718')

Survey Results

>100 mR/hr general area Cable Vault (755')

Survey Results

>100 mR/hr general area CNMT Instr Air Room (773')

Survey Results

>100 mR/hr general area AE/DF Switchgear Survey Results

>I100 mR/hr general area Turbine Bldg 735' West Survey Results

>100 mR/hr general area EDG 2-1, 2-2 Survey Results

>5 R/hr general area

[r Revisim I

_ Mode

(

All All Iq I

U 0=,

I I

I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE:

A group of ten (10) or mors persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded.

Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):

A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.

There are six CSFs:

Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.

Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical *equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE:

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):

Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs.

EOPs, etc.). operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.

Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to.be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.

A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).

INTRUSION/INTRUDER:

Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:

as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown, PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pc--'wial for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity,,

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

RUPTURED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable,.*:

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine nmback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled re=as in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

TOXIC GAS:

A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED:

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is n,,

expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in. corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

With specific regard to radioactivy releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).

Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.. alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check. or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fai' destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endangea )

public health and safety by exposure to radiation

A5.735B Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1/2 EPP/I-2 Unusual Event Document Owner Manager, Emergency Preparedness 1mm" Revision Number 17 Level Of Use In-Field Reference Safety Related Procedure Yes

Beaver Valley Power Station e

PNmbr EPP/I-2

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

112 In-Field Reference Unusual Event Reision: ]Page Number:

17 i Of ii EFFECTIVE INDEX Issue 8 Rev.

0 1

2 3

4 5

Issue 9 Rev.

0 1

2 3

4 Rev.

5 Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Safety Revisions Non-Safety Revisions Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision 6

7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 3-12-87 8-13-87 6-20-88 9-22-88 2-23-89 1-12-90 10-9-90 10-11-91 5-15-92 12-29-92 1-27-93 1-1-94 10-14-94 5-26-95 10-31-95 12-8-95 10-23-96 1-29-97 6-17-97 10-15-97 4-1-98 4-12-00 8-8-01 12-12-01

Procedure Numnber.

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/-2

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Unusual Event Revision:

Page Number:

17 1

ii of ii TABLE OF CONTENTS A.

Purpose B.

References C.

Responsibilities D.

Action Levels/Precautions E.

Procedure F.

Final Condition G.

Attachments

Beaver Valley Power Station e

PNmbr EPP/I-2

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Unusual Event Revision:

Page Number:

17 1 of 14 A.

PURPOSE This procedure describes the actions to be taken once an Unusual Event has been declared at the Beaver Valley Power Station. Actions to be completed by the Control Room are outlined in Section E. 1.0 while TSC actions are outlined in Section E.2.0.

B.

REFERENCES 1.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Preparedness Plan and Implementing Procedures.

2.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Operating Manuals.

3.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Health Physics Manual.

S4.0 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix E.

5.0 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".

6.0 Condition Report #971737.

Condition Report #993020.

Condition Report #00-2202 Condition Report #00-4309 Condition Report #01-0693 Condition Report #01-4468 C.

RESPONSIBILITY The Emergency Director (Nuclear Shift Supervisor of the affected Unit, until properly relieved by a designated alternate) has the responsibility and authority for implementation of the actions prescribed in this instruction.

If the Nuclear Shift Supervisor of the affected Unit is unavailable, the Nuclear Shift Supervisor of the unaffected Unit SHALL assume the role of the Emergency Director until relieved.

Or, if the occurrence is common to both Units (e.g.,

Security compromise, acts of nature), the Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor (per 1/2-OM 48.1.A.III.J) SHALL assume the role of Emergency Director.

Beaver Valley Power Station e

PNube EPP/I-2

Title:

Unit:

L.vel Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Unusual Event Revision:

Page Number.

17 2'of14 D.

ACTION LEVELS/PRECAUTIONS 1.0 Action Levels 1.1 An Unusual Event has been declared based on the occurrence of off-normal events which could indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant per EPP/I-1.

2.0 Precautions 2.1 Continued surveillance and assessment of plant conditions are necessary to ensure that the emergency classification is appropriately revised as conditions change, or as more definitive information is obtained.

2.2 Corrective actions to contend with the situation and to mitigate possible deterioration in plant conditions SHALL be conducted in accordance with the BVPS Operating Manual while simultaneously implementing this Instruction.

2.3 Following the declaration of an Unusual Event, Federal regulations require notification of offsite authorities MUST be made within fifteen minutes. (Refer to EPPIIP 1.1) 2.4 Contaminated/injured personnel no longer constitute an emergency declaration.

However, BVPS is required to notify the NRC per 10CFR50.72.

2.5 Faxing of the Initial Notification Form is NOT the "Official" Notification to the Offsite Agencies and does NOT meet the 15-minute notification criteria. The 15-minute notification criteria is met and "Official" notification made when a representative of BVPS speaks with a representative of each Offsite Agency.

Procedure Number.

Beaver Valley Power Station u

EPP/-2

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Unusual EventRevision:

Page Number:

Unsa vn 17 1 of 14 E.

PROCEDURE 1.0 Control Room NSS/ED actions:

1.1 Implement corrective actions.

1.2 Obtain Notification Package from the sealed EPP drawer.

NOTE:

Attachments designated with an

• are included in the Unusual Event Notification Package.

1.3 Complete INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM (EPP/IP 1.1, Att. 1 *)

1.4 Begin notifications of Offsite Agencies per EPP/IP 1.1 - On shift Communicator.

CHECK NOTE:

If actions are required in an emergency that are immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and departs from the license condition or Technical Specification, the action SHALL be approved, as a minimum, by a licensed Senior Reactor Operator prior to taking the action per 10 CFR 50.54(x) and (y).

NOTE:

Routine/Batch Releases at either Unit need not be discontinued upon declaration of an Unusual Event, UNLESS the release is the cause of the Unusual Event.

NOTE:

Initial Notifications to the Offsite Agencies MUST be completed within 15 minutes of the Emergency Declaration.

Beaver Valley Power Station I

EPP/I-2

Title:

Unusual Event Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Revision:

Page Number:

17 A

f4 1A CHECK 11 1.5 A SRO (from the unaffected Unit) SHALL complete the blanks below and notify the Emergency Response Organization (ERe).

"This is (Your Name) at Beaver Valley Power Station. At (time) hrs..

Unit has declared an UNUSUAL EVENT due to:

(Choose One and Continue)

a. DO NOT report to your emergency facility. I repeat, DO NOT report to your emergency facility.

b. Report to your emergency facility. I repeat, report to your emergency facility.

OR

c. Report to your alternate emergency facility. I repeat, report to your alternate emergency facility."

1.5.1 If ERG activation is NOT required, proceed to step 1.5.12 to send a Lotus Notes message only.

1.5.2 From a PAX phone, dial 4370.

1.5.3 Interrupt the greeting by IMMEDIATELY entering XXXXX(.

1.5.4 When prompted, enter scenario number XXXXX.

1.5.5 When prompted, verify scenario number (9 for YES or 6 for NO).

1.5.6 When prompted "Do you want to record your on the fly message 1", Press 9 for YES or 6 for NO.

(Continued)

M D p I

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/I-2

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Unusual Event Revision:

Page Number 17 1

5 of 14 CHECK 1.5.7 When prompted "Enter on the fly number 1 segment ID E'

or press star to record".

1.5.7.1 PRESS * (A short delay will occur).

1.5.8 When prompted "Please speak your message after the El tone", provide the information from Step 1.5 in your on the fly message.

1.5.8.1 PRESS the # Key when done with message.

1.5.9 Review message, when prompted "Is that correct" (Press 9 for YES or 6 for NO).

1.5.10 When prompted "You will queue scenario XXXXX.

L" It will now be sent. Are you sure this is what you want to do?" (Press 9 for YES or 6 for NO) 1.5.11 Call the Central Alarm Station (CAS)

(PAX

[]

5114/5115) and provide the following information:

"* Your name and title.

L

"* EPP CODE WORD _lI

• An UNUSUAL EVENT has been declared.

[]

ERO pagers have been activated. Call back at

[]

PAX when pager activates.

• Request Near Site Building Emergency L"

Notifications be made.

1.5.12 From Lotus Notes, send a message to "beeper all call" L"

with the information from E.1.5 above. Include if ERO is to report or not. (Limit 220 characters) 1.6 Complete UNUSUAL EVENT PAGE ANNOUNCEMENT I"

FORM (EPP/I-2, Att. 1 *).

1.7 Announce the Unusual Event Page Party Announcement.

Beaver Valley Power Station

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

-1/2 In-Field Reference Unusual Event Revision:

Page Number 17 6 of 14 CHECK 1.8 Complete FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM (EPP/IP 1.1, Att. 3 *).

1.8.1 On-shift Communications and Records Coordinator to perform Follow-Up Notifications.

1.9 Complete REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (NRC FORM 361).

NOTE:

(Licensed) Personnel from the opposite Unit should be utilized to complete NRC notifications.

NRC Operations Center 800-532-3469 or 301-816-5100 FAX: 301-816-5151 1.9.1 Provide details from NRC EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET to the NRC.

1.10 For Airborne release:

1.10.1 Complete OPERATIONAL INPUTS FOR DOSE ASSESSMENTS. (EPP/I-2, Att. 2 *)

1.10.2 Provide Attachment 2 to Health Physics personnel.

1.10.3 Instruct Health Physics to initiate dose projections (EPP/IP 2.6).

E]

El 1.10.4 Initiate offsite/onsite radiation surveys (EPP/IP 2.2, 2.3).

1.10.5 Obtain Dose Projection results from Health Physics.

p NOTE:

NRC notifications MUST be completed within 1 (one) hour of Emergency Declaration. (Satisfies 10CFR50.72)

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number: EPP/I-2 "ritle:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

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Page Number:

177o1 CHECK 1.11 For Liquid Release:

1.11.1 Obtain results from Health Physics personnel.

["

1.11.2 Determine if Liquid Release protective action is E"

required per EPP/IP 4.1 1.11.3 Notify downstream water treatment plants and relay PAR, if applicable, On-shift Communicator.

1.12 Escalate Emergency Classification, if necessary.

[]

1.13 Terminate when termination criteria met per TERMINATION

[]

GUIDELINES (EPP/IP 6.2, Att. 1 *).

2.0 TSC Emergency Director Actions (If activated):

[-]

2.1 Coordinate with the Control Room to implement corrective actions.

NOTE:

Attachments designated with an are included in the Communications and Records Coordinator Notification Area.

2.2 Instruct the Communications and Records Coordinator to I-]

complete the FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM (EPP/IP 1.1, Att. 3 *).

2.2.1 Review and approve completed FOLLOW-UP

[

NOTER-CATION FORM-

Beaver Valley Power Station

Title:

Unit:

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17 R of 14 CHECK 2.3 Instruct the Communications and Records Coordinator to fax L"

the completed FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM to the Offsite Agencies using the instructions located in the EPP Notification Book.

NOTE:

NRC notifications MUST be completed within 1 (one) hour of Emergency Declaration. (Satisfies 10CFR50.72) 2.4 Instruct the TSC Operations Coordinator to complete LI the REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (NRC FORM 361).

2.4.1 Ensure that the worksheet is provided to the Operations 1"]

Communicator manning the NRC ENS "RED" phone.

2.4.2 Ensure that the details from the NRC EVENT L"

NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET are provided to the NRC.

2.5 For Airborne release:

2.5.1 Instruct EA&DP to initiate dose projections L'

(EPP/IP 2.6).

2.5.2 Initiate offsite/onsite radiation surveys L"

(EPP/IP 2.2, 2.3).

2.5.3 Obtain Dose Projection results from EA&DP.

EL 2.6 For Liquid Release:

2.6.1 Obtain results from EA&DP personnel.

EL 2.6.2 Determine if Liquid Release protective action is EL required per EPP/IP 4.1 2.6.3 Instruct the Communications and Records Coordinator EL to notify downstream water treatment plants and relay the PAR, if applicable, per EPP/IP 1. 1, Attachment 2.

Procedur Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/-2

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1 17 9 of14 CHECK 2.7 Escalate Emergency Classification, if necessary.

2.8 Terminate when termination criteria met per TERMINATION GUIDELINES (EPP/IP 6.2, Att. 1).

F.

FINAL CONDITIONS 1.0 On-Call ED/alternate has been contacted.

2.0 Initial and Follow-Up Notifications completed.

3.0 The Unusual Event has been terminated with normal station administration resumed or the emergency reclassified.

4.0 Event termination calls are completed per IP 1.1 G.

ATTACHMENTS 1.0 Unusual Event Announcement 2.0 Operational Inputs For Dose Assessments

Beaver Valley Power Station I

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17 11 of 14 A5.715DD (1 of 1)

UNUSUAL EVENT PAGE ANNOUNCEMENT Should an Unusual Event be declared at BVPS, complete the following steps:

1)

Sound the Station Stand-by Alarm one (1) time.

2)

Read the following:

"Attention all Site personnel, this is an ACTUAL EVENT, BVPS Unit #

has declared an UNUSUAL EVENT at (time) due to

_ All shift emergency response personnel should report to the Control Room. All other personnel should remain alert for additional announcements."

Additional Comments:

3)

Perform Steps 1 and 2 two (2) additional times within 15 minutes of the first announcement, unless the event is escalated or terminated.

Time Initials

"* First Announcement

"* Second Announcement

"* Third Announcement Date

4)

Restore Page System to single unit operation upon termination of the event or upon direction of the Emergency Director.

Beaver Valley Power Station EoP/m-.

