High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) is a system which injects cooling water at high pressure. Similar to RCIC.
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| | Site | Start date | Title | Description |
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| ENS 58043 | Dresden | 17 November 2025 22:13:00 | HPCI Inoperable | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
At 1613 CST on November 17, 2025, it was discovered that the single train of high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) was inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The isolation condenser was operable during this time period.
There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
A fuse in the turbine stop valve circuit blew during initial system testing for unit startup. | | ENS 58036 | Fermi | 12 November 2025 17:50:00 | High Pressure Coolant Injection Inoperable | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
On November 12, 2025, at approximately 1250 EST, during surveillance testing of the high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system the HPCI minimum flow valve (E4150F012) would not open during stroke testing. HPCI had been removed from service for quarterly surveillance testing at 0957, November 12, 2025. The unplanned inoperability condition began at 1250 when a stroke time test was attempted, and the valve did not reposition. Since HPCI is a single-train safety system, this meets the criterion for event notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on loss of a single train safety system. Reactor core isolation cooling was and has remained operable. The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The failure is currently under investigation.
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Limiting conditions for operation 3.5.1 and 3.6.1.3 were entered to address HPCI inoperable. The site remains on normal offsite power, and all emergency diesel generators remain available. | | 05000296/LER-2025-002, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Inoperable Due to Failed Ramp Generating Signal Converter | Browns Ferry | 20 October 2025 | Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Inoperable Due to Failed Ramp Generating Signal Converter | | | LG-25-132, License Amendment and Alternative Request Related to One-Time Exception of Primary Containment Isolation Valve Testing | Limerick | 9 October 2025 | License Amendment and Alternative Request Related to One-Time Exception of Primary Containment Isolation Valve Testing | | | 05000259/LER-2025-001, Reactor Scram Due to Low Reactor Water Level | Browns Ferry | 30 September 2025 | Reactor Scram Due to Low Reactor Water Level | | | ML25268A178 | Hatch | 30 September 2025 | Authorization of Alternative Request RR-V-2 - Sixth Inservice Testing Interval | | | ML25268A175 | Hatch | 26 September 2025 | Authorization of Alternative Request RR-V-4 - Sixth Inservice Testing Interval | | | L-MT-25-031, Site Specific Emergency Action Level Technical Basis Documents Change | Monticello | 24 September 2025 | Site Specific Emergency Action Level Technical Basis Documents Change | | | IR 05000387/2025010 | Susquehanna | 22 September 2025 | Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection (CETI) Inspection Report 05000387/2025010 and 05000388/2025010 | | | 05000387/LER-2025-001, Manual Reactor Scram Following Partial Loss of Cooling to Main Transformer | Susquehanna | 22 September 2025 | Manual Reactor Scram Following Partial Loss of Cooling to Main Transformer | |
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