05000000/LER-1986-006, :on 860220,control Room Ventilation Isolation Signal Manually Initiated Per Tech Spec 3.3.3.1 Due to Inoperability of Control Room Intake Radiation Monitor. Caused by Improper Placement Following Maint
| Event date: | |
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| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation |
| 0001986006R00 - NRC Website | |
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-~~a aa* o m At 1429 CST on February 20, 1986, a Control Room Ventilation Isolation Signal (CRVIS) was manually initiated to satisfy the requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 due to the inoperability of Control Room intake radiation monitor CK-RE-05.
Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 requires, in part, that with an inoperable Control Room intake radiation monitor, to isolate the Control Room Ventilation System and to initiate operation of the system in the recirculation mode within one hour.
At the time of this event the unit was operating at 100 percent reactor power. Troubleshooting of CK-RE-05 required that it remain out of service for longer than one hour, and a manual CRVIS was initiated at 1429 CST.
All required Engineered Safety Features equipment responded properly except one e
Control Room Air Conditioning Unit.
This malfunction was the result of e c improper local control switch placement following maintenance activities of E'
February 16, 1986. The switches were properly positioned at 1447 CST on f
February 20.
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oE GF.-RE-05 was restored to operable status at 1913 CST, following replacement of a faulty power isolation board. The Control Room Ventilation' System was 000 restored to normal configuration at 1945 CST.
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There was no damage to plant equipment or radioactivity release as a result i
Soo of this event, and at no time was there a threat to the public health or a30 e safety.
There have been no previous similar occurrences.
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At 1439 CST on February 20, 1986, a Control Room Ventilation Isolation Signal (CRVIS) was manually initiated to satisfy the requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 due to an inoperable Control Room intake radiation monitor [VI-MON]. Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 requires, in part, that with an inoperable Control Room intake radiation monitor, within one hour isolate the Control Room Ventilation System [VI] and initiate operation of the system in the recirculation mode.
At the time of the event, the plant was in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 100 percent Reactor power.
Instrument and Control (16C) technicians had been troubleshooting Control Room intake radiation monitor GK-RE-05 to determine the reason its output could not be read on Cathode Ray Tube display [IO-CRT]
RMll in the Control Room. At 1342 CST, GK-RE-05 was placed in " BYPASS" to f acilitate the troubleshooting. When it became apparent that the troubleshooting would not be completed and the monitor returned to operable status within the one hour time f rame allowed by Technical Specifications, a manual CRVIS was initiated to satisfy the requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.3.1.
All required Engineered Safety Features (ESF) equipment responded properly to the manual CRVIS except Control Room Air Conditioning Unit [VI-ACU)
SGK04B and its associated dampers GK-HZ40A and GK-HZ40B. Redundant Unit SGK04A functioned normally. The malfunction of SGK04B was the result of mispositioned local switches on the associated refrigeration unit. At 1447 CST, the switches were placed in the proper position and SGK04B started and its dampers opened, which was the proper response to the CRVIS.
The cause of the malfunction of GK-RE-05 was subsequently determined to be a f aulty power isolation board which was replaced at approximately 1913 CST, restoring the monitor to operable status. Radiation Monitor GK-RE-05 is a Particulate, Iodine and Gas Monitor (Assembly 0356-1602), supplied by General Atomic Company. The Control Room ventilation system was restored to normal configuration at 1945 CST.
Investigations into the mispecitioning of the SGK04B switches revealed that SGK04B had been secured at approximately 0118 CST on February 16, 1986, because of a noise in the compressor and the local switches had been manipulated to pump down the ref rigeration unit.
It is believed that they were lef t in the wrong position at that time, because of a cognitive personnel error. The use of the switches to pump down the refrigeration unit is not covered in the system operating procedure. A sign at the switches provides the steps required to pump down, but it does not identify the need to return the switches to the proper position to allow the unit to properly respond to an Engineered Safety Features Actuation signal.
A sign has been placed at the switches requiring Control Room notification prior to switch manipulation and stating that the switches are Technical Specification related. Similar signs have been placed at local switches on the other air conditioning units.
In addition, this report is being added to Required Reading for operating personnel to emphasize the necessity of proper switch positioning.
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There have been no previous similar occurrences.
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KANSAS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY 9*4 E J CT C CMMn OLENN L MOESTER March 20, 1986 u m..o.., aeca..
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I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Mr. E.H. Johnson, Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV bil Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011 KMLNRC 86-048 Re:
Docket No. STN 50-482 Subj : Licensee Event Report 86-006-00 Gentlemen:
The enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv) concerning an Engineered Safety Features actuation.
Yours very truly, Glenn L. Koester Vice President - Nuclear GLK:see Enclosure DA ec: P0'Connor (2), w/a JCummins, w/a t
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