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Unusual Event Unit:

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eference

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Page Number 17 13 of 14 (1 of 2)

OPERATIONAL INPUTS FOR DOSE ASSESSMENTS To perform a dose projection, Health Physics personnel will require the following information:

1)

Type of accident: (Circle One) If unknown, use (2) LOCA W/GAP Activity.

(1)

LOCA W/RCS Activity - Loss of coolant accident and no greater than Tech Spec RCS Activity.

(2)

LOCA W/GAP Activity - Loss of coolant accident and core exit thermocouples have exceeded values (e.g., core cooling, RED PATH) that may indicate damage to fuel cladding with ESF's available.

(3)

Design Basis LOCA - Double ended shear of RCS piping, rapid RCS depressurization, minimum engineered safety features function.

(4)

LOCA W/Failed ESF's (TID14844) - Double ended shear of RCS piping, rapid RCS depressurization, no engineered safety features function and loss of containment.

(5)

Small Line Break LOCA - Loss of coolant accident via piping systems outside containment (i.e., letdown) and no greater than Tech Spec RCS activity.

(6)

RCCA Ejection - Reactor control cluster ejection causes loss of coolant accident which results in 10% gap release.

(7)

Steam Generator Tube. Rupture - SG Tube rupture with offsite power not available and affected SG used for cooldown (condenser not available).

(8)

Fuel Handling Accident - The drop of a single fuel bundle affecting another in the Fuel Handling Building.

(9)

Loss of AC Power - Loss of offsite power, natural circulation cooldown.

(10)

Gas Waste System Failure - Alarms or unplanned pressure loss from waste gas treatment/storage system.

(11)

Main Steam Line Break - Technical Specification RCS activity, with accident induced primary-to-secondary leak.

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• (2 of 2)

OPERATIONAL INPUTS FOR DOSE ASSESSMENTS

2)

Time of plant trip or start of accident:

3)

Delay time between accident and start of release:

(Hours)

4)

Expected, known, or default duration of release:

(Hours)

(If unknown, use one (1) hour as default value.)

5)

Known or expected release pathway: (Circle One)

Rel. Point Unit 1 Unit 2 Ventilation Vent SLCRS Process Vent Main Steam Ventilation Vent Condensate Pol.

SLCRS Decon Building Waste Gas Building Main Steam RP1 RP 2 RP 3 RP 4

A5.735B Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1/2 EPP/IP 1.1 Notifications Document Owner Manager, Emergency Preparedness Revision Number 28 Level Of Use In-Field Reference Safety Related Procedure Yes rnvwrD.NInI wwUwaN q

Procedure Number:

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28 i of ii EFFECTIVE INDEX Issue 8 Rev.

Issue 9 Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

Rev.

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0 1

2 3

4 5

6 0

1 2

3 5

6 7

8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Safety Revisions Non-Safety Revisions OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision Non-Intent Revision 3-12-87 8-13-87 3-10-88 6-20-88 2-23-89 6-30-89 3-22-90 9-27-90 6-28-91 12-29-92 1-27-93 11-10-93 4-22-94 7-29-94 11-15-94 1-20-95 5-26-95 9-1-95 12-8-95 2-1-96 10-23-96 1-29-97 6-17-97 1-16-98 4-1-98 7-1-98 1-13-99 9-28-99 12-2-99 7-12-00 1-23-01 5-1-01 6-29-01 8-8-01 12-12-01

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number EPP/IP 1.1

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28 ii of ii TABLE OF CONTENTS A.

Purpose B.

References C.

Responsibilities D.

Action Levels/Precautions E.

Procedure F.

Final Condition G.

Attachments

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I 28 I of 86 A.

PURPOSE This procedure provides guidance for making initial and follow-up notifications during an emergency.

B.

REFERENCES 1.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Preparedness Plan.

2.0 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Disaster Operations Plan/Annex E.

-3.0 State of Ohio Nuclear Pdwer:Plant Emergency Response Plan.

4.0 West Virginia Radiological Emergency Plan for A Fixed Nuclear Facility.

5.0 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix E.

".6.0 - NUREG-0654JFEMA-REP-l, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".

7.07.0:

Condition Report #971737.

Condition Report. #980706.

Condition Report #991967.

Condition Report #993020 TCN 1/2-00-020 Nuclear Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-11 Condition Report #01 -1975 Condition Report #01-0693 Condition Report #00-4309 Condition Report #00-2202 Condition Report #01-6697 C.

RESPONSIBILITIES The Communications and Records Coordinator (or qualified designated communicator, until properly relieved) is responsible to ensure that all required offsite notifications are completed within the proper time frame following the declaration of an emergency.

Security is responsible for initial notifications to near-site buildings.

D.

ACTION LEVELS/PRECAUTIONS 1.0,- This procedure is to be initiated upon any of the following conditions:

1.1 An emergency condition has been declared at the Beaver Valley Power Station as defined in the BVPS Emergency Preparedness Plan.

1.2 An existing emergency condition has been reclassified to a higher emergency category, and/or, a significant deterioration in conditions has occurred.

1.3 The emergency situation has been corrected, the emergency terminated, and recovery operations have begun.

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1. 1

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28 2 of 86 2.0 Emergency communications will originate in the BV 1/2 Control Rooms. See EPPJIP 1.2 "Communication and Dissemination of Information" for details of the communication systems available.

3.0 To minimize the spread of rumors and undue public anxiety, the following precautions should be followed:

3.1 All initial and follow-up notifications to County and State agencies SHALL be made with the Bell telephone system as the primary means, with predesignated back-ups available in the event the telephone systems are inoperable. A code word is utilized to ensure only authorized individuals receive the information.

3.2 Information SHALL be provided to only individuals whose identity is known, and whose organization is listed on the Emergency Notification Call-List EPP/IP

1. 1, Attachment 2. Any requests for information should be relayed to Corporate Communications at 724-682-5201.

3.3 No news announcements on the incident SHALL be made prior to completion of all required notifications.

News announcements will be developed as coordinated by the Corporate Communications Department.

4.0 In the event of a forced Control Room evacuation, the Onshift Communications and Records Coordinator will relocate to either CAS or the Communications Area of the TSC area of the ERF building, to make the required emergency notifications.

4.1 The Onshift Communications and Records Coordinator should contact the Emergency Director for form approvals and log the Emergency Director's name on the appropriate form.

Unit #1 - 724-682-5827 Unit #2 - 724-682-5327 NOTE:

If necessary, Security may radio the officer assigned to the Emergency Director/NSS under Appendix R to relay information as needed.

5.0 Upv-rG the initial declaration of an Unusual Event (only when ERO activated), Alert, Site AR'.- Emergency or General Emergency, Security personnel in the CAS will complete Attazliment 6 of this IP.

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___EPPIIIP

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3 of 86 6.0 All event notifications and escalations SHOULD be made to PEMA.

Follow-Up Notifications SHOULD be directed to DEP/BRP.

PEMA will ensure DEP/BRP is informed of the situation and contacts the plant for verification and assessment of the incident.

7.0

.Should any emergency situation require contacting the Beaver County Emergency Services Center (i.e., fire, ambulance), DO NOT use 9-1-1. NOTIFY Beaver County Emergency Services Center at (724) 775-0880.,

8.0 Once the County Emergency Operations Centers (EOC's) are-activated, the Coordinators may inform the BVPS emergency communicator of an alternate phone number to be utilized.

9.0 Should there be questions concerning the required notifications and/or the appropriate paperwork (notification forms, logs, etc.), personnel from Emergency Preparedness may be contacted for assistance.

E.

PROCEDURE NOTE:

Initial Notifications are to be, made to the first six listed Agencies on the Emergency Notifications Call List, EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2 and MUST be made within 15 minutes of the event declaration. Subsequent notifications MUST still be made.

NOTE:

The' BVPS Radio System is the alternate to the commercial phone system for notifications of offsite emergency response organizations. EPP/IP 1.2 Attachment 3, Step 6.0 provides direction in its use.,

NOTE:

If an emergency is reclassified and upgraded during the Follow-Up Notification process, the Communicator SHALL terminate the notification in progress and begin the upgraded Initial Notification process again per appropriate Attachment. If the Initial Notification Conference (INC) call is in progress, then the upgraded notifications SHALL be provided at this time.

The 15-minute clock for the notifications will restart at the time of the upgraded declaration.

NOTE:

IF contact cannot be made with the State of West Virginia, contact Hancock County (WVa) stating West Virginia did not answer and request Hancock County Office of Emergency Services contact the State with the Initial Notification information. It does not need read again.

Beaver Valley Power Station Pocedure Number.

EPP/IP 1. 1

Title:

Unit.

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1 28 4t of 86 1.0 Initial Notifications 1.1 Complete Initial Notifications and document as thoroughly as possible according to the instructions provided.

1.2 Control Room personnel should utilize Part A of the applicable notification Attachment shown below.

Unusual Event Notification Alert Notification Site Area Emergency Notification

• General Emergency Notification 0 1 1.3 TSC personnel should refer to Attachments 12 and 13.

2.0 Follow-Up Notifications NOTE:

Information for the Gaseous Follow-Up Notification Form is available via a MIDAS printout from Health Physics or EA&DP personnel.

2.1 Control Room personnel should utilize the applicable part of the Notification Attachment shown below.

Unusual Event Notification Alert Notification Site Area Emergency Notification General Emergency Notification 0 1 2.2 TSC personnel should refer to Attachment 12, Step 3.0.

I NOTE:

Faxing of the Initial Notification Form is NOT the "Official" Notification to the Offsite Agencies and does NOT meet the 15-minute notification criteria. The 15-minute notification criteria is met and "Official" notification made when a representative of BVPS speaks with a representative of each Offsite Agency.

NOTE:

The follow-up notification provides technical information to those qualified to use the data and serves as a means to verify the authenticity of an emergency notification.

The code word also provides verification.

0 0

0 0

I

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9-R 5 of 86 3.0 Subsequent Notifications 3.1 If it becomes necessary to reclassify the emergency, the Initial Notification Form is used and notifications are made in the same manner specified in Section E-1 of this procedure.

3.2 The Follow-Up Notification Form should be updated periodically (i.e., 2 times per shift) or at the discretion of the Emergency Director. This notification does not represent a change in classification.

4.0 Transfer of Responsibility 4.1 When TSC personnel are activated and have arrived onsite, a turnover SHALL be performed from the on-shift response organization to the TSC response organization.

4.2 When informed by TSC Communications and Records Coordinator, transfer communication responsibilities from the Control Room to the Technical Support Center.

5.0 Termination 5.1 When the emergency situation at BVPS has been terminated, make the appropriate termination calls per Attachment 5, Emergency Termination Checklist.

F.

FINAL CONDITIONS 1.0 Use of this procedure SHALL be terminated when the emergency situation is corrected or when directed by the Emergency Director.

2.0 (Emergency Termination Checklist) is to be completed for termination calls to offsite agencies for all emergency events.

NOTE:

Upon termination of the emergency situation and the subsequent termination of this IP, All originals of completed Attachments SHALL be forwarded to Emergency Preparedness..

Beaver Valley Power Station SEPP/IP

1. 1

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Page Number 28 6 of 96 G.

ATTACHMENTS 1.0 INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM 2.0 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST 3.0 FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM 4.0 REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (NRC FORM 361) 5.0 EMERGENCY TERMINATION CHECKLIST 6.0 NEAR-SITE BUILDING EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 7.0 ACTIVATION OF THE ERO USING BEEPERS AND ERO VOICE MAIL SYSTEM 8.0 UNUSUAL EVENT NOTIFICATIONS 9.0 ALERT NOTIFICATIONS 10.0 SITE AREA EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 11.0 GENERAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 12.0 TSC EVENT NOTIFICATIONS 13.0 NOTIFICATION FORM FAXING INSTRUCTIONS (Example) 14.0 ERO BEEPER ACTIVATION INSTRUCTIONS (Example) 15.0 ACTIVATION OF THE INITIAL NOTIFICATION CONFERENCE (INC) CALL INSTRUCTIONS (Example) 16.0 INSTRUCTIONS FOR NOTIFICATION OF ERO FOR EVENT ESCALATION/UPDATES

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

___EPPIIP

1. 1

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1 28 7 of 86 BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION ATTACHMENT 1 (1 of 1)

INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM

[-

THIS IS A DRILL D-] THIS IS AN ACTUAL EVENT

1.

THIS IS BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, MY NAME IS THE CODE WORD IS MAY I PLEASE HAVE YOUR NAME THE TIME IS

2.

EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

[-

UNUSUAL EVENT L] SITE A1 "l.ALERT I-- GENER.

[-] THE EVENT HAS BEEN TERMINATED.

L] UNIT #1

[] UNIT #2 TIME:

DAi (Name)

(Document on IP 1. 1Attachment 2).

(Document on IP' 1.1Attachment 2V_

MEA EMERGENCY AL EMERGENCY

'- INITIAL DECLARATION

[I ESCALATION 7

F-] NO CHANGE

3.

THE EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) NUMBER IS:

BRIEF NON-TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF EVENT IN CLASSIFICATION STATUS THERE IS D

NO AN AIRBORNE NON-ROUTINE RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IN PROGRESS E]

A LIQUID PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION (PAR)

6.

WIND DIRECTION IS FROM:

degrees AT 150';

WIND SPEED IS:

mph AT 35'

[]

THIS IS A DRILL

-" THIS IS AN ACTUAL EVENT APPROVED DATE THIS PRESENTS A/AN

4.

5.

NOTE:

THIS PAPER IS INTENDED TO BE PINK FOR BVPS ONLY, IT IS WHITE TO ACCOMODATE FAXING.

I

[

(Document on IP I lAttachment 2)

['E:

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EPP/IP 1. 1

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28 8 of 86 INTENTIONALLY BLANK

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

EPP/IP 1.1

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S....

.........,.. 2 89 o f 8 6 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST ATTACHMENT 2 (1 of 10)

"A5.715DQ INITIAL NOTIFICATION THE AGENCIES LISTED BELOW MUST BE NOTWFED WITHIN FIFTEEN (15) MINUTES AFrER THE EMERGENCY HAS BEEN DECLARED.

.ORGANIZATION CIRCLE-ONE.`i2..,

I CIRCLE ONE: -

PjRIMARY ALTERAMTE:

EMERGENCY:

-NUMBER,,_.

NUMBER

C~LASS'

1.

Beaver County Emergency 724-775-0880 724-774-1049 Management Agency 9-1-1 Dispatcher BCEMA.Director UE SAE Relay To: I R. Chiodo, Director Beaver, PA Director's Office EOC Number:

724-775-8605-FAX 724-775-1163-FAX ALERT GE

2.

PA Emergency Management 1-717-651-2001 Relay Thru BC-911 Agency Duty Officer 1-717-651-2021-FAX 724-775-0880 UE SAB BCEMA Director ALERT GE

3.

Columbiana County 1-330-424-7255 1-330-424-9725 Emergency Sheriffs Dispatcher CCEMA Director UE SAE Management Agency Lisbon, OH Director's Office Relay To: J. Carter, Director 1-330-4-24-9267-FAX ALERT GE EOC Number:

1-330-4243602-FAX

4.

Ohio Emergency Management 1-614-889-7150 1-614-466-2660 Agency Duty Officer Columbus, OH Ohio Highway Patrol UE SAE Dispatcher EOC Number:

1-614-764-2742-FAX 1-614-799-9249-FAX ALERT GE....

5.

West Virginia Office of 1-304-558-5380 1-304-564-4100 Emergency Services Duty Charleston, WV Sheriff's 9-1-1 E

SAE Officer Dispatcher 1-304-344-4538-FAX New Cumberland, WV ALERT GE

6.

Hancock County Office of 1-304-564-4100 1-304-564-4068 Emergency Services Sheriffs 9-1-1 HCOES Dispatcher SAE Relay To: J.P. Jones, Director Dispatcher Dispatcher's Office EOC Number:

1-304-564-4273-FAX ALERT GE N. Cumberland, WV 1-304-564-4031-FAX A>

(

CONTACT NAME TIMPI*

'FAX 1

INI.

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual Date:

?.

+*¢*'*,..+

• *. *.,k*.:.

• *+*.,

• r.

• s: *.* *

• ¸ I

I I I

I 7 "'i*lmli....

+* +'+"'"".....

"'+ "......

Comm&Records Coord Siglnature:

I

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

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1 28 10 of 86 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST ATTACHMENT 2 (2 of 10)

A5.715DQ FOLLOWUP NOTIFICATION CI]RCLIE ONE, CIRCLEN'E~.

PR1IMARjY,

.ALTERNATE EMERGENCYCOT T

ORWGArNIZTION NUMER NUMBE-R CLASS' COTATFAEI

1.

Beaver County Emergency 724-775-0880 724-774-1049 Management Agency 9-1-1 Dispatcher BCEMA Director UE SAE Y

Relay To: R. Chiodo, Director Beaver, PA Director's Office EOC Number:

ALERT GE N

2.

PEMA / DEP/BRP 1-717-651-2001 Relay Thru BC-911 y

724-775-0880 UE SAE BCEMA Director N

ALERT GE

3.

Columbiana County 1-330-424-7255 1-330-424-9725 Emergency Sheriff's Dispatcher CCEMA Director UE SAE Y

Management Agency Lisbon, OH Director's Office Relay To: J. Carter, Director ALERT GE N

EOC Number:

4.

Ohio Emergency Management 1-614-889-7150 1-614-466-2660 Agency Duty Officer Columbus, OH Ohio Highway Patrol UE SAE Y

EOC Number:

Dispatcher ALERT GE N

5.

West Virginia Office of 1-304-558-5380 1-304-564-4100 Y

Emergency Services Charleston, WV Sheriff's 9-1-1 UE SAE Duty Officer Dispatcher New N

Cumberland, WV ALERT GE

6.

Hancock County Office of 1-304-564-4100 1-304-564-4068 Emergency Services Sheriff's 9-1-1 HCOES Dispatcher UE SAE Y

Relay To: J.P. Jones, Director Dispatcher Dispatcher's Office EOC Number:

N. Cumberland, WV ALERT GE N

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual Comm&Records Coord Signature:

Date:

K

'rocedure Number:

EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

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Page Number:

Notifications ge':1 f8 28 11 of 86 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST (Cont'd).

ATTACHMENT 2 (3 of 10)

A5.715DQ The following are to be notified only for the emergency classifications listed in the Emergency Class column.

URCLE ONEft CRLEI'Oi3 PRIMARY

'ALTERNATE EMERENCY.

CONTACT-.

ORGANIZATION NUMBER NUBRCASNAME

-TIM*,

INITIAILS

7.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory NRC/ENS 1-301-816-5100 or Commission 1-301-951-0550 or UE SAE 1-301-415-0550 During Normal Working Hours FAX 1-301-816-5151 ALERT GE

8.

Contact one of the following:

Superintendent Unit 1 5111 Albert Hartner Operations or 724-378-2639 Superintendent Unit 2 5104 G. E. Storolis Operations Notifies W. Pearce 724-643-4543 Plant Mgr. Notifies 1895 L. Myers 330-757-7177 Sr. V.P. BVPS 5234 LE ONLY

9.

Corp. Comm. (Notify One)

A. J. Fenwick 5201 724-899-2396-(H) 330-761-4055 412-305-1012 (P)

UE ONLY T. M. Schneider 419-321-7129 330-659-6216 (H) 440-733-0728 (P)

R. G. Wilkins 440-774-2606 (Pager 1-419-640-3229) 10 BVPS Emergency Preparedness (Notify One) 5767 724-869-7165 UE ONLY S. L. Vicinie H. I. Szklinki 5772 724-457-9210 J. C. Contreras 5773 412-795-4931 S. J. Paletta 5774 304-387-4393 D. W. Skorupan 5808 11 NRC BVPS Site Rep.

(Notify One)

D. Kern 5570 724-728-3135 UE ONLY G. Wertz 5570 724-770-0393 Comm&Records Coord Signature:

Beaver Valley Power Station I

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual Date:

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

EPP/P 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

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Page Number:

L1 28 12 of 86 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST (Cont'd)

ATTACHMENT 2 (4 of 10)

A5.715DQ The following organizations are notified only for the emergency classifications listed in the Emergency Class. column.

CIRCLE ONE EMERkGENCY CONTACT

.-ORGANIZATION.NU R

NAME TIME*

INITIALS 12..

Bruce Mansfield Power Station 724-643-2300 724-643-5851 ALERT SAE GE

13.

Midland Water Plant 724-643-4920 (8:00-11:00 a.m. M thru F)

Liquid Release Alternate:

Beaver Co. EMA - 724-775-0880

14.

East Liverpool Water Plant 1-330-385-5050 1-330-385-8812 Liquid Release

Contact:

Mr. Clark

15.

Chester, W. VA. Water Plant 1-304-564-4100 (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) 1-304-387-2820 Liquid Release

16.

U.S Corps of Engineering

a.

New Cumberland Dam 1-740-537-2571 (Downriver) 724-643-8400

b.

Montgomery Dam (Upriver)

Alternate:

Liquid Release Beaver Co. EMA-724-775-0880

17.

U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety 412-644-5808 (Daylight)

All offsite 1-800-253-7465 (Night)

Releases - Actual 1-800-424-8802 (Nat'l Response) or Imminent Alternate:

Beaver Co. EMA-724-775-0880

18.

INPO 1-800-321-0614 (24 hr.) (Switchboard)

FAX 770-644-8549 ALERT FAX 770-644-8567 FAX 770-644-8594 SAE GE Comm&Records Cr---! Signature:

• Contact Tin," -Time of Initial Contact With Individual Date:

rocedure Number:

I EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision; Page Number:

2, 13 of 86 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST (Cont'd)

ATTACHMENT 2 (5 of 10)

A5.715DQ The following organizations are notified only for the emergency classifications listed in the. Emergency Class. column.

EMERGENCY COQNTACT ORANIZATION NUB'CLAS.NM TIME*

INITIALS

19.

Westinghouse Atomic Power Division

a. 'Site Rep.- (Don Durkosh) 724-682-5461 (W) 412-305-3198 (B) 412-741-1861 (H) 724-544-3010 (Cell)

b.

Ken Blanchard 412-374-6605 (W) 724-327-9051 (H) 412-760-4863

b. Ed Dzanis 724-682-5188 (W)

ALERT 724-834-2427 (H) 724-493-0793 (cell SAE GE (412-305-0601 (B)

20.

American Nuclear Insurers S

Radiological Nuclear Emergencies 1-860-561-3433 (Ext. 500)

ALERT

__ SAE GE Comm&Records Coord Signature:

Beaver Valley Power Station

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual Date:

EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST (Cont'd)

ATTACHMENT 2 The following organizations are not normally notified directly in the event of an emergency at JVPS, but may be contacted if particular emergency conditions warrant.

CIRCLEKONE,'.

EMERG.ENCY

.CONTACT ORGANIZATION NUMBER

CLASS,

-NME TM*

IIIL

21.

Pennsylvania DEP/BRP 1-717-651-2001 UE ALERT SAE GE

22.

Ohio Dept. of Health 614-644-2727 Bureau of Radiation Protection LIE ALERT SAE GE

23.

Pennsylvania State Police 724-773-7400 (Brighton Barracks)

UE ALERT SAE GE

24.

BOC Gases 1-304-387-0889 (24 Hrs.)

Ue ALERT

__SAE GE

25.

Ashland Oil Co.

1-800-274-5263 UE ALERT

_SAE GE

26.

Freedom Station Valvoline Oil 724-774-2020 IJE ALERT SAE GE

27.

Buckeye Pipeline Co.

1-800-523-9420 (24 Hrs.)

1-800-551-1285 (24 Hrs.)

LIE ALERT 1-800-331-4115 (24 Hrs.)

I SAE GE Comm&Records Coord Signature:

Beaver Valley Power Station ocd1re1Number:

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

__/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

128 14 of 86 (6 of 10)

A5.715DQ

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual Date:

(.I Procedure Number:

EPPIIP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

,1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

I 8

I 1-5 of 86 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST (Cont'd)

ATTACHMENT 2 (7 of 10)

A5.715DQ The following organizations are not normally notified directly in the event of an emergency at BVPS, but may be contacted if particular emergency conditions warrant.

ciRCtLB.NE ORGANIZAION NUMBR CLASS CONTACT MEANT_______

TIONUMBERCLASS NAME

~

TIE INTIALS:

28 Peoples Natural Gas 1-800-300-3333 UE ALERT SAE GE

29.

DOE RAP/IRAP Brookhaven Area Office 1-631-344-2200 (24 Hrs.)

UE ALERT SAE GE

30.

Medic-Rescue Ambulance Service Relay through Beaver Co. EMA-724-775-0880 UE ALERT "Alternate:

724-773-3104 SAE GE 724-728-3620 (Office)

31.

Shippingport Fire Department Relay through Beaver Co. EMA-724-775-0880 UE ALERT Alternate: 724-773-3100 SAE GE

32.

Shippingport Borough Relay through Beaver Co. EMA-724-775-0880 Alternate:

Police 724-643-1371 UE ALERT Manager 724-643-4333 (W),

724-643-9661 (H)

SAE GE Comm&Records Coord Signature:

Beaver Valley Power Station

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual Date:

EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST (Cont'd)

ATTACHMENT 2 The following organizations are not normally notified directly in the event of an emergency at BVPS, but may be contacted if particular emergency conditions warrant.

EMER~GENCYJ

-CONTACT ORGANIZATION NUMB3ER CNSS><

NAI TIME*'

INITIALS

33.

The Medical Center, Beaver, PA 724-728-7110 Emergency Room 724-773-3401 Alternate:

UE ALERT Relay through Beaver Co. EMA-724-775-0880 SAE GE

34.

University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Presbyterian Emergency Room 412-647-3333 UE ALERT SAE GE

35.

UPMC - Presby Radiation Emergency Response Program, 412-647-3595 Dept. of Radiation Medicine 412-624-2728 UE ALERT Radiation Safety Office SAE GE

36.

West Virginia Bureau For Public Health

/Radiation Protection 1-304-558-3526 UE ALERT SAE GE

37.

CSX Transportation Chief Dispatcher 1-800-232-0144 UE ALERT SAE GE

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual Comm&Records Coord Signature:

y Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

______________________________________EPP/IP

1.1 Title

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

I_1 28 16 of 86 (8 of 10)

A5.715DQ Date:

(/

Procedure Number:

EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

S1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications IRevision:

Page Number:

28 17 of 86 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST (Cont'd)

ATTACHMENT 2 (9 of 10)

A5.715DQ The following organizations are not normally notified directly in the event of an emergency at BVPS, but may be contacted if particular emergency conditions warrant.

.. CIC t NE EM9 RGENCY'

-CONTACT

.ORGANIZATION NUMBER CLASS NAME TIME*

INIT IALS

38.

US National Weather Service-Pittsburgh 412-262-1882 (24 Hrs.)

Forecast Office Coraopolis Office LUE ALERT SAE GE

39.

US Corps of Engineers 412-395-7144 Emergency Management Divisions LUE ALERT SAE GE

40.

EPA Region III 215-814-9016 LYE ALERT SAE GE

41.

National Response Center-DC (All Hazards) 800-424-8802 (24 Hrs.)

UE ALERT SAE GE

42.

PA Dept. of Environmental Protection 412-442-4000 (24 Hrs.)

LYE ALERT SAE GE

43.

PennDOT - Bridgeville Office 412-429-5002 (W)

Dist. Maint. Engr. - William Sacco 724-693-8214 (H)

UE ALERT SAE GE

44.

PennDOT -Rochester Office 724-774-6610 (W)

Maint. Manager - Frank Bologna 724-869-5296 (H)

UE ALERT I

SAE GE Comm&Records Coord Signature:

Beaver Valley Power Station I

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual Date:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number I-28 18 19486 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST APPENDIX R PAX P1 Unit #1 East Cable Vault (BIP Area)

West Cable Vault Unit #2 Alternate Shutdown Panel (Cont.) ATTACHMENT 2 (10 of 10)

A5.715DQ IONES NOTE:

If necessary, CAS may radio the officer assigned to the Emergency Director/NSS under Appendix R, to relay information, as needed.

5827 5827 5327

Beaver Valley Power Station IProcedure Number:

EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 I

In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

1 28 19 of 86 BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION ATTACHMENT 3 (1 of 5)

A5.715DR FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM F-1 THIS IS A DRILL D THIS IS AN ACTUAL EVENT NOTE:

NO IMMEDIATE CALLBACK IS REQUIRED. If you have not received a call verifying receipt of this FAX within 30 minutes, please call (724) 643-8000.

1.

THIS IS:

AT BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION UNIT 1/UNIT 2, THE CODE WORD IS MAY I HAVE YOUR NAME PLEASE

2.

THE FOLLOWING DATA REPRESENT THE MOST CURRENT AND ACCURATE INFORMATION, PROJECTIONS, AND/OR PROGNOSIS AVAILABLE AS OF:

TIME:

DATE:

3.

EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:

UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT DECLARED AT:

El 11 SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY TIME DATE

4.

CAUSE OF EMERGENCY (EAL

-)

APPROVED FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION D

D-NOTE:

THIS PAPER IS INTENDED TO BE PINK FOR BVPS ONLY, IT IS WHITE TO ACCOMODATE FAXING.

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

EPP/IP 1. 1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

28 20 of 86 BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION ATTACHMENT 3 (2 of 5)

A5.715DR FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM

5.

CURRENT PLANT STATUS:

CONDITIONS:

REACTOR:

STABLE SHUTDOWN El El UNSTABLE El AT POWER EQUIPMENT DAMAGE:

NONE F

MINOR El COOLING:

NORMAL COOLDOWN (FORCED FLOW El NORMAL COOLDOWN (NATURAL CIRCULATION)

El SAFETY INJECTION COOLDOWN (FEED AND BLEED) 0" N/A El

6.

ACCIDENTAL RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE: (TSC Only, See EA&DP)

GASEOUS TO ATMOSPHERE El LIQUID TO OHIO RIVER F

N/A E

7.

SURFACE CONTAMINATION ESTIMATES:

8.

NON-PLANNED RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE: (TSC Only, See EA&DP)

NO ROUTINE BATCH RELEASES WAS IN PROGRESS PRIOR TO DECLARATION.

ANY ROUTINE BATCH RELEASE HAS BEEN DISCONTINUED 1]

N/A I]

9.

REQUEST FOR OFFSITE SUPPORT: Specify Needs:

MAJOR NOTE:

THIS PAPER IS INTENDED TO BE PINK FOR BVPS ONLY, IT IS WHITE TO ACCOMODATE FAXING.

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

EPP/JP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

Ntfctos28 21 of 86 GASEOUS ATTACHMENT 3 (3 of 5)

A5.715DR FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[61

[81

[9]

Source:

NOTE:

Items numbered to coincide with MIDAS print-out.

Time Prepared:

Type of Accident:

(Circle One)

"* LOCA/WITH DBA ACTIVITY e STM GEN TUBE RUPTURE

• FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT

"* SMALL LINE BREAK LOCA

• LOSS OF AC POWER

• WASTE GAS DECAY TANK

"* LOCA/WITH GAP ACTIVITY

• RCCA EJECT

• FSAR BASIS

"* LOCA/WITH RCS ACTIVITY e MAIN STEAMLINE

• TID LOCA Time of Rx Trip or Accident start:

Release Started: (Y) (N)

[ 5 ]

Time:

(actual) (proj.)

Release Stopped: (Y) (N)

[ 7 ]

Duration:

(actual) (proj.)

Potential For Additional Release: (Y) (N)

Projected Release Based on:

Noble Gas:

uCi/sec Iodine:

uCi/sec Total:

uCi/sec I/NG Ratio:

Monitor ID:

Ul or U2 (Circle One)

Reading:

cpm or uCi/cc (Circle One) [ 16] Flow:

cfm 35ft Wind Speed:

[ 18 ] Delta-T:

[19] Stability:

150ft Direction:

[ 21 ] 500ft Direction:

[ 22 ] Precip: (Y) (N)

[10]

[11]

[12]

[131

[141

[15]

[17]

[20]

[23 1 NOTE:

THIS PAPER IS INTENDED TO BE PINK FOR BVPS ONLY, IT IS WHITE TO ACCOMODATE FAXING.

rValley Power Station Procedure Number:

Beaver VEPP/IP

1.1 Title

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

N oifcai ns28 22 of 86 Z

GASEOUS ATTACHMENT 3 FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM Projected Thyroid CDE (c)

EAB REM 2 mi REM 5 mi REM

-0 lmi REM EDE-TO-TEDE Ratio:

Actual Field Monitoring Results:

Time Point WB RE1 (a)

(b)

(c)

W11 REM REM REM REM Ir Thy REM/Hr (d)

OFFSITF. PROTFCTIVF ACTION RECOMMENDATION" Dist (4 of 5)

A5.715DR Sectors (a)

TEDE (b)

[241

[251

[26]

[271

[28]

[29]

NOTE:

THIS PAPER IS INTENDED TO BE PINK FOR BVPS ONLY, IT IS WHITE TO ACCOMODATE FAXING.

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPJIP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

1 28 23 of 86 LIQUID ATTACHMENT 3 (5 of 5)

A5.715DR FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM

/ TIME

1.

Potential For Additional Release:

Yes FI No VD LIQUID RELEASE ASSESSMENT:

PROCEDURE

2.

RADIONUCLIDES IN SAMPLE:

ATTACHMENT(s)

H-3 =

uCi/ml

=_

uCi/ml

=_

uCi/ml

=_

uCi/ml

=_

uCi/ml

=_

uCi/ml Actual

=_

uCi/ml

=

uCi/ml

=

uCi/ml

=

uCi/ml

=

uCi/ml

=

uCi/ml Projected

3.

TIME OF RELEASE START TIME OF RELEASE STOP RELEASE DURATION RELEASE FLOW RATE DILUTION RATE (Due to BVPS)

OHIO RIVER FLOW RATE

_ Hrs gpm gpm cuft/sec Hrs.

gpm gpm cuft/sec

4.

TS/ODCM FRACTION (TS/ODCM Limit = 10 x NRC-EC)

U

5.

EPA Mt No Emergency Unusual Event (TS/ODCM Fraction is > 2, and release > 60 minutes)

Alert Emergency (TS/ODCM Fraction is > 200, and release > 15 minutes)

[C FRACTION No PAR required (EPA-MPC is < 12)

F-1 PAR REQUIRED PER EPP/IP 4.1 (EPA-MPC > 12: NOTIFY THE MIDLAND WATER TREATMENT PLANT AND RECOMMEND THE PLANT STOP INTAKE FROM THE OHIO RIVER UNTIL NOTIFIED BY DEP/BRP. ALSO REFER TO EPP/IP 1.1 ATTACHMENT 2 FOR OTHER NOTIFICATIONS.)

NOTE:

THIS PAPER IS INTENDED TO BE PINK FOR BVPS ONLY, IT IS WHITE TO ACCOMODATE FAXING.

DATE

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

BEPP/IP

1.1 Title

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

28 24 of 86 INTENTIONALLY BLANK I

BeaverValley Power Station P roce I1Number:

_ev

_.eEPP/IP

1.1 Title

Unit:

Level Of Use:

.1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number 1--

2 25 of 86 ATTACHMENT 4 (1 of 2)

A5.715DS REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (NRC FORM 361)

THIS FORM IS NOW LOCATED ON THE REGULATORY AFFAIRS WEB PAGE.- HARD COPIES ARE MAINTAINED IN THE NOTIFICATION PACKAGES IN THE CONTROL ROOM AND TSC.

Beaver Valley Power Station

Title:

Notifications a6 Procedure Number:

FPP/IP Unit:

Level Of t 1/2 In-Fie Revision:

Page Numt 28 1

2 i

ATTACHMEI REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (NRC FORM 361)

THIS FORM IS NOW LOCATED ON THE REGULATORY AFFAIRS WEB PA4 COPIES ARE MAINTAINED IN THE NOTIFICATION PACKAGES IN THE ROOM AND TSC.

1.1 Jse.*

eld Reference tber.

26 of R6 4T4 (2 of 2)

A5.715DS GE. HARD CONTROL

Procedure Number:

EPP/IP 1. 1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

S.........

~2 8..

2 7 o f 86.....

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION ATTACHMENT 5 (1 of 2)

A5.715DT EMERGENCY TERMINATION CHECKLIST The Offsite agencies DO-NOT maintain the Emergency Termination Checklist. Instruct the agency to log the termination information and inform the cognizant individual of their organization of the termination date and time.

"This is Beaver Valley Power Station. This notification is to inform you that the emergency situation at Beaver Valley Power Station has been terminated on Date hours. Please complete all applicable procedures before terminating."

CONTACT ORGA&NIZATIN PERSON CONTACTED NU BRTIE*INITIALS'..

Beaver County Emergency Management Agency 724-775-0880 PA Emergency Management Agency 1-717-651-2001 Columbiana County Emergency Management 1-330-424-7255 Agency Ohio Emergency Management Agency 1-614-889-7150 Hancock County Office of Emergency Services 1-304-564-4100 West Virginia Office of Emergency Services 1-304-558-5380 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1-301-816-5100 Corporate Communications 724-682-5201 Bruce Mansfield Power Station 724-643-2300 Beaver Valley Power Station NOTE:

Date:

Approved (ED/ERM)

(

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

EPP/P 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION ATTACHMENT 5 (2 of 2)

A5.715DT EMERGENCY TERMINATION CHECKLIST NOTE:

The Offsite agencies DO NOT maintain the Emergency Termination Checklist. Instruct the agency to log the termination information and inform the cognizant individual of their organization of the termination date and time.

CONTACT ORG0ANIZATION.

PERSON CONTACTED, NUMBE~R TIME *INITIALS

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual Approved (ED/ERM)

Date:

Approved (ED/ERM)

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual Date:

StationProcedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPIIP 1. 1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

S1/2 IIn-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number.

S.....

28 29 of 86 BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION ATTACHMENT 6 (1 of 2)

A5.715GP SECURITY NEAR-SITE BUILDING EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS At the initial declaration of an Alert, or higher, emergency classification or if a Site protective action is required as determined by the Emergency Director (NSS), Security personnel SHALL page each of the following facilities using the building page number shown below or contact a listed individual.

TIME NOTIFIED A

Training Building

-PAX 7003 Building Page B

Simulator Building PAX 7001 Building Page C

Site Engineering Building (SEB)

PAX 7007 Building Page D

'-Warehouse 22 Building Page 1)

PAX 7002

Beaver Valley Power Station Notifications BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Revision:

Page Number:

ATTACHMENT 6 (2 of 2)

A5.715GP SECURITY NEAR-SITE BUILDING EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS

2)

Security personnel will circle or complete the following information per the Emergency Director (designee) and provide over the page/phone. Repeat message.

PART I This is an ACTUAL EVENT. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit # 1 / 2 has declared an emergency classification of ALERT / SITE AREA / GENERAL EMERGENCY at (Time)

All Emergency Response Personnel SHALL report to their Emergency Response positions. This is an ACTUAL EVENT.

PART II NOTE:

READ ONLY IF A SITE EVACUATION IS REQUIRED.

This is an ACTUAL EVENT. A Site Evacuation has been declared by the Emergency Director.

All non-emergency response personnel:

1)

Are dismissed to GO HOME.

2)

REPORT TO THE Hookstown Grange Offsite Assembly Area, or

3)

REPORT TO THE Western District Headquarters Raccoon Substation) Offsite Assembly Area to await further instructions.

This is an ACTUAL EVENT.

-I

,;d2 1 1 all 0" Ll 1Ilde:

Procedure Number.

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP.IP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

1 28 31 of 96 ATTACHMENT 7 (1 of 8)

ACTIVATION OF THE ERO USING BEEPERS AND ERO VOICE MAIL SYSTEM A.

PURPOSE This attachment is for using beepers and the Voice Mail System to make emergency event notifications to Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel and to verify that adequate ERO staffing levels are available.

B.

RESPONSIBILITY The Onshift Communications and Records Coordinator is responsible to ensure the actions outlined in this attachment are implemented.

C.

EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS 1.0 The following beeper notification system equipment is kept in CAS:

1.1 ERO beeper.

2.0 The following are found in the Control Room EPP sealed drawer.

2.1 Event Classification Packages

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Nu1.1r:

EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

I 1N c In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

1 28 32 of 86 ATTACHMENT 7 (2 of 8)

D.

PROCEDURE 1.0 Beeper Activation, using ERO Voice Mail System by CAS.

1.1 Upon the failure of the BVERS to actuate the ERO beepers, or at the discretion of the NSS/Emergency Director, the Onshift Communications and Records Coordinator SHALL call the Central Alarm Station (CAS), providing to the Nuclear Security Shift Supervisor or designee the following:

1.1.1 Your name and position.

1.1.2 EPP Code Word.

1.1.3 Event Classification 1.1.4 Appropriate beeper code:

9999995080 ("Actual Event")

0000005080 ("Actual Event--Site Inaccessible")

1.1.5 Request a call back when CAS pager actuates with proper code.

NOTE:

If at any time prior to beeper activation utilizing the 5080 suffix, the beepers activate with the appropriate message and with 4370 or 4380 as the last four (4) digits, continue with the Initial Notifications in progress.

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

1 28 3-3 of 86 ATTACHMENT 7 (3 of 8) 1.1.6 Instructions as to which message to be used for the ERO Voice Mail System:

"Actual Event" "Actual Event--Site Inaccessible" 1.2 Instruct the Nuclear Shift Security Supervisor to activate the beepers with the appropriate code.

1.2.1 Instruct the Nuclear Shift Security Supervisor to repeat the beeper activation two (2) times, 10 minutes apart to ensure that all appropriate personnel receive the call (i.e., 11:00 original call, 11:10 first recall, 11:20 second recall).

1.3 Once the ERO Voice Mail message has been changed, the Nuclear Security Shift Supervisor, or his designee, SHALL activate the ERO beepers.

NOTE:

The BVPS Radio System is the alternate to the commercial phone system for notification of offsite emergency response organizations.

EPP/IP 1.2,, Step 6.0 provides direction in its use.

1.4 Twenty minutes after the CAS pager has actuated, perform the following:

.NOTE:

The EROGVoice Mail System has a maximum of 4 lines available. If no lines are available, a busy signal will be received.

1.4.1 Remove the last three (3) pages of this Attachment "ERO Position List".

1.4.2 From a touch-tone phone or from a PAX phone dial 9-682-5080.

Procedure Number.

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPIP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number I

ATTACH ENT 74 of 86 ATTACHMENT 7 (4 of 8) 1.4.3 When the message begins press #.

NOTE:

Any calls responding to the beeper activation that are received by CAS or the Control Room are also to be included in the ERO Beeper Holders List.

NOTE:

Pressing 1 will repeat the voice mail message, pressing 2 will go to the next message. DO NOT ERASE voice mail messages. You do not have to wait for the prompt to press 1 or 2 1.4.4 When prompted to enter a Mail Box Number, enter

• 1 1 3 for an Actual Event or

• 1 1 4 for an Actual Event-Site Inaccessible.

1.5 On the "ERO Position List", record the callers name, ETA and if they are "fit for-duty" in the columns beside their ERO position. If a caller reports not "fit for-duty", write N/A in the ETA column.

NOTE:

The first 18 positions on the "ERO Position List" is the "Minimum Staffing" for TSC activation.

1.6 When done with messages on the ERO Voice Mail System, press *

• to exit Voice Mail.

NOTE:

ERO Call List and ERO Beeper Holders List are located on the EP Department Web Page.

I I

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

EPP/IlP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use.

In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

28 15 of 86 ATTACHMENT 7 (5 of 8) 1.7 Verify the first 18 positions on the "ERO Position List" are filled.

1.8 If no one for a designated position on the Minimum Staffing Section of the "ERO Position List" has responded, make follow-up calls to the designated coordinator OR alternates UNTIL a person qualified to fill that position has been contacted.

1.9 When all responses have been recorded on the "ERO Position List" AND the Minimum Staffing Checklist, perform the following:

1.9.1 Deliver copies of all paperwork to the ED.

1.9.2 Retain the original paperwork and forward to the Emergency Preparedness upon termination of the event.

1.10 When the emergency terminates or at the direction of the NSS/Emergency Director or Communications and Records Coordinator, have CAS return the ERO Voice Mail message to the NORMAL message.

1.11 In the case of an actual emergency, Control Room personnel SHOULD NOT erase the incoming voice mail messages. They are to be retained for permanent records of the calls received during the emergency.

2.0 Return to EPP/IP 1.1, Notification Attachment in progress.

NOTE:

Attempts to contact designated coordinators or alternates of a position should be made using the current Emergency Response Organization Call List.

Beaver Valley Power Station PocedureN1ber.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/[2 IIn-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

EPP/Implementing Procedures EPP/IP 1.1 NOTIFICATIONS ERO POSITION LIST ATTACHMENT 7 (6 of 8)

POSITION NAME ETA FFD EMERGENCY DIRECTOR COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS COORDINATOR COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANT COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANT COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANT EA&DP COORDINATOR TSC COORDINATOR RADCON COORDINATOR MAINTENANCE COORDINATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR OSC COORDINATOR OSC H.P. COORDINATOR COMPUTER COORDINATOR MECHANICAL ENGINEER

.ELECTRICAL ENGINEER NUCLEAR ENGINEER CHEMISTRY COORDINATOR EMERGENCY RECOVERY MANAGER

Beaver Valley Power Station C

(

Procedure Number:

EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

S28 37 of 86 EPP/Implementing Procedures EPPAIP 1.1 NOTIFICATIONS ERO POSITION LIST ATTACHMENT 7 (7 of 8)

POSITION NAME ETA FFD OSC COORDINATOR ASSISTANT OSC COORD. ASST "_

OSC H.P. COORDINATOR ASSISTANT OSC HP. COORDINATOR'ASSISTANT OSC H.P, COORDINATOR ASSISTANT..

ASSISTNAT TO THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR TSC OPS COORDINATOR....

TSC OPS COORDINATOR ASSISTANT OPS COMMUNICATOR OPS COMMUNICATOR OPS COMMUNICATOR EA&DP ASSISTANT EA&DP ASSISTANT ENVIRONMENTAL COORDINATOR CHEMISTRY COORDINATOR ASSISTANT COMPUTER OPERATOR COMPUTER OPERATOR COMPUTER OPERATOR._

MATERIALS ENGINEER...

Y -

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

___EPP/IP 1.1I

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

1 28 38 of R6 EPP/Implementing Procedures EPP/IP 1.1 NOTIFICATIONS ERO POSITION LIST ATTACHMENT 7 (8 of 8)

POSITION NAME ETA FFD SYSTEM ENGINEER ASSISTANT TO THE EMERGENCY/RECOVERY MANAGER EOF OPERATIONS COORDINATOR EOF OPS COMMUNICATOR OFFSITE AGENCY LIAISON NUCLEAR COMMUNICATIONS MANGER NUCLEAR COMMUNICATIONS WRITER NUCLEAR COMMUNICATIONS WRITER NUCLEAR COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ADVISOR JPIC MANAGER INFORMATION MANAGER INFORMATION COORDINATOR CHIEF COMPANY SPOKESPERSON '

TECHNICAL ADVISOR MEDIA RELATIONS COORDINATOR MEDIA RELATIONS COORDINATOR LOGISTICS COORDINATOR

Beaver Valley Power Station Pd m

EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

S1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

• 28 39 of 86 ATTACHMENT 8 (1 of 7)

UNUSUAL EVENT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM A.

Onshift Communications and Records Coordinator Initial Notification Actions:

1.0 Obtain completed Initial Notification Form from the NSS/ED.

2.0-Fax the Initial Notification Form to the Offsite Agencies.

2.1 Turn the external speaker located on the rear of the fax machine on".

.. 2.2 Place completedNotification Form(s) on the fax machine (face down).

NOTE:

Not all voice prompts are listed here, only the key ones.

2.3 Press the "HOOK" button or, if external speaker is not functioning, lift the phone receiver.

2.4 Press Speed Dial number "o01 (EPP FAX) on the fax machine (or enter

).

2.5 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE SUBSCRIBER ID AND POUND SIGN",

Press Speed Dial number "02" (or enter __.

2.6 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE PASSWORD AND POUND SIGN", Press Speed Dial number "03" (or enter

1. ).

2.7 You will hear a voice prompt "LOGGING IN, PLEASE WAIT". At the voice prompt "TO SEND A MESSAGE PRESS&" 1", press 1 on the numeric keypad (do not wait for additional prompts).

NOTE:

If Speed Dial "04"1 is used, Step 2.9 does not need to be performed.

(Continued)

Beaver Valley Power Station I

1.1 EPP/IP 1. 1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

1 28 40 of 86 ATTACHMENT 8 (2 of 7)

UNUSUAL EVENT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 2.8 At the voice prompt "ENTER RECIPIENT ADDRESS NUMBER, TO FAX TO A LIST PRESS *L", press Speed Dial number "04" (or enter 2.9 At the voice prompt "WHEN FINISHED PRESS THE

• AND # KEYS", press on the numeric keypad.

2.10 A voice prompt will inform you that "YOUR MESSAGE ID IS AND WILL BE SENT TO LIST 2.11 At the voice prompt "PLEASE START YOUR FAX MACHINE", press START.

2.12 Hang up the handset if used.

2.13 Turn "OFF" the external speaker on the rear of the fax machine, if used.

3.0 Activate Off-Site Agency Initial Notification Conference (INC) Call.

3.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked INC OR dial 9# 1-330-315-4380 (or from a PAX phone, dial 9-1-330-315-4380).

3.2 Interrupt the greeting by IMMEDIATELY entering XXXXXX.

3.2.1 IF unable to activate INC, GO TO PART B of this procedure.

3.3 When prompted, enter the scenario number XXXX.

3.4 When prompted, verify the scenario number (9 for YES or 6 for NO).

3.5 Verify, when prompted, "You will cue SCENARIO XXXX. It will now be sent.

Are you sure this is what you want to do?" (9 for YES or 6 for NO).

3.6 Hang up.

Beaver Valley Power Station edure Li EPP/IP L1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

.1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

S28 41 of 86 ATTACHMENT 8 (3 of 7)

UNUSUAL EVENT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM S4.0 Access Initial Notification Conference Bridge.

4.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked CONF. Bridge OR dial 9# 724-682-1900 (OR from a PAX phone, dial 9-724-682-1900).

4.2 When prompted, enter XXXX, then the # key.

5.0 Provide Initial Notification to Offsite Agencies.

5.1 As each Agency enters the INC call, state the following:

5.1.1 "This is at Beaver Valley (Your Name)

Power Station, the Code Word is 5.1.2 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative.

Contact Agency

-Time Contact Name INC FAX Initials Beaver County Y/N Y/N PEMA (State of Pennsylvania)

Y/N Y/N Columbiana County...

Y/N Y/N OEMA (State of Ohio)

Y/N Y/N Hancock County Y/N Y/N WVOES*

(State of West Y/N Y/N Virginia)

Hancock County can notify WVOES (State of West Virginia) if not on the Conference Call or not able to be contacted.

5.2 Ask each agency if they received the Initial Notification Form FAX and if it is legible.

5.2.1 IF YES, ask if there are any questions.

5.2.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

5.2.3 IF NO, provide information from Initial Notification Form.

(Continued)

Beaver Valley Power Station V Procedure Number:

pRPP/Tlp I

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:.

28 42 of 86 ATTACHMENT 8 (4 of 7)

UNUSUAL EVENT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 5.3 STATE "A Follow-Up Notification will be provided as information becomes available."

5.4 STATE "Beaver Valley Power Station is exiting the Initial Notification Conference Call.

Agencies may remain on the Conference Call for further discussion."

5.5 For any Agency(ies) NOT on the conference call, perform the following:

5.5.1 Contact each remaining Offsite Agency and, 5.5.2 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative.

5.5.3 STATE "This is (Your Name)

EPP Communicator".

5.5.4 STATE "EPP Code Word is 5.5.5 Ask each Agency if they received the Initial Notification Form Fax and if it is legible.

5.5.5.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

5.5.5.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

5.5.5.3 If NO, provide information from the Initial Notification Form.

6.0 Notify the NSS/ED of ERO Initial Notifications completed.

• Give NSS/ED the Execution Roster qualified Report from BVERS when it arrives on Control Room FAX machine (approximately thirty minutes from ERO activation).

I

Procedure. Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP.P 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

S29 4-3o4 86 ATTACHMENT 8 (5 of 7)

S,'UNUSUAL EVENT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 7.0 Document contact of the NRC within one (1) hour of the event declaration on EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

8.0 Contact each of the remaining Personnel/Organizations, as required, per EPP/IP 1.1, 9.10 Conduct Follow-Up Notifications.

9.1 Obtain a completed Follow-Up Notification Form from the NSS/ED.

9.2 Fax the Follow-Up Notification Form to the Offsite Agencies using the instructions from Step 2.0.

9.3 20 minutes after FAX was sent, or after return FAX received in the Control Room, notify the six (6) Offsite Agencies INDIVIDUALLY using EPP/IP 1.1, by:

9.3.1 STATE "This is (Your Name)

EPP Communicator".

9.3.2 STATE "The Code Word is 9.3.3 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative on the Follow-Up Notification part of EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

9.3.4 Ask agency if they received the Follow-Up Notification #XX FAX and if it is legible.

9.3.5 If YES, ask if any questions.

9.3.6 If NO, provide information from the Follow-Up Notification Form.

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Njumber:

"ITPP/TP 1 1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifi sRevision:

Page Number:

Ntfctos28 44 of 86 ATTACHMENT 8 (6 of 7)

UNUSUAL EVENT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 10.0 When contacted, turnover to Communications and Records Coordinator or (Communications Assistant) in the TSC (if ERO activated).

11.0 Upon termination of the emergency:

11.1 When directed by NSS/EI, complete the Emergency Termination Checklist, EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 5.

11.2 Collect all original/completed attachments and forward to Emergency Preparedness.

NOTE:

ONLY perform this part to contact Offsite Agencies individually for Initial Notification.

B.

Individual Offsite Agency Initial Notification(s).

1.0 Obtain completed Initial Notification Form from the NSS/ED or Control Room FAX machine.

2.0 Contact each required Offsite Agency per EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

3.0 Record the contact time and the name of agency representative on attachment.

4.0 STATE "This is (Your Name)

EPP Communicator".

5.0 STATE "EPP Code Word is

Beaver Valley Power Station roedure Nmber:

1.1 Title

Unit:

Level Of Use:

"1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:.

1 28 45 of 86 ATTACHMENT 8 (7 of 7)

UNUSUAL EVENT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 6.0 Ask each agency if they received the Initial Notification Form FAX and if it is legible.

6.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

6.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

6.3 If NO, provide information from Initial Notification Form.

7.0 Return to Part A, Step 5.0 of this attachment.

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure m.

E IPn-i 1.Ren

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

N/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

J 28 46 of 86 INTENTIONALLY BLANK

.1

Beaver Valley Power Station ProedreNumber:

11

_EPPJIP1.

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

S1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

28 47 of R6 ATTACHMENT 9 (1 of 7)

ALERT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM A.

Onshift Communications and Records Coordinator Initial Notification Actions:

• 1.0 Obtain completed Initial Notification Form from the NSS/ED.

2.0 Fax the Initial Notification Form to the Offsite Agencies.

2.1 Turn the external speaker located on the rear of the fax machine on".

2.2 Place completed Notification Form(s) on the fax machine (face down).

NOTE:

Not all voice prompts are listed here, only the key ones.

2.3 Press the "HOOK" button or, if external speaker is not functioning, lift the phone receiver.

2.4 Press Speed Dial number "r01 (EPP FAX) on the fax machine (or enter

).

2.5 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE SUBSCRIBER ID AND POUND SIGN",

Press Speed Dial number "02" (or enter

1. )_.

2.6 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE PASSWORD AND POUND SIGN", Press Speed Dial number "03" (or enter_

2.7 You will hear a voice prompt "LOGGING IN, PLEASE WAIT". At the voice prompt "TO SEND A MESSAGE PRESS "1", press 1 on the numeric keypad (do not wait for additional' prompts).

IfSeedDia"0"i used 2.9 NOTE:

[If Speed Dial '04" is used, Step 2.9 does not need to be performed.

(Continued)

Beaver Valley Power Station PrPdIP

1.1 Title

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number.

28 1

49 of 96

,J ATTACHMENT 9 (2 of 7)

ALERT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 2.8 At the voice prompt "ENTER RECIPIENT ADDRESS NUMBER, TO FAX TO A LIST PRESS *L", press Speed Dial number "04" (or enter 2.9 At the voice prompt "WHEN FINISHED PRESS THE

• AND # KEYS", press "6(*#3 on the numeric keypad.

2.10 A voice prompt will inform you that "YOUR MESSAGE ID IS AND WILL BE SENT TO LIST__

2.11 At the voice prompt "PLEASE START YOUR FAX MACHINE", press START.

2.12 Hang up the handset if used.

2.13 Turn "OFF" the external speaker on the rear of the fax machine, if used.

3.0 Activate Off-Site Agency Initial Notification Conference (INC) Call.

3.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked INC OR dial 9# 1-330-315-4380 (or from a PAX phone, dial 9-1-330-315-4380).

3.2 Interrupt the greeting by IMMEDIATELY entering XXXXXX.

3.2.1

[F unable to activate INC, GO TO PART B of this procedure.

3.3 When prompted, enter the scenario number XXXX.

3.4 When prompted, verify the scenario number (9 for YES or 6 for NO).

3.5 Verify, when prompted, "You will cue SCENARIO XXXX. It will now be sent.

Are you sure this is what you want to do?" (9 for YES or 6 for NO).

3.6 Hang up.

Procedure Number:.

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

S1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

"1 28 49 of 86 ATTACHMENT 9 (3 of 7)

ALERT NOTIFICATIONS "CONTROL ROOM 4.0 Access Initial Notification Conference Bridge.

4.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked CONE. Bridge OR dial 9# 724-682-1900 (OR from a PAX phone, dial 9-724-682-1900).

4.2:

When prompted, enter XXXX, then the # key.

5.0 Provide Initial Notification to Offsite Agencies.

S5.1 As each Agency enters the INC call, state the following:

5.1.1 "This is at Beaver Valley (Your Name)

Power Station, the Code Word is 5.1.2 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative.

Contact Agency Time Contact Name INC FAX Initials Beaver County Y/N Y/N PEMA (State of Y/N Y/N Pennsylvania)

Columbiana County Y/N Y/N QFEMA (State of Ohio).._._-

Y/N YIN Hancock County Y/N Y/N WVOES*

(State of West Y/N Y/N Virginia)

Hancock County can notify WVOES (State of West Virginia) if not on the Conference Call or not able to be contacted.

5.2 Ask each agency if they received the Initial Notification Form FAX and if it is legible.

5.2.1 IF YES, ask if there are any questions.

5.2.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

5.2.3 IF NO, provide information from Initial Notification Form.

(Continued)

Beaver Valley Power Station

Title:

Notifications AT Procedure Number.

EPP/1P 1.1

• Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Revision:

Page Number.

C2 T

50( of 76

?TACHMENT 9 (4 of 7)

ALERT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 5.3 STATE "A Follow-Up Notification will be provided as information becomes available."

5.4 STATE "Beaver Valley Power Station is exiting the Initial Notification Conference Call. Agencies may remain on the Conference Call for further discussion."

5.5 For any Agency(ies) not on the conference call, perform the following:

5.5.1 Contact each remaining Offsite Agency and, 5.5.2 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative.

5.5.3 STATE "This is (Your Name)

EPP Communicator".

5.5.4 STATE "EPP Code Word is 5.5.5 Ask each Agency if they received the Initial Notification Form Fax and if it is legible.

5.5.5.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

5.5.5.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

5.5.5.3 If NO, provide information from the Initial Notification Form.

6.0 Notify the NSS/ED of ERO Initial Notifications completed.

Give NSS/ED the Execution Roster qualified Report from BVERS when it arrives on Control Room FAX machine (approximately thirty minutes from ERO activation).

I

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPIIP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

S1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

28

-51 of 86 ATTACHMENT 9 (5 of 7)

ALERT NOTIFICATIONS

. CONTROL ROOM 7.0 Document contact of the NRC within one (1) hour of the event declaration on EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

8.0 Contact each of the remaining Personnel/Organizations, as required, per EPP/IP 1.1, 9.0 Conduct Follow-Up Notifications.,

9.1 Obtain a completed Follow-Up Notification Form from the NSS/ED.

9.2 Fax the Follow-Up Notification Form to the Offsite Agencies using the instructions from Step 2.0.

9.3 20 minutes after FAX was sent, or after return FAX received in the Control Room, notify the six (6) Offsite Agencies INDIVIDUALLY using EPP/IP 1.1, by:-

STATE "This is Communicator".

(Your Name-9.3.2 STATE "The Code Word is 9.3.3 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative on the Follow-Up Notification part of EPP/IP 1.1,.

9.3.4 Ask agency if they received the Follow-Up Notification #XX FAX and if it is legible.

9.3.5 If YES, ask if any questions.

9.3.6 If NO, provide information from the Follow-Up Notification Form.

10.0 When contacted, turnover to Communications and Records Coordinator or (Communications Assistant) in the TSC (if ERO activated).

9.3.1 EPP

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPIIP 1.

EPP/IP 1.1,

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/

In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

29

-52 of 86 ATTACHMENT 9 (6 of 7)

ALERT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 11.0 Upon termination of the emergency:

11.1 When directed by NSS/ED, complete the Emergency Termination Checklist, EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 5.

11.2 Collect all original/completed attachments and forward to Emergency Preparedness (BV-T).

NOTE:

ONLY perform this part to contact Offsite Agencies individually for Initial Notification.

B.

Individual Offsite Agency Initial Notification(s).

1.0 Obtain completed Initial Notification Form from the NSS/ED or Control Room FAX machine.

2.0 Contact each required Offsite Agency per EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

3.0 Record the contact time and the name of agency representative on attachment.

4.0 STATE "This is (Your Name)

EPP Communicator".

5.0 STATE "EPP Code Word is

Beaver Valley Power Station roer Numbe

_EPPIIP

1.1 Title

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

53 of 86 ATTACHMENT 9 (7 of 7)

ALERT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 6.0 Ask each agency if they received the Initial Notification Form FAX and if it is legible.

6.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

6.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

6.3 If NO, provide information from Initial Notification Form.

7.0 Return to Part A, Step 5.0 of this attachment.

Beaver Valley Power Station E*1.

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

28

-54 of 86 INTENTIONALLY BLANK I

Procedure Number Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number.

28 55 of 86 ATTACHMENT 10 (1 of 7)

SITE AREA EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM A.

Onshift Communications and Records Coordinator Initial Notification Actions:

1.0 Obtain completed Initial Notification Form from the NSS/ED.

2.0 Fax the Initial Notification Form to the Offsite Agencies.

2.1 Turn the external speaker located on the rear of the fax machine "on".

2.2 Place completed Notification Form(s) on the fax machine (face down).

NOTE:

Not all voice prompts are listed here, only the key ones.

2.3 Press the "HOOK" button or, if external speaker is not functioning, lift the phone receiver.

2.4 Press Speed Dial number "01" (EPP FAX) on the fax machine (or enter

).

2.5 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE SUBSCRIBER ID AND POUND SIGN",

Press SpeedDial number "02" (or enter _

2.6 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE PASSWORD AND POUND SIGN", Press Speed Dial number "03"? (or enter

1. ).

-2.7 You will hear a voice prompt "LOGGING IN, PLEASE WAIT". At the voice prompt "TO SEND A MESSAGE PRESS "1", press 1 on the numeric keypad (do not wait for additional prompts).-

I.

NOTE:

I!f Speed Dial "04" is used, Step 2.9 does not need to be performed.

(Continued)

Beaver Valley Power Station

Title:

Notifications AT SITE AREA EMERGENCY NOTIFICA[

CONTROL ROOM 2.8 At the voice prompt "ENTER RECIPIENT A TO A LIST PRESS *L, press Speed Dial numb Procedure Number:

EPP/IP 1.1 Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Revision:

Page Number.

28 56 of 96 TACHIIMENT 10 (2 of 7)

'IONS DDRESS NUMBER, TO FAX

'er "04" (or enter 2.9 At the voice prompt "WHEN FINISHED PRESS THE

• AND # KEYS", press

". 499 on the numeric keypad.

2.10 A voice prompt will inform you that "YOUR MESSAGE ID IS AND WILL BE SENT TO LIST__

2.11 At the voice prompt "PLEASE START YOUR FAX MACHINE", press START.

2.12 Hang up the handset if used.

2.13 Turn "OFF" the external speaker on the rear of the fax machine, if used.

3.0 Activate Off-Site Agency Initial Notification Conference (INC) Call.

3.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked INC OR dial 9# 1-330-315-4380 (or from a PAX phone, dial 9-1-330-3154380).

3.2 Interrupt the greeting by IMMEDIATELY entering XXXXXX.

3.2.1 IF unable to activate INC, GO TO PART B of this procedure.

3.3 When prompted, enter the scenario number XXXX.

3.4 When prompted, verify the scenario number (9 for YES or 6 for NO).

3.5 Verify, when prompted, "You will cue SCENARIO XXXX. It will now be sent.

Are you sure this is what you want to do?" (9 for YES or 6 for NO).

3.6 Hang up.

• ° I'

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station ProPer N 11

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

I 2R

-57 of R6 ATTACHMENT 10 (3 of 7)

SITE AREA EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 4.0 Access Initial Notification Conference Bridge.

4.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked CONF. Bridge OR dial 9# 724-682-1900 (OR from a PAX phone, dial 9-724-682-1900).

4.2 When prompted, enter XXXX, then the # key.

5.0 Provide Initial Notification to Offsite Agencies.

5.1 As each Agency enters the INC call, state the following:

5.1.1 "This is at Beaver Valley (Your Name)

Power Station, the Code Word is 5.1.2 Record the contact time and thie name of the agency representative.

Contact Agency Time Contact Name INC FAX Initials Beaver County Y/N Y/N PEMA (State of Y/N Y/N Pennsylvania).....

Columbiana County Y/N Y/N OEMA (State of Ohio).

Y/N Y/N Hancock County Y/N Y/N

.WVOES* (State of West Y/N YIN Virginia)

Hancock County can notify WVOES (State of West Virginia) if not on the Conference Call or not able to be contacted.

5.2 Ask each agency if they received the Initial Notification Form FAX and if it is legible.

5.2.1 IF YES, ask if there are any questions.

5.2.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

5.2.3 IF NO, provide information from Initial Notification Form.

(Continued)

Beaver Valley Power Station

1.

EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

11 28

-58 of 86 ATTACHMENT 10 (4 of 7)

SITE AREA EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 5.3 STATE "A Follow-Up Notification will be provided as information becomes available."

5.4 STATE "Beaver Valley Power Station is exiting the Initial Notification Conference Call. Agencies may remain on the Conference Call for further discussion."

5.5 For any Agency(ies) not on the conference call, perform the following:

5.5.1 Contact each remaining Offsite Agency and, 5.5.2 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative.

5.5.3 STATE "This is (Your Name)

EPP Communicator".

5.5.4 STATE "EPP Code Word is 5.5.5 Ask each Agency if they received the Initial Notification Form Fax and if it is legible.

5.5.5.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

5.5.5.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

5.5.5.3 If NO, provide information from the Initial Notification Form.

6.0 Notify the NSS/ED of ERO Initial Notifications completed.

• Give NSS/ED the Execution Roster qualified Report from BVERS when it arrives on Control Room FAX machine (approximately thirty minutes from ERO activation).

Procedure Number.

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

S1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

S...

28 59 of 86 ATTACHMENT 10 (5 of 7)

SITE AREA EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 7.0 Document contact of the NRC within one (1) hour of the event declaration on EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

8.0 Contact each of the remaining Personnel/Organizations, as required, per EPP/IP 1.1, 9.0 Conduct Follow-Up Notifications.

9.1 Obtain a completed Follow-Up Notification Form from the NSS/ED.

9.2 Fax the Follow-Up Notification Form to the Offsite Agencies using the instructions from Step 2.0.

9.3 20 minutes after FAX was sent, or after return FAX received in the Control Room, notify the six (6) Offsite Agencies INDIVIDUALLY using EPP/IP 1.1, by:

STATE "This is Communicator".

(Your Name) 9.3.2 STATE "The Code Word is 9.3.3 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative on the Follow-Up Notification part of EPP/IP 1.1,.

9.3.4 Ask agency if they received the Follow-Up Notification #XX FAX and if it is legible.

9.3.5 If YES, ask if any questions.

9.3.6 If NO, provide information from the Follow-Up Notification Form.

10.0 When contacted, turnover to Communications and Records Coordinator or (Communications Assistant) in the TSC (if ERO activated).

9.3.1 EPP

Beaver Valley Power Station I-1 Unit:

In-Field Reference Procedure Number

.PVP"I 1 1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

28 1

60 of Ri6 ATTACHMENT 10 (6 of 7)

SITE AREA EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 11.0 Upon termination of the emergency:

11.1 When directed by NSS/ED, complete the Emergency Termination Checklist, EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 5.

11.2 Collect all original/completed attachments and forward to Emergency Preparedness (BV-T).

NOTE:

ONLY perform this part to contact Offsite Agencies individually for Initial Notification.

B.

Individual Offsite Agency Initial Notification(s).

1.0 Obtain completed Initial Notification Form from the NSS/ED or Control Room FAX machine.

2.0 Contact each required Offsite Agency per EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

3.0 Record the contact time and the name of agency representative on attachment.

4.0 STATE "This is (Your Name)

EPP Communicator".

5.0 STATE "EPP Code Word is

Procedure N -umber.

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

"1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

I 28 61 of 86 ATTACHMENT 10 (7 of 7)

SITE AREA EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 6.0 Ask each agency if they received the Initial Notification Form FAX and if it is legible.

6.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

6.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

6.3 If NO, provide information from Initial Notification Form.

7.0 Return to Part A, Step 5.0 of this attachment.

Beaver Valley Power Station EP/mI1..

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Procedure Number Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

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S...28 63 of 86 ATTACHMENT 11 (1 of 7)

GENERAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM A.

Onshift Communications and Records Coordinator Initial Notification Actions:

1.0 Obtain completed Initial Notification Form from the NSS/ED.

2.0 Fax the Initial Notification Form to the Offsite Agencies.

2.1 Turn the external speaker located on the rear of the fax machine on".

2.2 Place completed Notification Form(s) on the fax machine (face down).

NOTE:

SI Not all voice prompts are listed here, only the key ones.

2.3 Press the "HOOK" button or, if external speaker is not functioning, lift the phone receiver.

2.4 Press Speed Dial number "01" (EPP FAX) on the fax machine (or enter

).

2.5 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE SUBSCRIBER ID AND POUND SIGN",

Press Speed Dial number "02" (or enter __.

2.6 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE PASSWORD AND POUND SIGN",,Press Speed Dial number "03" (or enter __.

2.7 You will hear a voice prompt "LOGGING IN, PLEASE WAIT". At the voice prompt "TO SEND A MESSAGE PRESS "1", press 1 on the numeric keypad (do not wait for additional prompts).

(Continued)

I

.NOTE:

If Speed Dial "04" is used, Step 2.9 does not need to be performed.

I

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28 64 of 86 ATTACHMENT 11 (2 of 7)

GENERAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 2.8 At the voice prompt "ENTER RECIPIENT ADDRESS NUMBER, TO FAX TO A LIST PRESS *L", press Speed Dial number "04" (or enter

1. M.

2.9 At the voice prompt "WHEN FINISHED PRESS THE

• AND # KEYS", press "on the numeric keypad.

2.10 A voice prompt will inform you that "YOUR MESSAGE ID IS AND WILL BE SENT TO LIST 2.11 At the voice prompt "PLEASE START YOUR FAX MACHINE", press START.

2.12 Hang up the handset if used.

2.13 Turn "OFF" the external speaker on the rear of the fax machine, if used.

3.0 Activate Off-Site Agency Initial Notification Conference (INC) Call.

3.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked INC OR dial 9# 1-330-315-4380 (or from a PAX phone, dial 9-1-330-315-4380).

3.2 Interrupt the greeting by IMMEDIATELY entering XXXXXX.

3.2.1 IF unable to activate INC, GO TO PART B of this procedure.

3.3 When prompted, enter the scenario number XXXX.

3.4 When prompted, verify the scenario number (9 for YES or 6 for NO).

3.5 Verify, when prompted, "You will cue SCENARIO XXXX. It will now be sent.

Are you sure this is what you want to do?" (9 for YES or 6 for NO).

3.6 Hang up.

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPIIP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

A 28 65 of 7)

ATTACHMENT 11 (3 of 7)

GENERAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 4.0 Access Initial Notification Conference Bridge.

4.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked CONF. Bridge OR dial 9# 724-682-1900 (OR from a PAX phone, dial 9-724-682-1900).

4.2 When prompted, enter XXXX, then the #key.

5.0 Provide Initial Notification to Offsite Agencies.

5.1 As each Agency enters the INC call, state the following:

5.1.1 "This is __at Beaver Valley (Your Name)

Power Station, the Code Word is 5.1.2 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative.

Contact Agency Time Contact Name INC FAX Initials Beaver County........

Y/N Y/N

.PEMA (Sate of Y/N Y/N Pennsylvania)

Columbiana County Y/N Y/N OEMA (State of Ohio)

Y/N Y/N Hancock*County Y/N Y/N WVOES* (State of West Y/N Y/N Virginia).

Hancock County can notify WVOES (State of West Virginia) if not on the Conference Call or not able to be contacted.

5.2 Ask each agency if they received the Initial Notification Form FAX and if it is legible.

5.2.1 IF YES, ask if there are any questions.

5.2.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

5.2.3 IF NO, provide information from Initial Notification Form.

(Continued)

Beaver Valley Power Station

• 1 Procedure-Niimber.

"PP TPf 1 1

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28 66 of R6 ATTACHMENT 11 (4 of 7)

GENERAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 5.3 STATE "A Follow-Up Notification will be provided as information becomes available."

5.4 STATE "Beaver Valley Power Station is exiting the Initial Notification Conference Call. Agencies may remain on the Conference Call for further discussion."

5.5 For any Agency(ies) not on the conference call, perform the following:

5.5.1 Contact each remaining Offsite Agency and, 5.5.2 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative.

5.5.3 STATE "This is (Your Name)

EPP Communicator".

5.5.4 STATE "EPP Code Word is 5.5.5 Ask each Agency if they received the Initial Notification Form Fax and if it is legible.

5.5.5.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

5.5.5.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

5.5.5.3 If NO, provide information from the Initial Notification Form.

6.0 Notify the NSS/ED of ERO Initial Notifications completed.

Give NSS/ED the Execution Roster qualified Report from BVERS when it arrives on Control Room FAX machine (approximately thirty minutes from ERO activation).

r T-

Procedure Number.

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPPeP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number.

1 29 67 of R6 ATTACHMENT 11 (5 of 7)

GENERAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 7.0 Document contact of the NRC within one (1) hour of the event declaration on EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

8.0 Contact each of the remaining Personnel/Organizations, as required, per EPP/IP 1.1, 9.0 Conduct Follow-Up Notifications.

.. 9.1 Obtain a completed Follow-Up Notification Form from the NSS/ED.

9.2 Fax the Follow-Up Notification Form to the Offsite Agencies using the instructions from Step 2.0.

9.3 20 minutes after FAX was sent, or after return FAX received in the Control Room, notify the six (6) Offsite Agencies INDIVIDUALLY using EPP/IP 1.1, by:

STATE "This is Communicator".

(Your Name) 9.3.2 STATE "The Code Word is 9.3.3 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative on the Follow-Up Notification part of EPP/IP 1.1,.

9.3.4 Ask agency if they received the Follow-Up Notification #XX FAX and if it is legible.

9.3.5 If YES, ask if any questions.

9.3.6 If NO, provide information from the Follow-Up Notification Form.

10.0 When contacted, turnover to Communications and Records Coordinator or (Communications Assistant) in the TSC (if ERO activated).

9.3.1 EPP

Beaver Valley Power Station EP I

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

28 68 of R*6

./

ATTACHMENT 11 (6 of 7)

GENERAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 11.0 Upon termination of the emergency:

11.1 When directed by NSS/ED, complete the Emergency Termination Checklist, EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 5.

11.2 Collect all original/completed attachments and forward to Emergency Preparedness (BV-T).

NOTE:

ONLY perform this part to contact Offsite Agencies individually for Initial Notification.

B.

Individual Offsite Agency Initial Notification(s).

1.0 Obtain completed Initial Notification Form from the NSS/ED or Control Room FAX machine.

2.0 Contact each required Offsite Agency per EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

3.0 Record the contact time and the name of agency representative on attachment.

4.0 STATE "This is (Your Name)

EPP Communicator".

5.0 STATE "EPP Code Word is

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station S*

EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1 /2 I

In-Field Reference Notifications ERevision:

Page Number:

L 28 69 of 86 ATTACHMENT 11 (7 of 7)

GENERAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS.

CONTROL ROOM 6.0 Ask each agency if they received the Initial Notification Form FAX and if it is legible.

6.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

6.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

6.3 If NO, provide information from Initial Notification Form.

7.0 Return to Part A, Step 5.0 of this attachment.

Beaver Valley Power Station ErP/1P 1.b1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

-1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number.

28 70 of 96 INTENTIONALLY BLANK

Pocedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

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S112 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

28 71 of 86 ATTACHMENT 12 (1 of 7)

TSC EVENT NOTIFICATION A.

INSTRUCTIONS 1.0 Comunications and Records Coordinator/Communications Assistant Actions:

1.1 Obtain copies of the forms faxed to the TSC by the Control Room from the TSC Fax machine located on the Communicator's desk.

.1.2 Contact the Control Room for turnover.

.1.3 Make copies of previously complete Initial and Follow-Up Notification Forms and distribute to the following:

1.3.1 TSC (9):

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 Communications Assts. (3)

Communications and Records Coord.

Emergency Director OPS Coordinator OPS Communicator (Red Phone)

OEMA Liaison Communicator NRC (Place in NRC cubicle) 1.3.2 EOF (7):

• Emergency/Recovery Manager e DEP/BRP

• Offsite Agency Liaison PEMA NRC O

OEMA WVOES 1.4 Obtain the EPP Notification Books from the Communicators desk, if not already done.

1.5 Continue with Notifications from the point the Onshift Communications and Records Coordinator'stopped.

I

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPIIP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

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Page Number.

29 79 of 86 ATTACHMENT 12 (2 of 7)

TSC EVENT NOTIFICATION 2.0 Initial Notifications, Communications and Records Coordinator Actions:

NOTE:

The BVPS Radio System is the alternate to the commercial phone system for notifications to offsite emergency response organizations. EPP/IP 1.2, Attachment 3, Step 6.0 provides direction in its use.

NOTE:

If an emergency is reclassified and upgraded during the Follow-Up Notification process, the Communications and Records Coordinator SHALL terminate the notification in progress and begin the upgraded Initial Notification process again per appropriate Attachment. If the Initial Notification Conference (INC) call is in progress, then the upgraded notifications SHALL be provided at this time. The 15-minute clock for the notifications will restart at the time of the upgraded declaration.

2.1 Provide the Emergency Director with the following:

0 0

Initial Notification Form (EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 1)

Follow-Up Notification Form (EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 3) 2.1.1 Provide the NRC Worksheet to the TSC Ops Coordinator for completion.

2.2 Obtain completed INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM from the Emergency Director.

2.3 Review INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM for all lines completed.

I NOTE:

Initial Notifications are to be made to the first six (6) listed Agencies on the EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CALL-LIST, EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2 and MUST be made within 15 minutes of the event declaration. Subsequent notifications MUST still be made.

F I

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

S28 73 of 86 ATTACHMENT 12 (3 of 7)

TSC EVENT NOTIFICATION 2.4 Make three (3) copies of completed INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM.

2.4.1 Provide copies of INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM to Communications Assistants.

2.5 Remove the NOTIFICATION FORM FAXING INSTRUCTIONS from the Communications and Records Coordinator's EPP Notification Book.

2.5.1 Fax the INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM following the steps on the NOTIFICATION FORM FAXING INSTRUCTIONS (Attachment 13 of this procedure).

2.6 Initiate the INC call, per Attachment 15.

2.7-Instruct another Communications Assistant to dial the INC, on another phone, to assist in monitoring the INC call.

2.8 As each Agency enters the INC call, state the following:

2.8.1 "This is at Beaver Valley (Your Name)

Power Station, the Code Word is 2.8.2 Conduct a roll-call using EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2, Page 2, for Agencies 1-6 documenting names and contact time.

S2.8.3 Verify from.each Agency receipt of the appropriate Initial Notification Fax (i.e., Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area or General Emergency) and that the Fax is legible.

IF YES, ask if any Agency has questions regarding the information provided on the fax.

Inform the Agency that a Follow-Up Notification will be relayed as information becomes available.

• STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

IF NO, provide information from the Initial Notification Form AND inform the Agency that a Follow-Up Notification will be relayed as information becomes available.

Beaver Valley Power Station Erceur 1.1 EPP/IP 1. 1

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1 28 74 of 96i ATTACHMENT 12 (4 of 7)

TSC EVENT NOTIFICATION 2.8.4 STATE "A Follow-Up Notification will be provided as information becomes available."

2.8.5 STATE "Beaver Valley Power Station is exiting the Initial Notification Conference Call.

Agencies may remain on the Conference Call for further discussion."

2.8.6 If a party cannot be contacted in a reasonable period of time, bypass that party and proceed down the list. After other required notifications are complete, re-attempt to contact any bypassed parties.

Every effort MUST be made to contact the organizations listed in Attachment 2 and all attempts MUST be documented.

2.9 For any Agency(ies) not on the conference call, perform the following:

2.9.1 Contact each remaining Offsite Agency and, 2.9.2 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative.

2.9.3 STATE "This is (Your Name)

EPP Communicator".

2.9.4 STATE "EPP Code Word is 2.9.5 Ask each Agency if they received the Initial Notification Form Fax and if it is legible.

2.9.5.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

2.9.5.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

2.9.5.3 If NO, provide information from the Initial Notification Form.

2.10 Notify the Emergency Director when the Initial Notification calls to the first six (6) Agencies have been made.

2.11 Verify the Ops Coordinator has given the NRC WORKSHEET to the OPS Communicator manning the NRC phone for relaying information. Log time contacted on EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

I

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPII 1.1 EPP/IP 1. 1

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28 7-5 of 86 ATTACHMENT 12 (5 of 7)

TSC EVENT NOTIFICATION 2.12 Send Lotus Notes Message to ERO pagers per Attachment 16, this procedure.

2.13 Distribute copies of the current Initial Notification Form per Step 1.3 3.0 Follow-Up Notifications NOTE:

The Follow-Up Notification Form should be updated periodically (i.e., 2 times per shift) or at the discretion of the Emergency Director.

3.1 Obtain information for the FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM (EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 3).

3.2 Complete the FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM and make three (3) copies to give to the Communications Assistants.

3.3 Fax the FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM following the instructions on the NOTIFICATIONYFORM FAXING INSTRUCTIONS (Attachment 13 of this procedure).

NOTE:

The follow-up notification provides technical information to those qualified to use the data and serves as a means to verify the authenticity of an emergency notification.

The CODEWORD also provides. verification.

NOTE:

If an emergency is reclassified and upgraded during the Follow-Up Notification process, the Communications and Records Coordinator SHALL terminate the notification in progress and begin the upgraded Initial Notification process again per appropriate Attachment. If the Initial Notification Conference (INC) call is in progress, then the upgraded notifications SHALL be provided at this time.

The 15-minute clock for the notifications will restart at the time of the upgraded declaration.

Beaver Valley Power Station P

1. 1,

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number 28 76 of 96 ATTACHMENT 12 (6 of 7)

TSC EVENT NOTIFICATION NOTE:

The INC call SHALL not be used for Follow-Up Notifications.

Offsite Agencies SHALL be called individually.

3.4 Upon receiving the TSC copy of the Follow-Up Notification Fax, or approximately 20 minutes after sending the Fax, begin Follow-Up Notifications to the first six (6) listed Agencies using EPP/JP 1.1, Attachment 2 "EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST".

3.4.1 Begin call by stating "This is (Your Name) at Beaver Valley Power Station, the Code Word is This is a Follow-Up Notification verification call."

3.4.2 Record name and time of contact on EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

NOTE:

The Follow-Up Notifications # (Number) is Entered in the lower right comer of Attachment 3, page 1 of 5.

3.4.3 Verify receipt of Follow-Up Notification # XX Fax and that the Fax is legible.

• IF YES, ask if there are any questions.

• IF NO, provide information from the Follow-Up Notification Form.

3.4.4 If a party cannot be contacted in a reasonable period of time, bypass that party and proceed down the list. After other required notifications are complete, re-attempt to contact any bypassed parties. Every effort must be made to contact the organizations listed in Attachment 2 and all attempts must be documented.

I

Beaver Valley Power Station Prceur

1.

EPP/IP 1. 1

Title:

Unit:

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1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number.

28 77 of 86 ATTACHMENT 12 (7 of 7)

TSC EVENT NOTIFICATION 4.0 Subsequent Notifications 4.1 If an emergency is escalated in classification, the INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM is used and notifications are made in the same manner specified in Steps 2 and 3 of this procedure.

4.1.1 If an emergency is escalated in classification, and the INC call is ongoing, then confirm the upgraded receipt of the Initial Notification Fax on the current INC call.

4.1.2 If an Agency has not received the upgraded Fax, provide the information.

5.0 -

Site Assembly and Personnel Accountability 5.1 Provide information to Near-Site Assembly Area Coordinators per EPP/IP 3.2,.

6.0 Termination, 6.1 Complete the EMERGENCY TERMINATION CHECKLIST (EPP/IP 1.1, ).

6.2 Collect all originals of the completed attachments and forward to Emergency Preparedness.

B.

FINAL CONDITIONS 1.0 Use of this procedure SHALL be terminated when the emergency situation is corrected or when directed by the Emergency Director.

2.0 (Emergency Termination Checklist) is to be completed for termination calls to offsite agencies for all emergency events.

NOTE:

Upon termination of the emergency situation and the subsequent termination of this IP, All originals of completed Attachments SHALL be forwarded to Emergency Preparedness.

Beaver Valley Power Station Eo P/mb 1.

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number 28 78 of R6 INTENTIONALLY BLANK

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

_EPP/IP

1.1 Title

Unit:

Level Of Use:

S1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

28 79 of 86 ATTACHMENT 13 (1 of 1)

NOTIFICATION, FORM FAXING INSTRUCTIONS EXAMPLE 1.0 Turn external speaker located on rear of fax machine to "ON".

2.0 Place completed Notification Forms on the Fax Machine (face down) and perform the following steps:

NOTE:

Not all voice prompts are listed here, only the key ones.

3.0 Press the "HOOK" button or, if the external speaker is not functioning, lift the phone receiver.

4.0 Press Speed Dial number "01" on the Fax Machine labeled "EPP FAX",

(or enter

).

This will connect you to a voice prompt which states "WELCOME TO AT&T'S ENHANCED FAX".

5.0 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE SUBSCRIBER ID AND POUND SIGN",

Press Speed Dial number "02".,

(or enter_

6.0 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE PASSWORD AND POUND SIGN",

Press Speed Dial number "03", (or enter_

7.0 You will hear a voice prompt "LOGGING IN, PLEASE WAIT". At the voice prompt "TO SEND MESSAGE, PRESS 1". PRESS 1 on the Fax number keys (do not wait for additional prompts).

NOTE:

If Speed Dial 04 is used, Step 9.0 does not need to be performed.

8.0 At the prompt "ENTER RECIPIENT ADDRESS NUMBER, TO ADDRESS TO A LIST PRESS *L ", Press Speed Dial Number ("04") or enter (L).

9.0 At the voice prompt "WHEN FINISHED PRESS THE "*" AND "#" KEYS",

press "*#" buttons on the Fax number keys.

10.0 A voice prompt will inform you that "YOUR MESSAGE ID IS XXXX AND WILL BE SENT TO XXXX RECIPIENTS".

11.0 At the voice prompt, "PLEASE START YOUR FAX MACHINE", press the Fax "START button.

12.0 Hang up the phone if used.

13.0 Return to procedure/Attachment step in progress.

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPIIP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

N28 L0 of B6L INTENTIONALLY BLANK ii

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

EPP/IP 1.L

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

S1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

1 28 81 of 86 NOTE:

If ERO activation is NOT required, proceed to step 1.11 to send a Lotus Notes message.

1.1 From a PAX phone, dial 4370 (or dial 9-724-643-4370).

El 1.2 Interrupt the greeting by IMMEDIATELY entering XXXX.

["

1.3 When prompted, enter scenario number XXXX.

1.4 When prompted, verify scenario number (9 for YES or 6 for NO).

El 1.5 When prompted, "Do you want to record your on the fly message El 1", Press 9 for YES or 6 for NO.

I ATTACHMENT 14 (1 of 2)

ERO BEEPER ACTIVATION INSTRUCTIONS XAMPLE)

CHECK 1.0 A SRO (from the unaffected Unit) SHALL complete the blanks below and EI notify the Emergency Response Organization ERO.

This is at Beaver Valley (Your Name)

Power Station. At (time) hours, Unit _

has Declared an due to:

a.

Report to your emergency facility.

I repeat, report to your emergency Facility.

OR

b.

Report to your alternate emergency facility, I repeat, report to your alternate emergency facility.

SProcedure Number.

Beaver Valley Power Station Po e

PPure Limer EPP/IP 1. 1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number.

Ntfctos1 28 82 of R6 ATTACHMENT 14 (2 of 2)

ERO BEEPER ACTIVATION INSTRUCTIONS (EXAMPLE)

CHECK 1.6 When prompted, "Enter on the fly 1 segment ID or press star to El record".

1.6.1 PRESS * (A short delay will occur).

['

1.7 When prompted, "Please speak your message after the tone", provide the El information from Step 1.0 in your on the fly message.

1.7.1 PRESS the # key when done with message.

[

1.8 Review message, when prompted "Is that correct?" (Press 9 for YES and 6 E]

for NO).

1.9 When prompted "You will queue scenario XXXX. It will now be sent.

F-1 Are you sure this is what you want to do?" (Press 9 for YES or 6 for NO) 1.10 Call the Central Alarm Station (CAS) (PAX 511415115) and provide the El following information:

"* Your name and title.

El

"* EPP CODE WORD l

A/An has been

[]

declared.

"* ERO pagers have been activated. Call back at PAX E-']

when pager activates.

"* Request Near Site Building Emergency Notifications be made.

["

1.11 From Lotus Notes, send a message "beeper all call" with the information

[

from Step 1.0 above.

Include if ERO is to report or not. (Limit 220 characters.)

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/JIP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Page Number:

28' R-3 of 86 ATTACHMENT 15 (1 of 2)

ACTIVATION OF THE INITIAL.NOTIFICATION CONFERENCE (INC) CALL INSTRUCTIONS (EXAMPILE)

A.

INITIATING INC NOTE:

If BVERS is unavailable, go to Part B. 1 of this Attachment.

1.0 Activate Offsite Agency Initial Notification Conference (INC) Call.

"1.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked INC OR DIAL 9# 1-330-315-4380 (or from a PAX phone, dial 9-1-330-315-4380).

1.2 Interrupt the greeting by IMMEDIATELY entering XXXXXX.

1.2.1 IF unable to activate INC, GO TO PART B of this procedure.

1.3 When prompted, enter the SCENARIO NUMBER XXXXX.

1.4 When prompted, verify the SCENARIO NUMBER (9 for YES OR 6 for NO).

1.5 Verify when prompted, "You will cue SCENARIO XXXX. It will now be sent.

Are you sure this is what you want to do?" (9 for YES OR 6 for NO.

1.6 Hang up.

2.0 Access Initial Notification Conference Bridge.

2.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked CONF. Bridge OR dial 9# 724-682 1900 (OR from a PAX phone, dial 9-724-682-1900).

2.2 When prompted, enter XXXXX, then the # key.

3.0 Return to Procedure/Attachment Step in progress.

Beaver Valley Power Station

.Prcedu Num 1

er 1.

Title:

Unit:

Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

Pge Number:

28 9 4 of 86 ATTACHMENT 15 (2 of 2)

ACTIVATION OF THE INITIAL NOTIFICATION CONFERENCE (INC) CALL INSTRUCTIONS (EXAMPLE)

B.

Individual Offsite Agency Initial Notification(s).

1.0 Obtain completed Initial Notification Form from the NSS/ED or Control Room FAX machine.

2.0 Contact each required Offsite Agency per EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

3.0 Record the contact time and the name of agency representative on attachment.

4.0 STATE "This is (Your Name)

EPP Communicator".

5.0 STATE "EPP Code Word is__

6.0 Ask each agency if they received the Initial Notification.Form FAX and if it is legible.

6.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

6.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

6.3 If NO, provide information from Initial Notification Form.

7.0 Return to Procedure/Attachment Step in progress.

Beaver Valley Power Station Prceur

1. 1 "Title:

Unit:

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28 8-5 of 86 ATTACHMENT 16 (1 of 1)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR NOTIFICATION OF ERO FOR EVENT ESCALATIONS/UPDATES

1.

Open Lotus Notes. Select New Memo.

2.

In the TO: block, type

3.

In the BODY: Type time and Unit followed by a brief description of the event. Message length should be kept to less than 220 characters.

4.

Press. SEND and continue with step 10.

OR

5.

If Lotus Notes is not working, then access the internet.

6.

Go to the web site www.airtouchpaging.com and click on Send A Message.

7.

In block for Step 1, enter XXXXXXXXXX.

8.

In block for Step 2, enter text message for transient (up to 240 characters, a counter is provided).

9.

At Step 3, click on send.

10.

Call the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and provide the following information:

• Identify yourself by name

• Your position

11.

Inform Security that the ERO beepers are going to be toned out with notification of a Unit Transient.

12.

Five minutes after initial contact of CAS, call CAS again (if they have not contacted you) to verify beeper actuation.

Beaver Valley Power Station I

EPP/ip 1.1

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